Answers at end.

True/False (True=A; False=B)

1. Empiricism is the study of the nature, extent, origin, and justification of knowledge.

2. "Empiricism" literally means the study of knowledge.

3. Empiricism is not a legitimate "epistemological" approach, because it is not really concerned with the study of the nature, sources, and limits of knowledge.

4. To say that Locke is a representational realist means that he believes that at least some of our ideas actually represent things outside of the mind.

5. In Locke's representationalist epistemology, our ideas are said to represent things in the world that cause us to have the ideas we have.

6. Even though Locke's epistemology is called representationalism because he argues that our ideas represent things in the world, he does not believe that things in the world cause us to have any of our ideas.

7. In Locke's representationalist theory of perception, external objects in the world cause us to have ideas from which we infer the existence of things.

8. In Locke's causal theory of perception, external objects in the world cause us to have ideas from which we infer the existence of things.

9. According to Locke, we can have knowledge of innate ideas (as opposed to ideas of sense experience) because they are based on primary qualities rather than secondary qualities.

10. According to Locke, ideas of sensation and reflection are innate because they are based on primary rather than secondary qualities.

11. According to Locke's representationalist theory, our ideas of so-called primary qualities correspond to the way things are in the world, but our ideas of secondary qualities do not.

12. By referring to the mind as a tabula rasa, Locke emphasizes the empiricist position that prior to experience the mind is blank or empty.

13. According to Locke, we know about abstract general ideas like humanity or blueness because there are such general things in the world to which such ideas correspond.

14. Primary qualities, for Locke, are ideas about things (e.g., being solid, taking up space, being in motion or at rest) which resemble the way those things really are.

15.  To distinguish primary and secondary qualities, Locke assumes that we can compare those characteristics of things that exist in objects themselves with characteristics that exist only in our minds.

16. In his critique of Locke, Berkeley argues that primary qualities cannot legitimately be distinguished from secondary qualities because primary qualities depend as much on perception as do secondary qualities.

17. According to Berkeley, because we can never know anything outside of our own minds, we must conclude that there is no such thing as a real world.

18. According to Berkeley, because we can never know anything outside of our own minds, the only defensible philosophic position is solipsism.

19. For Berkeley, "To be is to be perceived or to perceive" means that the only things that are real are ideas and the minds that have those ideas.

20. Instead of saying that we often perceive what really exists, Berkeley argues that what really exists is what we or some other minds perceive.

21. In Berkeley's phenomenalism, real physical objects are nothing other than the ideas or collections of sense data that are experienced by minds.

22. Berkeley recognizes that to his claim "to be is to be perceived" he has to add "or to perceive" in order to allow for the existence of minds (which are not perceived).

23. According to Berkeley, since only a mind can actually perceive ideas, and ideas are not real things, then only minds really exist.

24. According to Hume, because our ideas are copies of sense impressions, we cannot form ideas of anything (even imaginary creatures) without drawing ultimately on sense experiences.

25. According to Hume, we know that "every event has a cause" is true because we have never experienced an event without a cause.

26. "All human beings think clearly" is an example of a tautology.

27. For Hume causal relations are properly described by means of a posteriori statements.

28. Hume notes that our knowledge that the sun will rise tomorrow is necessarily certain because "the sun will rise tomorrow" is a matter of fact, not simply a relation of ideas.

29.  David Hume argues that, because things are nothing more than clusters of ideas, there is no meaningful way to talk about an external world which causes our ideas.

30. By characterizing objects as "permanent possibilities of sensation," John Stuart Mill claims that we can never know physical objects.

31. Even though J. S. Mill describes objects as "permanent possibilities of sensation," he does not deny that physical objects exist in the world.

32. According to logical positivism, meaningful statements are either based on sense experience or tautologies.

33. According to Popper's falsifiability criterion of science, theories proven to be false must not really have been scientific in the first place.

34. Realists argue that we do not experience objects in the world through our ideas--as if our ideas were intermediaries between our minds and objects; rather, we simply experience the objects themselves.

35. Contemporary realists (e.g., Armstrong) argue that, in perceiving we encounter the world directly (not merely our ideas), even though what we perceive is always interpreted by the mind.

36. Unlike the representationalist or phenomenalist, the commonsense or direct realist claims that the immediate object of perception exists independently of our awareness of it.

