Past Test Questions: Philosophy of Religion
Answers at end.
[Items in brackets not covered in 2005
textbook
or course.]
True/False (True=A, False=B)
1.
Philosophy
contributes to the aim of Afaith seeking
understanding@ by criticizing
rationalizations of religious beliefs
that appeal to biases or opinions for which there are no good arguments.
2.
For
theists, ways
of reasoning such as the ontological and cosmological arguments are
examples of
Afaith seeking
understanding."
3.
A
theist is
someone who believes that there is a God (even though he or she might
not claim
to know that God exists).
4.
Because
Anselm's
ontological argument is guided by his aim of “faith seeking
understanding,” it
is intended to persuade even the atheist to believe in God.
5.
The
ontological
argument gets its name from its attempt to prove the existence of God
simply by
showing how being or existence is implicit in the meaning of the term AGod.@
6.
Anselm=s ontological
argument assumes that it is greater for
God to exist in reality and in one=s mind
than for God to exist only in one=s mind.
7.
According
to
Anselm=s ontological
argument, if God is the greatest
conceivable being, and if it is greater for God to exist in reality and
in our
minds than solely in our minds, then God must exist in reality.
8.
According
to
Anselm’s ontological argument, if God is the greatest conceivable
being, then a
God who exists only in people’s minds and not in reality (outside of
their
minds) would not truly be God.
9.
According
to Anselm’s
ontological argument, even though the existence of God can be proven
simply by
understanding the meaning of “God,” each person has his/her own meaning
for
“God.”
10.
Anselm=s ontological
argument is an example of Afaith seeking
understanding@ in that his
belief in the existence of God depends on
his being persuaded by the argument.
11.
By
referring to
God as Athat being than
which nothing greater can be
conceived,@ St. Anselm
equates God with the universe and thus
endorses a pantheistic description of God.
12.
[Since
the
ontological argument for the existence of God relies on experiencing
the
reality of God in one=s life, it is
an a posteriori argument.]
13.
[A
posteriori
arguments for religious belief claim that religious belief is
reasonable, but a
priori arguments are those that acknowledge that religious belief
cannot be
based on reason.]
14.
[To
say that the
ontological argument for the existence of God is an a priori
argument
means that it relies on sensible experience for its justification.]
15.
[Anselm=s ontological
argument is an a priori argument
because it relies only on reason, not experience, to show how belief in
God=s existence
makes sense.]
16.
[Anselm=s version of
the ontological argument is an a
priori argument in that it does not rely on experience to prove the
existence of God.]
17.
[The
ontological
argument is an a priori argument because it claims that God=s existence can
be explained simply by understanding
the meaning of the term AGod@ without
appealing to sense experience.]
18.
[A
posteriori
propositions are known as true or false only if the predicate of the
proposition is contained necessarily and universally in the subject.]
19.
[To
say that a
being exists contingently means that its existence depends on something
else
and that it is possible to conceive of the non-existence of the being.]
20.
[To
say that God=s existence is necessary
(rather than
contingent) means that God does not rely or depend on anything else for
his
existence.]
21.
[Kant=s objection to
the ontological argument is based on
his observation that saying that something exists or does not exist
does not in
any way change what the thing is.]
22.
[By
noting how
existence is not a predicate, Kant wants to show how the proposition AGod exists@ is an
analytic statement.]
23.
[Descartes= ontological
argument assumes that since existence is
greater than non-existence, God exists.]
24.
[In
Malcolm’s
version of the ontological argument, if God’s existence is possible, he
must
exist necessarily, because any being that exists necessarily is more
perfect
than one who only possibly exists.]
25.
Hume
and Kant
criticize the ontological argument by saying that the claim AGod exists@ is
meaningless.
26.
According
to
Kant, the ontological argument for the existence of God is flawed
because the
concept of God is beyond anything we can understand and we do not know
which
predicates apply to him.
27.
[According
to the
cosmological argument, the existence of contingent beings
requires the
existence of a necessary being here and now without which their
existence would be unintelligible.]
28.
[St.
Thomas
Aquinas argues that, because the universe is contingent here and now,
there
must be a God here and now who accounts for its existence.]
29.
According
to
Thomas Aquinas, even though God was the original cause of all things at
creation, he is no longer needed to account for their existence because
divinely created laws of nature maintain things in existence.
30.
Someone
who
believes in the cosmological argument for the existence of God cannot
also
believe in the “big bang” theory of the origin of the universe because
God
could not have created the universe in that way.
31.
[Thomas
Aquinas= cosmological
argument is an a posteriori
argument because it relies on an appeal to experience to show that God
exists.]
32.
[The
cosmological
argument for the existence of God is an a priori argument
because it is
based on premises that can be known only by means of experience of the
world.]
33.
[Thomas
Aquinas= cosmological
argument is an a posteriori
argument because it relies on an appeal to experience to show that God
exists.]
34.
According
to
Aquinas= cosmological
argument, if there is no God, then the
existence of the universe would be absurd because there would be no
cause or
reason for it.
35.
For
Thomas
Aquinas, the first cause of the universe (God) has to have existed at
the
beginning of time but does not now have to exist in order for the
universe to
exist now.
36.
According
to
Aquinas= cosmological
argument for the existence of God, if
there is a cosmos, there must be a cause adequate to account for its
existence,
and that cause is God.
37.
According
to
supporters of the cosmological argument (e.g., Aquinas), the cause or
ultimate
justification for the universe cannot really be known because God is
outside of
relations of causality.
38.
[According
to
Aquinas= argument from
contingency, a potential being cannot
become an actual being except through the act or agency of another
potential
being.]
39.
According
to the
cosmological argument for the existence of God, because the universe
cannot be
its own cause, there must be another cause (namely, God) sufficient to
explain
the universe=s existence.
40.
According
to
Kant, the cosmological argument fails because it assumes that existence
is a
predicate that adds something to our understanding of the concept of AGod.@
41.
By
asking Awhat causes God?@ Hume
wants to show how God exists necessarily because God depends upon
nothing else
for His existence.
42.
The
cosmological
argument commits the Afallacy of
composition@ to the
extent that it suggests that just because everything in the universe
has a
cause, so also does the universe in its entirety.
43.
The
teleological
argument gets its name from the fact that it begins with an analysis of
the
nature of the concept AGod.@
44.
[Because
the
teleological argument for the existence of God begins with the
assumption that
God is (by definition) a designing creator, it is an a priori
argument.]
45.
The
teleological
argument for the existence of God is sometimes called the argument from
design
because it claims that the order found in the world is caused by a
designing
and purposive creator.
46.
[The
teleological
argument (or argument from design) for God=s
existence is an a posteriori argument because it is based on
our
experience of order or purpose in the universe.]
47.
The
design
argument for the existence of God shows how science explains the order
and
design of the universe without having to introduce an external mind to
direct
its development.
48.
In Paley=s teleological
argument for the existence of God, the
order and intricacy of things in the universe make sense only if an
ordering
and purposive mind is their cause.
49.
[The teleological argument for the existence
of God is an a posteriori argument since it bases its
conclusion that a
divine creator is responsible for the world on our experience of the
order and
intricacy of the world.]
50.
As
part of his
critique of the design argument, Hume claims that even if there is
order in the
universe, that does not prove that there is any design or purpose in
the
universe.
51.
In
criticizing
the teleological argument, Hume notes that there is no convincing
evidence for
believing that the world has either a purpose or an order (other than
one we
read into it).
52.
Hume
rejects the
design argument by noting that to argue analogously we must understand
the
analogously related things independently of one another in order to
draw the
analogy.
53.
Hume
rejects the
teleological argument based on analogy by noting that knowing that the
whole
universe is good does not necessarily imply that each of its parts is
good.
54.
According
to
Hume, the mixture of order and disorder in the world provides no
rational
support for belief in an infinitely good and powerful God.
55.
For
Hume,
religious skepticism is the only appropriate rational attitude to adopt
in the
face of the fact that an infinitely good and powerful God=s existence is
incompatible with real evil.
56.
According
to
Hume, because it is irrational to believe in something for which there
are no
good reasons, it is irrational to believe in God.
57.
Darwin=s criticism of
the teleological argument claims that order
in the universe does not prove that there is any design or purpose in
the
universe.
58.
In
criticizing
the teleological argument, Darwin claims that the perceived order in
the
universe can be explained simply as the result of natural causes, not
supernatural purposes or designs.
59.
Darwin
claims
that the order we find in the universe is the result of natural
selective
processes that are guided by divinely-instituted ends, goals, or
purposes.
60.
Darwin
claims
that the order we see in the universe is a good reason to believe that
God is
its purposive cause.
61.
Though
pantheists
claim they are not atheists, they really are because they deny that God
exists.
62.
In
contrast to
traditional theism, pantheism is concerned more with volitional
arguments for
religious belief than with rational arguments.
63.
Unlike
pantheists
(who identify the universe as God), panentheists
argue that while God is immanent in the universe (and thus includes
it), he is
also transcendent (i.e., more than the universe).
64.
Whereas
the
agnostic does not claim to know whether or not there is a God, the
atheist believes
firmly that there is no God.
65.
Though
all
atheists are agnostics, not all agnostics are atheists.
66.
Unlike
atheists,
agnostics believe in the existence of GodCit=s just that
they don=t know
how to prove it.
