Past Test Questions: Epistemology (Theory of
Knowledge)
Answers at end. [Items in brackets not covered in 2005 textbook or course.]
True/False
(True=A, False=B)
1. Epistemology is the study of the origin,
structure, and extent of reality.
2. Because rationalism does not rely on sense experience, it cannot provide justified true beliefs (i.e., knowledge) about a priori propositions.
3. Because rationalism does not rely on sense experience,
it can provide justified true beliefs (i.e., knowledge) about a
posteriori propositions but not a priori propositions.
4. [Rationalism is a form of foundationalist epistemology because it claims that
knowledge is possible only if it is based on a principle or principles that are
known with certainty.]
5. Rationalists argue that, since sense experiences are
often mistaken and thus cannot provide certainty, we must appeal to reason alone
to establish the foundations for knowledge.
6. Because rationalism does not rely on sense experience,
it cannot account for how we know anything at all and therefore is not really a
legitimate epistemological approach.
7. [According to Plato, things in our ordinary experience
(e.g., trees) are merely copies or instances of the ideal, perfect Forms in
virtue of which those ordinary things exist and are known.]
8. Plato’s theory of recollection is his way of explaining
how we know perfect or ideal instances of things (e.g., what a perfect triangle
is) even though we have never experienced such things with our
senses.
9. [According to Plato, the eternal Forms or Ideas are the
universal characteristics by which things are what they are and are known as
what they are.]
10. In Plato=s
account, Meno’s Paradox refers to the problem of
explaining how someone can remember anything about the realm of the Forms after
the shock of being born into this world.
11. [Plato’s
Forms are copies of the things we experience in this world.]
12. According to
Plato, our knowledge about things in the sensible world is not based on
sense experience but on our a priori apprehension of the
Forms.
13. [In his
account of the Divided Line, Plato says that objects of reason and understanding
(e.g., mathematical objects and Forms) depend on objects of belief and
imagination (e.g., sensible objects) to be known.]
14. [In Plato’s
Allegory of the Cave, the figures that cast shadows on the back wall of the cave
are supposed to be understood as the Forms in terms of which things outside of
the Cave are intelligible.]
15. [According to
Plato, to understand a thing means being able to conceive the thing in terms of
the concept or logos by which it is intelligible.]
16. [According to
Plato, the Form of the Good is the ultimate cause or rationale for every
meaningful or intelligible thing.]
17. For Plato,
all knowledge (as opposed to opinion) is innate insofar as it is based on
reasoning that cannot have been obtained through sense
experience.
18. [Plato’s
rationalism is a foundationalist epistemology
because it assumes that real knowledge is possible only if it is based on some
certain, unchanging priniciples (which in Plato’s
case are the Forms).]
19. According to
Descartes, a belief is justified only if it is based on an indubitable (undoubtable) principle.
20. Descartes
argues that we cannot know things about the world based on sense
experience because we can be deceived by our senses or might simply be
dreaming.
21. In order for
the self to exist, Descartes argues, there must be an infinite being (God) in
terms of which the self’s knowledge of itself as a finite existence is
intelligible.
22. Because
Descartes knows of God only through his sense experience of the world, his
argument that if he exists then God must exist is based on a posteriori
propositions.
23. Descartes
claims that when we know a physical object (e.g., wax) clearly and
distinctly, we do not rely on our intellect or reason but rather think of the
object solely by means of our senses.
24. By means of
his wax example Descartes wants to show how our ideas of substance and identity
are not based on sense experience.
25. Even though
Descartes recommends that we extend doubt to everything we believe, he
acknowledges that there are some beliefs (e.g., 2+3=5; shortest distance between
points is a straight line) that we cannot doubt.
26. By noting
that he is at least a doubting (thinking) being, Descartes shows how he knows he
exists.
27. The point of
Descartes’ appeal to an evil genius (as opposed to his discussion of illusions
and dreams) is to raise doubts about his knowledge of a priori
propositions and our ability to reason in general.
28. The point of
Descartes’ appeal to an evil genius (as opposed to his discussion of
illusions and dreams) is to raise doubts about his knowledge of a
posteriori propositions.
29. The
proposition “I think, therefore I am” provides Descartes with exactly what he as
a rationalist needs to develop an epistemology, namely, a rule by which to
distinguish a priori from a posteriori
propositions.
30. By means of
his “methodic doubt,” Descartes is able to show that there is one thing we can
know with absolute certaintyCnamely,
that we cannot know anything with certainty.
31. Descartes
uses the methodic doubt to show that there is at least one thing that can be
known with absolute certainty, namely, that he exists.
32. In order to
know that he exists, Descartes first has to prove that his bodily senses
can be trusted when they reveal to him that he is behaving in a thinking
manner.
33. The
methodic doubt by which Descartes hopes to achieve certainty and a
foundation for claims of knowledge is, for him, both a real and reasonable doubt
about the existence of things.
34. Descartes’
“methodic doubt” is intended to raise doubts about illusions, dreams, and
occasionally sense experiences--but not about beliefs concerning the self, God,
or one=s
own body.
35. According to
Descartes, since sense experience is sometimes deceiving, it cannot be the
ultimate and indubitable (undoubtable) basis for
knowledge.
36. According to
Descartes, no all-good God would permit us ever to make mistakes about what we
claim to know about the world using our senses.
37. [According to
Descartes, the criteria or principles for determining whether a claim is
true are clarity and distinctness.]
38. By assuming
that knowledge is possible by reasoning alone, rationalists like Plato and
Descartes conclude that the only things we ever know to exist are our minds and
their ideas.
39. According to
Jainism, our knowledge of sensible objects is based on our sense
perceptions of them.
40. An a
priori statement is one whose truth/falsity is known without having
to appeal to experience.
41. An a
posteriori statement is one whose truth/falsity is known without
having to appeal to experience.