37. According to naive or commonsense realism, minds and ideas are not real because they are not immediate physical objects of perception.

38. According to G. E. Moore, it is acceptable to say that we know that there is an external world (outside of our ideas) even if it is logically possible that we could be dreaming or hallucinating.

39. According to G. E. Moore, it is logically impossible (i.e., inconceivable) that we could be dreaming or hallucinating when we claim to know that there is an external world (i.e., outside of our ideas).

40. Contemporary realists argue that, even though all we ever know are our ideas, we still can justifiably claim to know what the external world is like because things in the world cause us to have ideas.

41. According to cognitive realists (or "correspondence theorists") such as Bertrand Russell, a proposition is true if it corresponds to a fact that exists independently of its being thought by anyone.

42. Because cognitive realists and cognitive relativists differ on what it means to say that a statement is true, they would also differ on which statements are true and which are false.

43. Though traditional and contemporary realists disagree about the details about how we perceive the world, they agree nonetheless that what we perceive is the world itself and not merely our ideas.

44. Academic skepticism is the philosophic position that claims that nothing exists.

45. According to realist critics of skepticism (e.g., Moore), there is no way that we can really know whether there is an external world.

46. Mathematical propositions (e.g., 7+5=12) are known a priori because their truth or falsity can be known without having to appeal to sense experience.

47. "Unicorns have horns" is not an analytic proposition because unicorns do not exist.

48. "Bachelors are fun-loving people" is a synthetic proposition because the predicate is contained in the subject.

49. Because empiricists emphasize sense experience as the basis for our knowledge of the world, they interpret all propositions as synthetic a priori propositions.

50. Kant claims that our knowledge about things in the world depends on how the mind structures experience.

51. Even though Kant agrees with the rationalists that the mind brings something to experience and is not a blank slate (tabula rasa), he agrees with the empiricists that knowledge depends also on experience.

52. According to Kant, all synthetic a priori judgments are false.

53. According to Kant, we know that all actual and possible experienced events (even future events) have causes because that is the way that our minds structure experience.

54. According to Kant, synthetic a priori propositions are true because the predicates of such propositions are not contained in the subjects of those propositions.

55. Because a priori propositions are known to be true or false prior to experience, they are similar to analytic propositions, since analytic propositions are true or false based solely on definitions.

56. According to the correspondence theory of truth (such as that adopted by Russell), only facts are true.

57. According to the correspondence theory of truth, a statement is true if it is consistent with our other beliefs.

58. According to the correspondence theory of truth, a proposition is true if it is consistent with our other beliefs, even if those beliefs do not represent or match facts in the world.

59.  A statement is true, according to the coherence theory of truth, if it is consistent with facts in the world that are independent of our beliefs.

60. According to the coherence theory, the truth of a proposition consists in its coherence with other beliefs or propositions.

61. According to the coherence theory of truth, a statement is true if it is consistent with facts in the world that are independent of our beliefs.

62. Because they differ on what it means to say that a statement is true, a coherence theorist and a pragmatist would also differ on which statements are true and which are false.

63. In William James' pragmatic theory of truth, a belief is validated, verified, or produces satisfactory results—in short, it works—because it describes the way things really are.

64. In the pragmatic theory of truth developed by James and Dewey, a belief is true because it "works" or produces expected results.

65. According to James's pragmatism, a proposition is true if, when acted upon, it satisfies our expectations.

66. According to Rorty, to say that a proposition is true means that we have no reason to doubt it.

67. According to cognitive relativism, agreement about what is true--what Rorty calls social solidarity--is achievable because truth is independent of human beings.
 

Multiple Choice

68. Aristotle says that what makes things be what they are--their essence--does not exist apart from individuals that exist in the world. So if all the members of a species were destroyed, then their essence or form:
 (a) would likewise be destroyed.
 (b) would be destroyed only if there were no one around to remember the species.
 (c) would continue existing (as with Plato's Forms) in some other realm of being.
 (d) would not be destroyed because there was no essence or form originally to be destroyed; there are only individuals, not universal essences or natures of things.

69. Empiricists charge that if claims of knowledge are limited to things we know with logical certainty, we will never be able to know anything about existing things in the world, because:
 (a) the actual existence of things in the world is known only through experience, not reason.
 (b) simply by thinking or reasoning we can know specifically which things exist and how.
 (c) things in the world cannot be known to exist unless they exist previously in some mind.
 (d) the existence of things depends on their having been created by some prior cause, God.

