

## White House Evolution and Institutionalization: The Office of Chief of Staff since Reagan

DAVID B. COHEN

*University of Akron*

KAREN M. HULT

*Virginia Polytechnic Institute & State University*

CHARLES E. WALCOTT

*Virginia Polytechnic Institute & State University*

*In exploring the evolution and institutionalization of the White House chief of staff and the office that chiefs oversee, we focus on presidencies from Reagan through Obama. We pay particular attention to the evolution of several major roles that chiefs of staff perform, to the dynamics in the chief of staff's office, and to the emergence of multiple deputy chiefs of staff. Despite variation in the activities and emphases of chiefs of staff and their operations, patterns include partisan learning across administrations, term and meta cycles, and distinctive prioritization of roles.*

The White House chief of staff, a job that Sherman Adams pioneered under Dwight Eisenhower, became a permanent fixture of the institutional presidency when Jimmy Carter formalized Hamilton Jordan's position in 1978. Since its emergence in 1953, the position has undergone steady evolution, and expectations about its performance mostly have stabilized. At the same time, the job continues to adapt to the distinctive needs of presidents and presidencies and to the dynamics of U.S. governance.

Based on a larger project that seeks to describe and analyze the office of the White House chief of staff over the course of the modern U.S. presidency (Cohen, Hult, and

---

*David B. Cohen is a professor of political science at the University of Akron, where he also is a fellow at the Ray C. Bliss Institute of Applied Politics. His research has been published on topics such as executive politics, U.S. foreign policy making, and homeland security.*

*Karen M. Hult is a professor of political science and chair of the Center for Public Administration & Policy at Virginia Tech. She is the author of numerous journal articles and Agency Merger and Bureaucratic Redesign, Empowering the White House, Governing the White House, and Governing Public Organizations.*

*Charles E. Walcott is a professor of political science emeritus at Virginia Tech and author of many journal articles and several books, including Empowering the White House, Governing the White House, and Governing Public Organizations.*

Walcott forthcoming), we here explore how and why the unit has evolved and trace its importance to the conduct of the contemporary presidency. At the same time, we focus on the individuals who have performed this job. Although the office clearly is the hub of the *institutional* presidency and presidents shape it in specific ways, the people who become chief of staff bring their own talents, interests, and limitations to the position. Chiefs have differed considerably in temperament, their relationships with the president, and the circumstances under which they served. Part of our task has been to tease out whether, how, and why it matters *who* happens to be chief of staff. In doing so, we take what Jacobs and King (2010, 793) call a “structured agency approach,” situating chiefs of staff within “existing. . . structures of organizational combat, institutions, and policy.”

We begin by briefly describing the evidentiary bases for the analysis, followed by the evolution of the position and the office. Then we examine the roles and activities of chiefs of staff, highlighting those who have served presidencies from Ronald Reagan through Barack Obama. Although space constraints necessitate that we deal in conclusions and illustrations, they flow from extensive research (by the authors and others) and numerous data sources.<sup>1</sup> Many reflect the observations of past chiefs of staff and other White House aides (in interviews with the authors, with scholars at the Miller Center, and from the White House Transition Project). Additional information comes from presidential papers, government documents, memoirs, and media reports.

## Evolution of the Position and Office of Chief of Staff

The advent of White House staffing with multiple professionals roughly coincides with most scholars’ understanding of the advent of the *modern* presidency. Nineteenth- and early twentieth-century presidents got along with only one paid professional staffer until Herbert Hoover introduced a four-man top staff in 1929 (Walcott and Hult 1995).<sup>2</sup> Franklin Roosevelt (FDR) had a similar staff until empowered by Congress to add several “administrative assistants” in the late 1930s. Presidents could manage such small staffs (including ushers, gardeners, and messengers, never numbering more than 50) informally, a task at which FDR, in particular, excelled.<sup>3</sup>

The White House Office did not increase notably in size until World War II, when it served as a fulcrum for the hastily created units charged with managing the war and the economy during that period. After the war ended, the remnants of these, located in the Office of War Mobilization and Reconstruction, were inloaded into the White House, under the direction of Truman presidential aide John Steelman. Although Steelman’s tasks mostly involved administration, he was not fully a chief of staff: he never had authority over

1. Some of the evidence has appeared, for example, in Cohen, Hult, and Walcott (2012), Cohen and Walcott (2012), Cohen, Vaughn, and Villalobos (2012), Cohen (1997, 2002), Cohen and Krause (2000), Cohen, Walcott, Warsaw, and Wayne (2008), Cohen, Dolan, and Rosati (2002), Villalobos, Vaughn, and Cohen (2014), Hult and Walcott (2004), and Walcott and Hult (1995).

2. Abraham Lincoln stands out as an exception; see Epstein (2009).

3. For accounts of White House staffs from Hoover through Carter, including the role, if any, of the chief of staff, see Walcott and Hult (1995) and Hult and Walcott (2004). On FDR’s White House, see, for example, Dickinson (1997).

the policy staff, headed first by Clark Clifford, then by Charles Murphy. Although the White House had grown significantly, the president still directed its operations.

### Position of Chief of Staff: From Partisan Learning to Stable Expectations

Dwight Eisenhower, with his military background and related emphasis on organization and staffing, initiated the changes in executive management that ultimately laid the foundations for the contemporary White House staff. Accustomed to having a chief of staff, he appointed Sherman Adams, former New Hampshire governor and campaign manager, to the position upon becoming president.<sup>4</sup> Adams oversaw the diverse operations in Eisenhower's carefully organized White House, making the *trains run on time* though sometimes terrifying the passengers and crew. The first formal chief of staff designed the template for White House staff leadership, finally passing the mantle to General Wilton Persons in October 1958, a gentler but no less effective manager (Walcott and Hult 1995).<sup>5</sup> Together, the two defined the job of chief of staff: managing White House decision processes, advising the president, protecting presidential interests, and representing the administration to, for example, Congress and the media.

This innovation was short lived, however, because Eisenhower's Democratic successors did not use such a formalized, *hierarchical* system (Walcott and Hult 2005). Instead, John Kennedy, reflecting Truman's experience and the advice of Truman veterans like Clark Clifford and Richard Neustadt, returned to a *spokes of the wheel* arrangement, with the president at the center of operations and no single aide designated as the sole administrative leader (Johnson 1974). Lyndon Johnson continued this system, even though he understood that it no longer was appropriate to the complex demands presidents confronted. He constantly tinkered with White House arrangements and designated specific staffers (e.g., Walter Jenkins, Horace Busby) as lead administrators. Nonetheless, the size and complexity of White House operations appeared to overload such an ad hoc system built around a former Senate leader (Walcott and Hult 1995).

In many ways, Richard Nixon initiated the first modern White House staff organization, although it built upon his experience as Eisenhower's vice president. Nixon's primary contribution was to graft public outreach activities (such as polling, interest group liaison, and local media relations) onto the more policy and legislation-oriented White House tasks he inherited. Such additions intensified the need for stronger management: the White House became the site where the streams of policy and politics came together and had to be integrated. Nixon's first chief of staff, H. R. (Bob) Haldeman, much like Sherman Adams, came to typify both the "president's S.O.B." style of staff leadership and, too often, the Nixon administration's capacity for excess (Hult and Walcott 2004, 19).

4. It was not until 1981 that the position was officially titled chief of staff. Most occupants until that time were known simply as assistant to the president.

5. Roger B. Porter recounts a similar history in one of a series of memos to new Reagan Chief of Staff Donald Regan. See January 23, 1985, "White House Organization IV: Office of the Chief of Staff," Regan, Donald T. Files, Series III: Subseries A Office of Administration, "[White House Organization: Memos Porter to Regan]," Box 11, Reagan Presidential Library, Simi Valley, CA.

Yet the power of *partisan learning* (Hult and Walcott 2004; Walcott and Hult 1995, 2005) remained strong. Democrats viewed Republican operations as being misguided—hierarchical, militaristic, corporate, and vulnerable to corruption. Jimmy Carter tried for more than two years to govern without a chief of staff, leaning on a committee of aides for White House management as he sought to integrate policy and politics. It did not work well (e.g., Burke 2000). Finally, Carter appointed a chief of staff, with generally positive results. To a large extent, the partisan debate had been resolved. The size and complexity of modern White House operations, combined with mounting demands, relentless problems, and diverse needs, made more informal and freewheeling White House arrangements virtually impossible.

The next Republican president, Ronald Reagan, improvised on the chief of staff structure, naming a *troika* of senior aides. The trio included a strong and capable chief of staff, James A. Baker III, who headed a fractious but by most accounts effective White House staff (e.g., Cannon 2000). In the second term, Donald Regan, evidently seeking to operate similarly to H. R. Haldeman, failed both to keep track of the *trains* (most notably, Iran-*contra*) and to please the president and first lady (Cohen 2002; Cohen and Krause 2000). Never had two chiefs and approaches to staff organization contrasted so sharply in a single presidential administration, highlighting the importance of the job of chief of staff. Reagan's final chiefs were Howard Baker, following Regan's firing, and Kenneth Duberstein, largely a caretaker (Cohen and Walcott 2012).

The next presidency reinforced the lessons that many drew from the second-term Reagan experience. Under George H. W. Bush, Chief of Staff John Sununu, despite his strength and considerable competence, overreached; his replacement, Samuel Skinner, failed in part because he had too little authority (Cohen 1997; Fitzwater 1995, 175-79).<sup>6</sup> Although few doubted the need for a chief of staff, the formulas for success in the job remained elusive.

