Past Test Questions: Truth
Answers at end. [Items in brackets not covered in 2005 course.]
True/False
(True=A, False=B)
1.
When
I say I know something, I do not always have to believe what I claim to know.
2.
Just
as it is impossible to know something that you don=t believe, you cannot believe
something you don=t know.
3.
Even though only true
propositions can be known, it is possible to believe a
proposition that is false.
4. We cannot know something that is false, because
what is false does not exist (i.e., it is nothing), and to know nothing is the
same as not knowing.
5. Gettier problems highlight the fact that it is possible to
know something without having to believe it.
6. AGettier problems@
identify instances where people truly know something but do not have
justified true beliefs.
7. For correspondence theorists (e.g., Russell), facts in
the world are true or false, not the beliefs about them.
8. Because Eastern (e.g., Indian) theorists deny the
existence of facts independent of our consciousness, they uniformly reject
correspondence theories of truth in favor of coherence theories.
9. According to the correspondence theory of truth (such
as that adopted by Russell), only facts are true.
10.
According to the
correspondence theory of truth, a statement is true if it is consistent with
our other beliefs.
11.
According to the
correspondence theory of truth, a proposition is true if it is consistent with
our other beliefs, even if those beliefs do not represent or match facts in the
world.
12.
A statement is
true, according to the coherence theory of truth, if it is consistent with
facts in the world that are independent of our beliefs.
13.
According to the
coherence theory, the truth of a proposition consists in its coherence with
other beliefs or propositions.
14.
According to the
coherence theory of truth, a statement is true if it is consistent with facts
in the world that are independent of our beliefs.
15.
Because coherence
theorists and pragmatists disagree about what it means to say that a
proposition (e.g., Athe lights are on@) is
true, they also have to disagree about whether that proposition is true.
16.
In William James= pragmatic theory of truth, a belief is validated,
verified, or produces satisfactory resultsCin
short, it worksCbecause it
describes the way things really are.
17.
In the pragmatic
theory of truth developed by James and Dewey, a belief is true because
it Aworks@ or produces expected results.
18.
According to
James=s pragmatism, a proposition is true if, when acted
upon, it satisfies our expectations.
19.
According to Richard
Rorty, to say that a proposition is true means that
we have no reason to doubt it.
20.
[Scientific
instrumentalists claim that theoretical entities such as gravity or electrons
do not really exist but are useful in predicting what will happen when we do
certain experiments.]
21.
[According to
cognitive realists (or Acorrespondence theorists@) such
as Bertrand Russell, a proposition is true if it corresponds to a fact that
exists independently of its being thought by anyone.]
22.
[Scientific
realists argue that theories can make accurate predictions only because the
theories describe the way things in the world really are.]
23.
[By claiming that
scientific theories allow us merely to predict future observations, conceptual
relativists deny that theoretical entities (e.g., electrons) are meaningful
concepts.]
24.
[Because
cognitive realists and cognitive relativists differ on what it means to say
that a statement is true, they would also necessarily differ on which
statements are true and which are false.]
25.
[According to
cognitive relativism, agreement about what is true—what Rorty
calls social solidarity—is achievable because truth is independent of human
beings.]
26.
[Because hermeneutics is concerned with the interpretation
of words and actions, it does not address questions about whether such
interpretations are true.]
27.
[According to
Wittgenstein=s early approach to language, it is possible to create
an ideal language that expresses facts about the world in a clear and
unambiguous way.]
28.
[In Wittgenstein=s later doctrine of Ameaning
as use,@ the meaning of a text can vary depending on how
people interpret it in their life activities.]
29.
[For Gadamer
no interpretation is ever true, because all interpretations include the
prejudices of the interpreter.]
30.
[Gadamer argues that we can achieve true interpretations only
by getting rid of the prejudices that guide thoughts.]
Multiple Choice
31.
Plato defines
knowledge as justified true belief. In terms of this definition, we might be
able to claim to know something as true which might actually be false,
but it is impossible for us really to know something that is false,
because:
(a) to
know something that is false is to know no real thing, nothing (i.e., not to
know at all).
(b) what
we know as true is ultimately based on what we claim to know as true.
(c) we
cannot give a justification or reason for believing in something that is false.
(d) in
contrast to our knowledge of the unchanging Forms, beliefs about particular
objects can change.
32.
Which of the
following IS NOT a necessary characteristic for saying that Mary knows
that today is Monday?
(a) It must be, in fact, true
that today is Monday.
(b) Mary must be able to give
a reason or justification for thinking that today is Monday.
(c) Mary could not have been
tricked into thinking that today is any day other than Monday.
(d) Mary must believe
that today is Monday.
33.
To say that I know
that today is Monday, I not only have to believe it and have reasons for
believing it; it must also, in fact, be true because:
(a) whenever I claim to know
something (e.g., today is Monday), I have to rely on the testimony of others.