70. According to empiricists, even though the kind of information provided by analytic a priori propositions is indubitable, it is not very useful in expanding our knowledge about the world, because:
  (a) the world is nothing other than what we experience it to be.
  (b) such propositions are concerned with the world as it is in itself, not with how we experience the world.
  (c) any information provided by such propositions is ultimately based on someone's personal experience.
  (d) such propositions are true (or false) by definition and do not describe any facts about the world.

71. In his assault on innate ideas, Locke notes that some thinkers argue that maybe all people (including children) have such innate ideas but simply are not aware of knowing such truths.  To this particular point Locke responds:
 (a) it makes no sense to say that we know something that we do not know.
 (b) even children know what they know only by means of experience.
 (c) even if all people agreed about a belief, that would not necessarily make it innate.
 (d) because we should limit our assent to the evidence, we should believe in innate ideas only to the extent that we have evidence for them.

72. In calling the mind a "tabula rasa," Locke wants to emphasize that all knowledge, even knowledge of mathematical truths, is based on solely on:
 (a) innate ideas.
 (b) experience.
 (c) formal training or education.
 (d) language.

73. "The particular bulk, number, figure, and motion of the parts of fire or snow are really in them, whether anyone's senses perceive them or not; and therefore they may be called real qualities, because they really exist in those bodies.  But light, heat, whiteness, or coldness, are no more really in them than sickness or pain is in manna [bread]."  In this passage Locke locates the distinction between primary and secondary qualities in the difference between:
 (a) the parts of bodies that we cannot sense and the parts that we can sense.
 (b) qualities of bodies that exist independently of sensation and qualities that rely on sensation.
 (c) the power to perceive things in our own bodies and the power to perceive things in other bodies.
 (d) those qualities that no one ever perceives and those qualities that we always perceive.

74. Substance, Locke claims, is that "I know not what" in which the primary qualities of a thing inhere.  Without assuming the existence of substance and primary qualities, Locke would not be able to conclude that his knowledge is in any way:
 (a) the same as the knowledge that God has in coordinating events in the universe.
 (b) the same as the knowledge that God has in ordering our sense data into specific things.
 (c) the same as other people have when they have his experiences.
 (d) based or grounded in a reality apart from experience.

75. In his critique of Locke, Berkeley notes that primary qualities (e.g., solidity, extension, motion/rest) cannot legitimately be distinguished from secondary qualities (e.g., colors, scents, sounds) because:
  (a) primary qualities exist in the mind of God, whereas secondary qualities exist only in human minds.
  (b) primary qualities of things are known a posteriori, whereas secondary qualities are known a priori.
  (c) neither primary nor secondary qualities exist in any mind (finite or infinite).
  (d) primary qualities depend for their existence as much on minds as do secondary qualities.

76. For Locke, all knowledge is based on ideas which represent things that really exist outside the mind and which cause our experiences.  The problem with this "representational realism," Berkeley notes, is that:
  (a) it suggests that the only thing that really exists is my own mind.
  (b) it assumes things outside our minds as causes of our ideas even though we know only our ideas.
  (c) it fails to indicate whether knowledge of things in the world are known a posteriori or a priori.
  (d) it suggests that our knowledge of the world is really based on innate ideas instead of mental images.

77. Berkeley writes, "I ask whether those supposed originals or external things, of which our ideas are the pictures or representations, be themselves perceivable or not?"  In answering this question, he concludes that really existing things must be ideas, because:
  (a) external things are perceivable and the only things that are perceivable are ideas.
  (b) ideas are caused in us by the external things ("supposed originals") that our ideas represent.
  (c) God cannot perceive ideas because he cannot perceive our minds.
  (d) to say that something exists means that it is perceivable, not that it is perceived (even by God).

78. Berkeley suggests that his theory prevents the skeptic from denying the existence of God, because in Berkeley's philosophy the existence of God is necessary to show why:
 (a) we feel that something external to us causes us to have particular perceptions.
 (b) the skeptical attitude towards knowledge undermines the doctrine of secondary qualities but not that of primary qualities.
 (c) the laws of nature are human generalizations of our experiences.
 (d) our interest in perception is one which has a religious or theological character.

