Answers at end.

True/False (True=A, False=B)

1.  To the extent that ethics, political philosophy, and aesthetics raise questions about judgments relating to value, they are concerned with axiology.

2.  The philosophical attempt of ethics to provide a standard for evaluating laws, religions, customs, and individual preferences is itself based on each philosopher's personal values.

3.  Because ethics studies moral values and obligations, it is concerned with consequences of action, not motives.

4.  According to Socrates and Plato, we should act virtuously for the sake of others, regardless of whether acting morally improves our ability to discern what is good or to control our passions.

5.  According to Socrates and Plato, we can be truly happy only if we allow our reason or intellect to guide our emotions and appetites.

6.  According to Socrates, because an immoral person is unable to integrate the various parts of his/her character or personality, no immoral person can really be happy.

7.  According to Socrates and Plato, even though an immoral person is unable to integrate the various parts of his/her character or personality, he or she can still really be happy.

8.  The characters in Plato's Republic appeal to the story of the ring of Gyges to make the point that only a fool would act morally if he or she could get away with acting immorally.

9.  In responding to the story of the ring of Gyges, Plato argues that immorality can never be in someone's ultimate self-interest because immoral people are never truly happy.

10.  In Plato's theory of the state, justice is ultimately achieved when the ruling class is able to do away with social inequalities by driving the military and working classes out of society.

11.  For Plato, the moral balance or harmony of the three parts of the soul is parallel to the condition of political harmony one must seek in the state.

12.  According to Plato, the soul achieves balance or harmony only when reason controls both the spirited (or courageous) part of the soul and the soul's appetites.

13.  According to Plato, moral goodness is achieved by eliminating the activities of the lower parts of the soul and acting solely on the basis of reason.

14.  Teleological theories of ethics determine the moral value of actions in terms of their consequences.

15.  In Epicurus' hedonism, moral decisions should be based on whether actions produce pleasure and avoid pain.

16.  Hedonism is a form of teleological ethical theory insofar as it recommends that we act so as to produce happiness (pleasure) as the consequence of our actions.

17.  The egoistic hedonist says that, if producing the greatest amount of pleasure for ourselves means that we have to take into account the pleasure of others, then we are under a moral obligation to do so.

18.  If psychological egoism is true, then no ethical position (including ethical egoism) is possible.

19.  To say that egoism is non-falsifiable (and thus not a legitimate philosophical theory) means that it is impossible for everyone to be an egoist.

20.  Because ethical egoism claims that we are incapable of doing anything other than promoting our self-interests, it violates the moral dictum "ought implies can."

21.  To say that "ought implies can" means that a person can be under a moral obligation to do something only if that person is able to do otherwise.

22.  "Ought implies can" summarizes the moral principle that if someone is physically able to do an action, he or she is morally obligated to do it.

23.  Because ethical egoism is concerned only with the pleasure or happiness of the person doing the action, it is not a form of teleological ethics.

24.  The ethical egoist says that, since it is impossible for us to do anything other than promote our own self-interest, it is pointless for us to develop a moral theory that indicates what we "ought" to do.

25.  For the utilitarian, the whole purpose of ethics and virtuous behavior is the production and increase of happiness.

26.  According to the utilitarian principle of morality, one should always act so as to produce the greatest overall and long-term amount of happiness for the greatest number of people.

27.  Utilitarians claim that actions have value and thus are morally good insofar as they produce happiness (good consequences) for the greatest number of people.

28.  Since utilitarianism is really a form of social hedonism, it cannot be considered as a consequentialist theory of morality.

29.  Like egoism, utilitarianism is a form of teleological ethics because it emphasizes using consequences as the basis for determining the morality of actions.

30.  Though both Epicurus and Bentham agree that we should do that which produces pleasure or happiness, they differ on whose pleasure or happiness should be taken into account.

31.  Because Bentham's hedonic calculus does not consider the pleasures or pains that other people experience as a result of a person's action, it is more egoistic than Mill's version of utilitarianism.

32.  According to Mill, the proof that happiness is good (and thus desirable) is that human beings desire it.

33.  According to J. S. Mill, we should focus on the quality of happiness produced by acts and ignore the quantity.

34.  According to J. S. Mill, the quantity (as opposed to the quality) of pleasures is determined by how well those pleasures enhance human fulfillment and well-being.

35.  According to Mill, the decision about which pleasures are qualitatively desirable should be made by people familiar with different kinds of pleasures based on what they generally desire.

36.  John Stuart Mill claims that what makes happiness desirable (and thus the basis for what ought to be desired) is the fact that happiness is desired.

37.  Utilitarians argue that, because all moral values are relative to cultural or individual choice, no universally valid moral principles hold for all human beings.

38.  Act utilitarians point out that, because violating a moral rule sometimes causes more happiness than following the rule, we are not only allowed to violate the rule, but we are morally obligated to violate it.

39.  Rule utilitarians claim that we should follow moral rules even if we think that violating them would yield better results, because following moral rules generally yields more overall happiness.

40.  Utilitarianism is a form of deontological ethics because it uses consequences to determine the morality of acts.

41.  Teleological ethical theories characterize moral obligation in terms of categorical rather than hypothetical imperatives.

42.  A deontological ethical theory is one that makes judgments about the morality of actions based on the ends, purposes, or consequences of the actions.

43.  Divine-command ethical theorists claim that what makes actions moral or immoral is God's command that we act or refrain from acting in certain ways.

44.  According to critics of divine-command theory, to say that God is good is redundant because any being who commands another destroys the other's ability to act freely.

45.  A person who has a moral obligation to do something is not physically able or free to do anything else.

46.  Kant rejects all forms of hypothetical imperatives because (he claims) no rational agent can ever be obligated to act morally.

47.  According to Kant, morality presumes that I, as a rational being, am able to do what is morally right because it is morally right.

48.  According to Kant, my actions are morally good only if my motives or intentions in so acting are for the sake of or because it is my duty to act in those ways.

49.  According to Kant, before we can decide what is morally valuable, we must decide what we are obligated to do.

50.  Kant's categorical imperative states that we should always act for the sake of doing our duty except when doing our duty conflicts with deeply held personal or religious values.

51.  For Kant, the only time someone is morally permitted to act contrary to the dictates of a moral law is when such a universalizable maxim comes into conflict with one's deeply held religious beliefs.

52.  To act virtuously, Kant argues, means to act for the sake of doing one's duty—even if that means going against one's religious beliefs.

53.  Because the categorical imperative does not admit of any exceptions, Kant concludes that it is impossible for anyone to do anything that would violate it.

54.  Even though the categorical imperative does not admit of any exceptions, Kant acknowledges that it is possible for people to violate it (that is, to be immoral).

55.  In Kantian ethics (following Hume), "ought implies can" refers to the claim that no one can be morally obligated to do something unless he or she is able to do it.

56.  "Ought implies can" summarizes the moral principle that if someone is physically able to do an action (e.g., kill someone), he or she is morally obligated to do it.

57.  To say that a moral imperative is categorical means (for Kant) that the demand should be obeyed without exception, regardless of the negative consequences of acting on it.

58.  From Kant's perspective, utilitarian consequentialism assumes that ethical reasoning is and should be based on a categorical (rather than a hypothetical) imperative.

59.  According to Kant, an action which has a motive or intention that cannot be successfully universalized might be moral or immoral depending on whether the action is done freely.

60.  According to Kant, I can be morally obligated to do an action only if everyone else in the same type of situation is likewise obligated.