(b) if it is true that today
is Monday (as it, in fact, is), then I cannot be misled into thinking
otherwise.
(c) if today were not Monday,
I would not know an actual thing: in short, I would know nothing, no thing.
(d) unless I have consulted a
calendar I will not believe others when they tell me that today is Monday.
34.
To say that you know
that there is life on other planets necessarily implies that you believe there
is life on other planets, that you have reasons to back up your belief, and
that:
(a) life
on other planets is perhaps vastly different from what we are used to.
(b) you
can trust your senses when you see extraterrestrial life forms.
(c) you
have experienced life on other planets personally.
(d) there
is, in fact, life on other planets.
35.
In order for me
to know that birds fly, it must be true that birds do fly, because:
(a) if it were not the case
that birds fly, then I would know that which is not true; in short, I would know
no thing: I would not know.
(b) whenever
I claim to know something, I have to rely on what I have been taught.
(c) if
it is true that birds fly (as it, in fact, is), then I cannot be mislead into
thinking otherwise.
(d) unless
I have seen birds fly I will not believe others when they tell me that birds
do, in fact, fly.
36.
In the
correspondence theory of truth, the proposition AThere is
a desk in this room@ is true only if:
(a) I think there is a desk
in this room.
(b) it
is reasonable to think that there is a desk in this room.
(c) there
is a desk in this room.
(d) if
I try to sit on what I think is the desk, it will support me.
37.
Critics charge
that the correspondence theory of truth fails to explain what truth is because
it fails to explain:
(a) how
we can compare our beliefs with actual states of affairs or facts in the world.
(b) why so many people would differ about what is true or false.
(c) how
some of our beliefs can be true even though we are unaware of that fact.
(d) how
many of our beliefs are consistent with one another and can be acted upon with
satisfying results.
38.
ASuppose we say, >the
table in the next room is round=; how should we test this judgment? In the case in
question, what verifies the statement of fact is the perceptual judgment that I
make when I open the door and look. But then what verifies the perceptual
judgment itself? . . . To which the reply is, that a judgment of fact can be
verified only by the sort of apprehension that can present us with a fact, and this
must be a further judgment.@ Here
(a) Bertrand Russell defends
the correspondence theory of truth against the pragmatic theory of truth.
(b) Brand Blanshard
defends the coherence theory of truth against the correspondence theory of
truth.
(c) the
Indian philosopher Dharmakirti defends the pragmatic
theory of truth against the coherence theory.
(d) William James defends the
correspondence theory of truth against the pragmatic theory of truth.
39.
Critics charge
that the coherence theory of truth is unable to explain falsehood, because if
truth is defined as the coherence of a proposition or belief with other
propositions or beliefs, then are not all coherent systems of belief true? That
is, if a belief is true because it is consistent with other beliefs in a
system, then:
(a) how
do we tell whether a proposition is inconsistent with other beliefs in that
same system?
(b) can=t a belief be false and yet the whole system with
which it is consistent still be true?
(c) why
can=t judgments that are consistent with many other
beliefs still be false within the same system of beliefs?
(d) couldn=t the
whole set of consistent beliefs be false?
40.
According to
Bertrand Russell, to say whether two propositions are coherent, we have to
determine whether they are consistent with one another according to laws of
logic. But laws of logic (e.g., the law of contradiction, which says that
something cannot be and not be at the same time) must themselves be true based
on facts, not on their coherence with other beliefs, because:
(a) a
set of propositions could be coherent with one another even though the whole
set is false.
(b) apart
from such laws, we would be unable to tell whether or not two beliefs are
coherent.
(c) the
truth of a proposition depends on how well it is consistent with or Acoheres@ with
other beliefs.
(d) although
laws of logic are not true or false, they define truth and falsity by
identifying facts.
41.
According to the
coherence theory of truth, a proposition is true if it is consistent with a set
of mutually supporting propositions. Critics (e.g., Russell) claim that this
means that false propositions could be considered true as long as they are
consistent with other propositions in a whole set of false propositions. To
this criticism, the coherence theorist replies:
(a) just
because one proposition in a set of propositions is false, that does not mean
that the whole set of propositions is false.
(b) a
proposition is false only if it is inconsistent with other propositions.
(c) a
set of propositions cannot be internally consistent without also being
consistent with all other sets of propositions.
(d) to
say that a whole set of propositions is false is simply to say that the set is
inconsistent with a larger set of propositions.
42.
Which of the
following IS NOT a typical objection raised against the pragmatic theory
of truth?
(a) Beliefs are not true
because they work; they work because they are true (apart from their
usefulness).
(b) Because a belief could Awork@ for some people and not others, its truth would be
purely relative.
(c) If acting on a belief
consistently satisfies our expectations (i.e., it works), then it is true.
(d) Some beliefs might be
justified (because acting on them can satisfy our expectations) and still be
false.