79. According to Berkeley, even if you and I do not have the same mental experiences when we think "red," we are still able to agree on what red is because:
 (a) as a secondary quality, the color red is something that is purely private and individual.
 (b) we learn to associate our experiences with words that we agree upon intersubjectively.
 (c) we in fact do have the same mental experience, even if we don't know it.
 (d) red is a simple idea, whereas redness is an abstract idea.

80. Instead of saying that we often perceive what really exists, Berkeley argues that:
 (a) what really exists is what we or some other minds perceive.
 (b) that which really perceives is all that really exists.
 (c) that which is perceived is that which does the perceiving.
 (d) we seldom perceive what really exists; when we do, we do not recognize it as such.

81. Berkeley expands his definition of the meaning of real things to include perceivers as well as things perceived because:
 (a) we can perceive our own minds but not the minds of others.
 (b) God perceives those things which no other minds perceive.
 (c) we can perceive each others' minds but not our own.
 (d) nothing can be perceived without its being perceived by some mind(s).

82. Plato's objective idealism differs from Berkeley's subjective idealism in that:
  (a) for Plato, ideas or Forms are real; for Berkeley, ideas are mere fictions and therefore unreal.
  (b) for Plato, ideas or Forms exist outside of minds; for Berkeley, ideas exist only in minds.
  (c) for Plato, ideas or Forms are immaterial entities; for Berkeley, ideas are material entities.
  (d) for Plato, ideas or Forms are conceptual generalizations; for Berkeley, ideas are spiritual or immaterial copies of spiritual realities.

83. If all I ever know is that I exist and have ideas, but cannot be sure about whether those ideas refer to anything outside of myself, then I am trapped in my own consciousness.  Such a position is referred to as:
 (a) conceptualism.
 (b) phenomenalism.
 (c) solipsism.
 (d) representational realism.

84. "There is no question of importance whose decision is not comprised in the science of man; and there is none which can be decided with any certainty before we become acquainted with that science."  Here Hume notes that since everything is known through our ideas and reasoning, then:
  (a) an empiricist epistemology is better than a rationalist epistemology insofar as empiricism gives us knowledge of the world and rationalism gives us knowledge of ourselves.
  (b) by acknowledging that certainty is unachievable, we show the fruitlessness of trying to develop a philosophy of human nature.
  (c) to know anything about human nature with any certainty, we first have to know about the world apart from our ideas and processes of reasoning.
  (d) by understanding human nature (which includes how our ideas of things are ordered), we can understand everything that is knowable.

85. Hume points out that, if all knowledge is based on experience, then our knowledge that every event has a cause has to be based on our experience of every event.  But since we have not had experiences of future events nor even of every past event, how can we be sure that all events (including future events) will have causes?  Hume's answer:
  (a) since we know that past events will be like future events, we can be sure they will all have causes.
  (b) we can't be sure: all we do is "imagine" events will have causes, we develop that habit or custom.
  (c) it is impossible even to imagine an event without imagining it as having had a specific kind of cause.
  (d) we know with certainty (innately) that no future or past events ever had causes.

86. According to Hume, we will never be able to know anything about whether there is a world outside of our ideas which causes those ideas because:
  (a) all of our ideas are based on sense impressions, and we have no way of comparing those impressions with their supposed external causes.
  (b) ideas are copies of sense impressions, and since the external world is itself a copy of an ideal world in our minds, we can never know what the external world is like.
  (c) the world outside of our ideas causes those ideas only in regard to "matters of fact" and not in regard to "relations of ideas."
  (d) the external world is the realm of matter, selves, and freedom--which are all unknowable because we have only sensible impressions of them but not ideas.

87. According to Hume, I cannot know (or predict with any certainty or high probability) that things in the future will occur in particular ways, because:
  (a) the future will not resemble the past: that is what distinguishes the future from the past.
  (b) I have no experience on which to base the claim that the future will resemble the past.
  (c) knowledge of the future would require an infinite intellect; for Hume, only God knows the future.
  (d) to have an idea of the future, I would have to have an idea of my future self (which is impossible).