61.  A maxim is a subjective principle of action or working rule which, according to Kant, we are morally bound or obligated to obey.

62.  According to Kant, a good will is a will to do what is what we are morally obligated to do (that is, our duty) regardless of the consequences.

63.  For Kant, I determine whether I am morally obligated to act a certain way by seeing whether the motive of my action can be universalized without contradiction or without being unacceptable to some people.

64.  According to Kant, we should treat people as ends-in-themselves (and never as means alone) because of the good consequences of doing so.

65.  According to Hume and Moore, ethical theories fall into a naturalistic fallacy when they derive moral obligations ("should" or "ought") from factual states ("is").

66.  Utilitarians commit a "naturalistic fallacy" by thinking that certain behavior is morally desirable because it has consequences that are desired.

67.  According to emotivism (or "positivism") value judgments are simply expressions of positive or negative feelings about something and thus are neither true nor false.

68.  According to logical positivists, ethical judgments are meaningful (and thus can be justified) because they describe a fact about the world--namely, certain actions produce happiness and ought to be done.

69.  For Sartre, individuals who believe in God depend on a standard of morality for which they are not responsible and for which they are not accountable.

70.  According to Sartre, every time I do something, I identify that kind of action as a standard of morality for all human beings.

71.  According to Sartre, nothing that a human being does, not even acting in "bad faith," allows that person to transcend human subjectivity.

72.  According to existentialist ethics, because there is no absolute foundation upon which moral judgments are based, we cannot justifiably be held responsible for our choice of any set of values.

73.  Moral systems—even those that value humility and passivity—are expressions (Nietzsche maintains) of the will to power, the will to overcome.

74.  Even though Nietzsche suggests that all reality is interpreted, he does not claim that truth itself is an expression of the will to power.

75.  According to Nietzsche, moral systems are attempts by the masses of weak people to keep strong individuals from exercising their creativity and passion.

76.  For Nietzsche, because morality is an expression of a slave mentality, no creative ("master") individual can really be called excellent, honorable, or noble.

77.  Nietzsche claims that those who adopt the master morality promote the common good and peace in society in order to develop all forms of life as expressions of the will to power.

78.  Nietzsche rejects utilitarianism because it gives equal value to all individuals, even those who do not deserve it.

79.  Nietzsche rejects moral theories such as Christian, utilitarian, and Kantian ethics because they fail to treat all human beings as essentially equal.

80.  Nietzsche claims that religion stands in the way of true human development to the extent that religious beliefs prevent us from making the authentic commitment to God necesssary for true salvation.

81.  Ethical relativists claim that cultures ultimately share the same basic ethical principles.

82.  Ethical relativists claim that even though cultures seem to differ on ethical standards, they ultimately share the same basic ethical principle--namely, moral goodness is that which produces happiness.

83.  Ethical relativists argue that, because all moral values are relative to cultural or individual choice, no universally valid moral principles hold for all human beings.

84.  For the cultural relativist, if a moral code of a society says that a certain action is right, it is right (at least within that society).

85.  Cultural relativism commits the "naturalistic fallacy" to the extent that it assumes that, because cultures differ about moral judgments, they are justified in holding their beliefs.

86.  According to conventional ethical relativism, we should tolerate the values of other cultures because there is no independent basis for criticizing those values.

87.  According to ethical subjectivists, moral values are based solely on an individual's beliefs.

88.  An ethical relativist cannot be a moral objectivist.

89.  It is impossible for an ethical absolutist to be a moral relativist.

90.  If moral objectivism is true, then homosexuality must be morally wrong.

91.  According to Carol Gilligan, the ethic of care characteristic of feminist ways of thinking emphasizes the obligation not to interfere in the lives of others.

92.  Feminine moral development, according to Carol Gilligan, occurs as a person moves from (1) caring only for herself, through (2) caring for others, to (3) adopting care as a universal moral principle.

93.  Sarah Hoagland argues that male-dominated ethics emphasizes competing interests, sacrifice and compromise, and duty instead of caring.

94.  Drawing on insights like those developed in ancient Greek virtue ethics, feminists point out that the aim of ethics should be to protect individual rights and to treat everyone in the same impartial, just way.

95.  According to Aristotle, because moral virtues are habits, they cannot be taught but only learned in living according to them.

96.  According to Aristotle, in a good or happy life someone is able to fulfill himself or herself through behavior that combines moderation, good fortune, and wisdom.

97.  According to Aristotle, because happiness is not only the goal of all human beings but also defined by anyone as he/she sees fit, there is no ultimate standard of ethics.

98.  In Aristotle's virtue ethics, moral value is a purely private matter, unconnected to how people interact with others in the community.

99.  According to virtue ethics, moral behavior is a balance of reason and emotional sensitivity to the needs and relations of individuals that does not aim at the indifferent application of abstract principles.

100.  According to deep ecologists, we are justified in promoting our own self-realization by using natural resources however we want because God has given us everything in the world for our benefit.

101.  Deep ecologists argue that all forms of life are valuable—but only insofar as they promote human well-being.
 

Multiple Choice

102.  Ethics, political philosophy, and aesthetics are areas of philosophy that address topics that are likewise addressed in fields like psychology, political science, sociology, and anthropology.  But instead of concentrating on what different people call the good life, moral duties, social obligations, or beauty, these areas of philosophy search for:
  (a) reasons why different people should or should not think about such topics as they do.
  (b) the personal or social causes of why different people think about such topics as they do.
  (c) ways of getting people to question and ultimately to reject ways they have been raised.
  (d) a basic principle or logos by which both philosophy and the social sciences can be reduced to the physical sciences (especially physics).

103.  Ethics and law have sometimes been distinguished in the following way:  the law attempts to resolve conflict in society by regulating behavior, whereas ethics is concerned with determining the rules for resolving conflict both in belief and in the behavior or action based on those beliefs.  Ethics thus emphasizes:
  (a) the reasons that can be given as to why certain beliefs should be adopted and certain actions done.
  (b) the ways in which individuals can be excused from being held responsible for their actions.
  (c) how a rational resolution of conflicting beliefs is unattainable due to the different backgrounds of people.
  (d) the difference between an individual's religious training and the requirements of the laws of his state and nation.

104.  Unlike religion, law, social custom, or personal preference, ethics is not concerned with describing our behavior in terms of faith, social order, or individual likes and dislikes.  Instead, it focuses on:
  (a) describing how each person's background and upbringing affects his or her beliefs about moral issues.
  (b) showing how religion, law, and social custom are culturally relative, but personal preference is subjective.
  (c) showing how motives are more crucial in making moral judgments than consideration of consequences, character, or the act itself.
  (d) explaining why we might or might not be justified in applying those other sets of beliefs to moral issues.

105.  From a philosophical perspective, religious teachings or revelations cannot (by themselves) serve as standards of morality because:
  (a) the appeal to the will of God as the reason for one's behavior cannot provide a motive for acting morally or immorally, even for religious believers.
  (b) interpretations of religious revelations often conflict with one another and thus provide no definite basis for making moral judgments and have no persuasive power for non-believers.
  (c) some religious beliefs (even those based on the Scriptures) are not only factually wrong but, if followed, would result in immoral behavior.
  (d) religious teachings are usually interpreted and enforced through civil laws that become the bases for personal or social morality.