42. [Even though
a posteriori propositions can
sometimes be universal, they are never necessary (that is, they are always
contingent).]
43. The word
“empiricism” literally means the study of knowledge.
44. Empiricism
is not a legitimate “epistemological” position, because it is not really
concerned with the study of the nature, sources, and limits of
knowledge.
45. Empiricism is
the study of the nature, extent, origin, and justification of
knowledge.
46. Empiricists
claim that purely mental (i.e., a priori) operations of reason do not
provide knowledge about the world.
47. [According to
Aristotle, through our senses we know things in the world because the
things we sense are real things.]
48. [Aristotle
says that what makes things be what they are--namely, their essence--does not
exist apart from individuals that exist in the world.]
49. According to
Locke’s representationalist theory, our ideas of
so-called primary qualities correspond to the way things are in the world, but
our ideas of secondary qualities do not.
50. By saying
that the mind is a tabula rasa, Locke emphasizes the empiricist doctrine that
prior to experience the mind is blank or empty.
51. In saying
that our mind at birth is a tabula rasa, Locke claims that all our knowledge is based on
experience.
52. For Locke,
all knowledge is based on simple ideas of experience and their combinations,
relations, or abstractions.
53. To say that
Locke is a representational
realist means that he believes that at least some of our ideas actually
represent things outside of the mind.
54. In Locke’s
representationalist epistemology, our ideas are
said to represent things in the world that cause us to have the ideas we
have.
55. Even though
Locke’s epistemology is called representationalism because he argues that our ideas
represent things in the world, he does not believe that things in the world
cause us to have any of our ideas.
56. According to
Locke, we can have knowledge of innate ideas (as opposed to ideas of sense
experience) because they are based on primary qualities rather than secondary
qualities.
57. According to
Locke, ideas of sensation and reflection are innate because they are based on
primary rather than secondary qualities.
58. [According to
Locke, we know about abstract general ideas like humanity or blueness because
there are such general things in the world to which such ideas
correspond.]
59. Primary
qualities, for Locke, are ideas about things (e.g., being solid, taking up
space, being in motion or at rest) which resemble the way those things really
are.
60. To
distinguish primary and secondary qualities, Locke assumes that we can compare
those characteristics of things that exist in objects themselves with
characteristics that exist only in our minds.
61.
62. According to
63. According to
64. For
65. In his
critique of Locke,
66. According to
67. A solipsist is someone who doubts
whether anything else exists other than his or her own
mind.
68. Instead of
saying that we often perceive what really exists,
69. In
70.
71. According to
72. Philosophical
skepticism claims that nothing
exists.
73. Skepticism
and solipsism are fundamentally identical, in that both deny that we can know
anything at all.
74. Epistemology
does not consider skepticism as
a legitimate theory because skepticism claims that we can never be completely
justified in our beliefs.
75. According to
Hume, because our ideas are copies of sense impressions, we cannot form ideas of
anything (even imaginary creatures) without drawing ultimately on sense
experiences.
76. According to
Hume, we know that Aevery
event has a cause@
is true because we have never experienced an event without a
cause.
77. “All human beings think clearly” is an
example of a tautology.
78. For Hume
causal relations are properly described by means of a
posteriori statements.
79. [Hume notes
that our knowledge that the sun will rise tomorrow is necessarily certain
because “the sun will rise tomorrow” is a matter of fact, not simply a
relation of ideas.]
80. Hume argues
that, because things are nothing more than clusters of ideas, there is no
meaningful way to talk about an external world which causes our
ideas.
81. [In Hume’s
view, a priori propositions are always analytic, and a posteriori propositions
are always synthetic.]
82. [“Bachelors are fun-loving people” is a
synthetic proposition because the predicate is contained in the
subject.]
83. [“Unicorns
have horns” is not an analytic proposition because unicorns do not
exist.]
84. [According to
logical positivism, meaningful statements are either based on sense experience
or tautologies.]
85. [Because a
priori propositions are known to be true or false prior to experience, they
are similar to analytic propositions, since analytic propositions are true or
false based solely on definitions.]
86. Mathematical
propositions (e.g., 7+5=12) are known a priori because their truth or falsity
can be known without having to appeal to sense experience.
87. Kant claims
that our knowledge about things in the world depends on how the mind structures
experience.
88. Our knowledge
of things in the world, according to Kant, is limited to how those things
appear to us as structured according to the categories of the
mind.
89. Kant combines
rationalism and empiricism by claiming that while sense data provide us with the
content of knowledge, the categories of reason organize that
content.
90. [Kant=s
epistemology is called “transcendental idealism” because he says that knowledge
Atranscends@
(or is beyond) what any human being can understand.]
91. Even though
Kant agrees with the rationalists that the mind brings something to experience
and is not a blank slate (tabula rasa), he agrees with the empiricists that knowledge
depends also on experience.
92. [According to
Kant, all synthetic a priori judgments are false.]
93. According to
Kant, we know that all actual and possible experienced events (even future
events) have causes because that is the way that our minds structure
experience.
94. [According to
Kant, synthetic a priori propositions are true because the predicates of such
propositions are not contained in the subjects of those
propositions.]
95. [Logical
positivists argue that, if only sense data reports and tautologies are
meaningful, then neither a priori nor a posteriori propositions
can be meaningful or true.]
96. [According to
realist critics of skepticism (e.g.,
97. [Critics of
foundationalist epistemology (e.g., Richard Rorty) argue that, since neither reason nor experience can
provide an ultimate foundation for knowledge, nothing can be known to be
true.]
98. [By
characterizing objects as “permanent possibilities of sensation,” John Stuart
Mill claims that we can never know physical objects.]
99. [Even though
J. S. Mill describes objects as “permanent possibilities of sensation,” he does
not deny that physical objects exist in the world.]