88. According to Hume, I do not have an idea of my self as anything other than the bundle of my perceptions or ideas, because whenever I think of my self, all I ever perceive are:
  (a) ideas of my self, not the impressions or perceptions on which those ideas are based.
  (b) randomly arranged impressions or perceptions, not some person having those impressions.
  (c) patterns of neuro-physiological activity, but not the behaviors that result from that activity.
  (d) acts of self-consciousness, which are themselves conscious of themselves being self-conscious, and they in turn are self-conscious, in an endless regress.

89. Hume's analysis of cause and effect undermines any claim to know that our ideas are caused by things in the world, because (according to Hume):
  (a) even though we cannot know that our ideas are caused by things in the world, we can at least believe that things in the world cause our ideas.
  (b) even if I can know what it is that I am experiencing at a particular moment, that does not mean that what I am experiencing actually exists in the world as the cause of that experience or idea.
  (c) we have no experience of any necessary connection between ideas and the things outside of our ideas that supposedly cause them.
  (d) the very notion of cause is unintelligible because it is not based on any sense experience.

90. Classical empiricism exhibits a repeated use of Occam's Razor: Locke says that we know external objects only indirectly through ideas that are caused by objects.  Berkeley denies that external objects exist at all, claiming that real things are ideas caused in our minds by God.  Hume goes even further in saying that:
  (a) external objects are created by God in such a way so as to make us have ideas of them.
  (b) God creates us so that there are minds that can be caused to think about external objects.
  (c) our minds are structured in a way that makes us think that God causes us to have ideas.
  (d) even the claim that God causes our ideas is not justified because cause itself is questionable.

91. Which of the following IS NOT a typical objection raised by critics against Locke's or Hume's empiricism?
  (a) Our experience is a web of beliefs, not a collection of discrete experiences.
  (b) Ideas are not intermediaries through which we experience things; we experience things themselves.
  (c) Knowledge of the world, including ideas of cause-effect and the self, is ultimately based on experience.
  (d) Our natural inclinations are as philosophically respectable as sense experience or truths by definition.

92. In his version of cognitive relativism, Richard Rorty suggests that instead of trying to discover some truth "out there," we should recognize that by truth we mean:
  (a) what we as members of a society mutually agree on, not some independent facts about the world.
  (b) our personal beliefs, regardless of what others in our society or those in other societies believe.
  (c) a set of beliefs that are supported by a theory or an explanation.
  (d) a set of facts about the world that would exist even if we did not exist.

93. Critics of Hume's skepticism acknowledge that there is always a purely logical or theoretical possibility that our so-called knowledge of the external world is unjustified.  But for such critics (e.g., Moore, Malcolm) that is irrelevant, because to say that we know things about the external world simply means that:
  (a) we have no good reason to doubt what we believe and cannot imagine really being wrong about it.
  (b) even if we were wrong about we know, we would not realize it and so it would not matter.
  (c) we believe that what we claim to know is based on all the other things we believe about the world.
  (d) our doubts about what we know about the world are based solely on weak (vs. strong) beliefs.

94. According to Logical Positivists, only those statements that can be tested by experience or are true by definition are meaningful.  The most that one would be able to say about ethical or religious claims would be:
 (a) they report on how we feel about something, but they do not express any truth.
 (b) such claims may be true or false; it's just that we may not know whether our beliefs are justified.
 (c) they are purely logical truths--that is, truths of reason (or by definition), not matters of fact.
 (d) they have meaning insofar as they provide the hypothetical or theoretical bases for thought.

95. According to positivists (also known sometimes as phenomenalists), the meaning of a sentence consists in its being either a tautology or understandable in terms of past or predicted sense experiences.  In other words, a sentence (like "God exists") is meaningful only if:
 (a) for the person who utters it, the sentence has meaning, regardless of what others think.
 (b) it represents the truth, even if we don't know which experiences to believe.
 (c) it is true by definition or is testable by appeal to sense experience.
 (d) it expresses a belief that is innate, known to all rational beings.

96. Positivists (also known sometimes as phenomenalists) claim that physical things are simply constructs of sense data that we talk about in ways different from those things that we identify as mental or spiritual things.  Specifically, to say that a thing is a physical object means that:
 (a) it is proper to speak about the thing in terms of dimensionality, size, and shape.
 (b) the thing's primary qualities (extension, shape, and solidity) do not depend on the mind.
 (c) appearances of the thing, even in hallucinations or dreams, must be accepted as real.
 (d) claims about it are ultimately understandable as being tautologies.

