POLS 308 (500): Game Theoretic Methods in Political Science
Professor Ahmer Tarar
Spring 2017
Monday, Wednesday, Friday 1:15 - 2:05 p.m., 1003 Allen Building

Office: 2045 Allen Building
Office Hours: Monday and Friday 11 a.m - 12 p.m. and by appointment
Office Phone: 845-2628
Email: ahmertarar@tamu.edu
Web: http://people.tamu.edu/~ahmertarar/ (link to course webpage is here)

Teaching Assistant: Kathryn Haglin
Email: hagl0098@tamu.edu

Course Overview:

Much of what happens in the world of politics involves decisions by individuals, such as politicians, leaders, generals, voters, etc. In this course, we will study an approach to analyzing (and possibly predicting) such decisions, often called the "rational choice" approach to decision-making. This approach uses analytical tools such as "decision theory", "expected utility theory", and "game theory". In this course, you will learn how to use these tools and apply them to decision-making settings of interest to you, and will also read contemporary political science research to see how these tools have been used to enhance our understanding of politics.

Learning Outcomes:

By the end of the course, students should:

• be able to construct and analyze game-theoretic models for understanding and explaining decision-making in a variety of settings that arise in politics (and everyday life).
• understand fundamental strategic dilemmas that individuals face in making political decisions, and optimal solutions to those dilemmas.
• understand how suboptimal outcomes can occur in decision-making situations among rational actors, and the incentives and structural features that can be modified to ameliorate those suboptimalities.
• be able to construct logically coherent explanations for complicated outcomes that are observed in political decision-making situations.
• have an enhanced analytical ability to make sense of observed political outcomes.

Prerequisites:

Game theory can be quite mathematical. However, the only math that you need to know in order to be successful in this course is high-school level algebra (manipulating and solving equations and inequalities, for example). But be forewarned that there will be A LOT of algebra, and so if algebra terrifies you, you should think about whether you really want to take this course. Because the material that we will cover involves a lot of algebra and deductive logical reasoning, it is very important to come to class if you want to do well in the course (this material is quite difficult to learn by just reading the textbook). In office hours, I will try to clarify things that you are having difficulty with, but I will not go over entire class lectures - that is what class is for.

During some class periods, mostly on Fridays, the teaching assistant, Kathryn Haglin, will go over additional game theory problems to help you better understand the material I went over in lecture, and will also answer questions you may have about the material. On some Fridays I will hold regular lecture.

Course Requirements:

Your grade will be based on two in-class exams (dates given below, in the course schedule section), and a number (probably five) of homework assignments (which will come mainly from the textbook). Each exam will account for 35% of your grade, and the homework assignments will together account for 30% of your grade. The second exam will be cumulative. The homework assignments will be posted on the course website and announced in class, and will usually be due a week after they are posted. You must staple your homework assignment before turning it in.

There will be no extra credit assignments at the end of the course, and so if you want to do well, do well on the regular assignments (homework and exams).

Late homework assignments will not be accepted, unless you have a university-excused absence or documented emergency. Make-up exams will only be given if you have a university-excused absence or documented emergency

We will present (on the blackboard) the correct solutions to the homework assignments immediately after you turn them in, so I recommend that you make a photocopy of your homework solution before the class period at which it is due, so that you can make corrections to it as we go over the correct solution.

Unless there ends up being a curve (depending on overall student performance at the conclusion of the course), the standard grading scale will be used: 90-100% for an A, 80-90% for a B, 70-80% for a C, 60-70% for a D, and below 60% is a failing grade.

Readings:

The following textbook is required and is available at the bookstore:

• Avinash Dixit, Susan Skeath, and David Reiley. Games of Strategy. 4th Edition (2015). Norton. [Note: This text will henceforth be referred to as DSR, as in the authors' last names.]

