Past Test Questions: Nature of Reality, Freedom, Time
Answers at end. [Items in
brackets not covered in 2005 textbook or course.]
True/False (True=A, False=B)
1. Unlike metaphysics, ontology is limited to claims about minds and is not concerned with the existence or reality of bodies in motion.
2. To ask whether whether a thing (e.g., the number A3@ or an immaterial mind) really exists or only seems to exist is to engage in an ontological or metaphysical enquiry.
3. Because metaphysics is concerned with the fundamental principles of the nature of reality, it can raise questions about whether God exists or why there is anything at all in the universe.
4. Metaphysical or ontological questions can ultimately be reduced to questions of epistemology because questions about what we know ultimately depend on the nature of reality or existence.
5. Metaphysical dualists (e.g., Descartes) argue that the two kinds of things in the worldCnamely, spiritual things (minds, ideas) and material things (bodies)Ccannot be explained in terms of one another.
6. Philosophical dualists like Descartes argue that mind and matter are fundamentally two different aspects of the same non-mental and non-physical substance.
7. Descartes argues that, because mental things are not in space nor do they have weight, shape, or other sensible characteristics, they are a different kind of thing than physical (material) objects.
8. Dualists claim that physical things are real, and immaterial, mental, or spiritual things are imaginary (not real).
9. By describing reality as either mental or physical, dualists (e.g., Descartes) equate ontology with epistemology.
10. For Descartes, since the mental and the physical can be conceived as distinct, it is possible that they are distinct.
11. Though ontological dualists claim that only two kinds of things are real, they admit that mental and physical things can ultimately be reduced to one kind of reality.
12. In contrast to metaphysical dualists, materialists and idealists agree that physical bodies and spiritual minds are able to interact by sharing some third, non-material, non-mental character.
13. Metaphysical dualists (e.g., Descartes) argue in favor of their position by pointing out that both materialists and idealists are unable to explain how physical bodies and spiritual minds interact.
14. [Ontological pluralism argues that universal claims about reality are subjective and relative to each person.]
15. [Metaphysical dualists and pluralists can ultimately be identified as monists because both dualism and pluralism end up saying that all reality is fundamentally one kind of thing.]
16. [For Aristotle, each thing has a particular essence or nature that defines it as that particular kind of thing.]
17. [According to ontological pluralism, reality consists of a variety of things or different kinds of things that cannot be reduced to one or two categories.]
18. [Aristotle=s ontology exemplifies pluralism insofar as (for Aristotle) differences in the kinds or species of things change depending on how we decide to arrange them.]
19. Materialism is the view that, because only physical matter and its properties exist, minds are merely manifestations of matter and are reducible to physical features.
20. Metaphysical materialists claim that all things except minds or ideas are ultimately physical or bodily.
21. [To say that materialism is a form of ontological monism means that it identifies what is real in terms of the practical (pragmatic) value of things.]
22. A metaphysical materialist is someone who claims that all behavior (including inanimate and human behavior) should be understood in terms of matter in motion.
23. According to materialists, even though mind and thought can be explained in purely physical terms (as bodies in motion), life itself must be explained in other than purely physical terms.
24. A philosophical materialist is someone who claims that all reality except for spiritual thoughts and emotions is what we experience by sensation (e.g., bodies in motion).
25. According to Eastern (Charvaka) materialism, because what we know is limited to sense experience, everything we think of as real must be sensibly experienceable and thus physical.
26. Because Eastern (Charvaka) materialism limits what is real only to experience, it is not a metaphysical theory.
27. In Hobbes= materialist metaphysics, only bodies in motion are real.
28. A metaphysical idealist is someone who claims that, because “bodies” are simply objects of mind (i.e., ideas), they do not exist apart from minds.
29. According to subjective idealism, there is no way to distinguish dreams or hallucinations from perceptions or experiences of what we call the Areal@ world.
30. In Hegel=s version of Absolute idealism, everything is real in virtue of its function in the process by which Absolute Mind comes to recognize itself in and through world history.
31. A philosophical idealist would claim that the difference between a real table and an imaginary one is that the real one is material or physical and the imaginary one exists only mentally.
32. A philosophical idealist would claim that a table is a collection of ideas that are themselves said to exist only if there is some material or physical brain in which they reside.
33. In Plato=s version of objective idealism, the things we experience in the world are real, because without them, the realm of the Forms would only be imaginary.
34. According
to
35. According
to
36. Like Plato, the Indian idealist Vasubandhu says that sensible objects are dream-like images, not real things.
37. The Indian philosopher Vasubandhu argues that through meditation and living an ethical life, we are able to transform the things we perceive with our senses into realities outside of our minds.
38. According to James=s pragmatism, something is real if it exists apart from our beliefs or actions.
39. For pragmatists, competing claims about the nature of reality are meaningful only if our acting on one belief rather than another would result in different consequences for how we live our lives.
40. ABachelors are fun-loving people@ is a synthetic proposition because the predicate is contained in the subject.
41. AUnicorns have horns@ is not an analytic proposition because unicorns do not exist.
42. According to logical positivism, meaningful statements are either based on sense experience or tautologies.
43. AUnicorns have horns@ is not a tautology because unicorns do not exist.
44. AA triangle has three sides@ is not a tautology, because to determine its truth, we have to appeal to experience.
45. According to logical positivists, even though theoretical entities such as atoms do not exist apart from our theories, statements about them are meaningful inasmuch as they predict or explain sense data.
46. According to logical positivists, ethical judgments are meaningful (and thus can be justified) because they describe a fact about the world--namely, certain actions produce happiness and ought to be done.
47. Despite the fact that postmodern antirealism describes reality as the product of many languages and cultures, it is a form of metaphysics because it is still committed to the project of describing the nature of reality.
48. Contemporary realists (e.g., Armstrong) argue that, in perceiving we encounter the world directly (not merely our ideas), even though what we perceive is always interpreted by the mind.
49. Unlike the representationalist or phenomenalist, the commonsense or direct realist claims that the immediate object of perception exists independently of our awareness of it.
50. According to naive or commonsense realism, minds and ideas are not real because they are not immediate physical objects of perception.
51. [According to G. E. Moore, it is acceptable to say that we know that there is an external world (outside of our ideas) even if it is logically possible that we could be dreaming or hallucinating.]
52. [According to G. E. Moore, it is logically impossible (i.e., inconceivable) that we could be dreaming or hallucinating when we claim to know that there is an external world (i.e., outside of our ideas).]
53. Positivism and pragmatism can be called anti-metaphysical because they support a materialist view of reality rather than a dualist or idealist view.
54. Both positivists (e.g., A. J. Ayer) and pragmatists (e.g., William James) agree that metaphysical/ontological claims such as AGod exists@ or Aminds are real@ are literally meaningless.
55. Although metaphysical realists and antirealists disagree on whether objects of our senses exist independently of our descriptions or language, they agree that reality can exist in a meaningful way apart from us.
56. According to metaphysical anti-realists, reality is not something independent of our thinking but is rather a social, institutional (e.g., linguistic) construct that might even be based on masculine prejudices.
57. In contrast to anti-realists, realists argue that material objects are the only things that exist.
58. Anti-metaphysical positions (e.g., positivism, pragmatism) raise doubts about ontology in general because they support a materialist paradigm rather than a dualist or pluralist paradigm.
59. By means of his phenomenology, Husserl argues that we can achieve certainty regarding metaphysical claims about reality as long as we limit those claims to consciousness and its objects.