At the same time, residual Democratic resistance to strong chiefs of staff persisted. Bill Clinton's first chief, Thomas "Mack" McLarty, had a more circumscribed job than most of his predecessors. Most considered him a *weak* chief of a staff in a system that pivoted more around the president (Cohen et al. 2008). Probably not coincidentally, the early Clinton White House staff was undisciplined and sometimes "chaotic" in its decision processes (Panetta in Takiff 2010, 207; see also Birnbaum 1996). By the middle of the second year, Leon Panetta replaced McLarty; the new chief introduced the hierarchical structuring and control that had come to be associated with the standard model of contemporary White House organization (Walcott and Hult 2005).

The administrations of both George W. Bush and Barack Obama mostly have followed this stabilizing model, albeit with clear contextual differences. Bush's two chiefs of staff, Andrew Card and Joshua Bolten, differed in temperament and in their relationships with the president. Each coped distinctively with a demanding White House

6. Henson W. Moore, White House Interview Program, interview with Martha Kumar, October 15, 2009, 25. <http://www.archives.gov/presidential-libraries/research/transition-interviews/pdf/moore.pdf> (accessed October 23, 2015).

**TABLE 1**  
**White House Chiefs of Staff, 1969-2015**

<i>Chief of Staff</i>	<i>Tenure</i>	<i>President</i>	<i>Party</i>
Harry Robbins (H. R.) Haldeman	1969-73	Nixon	Republican
Alexander M. Haig, Jr.	1973-74	Nixon	Republican
Donald H. Rumsfeld	1974-75	Ford	Republican
Richard M. Cheney	1975-77	Ford	Republican
William Hamilton M. Jordan	1979-80	Carter	Democratic
Jack H. Watson, Jr.	1980-81	Carter	Democratic
James A. Baker III	1981-85	Reagan	Republican
Donald T. Regan	1985-87	Reagan	Republican
Howard H. Baker, Jr.	1987-88	Reagan	Republican
Kenneth M. Duberstein	1988-89	Reagan	Republican
John H. Sununu	1989-91	G.H.W. Bush	Republican
Samuel K. Skinner	1991-92	G.H.W. Bush	Republican
James A. Baker III	1992-93	G.H.W. Bush	Republican
Thomas F. McLarty III	1993-94	Clinton	Democratic
Leon E. Panetta	1994-97	Clinton	Democratic
Erskine B. Bowles	1997-98	Clinton	Democratic
John D. Podesta	1998-01	Clinton	Democratic
Andrew H. Card, Jr.	2001-06	G.W. Bush	Republican
Joshua B. Bolten	2006-09	G.W. Bush	Republican
Rahm I. Emanuel*	2009-10	Obama	Democratic
William M. Daley	2011-12	Obama	Democratic
Jacob J. Lew	2012-13	Obama	Democratic
Denis R. McDonough	2013-pres	Obama	Democratic

\* After Emanuel left his post to run for mayor of Chicago, Senior Advisor Peter M. Rouse served as interim chief of staff from October 1, 2010, to January 13, 2011.

environment that included a dominant vice president and other strong-minded advisors (Cohen et al. 2008).

Meanwhile, Rahm Emanuel, Obama's first chief of staff, was selected largely because of his partisan ties and experience in Congress (Cohen 2009; Suskind 2011). Emanuel's successor, William Daley (the secretary of commerce in the second Clinton term), strove to bring more orderly management to the White House as well as to underscore ties to the business community (Ambinder 2011; Lipton 2011; Shapiro 2011). Daley faced significant challenges, which in turn triggered significant contraction of his responsibilities and his ultimate departure (Cohen, Hult, and Walcott 2012). Daley's replacement, Jacob Lew, restored evident calm and helped focus the White House on Obama's reelection. Lew left in January 2013 to head the treasury department, replaced by Denis McDonough, a senior National Security Council staffer and Obama intimate. McDonough has faced numerous challenges, including divided government, persistent partisan polarization, national security crises, gun violence, simmering racial problems, and ongoing disputes over energy and environmental issues.

Structurally, however, the six twenty-first-century chiefs of staff conform to the general mold that emerged and stabilized in the closing decades of the twentieth century. (Table 1 lists chiefs of staff from 1969 to 2015.)

## Institutionalization and Expansion of the Position of Deputy Chief of Staff

Chiefs of staff typically have organized their own immediate staffs in roughly similar ways. Although the Office of Chief of Staff was notably larger during much of the Clinton presidency, its size returned to between ten and twelve staffers, where it stabilized.<sup>7</sup> The number of staffers has remained steady in the Obama White House with ten staff members having served in 2014 and an average of 11.7 staffers over the first six years of the administration (see Table 2).<sup>8</sup>

As Table 3 indicates, the number of deputy chiefs of staff has increased incrementally over time. During the Reagan years, no more than one individual had the official title of deputy chief of staff at any one time. After Deputy Chief of Staff Michael Deaver left the White House in May 1985, he was replaced by Dennis Thomas who was a *de facto* deputy chief but bore the generic title: "Assistant to the President."<sup>9</sup> Chief of Staff Donald Regan also relied heavily on a group of subordinates, whom other Reagan officials derisively nicknamed "The Mice," whose titles and prominence were inferior to that of Deaver in the first term.<sup>10</sup>

Following Regan's departure in February 1987, Chief of Staff Howard Baker tapped Kenneth Duberstein to be his deputy, complete with the official title. Due to Baker's frequent absences from Washington to care for a sick wife and mother, Duberstein filled in more frequently than the average deputy (Reagan 2007). When Duberstein became chief of staff in 1988, he in turn elevated his longtime aide M. B. Oglesby to the position of deputy chief of staff.

Beginning with the George H. W. Bush administration, multiple deputy chiefs of staff became more commonplace. Bush chose Andrew Card and James Cicconi, both veterans of the Reagan White House, to be deputies to Chief of Staff John Sununu in 1989;

7. The number of individuals listed as working in the Office of Chief of Staff during the Clinton period is an anomaly as a number of functions and offices, such as communications, were moved temporarily under the umbrella of the Office of Chief of Staff following Leon Panetta's staff reorganization.

8. It is very difficult to provide an accurate and comparable accounting of White House staff and employees of the Office of Chief of Staff across administrations because of a lack of uniform reporting standards or titles. Furthermore, only since 1995 has the White House been required to provide a report to Congress listing its paid staff, titles, and salary. The Obama White House is the first to make this report available to the public electronically and has done so every year since 2009.

9. According to the Reagan Library, Thomas served as "de facto deputy chief of staff" but lacked the formal title: "In July 1985 William Dennis Thomas began work as the chief assistant to Donald Regan, the White House Chief of Staff. He served as a *de facto* deputy chief of staff, though [he never had the title]. Thomas advised and assisted Regan on the full range of policy and administrative matters, with a concentration on economic policy. Thomas also oversaw White House staff involvement in President Reagan's overseas trips, and coordinated the drafting of Reagan's State of the Union messages. He attended many Administration meetings with Mr. Regan, accompanied Regan on some of President Reagan's travels, screened appointment requests and telephone calls for Regan, and occasionally substituted for Regan at meetings and events." <http://www.reagan.utexas.edu/archives/textual/smf/thomasw2.htm> (accessed October 23, 2015).

10. According to Cannon (2000, 501-03), "The Mice" were Thomas C. Dawson, executive assistant to the chief of staff and deputy assistant to the president; David L. Chew, staff secretary and deputy assistant to the president; Al Kingdon, cabinet secretary and deputy assistant to the president; and W. Dennis Thomas, assistant to the president.

TABLE 2  
Size of Office of the Chief of Staff by Year<sup>11</sup>

<i>Year</i>	<i>U.S. Government Manual</i> <sup>12</sup>	<i>Archival Data</i> <sup>13</sup>	<i>Capital Source</i>	<i>Washington Post</i>	<i>Report to Congress</i> <sup>14</sup>
1953		1			
1954		1			
1955		1			
1956		1			
1957		1			
1958		1			
1959		1			
1960		1			
1961		0			
1962		0			
1963		0			
1964		0			
1965		0			
1966		0			
1967		0			
1968		0			
1969		6			
1970		6			
1971		5			
1972		4			
1973		5			
1974		4			
1975		2			
1976		5			
1977		0			
1978		0	7		
1979		9	-		
1980		11	20		
1981	5		10		
1982	7		-		
1983	7		9		
1984	7		-		

11. In order to construct this table, data were drawn from a number of different sources including archival data, the *U.S. Government Manual*, *National Journal's Capital Source*, *Washington Post* (Dan Froomkin), and the *Annual Report to Congress on White House Staff*.

12. Staffers are counted *only* when the *Manual* refers explicitly to the office of the chief of staff.

13. Data for 1953 through 2004 are from Table 2, Hult and Borrelli (2005). Data for 1953-68 are drawn from archival research for Walcott and Hult (1995); those for 1969-80 are from archival research for Hult and Walcott (2004).

14. The Obama administration released its annual reports to Congress that included the names, titles, and salaries of White House staffers. For example, the 2013 list can be found here at <http://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/disclosures/annual-records/2013> (accessed October 23, 2015).