106.  According to Plato, no one would choose to act immorally if he/she knew how acting immorally is really not in his/her self-interest.  But it is apparent that evil people appear (at least on the surface) to benefit from their immorality.  So how can acting morally really be in one's own self-interest?  Plato's answer:
  (a) Immoral behavior may in fact be in one's own self-interest; but morality is not immediately concerned with the individual as much as with society.
  (b) Harmonious integration or balance of the parts of one's personality is what makes someone truly happy and constitutes human excellence and moral virtue.
  (c) Since there is no objective moral standard (as the ring of Gyges story shows), whatever someone believes is in his or her self-interest is morally acceptable.
  (d) Virtue is the ability to do what one does well, so if someone is able to promote his or her self interest (even through immorality), then that person is virtuous.

107.  For Plato, acting morally benefits society at the same time as it promotes our own self-interest because:
  (a) those who are in power determine morality depending on what they choose to believe benefits them.
  (b) personal integrity (i.e., harmonizing the parts of our soul) is based on knowing our function in society.
  (c) only the rulers (vs. law enforcers or workers) can really be moral since only the rulers act on reason.
  (d) morality is less concerned with doing what is actually right than with doing what seems to be right according to one's society: that is what the Gyges ring story is about.

108.  For most Greeks, the question "why be moral?" is much more important than the question "what is moral?"  Plato's parallel between the parts of the soul and the parts of society collapses the two questions into one by:
  (a) showing why someone should care about having an integrated personality or contributing to the harmonious operation of society.
  (b) understanding how ethics is more concerned with intellectual judgments about actions and their consequences, and less with moral motivation.
  (c) recognizing that personal morality has little or nothing to do with social morality; that is, one's private moral judgments have no social parallels.
  (d) indicating how the judgments of society concerning who is happy and who is not should be used in telling who is moral and who is not.

109.  To say that Plato's question "Why be moral?" is not a moral, but rather a meta-ethical question means that it is a question about:
  (a) what makes certain actions moral or immoral.
  (b) how individuals should or should not be held responsible for the ways in which their consciences have been formed.
  (c) why someone should behave in certain ways, even when he agrees that it is the morally acceptable way to act.
  (d) why someone chooses to act in ways that conflict with the recommendations of others.

110.  "Why be moral?" is a metaethical question rather than an ethical question insofar as it is concerned with:
  (a) why someone would want to have a balanced personality or be a superior individual.
  (b) non-moral reasons for why someone should be moral.
  (c) how it is morally wrong for someone to be immoral.
  (d) what makes actions moral or immoral, right or wrong.

111.  Epicurus proposes that, even though decision-making should be based on the pursuit of pleasure, not all pleasures ought to be pursued equally, because:
  (a) pleasures are the fulfillment of our desires; and insofar as we are determined by nature to fulfill our desires, we must seek after pleasure.
  (b) we ought not to get pleasure out of fulfilling certain desires.
  (c) we cannot make decisions based on whether our actions produce pleasure without knowing beforehand whether we are justified in doing so.
  (d) simple pleasures (as opposed to extreme pleasures) are easier to satisfy, less prone to disappointment, and make us appreciate luxuries all the more.

112.  Epicurus says that the pursuit of pleasure is good, but not all pleasures ought to be pursued equally because:
  (a) not everyone agrees that beauty, prudence, honor, justice, courage, or knowledge are pleasurable.
  (b) some pleasures (e.g., satisfaction of vain desires) are associated with pain (e.g., disappointment).
  (c) even pleasures such as courage and knowledge have as much pain associated with them as vain desires.
  (d) pain and pleasure is always relative to the individual.

113.  Every time we succeed in any endeavor, we experience pleasure in having accomplished our goals.  But what if our goals involve causing harm to oneself or to others?--Wouldn't that indicate that the hedonistic pursuit of pleasure is wrong and should not be the basis of a moral system?  To this a hedonist like Epicurus would reply:
  (a) hedonism is not a way of life or a way of deciding how to act morally; it is merely a way of thinking.
  (b) if pursuing certain goals causes someone pleasure, that is all that matters; how others are affected or how they respond to the individual's acts is unimportant.
  (c) hedonism recommends that those kinds of endeavors that cause pain or unhappiness be avoided; it does not say that any successful effort whatsoever is desirable.
  (d) no one intentionally pursues or should pursue pleasure for its own sake; we should avoid worrying about morality as well.

114.  Critics have claimed that Hobbes' egoistic theory of human motivation (including his denial that anyone can ever act in a purely altruistic way) is not properly a scientific theory because it fails to fulfill Popper's falsifiability criterion for scientific theories.  Specifically, in order for Hobbes' position to be considered a legitimate theory:
 (a) it must be shown to be false.
 (b) it would allow for the possibility that it could be false.
 (c) it must be able to explain all behavior in terms of self-interest.
 (d) it would have to show how believing in the theory is in one's self-interest.

115.  Though systems of belief such as fatalism, determinism, and egoism provide their supporters with ways of explaining experience, these ways of thinking cannot be considered acceptable theories of human behavior because they violate the falsifiability criterion for legitimate theorizing.  They cannot be proven false because:
  (a) such systems of belief are simply true--as the failure of all attempted falsifications of them shows.
  (b) people who believed in them would be determined by fate to act always in their own self-interest.
  (c) there are no explanations of human behavior other than those proposed by these systems of belief.
  (d) any attempt to falsify them would be explained in their terms, supposedly confirming their truth.

116.  If psychological egoism is true, then no ethical system (including ethical egoism) is possible because:
  (a) ethics would then be merely a means by which individuals impose their values on others--exactly as Nietzsche says happens in Christianity.
  (b) if we are determined to act only in our self-interest, then it makes no sense to say we ought to act either in our self-interest or, for that matter, in any other way either.
  (c) psychological egoism is a theory of why people are motivated to act morally, whereas ethical egoism is a theory of how moral distinctions are determined.
  (d) without some means to decide which acts are morally good or bad, there is no way to explain why people act the way they do.

117.  Ethical egoists dismiss psychological egoism because (they say) psychological egoism undermines the possibility for any ethical behavior by ignoring one of the basic principles of ethical reasoning, namely:
  (a) is implies ought.
  (b) the end never justifies the means.
  (c) the naturalistic fallacy.
  (d) ought implies can.

118.  Stoics like Epictetus and Marcus Aurelius describe the good life in terms of a rational understanding of the law of nature, because insofar as we understand natural law:
 (a) we can change nature to accommodate our interests.
 (b) we can get pleasure out of the pure act of knowing.
 (c) we can limit our desires to things within our control.
 (d) we can remain indifferent about what we choose to do.

119.  For the Stoic a meaningful life is one in which she commits herself to do her duty, whatever it might be.  Limiting herself to doing her duty (regardless of what that entails) means:
  (a) recognizing how her freedom is limited by what she chooses to desire.
  (b) passively resigning herself to accept whatever happens as out of her control and unaffected by her action.
  (c) committing herself with all her power to take responsibility for what she does as her own.
  (d) not caring what she does or how she does it, as long as she thinks she won't be disappointed by taking unnecessary chances.

120.  Epictetus' Stoic claim that we should be happy with whatever life offers us differs from Epicureanism in that:
  (a) Epicureanism says that happiness consists in the unrestrained pursuit of pleasure (hedonism), whereas Stoicism says that we can achieve pleasure only by desiring things that will not disappoint us.
  (b) Epicureanism says that life can be meaningful only if we are happy (regardless of whether we satisfy our desires), but Stoicism says that we can be happy only if we satisfy our desires.
  (c) Epicureanism says that only those things that benefit us can make us happy, whereas Stoicism says only by doing things that benefit others can we be happy.
  (d) Epicureanism says we should desire things that do not disappoint us, whereas Stoicism says that we cannot be disappointed in life if we do not desire anything.