60. In Heidegger=s phenomenology, metaphysics is understood as the study of being in terms of intentionality (i.e., being engaged or oriented toward the world).
61. For Sartre, the brute facticity of reality has meaning independently of how we choose to think of it.
62. The freedom-determinism question is a metaphysical issue insofar as it acknowledges that there might be a difference between how human behavior appears and how it really is.
63. Unlike fatalists (who claim that every event is determined to occur in only one way), determinists claim that a human choice or action could have been different if its causes had been different.
64. Sartre argues that a person is ultimately free to act in the way she chooses, no matter what her personal inclinations or how she was raised.
65. According to Sartre, to be existentially free means to be able to do or be anything, and to interpret the world in any way, regardless of our training or upbringing.
66. According to Sartre, the choice to believe that we are not free and that we are determined by forces over which we have no control is itself a free choice.
67. If, as Sartre=s existentialism claims, Aman is responsible for his passion,@ then no matter what we as human beings do, we act either against our wills or out of scorn for God.
68. Though he says that we are Acondemned to be free@ and that we can Atranscend@ our social or personal situation, Sartre acknowledges that we are not always responsible for what we do.
69. By saying that we are Acondemned to be free,@ Sartre indicates how existentialism treats human beings as determined by external forces.
70. According to Sartre, bad faith is self-contradictory because it involves the free choice by an individual to believe that he is not free.
71. For Sartre, belief in God permits individuals to depend on a standard of morality for which they are not responsible and for which they are not accountable.
72. According to Sartre, real freedom requires that there must be no God, because if God exists and creates everything in the world (including humans), then we are not free to choose the kind of beings we become.
73. Sartre argues that a person is ultimately free to act in the way she chooses, except if her personal inclinations or the way she was raised forces her to act contrary to what she would have otherwise wanted to do.
74. In saying that Aexistence precedes essence,@ Sartre means that human beings are free to choose even not to act in any way whatsoever.
75. In saying that for humans Aexistence precedes essence,@ Sartre emphasizes how the external conditions of our existence (e.g., our genetic make-up or social conditioning) determines how we act.
76. According to Sartre, since human beings are no specific kinds of things at all, their essential value is determined by how they are viewed and revered by their parents.
77. In Sartre=s existentialism, to think that our actions are determined by our human nature or essence is bad faith.
78. Unlike Sartre, Simone de Beauvoir argues that a person is ultimately free to act in the way she chooses, no matter how she was raised or how social (e.g., gender) relations are structured.
79. According to Simone de Beauvoir’s version of existentialism, we must acknowledge that social obstacles often restrict the freedom of some people (e.g., women) to choose.
80. In contrast to Sartre=s version of existentialism, Simone de Beauvoir points out that we must recognize social constraints that stand in the way of the freedom to choose (e.g., in regard to women).
81. Hard determinism proposes that human beings cannot do what they want to do.
82. Unlike libertarians or compatibilists, determinists think that our actions are free only when they are caused.
83. According to determinism, all actions except for truly human (free) actions are events that have specific causes for why they happen the way they do.
84. Determinists believe that human behavior can be explained only if we think of it in the same law-governed ways in which we think of other things in nature.
85. Determinists claim that, even though we think we are free to act in different ways, we are nonetheless determined to act exactly as we do because every event (including human actions) is caused.
86. Unlike recent determinists (e.g., Freud, Skinner), ancient determinists (e.g., Leucippus, Democritus) claim that human beings are free even if they do not acknowledge that fact or understand how it is possible.
87. Classical
determinists (e.g., d=Holbach,
88. According to determinists, human actions are determined to occur in exactly the way they do because they (like all other events) have specific causes.
89. Determinists acknowledge that, if there were actions that could be explained only in terms of intentions and purposes, then those actions could be considered free; but, in fact, there are no such actions.
90. In hard determinism, freedom and determinism are incompatible because freedom would require that an action be uncaused.
91. According to hard determinists like Skinner and Freud, even though people may be responsible for their actions, they should not be held responsible for their actions, because no one is ultimately free.
92. [B. F. Skinner claims that positive reinforcement is more effective in conditioning human behavior than negative reinforcement because human beings naturally seek happiness.]
93. Skinner argues that, even though environment or conditioning are causes that determine our behavior, they cannot explain our behavior because they are not the reasons why we act as we do.
94. Determinists argue that while most human choices and actions are caused to occur in exactly the way they do, the recognition that we are determined is itself uncaused and thus undetermined.
95. According to hard determinists, no human action is free, but human choices are free.
96. Even though Freud is a hard determinist, he does admit that some acts are done freely if they are caused by unconscious drives, repressed memories, or anti-social urges.
97. In Freudian psychoanalysis, impulses, memories, desires, and fears may determine our unconscious behavior, but on the level of consciousness (the ego) we are free to act any way we want.
98. According to Freud, human behavior is determined by anti-social urges, painful childhood memories, unresolved emotional conflicts, and unconscious (repressed) desires and fears.
99. B. F. Skinner argues that people are not free and are not responsible for their actions since human behavior is determined by environment, conditioning, and heredity.
100. According to compatibilists, freedom and determinism are compatible because they cause one another.
101. Compatibilists argue that we are never responsible for our actions, because even when those actions are caused by our choices, our choices themselves are caused by forces over which we have no control.
102. According to the soft determinist, a Afree@ action is caused by one=s will or choice rather than by external forces, influences, or constraints.
103. Soft determinists (or “compatibilists”) claim that human actions can be free and determined at the same time.
104. Soft determinists allow for the possibility of freedom by arguing, against hard determinists, that some of our actions (i.e., the free ones) do not have causes.
105. Soft determinists are sometimes called Acompatibilists@ because they argue that saying that human acts are free can be compatible with saying that all human acts are caused or determined.
106. Compatibilists argue that we act freely or voluntarily when our action is based on our choices.
107. Compatibilists claim that actions that are caused by someone=s internal neurotic impulses are free because such impulses are part of one=s personality.
108. Because soft determinists (as opposed to hard determinists) believe that some of our actions are free, they acknowledge that some of our actions are not caused or determined by anything.
109. Soft determinists claim that acting Afreely@ means acting as a result of choosing--that is, according to what one wills to do.
110. According to soft determinists (Acompatibilists@), a human action is free only if nothing causes it.
111. Compatibilists argue that we can justifiably be held responsible only for those acts that are done voluntarily (that is, that result from our choosing to do them).
112. Soft determinists (i.e., compatibilists) claim that people are free when they can do what they want.
113. For compatibilists the key to the freedom debate lies in recognizing that, even though all our actions may be determined, our choices or decisions are not.
114. Compatibilists (e.g., Thomas Hobbes) suggest that necessity is compatible with freedom in that we are free to the extent that we are able to do what we want.
115. Contemporary compatibilists claim that we are free when we can do what we truly want (that is, what we would want if we were properly informed).
116. In the Stoic, Spinozistic version of soft determinism, acknowledging that we are completely determined Afrees@ us from worry that things could have been otherwise.
117. Hard and soft determinists disagree about whether we are free, but they agree that all our actions have causes.
118. Hume claims that rewarding or punishing a person requires that we accept determinism insofar as we assume actions are caused by the person doing the act.
119. Though determinists and indeterminists disagree on how to understand freedom, they agree that the way to study the issue is by focusing on the causes of acts rather than the reasons for which acts are done.
120. Like both hard and soft determinists, indeterminists claim that the issue of whether human actions are free should focus on determining how or even if actions have causes.