Table 2. *Continued*

<i>Year</i>	<i>U.S. Government Manual</i>	<i>Archival Data</i>	<i>Capital Source</i>	<i>Washington Post</i>	<i>Report to Congress</i>
1985	2		15		
1986	1		50		
1987	3		6		
1988	3		8		
1989	4		8		
1990	4		7		
1991	3		8		
1992	3		7		
1993	3		10		
1994	3		39		
1995	5		36		
1996	5		22		
1997	4		20		
1998	5		30		
1999	4		21		
2000	5		20		
2001	3		8		
2002	4		8		
2003	4		7		
2004	3		7		
2005			8	9	
2006			12	10	
2007			10	8	
2008				6	
2009					11
2010					11
2011					10
2012					13
2013					15
2014					10

they also were commissioned as “Assistants to the President.”<sup>15</sup> Despite having the formal title “Deputy to the Chief of Staff,” Card was a deputy chief of staff in every other sense. Except for one public event in February 1989, President Bush referred to Card publicly as “Deputy Chief of Staff” (Bush 1989). Cicconi, the other “Deputy to the Chief of Staff,” simultaneously served as staff secretary, thus controlling the paper flow and ensuring it went through the chief of staff’s office. James Baker had used this model in the first Reagan term; Baker’s deputy, Richard Darman, also had the “Deputy to the Chief of Staff” title and served as staff secretary. Cicconi’s hiring as deputy was engineered by both Baker and President-elect Bush to allow for a backchannel to the president. Bush, who as vice president witnessed the chaos and dictatorial tendencies of Regan, wanted to

15. See George H. W. Bush Library, “Appendix A: Digest of Other White House Announcements,” January 21, 1989. [http://bushlibrary.tamu.edu/research/public\\_papers.php?id=1380](http://bushlibrary.tamu.edu/research/public_papers.php?id=1380) (accessed December 3, 2013).

**TABLE 3**  
**Deputy Chiefs of Staff by President, Chief of Staff, and Date**<sup>16</sup>

<i>President</i>	<i>Chief of Staff</i>	<i>Deputy Chief of Staff</i> <sup>17</sup>
Ronald W. Reagan	James A. Baker III [01/20/81-02/02/85]	Michael K. Deaver [01/20/81-05/10/85]
	Donald T. Regan [02/02/85-02/27/87]	Michael K. Deaver [01/20/81-05/10/85] W. Dennis Thomas [07/15/85-05/87] <sup>18</sup>
	Howard H. Baker, Jr. [02/27/87-07/01/88]	Kenneth M. Duberstein [03/23/87-07/01/88]
	Kenneth M. Duberstein [07/01/88-01/20/89]	M.B. Oglesby, Jr. [07/05/88-01/20/89]
George H. W. Bush	John H. Sununu [01/20/89-12/16/91]	Andrew H. Card, Jr. [01/20/89-02/03/92] <sup>19</sup> James W. Cicconi [01/89-01/91] <sup>20</sup>
	Samuel K. Skinner [12/16/91-08/23/92]	Andrew H. Card, Jr. [01/20/89-02/03/92] William Henson Moore, III [02/03/92-08/23/92]
	James A. Baker III [08/23/92-01/20/93]	Robert B. Zoellick [08/23/92-01/20/93]
	Thomas F. McLarty III [01/20/93-07/17/94]	Mark D. Gearan [01/20/93-05/93] Roy M. Neel [05/93-11/93] Philip Lader [12/93-10/03/94] Harold M. Ickes [01/03/94-01/20/97] Harold M. Ickes (Policy and Political Affairs) [01/03/94-01/20/97] Philip Lader [12/93-10/03/94] Erskine B. Bowles (White House Operations) [10/03/94-01/11/96] Evelyn S. Lieberman (White House Operations) [01/11/96-12/96]
William J. Clinton	Leon E. Panetta [07/17/94-01/20/97]	Erskine B. Bowles [12/93-10/03/94] Sylvia M. Mathews [01/97-05/98] Maria Echaveste [05/29/98-01/20/01] John D. Podesta [01/97-10/20/98] Maria Echaveste [05/29/98-01/20/01] Stephen J. Ricchetti [11/98-01/20/01]
	Erskine B. Bowles [01/20/97-10/20/98]	Joseph W. Hagin (Operations) [01/20/01-07/20/08] Joshua B. Bolten (Policy) [01/20/01-06/26/03] Harriet E. Miers (Policy) [06/27/03-02/03/05] Karl C. Rove (Policy) [02/03/05-08/31/07]
	John D. Podesta [10/20/98-01/20/01]	Joseph W. Hagin (Operations) [01/20/01-07/20/08]
	Andrew H. Card, Jr. [01/20/01-04/14/06]	Joshua B. Bolten (Policy) [01/20/01-06/26/03] Harriet E. Miers (Policy) [06/27/03-02/03/05] Karl C. Rove (Policy) [02/03/05-08/31/07]
George W. Bush	Joshua B. Bolten	Joseph W. Hagin (Operations) [01/20/01-07/20/08]

16. Entries are drawn from the *U.S. Government Manual*, *National Journal's Capital Source*, archival materials from the Reagan Presidential Library, the Obama administration's Annual Reports to Congress, the Chief of Staff Report of the White House Transition Project (<http://whitehousetransitionproject.org/resources/briefing/WHTP-2009-21-Chief%20of%20Staff.pdf> [accessed October 23, 2015]), and other miscellaneous sources.

17. Unless otherwise noted, staffers had the formal title "Deputy Chief of Staff."

18. Official title was "Assistant to the President."

19. Official title was "Deputy to the Chief of Staff."

20. Official title was "Deputy to the Chief of Staff."

Table 3. *Continued*

<i>President</i>	<i>Chief of Staff</i>	<i>Deputy Chief of Staff</i>
	[04/14/06-01/21/09]	Blake L. Gottesman (Operations) [07/20/08-01/20/09] Karl C. Rove (Planning) [02/03/05-08/31/07] Joel D. Kaplan (Policy) [04/19/06-01/20/09]
Barack H. Obama	Rahm I. Emanuel [01/20/09-10/11/10] William M. Daley [01/13/11-01/27/12] Jacob J. Lew [01/27/12-01/25/13] Denis R. McDonough [01/25/13-present]	James A. Messina (Operations) [01/20/09-01/26/11] Mona K. Sutphen (Policy) [01/20/09-01/26/11] Alyssa M. Mastromonaco (Operations) [01/27/11-p] Nancy-Anne DeParle (Policy) [01/27/11-01/25/13] Alyssa M. Mastromonaco (Operations) [01/27/11-p] Nancy-Anne DeParle (Policy) [01/27/11-01/25/13] Alyssa M. Mastromonaco (Operations) [01/27/11-May 2014] Mark B. Childress (Planning) [Jan 2012-04/07/14] Robert Nabors (Policy) [01/25/13-2014] Anita Decker Breckenridge (Operations) [May 2014- present] Kristie A. Canegallo (Implementation) [05/16/14- present]

ensure he was not isolated by a powerful chief of staff.<sup>21</sup> When Cicconi left the White House at the beginning of 1991, Phillip Brady replaced him as staff secretary, but not as deputy chief of staff.

The Clinton White House initially had one deputy chief of staff, Mark Gearan, who was replaced by Roy Neel in May 1993, who in turn was replaced by Philip Lader that December. On January 3, 1994, Harold Ickes joined Lader as deputy chief of staff. From this point forward, every White House would have at least two deputy chiefs. Leon Panetta was the first chief of staff to give his deputies titles that matched their duties and responsibilities. On September 23, 1994, as part of a major White House reorganization, Panetta announced he was assigning the title of “Deputy Chief of Staff for Policy and Political Affairs” to Ickes and that Erskine Bowles was hired to replace Lader and would be appointed as “Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations” (Clinton 1994). Panetta’s successors, Erskine Bowles and John Podesta, continued the practice of having two deputies responsible for the two areas, but their official titles reverted to the pre-Panetta era designation of “Deputy Chief of Staff.”

The George W. Bush White House continued the practice of having two deputy chiefs of staff with one responsible for policy and the other operations. Yet as was the case in the second Clinton term, official titles of deputy chiefs of staff bearing the *operations* or *policy* moniker did not reappear until Chief of Staff Joshua Bolten appointed Joel Kaplan “Deputy Chief of Staff for Policy” in April 2006. However, Kaplan’s counterpart for operations, Joe Hagin, and Hagin’s successor, Blake Gottesman, were titled only “Deputy Chief of Staff.”

21. James Cicconi, interview with David B. Cohen and Karen M. Hult, May 3, 2012.

When Bolten hired Kaplan as a deputy chief of staff, he retained both existing deputies, Karl Rove and Joe Hagin; for the first time, a White House had three deputy chiefs of staff. Part of this likely was due to optics—firing a political heavyweight and Bush loyalist, such as Rove, who had much of his policy portfolio taken away when Kaplan was hired, would have resulted in unwanted media attention. Instead, Rove was made responsible for *planning* with a charge to focus on bigger policy and political issues.<sup>22</sup> When Rove left the administration in August 2007 with little fanfare, he was not replaced as deputy chief of staff.

Rahm Emanuel, a veteran aide in the Clinton White House and President Obama's first chief of staff, reverted to the Panetta practice of including an official descriptor in the deputy chief of staff titles. The new chief of staff appointed Jim Messina "Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations" and named Mona Sutphen "Deputy Chief of Staff for Policy." Every subsequent deputy has had an official descriptor in their title. In 2012, Mark Childress was named "Deputy Chief of Staff for Planning" thus giving the Obama White House three deputy chiefs. Much like Karl Rove, who assumed a similar position in 2006, Childress's assignment was to focus on bigger items such as the marketing and messaging of the Obama administration's signature first-term accomplishment, the Affordable Care Act (McMorris-Santero 2013). In April 2014, Childress left the White House to become Ambassador to Tanzania. He was replaced by Kristie Canegallo, whose title became "Deputy Chief of Staff for Implementation." At the end of 2014, Rob Nabors, deputy chief of staff for policy, left the White House and was not replaced, leaving the Office of Chief of Staff with two deputies.