121.  Existentialism differs significantly from Stoicism concerning why we should care about the specifics of what we choose as values.  The Stoic says we should care about doing our duty; but what that duty might be is something, the Stoic claims, is ultimately due to nature.  This is where the existentialist would object, claiming:
  (a) in spite of the fact that nature restricts what we can choose to do, we can still have an effect on human values by the choices we make.
  (b) values established in nature guide our choices and indicate what our duties are, but they do not force us to act in accord with those values.
  (c) freedom requires that we respond with scornful and grudging acceptance of the values implicit in the structure and laws of nature.
  (d) nature itself has meaning for humans only insofar as we choose to consider it as valuable, so our choices are not determined by nature.

122.  Bentham's utilitarianism is different from J. S. Mill's version in virtue of Mill's emphasis on:
  (a) the happiness of all creatures affected by actions, versus the happiness experienced by humans.
  (b) how actions done to achieve happiness are in fact desired as opposed to being desirable.
  (c) the concern for the qualitative character of happiness versus simply the quantitative.
  (d) the number of people affected versus the intensity of pleasure experienced by those affected.

123.  Though J. S. Mill agrees with Bentham that happiness is the goal of ethical behavior, he points out that "it is better to be a human being dissatisfied than a pig satisfied."  By this remark he indicates how:
  (a) some kinds of happiness are more desirable or valuable than others for social or cultural reasons.
  (b) according to the utilitarian principle, the greatest happiness is determined by the greatest number.
  (c) happiness ought to be desired (and thus is desirable) because people, in fact, desire to be happy.
  (d) uncultivated people are as competent to judge what happiness is as are cultivated people.

124.  According to J. S. Mill, "Of two pleasures, if there be one to which all or almost all who have experience of both give a decided preference, that is the more desirable pleasure."  The decision about which pleasures are qualitatively desirable should thus be made by those familiar with different kinds of pleasures based on:
  (a) whether the pleasures are egoistic (benefitting only the individual) or altruistic (benefitting others).
  (b) each person's doing his or her moral duty.
  (c) what those persons generally desire.
  (d) whether doing that which produces happiness is also doing that which produces pleasure.

125.  In deciding how far we have to calculate the consequences of our actions, Mill says that the utilitarian recommends that we should realistically consider only:
  (a) the rules of desire determined by the person of practical wisdom.
  (b) those persons most likely to be affected by our actions.
  (c) how our behavior follows necessarily from human nature itself.
  (d) the motive of the agent, and not necessarily the consequences of our actions.

126.  Which of the following IS NOT a typical argument raised against utilitarian ethical theories?
   (a) Utilitarianism permits treating individuals unjustly if more happiness is produced by doing so.
   (b) It is difficult (if not impossible) to compare and calculate the happiness produced by alternative acts.
   (c) Utilitarians are unaware of the distinction between actual, foreseeable, and intended consequences.
   (d) For utilitarians, expediency is the fundamental moral principle: the ends justify the means.

127.  Which of the following IS NOT an objection critics raise against the utilitarian use of happiness as a criterion for making moral judgments?
  (a) Happiness cannot be used as a criterion for morality because no one makes moral judgments that way.
  (b) There is no easy way to compare different types of happiness to calculate the "greatest amount."
  (c) Utilitarians cannot calculate happiness because future consequences of actions are never fully known.
  (d) Utilitarianism rewards doing what is expedient, even if it is unjust: the end justifies the means.

128.  One objection raised against utilitarianism is that we can never know what we are morally obliged to do since we can never know all the consequences of our actions.  Mill and other utilitarians reply to this by:
  (a) pointing out that no moral theory is ever able to indicate what we should not do.
  (b) agreeing that we may not know perfectly what the consequences will be, but we can determine them well enough to know what to do.
  (c) rejecting the claim: we, in fact, can know all of the consequences of our actions if we investigate the matter well enough.
  (d) redefining "consequences" so that they are limited to what we intend to do and not to what actually happens.

129.  Some theorists argue that the utilitarian claim that we are morally obligated to contribute to famine relief ignores one central fact about human nature, namely, that we are more inclined to help members of our own family or culture than others, and therefore should not be expected to do what we are not inclined to do in the first place.  To this the utilitarian responds:
  (a) taking care of those near us produces more overall happiness than taking care of others.
  (b) the amount of need in some cultures is greater than in others; our own needs are greatest.
  (c) while such feelings may be significant psychologically, they are irrelevant morally.
  (d) our moral obligations to promote the happiness of our family, friends, and immediate culture are more important than even obligations to protect the lives of others.

130.  One consequentialist argument against famine relief notes that feeding famine victims is not our moral responsibility, because it causes more harm than good insofar as it wastes our own resources, makes the starving more dependent on us, and creates conditions for more famine in the future.  Which of the following IS NOT a response utilitarian supporters of famine relief would typically give in return?
  (a) Feeding both the starving and ourselves would require us to become more efficient, knowledgeable, and industrious (all beneficial effects).
  (b) We have a responsibility to other human beings to save them from starvation regardless of future consequences; after all, we do not know what those consequences may be.
  (c) In feeding the starving we can--indeed, we are morally required to--demand that cultures receiving the food adopt farming and distribution programs to prevent future famine.
  (d) Recipients of food can be required to adopt social changes (e.g., birth control programs) in order to support themselves and not have to rely on others.

131.  Some critics of utilitarianism have argued that injustices against minorities would be permitted under utilitarian principles, since the violation of the rights of a few might produce more overall happiness than respecting those rights.  Utilitarians respond that, on the contrary, injustices against minorities would not be encouraged under their principles, because:
  (a) according to utilitarian principles, minorities have no rights.
  (b) if unjust practices became the rule in a society, there would be more unhappiness.
  (c) minorities do not experience happiness and unhappiness in the same way as the majority of society.
  (d) calculation of the greatest amount of happiness for the greatest number of people does not necessarily have to include consideration of all members of a society.

132.  Act utilitarians point out that sometimes violating a moral rule causes more happiness than following the rule.  In such cases, they argue, violating the rule is permitted:
  (a) only if no other violations of the rule occur again.
  (b) as long as no one affected by the action experiences any unhappiness.
  (c) as long as the person's intention or motive is to do his/her duty regardless of the consequences.
  (d) and even morally required by the utilitarian principle itself.

133.  Act utilitarians say that we should always do that specific action that produces the greatest happiness, even if this means violating moral rules.  Rule utilitarians challenge this, arguing that we should follow moral rules even if we think that violating them would yield better results, because:
  (a) following moral rules generally yields more overall happiness than the unhappiness created by allowing for the rare exceptions to rules.
  (b) we should not become slaves to any moral rules; morality is a matter of personal choices.
  (c) acting in general to produce the greatest amount of happiness for the greatest number of people is not always the morally right thing to do.
  (d) even if we follow moral rules, we will always cause unhappiness to someone.

134.  Critics sometimes claim that, for utilitarianism, motive seems to have nothing to do with the morality of an action.  Mill responds to this by pointing out that:
  (a) good consequences cannot follow from an act done by someone with an evil motive.
  (b) bad consequences often follow from actions which are done with the best motives in mind.
  (c) consequences determine the morality of an action; the person's motive affects only our judgment of the person doing the act, not the act itself.
  (d) the only way to determine what motive I have in acting is to determine the consequences of my action.