121. Like hard and soft determinists, indeterminists argue that truly free actions are chance or random events.
122. Indeterminists claim that insofar as nothing causes human actions, those actions are free.
123. According to indeterminists, Afree@ actions are events that have no cause at all.
124. According to indeterminists, Afree@ actions are events that are caused by our choices.
125. According to indeterminists, free actions are not determined or accounted for by either causes or reasons.
126.
Because soft determinism is a version of
indeterminism, it cannot be used to support any theory of punishment that
assumes that people are free.
127. Indeterminists argue that a Afree@ person does things that a causally-determined person could not do.
128. According to indeterminists, certain human actions—much like the behaviors of sub-atomic particles—are chance events: that is, specific causes do not determine them and they could have occurred otherwise.
129. Indeterminists and libertarians agree that what makes an action free is the fact that nothing causes or determines it to occur in exactly the way it happens.
130. According to libertarians, we should begin the discussion of freedom with our experience of defining ourselves through our choices, not with assuming (like determinists) that we are like other things in nature.
131. For libertarians real freedom consists in being able to act or choose differently in exactly the same circumstances and with exactly the same causal influences.
132. Libertarians claim that our experience of deliberation, spontaneous action, and moral responsibility indicates that some of our actions are not determined or caused by forces over which we have no control.
133. According to libertarians, a free will (as opposed to a free act) is an ability to choose that is not determined by antecedent causes.
134. According to libertarianism, a free act cannot be caused by anything (not even by an agent or person) because there is no such thing as a free act.
135. According to the agency or person theory of freedom, since a free act cannot be caused by anything (not even by an agent or person), there is no such thing as a free act.
136. According to the version of libertarianism called active self-determinism, we are able to criticize ourselves because Awe@ as subjects make choices about the kind of person we become.
137. The moral responsibility argument for libertarianism decides the issue of whether we are free ultimately on whether we believe we are free and morally responsible more than we believe that all events have determining causes.
138. To be free to do something can mean either to be free from restraints that interfere with the satisfaction of a desire or to have the ability to achieve some desired end, or perhaps both.
139. Existentialism is a form of determinism because it claims that we are ultimately not responsible for our actions.
140. Kant=s concept of time is both subjective and objective, in that it describes time as a mental (subjective) construct in which all phenomena are experienced as objectively real.
141. According to Bergson, our experience of the passage of time proves that time exists independently of experience.
Multiple Choice
142. The question AWhat does it mean for something to exist?@ is different from the question AWhat does it mean for us to know that something exists?@ The difference between the two questions highlights the difference between two branches of philosophy, namely:
(a)
epistemology and aesthetics.
(b)
epistemology and logic.
(c)
axiology and ontology/metaphysics.
(d)
ontology/metaphysics and epistemology.
143. To say that questions about the ontological status of minds are metaphysical questions means that:
(a)
even though the existence of bodies is not doubted, the
existence of minds is.
(b)
mental things are known only through introspection, whereas
physical things are known by sensation.
(c)
to determine whether minds are real we cannot rely
solely on physical, experimental observations.
(d)
we cannot determine what it would mean to say that minds
exist or do not exist.
144. Which of the following IS NOT a typical objection raised against mind-body dualism?
(a)
Mental activity
(e.g., thinking) might actually be a material process.
(b)
If the soul or
mind is not the body, then there is no reason to think that at death the mind
is destroyed.
(c)
There is no clear
way to explain how a spiritual mind can interact with a material body.
(d)
If we can know
only our own minds through introspection, then we cannot know if others have
minds.
145. Critics argue that metaphysical materialists cannot explain consciousness in purely physical terms because:
(a)
materialists deny the reality of freedom, an afterlife, and even
the experience of the passage of time.
(b)
consciousness has certain properties (e.g., intentionality) that
physical objects do not have.
(c)
physical terms are limited to what we experience, and no one
ever experiences being conscious.
(d)
mental states (e.g., ideas, beliefs) are the products of
genetics, conditioning, or upbringing, and thus cannot be described in physical
or behaviorist terms.
146. Some critics point out that sub-atomic particle physics undermines attempts by materialists to describe all reality in terms of physical properties, because in some respects sub-atomic particles of matter lack so-called:
(a) Ametaphysical@ properties (e.g., being).
(b) Amental@ properties (e.g., intentionality).
(c) Aphysical@ properties (e.g., location).
(d) Aautonomous@ properties (e.g., rationality).
147. Some critics of materialism argue that materialists cannot account in physical terms for emotions or social or legal relations (such as being married). But materialists would reply that this is no real problem for them, since emotions and social/legal relations are simply:
(a)
bodily phenomena, behaviors, or physical arrangements.
(b)
physical manifestations of real spiritual (immaterial) events.
(c)
mental states that are correlated with (though not
identical to) brain states or behaviors.
(d)
not explainable terms of metaphysics since they are not
real (that is, they do not exist).
148. Idealism explains physical reality as a function of thought just as materialism explains thought as a function of matter. In this way both theories can reduce the physical or the mental to one monistic account only by assuming a basic ontological distinction, namely that between:
(a)
rationalism and empiricism.
(b)
reason and experience.
(c)
truth and falsity.
(d)
appearance and reality.
149. For Plato, because we truly know something only in terms of its unchanging, perfect essence and because everything that appears to us in the sensible world changes or is imperfect, the only things we can know that are truly real are:
(a) the things that everyone in our society agrees to call by
the same names and to describe using the same language.
(b) the eternally existing Ideas or Forms that sensible
objects both embody and in terms of which are known.
(c) the ordinary objects in the world that we experienceCbut only during the moments when we experience them.
(d) tautologies (truths by definition) and those things of which we
have personal, sensible experience.
150. Plato is called a metaphysical idealist because he argues that things are real only to the extent that they are:
(a)
intelligible in terms of the unchanging essence or Aidea@ that makes them be what they are.
(b)
experienced by someone using his or her senses, even if that
experience changes constantly.
(c)
things that exist in someone=s mind
or as figments of someone=s imagination.
(d)
idealizations or optimistic expectations of what we expect things
will be like in heaven.
151. For Plato, ordinary sensible objects exist and are knowable as examples or instances of Ideas or AForms@ that do not exist in our ordinary sensible world. Forms do not exist in the sensible world because Forms:
(a)
are generalizations of our sensible experiences that
depend on our imaginations when we are asked the right kinds of questions.
(b)
would not exist unless there were individual things in the
sensible, experienced world by means of which the Forms could be known.
(c)
are not individual things but are rather the universal
essences or natures by which individual things are what they are and are known.
(d)
are constantly changing and are thus useless in providing
any knowledge about things in our ordinary sensible experience.
152. AAll of the choir of heaven and
furniture of the earth, in a word all those bodies which compose the mighty
frame of the world, have no substance without a mind. Their being is to be
perceived.@ In this
passage
(a) denies that bodies exist.
(b) shows why the world is a pure fiction.
(c) explains how there is nothing outside my individual mind.
(d) insists that reality depends on mind.
153. Plato=s objective idealism differs
from
(a)
for Plato, ideas or Forms are real; for
(b)
for Plato, ideas or Forms exist outside of minds; for
(c)
for Plato, ideas or Forms are immaterial entities;
for
(d)
for Plato, ideas or Forms are conceptual generalizations;
for
154. Critics of idealism note that, just because we think of reality in terms of experience, that does not mean that reality itself depends on our minds. In short, they claim, the objective things we perceive are not necessarily things:
(a) about which we would feel optimistic.
(b) as we subjectively perceive them.
(c) that exist only in the mind of God.
(d) that exist independently from our perceptions.