Although the deputies in the Obama White House have had formal titles indicating their emphases were *policy* or *operations*, some of the occupants recall that the distinction rarely made meaningful differences in their activities. For example, in the early Obama administration, as part of his portfolio, Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations Jim Messina supervised "the operational and political shops, overseeing the White House's interactions with the Secret Service, the scheduling office, the advance teams and the public liaison" (Kornblut 2009). Given his experience in both the House and Senate, Messina also oversaw the congressional liaison unit. Mona Sutphen, a foreign policy expert who had worked as a special assistant to the national security assistant in the Clinton administration, was deputy chief of staff for policy. Her primary responsibility was to oversee and coordinate the various policy councils and the interagency process in the White House (Wilson 2009). Nonetheless, despite their different titles, the deputies' duties were quite similar. Indeed, the Obama White House consciously removed the strict delineation of roles and responsibilities of the deputies, instituted at the beginning of the George W. Bush presidency. Instead, a particular deputy or other White House principal took the lead on a political, policy, or legislative matter, depending upon the particular confluence of issues facing the

22. On April 19, 2006, Press Secretary Scott McClellan announced a change in Rove's duties from policy to a broader strategic role: "Karl will continue to be Deputy Chief of Staff and Senior Advisor to the President. What this will do is it will allow him to focus more on the larger strategic planning, and Joel will focus on the day-to-day management of the policy process. And so this really frees Karl up to focus on bigger strategic issues. He will continue to be a crucial voice and trusted advisor on policy... as he has been since the beginning of this administration" (Bush 2006). See also Jackson and Benedetto (2006) about Rove's change of title and responsibilities.

administration and the particular background of the aide. Thus, a more fluid system and at times more volatile process replaced the relatively static system of the George W. Bush years. Mona Sutphen recalled the way the Office of Chief of Staff differed from the previous two administrations: “their dividing line” between deputy chief of staff roles and responsibilities represented “a much starker division of labor and ours was definitely not that way.”<sup>23</sup> She and Messina “had a tendency to divide up based on experience a little bit and areas of interest”; but “a lot of it had to do with who was busy with what and if a new issue cropped up on the radar screen. . . whoever had free hands would deal with it.”

As the Obama White House highlights, the duties of deputy chiefs of staff vary with the presidents and the chiefs of staff whom they serve. For example, in administrations in which the chief of staff frequently functioned as a presidential emissary to Congress, deputies also might take on those responsibilities, as M. B. Oglesby did for Ken Duberstein at the end of the Reagan administration and Jim Messina did under Rahm Emanuel. Other chiefs of staff prefer or prioritize performing some tasks more than others and charge one or more aides to take on the other activities. Henson Moore reports, for instance, that Samuel Skinner disliked traveling, so Moore traveled with President George H. W. Bush.<sup>24</sup> Later in the administration, as the 1992 election approached, Chief of Staff James Baker mostly eschewed internal White House brokering and coordinating tasks, devoting his energies to the reelection campaign.

## Duties of the Chief of Staff

A chief of staff's performance can be critical to the overall success or failure of an administration, leading scholars to work to better understand the tasks and activities of the position (see, e.g., Buchanan 1990; Burke 2000; Cohen et al. 2008; Ellis 1994; Hart 1995; Hess 1988; Neustadt 1987; Patterson 2008; Pfiffner 1996; Sullivan 2004). Some of this work has identified several major roles of chiefs of staff that capture the key responsibilities of the office.

The four roles we examine here—administrator, advisor, guardian, and proxy—are neither mutually exclusive nor collectively exhaustive. Indeed, they likely overlap quite frequently. For example, constructive coordination (part of administration) may produce mutually informing flows of advice, even while helping guard a president's scarce time and attention. Other times, the roles may pull in different directions. The chief of staff must be “the abominable ‘no’ man”; yet if staffers are too consistently thwarted, the White House may lose aides’ “creative force borne out of personal ambition,” replacing it with “cold cunning and competition among advisers” (Sullivan 2004, 8). A key dimension of the administrator role is a chief of staff acting as a broker among those with differing views; serving as an honest broker becomes difficult when a chief of staff has strong views that can push him or her toward advocacy as an advisor and influence how he/she frames issues and presents others' positions (see Table 4).

23. Mona Sutphen, interview with David B. Cohen. September 20, 2011.

24. Henson W. Moore, White House Interview Program, interview with Martha Kumar, October 15, 2009, 2. <http://www.archives.gov/presidential-libraries/research/transition-interviews/pdf/moore.pdf> (accessed October 23, 2015).

TABLE 4  
Staff Listed in Office of Chief of Staff<sup>25</sup>

<i>President</i>	<i>Chief of Staff</i>	<i>Deputy Chief(s) of Staff</i> <sup>26</sup>
Ronald W. Reagan	James A. Baker III	Richard Darman (Deputy to the Chief of Staff) <sup>27</sup>
		Frank Hodsoll [1981] <sup>28</sup>
	Donald T. Regan <sup>30</sup>	James W. Cicconi (Special Asst to the Chief of Staff [1981-85]) <sup>29</sup>
		Thomas Dawson
		William Henkel
Howard H. Baker, Jr.	Frederick Ryan	
	John C. Tuck (Exec Asst to the Chief of Staff) [1987-88]	
Kenneth M. Duberstein	John C. Tuck (Dir of Office of Chief of Staff) [1988-89]	
	John C. Tuck (Dir of Office of Chief of Staff) [1988-89]	
	Edward M. Rogers, Jr. (Exec Asst. to the Chief of Staff) [1989-92]	
George H. W. Bush	John H. Sununu	

25. Entries are drawn from the *U.S. Government Manual*, *Capital Source*, archival materials from the Reagan Presidential Library, the Obama administration's Annual Reports to Congress, and the White House Transition Project, <http://whitehousetransitionproject.org/resources/briefing/WHTP-2009-21-Chief%20of%20Staff.pdf> (accessed October 23, 2015).

26. Unless otherwise indicated, staffers had the formal title "Deputy Chief of Staff."

27. Darman's primary responsibility in the Reagan White House involved the work of a staff secretary, although he did not have that formal title. "He was responsible for managing the different components of the White House Office. He advised Baker on many policy issues, especially domestic policy, and worked with the Executive Branch and Congress on budget, tax, and Social Security legislation. He coordinated the work of the Budget Review Board... Darman was also coordinator for the Legislative Strategy Group, an informal White House committee headed by Baker coordinating the development of Administration legislative strategy. He attended most meetings of the Cabinet and National Security Council, and accompanied the President on most official trips." <http://www.reagan.utexas.edu/archives/textual/smf/darman.htm> (accessed October 23, 2015).

28. Hodsoll advised Baker on policy issues, especially those in foreign policy. "He also assisted Baker in issue identification, management matters, and policy execution, and was a designated liaison to various outside groups." A one-time Foreign Service officer, he worked with a British trading company in the Philippines. He worked in the Council on Environmental Quality from 1972 to 1973 and in the Environmental Protection Agency from 1983 to 1974; in the Department of Commerce from 1974 to 1977, Hodsoll worked with Baker when he was undersecretary of Commerce. Hodsoll was the staff coordinator for the 1980 Reagan presidential debate preparation, and he served on the transition team. He left the White House to be chair of the National Endowment for the Arts; Hodsoll worked in the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) during the entirety of the H.W. Bush administration. <http://www.reagan.utexas.edu/archives/textual/smf/hodsoll.htm> (accessed October 23, 2015).

29. Cicconi assisted Baker in managing the White House and implementing policy and overseeing the White House decision-making process. Though Cicconi came to the Reagan White House in November of 1981 to replace Hodsoll, "Cicconi was not involved in foreign policy or immigration issues to the extent that Hodsoll was." <http://www.reagan.utexas.edu/archives/textual/smf/cicconi.htm> (accessed October 23, 2015).

30. Regan had no aides with the deputy chief of staff title; those listed were in his office and served as deputies to the chief of staff.

**Table 4.** *Continued*

<i>President</i>	<i>Chief of Staff</i>	<i>Deputy Chief(s) of Staff</i>
	Samuel K. Skinner	
	James A. Baker III	
William J. Clinton	Thomas F. McLarty III	
	Leon E. Panetta	
	Erskine B. Bowles	
	John D. Podesta	
George W. Bush	Andrew H. Card, Jr.	
	Joshua B. Bolten	
Barack H. Obama	Rahm I. Emanuel	
	William M. Daley	
	Jacob J. Lew	
	Denis McDonough	

### Administrator

Perhaps the most fundamental role of a chief of staff is to be the administrative coordinator of the White House organization. Chiefs of staff oversee the White House policy and political processes, and they manage the president's time. They are responsible for the operation of the White House and often are blamed when processes go awry. With the frequent exception of the national security assistant (but see Cohen, Dolan, and Rosati 2002), other directors of White House units report to and through the chief of staff. The standard White House decision-making system, formally based on principles of inclusion and multiple advocacy, operates out of the chief's office (Walcott and Hult 2005).

Simultaneously, chiefs of staff must help to protect presidents by screening out matters that are not worthy of their always scarce time. Jack Watson, chief of staff to Jimmy Carter, noted,

In the exercise of everything, you're making a lot of decisions that the president never knows about: what should flow through to him and what should not. . . . It's about performing the functions and the responsibilities of the office as a reflector of the president's power and as a monitor, a gauge of where his own personal time and own personal attention should be applied (Sullivan 2004, 90-91).