97. According to the psychological atomism implicit in logical positivism, our knowledge of the world is built up from discrete sensory impressions.  However, as Gestalt theorists point out, perceptions are not simply isolated sense data, because perceptions--indeed, all experiences--are intelligible in virtue of:
 (a) other equally isolated sense data that are themselves innate ideas.
 (b) whether ideas are caused by material substances in the world or by God directly.
 (c) logical constructs of neutral (neither mental nor physical) sense experiences.
 (d) the linguistic background or social field of expectations by which they are identified.

98. Rorty's critique of positivism ("phenomenalism") is based on his rejection of the presupposition that knowledge requires a foundation in either innate ideas or sense data.  Instead of thinking of knowledge as a relation between a belief and a fact about the world, we should think of knowledge (he claims) as a relation between:
 (a) what we think we know and what we actually do know.
 (b) a belief and the social, historical arguments given to support it.
 (c) our sense perceptions and our innate ideas.
 (d) the way the mind organizes experiences according to the surface grammar of language and the way that language itself is structured by the deep grammar of neurology.

99. By combining rationalism and empiricism, Kant says we can explain how knowledge is possible in this way:
  (a) sense data provide us with the content of knowledge, the categories of reason organize that content.
  (b) categories of reason provide us with sense data, which are then organized either mentally or physically.
  (c) analytic truths are a priori, synthetic truths are a posteriori.
  (d) knowledge must be understood as a web of constantly changing beliefs, not a static collection of ideas.

100. According to Kant, the way to respond to Hume's critique of causality is to show that certainty about propositions like "every event has a cause" is possible in virtue of the fact that:
  (a) our experience of events itself is caused by something apart from all experience.
  (b) the "law" of causality (every event has a cause) is merely an inductive generalization.
  (c) even though every "effect" has a cause, not every "event" has a cause.
  (d) the mind (reason) structures all (even future) experiences in determinate, unchanging ways.

101. In order to avoid Hume's conclusion that we cannot know that things in the future will always have causes, Kant argues that we know that all events in the future will have causes because:
  (a) our belief that future events will have causes is so strong that it alone is sufficient to guarantee that future events will, in fact, have causes.
  (b) all minds are organized in such a way that, in order for events (including future events) to be experienced at all, they must always be experienced as having a cause.
  (c) cause-and-effect is a law of nature independent of human experience; regardless of whether we or any other minds experience them, events in the future will have causes.
  (d) future events themselves are caused by past and present events; so we know that if future events occur at all, they will have been caused by something.

102. Kant's critics claim that, if we know things in the world only insofar as they are experienced (as phenomena) and not as they are in themselves, we will never know if our ideas really describe the world.  His reply:
  (a) we can know with certainty even things supposedly beyond our sense experience (e.g., God, soul).
  (b) reason is not limited to any one set of categories; we can always choose another culture's categories.
  (c) "the world" is what we really experience; to think that there is something else is a mistake.
  (d) our knowledge depends not on experience but on the particular language games of our culture.

103. Kant joins elements of empiricism and rationalism by suggesting that, in addition to synthetic a posteriori propositions and analytic a priori propositions, there is a third kind of proposition that provides knowledge, namely, synthetic a priori propositions (such as "every event has a cause").  In this third kind of proposition:
  (a) the predicate is contained in the subject, and the truth of the proposition is known only by appealing to experience.
  (b) the predicate is not contained in the subject, and the truth of the proposition is known only by appealing to experience.
  (c) the predicate is contained in the subject, and the truth of the proposition is not known by appealing to experience.
  (d) the predicate is not contained in the subject, and the truth of the proposition is not known by appealing to experience.

104. According to critics of foundationalist epistemology (like Richard Rorty), evidence for one's beliefs can be conclusive without being necessarily conclusive or based on some indubitable (undoubtable) principle such as Descartes' cogito.  That is, it is sometimes legitimate to say that we "know" something even when:
 (a) we don't believe it.
 (b) what we know is not based on any evidence.
 (c) all evidence contradicts our belief.
 (d) we might still be wrong.