100.
Multiple Choice
101.
[According to Plato the Forms in terms of which all
sensible objects exist and are known must exist apart from the sensible world
because:
(a)
Forms are
generalizations of our sense experiences based on our use of imagination when we
are asked the right kinds of questions.
(b)
Forms would not
exist unless there were individual things in the sensible, experienced world by
means of which the Forms could be known.
(c)
as Plato
shows by his Divided Line, ordinary objects in the world (e.g., your desk)
cannot exist unless they are known with certainty by relying on our
senses.
(d)
we truly
know something only in terms of its unchanging, perfect essence, and everything
that appears to us in the sensible world changes or is
imperfect.]
102.
[In his discussion of the Divided Line, Plato says that,
in contrast to mere belief or opinion, knowledge is a belief for which we
give reasons or justifications by appealing:
(a)
to what our
senses reveal to us about how things appear to us, not how they
really are.
(b)
beyond the
Forms to images of goodness, beauty, and truth obtained from particular
objects.
(c)
to what we
sincerely believe is true about the Forms based on our experiences in the
world.
(d)
beyond sense
experience to unchanging ideas (Forms) that are perceived as rationally
ordered.]
103.
[In Plato=s
Divided Line, an ordinary sensible thing (e.g., your desk) is an object of
belief but is not an object of understanding or reason. To think of it as an
object of understanding or reason, we would have to conceive of
it:
(a)
based on
what we can picture using our senses or based on what we know from
sensation.
(b)
as a thing
that exists only in our minds or that exists in the physical, sensible world
apart from minds.
(c)
in purely
mathematical terms or in terms of the Form that identifies it as an object in
the first place.
(d)
as a concept
that is more real than the Form that identifies it as an object in the first
place.]
104.
[Plato indicates that the knowledge of pure reason is
preferable to conceptual understanding, because knowing that something is a certain kind
of thing is not as good as knowing:
(a)
how we come
to learn what to call a thing in virtue of our own
experiences.
(b)
the
logos or rationale of the thing, that is, why it is the way it
is.
(c)
why we
differ among ourselves about what we claim to know.
(d)
the
difference between knowledge and opinion as outlined in Plato=s Divided Line image.]
105.
[Plato defines knowledge as justified true belief. This
assumes that we might be able to claim to know something as true
which might actually be false. But, in fact, it is impossible for us really to
know something that is false,
because:
(a)
to know
something that is false is to know no real thing, nothing (i.e., not to know at
all).
(b)
what we know
as true is ultimately based on what we claim to know as
true.
(c)
we cannot
give a justification or reason for believing in something that is
false.
(d)
in contrast
to our knowledge of the unchanging Forms, beliefs about particular objects can
change.]
106.
Plato=s
suggestion that knowledge is innate or remembered when triggered by experience
is in response to a paradox he sets up for himself. The paradox, now referred to
as Meno=s
Paradox, has to do with the question of:
(a)
how
knowledge of the Forms can ever be anything other than a generalization of
experience.
(b)
how a person
can remember anything about the Forms after the shock of being born into this
world.
(c)
how anyone
can recognize the correct answer to a question without already knowing the
answer.
(d)
how concepts
bound to the realm of becoming have meaning only when associated with the realm
of Being.
107.
[In Plato=s
idealism, the unchanging Ideas or AForms@
in terms of which sensible objects both exist and are known must transcend (that
is, exist beyond) the changing realm of appearances; because if Forms changed,
then:
(a)
the only
things in the sensible world that we could ever experience would be
concepts.
(b)
the sensible
realm (in contrast to the intelligible realm) would consist only of copies of
real things.
(c)
nothing in
the experienced world could be or be identified as one determinate thing or
another.
(d)
the sensible
world would consist of unchanging Forms.]
108.
[In Plato=s
allegory of the cave, the Forms and mathematical objects (e.g., triangles) are
represented by things outside the cave and shadows or reflections of things
outside the cave. Inside the cave the objects carried by the figures in front of
the fire and the shadows cast on the wall by those objects
represent:
(a)
the things
we normally experience using our senses, the realm of
appearances.
(b)
things such
as mud and hair that do not seem to have a Form by which they are
intelligible.
(c)
the Forms we
remember after we have sensible experiences and recover from the shock of being
born.
(d)
things that
are understood when we try to use reason alone without the benefit of relying on
our senses as well.]
109.
According to Plato, we attain knowledge only by seeing
beyond this world of particular, changing objects to the true essences or Forms
in terms of which things in this world are intelligible. For example, we know
what triangularity is not from comparing sensible
triangles but by thinking of the ideal of triangularity in terms of which these sensible figures are
recognized as triangles. From this Plato concludes that all knowledge (as
opposed to opinion) is innate, because:
(a)
from the
moment we are born we know what things are in the world in terms of ideas that
we get through our senses.
(b)
since we are
born with senses (that is, our senses are innate), we can know things about the
sensible world with certainty as long as we rely on the senses
alone.
(c)
our
knowledge of the world is not really of the sensible world itself but of the
world grasped mathematically and ideally.
(d)
since our
knowledge of things is based on changing, sensible experience, it depends on a
clear understanding of what words mean.
110.
[AWhen
a person starts on the discovery of the absolute by the light of reason only,
and without any assistance of sense, and perseveres until by pure intelligence
he arrives at the perception of the absolute good, he at last finds himself at
the end of the intellectual world. . . . Dialectic, and dialectic alone, goes
directly to the first principle and is the only science which does away with
hypotheses in order to make her ground secure.@
Here Plato indicates how hypothetical knowledge cannot provide the foundation of
dialectical knowledge, because hypotheses simply:
(a)
explain
sense experiences in terms of general concepts which themselves are not
explained.
(b)
show how
particular objects of experience cause us to recall innate
ideas.