Other readings are journal articles, which are available from links on the online syllabus (at the course website given above). These links are to subscription-only databases, to which the university has subscribed. Hence, you can access them from a university computer, and from your home computer by logging in through the library's website or using VPN. You should print a PDF copy of the articles.

Students With Disabilities:

The Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) is a federal anti-discrimination statute that provides comprehensive civil rights protection for persons with disabilities. Among other things, this legislation requires that all students with disabilities be guaranteed a learning environment that provides for reasonable accommodation of their disabilities. If you believe you have a disability requiring an accommodation, please contact Disability Services, currently located in the Disability Services building at the Student Services at White Creek complex on west campus or call 979-845-1637. For additional information, visit http://disability.tamu.edu.

Course Materials/Copyright Statement:

The handouts used in this course are copyrighted. By “handouts,” I mean all materials generated for this class, which include but are not limited to syllabi, quizzes, exams, lab problems, in-class materials, review sheets, and additional problem sets. Because these are copyrighted, you do not have the right to copy the handouts, unless I expressly grant permission.

Plagiarism Statement:

The Aggie Honor Code: "An Aggie does not lie, cheat or steal, or tolerate those who do." As commonly defined, plagiarism consists of passing off as one’s own the ideas, words, writings, etc., which belong to another. In accordance with the definition, you are committing plagiarism if you copy the work of another person and turn it in as your own, even if you should have the permission of the person. Plagiarism is one of the worst academic sins, for the plagiarist destroys the trust among colleagues without which research cannot be safely communicated. If you have any questions regarding plagiarism, please consult the Aggie Honor System Office website (http://www.tamu.edu/aggiehonor) or the latest version of the Texas A&M University Student Rules, under the section “Scholastic Dishonesty.”

Course Schedule:

The following is the list of topics and readings that we will cover. This is subject to minor changes (I might add things, or delete things), depending on how things progress. Any changes will be announced in class and will be reflected in the online version of the syllabus, which should be consulted regularly.

Introduction

• Skim DSR Chapters 1 and 2

Decision Theory and Expected Utility Theory

• DSR pages 263-266 ("The Basic Algebra of Probabilities" section)
• The price of auto insurance
• When is it rational to vote?
• Pascal's Wager

Moral Choice Behind the Veil of Ignorance

• Harsanyi, John. 1975. "Can the Maximin Principle Serve as a Basis for Morality? A Critique of John Rawls's Theory." American Political Science Review 69(2):594-606. (online link)

The Inefficiency of War

• Fearon, James D. 1995. "Rationalist Explanations for War." International Organization 49(3):379-414. (online link)

Simultaneous-Move Games

• DSR Chapter 4
• DSR pages 362-370 ("Acquiring Credibility" and "Countering Your Opponent's Strategic Moves" sections)
• DSR pages 613-619 ("The Median Voter Theorem" section)

Mixed Strategies in Simultaneous-Move Games

• DSR Chapter 7

Sequential-Move Games

• DSR Chapter 3
• DSR pages 674-677 ("Alternating-Offers Model I: Total Value Decays" section; this is optional, but may be helpful in understanding the bargaining models we discuss in class)

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Exam #1 in class on Monday, March 6

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Games Involving Simultaneous and Sequential Moves

• DSR Chapter 6

Democratization

• Weingast, Barry R. 1997. "The Political Foundations of Democracy and the Rule of Law." American Political Science Review 91(2):245-63. (online link)

Games of Incomplete Information

• DSR Chapter 8 (you can skip the section titled "1: Imperfect Information: Dealing With Risk")

The Repeated Prisoner's Dilemma

• Axelrod, Robert. 1980. "More Effective Choice in the Prisoner's Dilemma." Journal of Conflict Resolution 24(3):379-403. (online link)
• DSR Chapter 10 (optional, but may be helpful in understanding this material)

Voting Paradoxes (Social Choice Theory)

• DSR Chapter 15

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Exam #2 in class on Friday, April 28 (this is our final class)

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