67.
Atheism
is an
extreme form of agnosticism.
68.
The
agnostic=s explanation
of evil acknowledges that, if God had
not chosen to create human beings with free will, the abuse of free
will would
not have resulted in sin.
69.
According
to the
free-will explanation of why evil exists, God created human beings with
free
will so that they could bring evil on themselves and thus be able to
appreciate
goodness and to build their characters.
70.
A
theodicy is an
attempt to explain how an omniscient, omnipotent, all‑good God can
exist
simultaneously with evil in the world.
71.
A
theodicy is a
proof of God=s existence
based on the belief that both good and
evil are matters of perspective.
72.
[According
to
Dostoevsky, the existence of God and the reality of evil can be
intelligibly
reconciled only if there is some afterlife that erases or makes up for
the
suffering we experience in this life.]
73.
Freud
argues that
religion is based on an infantile, often unconscious longing for a
father
figure who will protect us from the anxieties of life.
74.
According
to
Freud, even though religion might provide us with the delusion of a
father
figure who protects us from the anxieties of life, we should
nonetheless
believe that God really exists.
75.
According
to
Freud, the unresolved infantile fears and resentments that account for
religious beliefs can be overcome only through a faith in God as our
redeemer
from such delusions.
76.
According
to
Freud, even though religion deludes us with the image of a father
figure who
protects us from the anxieties of life, it serves a useful purpose by
making us
appreciate all that God has done for us.
77.
According
to
Freud, religion avoids dealing with the harsh reality of life by
promoting a
self‑deluding and infantile belief in a father figure who will save us
from feelings of helplessness and fear.
78.
Because
believers
in mystical experiences cannot Aprove@ the existence
of God, they agree with Freud that
religious belief is based on delusions.
79.
Kant=s moral
argument proves that God exists by identifying
God as the summum bonum,
the greatest good.
80.
According
to
Kant’s moral argument, if God does not exist, then there is no validity
or
“goodness” in the cosmological or teleological arguments--that is, they
are not
proofs.
81.
[According
to Feuerbach, religion keeps us from
affirming our own
characteristics and abilities, thus alienating
what is
essential to us by locating those traits in God.]
82.
[Feuerbach argues
that hopes and aspirations for human development are frustrated by
believing in
God, inasmuch as belief in God means alienating what is essentially
human from ourselves.]
83.
[Because
people
who have mystical experiences lose their own personal identities in
such an
experience, they agree with Feuerbach that
God is the
projection of alienated human characteristics.]
84.
[In
contrast to Feuerbach, Marx claims that
religious belief does not cause
human alienation as much as it is a symptomatic response to social
exploitation.]
85.
Marx
argues that
religion is the means by which we can change society and overcome
socio-political alienation.
86.
Marx=s criticism of
religion as Athe opium of
the masses@ is
intended more to challenge religious believers to work for social
change in God=s name rather
than to raise doubts about God=s existence.
87.
[From
Marx=s standpoint, Feuerbach=s analysis of
religious belief as a projected
alienation of human abilities fails to identify the socio-political
causes of
such alienation.]
88.
According
to
Marx, religion is the way that people can correct social alienation and
minimize the human misery caused by exploitative social structures.
89.
Volitional
arguments supporting religious belief are concerned more with the
question of
whether one should believe God exists rather than with the
question of
whether God actually exists.
90.
Volitional
arguments supporting religious belief are more concerned with the
question of
whether God exists than with rational justifications for believing in
God.
91.
William
James
argues that we should always limit our belief to that for which we have
evidence and should never commit ourselves to beliefs on insufficient
evidence.
92.
According
to
William James, if we have no intellectual basis on which to decide God=s existence,
our choice to believe must based on
whether such a belief satisfies our expectations and gives our lives
meaning.
93.
William
James
suggests that, unless we have sufficient evidence to support our belief
in the
existence of God, we should withhold that belief and adopt agnosticism.
94.
According
to
William James, though we cannot rationally decide whether God exists,
we are
justified in believing in God if making such a decision is very
important in
our lives and cannot be avoided anyway.
95.
To
say that
Pascal=s Awager@ is a
philosophic argument means that it appeals not
to faith or personal beliefs but to what is supported by rational
argumentation.
96.
Though
Pascal=s Awager@ shows that it
is reasonable to believe in God, it
does not prove that God exists.
97.
Pascal=s Awager@ proves that
God exists.
98.
Pascal=s wager
attempts to prove that God exists by showing
how arguments in favor of God=s existence are
more reasonable than arguments against
his existence.
99.
Instead
of
providing a proof that God exists, Pascal=s wager
shows that believing in God=s existence is
more rational (using projected
consequences as a criterion) than not believing.
100.
According
to
Pascal, even if the chance of God=s
existence is less than 50-50, belief in God is prudent and rationally
justified
because of its potential rewards.
101.
Though
Pascal=s wager
shows that it is reasonable to believe
in God, it does not prove that God exists.
102.
Like
Pascal, Kant
argues that believing in the existence of God will make us happy.
103.
According
to
religious mystics, the loss of a sense of personal identity when united
with
God is an hallucination.
104.
Critics
argue
that mystical experiences might
simply be hallucinations or caused by neurological abnormalities.
105.
According
to
Kierkegaard, human existence should not be described in terms of
objective
facts but in terms of subjective, non-universalizable
truths.
106.
For
Kierkegaard,
true religious belief requires a leap of faith that is not
justified by
any knowledge we have.
107.
For
Kierkegaard,
because the moral life is based on objective, rational, and universalizable
principles, it is much more Aauthentic@ than
one based on the subjective truth of religion.
108.
Kierkegaard
argues that since religious commitment is absurd, it has to be based on
faith,
not reason.
109.
Kierkegaard
claims that by making a Aleap of faith@ a
person can prove that God actually exists.
110.
According
to
Kierkegaard, angst is the anguish or anxiety implicit in the
authentic
experience of the ambiguity of human existence.
111.
For
Kierkegaard,
since no convincing arguments can be given to justify existence itself,
the
only proper (i.e., authentic) response is unconditioned faith in God=s promise of
salvation.
112.
[The aesthetic
life style (for Kierkegaard) provides no guide for making decisions
because
those who pursue the aesthetic life acknowledge that human existence is
ambiguous.]
113.
Kierkegaard=s Aleap of faith@ is
based on the assumption that religious commitment is justified only if
it is
consistent with our other (e.g., moral, social) beliefs.
114.
Abraham=s Aleap of faith@ was,
for Kierkegaard, an ethical but not a religious decision because it was
based
on Abraham=s knowledge of
what was morally right.
115.
In
defining truth
in terms of subjectivity, Kierkegaard claims that the truth of
statements (even
about things about which we are only mildly curious) is based on how we
feel
about them.
116.
According
to
Kierkegaard, our existence is meaningful only to the extent that we can
give an
objective, rational justification for believing in God=s promise of
salvation.
117.
For
the feminist
theologian Mary Daly, the Western depiction of God as having power over
people should be replaced by a Goddess in relation to whom we develop
mutual
recognition and respect.
118.
Feminist
theologians (e.g., Mary Daly) argue that replacing the power/authority
model of
a male God makes the notion of God Anuminous@ (holy and
wholly other) and Aineffable@
(inexpressible).
Multiple Choice:
119.
According
to
Anselm=s version of
the ontological argument, God must exist
both as an object of belief in people=s minds
and as a reality outside of their minds, because:
(a)
without being able to believe in a God who exists
apart from
their minds, some people would not be able to make sense of what is in
their
minds.
(b)
a
being who
exists only in the mind is not as great as one who exists both in minds
and
outside of minds.
(c)
if
God existed
only in people=s minds, then
those who do not fully understand what
or who God is would not be able to believe in him.
(d)
according
to the
definition of AGod@ accepted by
believer and atheist alike, God is beyond
all understanding (and thus must be outside of people=s minds).
120.
According
to
Anselm=s ontological
argument, if God is the greatest
conceivable being, then a God who exists only in people=s minds and not
in reality (outside of their minds)
would not truly be God, because:
(a) a being who
exists only
mentally would not be as great as one who exists mentally and in
reality.
(b) only God could
know the
greatest conceivable being, and thus only he knows whether he truly
exists.
(c) the real existence of God
outside of minds depends on his being thought about by human minds.
(d) for a thing to be God, it has to be conceivable;
and if anything is conceivable, it must exist.
121.
According
to the
ontological argument, if AGod@ means the
greatest conceivable being, then he exists
because:
(a) without God as cause,
nothing else could exist or be conceived to exist.
(b) a being who did not exist
would lack a trait (existence) that the greatest conceivable being
would have.
(c) no one fully understands
what God is, so no one can say whether he exists or not.
(d) whether or not God exists does not
really matter
to the person of Afaith seeking
understanding.@
122.
Which
of the
following IS NOT an assumption in Anselm=s
ontological argument?
(a) That being than which
nothing greater can be conceived exists at least (but not necessarily
at most)
in the mind.
(b) A being that exists in
reality and in the mind is more perfect than one that exists in the
mind alone.
(c) It is greater for something
to exist necessarily only in the mind than contingently in reality.
(d) By AGod@ we understand
that being than which nothing greater
can be conceived.
123.