(c)
describe
sense experience without providing an explanation for dialectical
methods.
(d)
reject the
use of reason, preferring instead dialectic, to achieve
knowledge.]
111.
After noting that we sometimes have been deceived
by our senses, Descartes argues that we cannot rely on any sense
experience as the basis for knowledge because:
(a)
even in our
dreams we experience the same kinds of objects that we experience while
awake.
(b)
without our
sense experiences we would not know what words like Adoubt@ mean.
(c)
a
posteriori propositions always depend
for their truthfulness on sense experience.
(d)
we never
know which sense experiences are accurate, so we should play it safe and doubt
them all.
112.
Descartes=
evil genie hypothesis is not intended to raise doubts about whether our senses
can be trusted or whether our bodies and the physical world exist. By
highlighting the possibility of sense deception and dreaming, he has already
raised those doubts. The point of the evil genie hypothesis is
to:
(a)
argue that
God can exist only if we assume that a comparable evil power (the devil) exists
as well.
(b)
raise doubts
about a priori beliefs and reasoning abilities that do not depend on
sense or being awake.
(c)
provide a
means whereby we can escape from the skepticism created by universal
doubt.
(d)
show how
dreaming lacks the coherence of being awake and thus cannot be confused with
it.
113.
Descartes appeals to the device of the evil genius to
make sure that we do not uncritically accept a priori propositions
without first allowing for the possibility that we might be wrong about them.
Why?
(a)
Unlike a
posteriori propositions that depend for their truth or falsity on
experience, a priori propositions are known as true or false prior
to experience.
(b)
A
priori propositions are both necessary and universal, whereas
a posteriori propositions are not.
(c)
If there is the
slightest possibility that we could be wrong about the foundation of our
knowledge, then everything based on that foundation is
questionable.
(d)
The evil genius is
Descartes= way of ensuring that he does not forget how his whole
project of methodic doubt is itself prior to any experiences (and thus a
priori).
114.
According to Descartes, illusions and dreams often
appear as real as ordinary sense experience, but they obviously cannot provide
us with any certainty about the world. Because sense experience is also often
mistaken, it too cannot provide a dependable ground for knowledge. Given such a
situation, he concludes, the most responsible thing that a true searcher for
truth can do is to engage in methodic doubt--that is, a doubt
about:
(a)
those things
for which we have good reason to doubt.
(b)
only those
things for which we have no good reason to doubt.
(c)
contingent
but not necessary truths.
(d)
everything,
even if such a doubt seems unreasonable.
115.
Descartes argues that the cogito (I think, I exist) is the
foundation for all subsequent knowledge because it:
(a)
provides an
indubitable principle on which all other claims of knowledge can be
based.
(b)
is the first
step in Descartes= method of doubt.
(c)
is not
really known to be true but is rather something that everyone
believes.
(d)
can be
doubted just as much as anything else we might claim to
know.
116.
As the product of his methodic doubt, the proposition
AI
think, therefore I am@
provides Descartes with exactly what he as a rationalist needs to develop an
epistemology, namely:
(a)
a criterion
or rule by which to distinguish a priori from a posteriori
propositions.
(b)
an
indubitable, certain principle on which to ground all other claims of
knowledge.
(c)
a way of
distinguishing empiricist principles from rationalist principles of
knowledge.
(d)
the basis
for an a posteriori proof for the existence of God.
117.
Descartes=
wax example indicates how we can know what a thing (e.g., wax)
is:
(a)
in purely
mathematical terms, without having to rely on what our senses tell us about
it.
(b)
only after
it has changed into something which it originally is not.
(c)
in terms
about which even the evil genius could not have tricked
us.
(d)
without
having to relate scientific truth to religious belief.
118.
Descartes=
wax example is intended to show that the wax is the same substance before and after it
is melted, and this observation indicates how:
(a)
our senses
portray the physical characteristics of wax in purely non-sensible
ways.
(b)
our
knowledge of sensible objects (e.g., wax) is based on what reason, not sense,
identifies.
(c)
without
sense experiences, we would not know whether the wax before and after melting is
the same.
(d)
knowing that
something is wax is the same thing as sensibly experiencing something as
wax.
119.
To know anything with certainty about the world,
Descartes first has to prove that God exists because:
(a)
without God
there is no reasonable hope for an afterlife and thus no reason to act
morally.
(b)
a perfect
(all-good) God would not allow us to be wrong when we know things clearly and
distinctly.
(c)
if
God=s existence is doubtful, so is Descartes= existence; so he has to prove that God
exists.
(d)
as the most
important thing in the world, God is the first thing that must be shown to
exist.
120.
The knowledge of his own existence is the basis,
Descartes claims, for all subsequent knowledge. But before he can justify his
knowledge of anything about the world, he first has to prove that an all-good
God exists because:
(a)
even if God
does exist, he might not be all-good and could make us think (mistakenly) that
we exist.
(b)
our
knowledge of the world is independent of God=s existence, but knowing about God is useful in
life.
(c)
if God
exists, only he (and not Descartes) would be able to have clear and distinct
ideas of the world.
(d)
unless God
exists, there is no guarantee that clear and distinct ideas about the world can
be trusted.
121.
Descartes=
methodic doubt expands from raising questions about sense experiences to more
general doubts about whether my body or the world exists (it might be a dream)
and finally to doubts about:
(a)
how one
culture=s beliefs about what is real can be compared to the
beliefs of other cultures.
(b)
what causes
our ideas to seem so real, when we know in fact that our ideas are merely
imaginations.
(c)
whether our
reasoning abilities can be trusted (an evil genie might trick us regarding a
priori claims).
(d)
the value of
doubting itself, in an epistemological comparison of rationalism and
empiricism.
122.
According to the Aepistemological
turn@
epitomized by Descartes=
philosophy, epistemology takes precedence over metaphysics. In other words, in
Descartes=
philosophy:
(a)
that which
is real is more important than that which is imaginary.