Until Leon Panetta moved to the White House from the OMB, Andrew Friendly, President Clinton's personal assistant, marveled: "There wasn't an enforcer. . . . There weren't restrictions on who could walk in the hall outside the Oval Office in the West Wing" (Friendly, in Takiff 2010, 210).

In addition, the chief of staff is responsible for myriad aspects of administrative leadership in the White House. As Kernell (Kernell and Popkin 1986, 205) summarized succinctly, among these are "providing the president with information, relaying messages to those in the line agencies, maintaining the president's calendar, giving him technical advice when he solicits it, and generally performing whatever duties a manager could reasonably ask of a factotum."

To aid with coordination, chiefs of staff typically rely in part on the overall White House hierarchy on top of which their office sits. Hierarchical processes help gather information and issue direction and guidance. Such arrangements contribute to ensuring an administration “hold[s] people accountable [and] speak[s] with one voice” (Erskine Bowles, in Sullivan 2004, 57).

Hierarchical channels usually are complemented by regular meetings of varying administration officials, in and out of the chief of staff’s office. Such sessions also are arenas for exchanging intelligence, dividing work, and giving orders. They can range from daily meetings of “senior staff” to less frequent “planning group” sessions to “issues lunches.”<sup>31</sup> Reagan Chief of Staff Donald Regan, for example, held daily “operational meetings” to review the day’s schedule and assign tasks; participants included the press secretary, cabinet liaison, legislative affairs staffers, the National Security Agency (NSA), the Council of Economic Advisers (CEA) chair, the director or deputy director of OMB, and the communications and political affairs directors.<sup>32</sup> Regan also organized “agenda planning meetings” to develop “action plans” that looked several months ahead to shape scheduling decisions and to promote aspects of the president’s agenda.<sup>33</sup> After 9/11, Deputy Chief of Staff Joshua Bolten chaired a “domestic consequences” group that met daily “to deal with the fallout from the attacks” (Allen and Supress 2001, A3).

These sorts of coordinating mechanisms pose numerous challenges. Among them is assuring that key participants are included. Reagan Press Secretary Larry Speakes, for instance, complained more than once that no one from his office had participated in activities about which journalists often asked: “I have been left out of a couple of legislative strategy meetings recently. At the moment I am at a loss on how to react to the Gramm–Rudman proposal, which will surely come up in today’s press briefing.”<sup>34</sup> Such lessons often must be relearned, especially as staffers change in the same administration. Thus, deputy OMB Director Joseph Wright wrote to Deputy Chief of Staff Kenneth Duberstein, “I was somewhat surprised by the concern expressed over the ‘lack of warning’ on the disaster Relief veto. We have discussed this bill over the last two mos. Anyway, we’ll try to do better. Continued [Legislative Strategy Group] update sessions would help.”<sup>35</sup>

31. See, for example, Donald T. Regan: Files, Series II White House Legal Task Force, Box 10, November 25, 1985, “Issues Lunch” (“Agenda: Legislative update Friedersdorf, Press update Speakes, NSC update Poindexter, Cabinet Affairs Kingon, Selected Policy Developments Svahn, Communication Opportunities Buchanan, Intergovernmental Issues Daniels”), Reagan Presidential Library.

32. In, for example, Donald T. Regan Files: Series II, Boxes 8, 10; Thomas C. Dawson, II Files, Box 1, Reagan Presidential Library.

33. See folders in Regan Files Series III: Meetings, Box 5, Reagan Presidential Library. A meeting on August 12, 1985, for example, included Regan, Patrick Buchanan, M. B. Oglesby from legislative liaison, Joseph Wright (OMB), and William Henkel (Office of Chief of Staff), and was designed to begin discussing plans for a “fall offensive.”

34. Speakes to W. Dennis Thomas, October 2, 1985, Thomas Files, Box 5, “Press [2 of 2],” Reagan Presidential Library. Similarly, in January 1987, Speakes, in “Press [1 of 2],” noted, “[R]eporters’ questions are beginning to turn more and more to the State of the Union, and neither Pete, Rusty, nor I have been involved in the planning, development, or circulation processes.”

35. Wright to Duberstein, Ball, Dawson cc; Miller, Wheeler, Steve Tupper, May 23, 1987, Rhett B. Dawson Files, OA14827, Box 2, “[34/496 File (Legislative Strategy Group)] 8 of 12,” Reagan Presidential Library.

Similarly, reliance on hierarchy for coordination may be demanding, as the shift from McLarty to Panetta under Clinton and from Emanuel to Daley under Obama suggest. Even though Daley retained the existing structure of the chief's office, for instance, he installed new hierarchical procedures in the White House and sought to control access to the president more tightly than his predecessor. The result was clear tension: "Is there a level of unhappiness with Bill around the White House? Yeah. . . . You do what you have to do to streamline the organization, cutting meetings from 20 people to five. But a lot of people are pissed" (Thrush, Bresnahan, and Parnes 2011b). One White House staffer complained that "Daley's been more intent 'on controlling the outflow and the inflow from the Oval' than energizing a staff besieged by bad news and the late 2010 organizational shakeup" (Thrush, Bresnahan, and Parnes 2011b). The discontent partially reflected a change in administrative style: for a time Daley eliminated daily 8:30 a.m. meetings with the larger staff, which had followed earlier senior staff meetings. Although Daley eventually reinitiated the 8:30 daily meeting, staff unhappiness continued (Thrush and Brown 2012).<sup>36</sup>

Daley also was criticized, for example, for not always being available for consultation. Unlike Emanuel, Daley often was unreachable: "He goes dark—you need an answer, and by the time he gets back to you, it's too late. And that's not good for the manager of a bunch of burning pots" (Clift and Murphy 2011).

At the same time, chiefs of staff vary in the attention they pay to administration. Some, such as Erskine Bowles under Clinton, self-consciously emphasized coordination, "setting up goals, objectives, and time lines and holding people accountable. I tried to make sure that the administration was focused" (Sullivan 2004, 57). Others, like Rahm Emanuel, devoted less energy to the task. Suskind, for example, argued that Emanuel's "'points on the board' focus never became a managerial strategy," sometimes amplifying policy drift and confusion both in and out of the White House (2011, 115). Although under Emanuel the Obama White House lacked the efficiency of the George W. Bush administration, it scarcely approached the chaos of the early Clinton years or the lack of prioritization and direction of the short-lived Skinner operation under George H. W. Bush. By contrast, George W. Bush's chiefs of staff, Card and Bolten, kept their hands firmly on the tiller, participating in virtually all significant policy discussions, including those involving national security (McClellan 2008).<sup>37</sup>

## Advisor

A second role of chiefs of staff is that of advisor. As a conduit to the president for much of the rest of the staff and the broader administration, outsiders routinely counsel

36. Yet, the constriction of access to Obama evidently was according to plan. According to Thrush, Bresnahan, and Parnes (2011a, 2) "Daley is doing what his boss wants. He takes his role of gatekeeper seriously, and has restricted the torrent of paper and people into the Oval Office. The decision to downsize and deprioritize Obama's legislative affairs team was made before Daley ever entered the building on a blueprint from interim chief of staff Pete Rouse.... 'Sometimes people take out their frustrations on POTUS,' said a senior administration official. 'Sometimes—hopefully—they take it out on the chief of staff instead. He's always going to be the top target.'"

37. Joshua B. Bolten, interview with David B. Cohen, October 19, 2007. Andrew H. Card, interview with David B. Cohen. October 25, 2007.

the chief of staff to eschew advocacy and to act instead as an *honest broker*, with the duty to assure that the president is exposed to a range of relevant opinions and expertise. The honest broker is, however, expected to hold and share his or her opinions when the president desires them. Although the relationship between president and chief of staff has varied, many chiefs have become integral members of the inner circle of advisors to whom the president listens most closely.<sup>38</sup> This is crucial because chiefs of staff often are the last ones to see the president before important decisions are made; in effect they constitute the last line of defense against faulty decisions. James Baker, Reagan's first chief of staff and George H. W. Bush's last, observed,

I think one of the most important functions you can perform for your president is to be willing to give it to him with the bark off. You have to be willing to go in there and say, "I really disagree with that, sir," or "I don't think that's the way we ought to go." You'll win some of those and you'll lose some of them but that is one of the most important things that you have to do for your president. The worst chief of staff I think would be a "yes man" who was never willing to tell the president what his views were or what he thought (Sullivan 2004, 39).

This is an inevitable consequence of the chief of staff's access to the president. Moreover, even those chiefs who have sought to be neutral policy brokers still had to make decisions about the issues and information that went all of the way to the chief executive and those that did not. Even when chiefs of staff intentionally are *not* advocates, their judgments about policy and politics will be influential. Presidential scholar Bradley Patterson, a White House aide to Eisenhower, Nixon, and Ford, argued that the chief of staff always is more than a broker:

In the decisionmaking process, the chief of staff is always an honest broker. But only an honest broker? By no means. Presidents expect their chiefs of staff to hold, and to express, their own independent judgments about any issue in the Oval Office neighborhood. They must do so, however, without using their stature and their proximity to give their own arguments an "edge" over competing contentions from other staffers or cabinet disputants (Patterson 2000, 353; cf. Popkin 1986, 6).