135.  In reply to those who object that utilitarianism permits lying if it produces happiness, J. S. Mill responds in what is now called a rule utilitarian way: "Any, even unintentional deviation from truth weakens the trustworthiness of human assertion, which is the principal support of all social well-being, civilization, virtue, and everything on which human happiness on the largest scale depends."  Mill's basic point is that:
  (a) insignificant ("white") lies sometimes do cause happiness, so they are morally permissible.
  (b) even occasional white lies are immoral because they cause more harm than good in the long run.
  (c) we would be morally obligated to tell the truth even if, as a rule, it did not cause happiness.
  (d) lying is immoral because it generally causes unhappiness; but if someone who is qualified to judge the difference between happiness and unhappiness approves the lie, it is OK.

136.  Rule utilitarians have argued that injustices against minorities would be permitted under act utilitarian principles, since the violation of the rights of a few might produce more overall happiness in certain situations than respecting those rights.  They argue that, by contrast, under rule utilitarianism injustices against minorities would not be encouraged because:
  (a) individuals and minorities have rights only in deontological ethics, not in teleological ethics.
  (b) rule utilitarianism indicates how to act in general, not how to act in specific situations.
  (c) if unjust practices became the rule in a society, there would be more unhappiness.
  (d) calculation of the greatest amount of happiness for the greatest number of people does not necessarily have to include consideration of all members of a society.

137.  Rule utilitarians argue that we should always do those things that as a rule promote happiness.  In a specific case where following the rules would probably cause unhappiness, rule utilitarians say:
  (a) people follow rules that promote their own happiness more than rules promoting general happiness.
  (b) we should abide by rules because it is our duty, not because of the consequences of following rules.
  (c) the long-term effect of violating moral rules would be more unhappiness, so we should follow the rule.
  (d) we should follow rules in specific cases only if happiness results; otherwise we should violate rules.

138.  Rule utilitarians argue that we should always do those things that, as a rule, promote happiness.  In specific cases where following the rules would be unjust and cause unhappiness, rule utilitarians point out that:
  (a) any act of injustice will cause someone unhappiness, and therefore violations of rules are still immoral.
  (b) actual consequences of our actions are often unforeseen, so we have to rely on the intended consequences.
  (c) exceptions can be built into the rules to allow for occasional short-term injustice and long-term happiness.
  (d) the only people who can make a judgment about what is just/unjust are those who know which actions promote, as a rule, happiness.

139.  The deontological theory of ethics called divine law theory is sometimes confused with natural law theory because both often refer to God.  But unlike in natural law theory, a person is, in fact, morally obligated to act in a certain way under divine law theory:
  (a) if he/she believes that it is what God commands.
  (b) if God should require him/her to act in certain ways.
  (c) if acting in accord with the person's nature is morally correct.
  (d) if God really does command it, regardless of whether it conflicts with human nature.

140.  Divine command theorists point out that every ethical theory must have two components: a theory of value and a theory of obligation.  In the case of divine command theory, value is determined by:
  (a) what God wills, and obligation is determined by God's rewards and punishment.
  (b) God's will that we be happy, and obligation is determined by our acceptance of God's will.
  (c) our interpretation of God's will, and obligation is determined by social agreement with our interpretation.
  (d) what we believe God wills for us, and obligation is determined by what we know God wills for us.

141.  Critics of the divine-command theory of ethics raise a number of objections against it.  Which of the following IS NOT one of those objections?
  (a) If God's command is the basis for determining what is moral, then it makes no sense to say that God's commands are good; that is, God's commands are arbitrary.
  (b) Because secular (non-religious) moral systems do not provide a motive or reason for acting morally, they are able to identify what is moral in a way that the divine command theory does not.
  (c) Religion is not only unnecessary for morality but is even a hindrance, because it creates false hopes and distracts people from doing good things for one another for its own sake.
  (d) Acting in a certain way simply because it is required by God does not encourage people to see why they should do what they do, and in this sense religious ethics is not as deep-seated as secular ethics.

142.  Which of the following IS NOT an objection Kant raises against consequentialism?
  (a) If we are inclined to do an act because we naturally seek good consequences (happiness), then we do not act freely and are not morally responsible.
  (b) The task of ethics is to make judgments about what people intend to do when they act, regardless of the consequences.
  (c) Because people disagree about what happiness is, good consequences cannot provide an ultimate criterion for making moral judgments.
  (d) The consequences of our actions are often out of our control, so we cannot be held responsible for them or have our actions judged based on them.

143.  Kant claims that moral obligation cannot be based on a "hypothetical imperative" such as "if you want to be happy, then you must do X," because:
  (a) a moral imperative or command must be directed to a specific individual and require a specific action.
  (b) what people want to do is never really connected with what they actually do.
  (c) happiness can vary from person to person, is often out of our reach, and is not a freely-desired goal.
  (d) a good will acts  for the sake of doing one's duty (which is always to produce happiness however it is defined).

144.  According to Kant, virtuous actions are those that are done for the sake of doing one's duty--which means acting for the right reason or with the right motive or intention.  Kant limits the discussion of the moral character of actions to motives or intentions and does not consider consequences crucial, because:
  (a) the consequences are often out of our control and are valued differently by different people.
  (b) only those actions based on universalizable motives are moral actions.
  (c) moral decisions are conditioned by one's culture and by how one is raised.
  (d) every time someone acts, he or she has a motive; but there are not always consequences to acts.

145.  According to Kant, morality presumes that I, as a rational being, am able to do what is morally right because it is morally right.  So, unless doing my duty is my motive in acting, my action is not morally good, because:
  (a) actions that are done solely for the sake of doing my duty do not promote happiness as much as actions done because they are morally right.
  (b) acting with motives other than doing my duty--for example, acting out of instinct, passion, or interest--is not universalizable and thus cannot be the basis for rational behavior.
  (c) if my motive in acting is that I am willing to take responsibility for the consequences of my action, then my action is morally good.
  (d) sometimes doing my duty conflicts with doing the right thing--especially when doing the right thing involves acting in accord with my religious beliefs.

146.  According to Kant, an action which has a motive or intention that cannot be successfully universalized:
  (a) might be moral or immoral, depending on the consequences of the action.
  (b) might be moral or immoral, depending on whether the act is considered acceptable in the person's society.
  (c) is immoral.
  (d) might be moral or immoral, depending on whether the action is done freely.

147.  Kant claims that I can determine whether all other rational beings are obligated to do what I am obligated to do by trying to see whether:
  (a) certain practices are universally accepted throughout different cultures.
  (b) other examples of my action yield good consequences.
  (c) the action would be universally good for all individuals.
  (d) the motive of my action can be universalized without contradiction or without being unacceptable to some people.

148.  For Kant, the morality of an action is determined by the one thing over which we have control, namely, motive.  Specific actions cannot be universalized, and consequences of actions cannot determine morality because they are often out of our control.  Only motive can be the basis for moral judgments, and the only pure moral motive is:
   (a) doing that which we think is going to produce the greatest amount of happiness for the most people.
   (b) acting in a way that is consistent with our religious beliefs and conscience.
   (c) choosing to have as our motive that which other people often have as their motive in acting.
   (d) willing to do that which all other rational beings could accept and will without contradiction.

