True/False (True=A; False=B)

1.  According to determinism, all actions except for truly human (free) actions are events that have specific causes for why they happen the way they do.

2.  The freedom-determinism question is a metaphysical issue insofar as it acknowledges that there might be a difference between how human behavior appears and how it really is.

3.  Determinists believe that human behavior can be explained only if we think of it in the same law-governed ways in which we think of other things in nature.

4.  Determinists claim that, even though we think we are free to act in different ways, we are nonetheless determined to act exactly as we do because every event (including human actions) is caused.

5.  According to determinists, human actions are determined to occur in exactly the way they do because they (like all other events) have specific causes.

6.  Determinists acknowledge that, if there were actions that could be explained only in terms of intentions and purposes, then those actions could be considered free; but, in fact, there are no such actions.

7.  In hard determinism, freedom and determinism are incompatible because freedom would require that an action be uncaused.

8.  According to hard determinists like Skinner and Freud, even though people may be responsible for their actions, they should not be held responsible for their actions, because no one is ultimately free.

9.  B. F. Skinner claims that positive reinforcement is more effective in conditioning human behavior than negative reinforcement because human beings naturally seek happiness.

10.  Skinner argues that, even though environment or conditioning are causes that determine our behavior, they cannot explain our behavior because they are not the reasons why we act as we do.

11.  Hard determinism proposes that human beings cannot do what they want to do.

12.  Determinists argue that while most human choices and actions are caused to occur in exactly the way they do, the recognition that we are determined is itself uncaused and thus undetermined.

13.  According to hard determinists, no human action is free, but human choices are free.

14.  Even though Freud is a hard determinist, he does admit that some acts are done freely if they are caused by unconscious drives, repressed memories, or anti-social urges.

15.  In Freudian psychoanalysis, impulses, memories, desires, and fears may determine our unconscious behavior, but on the level of consciousness (the ego) we are free to act any way we want.

16.  According to the soft determinist, a "free" action is caused by one's will or choice rather than by external forces, influences, or constraints.

17.  Soft determinists claim that human actions can be free and determined at the same time.

18.  Soft determinists allow for the possibility of freedom by arguing, against hard determinists, that some of our actions (i.e., the free ones) do not have causes.

19.  Soft determinists are sometimes called "compatibilists" because they argue that saying that human acts are free can be compatible with saying that all human acts are caused or determined.

20.  Compatibilists argue that we act freely or voluntarily when our action is based on our choices.

21.  Compatibilists suggest that, even though kleptomaniacs cannot help stealing, they are free insofar as they think that they do not have to steal.

22.  Compatibilists claim that actions that are caused by someone's internal neurotic impulses are free because such impulses are part of one's personality.

23.  Because soft determinists (as opposed to hard determinists) believe that some of our actions are free, they acknowledge that some of our actions are not caused or determined by anything.

24.  Soft determinists claim that acting "freely" means acting as a result of choosing--that is, according to what one wills to do.

25.  According to soft determinists ("compatibilists"), a human action is free only if nothing causes it.

26.  Compatibilists argue that we can justifiably be held responsible only for those acts that are done voluntarily (that is, that result from our choosing to do them).

27.  Soft determinists (i.e., compatibilists) claim that people are free when, for example, they can do what they want.

28.  For compatibilists the key to the freedom debate lies in recognizing that, even though all our actions may be determined, our choices or decisions are not.

29.  Contemporary compatibilists claim that, even if we are able to do what we want, we might still not be free if what we think we want is not what we would truly want if we were properly informed.

30.  In the Stoic, Spinozistic version of soft determinism, acknowledging that we are completely determined "frees" us from worry that things could have been otherwise.

31.  In Hume's soft determinism, freedom and determinism are compatible because they are necessarily the causes of one another.

32.  Passive soft (or self-) determinists claim that freedom means being able to do what one wants to do and to determine what one wants.

33.  Hard and soft determinists disagree about whether we are free, but they agree that all our actions have causes.

34.  Hume claims that rewarding or punishing a person requires that we accept determinism insofar as we assume actions are caused by the person doing the act.

35.  Though determinists and indeterminists disagree on how to understand freedom, they agree that the way to study the issue is by focusing on the causes of acts rather than the reasons for which acts are done.

36.  Like both hard and soft determinists, indeterminists claim that the issue of whether human actions are free should focus on determining how or even if actions have causes.