One must be careful not to overemphasize such commentary, however. Apart from routine duties, a chief of staff's importance as an advisor has depended upon the particular relationship with the president and on the nature of the constellation of other advisors in and around the White House. As John Sununu, George H. W. Bush's first chief of staff commented, "the role of a chief of staff is whatever the president wants that role to be" (Sullivan 2004, 24).

Additionally, a chief of staff's utility as an advisor will depend upon experience and expertise. A chief who has been a member of Congress, such as Rahm Emanuel, Leon

38. On occasion, deputy chiefs of staff also serve as advisors. In Ronald Reagan's first term, for example, Richard Darman evidently advised the president on budget-related matters. Darman to President, January 9, 1984, Richard G. Darman Files, Series I: Subject Files, Box 4, "Presidential Decision File," Reagan Presidential Library.

Panetta, or Howard Baker, seems certain to be a trusted advisor on legislative matters. Emanuel devoted much of his energy to advising President Obama. Not shy about his own opinions impacting policy decisions, the chief of staff was involved in all major policy initiatives, was a valued member of the inner circle, and frequently played the bad cop to the president's good. A relative Washington newcomer, such as Donald Regan, John Sununu, or Samuel Skinner, would be less apt to assume such a role, at least initially. As a former business executive and secretary of the treasury, however, Regan frequently discussed with and presented economic and budget data to President Reagan.

Sununu and Emanuel also illustrate the risks that chiefs of staff can run when they act as advisors. Despite the former's comment that he considered "one of his responsibilities" to be being an honest broker, "he quickly acquired the reputation of a policy advocate and a heavy-handed operative with a tough, even intimidating style" (Burke 2005, 231). Emanuel received similar criticism: he reportedly confronted difficulties brokering disagreements because he so often was an advocate (Suskind 2011; Wolfe 2010).

## Guardian

Chiefs of staff are responsible as well for screening the issues and individuals that clamor for access to the White House. As guardians, chiefs of staff seek to protect the president, the president's time and attention, and the president's interests, whether from hostile media and legislators, wayward members of the administration, or the consequences of presidential action or inaction. Chiefs of staff undertake unpopular tasks such as firing personnel, saying "no" to specific requests, and acting as the president's enforcer. As Richard Cheney, Gerald Ford's second chief of staff recalled, "I was the SOB, and on a number of occasions, got involved in shouting matches with the vice-president [Nelson Rockefeller]" in the process of buffering the relationship between the president and vice president (in Kernell and Popkin 1986, 175-76).

Haldeman recalled that President Nixon routinely needed to be protected, even from himself:

Time and again I would receive petty vindictive orders . . . after a Senator made a Vietnam War speech: "Put a 24-hour surveillance on that bastard." And so on and on. If I took no action, I would pay for it. The President never let up . . . I'd say "I'm working on it," and delay until Nixon would one day comment with a sort of half-smile on his face, "I guess you never took action on that, did you?" "No." "Well, I guess it was the best thing." (Haldeman 1978, 58-59).

Even though not every chief of staff has as much confidence in himself or his relationship with the president to go as far as Cheney and Haldeman did, virtually all find themselves enmeshed in contention. As Nixon wrote, "A good chief-of-staff is seldom popular. He must carry out tough decisions . . . that his boss makes but is reluctant to execute . . . [and] he sometimes finds he doesn't have many friends or supporters" (1990, 274).

Chiefs of staff can find themselves acting as guardians on myriad issues, often of widely varying importance. For example, James Baker and his special assistant James Cicconi met with Governor Jeb Bush and former Congressman Bill Cramer at their request about “the impact of FAA [Federal Aviation Administration] noise regulations on certain small airlines operating in Florida,” concerned about evidently different treatment of airlines. “Since ‘hush kits’ have not yet been approved by the FAA, [one airline] would have to cease operations on January 1, 1985 unless granted a temporary exemption. Jim Baker explained several times that the White House could not become involved in any exemption decision,” and he did not assist in getting them an appointment with Transportation Secretary Elizabeth Dole.<sup>39</sup>

In contrast, Michael Deaver recalls the chief of staff enlisting his support in protecting President Reagan: “the first day in the White House” James Baker “pulled up a chair to my desk and said, ‘Look . . . you and I have got to make a pact here. Those guys in the National Security Council want to get us in a war in Central America. Now, we’ll be out of here so fast it will make your head swim if we get ourselves in a war down there. So you need to keep your eyes and ears open, and I do too.’”<sup>40</sup>

Less dramatically but still critically, Rahm Emanuel refereed disputes early in the Obama administration over the size and nature of the fiscal stimulus.<sup>41</sup> Similar patterns appeared in other legislative victories. In debate over the Affordable Care Act Emanuel “emerged as the leading foil” (Baker 2010, 39). The chief of staff’s visibility and willingness to make difficult decisions in order to reach a deal on health care angered those across the ideological spectrum. While liberals criticized Emanuel for sacrificing a public option and Medicare negotiating rights to gain support from the insurance and pharmaceutical industries, Republicans blamed him for Obama’s waning interest in bipartisanship. Arguably, of course, this is exactly how a chief of staff serving as a guardian should act: to push the legislative agenda forward, while buffering the president from the fray (Cohen et al. 2012).

As presidential reelections approach, other tasks for guardians surface. Thus, for example, James Baker reminded the directors of the public liaison and intergovernmental

39. James W. Cicconi note to file, December 1984, James A. Baker III Files 1981-1985 Box 6, Series I: Memorandum File, Subseries B 1982-1983, Subseries C 1984-January 1985, “Jim Cicconi File,” Reagan Presidential Library.

40. Michael Deaver, interview Miller Center, University of Virginia, September 12, 2002, tapes 5, 36. <http://millercenter.org/president/reagan/oralhistory/michael-deaver> (accessed October 23, 2015).

41. Ryan Lizza (2009) observed, “By any measure, what Obama’s White House has achieved in passing the stimulus bill is historic. The last President to preside over a legislative victory of this magnitude so early in his Administration was Franklin Roosevelt, who on the sixth day of his Presidency persuaded Congress to enact a wholesale restructuring of the banking system.... Yet praise for Obama was surprisingly grudging. Some liberal Democrats said that Emanuel and his team had made too many concessions to House Republicans, all of whom voted against the legislation. Meanwhile, conservatives complained that Obama had broken his pledge of bipartisan cooperation. Both arguments infuriated Emanuel, who spent hours on the Hill during the negotiations, arranged private meetings with Obama in the Oval Office for the Republican senators Susan Collins, Olympia Snowe, and Arlen Specter, whose votes were critical to the bill’s passage, and personally haggled over the smallest spending details during a crucial evening of bargaining that lasted until the early morning. ‘They have never worked the legislative process,’ Emanuel said of critics like the *Times* columnist Paul Krugman, who argued that Obama’s concessions to Senate Republicans—in particular, the tax cuts, which will do little to stimulate the economy—produced a package that wasn’t large enough to respond to the magnitude of the recession. ‘How many bills has he passed?’”

relations units: “your offices on behalf of the President will be subjected to great scrutiny by the press and by Congress”; he proceeded to outline “guidelines about permissible activities,” noting that any activity as a presidential surrogate “must be cleared through [Margaret] Tutwiler [in the chief of staff’s office] and authorized by the Reagan-Bush Committee in advance.”<sup>42</sup>

### Proxy<sup>43</sup>

The final role we consider is that of proxy. Chiefs of staff frequently stand in for presidents, meeting and negotiating with members of Congress, speaking to constituency groups, or conveying presidential positions to the media (on, e.g., the Sunday morning news shows) or in more private meetings.

All chiefs of staff represent the White House to Congress to varying degrees. Although many legislators crave dealing directly with the president, they expect chiefs of staff to convey administration policy and presidential preferences. Most recent chiefs of staff have spent considerable time in congressional relations, “at least since the emergence of James Baker” in the first term of the Reagan administration (Walcott et al. 2003, 132). Baker, for example, routinely met with members of Congress, like Senator Mark Hatfield (R-OR), to secure their support on important legislation.<sup>44</sup> A later Reagan chief of staff, Howard Baker, frequently canvassed the halls of the U.S. Capitol, working to counter concerns about the president’s control over his administration in light of the Iran-contra findings (Cohen and Walcott 2012). Although Regan and Sununu also dealt with legislators, they had much less success.<sup>45</sup>

Among Clinton’s chiefs of staff, Panetta and Bowles were quite active in working with congressmembers, especially in budget negotiations. Similarly, under George W. Bush, Card and Bolten were frequently on Capitol Hill. Yet the ubiquity of Emanuel’s attention is unrivaled. In virtually all of the major legislative battles during the time he was in the White House, Emanuel led negotiating and moving bills through Congress. As one journalist observed, “The White House legislative strategy blends Obama’s vision and salesmanship with Emanuel’s granular political expertise and deal making skills” (Murray 2009). In sharp contrast, Daley alienated the Democratic leadership. His relationship with Senate Majority Leader Harry Reid was especially difficult, particularly following the breakdown of the 2011 debt-ceiling negotiations when Daley sought side deals without conferring with Reid (Thrush, Bresnahan, and Barnes 2011).

42. Baker to Verstandig and Whittlesey, December 15, 1983, James A. Baker III Files 1981-1985, Box 5, Series I: Memorandum File, Subseries B 1982-1983, “Political Affairs [3 of 3],” Reagan Presidential Library.

43. This role encompasses many of the activities that Walcott et al. (2003, 132-33) included under “Negotiating with the Environment.”