105. The three standard theories of truth discussed in epistemology are the correspondence, coherence, and pragmatic theories.  Which of the following descriptions DOES NOT match any one of these three?
  (a) A belief is true if, when acted upon, it results in the satisfaction of expectations.
  (b) A belief is true if it is consistent with other beliefs we hold.
  (c) A belief is true if it describes the way the world is.
  (d) A belief is true if a person really wants it to be true.

106.  In the correspondence theory of truth, the proposition "There is a desk in this room" is true only if:
 (a) I think there is a desk in this room.
 (b) it is reasonable to think that there is a desk in this room.
 (c) there is a desk in this room.
 (d) if I try to sit on what I think is the desk, it will support me.

107. According to Russell, to say whether two propositions are coherent, we have to determine whether they are consistent with one another according to laws of logic.  But laws of logic (e.g., the law of contradiction, which says that something cannot be and not be at the same time) must themselves be true based on facts, not on their coherence with other beliefs, because:
  (a) a set of propositions could be coherent with one another even though the whole set is false.
  (b) apart from such laws, we would be unable to tell whether or not two beliefs are coherent.
  (c) the truth of a proposition depends on how well it is consistent with or "coheres" with other beliefs.
  (d) although laws of logic are not true or false, they define truth and falsity by identifying facts.

108. Critics charge that the coherence theory of truth is unable to explain falsehood, because if truth is defined as the coherence of a proposition or belief with other propositions or beliefs, then are not all coherent systems of belief true?  That is, if a belief is true because it is consistent with other beliefs in a system, then:
  (a) how do we tell whether a proposition is inconsistent with other beliefs in that same system?
  (b) can't a belief be false and yet the whole system with which it is consistent still be true?
  (c) why can't judgments that are consistent with many other beliefs still be false within the same system of beliefs?
  (d) couldn't the whole set of consistent beliefs be false?

109. According to the coherence theory of truth, a proposition is true if it is consistent with a set of mutually supporting propositions.  Critics (e.g., Russell) claim that this means that false propositions could be considered true as long as they are consistent with other propositions in a whole set of false propositions.  The coherence theorist replies to this criticism this way:
  (a) just because one proposition in a set of propositions is false, that does not mean that the whole set of propositions is false.
  (b) a proposition is false only if it is inconsistent with other propositions.
  (c) a set of propositions cannot be internally consistent without also being consistent with all other sets of propositions.
  (d) to say that a whole set of propositions is false is simply to say that the set is inconsistent with a larger set of propositions.

110. Against those who attempt to discover some all-inclusive (capital T) Truth "out there," Richard Rorty and other critics of foundationalist epistemology suggest that by truth we should mean instead:
  (a) what we as members of a society mutually agree on, not some independent facts about the world.
  (b) what we know in virtue of the unchanging a priori (innate) ideas implicit in reasoning itself.
  (c) a set of beliefs that are based on indubitable (undoubtable) principles.
  (d) a set of facts about the world that would exist even if we did not exist.
 

Answers:
 

1.  B 2.  B 3.  B 4.  A 5.  A 6.  B 7.  A 8.  A 9.  B 10.  B 11.  A 12.  A 13.  B 14.  A 15.  A 16.  A 17.  B 18.  B

19.  A 20.  A 21.  A 22.  A 23.  B 24.  A 25.  B 26.  B 27.  A 28.  B 29.  A 30.  B 31.  A 32.  A 33.  B 34.  A 35.  A 36.  A

37.  B 38.  A 39.  B 40.  B 41.  A 42.  B 43.  A 44.  B 45.  B 46.  A 47.  B 48.  B 49.  B 50.  A 51.  A 52.  B 53.  A 54.  B

55.  A 56.  B 57.  B 58.  B 59.  B 60.  A 61.  B 62.  B 63.  B 64.  A 65.  A 66.  A 67.  B 68.  A 69.  A 70.  D 71.  A 72.  B 73.  B

74.  D 75.  D 76.  B 77.  A 78.  A 79.  B 80.  A 81.  D 82.  B 83.  C 84.  D 85.  B 86.  A 87.  B 88.  B 89.  C 90.  D 91.  C 92.  A

93.  A 94.  A 95.  C 96.  A 97.  D 98.  B 99.  A 100.  D 101.  B 102.  C 103.  D 104.  D 105.  D 106.  C 107.  B 108.  D 109.  D 110.  A