37.  Like hard and soft determinists, indeterminists argue that truly free actions are chance or random events.

38.  Indeterminists claim that insofar as nothing causes human actions, those actions are free.

39.  According to indeterminists, "free" actions are events that have no cause at all.

40.  According to indeterminists, free actions are not determined or accounted for by either causes or reasons.

41.  Because soft determinism is a version of indeterminism, it cannot be used to support any theory of punishment that assumes that people are free.

42.  Indeterminists argue that a "free" person does things that a causally-determined person could not do.

43.  According to indeterminists, certain human acts are chance events--that is, specific causes do not determine them: they could have occurred otherwise.

44.  Indeterminists and libertarians agree that what makes an action free is the fact that nothing causes or determines it to occur in exactly the way it happens.

45.  For libertarians real freedom consists in being able to act or choose differently in exactly the same circumstances and with exactly the same causal influences.

46.  Libertarians claim that our experience of deliberation, spontaneous action, and moral responsibilty indicates that some of our actions are not determined or caused by forces over which we have no control.

47.  According to libertarians, a free will (as opposed to a free act) is an ability to choose that is not determined by antecedent causes.

48.  According to the agency or person theory of freedom, since a free act cannot be caused by anything (not even by an agent or person), there is no such thing as a free act.

49.  According to the version of libertarianism called active self-determinism, we are able to criticize ourselves because "we" as subjects make choices about the kind of person we become.

50.  Sartre argues that a person is ultimately free to act in the way she chooses, no matter what her personal inclinations or how she was raised.

51.  According to Sartre, to be existentially free means to be able to do or be anything, and to interpret the world in any way, regardless of our training or upbringing.

52.  According to Sartre, the choice to believe that we are not free and that we are determined by forces over which we have no control is itself a free choice.

53.  If, as Sartre's existentialism claims, "man is responsible for his passion," then no matter what we as human beings do, we act either against our wills or out of scorn for God.

54.  Though he says that we are "condemned to be free" and that we can "transcend" our social or personal situation, Sartre acknowledges that we are not always responsible for what we do.

55.  By saying that we are "condemned to be free," Sartre indicates how existentialism treats human beings as determined by external forces.

56.  According to Sartre, bad faith is self-contradictory because it involves the free choice by an individual to believe that he is not free.

57.  For Sartre, belief in God permits individuals to depend on a standard of morality for which they are not responsible and for which they are not accountable.

58.  According to Sartre, real freedom requires that there must be no God, because if God exists and is the creator of everything in the world (including humans), then we are not free to choose the kind of beings we become.

59.  In saying that "existence precedes essence," Sartre means that human beings are free to choose even not to act in any way whatsoever.

60.  In saying that for humans "existence precedes essence," Sartre emphasizes how the external conditions of our existence (e.g., our genetic make-up or social conditioning) determines how we act.

61.  In Sartre's existentialism, to think that our actions are determined by our human nature or essence is bad faith.

62.  According to Sartre, since human beings are no specific kinds of things at all, their essential value is determined by how they are viewed and revered by their parents.

63.  Unlike Sartre, Simone de Beauvoir argues that a person is ultimately free to act in the way she chooses, no matter how she was raised or how social (e.g., gender) relations are structured.

64.  Like the existentialist, the person who embodies perverse freedom challenges religious or moral values by acting in "bad faith."

65.  To be insane is to be perversely free.

66.  To be free to do something can mean either to be free from restraints that interfere with the satisfaction of a desire or to have the ability to achieve some desired end, or perhaps both.
 

Multiple Choice

67.  According to determinism, human choices and actions are like all other events in the universe, insofar as:
  (a) they are determined by specific causes to occur in exactly the way they do.
  (b) they have causes that are ultimately outside of nature (for example, God or fate) and therefore cannot be affected by human behavior.
  (c) we never have any idea about what causes them.
  (d) there is really nothing that ultimately causes them: they just "happen."

68.  Determinism differs from predestination and fatalism insofar as it explains human behavior in terms of:
  (a) causes, not reasons.     (c) natural events, not supernatural events.
  (b) actions, not choices.    (d) the past, not the future.

69.  According to proponents of hard determinism (e.g., Holbach), we think we are free (though really we are not) because:
  (a) we do not know the causes of our actions and thus assume our actions have no causes.
  (b) the causes of our actions are so complex that there really isn't any cause for our actions.
  (c) the choices we make are themselves uncaused, though actions based on the choices are determined.
  (d) everything that exists naturally is causally determined (including our thinking we are free).

