The most popular and most dangerous of all elementary economic fallacies is the claim that an unproductive economy may be harmed by free trade. This view misunderstands one of the subtlest but most powerful deductions in economic theory: the principle of comparative advantage.

Pop economists of even the smallest pretension claim an intimate acquaintance with the principle of comparative advantage—usually pointing out, wrongly, that it dates back to Adam Smith. Understanding why it is wrong to credit Smith with this crucial idea takes you a good way towards understanding the idea itself.

Smith was much concerned with the gains to be made from specializing. Hence his interest in trade among people and nations: specialization both requires and promotes trade. But what Smith said about specialization was implicitly based on the idea of absolute, as opposed to comparative, advantage.

It is mere common sense that if one country is very good at making hats, say, and another is very good at making shoes, then total output can be increased by arranging for the first country to concentrate on making hats and the second on making shoes. Then, through trade in both goods, more of each can be consumed in both places.

That is a tale of absolute advantage, such as Adam Smith might have told. Each country is better than the other at making a certain good, and so profits from specialization and trade. Comparative advantage is different: a country will have it despite being bad at the activity concerned. Indeed, it can have a comparative advantage in making a certain good even if it is worse at making that good than any other country.

This is not economic theory, but a straightforward matter of definition: a country has a comparative advantage where its margin of superiority is greater, or its margin of inferiority smaller. Carl Lewis, one imagines, is better than Bill Clinton at both sprinting and tennis—that is, he has an absolute advantage in both. Even so, the president has a comparative advantage in tennis, in which his margin of inferiority, however impressive, is presumably smaller. Conversely, Mr Lewis’s comparative advantage is in sprinting, in which his margin of superiority is greater.

Across any range of athletic events, Mr Clinton would have no comparative advantage with respect to Mr Lewis only in the all-but-impossible circumstances that his margin of inferiority were exactly the same in each sport. As long as he is, as it were, relatively less bad at something, he is bound to have a comparative advantage in that activity.

Accordingly, when people say of Africa, or Britain, or wherever, that it has no comparative advantage in anything, they are simply confusing absolute advantage (for which their claim may or may not be true) with comparative advantage (for which it is certainly false).
Why does this confusion over terms matter? Because the case for free trade is often thought to depend on the existence of absolute advantage—and is therefore thought to collapse whenever absolute advantage is absent. But economics (thanks to David Ricardo in the 19th century, not Adam Smith in the 18th) shows that gains from trade follow, in fact, from comparative advantage. Since comparative advantage is never absent, this gives the theory far broader scope than most popular critics suppose.

In particular, it shows that even countries which are desperately bad at making everything can expect to gain from international competition. If countries specialize according to their comparative advantage, the can prosper through trade regardless of how inefficient, in absolute terms, they may be in their chosen speciality.

At first sight this is an implausible, not to say miraculous, finding. In economics, it stands apart. One distinguished practitioner has even called the principle of comparative advantage the only result in economic theory that is neither trivial nor false. That may be a little hard on the rest of economics, but it does suggest that the principle is worth the small effort required to understand it.

Speaking of which

Imagine a global economy comprising two countries, North and South. Each makes two goods, bread and wine; each has 100 workers, and no input but labor is required for production. Assume that they are market economies but, to begin with, closed to foreign trade.

To proceed, an assumption about technology is required. North, it seems, could make 100 loaves a day if it devoted all its manpower to bread, and 100 bottles a day if it devoted all its manpower to wine, with all intermediate combinations (50 loaves and 50 bottles, say) in proportion. Its production choices are therefore shown by the line, which is called a production-possibility frontier. Exactly how much of each good it chooses to produce depends on the relative demand in North for bread and wine. Suppose demand is such that the economy chooses point A: 70 loaves and 30 bottles.

South is less efficient at making both goods. At one extreme, it could make 30 loaves a day; at the other, 90 bottles of wine. Suppose demand is such that it produces 20 loaves and 30 bottles.

With these facts, the rate at which bread will be exchanged for wine in each economy is known. In North this rate is 100 loaves to 100 bottles (that is, 1:1). In South it is 30 loaves to 90 bottles (1:3). These rates, which are the relative prices of bread and wine in the two economies, are shown by the slopes of the lines in charts 1 and 2.