155. Although pragmatism and positivism differ in other respects, they are both anti-metaphysical insofar as:
(a)
they define reality in ontological, rather than
metaphysical, terms.
(b)
they recognize how true reality is always beyond anything
we can experience.
(c)
they insist that concepts and distinctions are meaningless
unless they have a practical application.
(d)
they reject the feminist description of reality as a
masculine social construction.
156. Which of the following IS NOT an objection raised against the logical positivist claim that statements are meaningful only if they are either true/false by definition or based on experience?
(a)
Since the
principle itself is neither a tautology nor empirical, it is itself
meaningless.
(b)
On this
principle, metaphysical or theological claims (e.g., God exists) would be
meaningless or mere expressions of feeling or emotion, not claims of truth; and
most reasonable people don=t buy that.
(c)
On this principle,
aesthetic or ethical claims (e.g., killing is wrong) would be meaningless or
mere expressions of feeling or emotion, not claims of truth; and most
reasonable people don=t buy that.
(d)
Since
metaphysical claims about the nature of reality ought to be meaningful, it is
important that we have some explicit way to distinguish meaningful and
meaningless statements from one another.
157. [Ordinary language philosophers claim that the best way to address the issue of how we should speak about the nature of reality is to see how we, in fact, ordinarily speak about something=s being real. If we ordinarily say that something is real in one context and not real in another, then (according to these theorists):
(a)
we must recognize how what we mean by a Areal@ thing is itself a flexible concept.
(b)
a thing=s reality should be determined (as naďve realism
suggests) by its essence or form.
(c)
the context in which there is the most physical reality
should be more important.
(d)
one of these ways of speaking simply must be wrong.]
158. Antirealists claim that what we mean by Areality@ depends on how we describe it. If we ordinarily say that something is real in one context and that it is not real in another, then (according to these theorists):
(a)
we must recognize that what we mean by a Areal@ thing is itself a flexible concept.
(b)
the reality of the thing should be determined (as naive
realism suggests) by its essence or form.
(c)
that context in which there is the most physical reality
should be more important.
(d)
one of these ways of speaking simply must be wrong.
159. Anti-realists (e.g., Hilary Putnam, Charles Taylor) doubt whether ontological or metaphysical claims can be justified by being grounded in reality, because the notion of reality is itself:
(a)
a contradictory and impossible concept: if anything is
real, then nothing is real.
(b)
based on what we know a priori as opposed to what we
know a posteriori.
(c)
a social, institutional (e.g., linguistic) construct
that we appeal to for practical (often political) reasons.
(d)
not an issue of concern in ontological or metaphysical
enquiries.
160. In the realist/anti-realist debate, realists (e.g., John Searle) claim that we have to assume that something exists independent of our thinking, because to think anything at all we have to assume that:
(a) our minds exist, even if nothing else does.
(b) reality is the background for our thought.
(c) reality varies from one person to another.
(d) whatever exists is real (except thinking itself).
161. [Some feminists (e.g., Catherine McKinnon) claim that thinking of reality as a determinate, identifiable, and meaningful thing apart from our input or control is dangerous because such a view:
(a)
contradicts what most people believeCnamely, that reality is whatever we choose to make of
it.
(b)
encourages people to accept discrimination and exploitation
simply as Athe way things are.@
(c)
places God at the center of reality and reduces humans
(particularly women) to a secondary status.
(d)
fails to recognize how only indeterminate and
unidentifiable things ever really have an effect on us.]
162. [Rorty=s critique of positivism (Aphenomenalism@) is based on his rejection of the presupposition that knowledge requires a foundation in either innate ideas or sense data. Instead of thinking of knowledge as a relation between a belief and a fact about the world, we should think of knowledge (he claims) as a relation between:
(a)
a belief and the social, historical arguments given to
support it.
(b)
what we think we know and what we actually do know.
(c)
our sense perceptions and our innate ideas.
(d)
the way the mind organizes experiences according to the
surface grammar of language and the way that language itself is structured by
the deep grammar of neurology.]
163. Existentialists differ on whether we should believe in God. Kierkegaard (and perhaps, Camus) endorses religious belief. Nietzsche and Sartre, though, argue that our existential condition requires us not to believe in God, because:
(a)
if God exists and we cannot prove it to ourselves, then
punishment for such ignorance would be unjust.
(b)
no one can believe in God without making the very leap
of faith that atheistic existentialism requires.
(c)
any of our beliefs about God would be an interpretation
that God himself creates in us by creating us.
(d)
belief in God shifts our attention away from claiming
responsibility for our existence and improving it.
164. The kind of existentialism that Kierkegaard and Camus develop emphasizes how our response to human existence is paradoxical, to the extent that we have to:
(a)
recognize that there is no God who gives our existence meaning,
but nonetheless we must imagine a God.
(b)
believe that existence is meaningful in order to trick
ourselves (subjectively) into thinking that it is not.
(c)
ignore the absurdities in human existence by seeing how a subjective
faith in God removes all doubts.
(d)
acknowledge that our existence is ultimately absurd but
nevertheless commit ourselves passionately to it.
165. Critics claim that existentialism cannot provide a determinate metaphysics, because if reality itself is open-ended and indeterminate, then it can never be described. To this, existentialists reply:
(a)
the task of metaphysics is not to provide an explanation
of reality, but to show how there is no reality.
(b)
the possibility of thinking of reality in terms of what it
is not reveals how reality is tied to consciousness.
(c)
even though consciousness is illusory, the things that
consciousness focuses on are real and not open-ended.
(d)
because it is difficult if not impossible to eliminate our
prejudices, a fixed and unchanging definition of reality can be justified only
through a Aleap of faith.@
166. In Sartre=s existentialism, reality is not simply some thing Aout there.@ Rather, it is the subjective, passionate engagement in terms of which the world gains meaning through our choice to think of it under negation, that is:
(a)
not as what it is, but as what we can choose to make of
it.
(b)
as the oppressive, pessimistic (in general, negative) facticity that frustrates all our efforts at creation.
(c)
not as the product of individual creativity, but the
product of social institutions and gender constraints.
(d)
as a sequence of events or as an arrangement of things
over which we ultimately have no control.
167. According to Sartre, the world consists of our interpretation of and response to facticity. We are Athrown@ into a situation in which everything (our selves included) must be evaluated as more or less significant. To respond to this situation in Abad faith@ is to act in an inauthentic, contradictory, self-refuting manner. In other words, bad faith is:
(a)
the belief in humanistic (this-worldly) values over
God-given, religious values.
(b)
the choice to believe that we have no choice regarding
the way the world is.
(c)
the belief in the priority of one=s own subjective values over objective values and
facts.
(d)
the belief that our own personal choices have
significance for all other people.
168. Sartre claims that, instead of saying that human beings are free, it would be more correct to say that human beings are freedom, because to say that human beings are free:
(a)
describes human beings as lacking all moral responsibility for
what they become.
(b)
ignores the fact that, for the most part, human beings are
determined to act in certain definite ways because of their upbringing.
(c)
implies that freedom is a characteristic found in a
determinate human essence.
(d)
condemns human beings to labor under the burden of freely
choosing their own nature in terms of their actions.
169. Sartre notes that, in our existential predicament, humanity can become anything it chooses. In turn, Skinner suggests that a behaviorist, deterministic, and scientific view of human beings Aoffers exciting possibilities. We have not yet seen what man can make of man.@ Sartre, though, would reject behaviorism because, in his view:
(a)
behaviorism is scientific and based on observation, whereas
existentialism is based on the belief that we are determined to believe that we
are free.