70.  Determinists argue that, even though we think we are free to act in different ways, we are nonetheless determined to act as we do because every event (including human actions) has a determining cause.  Critics object that this way of thinking about cause does not necessarily support determinism.  Which of the following IS NOT an objection against determinism based on a critique of our understanding of causality?
  (a) Because we have not experienced all events, we cannot conclude that every event has a cause.
  (b) Though we regularly experience the conjunction of some events with other events, we cannot say that their connection is necessary, because we do not experience how they are bound to one another.
  (c) Though our minds may be structured in a way that requires us to experience things in the world as related causally, that does not mean that things in the world are actually related causally.
  (d) If people really are determined to act as they do (and thus are not free), then we cannot legitimately hold them responsible for their actions.

71.  Hard determinists claim that, because all human actions are events and all events have determining causes, all human actions are determined (i.e., not free).  However, people mistakenly think they are free for a number of reasons.  Which of the following IS NOT a reason typically given by determinists to explain this mistake?
  (a) We think that if people are not free, they cannot be justifiably held responsible for their actions.
  (b) We don't know all of the determining causes of our behavior.
  (c) We want to explain everything (including our behavior) in terms of laws of nature.
  (d) We like to believe we are different from the rest of nature.

72.  According to hard determinists such as Skinner, if human behavior is determined by causes, then it makes no sense to say that people are responsible for their actions.  But this does not imply that we are unjustified in holding someone responsible for their actions, since:
  (a) it is unfair to blame or praise someone for an action that he or she could not have chosen to do otherwise.
  (b) we are justifiably held responsible only for those actions for which we are responsible.
  (c) by holding someone responsible for an action, we cause the person to become more free (and thus to be more responsible) in the future.
  (d) holding someone responsible for an action can fulfill a social or political purpose even if the person could not have done otherwise.

73.  Hard determinists argue that, just because people are not responsible for their actions, that does not mean that the rest of us can't hold them responsible for their actions.  They argue that by holding people responsible for their actions (e.g., through rewards, punishments, or psychological treatment), we:
  (a) are acting in an admittedly unjust and unfair manner, but that is what society dictates we must do.
  (b) respect people's freedom to act in any way whatsoever and give them what they deserve.
  (c) can exert other conditioning forces so that their lives are modified to be more useful and happy.
  (d) recognize that eros and thanatos cannot completely overwhelm our socially-instilled conscience (the super-ego) and the reality principle.

74.  Theories of freedom and theories of punishment focus attention on the differences between being responsible and being held responsible for our actions.  In this regard, the theory of deterrence presumes a theory of hard determinism, insofar as (in deterrence) the purpose of punishment is:
  (a) to protect the society from dangerous individuals who freely choose to threaten others.
  (b) to change behavior by holding someone responsible even though he or she could not have done otherwise.
  (c) to hold responsible only those individuals who are responsible for their actions.
  (d) to deter individuals from unacceptable acts if they are responsible, and to indicate how they can learn to hold themselves responsible.

75.  According to the hard determinist, human actions and choices, like everything else, are events that have specific and determining causes.  As to why people still believe in the "illusion" of freedom, the hard determinist gives a number of explanations.  Which of the following IS NOT one of those explanations?
  (a) People think that if they are like all other (determined) things in the universe, then they will no longer be able to claim any privileged moral or spiritual status.
  (b) People insist that they sometimes act without knowing why they do what they do.
  (c) People believe that while external forces (such as environment, upbringing, or genetics) can influence their behavior, such forces do not determine it.
  (d) People are ignorant of the complex influences and causes that determine their actions and choices.

76.  If human beings are products of their environment and conditioning (as Skinner claims), how can they be held responsible for their actions (if they were not "free" to have done otherwise)?
  (a) It only seems that people are not free; in fact, they can change their behavior if they really want to, if they truly set their minds to it.
  (b) Even though human nature is determined genetically, we can take responsibility for our own genetic natures by affirming them as our own and taking credit for our actions.
  (c) Holding someone responsible for an action means reinforcing desirable behavior--not as a reward for past actions but to cause someone to act in desirable ways in the future.
  (d) The task of deterministic psychology is to recognize how the concepts of freedom and dignity have contributed to an improvement in the human condition by changing behaviors.

77.  Which IS NOT a typical objection raised against Skinner's behavioristic form of hard determinism?
  (a) Behaviorism explains human actions and choices in terms of causes alone and ignores the possibility of explaining them in terms of reasons.
  (b) Behaviorism explains how all actions are determined but not how all human choices are free.
  (c) Behaviorism interprets human actions in terms of unreflective responses to stimuli instead of thoughtful consideration of options.
  (d) Behaviorism (like determinism in general) does not permit refutation and therefore cannot be considered an appropriate theory in the freedom-determinism debate.