[According
to
Descartes= version of the
ontological argument, if God is
defined as an absolutely perfect being, then he must exist because:
(a) if God
does not exist, then there would be
no object outside of people=s minds to
which they could refer when they say that
they believe.
(b) if the
definition of God as absolutely
perfect is accepted only by believers, then anyone who doubts the
definition
would also have to doubt whether God exists.
(c) without
an argument for the
existence of God, religious believers would not be able to defend their
definition of God as absolutely perfect.
(d) since it
is better for a thing to exist
than for it not to exist, any God that did not exist would not, by
definition,
be absolutely perfect.]
124.
One
objection to
the ontological argument is that the argument assumes the false premise
that
real existence adds something to the concept of God. The premise, it is
argued,
is false because:
(a) to say
that something exists does not in
any way change or enhance what it is.
(b) the
concept of a thing, along with the
actual existence of the thing, is greater than the thought of the thing
alone.
(c)
something that exists necessarily is
greater than that which exists contingently.
(d) even if
the world is imperfect, that does
not necessarily mean that its creator (God) is imperfect.
125.
Kant
notes that
when we think of something, we know that it exists as an object of
thought. But
just because something is an object of thought, that does not mean that
the
object exists. The problem with the ontological argument is that it
treats
existence as a predicate. In other words, Kant insists that:
(a) without knowing whether something
exists or not,
it is impossible even to be able to think of the thing.
(b) nothing can exist unless it is
understood as being
a product or Apredicate@ of God.
(c) a predicate is something that is
said about a
subject (for example: in Ax is y,@ y is
the predicate).
(d) to say that something exists or does
not exist
does not change the meaning of the thing we think.
126.
Critics
of Anselm=s ontological
argument (e.g., Hume, Kant) claim that
merely having an idea of something (e.g., God) cannot be the basis for
claiming
that the thing exists. However, defenders of the argument reply that:
(a) by
saying that God exists, they do not aim
to prove that God exists but only aim to show how no a priori
or a
posteriori proofs can make sense of belief in God.
(b) saying
that God exists does not add
anything to what God is, since God=s
existence (the fact that he exists) is different from his
essence (what
he is).
(c) God is
unlike anything else about which we
can have ideas, since God (by definition) cannot be thought without
also
thinking his existence.
(d) a perfect thing
(e.g., God) might not
exist, but that is no good reason to believe that he does not exist.
127.
Kant
claims that
the ontological argument for God=s
existence is flawed because it fails to recognize how:
(a) the causes of our ideas are outside
of what we
experience and therefore cannot be thought.
(b) God=s
existence is beyond anything we can comprehend and so cannot be proven
or disproven.
(c) saying that something exists or does
not exist
does not change what it is or our concept of it.
(d) it suggests that, if God does not
exist, then the
devil (the worst possible being) must exist.
128.
Against
those who
accept the ontological argument, Kant says that the argument proves God=s existence
only if there is a greatest
conceivable being. But this, he claims, is where the argument fails,
because:
(a) the greatest conceivable being would
exist both in
people=s minds and in
reality.
(b) the greatest conceivable being has
to
exist, since actual existence is greater than possible existence.
(c) we cannot conclude that such a being
exists simply
from the fact that its existence is possible.
(d) a being who exists only in one person=s mind would be
less than a being who exists in all
minds.
129.
[According
to one
version of the ontological argument, God must exist because necessary
existence
is greater than contingent or merely possible existence. But critics
point out that
this same way of thinking can be used to prove that God not only does
not
exist but also that it is impossible that God exists, because:
(a) the sheer fact that one can conceive
of a greatest
being does not mean that such a being exists.
(b) necessary non-existence is greater
than contingent
or merely possible non-existence.
(c) if there were a best conceivable
being, there
would also be a worst conceivable being (the devil).
(d) the concept of God=s
necessary existence is no greater than the concept of God=s contingent or
possible existence, since both
concepts are in our minds alone and say nothing about reality.]
130.
In
Anselm=s version of
the ontological argument, a non‑existing
God would lack a characteristic or predicate that an existing God would
have,
and therefore a non‑existing God would be inferior to an existing one.
But in his refutation of the argument, Kant notes that because
existence is not
a predicate, knowing or not knowing about the existence or
non‑existence
of something does not affect our being able to know the thing. In other
words,
the point Kant makes is this:
(a) thinking
of God and thinking of God=s existing in
no way adds anything to the concept.
(b) to think
of God as not existing is
impossible, since by our thinking of him he must exist.
(c) God
certainly does not need us to think of
him in order to exist; but unless we think of him, we cannot know that
he
exists.
(d) adding
existence to the concept of God
does not change God, but it does change our understanding or idea of
God.
131.
[In
his version
of the ontological argument Norman Malcolm claims that, if God is the
greatest
conceivable being, not only does God happen to exist but God has
to
exist, because:
(a) without God, nothing else would ever
exist.
(b) it is better for something to exist
than for it
not to exist (at least this is what people practically believe).
(c) since necessary existence is greater
than possible
existence, God exists necessarily (vs. contingently).
(d) even though the concept God
is internally
contradictory, we must believe in him to make sense of life.]
132.
[According
to
Descartes= version of the
ontological argument, a being who
lacks existence would not be as great a being as one who exists; and
since God
is perfect, he must necessarily exist. Against this reasoning Hume
replies:
(a) We can
know nothing about God because our
finite minds are incapable of knowing anything with certainty about an
infinitely existing God.
(b) Even
though even an atheist would agree
with the definition of God as an absolutely perfect being, not everyone
would
equate that with the greatest conceivable being.
(c) If we
can conceive of God=s existence, we
can likewise conceive of his non‑existence;
and that is all that is needed to show that the idea of God alone
cannot prove
he exists.
(d) An a
priori argument for the
existence of God can prove that he actually exists but not that it is
possible
for him to exist (which would have to be proven a posteriori).]
133.
Hume
rejects the
ontological argument for God=s existence by
pointing out that it is wrong to think
that, based merely on a definition, idea, or meaning one can make
claims about
reality. He supports this by saying:
(a) as long
as someone believes in God, that
is all he or she needs to prove that God exists.
(b) without
first believing that something
(e.g., God) exists, one cannot have a definition or idea of it.
(c) if
something (e.g., God) is conceivable as
existing, it can likewise be conceived of as not existing.
(d) if the
definition or idea of something
(e.g., God) is not only possible but logically necessary, then the
existence of
that thing is not only possible but logically necessary as well.
134.
[According
to
Hume=s critique of
the ontological argument, if something
(e.g., God) can be conceived as existing, it can also be conceived as
not
existing. The fact that God=s existence is
possible does not prove that it is
actual because, for Hume:
(a) the meaning of God varies
from one person
to another.
(b) only an infinite mind would know
whether God truly
exists, and that assumes what is to be proven.
(c) by definition, any God who does not
exist simply
would not be God.
(d) we cannot know what actually exists
without appeal
to experience.]
135.
AIf everything
that exists in the world (including the
world itself) is not the cause of its own existence, then there must be
a cause
of the world=s existence
which itself does not need to be caused by
anything else: that uncaused cause is God.@ This
line of argument is called:
(a) the
existential argument.
(b) the
cosmological argument.
(c) the
ontological argument.
(d) the
teleological argument.
136.
Thomas Aquinas
points out that the cosmological argument does not assume that there
was some
original creation that long ago began the causal sequence of events in
history,
for reason alone cannot rule out the possibility that the universe has
existed
for an infinite time. Besides, if one assumed that God originally
created the
world long ago, that could not be used as an argument for the existence
of God,
because that would prove only that:
(a) what we think of as God must
be the same
as the universe.
(b) God
would have had to have a cause (which
would have been the universe itself).
(c) God may
have existed at the moment of
creation, but not necessarily now.
(d) there is
no rational justification for
thinking that the universe has any cause at all.
137.
According
to
Thomas Aquinas= discussion of
the cosmological argument for God=s existence,
there must be an ultimate cause or reason
for the existence of the world (namely, God). If there were no such
cause, then
there would be no way to explain why:
(a) anything
(including the world) exists at
all.
(b) God
exists.
(c)
everything always has to be explained.
(d) God
would choose to create a world at all.
138.
According
to
Aquinas, the universe must have a cause which itself has no cause and
therefore
has existed for all eternity. Hume rejects this argument by pointing
out that
there would be no need to postulate the existence of a cause
independent of the
universe if we were simply to acknowledge the possibility that:
(a) the
universe itself might have existed for
all eternity and thus is its own cause.
(b) the
universe itself causes God, who then
re‑creates the universe (e.g., in the Big Bang).
(c) because
every thing in the universe is its
own cause, every thing has always existed.
(d) nothing
other than God could be its own
cause.
139.
Thomas
Aquinas= account of the
cosmological argument assumes that
there is a rationale or explanation for the existence of the things we
experience in the world. He concludes that the ultimate cause of that
existence
is itself not created by anything else, because:
(a) without
that ultimate cause there would be
no way to explain why anything happens at all.
(b) the
ultimate cause cannot be known as the
cause of itself since it would be known only by God.
(c) if there
is an ultimate cause (God), then
there would be no reason for the world to exist.
(d) God=s
infinity consists not in being the ultimate cause but in the infinite
regress
associated with there not being an ultimate cause.
140.
Thomas
Aquinas
argues that the world now exists because God now exists as its cause.