(b)
before we
can know what exists, we must know what we can know and what knowing
means.
(c)
knowing
something to be true comes after believing something to be
true.
(d)
nothing
exists without first being known by human beings to exist.
123.
Rationalists often claim that knowledge of ideas
or principles is possible only if we are born with such ideas or principles.
Which of the following IS NOT a position defending innate
ideas?
(a)
Certain ideas or
propositions are remembered as truths acquired before our births
(Plato).
(b)
All people in all
cultures have similar beliefs (e.g., about causality): that proves innate ideas
(Locke).
(c)
Ideas and truths
are knowable in virtue of innate dispositions of the mind
(Leibniz).
(d)
Our past unethical
behavior has blinded us to our naturally innate knowledge of all things
(Jainism).
124.
Both Plato and Descartes are often identified as
rationalists because they agree generally on doctrines that distinguish them
from empiricists. Which of the following IS NOT a typical
rationalist doctrine?
(a)
Though sense
experience is sometimes deceptive, it is necessary for true
knowledge.
(b)
Sense experience
cannot be trusted to provide knowledge.
(c)
Reason alone must
be the means for getting knowledge.
(d)
Knowledge is based
ultimately on innate ideas and a priori principles.
125.
Which of the following IS NOT a typical
objection raised against a rationalist view such as Descartes=?
(a)
A
priori propositions may be true, but
they tell us nothing about the way the world is.
(b)
Sense experience
may not be certain, but we are often justified in claiming to know things based
on it.
(c)
We never really
know physical objects other than as intelligible (mathematical, quantifiable)
objects.
(d)
There is no
agreement on which ideas or beliefs are self-evident or
innate.
126.
[According to critics of foundationalist epistemology (like Richard Rorty), evidence for one=s
beliefs can be conclusive without being necessarily conclusive or based on
some indubitable (undoubtable) principle such as
Descartes=
cogito. That is, it is sometimes legitimate to say that we Aknow@
something even when:
(a)
we
don=t believe it.
(b)
what we know
is not based on any evidence.
(c)
all evidence
contradicts our belief.
(d)
we might
still be wrong.]
127.
Which of the following is an a
priori proposition?
(a)
All material
objects are extended (that is, they take up space).
(b)
Some material
objects are heavier than others.
(c)
All physical
objects are seen sometime or other by some human being.
(d)
Some material
objects are living creatures.
128.
Empiricists charge that if claims of knowledge are
limited to things we know with logical certainty, we will never be able to
know anything about existing things in the world, because:
(a)
the actual
existence of things in the world is known only through experience, not
reason.
(b)
simply by
thinking or reasoning we can know specifically which things exist and
how.
(c)
things in
the world cannot be known to exist unless they exist previously in some
mind.
(d)
the
existence of things depends on their having been created by some prior cause,
God.
129.
According to empiricists, even though the kind of
information provided by a priori propositions is indubitable, it is not
very useful in expanding our knowledge about the world, because:
(a)
the world is
nothing other than what we experience it to be.
(b)
such
propositions are concerned with the world as it is in itself, not with how we
experience the world.
(c)
any
information provided by such propositions is ultimately based on
someone=s personal experience.
(d)
such
propositions are true (or false) by definition and do not describe any facts
about the world.
130.
John Locke argues that our knowledge of the world is not
based on innate ideas, for if ideas were innate:
(a)
they would
be known a posteriori and thus come into our consciousness through
experience.
(b)
we could
know them only in terms of primary qualities and not in terms of secondary
qualities.
(c)
they would
be based on simple ideas rather than complex ideas, relations, or
abstractions.
(d)
everyone
would have them and would know they have them (yet neither of these is the
case).
131.
In his assault on innate ideas, Locke notes that some
thinkers argue that maybe all people (including children) have such innate ideas
but simply are not aware of knowing such truths. To this particular point Locke
responds:
(a)
it makes no
sense to say that we know something that we do not know.
(b)
even
children know what they know only by means of experience.
(c)
even if all
people agreed about a belief, that would not necessarily make it
innate.
(d)
because we
should limit our assent to the evidence, we should believe in innate ideas only
to the extent that we have evidence for them.
132.
In calling the mind a Atabula rasa,@
Locke wants to emphasize that all knowledge, even knowledge of mathematical
truths, is based on solely on:
(a)
innate
ideas.
(b)
experience.
(c)
formal
training or education.
(d)
language.
133.
AThe
particular bulk, number, figure, and motion of the parts of fire or snow are
really in them, whether anyone=s
senses perceive them or not; and therefore they may be called real
qualities, because they really exist in those bodies. But light, heat,
whiteness, or coldness, are no more really in them than sickness or pain is in
manna [bread].@
In this passage Locke locates the distinction between primary and secondary
qualities in the difference between:
(a)
the parts of
bodies that we cannot sense and the parts that we can
sense.
(b)
qualities of
bodies that exist independently of sensation and qualities that rely on
sensation.
(c)
the power to
perceive things in our own bodies and the power to perceive things in other
bodies.
(d)
those
qualities that no one ever perceives and those qualities that we always
perceive.
134.
[Substance, Locke claims, is that AI
know not what@
in which the primary qualities of a thing inhere. Without assuming the existence
of substance and primary qualities, Locke would not be able to conclude that his
knowledge is in any way:
(a)
the same as
the knowledge that God has in coordinating events in the
universe.
(b)
the same as
the knowledge that God has in ordering our sense data into specific
things.
(c)
the same as
other people have when they have his experiences.
(d)
based or
grounded in a reality apart from experience.]
135.
For Locke, all knowledge is based on ideas that
represent things outside the mind which cause our experiences. The problem with
this Arepresentational
realism,@
(a)
it implies
that the only thing that really exists is God=s mind.