78.  Plato argues that we know we are free because at times we sense a conflict between the dictates of reason and the demands of passion and can choose reason over passion. Freud denies that this proves we are free because:
  (a) as the existentialists point out, all of our actions might be free, but that does not apply to our choices.
  (b) our awareness of a conflict between reason and passion is itself something we can decide to reject.
  (c) our choice to act rationally is itself caused by unconscious, irrational desires and suppressed feelings.
  (d) the choice of reason over passion is a purely random, chance event over which we have no control.

79.  For Stoics like Marcus Aurelius, freedom consists in realizing one's place in the universe and in conforming to the law of nature that governs the heavens, social structure, and even the parts of one's soul.  We are "free" only when we act according to "right reason."  To act in any other way would not be free because:
  (a) our actions would not really be "our" actions but rather the actions of other forces in nature.
  (b) the fatalism of Stoic philosophy rules out the possibility that anyone ever acts freely.
  (c) right reason refers to how we think, not to how our thoughts match the world or how we act.
  (d) the more we learn about ourselves, the more we free ourselves from laws of nature.

80.  Stoics like Epictetus and Marcus Aurelius describe the good life in terms of a rational understanding of the law of nature, because insofar as we understand natural law:
 (a) we can change nature to accommodate our interests.
 (b) we can get pleasure out of the pure act of knowing.
 (c) we can limit our desires to things within our control.
 (d) we can remain indifferent about what we choose to do.

81.  According to the version of soft determinism adopted by St. Augustine and Hume, even though all of our actions are caused by something, some of our acts can still be called free insofar as:
 (a) they are caused by our choices.       (b) God causes us to choose those actions.
 (c) our choices are not determined.        (d) choices form character or personality.

82.  Which of the following IS NOT a version of soft determinism?
  (a) Though our actions are predetermined in virtue of God's foreknowledge, they are still free because (from our perspective) our decisions to act one way or another are up to us.
  (b) The knowledge that our acts are determined frees us from the anxiety of not being sure about whether our choices or actions are correct.
  (c) To the extent that our actions are determined by our choices, they are done freely.
  (d) Not only are our actions free when they result from our choices, but our choices as well are free insofar as they are not influenced by any other event.

83.  Compatibilists are sometimes called "soft determinists" because they claim that, even though all human actions are determined by some cause, certain actions are free when they are caused by:
  (a) purely random, unpredictable, chance events (as described in quantum-mechanics indeterminacy theory).
  (b) the genetics, upbringing, or social conditioning of the person doing the action.
  (c) the unconscious impulses or drives of the person doing the action.
  (d) the decision, choice, or character of the person doing the action.

84.  Though both St. Augustine and Baruch Spinoza endorse the views of passive soft-determinism, they differ on how they understand the notion of freedom, insofar as:
  (a) Augustine says that freedom means being able to act as one chooses; Spinoza says that freedom consists in affirming one's complete determination.
  (b) Augustine says that since God determines us to be the persons we are, we are not free; Spinoza says that by affirming that we are free of God's determination, we make ourselves free.
  (c) Augustine says that we are free when we act contrary to the conditioning forces that form our personalities; Spinoza says that freedom consists in acting as our personality dictates.
  (d) Augustine says that freedom means being passive and not acting at all; Spinoza says that freedom means acting contrary to our personality or character.

85.  The Stoic philosopher Epictetus says, "To accuse others for one's own misfortunes is a sign of lack of education; to accuse oneself shows that one's education has begun; to accuse neither oneself nor others shows that one's education is complete."    Accusing oneself is only the beginning, not the completion, of education, because true freedom for the Stoic consists in recognizing how:
  (a) both our actions and our feelings or emotions about our actions are ultimately determined.
  (b) rational self-control is impossible, because it contradicts our human essence (and thus is an example of what Sartre calls "bad faith").
  (c) one's own pleasure should be the ultimate basis for judging the rationality of actions.
  (d) we do not control events in our lives, but we can control our feelings or judgments about them.

86.  Even though the compatibilist version of soft determinism acknowledges that every human action has a cause, it still maintains that some acts are "free" insofar as:
  (a) the individual doing the act feels that he or she is free and that the act is done spontaneously.
  (b) nothing causes the individual to choose what she does.
  (c) so-called "free" acts are due to the person's choice or decision to do them.
  (d) the individual's acts could not have been predicted.