God could
not have created the world a long time ago and then withdrawn from any
further
involvement in it, because:
(a) if God caused the world, then
something must have
caused God, and something else caused it, etc.
(b) God cares about his creation and
would not abandon
it simply because it can exist on its own now.
(c) God=s
existence depends on the world=s existence
just as much as the world depends on God.
(d) the present existence of the world
is not
necessary; it relies on a being that now exists to make it exist.
141.
AFrom the
principle of sufficient reason it follows
that there must be a reason, not only for the existence of everything
in the
world but for the world itself.@ Advocates of
the cosmological argument conclude from
this that, as the sufficient reason for the world=s
existence, God himself needs no sufficient reason because he is eternal
and
uncaused. To this particular point critics reply:
(a) The principle of sufficient reason
itself depends
on there being a God to guarantee the truth of the principle, and that
merely
begs the question about God=s existence.
(b) The question of who causes God is
not at issue
here; what is at issue is whether God created the universe at some
particular
time or whether the universe has existed for all eternity.
(c) If God can be uncaused and eternal,
so can the
world, in which case the world can be its own sufficient reason.
(d) The fact that God created the world
billions of
years ago does not prove that he continues to exist.
142.
According
to
Aquinas, an infinite causal regress (saying A is caused by B, which
itself is caused
by C, and so on infinitely) fails to account rationally for the
existence of
things in the world because:
(a) that
would mean that the world has existed
for all eternity.
(b) every
thing in the world would be existing
for all eternity.
(c) such a
regress itself would never change.
(d) it, in
effect, denies that existence
ultimately can be explained.
The following quote
summarizing Thomas Aquinas= cosmological
argument applies to the next two
questions:
A(1) Since
objects or events exist, and since no object
of experience contains within itself the reason of its existence, the
totality
of objects must have a reason external to itself. That reason must be
an
existent being. This being is either itself the reason for its own
existence,
or it is not. If it is, well and good. (2) If it is not, then we must
proceed
farther. But if we proceed to infinity in that sense, then there=s no
explanation of existence at all.@
143.
To
the first part
of this argument Hume would reply:
(a) only
things that exist necessarily could
be the reason for the existence of contingent beings; such necessary
beings are
infinite.
(b) what we
know about objects of experience
is that they are caused; therefore we can conclude that objects beyond
our
experience are uncaused.
(c) just as
scientists cannot predict
subatomic causal interactions, so the philosopher cannot predict what
causal
interactions God has with the world.
(d) because
the concept of cause is limited to
our observations of particular things, we cannot conclude anything
about
whether the totality of things has any cause.
144.
A
second problem
Hume would have with this argument by has to do with Aquinas= implicit
assumption that everything has a reason or
cause for its existence which can also be said of the totality of the
universe.
Hume would respond to this by:
(a) denying
that, for God, everything has to
have a reason or cause for its existence.
(b) claiming
that existence cannot justifiably
be predicated of a subject as part of its definition.
(c)
challenging the assumption that the
existence of the universe can be explained.
(d) arguing
that the principle that everything
has a reason or cause applies only to the universe taken as a totality
and not
as an infinite series of particular events or objects.
145.
The
cosmological
argument for the existence of God claims that there has to be a cause
of the
universe (God) which itself is uncaused. Hume objects to this line of
argument
by pointing out that:
(a) the very notion of a being who has
always existed is
an impossibility.
(b) God does not need to cause himself,
he only needs
to cause the universe.
(c) if God needs no cause, then perhaps
neither does
the universe: perhaps it has always existed.
(d) even if God caused the universe,
that does not
explain why so many people fail to recognize that fact.
146.
Hume
rejects the
cosmological argument for God=s existence
because it ignores the possibility that
the causal sequence of events in the universe might stretch back
infinitely. If
the universe has always existed, he argues, it would not need a divine
origin.
In reply, defenders of the cosmological argument claim that:
(a) the
universe cannot have existed
infinitely (eternally) because nothing can exist eternally.
(b) though
things in the universe have existed
eternally, the universe as a totality has not always existed.
(c) though
the universe as a totality has
always existed, individual things in it have not always existed.
(d)
regardless of whether the universe had an
origin, something (God) must be causing it to exist now.
147.
Which
of the
following IS NOT one of Hume=s
criticisms of the cosmological argument for God=s
existence?
(a) The argument proves merely that some
force may cause
the universe, not a personable, loving father.
(b) Even if the universe itself has a
cause, not
everything in it has to have a cause.
(c) If God can be said to have existed
from all
eternity, why can=t this be said
of the universe as well?
(d) Why should we think that everything
(including the
universe) has a cause or reason for its existence?
148.
The
contingency
version of the cosmological argument attempts to avoid a problem with
the Afirst cause@ version
of the argument by noting that, even if the universe was originally
created
long ago, that still does not guarantee that God currently exists. To
prove
that God exists now, the argument goes, we have to recognize:
(a) that since the universe=s non-existence
is a possibility, its current actual
existence must depend on there being a necessarily existing being (God)
who
causes it.
(b) that the so-called Afirst
cause@ of the
universe could itself have had a cause, and
that one could have had a cause, and so on endlessly back in time.
(c) how the notion of first cause is
itself something
that Adepends on@
something that itself cannot be explained: that is why the argument is
called
the argument from contingency.
(d) how the first cause of the universe
depends on the
non-existence of the universe prior to God=s
creating it; in this sense, God depends on the universe.
149.
[To
the argument
that things in the universe could not simply have happened by chance
but rather
happened according to laws of nature formulated by God, Hume replies
that:
(a) the laws
of
nature could have been designed by some infinite mind other than God.
(b) without
the
laws of nature, there would be nothing that proves or disproves God=s existence.
(c) because
the
laws of nature order our experiences in determinate sequences, that
proves that
something must cause those laws (namely, God).
(d) laws of
nature are summaries of events in our experience.]
150.
Hume
claims that
the teleological argument fails to prove that God exists because it
assumes
that the world can be explained by appealing to an analogy with human
artifacts. The analogy fails, he says, because:
(a) it is based solely on our
experiences with past
human artifacts, not future ones.
(b) we cannot say that the world has to
have a maker
in the first place.
(c) no religious believer accepts
arguments regarding
God based on analogies.
(d) like all other artifacts, the
universe might well
be the result of mere chance.
151.
[In
criticizing
the teleological argument, Hume asks, ACould a
peasant if the Aeneid were read to
him,
pronounce that poem to be absolutely faultless, or even assign to it
its proper
rank among the productions of human wit, he who had never seen any
other
production?@ Hume=s point is that:
(a) we know that the universe has no
particular cause,
even though we are unable to prove it.
(b) just because the world exhibits a
certain amount
of order, that does not mean that it also has a design or purpose.
(c) the world, just like Virgil=s poem, is full
of major flaws that could be detected
only if we had infinite intellects.
(d) our limited intelligence prevents us
from deciding
whether or not God=s creation of
the world is praiseworthy.]
152.
To
the argument
that the intricacy and order of things in the universe could not simply
have
resulted from chance but rather must have been caused by God, Hume
(among
others) replies that:
(a) the
order of things in the world follows
laws of nature that could not have been designed by any mind other than
an
infinite mind, God.
(b) though
the laws of nature are based on
generalizations of experience, the divine cause of those laws is
knowable
without having to rely on experience.
(c) laws of
nature simply summarize our
experiences and do not imply that there are, in the world itself,
orderly
sequences or that something must cause those sequences.
(d) since
laws of nature are statistical
averages of possibilities of chance events, they are in no way based on
actual
experiences and cannot provide knowledge of the world or its cause.
153.
According
to one
classic statement employing the teleological argument, AIt is not
necessary that a machine be perfect, in
order to show with what design it was made; still less necessary, where
the
only question is, whether it were made with any design at all.@ The problem
with applying this view to the question
of God=s design in
creating the universe, from Hume=s standpoint,
is that:
(a) it
presumes what needs to be proven,
namely, that the universe is like a machine.
(b) because
no machine is perfect, no universe
could be designed so as to exhibit the characteristics of a perfect
machine.
(c) some
machines do not have any design at
all.
(d) as long
as people are inclined to see
design or purpose in the universe, there is no argument that will
persuade them
otherwise.
154.
Hume
raises a
number of objections against using the teleological argument as a basis
for
believing in the existence of God. Which of the following IS NOT
one of
these objections?
(a) The
argument assumes that the universe is like other things we have
experienced;
but since we did not experience the creation of the universe, we cannot
be sure
that universes have causes.
(b) The
argument assumes that because the world is orderly there must be an
ordering
mind that causes it; but the world exhibits as much disorder as order,
and we
imagine order where there is none.
(c) The
argument shows at best that a very powerful and very wise source could
be the
cause of the (finite) world, but not an all‑powerful, wise, and good
one.
(d) The
argument assumes that, since God has existed for all eternity, so the
world
also must have existed for all eternity.
155.
Which
of the
following IS NOT a criticism raised by Hume against the teleological
argument?
(a) The claim that the universe is
ordered is doubtful
since humans imagine order even when there is none.
(b) We cannot use analogy in discussing
the universe
because we do not experience universes.
(c) Even if we argue analogously, we
cannot conclude
that its creator is all-wise or all-good.
(d) Our inability to appreciate the
order or design of
the world is due to our fallen, sinful natures.