(b)
existentialism may not explain the human condition as well as
behaviorism, but that does not mean that it is wrong.
(c)
what it means to be human is not something that is
revealed by observable behavior.
(d)
behaviorism denies human freedom in saying that we are controlled
by environment.
170. According to Sartre, the claim that human existence precedes essence requires that there be no God, because if God exists and creates everything in the world (including humans), then:
(a)
humans are not free to choose the kind of beings they become
and are responsible for.
(b)
the cause of evil in the world is due to human action and
not God=s actions.
(c)
existentialism precedes essentialism as an explanation of human
nature.
(d)
there is no limit on human actions or human nature, even if
God creates us.
171. According to Sartre, one of the implications of human freedom is that whatever we do must be understood as a model or moral standard for all humanity to live up to, because:
(a)
the experience of absolute freedom makes us realize that
nothing we do ultimately matters.
(b)
as we get older we learn that our parents= approval of our actions is based on their own absolute
values.
(c)
since there is no human essence or nature, through our
actions we define what it means to be human.
(d)
unless we experience the anguish of being free, we cannot
ever appreciate what it means to be human.
172. Sartre claims that Awe are condemned to be free.@ He means that, regardless of our background or culture:
(a)
we should not ignore the fact that all cultures
ultimately share the same moral values.
(b)
we cannot avoid making value judgments (choices) for
which we must take responsibility.
(c)
nothing that we do will ultimately make a difference in our
salvation: God has already decided that.
(d)
whatever we do, it will be wrong.
173. According to determinism, human choices and actions are like all other events in the universe, insofar as:
(a)
they are determined by specific causes to occur in exactly
the way they do.
(b)
they have causes that are ultimately outside of nature
(for example, God or fate) and therefore cannot be affected by human behavior.
(c)
we never have any idea about what causes them.
(d)
there is really nothing that ultimately causes them: they
just Ahappen.@
174. [Determinism differs from predestination and fatalism insofar as it explains human behavior in terms of:
(a) causes, not reasons.
(b) actions, not choices.
(c) natural events, not supernatural events.
(d) the past, not the future.]
175. According to proponents of hard determinism (e.g., Holbach), we think we are free (though really we are not) because:
(a)
we do not know the causes of our actions and thus assume
our actions have no causes.
(b)
the causes of our actions are so complex that there
really isn=t any
cause for our actions.
(c)
the choices we make are themselves uncaused, though
actions based on the choices are determined.
(d)
everything that exists naturally is causally determined
(including our thinking we are free).
176. Determinists argue that, even though we think we are free to act in different ways, we are nonetheless determined to act as we do because every event (including human actions) has a determining cause. Critics object that this way of thinking about cause does not necessarily support determinism. Which of the following IS NOT an objection against determinism based on a critique of our understanding of causality?
(a)
Because we have
not experienced all events, we cannot conclude that every event has a
cause.
(b)
Though we
regularly experience the conjunction of some events with other events, we
cannot say that their connection is necessary, because we do not experience how
they are bound to one another.
(c)
Though our minds
may be structured in a way that requires us to experience things in the
world as related causally, that does not mean that things in the world are
actually related causally.
(d)
If people really
are determined to act as they do (and thus are not free), then we cannot legitimately
hold them responsible for their actions.
177. Hard determinists claim that, because all human actions are events and all events have determining causes, all human actions are determined (i.e., not free). However, people mistakenly think they are free for a number of reasons. Which of the following IS NOT a reason typically given by determinists to explain this mistake?
(a)
We think that if
people are not free, they cannot be justifiably held responsible for their
actions.
(b)
We don=t know all of the determining causes of our behavior.
(c)
We want to
explain everything (including our behavior) in terms of laws of nature.
(d)
We like to
believe we are different from the rest of nature.
178. Unlike Plato, Freud denies that our sense of a conflict between reason and passion proves we are free because:
(a)
as existentialists point out, all of our actions might
be free, but that does not apply to our choices.
(b)
our awareness of a conflict between reason and passion is
itself something we can decide to reject.
(c)
the choice of reason over passion is a purely random,
chance event over which we have no control.
(d)
our choice to act rationally is itself caused by
unconscious, irrational desires and suppressed feelings.
179. Critics respond to Freud=s explanation of the causes of human behavior by emphasizing how his account is:
(a)
not a form of determinism because it claims that we are
ultimately not responsible for our actions.
(b)
an attempt to give a rational account of behavior
instead of a causal account.
(c)
useful for explaining abnormal, irrational behavior but not
normal, rational behavior.
(d)
like Sartre=s
account, an argument for thinking that there is no human essence or nature.
180. According to hard determinists such as Skinner, if human behavior is determined by causes, then it makes no sense to say that people are responsible for their actions. But this does not imply that we are unjustified in holding someone responsible for their actions, since:
(a)
it is unfair to blame or praise someone for an action
that he or she could not have chosen to do otherwise.
(b)
we are justifiably held responsible only for
those actions for which we are responsible.
(c)
by holding someone responsible for an action, we cause
the person to become more free (and thus to be more responsible) in the
future.
(d)
holding someone responsible for an action can fulfill a
social or political purpose even if the person could not have done otherwise.
181. Hard determinists argue that, just because people are not responsible for their actions, that does not mean that the rest of us can=t hold them responsible for their actions. They argue that by holding people responsible for their actions (e.g., through rewards, punishments, or psychological treatment), we:
(a)
are acting in an admittedly unjust and unfair manner, but
that is what society dictates we must do.
(b)
respect people=s
freedom to act in any way whatsoever and give them what they deserve.
(c)
can exert other conditioning forces so that their lives
are modified to be more useful and happy.
(d)
recognize that eros and thanatos cannot completely overwhelm our
socially-instilled conscience (the super-ego) and the reality principle.
182. [Theories of freedom and theories of punishment focus attention on the differences between being responsible and being held responsible for our actions. In this regard, the theory of deterrence presumes a theory of hard determinism, insofar as (in deterrence) the purpose of punishment is:
(a)
to protect the society from dangerous individuals who
freely choose to threaten others.
(b)
to change behavior by holding someone responsible even
though he or she could not have done otherwise.
(c)
to hold responsible only those individuals who are
responsible for their actions.
(d)
to deter individuals from unacceptable acts if they are
responsible, and to indicate how they can learn to hold themselves
responsible.]
183. According to the hard determinist, human actions and choices, like everything else, are events that have specific and determining causes. As to why people still believe in the Aillusion@ of freedom, the hard determinist gives a number of explanations. Which of the following IS NOT one of those explanations?
(a)
People think that
if they are like all other (determined) things in the universe, then they will no
longer be able to claim any privileged moral or spiritual status.
(b)
People insist
that they sometimes act without knowing why they do what they do.
(c)
People believe
that while external forces (such as environment, upbringing, or genetics) can influence
their behavior, such forces do not determine it.
(d)
People are
ignorant of the complex influences and causes that determine their actions and
choices.
184. If human beings are products of their environment and conditioning (as Skinner claims), how can they be held responsible for their actions (if they were not Afree@ to have done otherwise)?
(a)
It only seems
that people are not free; in fact, they can change their behavior if they
really want to, if they truly set their minds to it.
(b)
Even though human
nature is determined genetically, we can take responsibility for our own
genetic natures by affirming them as our own and taking credit for our actions.
(c)
Holding someone
responsible for an action means reinforcing desirable behavior--not as a reward
for past actions but to cause someone to act in desirable ways in the future.