87.  Like passive self- (or "soft"-) determinism, Aristotle's active self-determinism says that actions are free if they are voluntary.  However, his view differs from passive self-determinism insofar as he argues that:
  (a) our choices are themselves caused by external forces (e.g., environment, upbringing) over which we ultimately have no control.
  (b) we cannot be held responsible for our actions if they are the result of past choices we have made, because we cannot change the past.
  (c) just as nothing causes us to choose to be a certain kind of person or self, so nothing can cause us to act (even involuntarily) in ways other than we choose.
  (d) through our decisions we choose the kind of personality or character we have, and we are free insofar as we act based on what we choose.

88.  According to Aristotle's active self-determinism, I am responsible for both my actions and my choices because I can determine the kind of character, personality, or self I have.  Critics object to this by noting that:
  (a) in active self-determinism, "I" am responsible only for my involuntary actions.
  (b) the ability to change personality is itself something over which one ultimately has no control.
  (c) once I recognize how my character has been formed by past experiences, "I" can decide to reform my self by deciding how much importance to place on such experiences.
  (d) changing one's character is possible only if one makes a firm commitment to do so.

89.  In reply to the compatibilist claim that we are free when our choices cause our actions, hard determinists say:
  (a) though a free act might be the result of a choice, the choice itself is the result of other external or internal causes.
  (b) because actions that are uncaused cannot be predicted or controlled, it seems silly to say that they are free and can be used to justify our assignment of moral praise or blame.
  (c) there is no such thing as an action that results from or is caused by a choice, because there is no way to know whether or not someone chooses to do something.
  (d) true freedom consists in simply accepting the fact that we are determined.

90.  In response to the soft determinist claim that freedom is not illusion, hard determinists reply:
  (a) even though nothing may cause an individual to choose to act in a particular way, he will act in a certain way anyway.
  (b) though a free act might be uncaused, a "free" choice is not uncaused.
  (c) even though free acts do not have causes, determined acts always have causes.
  (d) though a so-called "free" act might be the result of a human choice, the choice itself is the result of other external causes.

91.  In defending a soft determinist stance, Hume says that a "free" action is one we normally experience as being preceded by (or "caused" by) an act of will or choice; and an action that is not done freely is one that is preceded by events other than choices.  In any event, Hume claims, it makes no sense to ask about the cause of choices, because:
  (a) the causes of our choices must be other choices, and those have other choices as causes, going back infinitely.
  (b) we have no experience of constant conjunctions of events prior to choices, and thus we cannot conclude that there is a connection in which choices are effects.
  (c) without external causes there could be no account of how choices are made and about how certain acts are not done freely.
  (d) the cause of a choice is an unknown event that occurs before we act, over which we have no control and is thus irrelevant in our decision to act.

92.  "Actions are, by their very nature, temporary and perishing; and where they proceed not from some cause in the character and disposition of the person who performed them, they can neither redound to his honor, if good; nor infamy, if evil."  Here Hume is noting that:
  (a) to hold someone responsible for an action requires that we trace the action to its cause in the individual's character; the action itself cannot be held responsible.
  (b) individuals are responsible for their characters but not for their actions.
  (c) the character of a person is reflected in the kinds of actions he or she does; so no praise or blame of the person reflects on the character of the act.
  (d) we cannot draw inferences concerning actions based on the experienced association of those actions with motives, inclinations, and circumstances.

93.  Against Hume's compatibilist (i.e., soft determinist) claim that my action is free if it is preceded by my willing or choosing it, hard determinists argue that this does not solve the problem because it does not explain:
  (a) God's role in predetermining our actions.         (b) how we know whether our actions are good.
  (c) how rational and irrational behavior differ.      (d) how my act of will or choice itself is free.

94.  Which of the following IS NOT an argument against determinism?
  (a) It is possible that human freedom is a non-determined characteristic that has emerged out of a system of otherwise causally determined things.
  (b) Our experience of ourselves as free seems to be as good an argument for freedom as anything else.
  (c) Like everything else in the universe, human actions must be caused by something; nothing justifies claiming that we are exceptions to the rule.
  (d) For practical reasons like being justified in holding people morally and legally responsible for their actions, we need to reject determinism.

95.  One of the major objections raised against determinism is that it cannot be shown to be false and therefore, as a theory, cannot be tested.  Why can't the theory be shown to be false?
  (a) Because its truth cannot be questioned.
  (b) Because it claims that every event has a cause.
  (c) Because objections to the theory fail to explain why people do what they do.
  (d) Because even attempted falsifications of the theory are explainable in terms of the theory (i.e., as determined).