156.
Hume
claims that
the teleological (or design) argument fails to prove that God exists
because it
assumes that, just as there is a connection between objects (e.g.,
watches) and
their makers, so also there is a connection between the universe and
its maker
(God). To assume such an analogy, Hume
argues, is unjustified because:
(a) as
pantheists point out, God is the
universe, not some external cause.
(b) it would
require that we know from
experience that universes always have creators.
(c) if God
is Abeyond@ our
experience, then he also cannot be a personal
being who cares about us.
(d) no
argument from analogy can be based on
experience.
157.
Hume
argues that,
even if we accept the doubtful claim that there is order and design in
the
universe, that would not prove that an all-wise and all-powerful God is
its
cause, because:
(a) for us to be able to say that there
is order and
design in the universe, we would have to compare our universe with
other
universes that lack order and design (which we cannot do).
(b) an infinite being is not needed to
create our
finite universe, only a very wise and powerful being or a group of
beings that
may not even still exist.
(c) an all-wise and all-powerful God
could not create
a world that is imperfect, and since our universe is imperfect, no God
could
have created it.
(d) we cannot say that God designed the
world with any
order and purpose in mind unless we know what such order or purpose
would be.
158.
Defenders
of the
teleological argument for the existence of God claim that, just as a
watch has
a watch-maker, so the world has a world-maker (God) who designs it.
Hume
rejects this analogy because, he says:
(a) neither the universe nor watches
have order or
purpose; we only imagine them that way.
(b) we have no experience of universes
being created,
so we don=t know if our
universe has a creator.
(c) even if the universe exhibits the
order and
purpose of a designing mind, that does not mean that the universe has a
cause.
(d) imperfections in a watch are due to
the fact that
watch-makers are not perfect, but because God is perfect, the universe
he
creates actually does not contain imperfections.
159.
ACould a
peasant, if the Aeneid
were read to him, pronounce that poem to be absolutely faultless,
or even
assign to it its proper rank among the productions of human wit, he who
had
never seen any other production?@ In this
comment Hume is pointing out how:
(a)
comparing
the world to a poem is like comparing the work of God to the work of
peasants.
(b) even if
God
is perfect, he has nonetheless created all orders of beings, including
imperfect thinkers (like ourselves) who are poorly qualified to judge
His work.
(c)
assigning
the universe to Aits proper rank@ means
comparing it to other things in our experience; insofar as it is better
than
anything else, it is the comparative best.
(d) it is
impossible for us to tell, based on our limited experience, whether the
system
of the world contains any great flaws or deserves any considerable
praise.
160.
AWhen two
species of objects have always been observed
to be conjoined together, I can infer, by custom, the existence of one
wherever
I see the existence of the other; and this I call an argument from
experience.
But how this argument can have place where the objects, as in the
present case,
are single, individual, without parallel or specific resemblance, may
be
difficult to explain. . . . To ascertain this reasoning it were
requisite that
we had experience of the origin of worlds; and it is not sufficient,
surely,
that we have seen ships and cities arise from human art and contrivance.@ In this
passage Hume:
(a) raises
questions about the argument from
analogy in proving God=s existence.
(b) says
that we can prove the existence of
God based on experience.
(c) shows how the use
of the argument from
analogy proves that God does not exist.
(d)
denies that the existence of an infinite
God follows from the existence of a finite world.
161.
[Philosophers
(e.g., Kant) have claimed that the cosmological and teleological
arguments are
ultimately based on the ontological argument, for even if we agree that
God causes
the existence and order of the universe, we still have to explain:
(a) why God would have caused this
universe.
(b) how an all-good God would allow evil
to exist.
(c) why God existsCthat is,
what causes God to exist.
(d) why atheists do not believe in God.]
162.
One
of the
classic arguments against the existence of God is the problem of evil.
Which of
the following IS NOT a typical response religious believers
give to this
argument?
(a) Evil is
not real; it only seems real from
our limited perspective.
(b) Evil is
not due to God but to the abuse of
freedom by human beings.
(c) Evil is
necessary so that we can identify
good and be motivated to achieve the good.
(d) Evil is
an incoherent, impossible concept,
and so not even God could know what evil is.
163.
Hume
and Darwin
object to the teleological argument for the existence of God, but they
differ
on the issue of:
(a) arguing by analogy: Hume compares
the universe to
a watch; Darwin compares it to an animal.
(b) order: Darwin says things in nature exhibit order but not
purpose/design; Hume denies even the order.
(c) design/purpose: Darwin attributes
natural
variations to divine purpose; Hume denies variations occur.
(d) cause: Hume says that nature creates
its own ends
or purposes; Darwin says that God does it.
164.
Religious
believers sometimes claim that the existence of evil in the world is
not due to
God but rather to human failings (sin). Therefore, they point out, the
existence of evil cannot be used as an argument against the belief in
God. To
such a strategy, skeptics about the existence of God reply:
(a) this way
of
reasoning assumes that there is a God and then tries to place the blame
for
evil on human beings; but the point of the criticism is to challenge
the
original assumption itself.
(b) since no
one really believes in the reality of evil, no one can use the
existence of
evil as the basis for not believing in the reality of God.
(c) sin is a
misuse of human freedom; though God is responsible for having created
human
beings as free, he is not responsible for how they use that freedom.
(d) evil is
due
neither to God nor human beings; it is the activity of the devil.
165.
Religious
believers sometimes argue that evil does not necessarily prove there is
no God;
rather, evil exists so that we can appreciate goodness and improve
ourselves in
response to it. Critics respond to this by noting that:
(a) God
could have made us more sensitive to
good without our having to endure so much suffering.
(b) evil is
not real; it only seems real from
our perspective.
(c) any
suffering we experience in this life
will be more than compensated in an afterlife.
(d) no one
really believes that people become
better through responding to challenges.
166.
Against
those who
argue that we need evil so that we can appreciate the good and can
become moral
beings, atheists and agnostics reply that:
(a) that makes evil something necessary
and even good;
otherwise, why would God allow so much of it?
(b) evil is simply the absence of what
is good or
real; it is thus not an argument against God=s
existence.
(c) evil is a matter of perspective;
what is evil from
our viewpoint is good from God=s viewpoint.
(d) if it were not for human sinfulness
and misuse of
free will, there would be no evil in the world.
167.
Religious
believers sometimes claim that God is not responsible for evil in the
world; it
is due to the misuse by human beings of their free will. Which of the
following
IS NOT a typical objection to this argument?
(a) God
could
have created us with more intelligence (hightening
our sensitivity to immorality) without affecting our freedom, but he
chose not
to; why?
(b) Why doesn=t God (who
presumably is an all‑loving father)
intervene in the world when we sin in order to prevent suffering that
often
outweighs our errors.
(c) If God
had
created us like himself, then we would not have been truly human; we
are as
good as human beings can be.
(d) Even if
moral evil is due to our sins, how can the non‑moral evil (e.g.,
disease,
natural disasters) experienced by innocent children be caused by their
abuse of
free will?
168.
The Aaesthetic
totality@
solution to the problem of evil argues that, without evil in the world,
we
would not be able to identify the good nor would we appreciate the good
as much
as we do. If everything were good (the argument goes), then life would
not be
interesting. To this, critics reply:
(a) since
each person has his/her own meaning
for good and evil, God could not have given us all the same
appreciation of the
distinction without making us all the same.
(b) God
could have created in us appreciation
of the good without our suffering to learn it.
(c) since
there is no suffering in heaven (or
happiness in hell), there is no knowledge of good or evil there; so we
must be
in heaven, since we now experience the good.
(d) shadows
and tragedies are necessary
components of the total beauty of the universe.
169.
Some
people claim
that the apparently needless suffering and deaths of small children do
have a
purpose in God=s grand scheme:
it inspires others to do the good.
Furthermore, the argument goes, innocent children will be rewarded in
an
afterlife. To this, critics reply:
(a) it is
unjust to punish an innocent to make
a point to others, and no amount of reward will erase that unjust
suffering.
(b) guilty
people suffer just as much as
innocent people; why should the innocents be given special
consideration?
(c) unless
we have some guidance about what is
good, we will suffer and die just like the small children; would that
be fair
to the rest of us?
(d) since
all human beings (as descendents of
Adam) are tainted with original sin, they are all guilty, even
so‑called
innocent children.
170.
Religious
believers often note that evil is not caused by God but is rather the
result of
the misuse of human freedom. To this, critics reply that, if God is
all-knowing
and all-powerful, he is in fact ultimately responsible for our sinful
failings
because:
(a) God creates us in his image, which
means he
creates us with the ability to choose good or evil.
(b) if God had created us already in
heaven, we would
have no reason to develop moral characters.
(c) if we never experienced evil, we
would not be able
to recognize or appreciate the good.
(d) knowing even before we exist how we
will misuse
our freedom, God nonetheless still creates us.
171.
Some
religious
believers have suggested that the presence of evil in the world
actually makes
us better people, because our struggles against evil builds character.
If that
is the case, then there is a reason for the presence of evil‑‑a
reason which makes evil actually desireable:
in
short, it=s good that
there is evil in the world. Against this
way of thinking, critics raise the objection:
(a) this
does not explain why we are
fascinated with the Abeauty@ of pure evil.
(b) no
amount of effort or struggle builds
character; you=re born with a
good character.