(b)
it suggests
that our knowledge of the world is really based on innate ideas instead of
mental images.
(c)
it assumes
things outside our minds as causes of our ideas even though we know only our
ideas.
(d)
it fails to
indicate whether things in the world are known a posteriori or a
priori.
136.
In his critique of Locke,
(a)
primary
qualities exist in the mind of God, whereas secondary qualities exist only in
human minds.
(b)
primary
qualities depend for their existence as much on minds as do secondary
qualities.
(c)
neither
primary nor secondary qualities exist in any mind (finite or
infinite).
(d)
primary
qualities of things are known a posteriori, whereas secondary qualities
are known a priori.
137.
According to
(a)
To show how some of
our ideas really do represent material things as we perceive
them.
(b)
To show how God is
the source of our ideas of primary qualities but not ideas of secondary
qualities.
(c)
To show how our
different ideas can never provide certainty or knowledge about the
world.
(d)
To show how some
ideas of primary qualities (e.g., solidity, shape) can also be understood as
ideas of secondary qualities (e.g., color).
138.
Instead of saying that we often perceive what really
exists,
(a)
what really
exists is what we or some other mind perceives.
(b)
that which
really perceives (i.e., mind) is all that really exists.
(c)
that which
is perceived (i.e., idea) is that which does the
perceiving.
(d)
we seldom
perceive what really exists; when we do, we do not recognize it as
such.
139.
(a)
ideas are caused in
us by the external things (Asupposed originals@) that our ideas represent
(b)
external
things are perceivable and the only things that are perceivable are
ideas.
(c)
God cannot perceive
ideas because he cannot perceive our minds.
(d)
to say that
something exists means that it is perceivable, not that it is perceived (even by
God).
140.
(a)
we feel that
something external to us causes us to have particular
perceptions.
(b)
the
skeptical attitude towards knowledge undermines the doctrine of secondary
qualities but not that of primary qualities.
(c)
the laws of
nature are human generalizations of our experiences.
(d)
our interest
in perception is one which has a religious or theological
character.
141.
According to
(a)
as a
secondary quality, the color red is something that is purely private and
individual.
(b)
we learn to
associate our experiences with words that we agree upon intersubjectively.
(c)
we in fact
do have the same mental experience, even if we don=t know it.
(d)
red is a
simple idea, whereas redness is an abstract idea.
142.
(a)
we can
perceive our own minds but not the minds of others.
(b)
God perceives those
things which no other minds perceive.
(c)
we can
perceive each others= minds but not our own.
(d)
nothing can
be perceived without its being perceived by some mind(s).
143.
If all I ever know is that I exist and have ideas, but
cannot be sure about whether those ideas refer to anything outside of myself, then I am trapped in my own consciousness. Such a
position is referred to as:
(a)
conceptualism.
(b)
phenomenalism.
(c)
solipsism.
(d)
representational realism.
144.
AThere
is no question of importance whose decision is not comprised in the science of
man; and there is none which can be decided with any certainty before we become
acquainted with that science.@
Here Hume notes that since everything is known through our ideas and reasoning,
then:
(a)
an
empiricist epistemology is better than a rationalist epistemology insofar as
empiricism gives us knowledge of the world and rationalism gives us knowledge of
ourselves.
(b)
by
acknowledging that certainty is unachievable, we show the fruitlessness of
trying to develop a philosophy of human nature.
(c)
to know
anything about human nature with any certainty, we first have to know about the
world apart from our ideas and processes of reasoning.
(d)
by
understanding human nature (which includes how our ideas of things are ordered),
we can understand everything that is knowable.
145.
Hume points out that, if all knowledge is based on
experience, then our knowledge that every event has a cause has to be based on
our experience of every event. But since we have not had experiences of future
events nor even of every past event, how can we be sure that all events
(including future events) will have causes? Hume=s
answer:
(a)
since we
know that past events will be like future events, we can be sure they will all
have causes.
(b)
we
can=t be sure: all we do is Aimagine@ events will have causes, we develop that habit or
custom.
(c)
it is
impossible even to imagine an event without imagining it as having had a
specific kind of cause.
(d)
we know with
certainty (innately) that no future or past events ever had
causes.
146.
Locke says that we know external objects only indirectly
through ideas that are caused by objects.
(a)
external
objects are created by God in such a way so as to make us have ideas of
them.
(b)
God creates us so
that there are minds that can be caused to think about external
objects.
(c)
our minds
are structured in a way that makes us think that God causes us to have
ideas.
(d)
even the
claim that God causes our ideas is not justified because cause itself is
questionable.
147.
Hume argues that we do not know a priori that all
events have causes, and our a posteriori knowledge of causal relations is
limited to temporal priority and contiguity. This latter Aknowledge@
does not guarantee that every event (y) must have some cause (x),
because:
(a)
thus far in
our experience, every event y has always had a cause x, and even
if it is not a certainty, there is a high probability that future events will
also have causes.
(b)
we do not
experience any necessary connection between prior, contiguous events x
and subsequent events y that we think of as their
effects.
(c)
the meaning
of the word event, unlike that of effect, contains within it as
part of its definition the notion of having a cause.
(d) even if we do not know what the cause of an event is, then at least God knows; and that is all that we need to guarantee the cause-effect relationship.
148.
For Hume (unlike Locke or Berkeley), we cannot know the
cause of our ideas because the concept of cause:
(a)
is a pattern
of regularity that God has created in our minds to allow us to live in the
world.
(b)
refers only
to the relation between ideas that I have and the ideas that other people
have.
(c)
refers only
to how our ideas are associated, and thus cannot be applied outside of our
ideas.
(d)
the three
components of cause (temporal priority, contiguity, and necessary connection)
are innate.
149.