96.  In reply to the soft determinist, the hard determinist points out that the choices people make and upon which they act are functions of their personalities or characters.  But since one's personality or character is itself a product of environment, genetics, upbringing, etc., it still seems that people are not really free.  In order to avoid this hard determinist conclusion, the indeterminist proposes that truly free actions are:
  (a) best explained not in terms of causes but in terms of the person or "agent" who chooses to do the action.
  (b) spontaneous, chance, or random events uncaused by personality or choice.
  (c) caused by motions of sub-atomic particles, which themselves have certain (though unknown) causes.
  (d) actions that have specific causes, but we don't know what those causes are.

97.  In response to hard determinists, some compatibilists acknowledge that their solution to the question of human freedom seems to ignore the fundamental claim of determinism—namely, that every event, including acts of will, has a determining cause.  But, they argue, the distinction between voluntary and involuntary actions is crucial:
  (a) for distinguishing caused and uncaused actions.
  (b) for teleological, if not for deontological, determinism.
  (c) for moral, legal, and interpersonal purposes.
  (d) to guarantee the universality of causation.

98.  Though hard determinists, soft determinists, and indeterminists disagree about whether and how people can act freely, they do agree on one thing:
  (a) only actions done for reasons can count as free actions.
  (b) we should focus on the presence or absence of causes in discussing freedom.
  (c) because every act has some cause (even if it is unknown), there is no real freedom.
  (d) we cannot hold anyone responsible for free acts if those acts have causes.

99.  According to the indeterminist, if an event has a specific cause or causes, it is predictable (at least in principle).  But since quantum mechanics shows that no sub-atomic particle event is in principle absolutely predictable (and is thus a random or chance event), we might be justified in thinking that "free" human actions are similar types of events.  Against this argument, critics of indeterminism reply:
  (a) a chance or random action is not be what we normally call a "free" human action.
  (b) even if human actions were absolutely predictable, we could still say that they were uncaused.
  (c) moral and religious doctrines require that we believe that people are determined, whether or not science supports such a belief.
  (d) if small-scale sub-atomic ("micro") events were predictable, that would prove that large-scale ("macro") events such as human actions are unpredictable.

100.  According to William James, the question about whether we are free or determined can best be decided on pragmatic grounds.  That is, we have to decide which makes more sense:
  (a) believing that freedom is an illusion or believing that chance events (e.g., free choices) occur.
  (b) hard determinism's denial of freedom or soft determinism's qualified acceptance of freedom.
  (c) holding people responsible for their actions, or holding them responsible for their choices.
  (d) believing that regrettable actions really could have been avoided, or believing that such actions are purely random, chance events.

101.  Indeterminists argue that if anything causally determines our actions, those actions are not free. That is why free human actions must be random, chance, unpredictable, uncaused events.  Critics object to this by noting that:
   (a) if an event happens randomly or by chance, it would be unpredictable and thus uncaused.
   (b) in such an account we could not control (and thus be justifiably held responsible) for our actions.
   (c) when someone does an action freely, he/she cannot predict what consequences will follow from it.
   (d) just as it is our duty to act morally, so it is also our duty to act freely: that is, "is implies ought."

102.  Critics of indeterminism claim that, if so-called "free" choices and actions are uncaused, unpredictable, chance events, then no one who acted freely would know beforehand what he or she was about to do.  This strikes critics as being simply wrongheaded, because if that were true, no one could justly be held responsible for his or her actions.  In response, the indeterminist might agree with the hard determinist, pointing out that:
  (a) since being responsible and being held responsible are different, we need to change how we understand just treatment to accommodate our understanding of what freedom means.
  (b) because there is really no difference between a free act and one that is causally determined, it makes no sense to hold people responsible for their actions by punishing or rewarding them.
  (c) uncaused, chance events do not really happen in nature or in human actions; it only seems like they are uncaused because they are so difficult to predict.
  (d) even if chance events occur in nature, that does not mean that they cannot be predicted based on natural laws; it is simply more difficult to do it with human beings than with other things.

103.  Libertarians point out that determinism violates its own claim to scientific respectability by failing to explain what we observe.  That is, the sheer fact that determinism fails to explain what we experience daily should be enough to prove that determinism is incorrect, insofar as it proposes a theory that:
  (a) is inconsistent with other scientific theories that emphasize the role of causality in explaining behavior.
  (b) ignores the indeterminacy and randomness of sub-atomic particle physics.
  (c) acknowledges that there is a difference between human behavior and the behavior of other things despite evidence to the contrary.
  (d) denies that we engage in free choices and acts, and recommends that we accept that theory despite our daily experience to the contrary.