(c) there is
no real evil in the world, only
what appears from our perspective as evil.
(d) much
less evil is needed to challenge us
to make great efforts, so why is there so much?
172.
Religious
believers deny that the so‑called problem of evil is an argument
against
the existence of an all‑good, all‑powerful God. They note (1) that
things or events are evil only from our perspective and (2)
that evil is
necessary to highlight the good and to make us appreciate the good.
Against
these attempts to defend God, though, critics reply:
(a) God does
not have to be defended nor do his ways need to be justified; we should
simply
accept the fact that God is the source of all that is good and leave it
at
that.
(b) if evil
is
not real but only a matter of perspective, then so is good; if there is
no
reason to blame God for bad things that happen to us, there is no
reason to
credit him for good things either.
(c) the
presence of evil in our lives challenges us to work harder and to
improve
ourselves; thus evil is really something beneficial, another gift from
God, and
thus not really evil.
(d) though
the
concept of an all‑good, all‑powerful God seems impossible or
incoherent, it is not: it is a problem only for us because we have
limited
intellects.
173.
[Dostoyevsky
claims
that the existence of God and the problem of evil cannot be rationally
reconciled in a theodicy, because to do so would make evil something
that makes
sense and thus should be accepted as part of one=s life.
Instead, Dostoyevsky suggests that the proper response to the problem
of evil
is to:
(a) portray God as either not
all-powerful or not
all-good (or both).
(b) have faith in God despite being
justified in
doubting him because of the existence of evil.
(c) explain how suffering is the result
of human
sinfulness and misuse of free will.
(d) hope that there is an afterlife in
which all
earthly sufferings are balanced by happiness.]
174.
[Dostoevsky
argues that we should choose not to relinquish our belief in the
reality of
evil because to do so would be to trivialize it. As long as we believe
in the
reality of evil, we must continue to question why God permits it. To
such
questioning, God remains silent because:
(a) we do
not
want Him to explain why there is evil in the world, because if we
understood it
we would no longer experience reasons for despair.
(b) any
attempted explanation would Amake sense@ of
evil, which is precisely what cannot be done.
(c) there is
really not a distinction in the world itself between good and evil; it
is only
a human construct.
(d) God has
provided explanations through the Scriptures about why there is evil in
the
world (it is due to human sin and weakness); it=s just
that we are not listening.]
175.
[One
of
Dostoevsky=s characters
claims, AIt=s not that I don=t accept
God, it=s the world
created by him I don=t and cannot
accept.@ In
terms of attempted theodicies, this means
that:
(a) the
existence of evil proves that God does
not exist.
(b) the fact
that God is perfect indicates how
evil is simply in our perception of things.
(c) the
world cannot be perfect (like God is)
and thus needs to be rejected.
(d)
acknowledging God=s existence
does not deny or ignore evil in the
world.]
176.
[Dostoevsky
also
comments: AIf all must
suffer to pay for the eternal harmony,
what have children to do with it? It=s beyond
all comprehension why they should suffer, why they should pay for the
harmony.@ The harmony he
refers to is the harmony:
(a) that
balances the evil in the world with
the happiness of an afterlife.
(b) between
crime or sin (human failure) and
the punishment that such failure requires.
(c) that
balances suffering with forgiveness,
injustice with mercy.
(d) between
human lack of understanding of God=s ways and theodicies
showing that God=s existence is
compatible with the existence of evil.]
177.
[Dostoyevsky
writes, AIt=s not worth the
tears of one tortured child who beat
himself on the breast with his little fist and prayed in his stinking
outhouse,
with his unexpiated tears to >dear, kind
God=! It=s not worth it,
because those tears are unatoned for. . .
. What do I care for a hell for
oppressors? What good can hell do, since those children have already
been
tortured?@ The point
Dostoyevsky makes here is that:
(a) like all evil, suffering is a matter
of
perspective: our idea of pain is not the same as God=s.
(b) there is no rational explanation (or
theodicy) for
how God and evil can exist simultaneously.
(c) we can believe in God only if we
recognize how
suffering in this life is balanced off in heaven.
(d) the Agood@ provided by
the threat of hell is that it makes some
people act morally.]
178.
[According
to Feuerbach, religion has played a
significant role in human
history by pointing out how human existence aspires to what it has not
yet
achieved. Belief in God (he says) now stands in the way of human
fulfillment,
however, because it prevents us from seeing how God is simply:
(a) the
infinite, positive counterpart to
Satan and the forces of evil.
(b) the
source of human existence and the inspiration
to human endeavors.
(c) the
cause of human suffering and thus the
reason why we must rely only on ourselves.
(d) the
infinite extension of humanity,
idealized and alienated from our essence.]
179.
[Marx
criticizes Feuerbach for not explaining
why human beings are so
alienated from themselves that they are willing to escape from reality
through
the Aopium@ of religion.
The real source for why people turn to
the illusions of religion, Marx claims, is:
(a) a
tendency to idealize familial and social
relations in order to protect religious beliefs.
(b) a
willingness to avoid the misery caused
by social inequities, structures, and relations.
(c) the
inability to reconcile an all‑knowing
God with human freedom.
(d) the fact
that people are unwilling to
implement religious teachings into their lives.]
180.
According
to
Marx, religion is Athe opium of
the masses@ insofar
as religious beliefs:
(a) make us
dissatisfied with social
inequalities and prompt us to call for social change.
(b) alienate
us from one another by
emphasizing just how transcendent God really is.
(c) create
in us a mentality that we are not
individuals in God=s eyes, only
human masses.
(d)
desensitize us to the human misery caused
by social structures we should change.
181.
According
to
Freud, religion depresses the value of life and diminishes intelligence
by
encouraging believers to think that they are unable to take care of
themselves
or understand why they exist. They are willing to accept this state of
affairs
because:
(a) like children they want to be
protected from the
pains and anxiety of dealing with harsh reality.
(b) they are willing to permit
socio-political
inequalities as long as they are allowed to exploit others.
(c) life is valueless and they really do
not know how
to take care of themselves or understand why they exist.
(d) the infantile fear and resentment of
most
religious believers will be overcome as they grow in faith.
182.
Freud
argues that
religious beliefs are born out of infantile fears of helplessness and a
longing
for a father figure to protect us from the anxieties of life. But (a
critic
might say) what is wrong with someone=s having
such a delusion? As long as it makes people feel better, what=s the harm? To
this, Freud answers:
(a) As long as religion provides people
with the means
for redirecting their lives to productive ends, it is a viable way of
dealing
with frustration and anxiety.
(b) Because religion suggests that
people are
ultimately powerless to change things in their lives, it prevents them
from
developing the maturity to cope with reality.
(c) The problem is not with religion as
such, but only
with those forms of religion that make people feel better; fatalistic
or
depressing religions are realistic and OK.
(d) To say that religion is a delusion
does not mean
that it is not true; it is only to say that, for some immature people,
religion
can become a way of avoiding reality.
183.
By
referring to
religious belief as an illusion, Freud tries to show how our wanting
something
to be true often has the effect of making us believe that it is true.
In the
case of religion, what we want to believe is that:
(a) our
faith in God and an afterlife is
enough to overcome our illusion that there is no God.
(b) there is
some God, heaven, or reward that compensates
for earthly frustrations and death.
(c) all of
the wishes and hopes that we have
can be fulfilled by God in this life.
(d) our fear
of death and abandonment in a
godless world can be overcome through psychoanalytic enlightenment.
184.
[According
to
Freud, AWhat is
characteristic of illusions is that they are
derived from human wishes. In this respect they come near to
psychiatric
delusions. But they differ from them too. . . . In the case of
delusions, we
emphasize as essential their contradiction with reality. Illusions need
not
necessarily be false.@ By applying
this distinction to religious beliefs,
Freud concludes:
(a) all
religious doctrines are illusions, and
some are so improbable that they are delusions.
(b) all
religious doctrines are delusions
because there is no way they could be true.
(c) some
religious doctrines are known to be
true; false ones are illusions, not delusions.
(d)
religious doctrines can be neither
illusions nor delusions since they are only beliefs.]
185.
Volitional
arguments differ from rational arguments for the existence of God
because
volitional arguments:
(a) focus on how belief in God makes a
difference in
one=s life instead
of focusing on whether God exists.
(b) justify belief in God by showing how
such a belief
is shared by other people in one=s
culture.
(c) attempt to prove God=s
existence by appeal to sensible or mystical experiences.
(d) are based on what one would hope
would be true
even though it is known to be false.
186.
Religious
believers sometimes argue that mystical experiences prove that God
exists,
because such experiences:
(a) provide the mystic with rational
arguments to
convince others about God=s existence.
(b) reveal how having a sense of one=s own personal
identity is important for religious
belief.
(c) happen only after someone has
decided to change
his/her life for the better.
(d) put the mystic in touch with some
awe-inspiring
Other that makes his/her own existence meaningful.
187.
By
saying that
causality is a function of how our minds structure experience, Kant
denies the
possibility of saying that there could be a cause for the world that we
experience, because:
(a) the
cause
of our experience of the world cannot be explained in any way other
than by
postulating the existence of God.
(b) without
supposing that there is some cause for why we experience the world as
we do, we
cannot explain how things are experienced in causal relations.