44. See, for example, Feb 16, 1983, Khedouri to Baker re: Hatfield/Baker meeting on jobs bill Baker Files, Baker Files: Series I Subject Files, Box 3, “WH Staff Memoranda—Cabinet Affairs [3 of 3],” Reagan Presidential Library.

45. On Regan, see, for example, Dennis Thomas to Donald T. Regan, “Hill Relations,” September 3, 1985, “Regan Memorandum (Sensitive) (2),” Thomas Files, Box 5, Reagan Presidential Library. For example, for Sununu, see Cohen (1997, 2002).

Although Lew and McDonough repaired much of the damage Daley created with lawmakers from both parties (e.g., Cook 2012; Kuhnhenh 2013), neither experienced Emanuel's level of legislative success while facing a hostile House of Representatives controlled by the opposition party.

Another dimension of the proxy role is interacting with the media. These relations have evolved over time. James Baker recalled that a predecessor, Richard Cheney, recommended, "be sure you spend a lot of time with the press giving them your spin, why you're doing these things. Talk to them. But always do it invisibly" (Walcott et al. 2003, 133). In less than ten years, however, Leon Panetta "met regularly with the press for both formal and informal briefings" (Walcott et al. 2003, 133). Later in the Clinton years, chief of staff John Podesta was a visible public spokesperson on behalf of the president and the entire administration at the height of the Clinton–Lewinsky scandal:

[At first] we thought it was important to send the lawyers out . . . [But] the American public couldn't understand all the legalese, and so I became the surrogate and tried to explain this matter in ways that ordinary people could understand. . . . I got to sit in the dunking tank (Podesta 2006).

Emanuel embraced the role of media proxy and was quite accessible to the news media. Appearing frequently on news shows, he announced controversial policies and discussed the administration's tactics with a level of candor that surprised some journalists (Milbank 2009). Emanuel assumed a higher profile than his immediate predecessor, Josh Bolten, or his successors (Kurtz 2009). If James Baker preferred to work in the shadows, Emanuel took the spotlight, speaking on the record and commenting on most issues (Milbank 2009).

Moreover, chiefs of staff might be considered to be serving as presidential proxies when they seek to resolve major disagreements within an administration. Some, for instance, have urged the creation of and served on budget review committees to mediate disputes between agencies and the OMB over the amounts that OMB recommends for the president's annual budget.<sup>46</sup>

The extent and nature of any specific chief of staff's involvement as proxy may well reflect numerous factors, including lack of presidential interest in engaging in certain actions, strategic decisions about appropriate expenditures of presidential time and energy, or growing demands for presidential presence. Such participation, of course, also likely includes consideration of an individual chief's skill, time, and inclination. Perhaps most critical is the receptivity of those outside the White House to a chief of staff standing in for a president. Chiefs are more likely to be viewed as appropriate proxies if they are perceived to be close, trusted presidential advisors who accurately convey the president's priorities and values.

46. For example, see May 27, 1983, memo for heads of all departments and agencies from Budget Review Board (Baker, Meese, Stockman), "WH Staff Memoranda—Cab Affairs [1 of 3]" James A. Baker III Files 1981-1985, Series I: Memorandum File, Box 2, Reagan Presidential Library.

## Conclusions

As this overview has highlighted, there is considerable variation in the activities and emphases among the occupants of the chief of staff position. Although a chief of staff like Rahm Emanuel performed all four of the roles we have examined, it is clear that he paid most attention to his involvement as an advisor and as a proxy (Cohen et al. 2012). He also served as a sturdy guardian of the president, despite evident disagreement on policy priorities and strategies (e.g., Wolffe 2010, 102). Meanwhile, even while controlling for the party of the president, a chief like Erskine Bowles evidently prioritized coordination and serving as a guardian.

As we noted at the outset, the position and office of White House chief of staff is an institutionalized feature of the contemporary U.S. presidency. Yet, beginning with the Reagan presidency, the chief of staff and (at least until recently) his aides in Republican administrations have appeared to perform better in pursuing presidential objectives at the outset of administrations. This probably reflects several factors: Republicans' longer experience and apparently greater comfort with this approach to governing,<sup>47</sup> GOP presidents' somewhat shorter and better focused early agendas, and possibly greater internal consensus about priorities and strategies (Walcott and Hult 2005). One should not over-emphasize these differences, however. Before 9/11, the George W. Bush administration, for instance, confronted disagreements about national security objectives and priorities, difficulties with its faith based initiatives, and a stalled legislative program; after the terrorist attacks, the national security decision process arguably was flawed and the range of options to which the president was exposed too narrow.<sup>48</sup> Meanwhile, for all of the contention over sequencing initiatives and ordering priorities, the Obama White House had several early successes (Cohen 2009).

Our tracing of the evolution of the position of chief of staff also points to possible term cycles (Rockman 1984).<sup>49</sup> First, for instance, in several administrations, greater hierarchy and improved coordination had to be (re)introduced, as happened in the first Clinton term, following Skinner's brief stint as chief of staff during George H. W. Bush's term, and after Emanuel departed from the Obama White House. Other times (post-Regan in the second Reagan term and following Sununu in the George H. W. Bush administration), the existing hierarchy needed to be tempered, allowing more streams of intelligence and guidance. These sorts of adjustments are consistent with familiar patterns of decreasing presidential influence and increasing effectiveness (Light 1998).

Evidence of the impact of the unrelenting demands on chiefs of staff over the course of a presidency also is plentiful. Only relatively rarely do occupants of the chief of staff position get to select the time and manner of their departures, with James A. Baker III perhaps the most fortunate after Reagan's first term. Others—for example, Donald Regan

47. This is consistent with reports of Republican candidate Mitt Romney's transition planning. See, for instance, Parker (2012).

48. See, for example, Hult (2003, 63), Hult, Walcott, and Cohen (2009), Gellman (2008), and Clarke (2006).

49. Rockman (1984) distinguishes between *term cycles* and *meta cycles*. The former unfold over the course of a four-year presidential term.

and John Sununu—evidently failed to fully appreciate that the power that accompanies the position also carries significant responsibilities and constraints. Meanwhile, Andrew Card may illustrate the risks of continuing service beyond the point at which a staffer requests relief (as he did after President Bush's reelection), while Thomas McLarty highlights the significance of presidential choice and learning.

One also sees characteristic changes based on the presidential election cycle. Chiefs of staff frequently oversee and direct presidential election campaigns, producing characteristic shifts in their—and the larger staffs—allocation of time and energy. Indeed, a primary criticism of Samuel Skinner during his abbreviated stint as chief of staff for George H. W. Bush was that he did not have (or evidently want) full control of the reelection campaign. By the time James Baker returned to take the reins, he could do little else than focus on the troubled reelection efforts.

Yet another apparent pattern is consistent with Bert Rockman's (1984) notion of meta cycles, changes that emerge over longer periods of time. Chiefs of staff in administrations of both parties now appear somewhat more likely to undertake roles as presidential proxies, dealing with Congress and the media. It may well be that the nature of demands on a presidents' time and changing expectations in Congress and among parts of the communications media have made it both more necessary and more accepted for chiefs of staff (and on occasion their deputies) to articulate and negotiate for their bosses.

Quite clearly, presidents differ in their priorities, objectives, and strategic acumen. These in turn shape but scarcely determine their senior staffers' own goals and skills. Yet presidents and chiefs of staff alike must react to as well as seek to influence the complex, interconnected, and sometimes volatile governing contexts in which they are enmeshed. The Office of Chief of Staff is a critical, albeit partial, vantage point from which to make sense of these dynamics.

## References

- Allen, Mike, and Alan Sipress. 2001. "Attacks Refocus White House on How to Stop Terrorism." *Washington Post*, September 26.
- Ambinder, Marc. 2011. "Prime Minister to President." *National Journal*, January 8.
- Baker, Peter. 2010. "The Limits of Rahmism." *New York Times*, March 8.
- Buchanan, Bruce. 1990. "Constrained Diversity: The Organizational Demands of the Presidency." *Presidential Studies Quarterly* 20 (Fall): 791-822.
- Burke, John P. 2000. *The Institutional Presidency: Organizing and Managing the White House from FDR to Clinton*. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.
- . 2005. "The Neutral/Honest Broker Role in Foreign Policy Decision-Making: An Assessment." *Presidential Studies Quarterly* 13 (June): 229-58.
- Bush, George H. W. 1989. "Remarks to the American Legislative Exchange Council." April 28. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=16978> (accessed October 23, 2015).
- Bush, George W. 2006. "Press Gaggle by Scott McClellan." April 19. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=64310> (accessed October 23, 2015).
- Cannon, Lou. 2000. *President Reagan: The Role of a Lifetime*. New York: PublicAffairs.
- Clarke, Richard. 2006. Interview. *Frontline*. January 23. <http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/darkside/interviews/clarke.html> (accessed October 23, 2015).