According to Hume, I cannot know (or predict with any
certainty or high probability) that things in the future will occur in
particular ways, because:
(a)
the future
will not resemble the past: that is what distinguishes the future from the
past.
(b)
I have no
experience on which to base the claim that the future will resemble the
past.
(c)
knowledge of
the future would require an infinite intellect; for Hume, only God knows the
future.
(d)
to have an
idea of the future, I would have to have an idea of my future self (which
is impossible).
150.
According to Hume, we will never be able to know
anything about whether there is a world outside of our ideas which causes those
ideas because:
(a)
all of our
ideas are based on sense impressions, and we have no way of comparing those
impressions with their supposed external causes.
(b)
ideas are
copies of sense impressions, and since the external world is itself a copy of an
ideal world in our minds, we can never know what the external world is
like.
(c)
the world
outside of our ideas causes those ideas only in regard to Amatters of fact@ and not in regard to Arelations of ideas.@
(d)
the external
world is the realm of matter, selves, and freedom--which are all unknowable
because we have only sensible impressions of them but not
ideas.
151.
Hume=s
analysis of cause and effect
undermines any claim to know that our ideas are
caused by things in the world, because (according to
Hume):
(a) the notion of "cause" applies only to things outside our experience, not to our ideas.
(b) whenever we experience things that have no causes, we conclude that they are miracles.
(c) the cause-effect relation is a relation of ideas and cannot be applied to anything outside our ideas.
(d) the cause of our ideas must be something other than our ideas.
152.
[Which of the following IS NOT a typical
objection raised by critics against Locke=s
or Hume=s
empiricism?
(a)
Our experience is a
web of beliefs, not a collection of discrete experiences.
(b)
Ideas are not
intermediaries through which we experience things; we experience things
themselves.
(c)
Knowledge of the
world, including ideas of cause-effect and the self, is ultimately based on
experience.
(d)
Natural
inclinations are as philosophically respectable as sense experience or truths by
definition.]
153.
[Critics of
Hume=s
skepticism acknowledge that there is always a purely logical or theoretical
possibility that our so-called knowledge of the external world is unjustified.
But for such critics (e.g., Moore, Malcolm) that is irrelevant, because to say
that we know things about the external world simply means that:
(a)
we have no
good reason to doubt what we believe and cannot imagine really being wrong about
it.
(b)
even if we
were wrong about we know, we would not realize it and so it would not
matter.
(c)
we believe
that what we claim to know is based on all the other things we believe about the
world.
(d)
our doubts
about what we know about the world are based solely on weak (vs. strong)
beliefs.]
154.
By combining rationalism and empiricism, Kant says we
can explain how knowledge is possible by noting how:
(a)
sense data
provide us with the content of knowledge, the categories of reason organize that
content.
(b)
categories
of reason provide us with sense data, which are then organized either mentally
or physically.
(c)
a priori
truths are innate, whereas a
posteriori truths are based on experience.
(d)
knowledge
must understood as a web of constantly changing beliefs, not a static collection
of ideas.
155.
[Kant joins elements of empiricism and rationalism by
suggesting that, in addition to synthetic a posteriori propositions and analytic
a priori propositions, there is a third kind of proposition that provides
knowledge, namely, synthetic a priori propositions (such as Aevery
event has a cause@).
In this third kind of proposition:
(a)
the
predicate is contained in the subject, and the truth of the proposition is known
only by appealing to experience.
(b)
the
predicate is not contained in the subject, and the truth of the proposition is
known only by appealing to experience.
(c)
the
predicate is contained in the subject, and the truth of the proposition is not
known by appealing to experience.
(d)
the
predicate is not contained in the subject, and the truth of the proposition is
not known by appealing to experience.]
156.
Kant Asaves@
science from Hume=s
skeptical description of causal regularity (as merely a habit or custom) by
proposing that our knowledge that all events have causes is due to the fact
that:
(a)
our minds
are structured to experience all events (as phenomena) as having
causes.
(b)
events in
the realm of the Forms always have causes, even if we don=t experience them.
(c)
just as our
experience is caused by something, so also is our knowledge of that
experience.
(d)
our habit of
thinking of things as causally related is an inductive generalization of past
experience.
157.
According to Kant, the way to respond to Hume=s
critique of causality is to show that certainty about propositions like Aevery
event has a cause@
is possible in virtue of the fact that:
(a)
our
experience of events itself is caused by something apart from all
experience.
(b)
the
Alaw@ of causality (every event has a cause) is merely an
inductive generalization.
(c)
the mind
(reason) structures all (even future) experiences in determinate, unchanging
ways.
(d)
even though
every Aeffect@ has a cause, not every Aevent@ has a cause.
158.
In order to avoid Hume=s
conclusion that we cannot know that things in the future
will always have causes, Kant argues that we know that all events in the future
will have causes because:
(a)
our belief
that future events will have causes is so strong that it alone is sufficient to
guarantee that future events will, in fact, have causes.
(b)
all minds
are organized in such a way that, in order for events (including future events)
to be experienced at all, they must always be experienced as having a
cause.
(c)
cause-and-effect is a law of nature independent of human experience;
regardless of whether we or any other minds experience them, events in the
future will have causes.
(d)
future
events themselves are caused by past and present events; so we know that if
future events occur at all, they will have been caused by
something.
159.
Kant=s
critics claim that, if we know things in the world only insofar as they are
experienced (as phenomena) and not as they are in themselves, we will
never know if our ideas really describe the world. To this he
replies:
(a)
we can
know with certainty even things supposedly beyond our sense experience
(e.g., God, soul).
(b)
reason is
not limited to any one set of categories; we can always choose another
culture=s categories.
(c)
the world is
what we really experience; to think of things Ain themselves@ is impossible, contradictory.
(d)
our
knowledge depends not on experience but on the particular language games of our
culture.
160.