(c) there
would
be no sense in talking about a cause of experience if causality is a
relation
limited to or contained within experience.
(d) none of
the
things that we experience in the world really has a cause; Acause@ applies only
to things beyond our experience.
188.
Kant=s moral
argument for the existence of God is based on
the practical assumption that most people believe that there is a real
difference between moral right and wrong. Kant uses this belief as the
basis
for his argument for God=s existence by
claiming that:
(a) any
belief in God that is based on an
assumption‑‑even the assumption that there is a difference between
moral right and wrong‑‑is a hypothetical, not a categorical,
imperative.
(b) a God
who is less than all good might not
be concerned with morality; therefore, if there is morality at all, God
must be
perfectly good.
(c) there
must be a being who reconciles
virtuous efforts with appropriate rewards; otherwise, there is no
greatest good
as a standard for morality.
(d) God is
the cause for the development of
moral distinctions in human history.
189.
Kant=s Amoral argument@ for God=s existence is
based on the assumption that only a God
could guarantee that those who deserve to be happy (namely, the
virtuous)
actually are happy. Such a guarantee is needed for there to be a summum bonum
(greatest good). And ultimately, we must believe there is a summum
bonum, because otherwise:
(a) the summum
bonum would be God himself.
(b) the universe would be God but not
good.
(c) there would be no reason to believe
in hell.
(d) moral distinctions (good/bad) would
make no sense.
190.
[Kant=s moral
argument for God=s
existence assumes that no a posteriori or a priori proof succeeds and
that only
a practical argument can justify belief in God. That is why Kant says
that his
argument ultimately depends not on some theoretical proof but on an
assumption,
namely, that:
(a) moral
distinctions are based on God=s laws.
(b) no one
can be happy without being
virtuous.
(c) morality
(distinguishing right/wrong)
makes sense.
(d) the summum
bonum is good only in God=s eyes.]
191.
Pascal=s wager assumes
that the probability of God=s existence is
50‑50; either God exists or he doesn=t. Some critics
counter by saying that the probability
of the kind of Christian (infinite) God Pascal claims we should believe
in is
much less than 50%, and so we have more reason not to believe in such a
being.
Pascal=s answer to
this is:
(a) even if
the probability is very small, the
payoff is worth believing in such a God.
(b) the
probability of there being such a God
is even greater than 50‑50.
(c) since
the probability of someone=s believing in
God is 50‑50, so is God=s existence.
(d) because
the probability of our being
sure that God exists is zero, the probability that he exists is
50‑50.
192.
At
issue in the
discussion of Pascal=s wager is
whether it is reasonable to believe
in the existence of God without convincing evidence. Since the
religious
believer could be wrong, isn=t it
philosophically irresponsible to believe without
that evidence? To this Pascal says:
(a) in the
absence of a proof one way or the other, we in fact choose to live our
lives
based on something: why not use the anticipated rewards of religious
belief as
that basis?
(b) it would
be
contrary to human nature to believe in the existence of a God for whom
we have
no evidence.
(c) God
would
not reward a believer with eternal happiness if the person adopts the
belief as
a result of considering the possible rewards of such a belief.
(d) the
Christian life is fulfilling enough that, even if there is no God or
afterlife,
people should adopt Christianity for its own sake.
193.
Critics
of Pascal=s wager argue
that it reduces religious belief simply
to going with the odds, and it overlooks strong evidence against God=s existence
(such as the fact of evil in the world).
To such points, Pascal replies that:
(a) belief
in
God (even if there is only a small chance of his existence) is prudent
and
rationally justified‑‑and thus presumably respected by God‑‑because
of its potential rewards.
(b) even
though
there are convincing, rational arguments proving that God does not
exist, we
simply wish that God would exist as a protective father figure, and
that is
good enough as a basis for belief.
(c) there is
no
real question about whether belief is justified: the probability of God=s existence is
much greater than 50‑50, because
evil is simply a matter of human perspective.
(d) belief
in
God=s existence is
rationally justified only if God, in
fact, exists; so if God, in fact, does not really exist, then it would
make no
sense to believe that he does exist.
194.
Some
thinkers
(e.g., William Clifford) argue that we should never believe anything
unless we
have sufficient evidence. William James replies that sometimes we are
justified
in believing certain things on insufficient evidence (e.g., that there
is a
God)Cbut only if our
decision about whether or not to adopt
such beliefs:
(a) is itself something for which we
have sufficient
evidence.
(b) is unavoidable and could make a real
difference in
our lives.
(c) is consistent with other things we
believe.
(d) is something we could learn to live
with and
regarding which our conscience would not bother us.
195.
[In
answering the
question of whether people are justified in religious beliefs, William
James
points out that there is a difference between beliefs that are
meaningful and
those that are true. For if a belief is not meaningful in the first
place, then
it makes no sense to ask whether it is true. The difference, he says,
can be
summarized this way:
(a) though
meaningful beliefs can make a practical difference in one=s life, they do
not necessarily do so; but true
beliefs always make a practical difference in one=s life.
(b)
meaningful
beliefs are consistent with, and satisfy expectations regarding, other
parts of
our experience; true beliefs make a practical difference in one=s life.
(c) a belief
can be true without being meaningful, insofar as truth is something
independent
of people=s beliefs,
whereas meaningfulness is not.
(d)
meaningful
beliefs make a practical difference in one=s life;
true beliefs are consistent with, and satisfy expectations regarding,
other
parts of our experience.]
196.
According
to
William James, we are justified in believing in something (e.g., God)
on insufficient
evidence only when our decision cannot be made on purely intellectual
grounds
and only when making the decision is:
(a) something we can otherwise avoid and
is not all
that important one way or the other.
(b) based on the kind of solid rational
argumentation
that sufficient evidence would provide.
(c) unavoidable, important for how we
live our lives,
and something we could go either way on.
(d) meaningless or unintelligible to
others and even
to ourselves.
197.
According
to
William James, actions based on beliefs for which there are no
conclusive
answers (e.g., the belief in God) might be considered rational actions
when and
only when such a choice of action:
(a) makes a
practical, real difference in how
we live or what meaning we attach to our lives.
(b) produces
the greatest amount of happiness
for the greatest number of people.
(c) is based
on a theoretical explanation of
why people act the way they do.
(d) would be
what most people in the world
agree on, regardless of culture or background.
198.
For
William
James, the decision about whether to believe in God is not based on
rational
arguments but on how believing or not believing makes a practical
difference in
our lives. The important question is thus not:
(a) AWhen am I
justified in believing in God on insufficient
evidence?@ but AWhat is
sufficient evidence?@
(b) AWould it be
immoral for me not to believe in God?@ but AWhy does God
permit evil in the world?@
(c) AIs belief in
God an illusion?@ but AIs belief in
God justified by reason?@
(d) ADoes God exist?@ but AShould I
believe that God exists?@
199.
William
James
says that our passional engagement or
involvement in
living commits us to making choices in situations where no intellectual
or
rational grounds are sufficient to indicate what ought to be done.
These
situations, however, are limited only to those in which we are faced
with what
he calls a Agenuine option@‑‑that
is, an option in which:
(a) we have a choice between, on the one
hand,
something that is meaningful and, on the other hand, something that is
true.
(b) belief in God is something for which
we do not
have convincing evidence but which Aworks@ for us by
being consistent with social teachings and
practices.
(c) we are forced to make some decision;
making the
decision has a significant impact on our lives; and both alternatives
are
equally appealing.
(d) doing what works has the Acash value@ of
being something that someone can justify with rational arguments.
200.
Both Blaise Pascal and William James say that it is reasonable
to believe in the existence of God even when empirical evidence or
demonstrated
proof is lacking. They differ, however, in the following way:
(a) for
Pascal,
not believing in God ignores all of the convincing evidence for his
existence;
for James, believing in God ignores all of the convincing evidence
against God=s existence.
(b) for
Pascal,
belief in God is justified in terms of possible afterlife rewards; for
James,
belief is justified in terms of how well it satisfies expectations or
is
consistent with our other beliefs.
(c) for
Pascal,
belief is a bet, a wager for which one cannot give any justification
one way or
the other; for James, religious belief is justified by the fact that
most
people believe in God.
(d) for Pascal, the religious life is so
fulfilling
that, even if there is no afterlife, people should believe for its own
sake;
for James, that is not enough: there must be an afterlife.
201.
Mystics
claim
that their experiences provide evidence of God as a transcendent Other
in which
all thought (even of oneself) occurs. In such experiences notions of
oneself
and God as particular beings is replaced by:
(a) an awareness of the superiority of
oneself over
all other beings (including God).
(b) a rational knowledge of specific
truths about
oneself and God.
(c) recognition of those arguments or
proofs for the
existence of God that are most intellectually satisfying.
(d) a turn away from self-centered
concerns to a sense
of union or oneness with all things through God.
202.
AI contemplate
the order of nature in the hope of
finding God, and I see omnipotence and wisdom; but I also see much else
that
disturbs my mind and excites anxiety. The sum of all is this objective
uncertainty.@ From this
Kierkegaard concludes that:
(a)
belief in God cannot be grounded on reason or sense experience; it can
be based
only on a leap of faith.
(b)
because our uncertainty is objective and real, we should withhold
belief until
we have more evidence.
(c)
doubt proves that I exist, and if I exist, then (as Descartes also
shows) God
exists.