(d)
The task of
deterministic psychology is to recognize how the concepts of freedom and
dignity have contributed to an improvement in the human condition by changing
behaviors.
185. Which IS NOT a typical objection raised against Skinner=s behavioristic form of hard determinism?
(a)
Behaviorism
explains human actions and choices in terms of causes alone and ignores
the possibility of explaining them in terms of reasons.
(b)
Behaviorism
explains how all actions are determined but not how all human choices
are free.
(c)
Behaviorism
interprets human actions in terms of unreflective responses to stimuli instead
of thoughtful consideration of options.
(d)
Behaviorism (like
determinism in general) does not permit refutation and therefore cannot be
considered an appropriate theory in the freedom-determinism debate.
186. Determinists argue that there is no human freedom because, like everything else in nature, human behavior (including thought) is regulated by laws of nature. Critics object, however, that this fails to account for our ability:
(a)
to explain human behavior in terms of unconscious
desires or fears rather than genetics or environment.
(b)
to account for our choices or personalities by appealing
to external forces (e.g., genetics, environment).
(c)
to Astep outside@ our
normal ways of thinking and challenge our own beliefs and change our behavior.
(d)
to hold others responsible for their actions even
though they, in fact, are not responsible.
187. Against the compatibilist (i.e., soft determinist) claim that my action is free if it is preceded (i.e., Acaused@) by my willing or choosing it, hard determinists argue that this does not solve the problem because:
(a)
even though a free act may be uncaused, a free choice is
not uncaused.
(b)
even though a free act might be the result of a choice,
the choice itself is the result of external causes.
(c)
nothing about someone=s
personality can allow anyone else to predict what he or she will do.
(d)
even though free acts do not have causes, determined acts
always have causes.
188. [For Stoics like Marcus Aurelius, freedom consists in realizing one=s place in the universe and in conforming to the law of nature that governs the heavens, social structure, and even the parts of one=s soul. We are Afree@ only when we act according to Aright reason.@ To act in any other way would not be free because:
(a)
our actions would not really be Aour@ actions but rather the actions of other forces in
nature.
(b)
the fatalism of Stoic philosophy rules out the
possibility that anyone ever acts freely.
(c)
right reason refers to how we think, not to how our
thoughts match the world or how we act.
(d)
the more we learn about ourselves, the more we free
ourselves from laws of nature.]
189. [Stoics like Epictetus and Marcus Aurelius describe the good life in terms of a rational understanding of the law of nature, because insofar as we understand natural law:
(a)
we can change nature to accommodate our interests.
(b)
we can get pleasure out of the pure act of knowing.
(c)
we can limit our desires to things within our control.
(d)
we can remain indifferent about what we choose to do.]
190. According to the version of soft determinism adopted by St. Augustine and Hume, even though all of our actions are caused by something, some of our acts can still be called free insofar as:
(a) they are caused by our choices.
(b) God causes us to choose those actions.
(c) our choices are not determined.
(d) choices form character or personality.
191. Which of the following IS NOT a version of soft determinism?
(a)
Though our actions
are predetermined in virtue of God=s
foreknowledge, they are still free because (from our perspective) our
decisions to act one way or another are up to us.
(b)
The knowledge
that our acts are determined frees us from the anxiety of not being sure about
whether our choices or actions are correct.
(c)
To the extent
that our actions are determined by our choices, they are done freely.
(d)
Not only are our
actions free when they result from our choices, but our choices as well are
free insofar as they are not influenced by any other event.
192. Compatibilists are sometimes called Asoft determinists@ because they claim that, even though all human actions are determined by some cause, certain actions are free when they are caused by:
(a)
purely random, unpredictable, chance events (as described in
quantum-mechanics indeterminacy theory).
(b)
the genetics, upbringing, or social conditioning of the
person doing the action.
(c)
the unconscious impulses or drives of the person doing
the action.
(d)
the decision, choice, or character of the person doing
the action.
193. [Though
both
(a)
Augustine says
that freedom means being able to act as one chooses; Spinoza says that freedom
consists in affirming one=s complete determination.
(b)
Augustine says
that since God determines us to be the persons we are,
we are not free; Spinoza says that by affirming that we are free of God=s determination, we make ourselves free.
(c)
Augustine says
that we are free when we act contrary to the conditioning forces that form our
personalities; Spinoza says that freedom consists in acting as our personality
dictates.
(d)
Augustine says
that freedom means being passive and not acting at all; Spinoza says that
freedom means acting contrary to our personality or character.]
194. Traditional compatibilists (e.g., Hobbes) claim that we are free as long as we can do what we want. Contemporary compatibilists, however, point out that because we may be mistaken about what we truly want, freedom is:
(a)
an illusion created by our mistaken belief that we can
know what it is that we do.
(b)
the ability to ignore what we want and do that which we
do not want.
(c)
the ability to do what we would have wanted if we were properly
informed.
(d)
incompatible with all forms of determinism, especially soft
determinism.
195. [The Stoic philosopher Epictetus says, ATo accuse others for one=s own misfortunes is a sign of lack of education; to accuse oneself shows that one=s education has begun; to accuse neither oneself nor others shows that one=s education is complete.@ Accusing oneself is only the beginning, not the completion, of education, because true freedom for the Stoic consists in recognizing how:
(a)
both our actions and our feelings or emotions about our
actions are ultimately determined.
(b)
rational self-control is impossible, because it contradicts
our human essence (and thus is an example of what Sartre calls Abad faith@).
(c)
one=s own pleasure should be the ultimate basis for
judging the rationality of actions.
(d)
we do not control events in our lives, but we can
control our feelings or judgments about them.]
196. Even though the compatibilist version of soft determinism acknowledges that every human action has a cause, it still maintains that some acts are Afree@ insofar as:
(a)
the individual doing the act feels that he or she is free
and that the act is done spontaneously.
(b)
nothing causes the individual to choose what she does.
(c)
so-called Afree@ acts are due to the person=s choice or decision to do them.
(d)
the individual=s acts
could not have been predicted.
197. [Like passive self- (or Asoft@-) determinism, Aristotle=s active self-determinism says that actions are free if they are voluntary. However, his view differs from passive self-determinism insofar as he argues that:
(a)
our choices are themselves caused by external forces
(e.g., environment, upbringing) over which we ultimately have no control.
(b)
we cannot be held responsible for our actions if
they are the result of past choices we have made, because we cannot change the
past.
(c)
just as nothing causes us to choose to be a certain
kind of person or self, so nothing can cause us to act (even
involuntarily) in ways other than we choose.
(d)
through our decisions we choose the kind of personality or
character we have, and we are free insofar as we act based on what we choose.]
198. [According to Aristotle=s active self-determinism, I am responsible for both my actions and my choices because I can determine the kind of character, personality, or self I have. Critics object to this by noting that:
(a)
in active self-determinism, AI@ am responsible only for my involuntary actions.
(b)
the ability to change personality is itself something
over which one ultimately has no control.
(c)
once I recognize how my character has been formed by past
experiences, AI@ can decide to reform my self by deciding how much
importance to place on such experiences.
(d)
changing one=s character is possible only if one makes a firm
commitment to do so.]
199. In reply to the compatibilist claim that we are free when our choices cause our actions, hard determinists say:
(a)
though a free act might be the result of a choice, the
choice itself is the result of other external or internal causes.
(b)
because actions that are uncaused cannot be predicted or
controlled, it seems silly to say that they are free and can be used to justify
our assignment of moral praise or blame.
(c)
there is no such thing as an action that results from or is
caused by a choice, because there is no way to know whether or not someone
chooses to do something.
