Questions on Hume: Liberty, Self

1. What justification does Hume give for claiming that "the conjunction between motives and voluntary actions is as regular and uniform as that between the cause and effect in any part of nature"? And what significance does this have for resolving the "merely verbal" disputes about human freedom (liberty)?

2. How does Hume link the two definitions of cause to his definition of necessity?

3. How does this linkage help in understanding the relation of motives or inclinations to action?

4. In terms of Hume's analysis of cause, what makes a person morally responsible for an action?

5. Why can't we say (e.g., with Descartes) that we can know (based on God's veracity) that our perceptions are caused by external objects? And why not attribute such knowledge to natural instinct?

6. Based on the Enquiry's concluding remarks about which books to "commit to the flames": how would works on theology, morality, and aesthetics fare?

7. Why can't experiences be used to show either that objects continue to exist when we do not sense them, or that they exist distinct from our minds?

8. Why can't we think of our ideas simply as representations of external objects?

9. How do the concepts of constancy and coherence function in Hume's explanation of our belief in the continued existence of external objects? And why do we suppose that objects have a continued existence apart from our experience?

10. Why don't we have a particular, simple idea of the self? What sense of self does Hume consider acceptable (at least up to his Appendix)?

11. How can nature cure us of the "philosophical melancholy" brought on by the imperfections of human reason?

12. In the Appendix to his Treatise of Human Nature, Hume says that his account of the self is defective: what is wrong with it?

13. What does it mean to say that Hume's philosophy suggests aspects of naturalism and noncognitivism?