- Clift, Eleanor, and Patricia Murphy. 2011. "Behind Bill Daley's Demotion." *Daily Beast*. November 9. <http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2011/11/09/bill-daley-unhappy-camper-why-he-was-demoted-at-the-white-house.html> (accessed October 23, 2015).
- Clinton, William J. 1994. "Press Briefing by Chief of Staff Leon Panetta." September 23. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=59786> (accessed October 23, 2015).
- Cohen, David B. 1997. "George Bush's Vicar of the West Wing: John Sununu as White House Chief of Staff." *Congress & The Presidency* 24 (Spring): 37-59.
- . 2002. "From the Fabulous Baker Boys to the Master of Disaster: The White House Chief of Staff in the Reagan and G.H.W. Bush Administrations." *Presidential Studies Quarterly* 32 (September): 463-83.
- . 2009. "The White House Chief of Staff in the Obama Administration: A Six Month Review." *The White House Transition Project*. July. <http://whitehousetransitionproject.org/resources/briefing/SixMonth/Cohen%20COS%202009%20Eval.pdf> (accessed October 23, 2015).
- Cohen, David B., and Charles E. Walcott. 2012. "Cincinnatus of Tennessee: Howard Baker as White House Chief of Staff." *Baker Center Journal of Applied Public Policy* 4 (2): 69-84.
- Cohen, David B., and George A. Krause. 2000. "Presidents, Chiefs of Staff, and the Structure of White House Organization: Survey Evidence from the Reagan and Bush Administrations." *Presidential Studies Quarterly* 30 (September): 421-42.
- Cohen, David B., Charles E. Walcott, Shirley Anne Warshaw, and Stephen J. Wayne. 2008. "The Chief of Staff." *The White House Transition Project, 2008, Report 2009-21*. <http://whitehouse-transitionproject.org/resources/briefing/WHTP-2009-21-Chief%20of%20Staff.pdf> (accessed October 23, 2015).
- Cohen, David B., Chris J. Dolan, and Jerel A. Rosati. 2002. "A Place at the Table: The Emerging Foreign Policy Roles of the White House Chief of Staff." *Congress & the Presidency* 29 (Autumn): 119-49.
- Cohen, David B., Justin S. Vaughn, and Jose D. Villalobos. 2012. "Manager-in-Chief: Applying Public Management Theory to Explain White House Chief of Staff Performance." *Political Research Quarterly* 65 (4): 841-54.
- Cohen, David B., Karen M. Hult, and Charles E. Walcott. 2012. "The Chicago Clan: The Chiefs of Staff in the Obama White House." *Social Science Quarterly* 93 (5): 1101-126.
- . Forthcoming. *White House Chief of Staff: Evolution of a Presidential Institution*. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas.
- Cook, Nancy. 2012. "Jack Lew: The Man Who Could Save Obama's Legacy." *National Journal*, November 1.
- Dickinson, Matthew J. 1997. *Bitter Harvest: FDR, Presidential Power, and the Growth of the Presidential Branch*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Ellis, Richard J. 1994. *Presidential Lightning Rods: The Politics of Blame Avoidance*. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas.
- Epstein, David Mark. 2009. *Lincoln's Men: The President and His Private Secretaries*. New York: Smithsonian Books.
- Fitzwater, Marlin. 1995. *Call the Briefing! Bush and Reagan, Sam and Helen: A Decade with Presidents and the Press*. New York: Times Books.
- Gellman, Barton. 2008. *Angler: The Cheney Vice Presidency*. New York: Penguin Books.
- Hart, John. 1995. *The Presidential Branch: From Washington to Clinton*. 2nd ed. Chatham, NJ: Chatham House Publishers.
- Hess, Stephen. 1988. *Organizing the Presidency*. 2nd ed. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution.
- Hult, Karen M. 2003. "The Bush White House in Comparative Perspective." In *The George W. Bush Presidency: An Early Assessment*, ed. Fred I. Greenstein. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 51-77.
- Hult, Karen M., and Charles E. Walcott. 2004. *Empowering the White House: Governance under Nixon, Ford, and Carter*. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas.
- Hult, Karen M., and MaryAnne Borrelli. 2005. "Organizational Interpretation or Objective Data? Examining the U.S. Presidency through the *Government Manual*." Presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, September.

- Hult, Karen M., Charles E. Walcott, and David B. Cohen. 2009. "Not Always According to Plan: Theory and Practice in the Bush White House." In *Judging Bush*, eds. Robert Maranto, Tom Lansford, and Jeremy Johnson. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 115-35.
- Jackson, David, and Richard Benedetto. 2006. "White House 'Transition' Continues." *USA Today*, April 20.
- Jacobs, Lawrence R., and Desmond S. King, 2010. "Varieties of Obamaism: Structure, Agency, and the Obama Presidency." *Perspectives on Politics* 8 (September): 793-802.
- Johnson, Richard Tanner. 1974. *Managing the White House: An Intimate Study of the Presidency*. New York: Harper & Row.
- Kernell, Samuel, and Samuel L. Popkin. 1986. Editors. *Chief of Staff: Twenty-Five Years of Managing the Presidency*. Los Angeles: University of California Press.
- Kornblut, Anne E. 2009. "For Obama's Political Knots, He's the 'Fixer'; Low-Profile Aide Jim Messina Has Tackled Tough Problems." *Washington Post*, February 21.
- Kuhnhehn, Jim. 2013. *Obama's Gatekeeper Now Point Man on Healthcare*. Associated Press, November 26
- Kurtz, Howard. 2009. "Emanuel's Mastery of Reading Reporters." *Washington Post*, June 23.
- Light, Paul. 1998. *The President's Agenda: Policy Choice from Kennedy to Clinton*. 3rd ed. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.
- Lipton, Eric. 2011. "In Daley, a Businessman's Voice in the Oval Office." *Wall Street Journal*, January 7.
- Lizza, Ryan. 2009. "The Gatekeeper: Rahm Emanuel on the Job." *New Yorker*, March, 2
- McClellan, Scott. 2008. *What Happened: Inside the Bush White House and Washington's Culture of Deception*. New York: PublicAffairs.
- McMorris-Santoro, Evan. 2013. "Meet the Most Powerful Man in the White House You've Never Heard Of." *BuzzFeed*, May 30. <http://www.buzzfeed.com/evanmcsan/meet-the-most-powerful-man-in-the-white-house-youve-never-he#.vpmlKyQ42> (accessed October 23, 2015).
- Milbank, Dana. 2009. "At Breakfast with Emanuel, a Side of Sausage-Making." *Washington Post*, June 26.
- Murray, Shailagh. 2009. "Obama's Chief of Staff Grants Access, Gets Results." *Washington Post*, April 13.
- Neustadt, Richard E. 1987. "Does the White House Need a Strong Chief of Staff?" *Presidency Research* 10 (1).
- Nixon, Richard M. 1990. *In the Arena: A Memoir of Victory, Defeat and Renewal*. New York: Simon and Shuster.
- Parker, Ashley. 2012. "Campaigning Aside, Team Plans a Romney Presidency." *New York Times*, August 16.
- Patterson, Bradley H., Jr. 2000. *Inside the West Wing*. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution.
- . 2008. *To Serve the President: Continuity and Innovation in the White House Staff*. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution.
- Pfiffner, James P. 1996. *The Strategic Presidency: Hitting the Ground Running*. 2nd ed. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas.
- Podesta, John D. 2006. "Interview." *Nightline/Frontline*. June. <http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/clinton/interviews/podesta.html> (accessed October 23, 2015).
- Reagan, Ronald. 2007. *The Reagan Diaries*, ed. Douglas Brinkley. New York: HarperCollins.
- Rockman, Bert A. 1984. *The Leadership Question: The Presidency and the American System*. New York: Praeger.
- Shapiro, Ari. 2011. "Despite Business Ties, Daley Struggled in Debt Talks." *National Public Radio*, August 3. <http://www.npr.org/2011/08/03/138938640/despite-business-ties-daley-struggled-in-debt-talks> (accessed October 23, 2015).
- Sullivan, Terry, ed. 2004. *The Nerve Center: Lessons in Governing from the White House Chiefs of Staff*. College Station: Texas A&M University Press.
- Suskind, Ron. 2011. *Confidence Men: Wall Street, Washington, and the Education of a President*. New York: HarperCollins.

- Takiff, Michael. 2010. *A Complicated Man: The Life of Bill Clinton as Told by Those Who Know Him*. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.
- Thrush, Glenn, and Carrie Budoff Brown. 2012. "Why Daley Had to Go." *Politico*, January 9. <http://www.politico.com/story/2012/01/why-daley-had-to-go-071254> (accessed October 23, 2015).
- Thrush, Glenn, John Bresnahan, and Amie Parnes. 2011a. "Bill Daley Struggles to Fix Barack Obama's Slump." *Politico*. September 11. [http://www.politico.com/news/stories/0911/63648\\_Page2.html](http://www.politico.com/news/stories/0911/63648_Page2.html) (accessed November 4, 2015).
- . 2011b. "Trouble on Daley's Watch." *Politico*, September 15. <http://www.politico.com/story/2011/09/trouble-on-daleys-watch-063648> (accessed October 23, 2015).
- Wolffe, Richard. 2010. *Revival: The Struggle for Survival inside the Obama White House*. New York: Crown Publishers.
- Villalobos, Jose D., Justin S. Vaughn, and David B. Cohen. 2014. "Public Management in Political Institutions: Explaining Perceptions of Chief of Staff Influence in the White House." *Public Administration* 92 (3): 744-60.
- Walcott, Charles E., and Karen M. Hult. 1995. *Governing the White House: From Hoover through LBJ*. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas.
- . 2005. "White House Structure and Decision Making: Elaborating the Standard Model." *Presidential Studies Quarterly* 35 (June): 303-18.
- Walcott, Charles E., Shirley Anne Warshaw, and Stephen J. Wayne. 2003. "The Office of Chief of Staff." In *The White House World: Transitions, Organization, and Office Operations*, eds. Martha Joynt Kumar and Terry Sullivan. College Station: Texas A&M University Press, 111-39.
- Wilson, Scott. 2009. "Another World; Policy Chief Enters a New Phase." *Washington Post*, April 14.