(d)
in mystical experiences we are united with God in a way in which our
sense of
personal identity is lost.
203.
According
to
Kierkegaard, the truly authentic (Areligious@) individual
acts Aby
virtue of the absurd,@ that is:
(a) based on whatever the person thinks
is required by
a Aleap of faith.@
(b) based on what everyone else would
recognize as a universalizable and shared
truth.
(c) without being able to distinguish
the aesthetic,
moral, and religious life.
(d) without being able to fully explain
his/her
actions in socially acceptable or rationally justifiable ways.
204.
According
Kierkegaard an authentic (Areligious@) person
acts Aby virtue of
the absurd,@ that
is, on faith alone. Such action is based on a recognition that truths
about how
I live are not objective facts about which I am merely curious or
dispassionately interested. Rather, their truth is determined by:
(a)
the way in which my life is improved and my interactions with others
produce
more happiness.
(b)
their being justified based on rational argumentation and social
approval.
(c)
my unconditional, passionate, and personal commitment that they be the
basis
for my existence.
(d)
how well my decisions correspond to what I am confidently assured is God=s will.
205.
For
Kierkegaard,
the truth about the possibility that there is a God who makes our
existence
meaningful must be subjective rather than objective. In other words,
the questioning
of whether there is a God is itself meaningful only in terms of the
answer one discovers.
That fact recognizes:
(a) how our
interest in believing in the
existence of God is much more than intellectual curiosity about some
fact that
is independent of our search for an answer.
(b) how the
distinction between subjective and
objective truth is a function of whether one believes in the existence
of God
or not.
(c) how
belief in the existence of God is
something purely personal and private, regardless of whether there is
any
justification at all in believing that there is a God.
(d) how the
questioning of whether there is a
God can come to an end once someone acknowledges that there is no true
answer
to the question.
206.
According
to
Kierkegaard, religious belief entails a leap of faith (like that of
Abraham)
which cannot be rationally justified or known‑‑even in hindsight‑‑to
be correct. For if we could know that our belief could be
understood
rationally, justified morally, or accepted socially, then:
(a) we could
understand why no leap of faith
can ever merit salvation.
(b) we would
know that religious belief is
always forced, momentous, and live.
(c) we could
see why the religious life is to
be preferred over the aesthetic and moral life.
(d) we would
not have to rely on faith at all
but could instead believe based on reasons.
207.
According
to
Kierkegaard, the attempt to understand God rationally is contrary to
the Aleap of faith@
required in a religious commitment, because:
(a) if
knowledge of God could be reasoned to,
there would be no need for passionate faith.
(b) no other
argument for God=s existence is
as rational as the leap of faith
argument.
(c) a
religious commitment has to be based on
a belief that is rationally intelligible; otherwise, no one would
understand
what it means to believe.
(d) after
all, most of us believe because our
parents or society tell us what to believe.
208.
Though
they
differ about how important religious belief should be in the lives of
human
beings, Kierkegaard and Hume agree on one fundamental point, namely:
(a) people
are rationally justified in
believing in God if that is what they choose to do.
(b) belief
in the existence of God is rational
only if it is socially recognized as appropriate.
(c)
religious beliefs are justifiable based
not on social practices but on rational argument.
(d) there is
no rational justification for
belief in the existence of God.
209.
[According
to
Kierkegaard, the Aethical@ person
is someone who acts based on morally defensible principles. The life of
such a
person, he maintains, is inauthentic because:
(a) one is ethical not by
acting on objective universal principles but by doing what society
says.
(b) ethical principles are
objective and universal, but not crucial in the individual=s decisions.
(c) moral principles
summarize Christian (i.e., middle class, bourgeois) values.
(d) moral principles are true
precisely because they are objective and rational.]
210.
According
to
Kierkegaard, religious faith requires a leap beyond what is socially
acceptable
and rationally justifiable because:
(a) most
religious practices are simply
excuses for socializing with people who could care less about giving a
rational
justification for their actions.
(b) unless a
person believes in what his or
her society and religious upbringing says is right, he or she is unable
to
understand how life can be meaningful.
(c) even if
someone makes a leap of faith and
believes that God will save him or her, that in no way diminishes the
meaninglessness of human existence.
(d) socially
acceptable action requires no
faith at all, and rationally justifiable action applies only to the
universal
(whereas faith in salvation is particular).
211.
An
objection
typically raised against Kierkegaard=s
treatment of religious belief is that it fails to distinguish between
someone
who has a justified belief and someone who is insane. To this
objection,
Kierkegaard replies:
(a) unlike
insanity, justified religious
belief can be defended by appealing to universal, moral principles.
(b) insane
people do not believe anything, but
religious individuals have beliefs that others can adopt too.
(c) an
insane person=s acts are
intelligible only to himself; the true
believer=s acts make
sense to others.
(d) like
existence itself, religious belief
has no ultimate rational justification; so there is really no way to
distinguish it from insanity.
212.
For
Kierkegaard
the anxiety associated with the ambiguity of human existence undermines
our
belief that life is meaningful in virtue of scientific, rational, and
ethical
truths. Which of the following beliefs WOULD NOT be
characteristic of
authentic human existence?
(a) What we
believe to be true has
significance for us only to the extent that it is true for us as
existing
individuals.
(b) Human
significance is not defined in terms
of fulfilling a universal essence or nature.
(c)
Religious commitment guarantees heavenly
salvation.
(d) The gulf
between the finite and the
infinite can be bridged only by a leap of faith.
213.
Kierkegaard
notes
that the truth about human existence is not knowable as are other facts
about
the world, because those other things are facts concerning which we do
not
really care. What makes our beliefs true, though, is not only that we
care
about them but also that:
(a) they are
based on an objective, impersonal
relation between the belief and the world.
(b) even
after adopting those beliefs we
continue to experience anxiety and doubt about them.
(c) after
adopting the belief we are comforted
in the knowledge that God=s grace has
saved us.
(d) faith in
God allows us to believe anything
we want and that will make it true.
214.
Which
of the
following IS NOT a view developed by Hinduism, Buddhism, or Zen
Buddhism?
(a) Union with God is possible only by
acknowledging
him as a personal and individual being.
(b) By not thinking of things as
different from one
another, we experience the divine.
(c) Reality is one and the cycle
of individual
rebirth is regulated by the law of karma.
(d) Release from earthly suffering is
achieved only by
not seeking to satisfy the self.
Answers: [items in brackets
not covered in 2005 textbook or course]
1.
A
2.
A
3.
A
4.
B
5.
A
6.
A
7.
A
8.
A
9.
B
10.
B
11.
B
12.
[B]
13.
[B]
14.
[B]
15.
[A]
16.
[A]
17.
[A]
18.
[B]
19.
[A]
20.
[A]
21.
[A]
22.
[B]
23.
[A]
24.
[A]
25.
B
26.
B
27.
[A]
28.
[A]
29.
B
30.
B
|
31.
[A]
32.
[B]
33.
[A]
34.
A
35.
B
36.
A
37.
B
38.
[A]
39.
A
40.
B
41.
B
42.
A
43.
B
44.
[B]
45.
A
46.
[A]
47.
B
48.
A
49.
[A]
50.
A
51.
A
52.
A
53.
B
54.
A
55.
A
56.
A
57.
A
58.
A
59.
B
60.
B |
61.
B
62.
B
63.
A
64.
A
65.
B
66.
B
67.
B
68.
B
69.
B
70.
A
71.
B
72.
[B]
73.
A
74.
B
75.
B
76.
B
77.
A
78.
B
79.
B
80.
B
81.
[A]
82.
[A]
83.
[B]
84.
[A]
85.
B
86.
B
87.
[A]
88.
B
89.
A
90.
B |
91.
B
92.
A
93.
B
94.
A
95.
A
96.
A
97.
B
98.
B
99.
A
100.
A
101.
A
102.
B
103.
B
104.
A
105.
A
106.
A
107.
B
108.
A
109.
B
110.
A
111.
A
112.
[B]
113.
B
114.
B
115.
B
116.
B
117.
A
118.
B
119.
B
120.
A |
121.
B
122.
C
123.
[D]
124.
A
125.
D
126.
C
127.
C
128.
C
129.
[B]
130.
A
131.
[C]
132.
C
133.
C
134.
D
135.
B
136.
C
137.
A
138.
A
139.
A
140.
D
141.
C
142.
D
143.
D
144.
C
145.
C
146.
D
147.
B
148.
A
149.
D
150.
B |
151.
[D]
152.
C
153.
A
154.
D
155.
D
156.
B
157.
B
158.
B
159.
D
160.
A
161.
C
162.
D
163.
B
164.
A
165.
A
166.
A
167.
C
168.
B
169.
A
170.
D
171.
D
172.
B
173.
[B]
174.
[B]
175.
[D]
176.
[A]
177.
[B]
178.
[D]
179.
[B]
180.
[D] |
181.
A
182.
B
183.
B
184.
A
185.
A
186.
D
187.
C
188.
C
189.
D
190.
C
191.
A
192.
A
193.
A
194.
B
195.
[D]
196.
C
197.
A
198.
D
199.
C
200.
B
201.
D
202.
A
203.
D
204.
C
205.
A
206.
D
207.
A
208.
D
209.
[B]
210.
D |
211.
D
212.
C
213.
C
214.
A |