(d)
true freedom consists in simply accepting the fact that we
are determined.
200. In response to the soft determinist claim that freedom is not illusion, hard determinists reply:
(a)
even though nothing may cause an individual to choose to
act in a particular way, he will act in a certain way anyway.
(b)
though a free act might be uncaused, a Afree@ choice is not uncaused.
(c)
even though free acts do not have causes, determined acts
always have causes.
(d)
though a so-called Afree@ act might be the result of a human choice, the choice
itself is the result of other external causes.
201. In defending a soft determinist stance, Hume says that a Afree@ action is one we normally experience as being preceded by (or Acaused@ by) an act of will or choice; and an action that is not done freely is one that is preceded by events other than choices. In any event, Hume claims, it makes no sense to ask about the cause of choices, because:
(a)
the causes of our choices must be other choices, and
those have other choices as causes, going back infinitely.
(b)
we have no experience of constant conjunctions of events
prior to choices, and thus we cannot conclude that there is a connection in
which choices are effects.
(c)
without external causes there could be no account of how
choices are made and about how certain acts are not done freely.
(d)
the cause of a choice is an unknown event that occurs
before we act, over which we have no control and is thus irrelevant in our
decision to act.
202. AActions are, by their very nature, temporary and perishing; and where they proceed not from some cause in the character and disposition of the person who performed them, they can neither redound to his honor, if good; nor infamy, if evil.@ Here Hume is noting that:
(a)
to hold someone responsible for an action requires that
we trace the action to its cause in the individual=s character; the action itself cannot be held
responsible.
(b)
individuals are responsible for their characters but not for
their actions.
(c)
the character of a person is reflected in the kinds of
actions he or she does; so no praise or blame of the person reflects on the
character of the act.
(d)
we cannot draw inferences concerning actions based on
the experienced association of those actions with motives, inclinations, and
circumstances.
203. Against Hume=s compatibilist (i.e., soft determinist) claim that my action is free if it is preceded by my willing or choosing it, hard determinists argue that this does not solve the problem because it does not explain:
(a)
God=s role in predetermining our actions.
(b)
how we know whether our actions are good.
(c)
how rational and irrational behavior differ.
(d)
how my act of will or choice itself is free.
204. Which of the following IS NOT an argument against determinism?
(a)
It is possible
that human freedom is a non-determined characteristic that has emerged out of a
system of otherwise causally determined things.
(b)
Our experience of
ourselves as free seems to be as good an argument for
freedom as anything else.
(c)
Like everything
else in the universe, human actions must be caused by something; nothing
justifies claiming that we are exceptions to the rule.
(d)
For practical
reasons like being justified in holding people morally and legally responsible
for their actions, we need to reject determinism.
205. One of the major objections raised against determinism is that it cannot be shown to be false and therefore, as a theory, cannot be tested. Why can=t the theory be shown to be false?
(a)
Because its truth
cannot be questioned.
(b)
Because it claims
that every event has a cause.
(c)
Because
objections to the theory fail to explain why people do what they do.
(d)
Because even
attempted falsifications of the theory are explainable in terms of the theory
(i.e., as determined).
206. In reply to the soft determinist, the hard determinist points out that the choices people make and upon which they act are functions of their personalities or characters. But since one=s personality or character is itself a product of environment, genetics, upbringing, etc., it still seems that people are not really free. In order to avoid this hard determinist conclusion, the indeterminist proposes that truly free actions are:
(a)
best explained not in terms of causes but in terms of the
person or Aagent@ who chooses to do the action.
(b)
spontaneous, chance, or random events uncaused by personality or
choice.
(c)
caused by motions of sub-atomic particles, which themselves
have certain (though unknown) causes.
(d)
actions that have specific causes, but we don=t know what those causes are.
207. In response to hard determinists, some compatibilists acknowledge that their solution to the question of human freedom seems to ignore the fundamental claim of determinismCnamely, that every event, including acts of will, has a determining cause. But, they argue, the distinction between voluntary and involuntary actions is crucial:
(a)
for distinguishing caused and uncaused actions.
(b)
for teleological, if not for deontological, determinism.
(c)
for moral, legal, and interpersonal purposes.
(d)
to guarantee the universality of causation.
208. Indeterminists argue that if anything causally determines our actions, those actions are not free: that is why free human actions must be random, chance, unpredictable, uncaused events. Critics object to this by arguing that:
(a)
if an event happens randomly or by chance, it would be
unpredictable and thus uncaused.
(b)
just as it is our duty to act morally, so it is also our
duty to act freely: that is, Ais implies ought.@
(c)
when someone does an action freely, he/she cannot predict
what consequences will follow from it.
(d)
in such an account we could not control (and thus be
justifiably held responsible) for our actions.
209. Though hard determinists, soft determinists, and indeterminists disagree about whether and how people can act freely, they do agree on one thing:
(a)
only actions done for reasons can count as free actions.
(b)
we should focus on the presence or absence of causes in
discussing freedom.
(c)
because every act has some cause (even if it is unknown),
there is no real freedom.
(d)
we cannot hold anyone responsible for free acts if those
acts have causes.
210. According to the indeterminist, if an event has a specific cause or causes, it is predictable (at least in principle). But since quantum mechanics shows that no sub-atomic particle event is in principle absolutely predictable (and is thus a random or chance event), we might be justified in thinking that Afree@ human actions are similar types of events. Against this argument, critics of indeterminism reply:
(a)
a chance or random action is not be what we normally call
a Afree@ human action.
(b)
even if human actions were absolutely predictable, we
could still say that they were uncaused.
(c)
moral and religious doctrines require that we believe that
people are determined, whether or not science supports such a belief.
(d)
if small-scale sub-atomic (Amicro@) events were predictable, that would prove that
large-scale (Amacro@) events such as human actions are unpredictable.
211. Critics of indeterminism claim that, if so-called Afree@ choices and actions are uncaused, unpredictable, chance events, then no one who acted freely would know beforehand what he or she was about to do. This strikes critics as being simply wrongheaded, because if that were true, no one could justly be held responsible for his or her actions. In response, the indeterminist might agree with the hard determinist, pointing out that:
(a)
since being responsible and being held
responsible are different, we need to change how we understand just treatment
to accommodate our understanding of what freedom means.
(b)
because there is really no difference between a free act and
one that is causally determined, it makes no sense to hold people responsible
for their actions by punishing or rewarding them.
(c)
uncaused, chance events do not really happen in nature or in
human actions; it only seems like they are uncaused because they are so
difficult to predict.
(d)
even if chance events occur in nature, that does not mean
that they cannot be predicted based on natural laws; it is simply more
difficult to do it with human beings than with other things.
212. Libertarians point out that determinism violates its own claim to scientific respectability by failing to explain what we observe. That is, the sheer fact that determinism fails to explain what we experience daily should be enough to prove that determinism is incorrect, insofar as it proposes a theory that:
(a)
is inconsistent with other scientific theories that
emphasize the role of causality in explaining behavior.
(b)
ignores the indeterminacy and randomness of sub-atomic
particle physics.
(c)
acknowledges that there is a difference between human behavior and
the behavior of other things despite evidence to the contrary.
(d)
denies that we engage in free choices and acts, and
recommends that we accept that theory despite our daily experience to the
contrary.
213. Libertarians argue that our experiences of deliberating, acting spontaneously, and feeling morally responsible (e.g., guilt, remorse) prove that we are free. Determinists reply that such experiences are:
(a)
illusions or ways of dealing with conflicting desires.
(b)
the products of choices by which agents constitute or
determine themselves to be selves.