149.  According to Kant, acting morally means acting on an intention that a reasonable person could will all persons to adopt as the motive for their actions.  Critics claim that this makes Kant a consequentialist, insofar as universalizability considers the consequences of everyone acting that way.  Kant rejects this by pointing out that:
  (a) to say that an intention must be universalizable does not mean that everyone's intentions need to be considered, only the intentions of those who are going to be affected by the action.
  (b) the intended consequences of actions are often not the same as their actual consequences.
  (c) intentions, not consequences, identify moral actions; if an intention cannot be universalized for any reason (including unacceptable consequences), it cannot be the basis for a moral act.
  (d) if people actually did their moral duty, then the consequences of their doing so would be better than if they only intended to do their duty.

150.  Kant suggests that the maxim upon which an action is based, and not the individual action itself, is the key for determining whether an action is morally good, because:
  (a) a specific action is, by definition, not universalizable.
  (b) our actions are always based on some maxim or other.
  (c) without maxims we would not know what to do.
  (d) our maxims are subjective rules of behavior upon which actions are based.

151.  Kant argues that acting in accordance with duty does not make an action morally worthwhile; rather it is acting for the sake of or because it is one's duty that makes the act morally worthy.  He makes this distinction to indicate how:
  (a) the consequences of one's actions might be good or bad depending on how much happiness is produced.
  (b) actions that are done freely are always morally good actions.
  (c) the moral value of an action is determined by one's motives, not by the consequences of one's actions.
  (d) acting in a self-interested way differs from acting based on maxims.

152.  Which of the following IS NOT an objection raised against Kant's ethical theory?
  (a) Just because someone is concerned with promoting happiness instead of doing his/her duty, that does not mean that his/her action lacks moral value.
  (b) Just because I am naturally inclined to pursue happiness, that does not mean that I can't act from duty.
  (c) Just because the exact consequences of actions are unknown or are not in our complete control, that does not mean that we are not responsible for or should not consider those consequences.
  (d) In moral dilemmas, rules often conflict; in such cases, Kantian ethics is of no help.

153.  According to existentialist ethics, there is no absolute foundation upon which moral judgments are based; we are free to adopt any moral system we choose.  As Sartre notes, however, we are responsible for choosing that set of values.  Any system of moral values that is established by some means other than human choice, then:
  (a) contradicts the principle on which the ability to make moral distinctions is based.
  (b) ought to be grounded in the will of God or in generally accepted social practices.
  (c) in fact never are used by people (even mistakenly) to make moral judgments.
  (d) is immoral if the consequences are bad for us.

154.  When Sartre says that "there is no human nature," what he means is that:
  (a) as self-conscious beings, we can and do determine the kinds of beings that we are.
  (b) there can be no basis for deciding between anguish and despair.
  (c) human beings do not have genetic characteristics that identify them biologically as members of a species.
  (d) existentialism can accept the existence of God only as the a priori foundation of ethical judgments.

155.  Sartre claims that, for human beings, "existence precedes essence"; in other words:
  (a) when human beings are rational, they fulfill their essence of being human.
  (b) human beings are essentially determined to exist according to certain God-given directives.
  (c) human beings are free to choose even not to act in any way whatsoever.
  (d) human beings are condemned to be free and to become anything they choose through their actions.

156.  If, as Sartre's existentialism claims, "man is responsible for his passion," then no matter what we as human beings do, we do it:
  (a) against our wills.
  (b) without thought.
  (c) freely.
  (d) out of scorn for God.

157.  Nietzsche argues that the task of true morality is to indicate how human beings, as part of nature, can move "beyond good and evil" by means of the attempt to:
  (a) overcome and gradually do away with our natural inclinations of aggression and struggle.
  (b) show our nobility through self-restraint and compassion for the less fortunate.
  (c) accept tolerantly our own weaknesses as indications of our place within God's plan.
  (d) make moral distinctions the explicit products of the exercise of human will.

158.  According to Nietzsche, members of the herd endorse the slave values of sympathy, kindness, and the "common" good because:
  (a) they feel that they should be treated kindly and compassionately since they are not responsible for their lack of power.
  (b) they believe that, if they treat the master-morality overmen kindly, those noble individuals will not harm them.
  (c) they fear that a lack of sympathy or kindness, or failure to consider the common good, will cause the men of nobility to feel threatened by them.
  (d) they prefer following God's will rather than struggling against it (like the overmen are constantly having to do).

159.  Critics of morality (e.g., Callicles or Nietzsche) argue that recommending that people act morally (that is, with self-restraint, moderation, or concern for others) is itself an attempt by "common" people to impose their will on their superiors.  They conclude, therefore, that doing something because it is moral makes no sense, since:
  (a) even common people admit that no one should act morally unless it produces happiness for him or her.
  (b) only a personality that harmonizes the competing interests of reason, emotion, and appetite is moral.
  (c) the "all too human" values of ordinary people do not provide any guidance for how people should act.
  (d) that would require us to affirm our power to decide values by restricting that power.

160.  The "first principle" of Nietzsche's version of humanism is this: "The weak and the failures shall perish.  They ought even to be helped to perish.  What is more harmful than vice?--Practical sympathy and pity for all the failures and all the weak: Christianity."  In Nietzsche's trans-valuation of humanism, Christianity is:
  (a) Nietzsche's attempt to reintroduce values into his theory of the will to power.
  (b) an afterlife project that Nietzsche endorses as promoting the overman.
  (c) the means by which noble aims filter down from masters to slaves.
  (d) that which frustrates the prospects of human advancement.

161.  Nietzsche claims that "because life is precisely Will to Power," the attempt to bend all wills to a common good, avoiding violence and exploitation in order to achieve peace in society, is:
  (a) "the fundamental principle of society" and the necessary means for the development of all life.
  (b) the goal of the noble class.
  (c) "the Will to the denial of life," which itself invites dissolution and decay.
  (d) the dark night of barbarism in which "all who are born after us belong to a higher history than any history hitherto."

162.  According to Nietzsche, everything that exists or happens is an expression of the will to power—even the resentment of weak people toward creative, self-determining individuals.  What Nietzsche objects to about "slave" resentment is not its effort but rather:
  (a) its unwillingness to acknowledge itself as the active source of its values.
  (b) its ability to destroy the will to power by promoting values of passivity and weakness.
  (c) its willingness to think that the will to power is more important than the will to truth.
  (d) its inability to free itself from the external forces that determine it to say "No" to creativity.

163.  Nietzsche's critique of "slave morality" includes an attack on the belief in the existence of God, because as long as God exists:
  (a) human beings will continue to experience guilt for their failing to live up to God's call for them to improve themselves in accord with His law.
  (b) there will always be the possibility that God could aid the individuals of the slave or herd mentality against the noble individual (the overman).
  (c) human beings will always have someone to fall back on and blame for their failings, rather than take responsibility for their destiny.
  (d) there is always the possibility that God may bring peace to the world and thus destroy the need for the overman.

164.  Anti-foundationalists (AFs) reject both teleological and deontological ethical theorizing because they (AFs):
  (a) deny that there is any one set of values, practices, or principles that should guide our moral decisions.
  (b) deny that anyone can justifiably make a moral decision that is not always already self-interested.
  (c) agree with logical positivists: moral judgments are merely expressions of feeling or emotion.
  (d) think that teleological and deontological theories ultimately do not appeal to any moral principles.

165.  Moral virtue, for Aristotle, entails acting in accord with the dictates of reason as determined by:
  (a) an objective, shared standard of right and wrong equally applicable to all people.
  (b) a mean or point of moderation between the extremes of morally good and morally evil behavior.
  (c) the mean or point of moderation between the extremes of possible alternative ways of acting.
  (d) the denial of one's own interests in favor of the good of one's community.