104.  Libertarians argue that our experiences of deliberating, acting spontaneously, and feeling morally responsible (e.g., guilt, remorse) prove that we are free.  Determinists reply that such experiences are:
  (a) illusions or ways of dealing with conflicting desires.
  (b) the products of choices by which agents constitute or determine themselves to be selves.
  (c) justified because they are revealed through introspections and immediately obvious intuitions.
  (d) indeterminate at the level of subatomic particle (quantum) physics.

105.  According to the moral responsibility argument for libertarianism, the question about whether we are free or determined must ultimately be decided on whether:
  (a) people are responsible for their actions or are justifiably held responsible for their actions.
  (b) our belief in moral responsibility is more certain than our belief that every event has a cause.
  (c) people are responsible for their actions or are responsible only for their choices.
  (d) regrettable (immoral) actions really could have been avoided or are purely random, chance events.

106.  Though compatibilists disagree with libertarians about whether our actions are free, they do not disagree about whether our choices are free, because according to compatibilists:
  (a) our choices are never free; they are always caused by external forces or internal compulsions.
  (b) choices are free only when they are caused by neither external forces nor internal compulsions.
  (c) it is pointless to talk about a free choice, since that would be a choice that one chooses.
  (d) the only actions for which we can justifiably be held responsible are voluntary (i.e., chosen) actions.

107.  Human behavior can be explained in terms of either the causes of an action or the reasons for which the action is done.  This distinction between causes and reasons is concerned with the distinction between:
 (a) what someone does and what kind of character or set of habits he or she has.
 (b) the events prior to an action and the intended goals of an action.
 (c) actions that are desired and actions that are expected to yield certain consequences.
 (d) actions and choices.

108.  Theories of freedom explain human behavior in terms of either the causes of an action or the reasons for which the action is done.  Which of the following theories provide rational rather than causal explanations?
  (a) Hard and soft determinism and indeterminism.
  (b) Indeterminism, compatibilism, and soft determinism.
  (c) Compatibilism and libertarianism.
  (d) Agency, person, and existentialist theories.

109.  According to one variation of libertarianism, we should assume that we are free even if we cannot prove it, because in order to think of ourselves as moral beings, we must also think of ourselves as free. Why?
   (a) Because if we are not free, we cannot really choose alternative ways of acting: ought implies can.
   (b) Because if we are free, we can choose to believe what we want, even to believe that we are not free.
   (c) Because our choices in acting are determined by how much information we have about consequences.
   (d) Because randomness and chance characterize all aspects of nature, including human behavior.

110.  According to Sartre, the world consists of our interpretation of and response to facticity.  We are "thrown" into a situation in which everything (our selves included) must be evaluated as more or less significant.  To respond to this situation in "bad faith" is to act in an inauthentic, contradictory, self-refuting manner.  In other words, bad faith is:
  (a) the belief in humanistic (this-worldly) values over God-given, religious values.
  (b) the choice to believe that we have no choice regarding the way the world is.
  (c) the belief in the priority of one's own subjective values over objective values and facts.
  (d) the belief that our own personal choices have significance for all other people.

111.  Sartre claims that, instead of saying that human beings are free, it would be more correct to say that human beings are freedom, because to say that human beings are free:
  (a) describes human beings as lacking all moral responsibility for what they become.
  (b) ignores the fact that, for the most part, human beings are determined to act in certain definite ways because of their upbringing.
  (c) implies that freedom is a characteristic found in a determinate human essence.
  (d) condemns human beings to labor under the burden of freely choosing their own nature in terms of their actions.

112.  Sartre notes that, in our existential predicament, humanity can become anything it chooses.  Skinner likewise suggests that a behaviorist, deterministic, and scientific view of human beings "offers exciting possibilities.  We have not yet seen what man can make of man."  Sartre, however, would reject behaviorism because, in his view:
  (a) behaviorism is scientific and based on observation, whereas existentialism is based on the belief that we are determined to believe that we are free.
  (b) existentialism may not explain the human condition as well as behaviorism, but that does mean that it is wrong.
  (c) what it means to be human is not something that is revealed by observable behavior.
  (d) behaviorism denies human freedom in saying that we are controlled by environment.

113.  According to Sartre, the claim that human existence precedes essence requires that there be no God, because if God exists and is the creator of everything in the world (including humans), then:
 (a) humans are not free to choose the kind of beings they become and are responsible for.
 (b) the cause of evil in the world is due to human action and not God's actions.
 (c) existentialism precedes essentialism as an explanation of human nature.
 (d) there is no limit on human actions or human nature, even if God creates us.