43.
The three
standard theories of truth discussed in epistemology are the correspondence,
coherence, and pragmatic theories. Which
of the following descriptions DOES NOT match any one of these
three?
(a) A belief is true if, when
acted upon, it results in the satisfaction of expectations.
(b) A belief is true if it is
consistent with other beliefs we hold.
(c) A belief is true if it
describes the way the world is.
(d) A belief is true if a
person really wants it to be true.
44.
[Against those
who say that knowledge must be based on indubitable principles or sense
experience, critics of foundationalist epistemology
(e.g., Richard Rorty) instead suggest that by knowledge
we should mean:
(a) what
we as members of a society mutually agree on, not some independent truth about
the world.
(b) the
interlocking set of unchanging a priori (innate) ideas implicit in
reasoning itself.
(c) whatever
an individual wants it to mean, as long as it Aworks@ for him or her.
(d) a
set of facts about the world that would exist even if we did not exist.]
45.
Against those who
attempt to discover some all-inclusive (capital T) Truth Aout there,@ Richard
Rorty and other critics of a correspondence theory of
truth suggest that by truth we should mean instead:
(a) a
set of facts about the world that would exist even if we did not exist.
(b) what
we know in virtue of the unchanging a priori (innate) ideas implicit in
reasoning itself.
(c) a
set of beliefs that are based on indubitable (undoubtable)
principles.
(d) what
we as members of a society mutually agree on, not some independent facts about
the world.
46.
[Scientific
instrumentalists argue that theoretical entities (e.g., atoms) are practical
means for making predictions and do not describe things that exist apart from
theories. In this sense, instrumentalists are more like:
(a) coherence
truth theorists than pragmatic truth theorists.
(b) realists
than correspondence truth theorists.
(c) conceptual
relativists than realists.
(d) pragmatist
truth theorists than correspondence theorists.]
47.
[Scientific
realists seem to assume a correspondence theory of truth, in that they argue
that claims about theoretical entities (e.g., gravity, electrons) are true only
if those claims:
(a) correspond
to our other Aprejudices@ about
the world.
(b) describe
things that really exist in the world.
(c) describe
those things without using scientific equipment.
(d) are
useful in predicting how our ideas correspond to things.]
48.
[By claiming that
theories are intended to describe the world as it is, scientific realists
assume a:
(a) coherence
theory of truth.
(b) pragmatic
theory of truth.
(c) correspondence
theory of truth.
(d) a
hermeneutic theory of interpretation.]
49.
[For conceptual
relativists, claims about reality are intelligible only in terms of the
theoretical frameworks in which observations and predictions are made. For
example, claims about electrons are true only if such claims are:
(a) consistent
with other accepted beliefs and practices.
(b) knownCthat is, beliefs that are both true and warranted.
(c) about
things whose characteristics are said to exist independently of being described
by any theory.
(d) conceivable
as existing independently of any theoretical description.]
50.
[In his version
of cognitive relativism, Richard Rorty suggests that
instead of trying to discover some truth Aout
there,@ we should recognize that by truth we mean:
(a) a
set of beliefs that are supported by a theory or an explanation.
(b) our
personal beliefs, regardless of what others in our society or those in other
societies believe.
(c) what
we as members of a society mutually agree on, not some independent facts about
the world.
(d) a
set of facts about the world that would exist even if we did not exist.]
51.
[According to Schleiermacher, our interpretation of a text is true if it
expresses:
(a) what
the text would mean in an ideal language.
(b) the
same structure of facts that exist in the world.
(c) what
God understands the text to mean.
(d) the
meaning that the author intended.]
52.
[Wittgenstein=s shift from his Apicture
theory@ of meaning to his doctrine of Ameaning as use@ marks a
shift:
(a) from
a coherence theory of truth to a correspondence theory of truth.
(b) from
a correspondence theory of truth to a pragmatic theory of truth.
(c) from
a pragmatic theory of truth to a coherence theory of truth.
(d) from
a conceptual relativist theory of truth to a realist theory of truth.]
Answers. [Items in brackets not covered in 2005 course.]
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1.
B 2.
B 3.
A 4.
A 5.
B 6.
B 7.
B 8.
B 9.
B 10.
B 11.
B 12.
B 13.
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14.
B 15.
B 16.
B 17.
A 18.
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A 20.
[A] 21.
[A] 22.
[A] 23.
[B] 24.
[B] 25.
[B] 26.
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27.
[A] 28.
[A] 29.
[B] 30.
[B] 31.
A 32.
C 33.
C 34.
D 35.
A 36.
C 37.
A 38.
B 39.
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40.
B 41.
D 42.
C 43.
D 44.
[A] 45.
D 46.
[D] 47.
[B] 48.
[C] 49.
[A] 50.
[C] 51.
[D] 52.
[B] |