166.  According to Aristotle, a happy life is a life of virtue, one in which the individual contributes to the good of his or her community and is respected for such contributions.  At the heart of his description of the morally good life is one's honor in a society, because being an honorable individual means being someone who:
  (a) recognizes how his or her own well-being is intimately linked to the good of the community.
  (b) appreciates how moral values vary from culture to culture and from individual to individual.
  (c) can live a life of moderation without having be sensitive to or involved in social or civic affairs.
  (d) contemplates philosophical principles in order to understand the truths of nature.

167.  For Aristotle, "Moral states are the results of activities like the states themselves.  It is our duty, therefore, to keep a certain character in our activities, since our moral states depend on the differences in our activities."  This "certain character" is:
  (a) activity in accordance with reason (i.e., sensitive to the social and personal dimensions of human existence).
  (b) the point at which the individual's "golden mean" rule cancels out the society's own definition of "moderation."
  (c) neither excess nor deficiency, but rather the alternation of the two (where one takes over sometimes, and the other at other times).
  (d) the point of moderation in action between virtue and vice, the individual's good as opposed to the social definition of the good.

168.  Ethical judgments are usually distinguished from judgments of personal preference, taste, or prejudice by means of showing that ethical judgments:
 (a) can be explained in terms of the particular customs or practices of a group or culture.
 (b) are intended primarily to rationalize already accepted practices in a society.
 (c) serve only as ideals and cannot be the bases upon which people live daily.
 (d) need to be supported by reasons that should be universally intelligible or acceptable.

169.  Because absolutists argue that the quality or value of something is independent of being designated or recognized as such, they treat ethical judgments:
 (a) as relative to one's own conscience or set of values.
 (b) as true or false depending on one's society or on how one is raised.
 (c) as inaccessible to the human mind, ultimately unknowable and practically meaningless.
 (d) as facts about the world which are true or false regardless of human judgments.

170.  Which of the following characterizations is FALSE?
 (a) It is possible for a subjectivist to be a relativist.
 (b) It is possible for a relativist to be an objectivist.
 (c) It is possible for an absolutist to be a subjectivist.
 (d) It is possible for an objectivist to be an absolutist.

171.  Critics claim that subjective relativism is practically unacceptable and theoretically contradictory.  It is practically unacceptable in that no society could survive unless its members shared the values needed to maintain the society.   Subjective relativism is theoretically contradictory insofar as it:
  (a) assumes that individuals choose their own values and are responsible for their choice of values.
  (b) claims that moral judgments express only how someone feels about an action.
  (c) assumes a universal value (viz., freedom to decide one's values) should be respected by others.
  (d) argues that the reasons it gives for acting morally are metaethical, not normative.

172.  According to the cultural relativist Ruth Benedict, "The very eyes with which we see a problem are conditioned by the long traditional habits of our own society."  Because of this, she concludes:
  (a) without some perspective upon which to base claims, no observer can justifiably criticize another culture.
  (b) claims about cultural differences are as judgmental as they are descriptive.
  (c) all cultural differences can be reduced to basic differences in human nature.
  (d) organized behavior within a particular society prevents its own members from seeing when they have problems.

173.  According to the cultural relativist, the attempt to evaluate the moral beliefs of one's own culture is bound to fail because:
  (a) obviously some cultures have better systems of moral beliefs than others.
  (b) values are not determined by one's culture as much as they are by the individual's personal beliefs and prejudices.
  (c) even within a particular culture's belief system, no actions are really ever identified as good or bad.
  (d) in order to make such an evaluation, one has to use the very values which are themselves being judged.

174.  Critics argue that if moral relativism is correct, some beliefs and practices would not make sense—specifically:
  (a) we could not hope to resolve moral disputes, all toleration and criticism of moral beliefs would be unjustified, and there could be no real moral reform or progress.
  (b) we could not individually make judgments about what we should or should not do, present arguments to support our beliefs, or for that matter even have moral beliefs.
  (c) we could not tolerate people who have beliefs different from our own, we would have to force our values on others, and any moral reform or progress would be purely private or subjective.
  (d) we could not reduce suffering or consider the welfare of non-human beings as morally significant.

175.  Which of the following IS NOT a reason typically proposed to explain why people endorse moral relativism?
  (a) It is obvious that different cultures have different beliefs; relativism is a proper response to ethnocentrism.
  (b) There is ultimately only one right way to think about morality, one fact of the matter that does not vary from person to person: namely, relativism.
  (c) Relativism is the only viable alternative to the absolutist belief that there is only one moral standard.
  (d) With the decline of religion, fewer people believe that there is an objective set of beliefs or truths about what is right and wrong.

176.  Which of the following IS NOT an objection that can be raised against ethical relativism?
  (a) If relativism is correct, then we will not be able to resolve ethical disputes by appealing to arguments.
  (b) If relativism is correct, then we as individuals cannot believe that moral behavior reduces suffering.
  (c) If relativism is correct, then neither criticism, moral progress, nor toleration are morally justifiable.
  (d) Because it is difficult to identify the "cultures" an individual belongs to, it is not helpful to say that an individual's values are determined by his or her culture.

177.  Ethical relativists often base their position on cultural value differences.  Such a strategy is flawed because:
  (a) the subjective, personal beliefs of an individual cannot be the basis for any moral theory.
   (b) even though cultural relativism is an absolutist position, it is not an objectivist position.
  (c) the fact that moral beliefs differ among cultures does not imply that moral beliefs ought to differ.
  (d) moral rules intended to reduce suffering and promote human flourishing are adopted in all cultures.

178.  Suppose that human well-being is the correct standard for evaluating ethical theories and judgments.  Would this mean that we have to reject the cultural relativist's claim that each culture has a right to decide its own values?
  (a) No: no culture can impose its values on any other culture, even if those values promote human well-being.
  (b) No: all cultures are different in what they value (indeed, that is what makes them different in the first place); so the destruction of cultural differences would mean the end of cultures.
  (c) Yes: but each culture would have to decide whether "promoting well-being" for its members is really what it wants.
  (d) Yes: any culture that would not satisfy basic material and social needs of all of its members would not be as good as it should be.

179.  "Even if people have similar needs, sentiments, emotions, and attitudes, there is still the question of whether these should or should not be satisfied or accepted as legitimate."  How is such a claim intended as a criticism of personal or cultural relativism?
  (a) The fact that people agree in their moral beliefs does not make the beliefs justified or correct.
  (b) Since people in different cultures hold different beliefs, they try to satisfy their needs differently.
  (c) Even if people agree on what they believe, it is difficult (if not impossible) to get them to live according to what they believe.
  (d) Only those beliefs which have universal support should be accepted as true.

180.  According to the cultural or subjective relativist, the fact that moral values vary from culture to culture or from individual to individual implies that no absolute or objective moral standards should be applied to all people in all times or cultures.  The problem with this line of argument is that:
  (a) it ignores the fact that not all cultures and individuals respect and tolerate the rights and values of others.
  (b) it assumes that no set of moral values can be the basis for behavior unless its absolute principles are fixed and cannot be changed or modified.
  (c) it commits the naturalistic fallacy by reasoning from the fact that values differ to the claim that people are morally justified in acting on their cultural or individual beliefs.
  (d) it endorses the logical positivist claim that moral statements are neither analytic (true by definition) nor synthetic (true by empirical observation).