(c)
justified because they are revealed through introspections and
immediately obvious intuitions.
(d)
indeterminate at the level of subatomic particle (quantum) physics.
214. According to the moral responsibility argument for libertarianism, the question about whether we are free or determined must ultimately be decided on whether:
(a)
people are responsible for their actions or are
justifiably held responsible for their actions.
(b)
our belief in moral responsibility is more certain than
our belief that every event has a cause.
(c)
people are responsible for their actions or are
responsible only for their choices.
(d)
regrettable (immoral) actions really could have been avoided or
are purely random, chance events.
215. Though compatibilists disagree with libertarians about whether our actions are free, they do not disagree about whether our choices are free, because according to compatibilists:
(a)
our choices are never free; they are always caused by
external forces or internal compulsions.
(b)
choices are free only when they are caused by neither
external forces nor internal compulsions.
(c)
it is pointless to talk about a free choice, since that
would be a choice that one chooses.
(d)
the only actions for which we can justifiably be held
responsible are voluntary (i.e., chosen) actions.
216. Most theorists agree that we are not morally responsible for our actions when those actions are:
(a)
immoral in terms of social values but not immoral in terms of
our own personal values.
(b)
based on sincerely held religious beliefs (as opposed to
beliefs acquired because of our upbringings).
(c)
inconsistent with our normal ways of behaving or what our friends
or family would expect of us.
(d)
constrained by threats or when the consequences of our acts are
unexpected or beyond our control.
217. According to William James, the question about whether we are free or determined can best be decided on pragmatic grounds. That is, we have to decide which makes more sense:
(a)
believing that freedom is an illusion or believing that chance
events (e.g., free choices) occur.
(b)
hard determinism=s denial
of freedom or soft determinism=s qualified acceptance of freedom.
(c)
holding people responsible for their actions, or
holding them responsible for their choices.
(d)
believing that regrettable actions really could have been
avoided, or believing that such actions are purely random, chance events.
218. In the agency theory of freedom, a free act is caused by a person, but a person is not a thing before a choice is made. Rather, a person is:
(a)
the product of environment, upbringing, genetics, and
associations with family and friends.
(b)
the collection of mental states (character, habits) that
cause a choice.
(c)
the result of choices, the summary of acts of giving reasons
for why actions are done.
(d)
the openended possibility of
there not being any cause or reason for why an action is done.
219. According to one version of libertarianism, we are the Apersons@ or self-determining agents who cause our actions. When we act, we not only identify the action as a particular event but also define ourselves. We are thus free, in that:
(a)
we do not know what
causes us to act, but those who know us well could know exactly how we would
act.
(b)
prior to our acting in a certain way, there is no defined
self who can be identified as the cause of action.
(c)
what we intend to do in acting is not limited to
what we can foresee or what actually happens to us.
(d)
the person or self that we are is itself caused not by us
but by our genetics, upbringing, and environment.
220. Human behavior can be explained in terms of either the causes of an action or the reasons for which the action is done. This distinction between causes and reasons is concerned with the distinction between:
(a)
what someone does and what kind of character or set of
habits he or she has.
(b)
the events prior to an action and the intended goals of
an action.
(c)
actions that are desired and actions that are expected to
yield certain consequences.
(d)
actions and choices.
221. Theories of freedom explain human behavior in terms of either the causes of an action or the reasons for which the action is done. Which of the following theories provide rational rather than causal explanations?
(a)
Hard and soft
determinism and indeterminism.
(b)
Indeterminism, compatibilism, and soft determinism.
(c)
Compatibilism and libertarianism.
(d)
Agency, person,
and existentialist theories.
222. According to one variation of libertarianism, we should assume that we are free even if we cannot prove it, because in order to think of ourselves as moral beings, we must also think of ourselves as free. Why?
(a)
Because if we are
not free, we cannot really choose alternative ways of acting: ought implies can.
(b)
Because if we are
free, we can choose to believe what we want, even to believe that we are not
free.
(c)
Because our
choices in acting are determined by how much information we have about
consequences.
(d)
Because
randomness and chance characterize all aspects of nature, including human
behavior.
223. Which of the following IS NOT an objection raised against libertarian and existentialist views of freedom?
(a)
To say that Awe@ choose ourselves assumes that we are both the cause
and effect of our choices.
(b)
Simply wanting to
believe from the beginning that we are free does not make it true.
(c)
Our sense of
ourselves as moral beings suggests that we should think of ourselves as free.
(d)
Even the choice
to believe that we are creative and free itself needs to be explained, and that
can be done most obviously by appealing to causes such as genetics, conditioning,
upbringing, etc.
224. McTaggart and Bergson agree that time is real, but they disagree about whether time itself is:
(a)
a conceptual abstraction (as McTaggart
says) or a fixed sequence of events (as Bergson
claims).
(b)
moving (as Bergson claims) or merely
seems to move from our perspective (as McTaggart
says).
(c)
an objective sequence of events that exists
independently of us (Bergson says yes, McTaggart no).
(d)
nothing more than a real illusion, like a mirage or
hallucination (McTaggart says yes, Bergson no).
Answers:
[Items in brackets not covered in 2005 textbook or course.]
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1.
B 2.
A 3.
A 4.
B 5.
A 6.
B 7.
A 8.
B 9.
B 10. A 11. B 12. B 13. B 14. [B] 15. [B] 16. [A] 17. [A] 18. [B] 19. A 20. B 21. [B] 22. A 23. B 24. A 25. A 26. B 27. A 28. A 29. B 30. A |
31. B 32. B 33. B 34. A 35. B 36. A 37. B 38. B 39. A 40. B 41. B 42. A 43. B 44. B 45. A 46. B 47. A 48. A 49. A 50. B 51. [A] 52. [B] 53. B 54. B 55. B 56. A 57. B 58. B 59. A 60. A |
61. B 62. A 63. A 64. A 65. A 66. A 67. B 68. B 69. B 70. A 71. A 72. A 73. B 74. B 75. B 76. B 77. A 78. B 79. A 80. A 81. B 82. B 83. B 84. A 85. A 86. B 87. A 88. A 89. A 90. A |
91. B 92. [A] 93. B 94. B 95. B 96. B 97. B 98. A 99. A 100. B 101. B 102. A 103. A 104. B 105. A 106. A 107. B 108. B 109. A 110. B 111. A 112. A 113. B 114. A 115. A 116. A 117. A 118. A 119. A 120. A |
121. B 122. A 123. A 124. B 125. A 126. B 127. B 128. A 129. A 130. A 131. A 132. A 133. A 134. B 135. B 136. A 137. A 138. A 139. B 140. A 141. B 142. D 143. C 144. B 145. B 146. C 147. A 148. D 149. B 150. A |
151. C 152. D 153. B 154. B 155. C 156. D 157. [A] 158. A 159. C 160. B 161. [B] 162. [A] 163. D 164. D 165. B 166. A 167. B 168. C 169. D 170. A 171. C 172. B 173. A 174. [D] 175. A 176. D 177. C 178. D 179. C 180. D |
181. C 182. B 183. B 184. C 185. B 186. C 187. B 188. [A] 189. [C] 190. A 191. D 192. D 193. [A] 194. C 195. [D] 196. C 197. [D] 198. [B] 199. A 200. D 201. B 202. A 203. D 204. C 205. D 206. B 207. C 208. D 209. B 210. A |
211. A 212. D 213. A 214. B 215. C 216. D 217. A 218. C 219. B 220. B 221. D 222. A 223. C 224. B |