Now suppose that the economies are allowed to trade with each other. What happens? Certainly, North is going to offer South some bread in exchange for wine. In North, a loaf sells for just one bottle of wine; across the border, it fetches three. Once trade is possible, consumers in the North will no longer be happy: at these prices, they can
improve their position through trade.

Consumers in the South will be happy to go along. They will be keen to sell some wine. At home, a bottle sells for one-third of a loaf; in the North, the same bottle sells for a full loaf.

Here then is the automatic connection between comparative advantage and trade. In North, bread is cheap in relation to wine; in South, bread is dear in relation to wine. That difference – the difference between the slopes of the lines in charts 1 and 2 – gives North its comparative advantage in bread, and South its comparative advantage in wine. The same difference creates the opportunity for trades that will make both sides better off.

**Between the lines**

How does this process work itself out? Once the pattern of trade between North and South has settled down, we can be sure of one thing: the relative price of bread and wine will be the same in both countries. Otherwise, the pattern of trade will shift again as buyers and sellers engage in further cross-border "arbitrage" between the two goods.

Where will the price settle? This cannot be deduced from the existing assumptions: it depends on the pattern of demand in North and South. All we know is that the free-trade price will lie between the initial prices in North and South.

Given only this, however, it is possible to say exactly what and how much North and South will produce. At any price even fractionally above 1:1, North will specialize entirely in the production of bread. That is because by making only bread, and trading some of it for wine, it can achieve its highest possible consumption of both goods. This is shown in chart 3.

At a price of 1:2, say, North produces at point B, and can then, in effect, trade along its new price line to any of a range of points. This new price line is a consumption-possibility (as opposed to production-possibility) frontier. It includes many points that are above and to the right of A. At such points, North would consume more of both goods, and therefore be unambiguously better off than it was at A.

If North chose to produce at any point on its production-possibility frontier other than B, opportunities to do better by making more bread and less wine (thus shifting the consumption frontier upwards) would again be left unexploited. In this simple model of a market economy, that cannot happen. North does as well as it can, and specializes entirely in bread. By exactly the same reasoning, South specializes entirely in wine.

None of this depends on the particular price set in the market. That will be determined by the pattern of trade in bread and wine. The price will settle at whatever level is
needed to balance North's exports (South's imports) of bread with North's imports (South's exports) of wine. We know that this value will lie between 1:1 and 1:3. For illustrative purposes, suppose the price does turn out to be 1:2, as in charts 3 and 4. Then charts 5 and 6 show a possible outcome.

Each economy moves from its initial production at A to complete specialization at s. From there, with prices changing to balance the flows of goods, each economy trades along its (shifting) consumption frontier to point c. There, equilibrium is achieved at a price of 1:2, with both economies consuming more of both goods than before.

For greater clarity, the numbers in charts 5 and 6 are also set out in the table. The highlighted numbers are what really matter. Because of trade, North consumes five more loaves and 20 more bottles of wine than before. Unproductive South consumes five more loaves and ten more bottles of wine. There you have it: the gains from trade.

**Free and fair trade**

Those suspecting sleight of hand may still find it confusing that South can sell wine in competition with North, even though North makes wine more efficiently. The answer to this puzzle, embedded in the foregoing analysis, is wages.

Recall that, after trade, South's 100 workers make 90 bottles of wine a day. So their daily wage must be nine-tenths of a bottle. (By assumption, there are no other factors of production: workers receive all output as wages.) North's workers make 100 loaves, so they each earn one loaf a day; at the after-trade price, that is equivalent to two bottles of wine. In other words, wages in South are less than half of wages in North.

That difference is enough to offset South's low productivity in wine, making it a "competitive" supplier. But the difference is not enough to offset South's low productivity in bread. This is just another way of saying that North has comparative advantage in bread, and South in wine.

Unequal wages may be an efficient basis for trade, but are they a just one? It is often argued that such trade is unfair on North, because its suppliers are being undercut by Southern sweatshop labor. The same logic, slightly twisted, yields the opposite complaint: trade is unfair on South, because its workers are being exploited.

The best answer to both arguments is simply to point out that, "fair" or not, trade raises incomes in both countries. Victims of injustice and exploitation should always be so lucky.