Critics of Kant argue that his attempt to guarantee
knowledge by proposing that all minds organize experience according to universal
categories ignores how:
(a)
even
anomalies in experience can be explained to the extent they appear to us (i.e.,
as phenomena).
(b)
sense data
alone do not give us knowledge of the world: our minds are not blank
slates.
(c)
we know
things about the world not by means of innate ideas but only through
perceptions.
(d)
ways of
organizing experience vary in different cultures and languages (the Sapir-Whorf hypothesis).
161.
[According to the psychological atomism implicit in
logical positivism, our knowledge of the world is built up from discrete sensory
impressions. However, as Gestalt theorists point out, perceptions are not
simply isolated sense data, because perceptionsCindeed,
all experiencesCare
intelligible in virtue of:
(a)
other
equally isolated sense data that are themselves innate
ideas.
(b)
whether
ideas are caused by material substances in the world or by God
directly.
(c)
logical
constructs of neutral (neither mental nor physical) sense
experiences.
(d)
the
linguistic background or social field of expectations by which they are
identified.]
162.
[According to Logical Positivists, only those statements
that can be tested by experience or are true by definition are meaningful. The
most that one would be able to say about ethical or religious claims would
be:
(a)
they report
on how we feel about something, but they do not express any
truth.
(b)
such claims
may be true or false; it=s just that we may not know whether our beliefs are
justified.
(c)
they are
purely logical truths--that is, truths of reason (or by definition), not matters
of fact.
(d)
they have
meaning insofar as they provide the hypothetical or theoretical bases for
thought.]
163.
[According to positivists (also known sometimes as phenomenalists), the meaning of a sentence consists in its
being either a tautology or understandable in terms of past or predicted sense
experiences. In other words, a sentence (like AGod
exists@)
is meaningful only if:
(a)
for the
person who utters it, the sentence has meaning, regardless of what others
think.
(b)
it
represents the truth, even if we don=t know which experiences to
believe.
(c)
it is true
by definition or is testable by appeal to sense
experience.
(d)
it expresses
a belief that is innate, known to all rational beings.]
164.
[Positivists (also known sometimes as phenomenalists) claim that physical things are simply
constructs of sense data that we talk about in ways different from those things
that we identify as mental or spiritual things. Specifically, to say that a
thing is a physical object means that:
(a)
it is proper
to speak about the thing in terms of dimensionality, size, and
shape.
(b)
the
thing=s primary qualities (extension, shape, and solidity) do
not depend on the mind.
(c)
appearances of the thing, even in hallucinations or dreams, must be accepted as
real.
(d)
claims about it are ultimately understandable as being tautologies.]
165.
According to the Aproblem of induction@ (often credited to Hume), we cannot use past experiences to predict the probability of future events or experiences, because such predictions would: (a)
not be based on generalizations of past experiences but rather on primary (vs. secondary) qualities. (b)
assume the future will resemble the past; but without experience of the future, we cannot conclude this.
(c)
rely more on custom/habit (i.e., things outside the mind) than on the unchanging structure of the mind. (d)
be merely hypothetical (and thus not intelligible in terms of any conceivable paradigm).
166.
According to Thomas Kuhn, when a scientific revolution occurs (i.e., when one set of theories and practices that have traditionally defined a discipline is replaced by another), not only are new methods adopted, but also: (a)
no new paradigm replaces the former paradigm. (b)
the new paradigm is used to reassert the truth of the old paradigm.
(c)
new insights are gradually added to the old ones.
(d)
the very objects studied by the discipline change.
1.
A 2.
B 3.
B 4.
[A] 5.
A 6.
B 7.
[A] 8.
A 9.
[A] 10.
[B] 11.
[B] 12.
A 13.
[B] 14.
[B] 15.
[A] 16.
[A] 17.
A 18.
[A] 19.
A 20.
A |
21.
A 22.
B 23.
B 24.
A 25.
B 26.
A 27.
A 28.
B 29.
B 30.
B 31.
A 32.
B 33.
B 34.
B 35.
B 36.
B 37.
[A] 38.
B 39.
B 40.
A |
41.
B 42.
[A] 43.
B 44.
B 45.
B 46.
A 47.
[A] 48.
[A] 49.
A 50.
A 51.
A 52.
A 53.
A 54.
A 55.
B 56.
B 57.
B 58.
[B] 59.
A 60.
A |
61.
B 62.
A 63.
B 64.
A 65.
A 66.
B 67.
A 68.
A 69.
A 70.
A 71.
B 72.
B 73.
B 74.
B 75.
A 76.
B 77.
B 78.
A 79.
[B] 80.
A |
81.
[A] 82.
[B] 83.
[B] 84.
[A] 85.
[A] 86.
A 87.
A 88.
A 89.
A 90.
[B] 91.
A 92.
[B] 93.
A 94.
[B] 95.
[B] 96.
[B] 97.
[B] 98.
[B] 99.
[A] 100.
B 101.
[D] |
102.
[D] 103.
[C] 104.
[B] 105.
[A] 106.
C 107.
C 108.
[A] 109.
C 110.
[A] 111.
D 112.
B 113.
C 114.
D 115.
A 116.
B 117.
A 118.
B 119.
B 120.
D 121.
C |
122.
B 123.
B 124.
A 125.
C 126.
[D] 127.
A 128.
A 129.
D 130.
D 131.
A 132.
B 133.
B 134.
[D] 135.
C 136.
B 137.
A 138.
A 139.
B 140.
A 141.
B |
142.
D 143.
C 144.
D 145.
B 146.
D 147.
B 148.
C 149.
B 150.
A 151.
C 152.
[C] 153.
[A] 154.
A 155.
[D] 156.
A 157.
C 158.
B 159.
C 160.
D 161.
[D] |
162.
[A] 163.
[C] 164.
[A] 165.
B 166.
D |