2. Why do "entities by aggregation" have their unity in our mind alone, and what does it mean to say that "such unity is based upon the relations or modes of genuine substances"?
3. Leibniz objects to the (Cartesian and Spinozistic) view that bodies are individuated by differences in extension, shape, and motion, because such an "imaginary" account fails to provide an explanation for the metaphysical force in corporeal substances that causes such motion. What does this mean?
4. How does the "fatal necessity" of even free things depend on Leibniz's claim that the predicate is always contained within the subject?
5. How is Leibniz's principle of identity the basis for his principle of sufficient reason and his principle of the identity of indiscernibles? (Of course, you should say what these principles are as you explain how they are linked to one another.)
6. How does Leibniz's idea of the "complete or perfect notion" of an individual substance rule out purely extrinsic characteristics ("denominations")?
7. How can Leibniz claim that, even though God decrees that Peter shall certainly sin or Judas be certainly damned, their actions are not necessary but free?
8. How does every individual substance express the whole universe?
9. How can substances act upon, and be acted upon by, other substances and yet not be able to exercise any "metaphysical" action on one another? And how is this seen in the relation of soul and body?
10. Why is it absurd to think that diverse parts of empty space could not be distinguished from one another by number alone? And how is this related to Leibniz's claim that there are no atoms?
11. What does Leibniz mean by saying that "extension and motion and bodies themselves, insofar as they consist in these alone, are not substances but true appearances, like rainbows and mock suns"?
12. What is the difference between necessary (i.e., "essential") and contingent (i.e., "existential") truths?