114.  According to Sartre, one of the implications of human freedom is that whatever we do must be understood as a model or moral standard for all humanity to live up to, because:
   (a) the experience of absolute freedom makes us realize that nothing we do ultimately matters.
   (b) as we get older we learn that our parents' approval of our actions is based on their own absolute values.
   (c) since there is no human essence or nature, through our actions we define what it means to be human.
   (d) unless we experience the anguish of being free, we cannot ever appreciate what it means to be human.

115.  Sartre claims that "we are condemned to be free." He means that, regardless of our background or culture:
   (a) we should not ignore the fact that all cultures ultimately share the same moral values.
   (b) we cannot avoid making value judgments (choices) for which we must take responsibility.
   (c) nothing that we do will ultimately make a difference in our salvation: God has already decided that.
   (d) whatever we do, it will be wrong.

116.  Existentialists differ on whether we should believe in God.  Kierkegaard (and perhaps, Camus) endorses religious belief.  Nietzsche and Sartre, though, argue that our existential condition requires us not to believe in God, because:
   (a) if God exists and we cannot prove it to ourselves, then punishment for such ignorance would be unjust.
   (b) belief in God shifts our attention away from claiming responsibility for our existence and improving it.
   (c) no one can believe in God without making the very leap of faith that atheistic existentialism requires.
   (d) any of our beliefs about God would be an interpretation that God himself creates in us by creating us.

117.  The kind of existentialism that Kierkegaard and Camus develop emphasizes how our response to human existence is paradoxical, to the extent that we have to:
   (a) recognize that there is no God who gives our existence meaning, but nonetheless we must imagine a God.
   (b) believe that existence is meaningful in order to trick ourselves (subjectively) into thinking that it is not.
   (c) ignore the absurdities in human existence by seeing how a subjective faith in God removes all doubts.
   (d) acknowledge that our existence is ultimately absurd but nevertheless commit ourselves passionately to it.

118.  In the agency theory of freedom, a free act is caused by a person, but a person is not a thing before a choice is made.  Rather, a person is:
  (a) the product of environment, upbringing, genetics, and associations with family and friends.
  (b) the collection of mental states (character, habits) that cause a choice.
  (c) the result of choices, the summary of acts of giving reasons for why actions are done.
  (d) the openended possibility of there not being any cause or reason for why an action is done.

119.  According to one version of libertarianism, we are the "persons" or self-determining agents who cause our actions.  When we act, we not only identify the action as a particular event but also define ourselves.  We are thus free, in that:
   (a) prior to our acting in a certain way, there is no defined self who can be identified as the cause of action.
   (b) we do not know what causes us to act, but those who know us well could know exactly how we would act.
   (c) what we intend to do in acting is not limited to what we can foresee or what actually happens to us.
   (d) the person or self that we are is itself caused not by us but by our genetics, upbringing, and environment.
 

Answers:
 

1.  B 2.  A 3.  A 4.  A 5.  A 6.  A 7.  A 8.  B 9.  A 10.  B 11.  B 12.  B 13.  B 14.  B 15.  B 16.  A 17.  A 18.  B 19.  A 20.  A

21.  B 22.  B 23.  B 24.  A 25.  B 26.  A 27.  A 28.  A 29.  A 30.  A 31.  B 32.  B 33.  A 34.  A 35.  A 36.  A 37.  B 38.  A 39.  A 40.  A

41.  B 42.  B 43.  A 44.  A 45.  A 46.  A 47.  A 48.  B 49.  A 50.  A 51.  A 52.  A 53.  B 54.  B 55.  B 56.  A 57.  A 58.  A 59.  B 60.  B

61.  A 62.  B 63.  B 64.  B 65.  B 66.  A 67.  A 68.  C 69.  A 70.  D 71.  C 72.  D 73.  C 74.  B 75.  B 76.  C 77.  B 78.  C 79.  A 80.  C

81.  A 82.  D 83.  D 84.  A 85.  D 86.  C 87.  D 88.  B 89.  A 90.  D 91.  B 92.  A 93.  D 94.  C 95.  D 96.  B 97.  C 98.  B 99.  A 100.  A

101.  B 102.  A 103.  D 104.  A 105.  B 106.  C 107.  B 108.  D 109.  A 110.  A 111.  C 112.  D 113.  A 114.  C 115.  B 116.  B 117.  A 118.  C 119.  A