181.  Relativists think that if we recognize how moral values differ from individual to individual or culture to culture, we will see that there is no neutral, objective, or universal moral standard.  From this they conclude that we should tolerate the value systems of others.  But this conclusion seems to contradict their fundamental belief because it:
  (a) suggests that tolerating different viewpoints has value only for relativists, not objectivists.
  (b) assumes that all persons universally ought to value toleration, even those who do not actually do so.
  (c) fails to indicate how toleration can be a value only for consequentialists, not deontologists.
  (d) treats toleration as a value that no one ought to adopt, even though most individuals and cultures in fact do.

182.  Critics of ethical relativism often note that cultures seldom differ on certain basic values: only their belief systems differ.  In other words:
  (a) each culture determines the basic values necessary for the culture's existence.
  (b) no culture can exist very long unless it establishes practices that distinguish it from others.
  (c) prejudices within our own society often determine our moral views.
  (d) cultures differ in how more or less universal values are implemented in practices.

183.  "My thesis about traditional ethics is this: (1) The focus and direction of traditional ethics, indeed its function, has not been individual integrity and agency (ability to make choices and act) but rather social organization and control.  (2) The values around which traditional ethics revolves are antagonistic, the values of dominance and subordination.  As a result, (3) traditional ethics undermines rather than promotes individual moral ability and agency.  And (4) these aspects of traditional ethics combine to legitimize oppression by redefining it as social organization.  Appeal to rules and principles is at the heart of this endeavor."  In this passage:
  (a) Sarah Hoagland shows how male-dominated ethics emphasizes competing interests, sacrifice and compromise, and duty instead of caring.
  (b) Plato points out how totalitarian political systems value traditions more highly when those traditions focus on domination and oppression.
  (c) Kant portrays ethical values as products of the antagonism between those who emphasize motives and those who emphasize consequences.
  (d) Ayn Rand expresses disappointment in ethical systems that value the rights of the individual over the rights of the State.

184.  Feminists have argued that the emphasis of virtue ethics on making moral judgments on a case-by-case basis is more in keeping with the spirit of morality than (masculine) emphases on abstract principles of justice, because:
  (a) virtue requires that we make moral judgments without considering the circumstances or situations.
  (b) morality is about doing what is right, which means doing that which can be defended universally.
  (c) ethics should be about doing our duty, which (as Kant notes) varies from person to person.
  (d) a full life balances reason and the emotional particularities of caring for others and our relationships.

185.  Progress through the feminine stages of knowing described by Mary Field Belenky and others is marked, in part, by a movement from subjective experience and intuition through a stage of shared experience and empathy.  Though this latter stage includes intuition, it is considered just as objective as masculine proof strategies, since:
  (a) it relies on communication with others to determine whether one's personal feelings are justified.
  (b) it, like masculine strategies of reasoning, begins with accepting the testimony of experts as the truth.
  (c) it, like the masculine model, acknowledges that rationality and knowledge are ultimately subjective.
  (d) it emphasizes objective logic and reasoning instead of emotion, feeling, or personal experience.

186.  Masculine and feminine models of thinking differ about the importance of an individual's intuition.  In the masculine model, knowledge is abstract and universal: individual intuition is either merely an example of general knowledge or a threat to it.  But in the feminine model, individual intuition is necessary because knowledge is:
  (a) arrived at only after critically examining the facts and discarding irrelevant personal testimony.
  (b) inherently and unavoidably a product of insights and feelings shared by individuals with one another.
  (c) based on what an individual learns from authorities, tradition, or his or her society.
  (d) whatever an individual personally feels is correct, regardless of what others may say or feel.

187.  According to Carol Gilligan, feminine ways of thinking about moral decisions are based on an "ethics of care" rather than (male) impersonal, abstract principles.  That is, women think of ethical situations:
  (a) as opportunities to deny that there is any right or wrong way to act and to show how the very act of making ethical distinctions is itself a form of male domination.
  (b) not as questions with true or false answers, but as conflicts that need to be resolved in order to maintain stable interpersonal relationships.
  (c) as opportunities to replace so-called universal abstract principles of ethical judgment with more specific abstract principles (e.g., principles that apply only to one's culture).
  (d) not as gender (masculine-feminine) conflicts, but as problems that can be solved by calculating the foreseen consequences for those affected by actions.

188.  According to the (feminist) ethics of care, emotional involvement and sensitivity to the differing needs of other people in different situations are necessary elements in making objective moral judgments because:
  (a) morality is based on nothing more than how each individual feels about things.
  (b) sensitivity and caring are subjective expressions of rational, objective, unemotional ways of thinking.
  (c) particular needs and situations seem to differ, but they are similar enough for general moral judgments.
  (d) without sympathetic, emotional involvement, we cannot understand exactly what action occurs or why it is done.

189.  Critics of feminist ethics point out that, while an ethics of care might sound nice, it is less useful than an ethics of justice for addressing problems generated in modern Western societies.  To this criticism, feminists reply that:
  (a) without being able to rely on traditional ethical theories (e.g., utilitarianism, Kantian duty ethics), we would not know how to make moral decisions.
  (b) social practices should focus on cultivating relations with others rather than encouraging competition and self-interested individualism.
  (c) marketplace competition and rational self-interested behavior are matters of economic and political concern and are thus not issues that are of ethical significance.
  (d) being responsible for or caring for others in our society is best accomplished by encouraging competition and self-interested individualism.
 

Answers:
 
 

1.  A 2.  B 3.  B 4.  B 5.  A 6.  A 7.  B 8.  A 9.  A 10.  B 11.  A 12.  A 13.  B 14.  A 15.  A 16.  A 17.  A 18.  A 19.  B 20.  B 21.  A

22.  B 23.  B 24.  B 25.  A 26.  A 27.  A 28.  B 29.  A 30.  A 31.  B 32.  A 33.  B 34.  B 35.  A 36.  A 37.  B 38.  A 39.  A 40.  B 41.  B 42.  B

43.  A 44.  B 45.  B 46.  B 47.  A 48.  A 49.  A 50.  B 51.  B 52.  A 53.  B 54.  A 55.  A 56.  B 57.  A 58.  B 59.  B 60.  A 61.  B 62.  A 63.  A

64.  B 65.  A 66.  A 67.  A 68.  B 69.  A 70.  A 71.  A 72.  B 73.  A 74.  B 75.  A 76.  B 77.  B 78.  A 79.  B 80.  B 81.  B 82.  B 83.  A 84.  A

85.  A 86.  A 87.  A 88.  B 89.  A 90.  B 91.  B 92.  A 93.  A 94.  B 95.  A 96.  A 97.  B 98.  B 99.  A 100.  B 101.  B 102.  A 103.  A 104.  D 105.  B

106.  B 107.  B 108.  A 109.  C 110.  B 111.  D 112.  B 113.  C 114.  B 115.  D 116.  B 117.  D 118.  C 119.  C 120.  D 121.  D 122.  C 123.  A 124.  C 125.  B 126.  C

127.  A 128.  B 129.  C 130.  B 131.  B 132.  D 133.  A 134.  C 135.  B 136.  C 137.  C 138.  C 139.  D 140.  A 141.  B 142.  B 143.  C 144.  A 145.  B 146.  C 147.  D

148.  D 149.  C 150.  A 151.  C 152.  B 153.  A 154.  A 155.  D 156.  C 157.  D 158.  A 159.  D 160.  D 161.  C 162.  A 163.  C 164.  A 165.  C 166.  A 167.  A 168.  D

169.  D 170.  C 171.  C 172.  B 173.  D 174.  A 175.  B 176.  B 177.  C 178.  C 179.  A 180.  C 181.  B 182.  D 183.  A 184.  D 185.  A 186.  B 187.  B 188.  D 189.  B