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Presidential Power in National Security: A Guide to the President-Elect

LOUIS FISHER
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Over the last half century, presidents have read their national security powers in sweeping terms, doing great damage to themselves, their parties, the nation, and regions around the world. The effective use of military force and foreign policy initiatives requires the building of consensus, public understanding, and acting within the law. Too often, presidents have claimed the unilateral power to commit the nation to war by making uninformed references to the commander in chief clause. They have also asserted "preeminence" in the making and conduct of foreign policy. Heavy political and constitutional costs flowed from miscalculations by Harry S. Truman in Korea, Lyndon B. Johnson in Southeast Asia, and George W. Bush in Iraq. Over the last seven years, the reputation of the United States has lost credit around the world because of indefinite detention without trial, torture memos, Abu Gbraib, Guantánamo, the claim of "law-free zones," extraordinary rendition, and other U.S. policies and practices.

Respect for the Constitution and joint action with Congress provide the strongest possible signal to both enemies and allies. By following those principles, other countries understand that U.S. policy has a broad base of support and is not the result of temporary, unilateral presidential actions that divide the country and are likely to be reversed. National security is strengthened when presidents act in concert with other branches and remain faithful to constitutional principles.

In periods of emergency and threats to national security (perceived or real), the rule of law has often taken a backseat to presidential initiatives and abuses. Although this pattern is a conspicuous part of American history, it is not necessary to repeat the same mistakes every time. Faced with genuine emergencies, there are legitimate methods of executive action that are consistent with constitutional values. There are good precedents from the past and a number of bad ones.

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AUTHOR'S NOTE: Views expressed here are personal, not institutional.

In response to the 9/11 terrorist attacks, the United States largely decided to adopt the bad ones. The responsibility for this damage to the Constitution lies primarily with the executive branch, but illegal and unconstitutional actions cannot occur and persist without an acquiescent Congress and a compliant judiciary. The Constitution's design, relying on checks and balances and the system of separation of powers, was repeatedly ignored after 9/11. There are several reasons for these constitutional violations. Understanding them is an essential first step in returning to, and safeguarding, the rule of law and constitutional government.

Making Emergency Actions Legitimate

The Constitution can be protected in times of crisis. If an emergency occurs and there is no opportunity for executive officers to seek legislative authority, the executive may take action—sometimes in the absence of law and sometimes against it—for the public good. This is called the “Lockean prerogative.” John Locke advised that in the event of executive abuse, the primary remedy was an “appeal to Heaven.”

A more secular and constitutional safeguard emerged under the American system. Unilateral presidential measures at a time of extraordinary crisis have to be followed promptly by congressional action—by the entire Congress and not some subgroup within it.¹ To preserve the constitutional order, the executive prerogative is subject to two conditions. The president must (1) acknowledge that the emergency actions are not legal or constitutional and (2) for that very reason come to the legislative branch and explain the actions taken, the reasons for the actions, and ask the legislative branch to pass a bill making the illegal actions legal.

Those steps were followed by President Abraham Lincoln after the Civil War began. He took actions we are all familiar with, including withdrawing funds from the treasury without an appropriation, calling up the troops, placing a blockade on the South, and suspending the writ of habeas corpus. In ordering those actions, Lincoln never claimed to be acting legally or constitutionally, and he never argued that Article II somehow allowed him to do what he did.

Instead, Lincoln admitted to exceeding the constitutional boundaries of his office and therefore needed the sanction of Congress. He told Congress that his actions, “whether strictly legal or not, were ventured upon under what appeared to be a popular demand and a public necessity, trusting then, as now, that Congress would readily ratify them.” He explained that he used not only his Article II powers but also the Article I powers of Congress, concluding that his actions were not “beyond the constitutional competency of Congress.” He recognized that the superior lawmaking body was Congress, not the president. When an executive acts in this manner, he invites two possible

1. After 9/11, the Bush administration met only with the “Gang of Eight” to reveal what became known as the “Terrorist Surveillance Program.” The Gang of Eight consists of four party leaders in the House and the Senate and the chair and ranking member of the two intelligence committees. The administration did not seek congressional approval until after the program had been disclosed by the *New York Times* in December 2005.

consequences: either support from the legislative branch or impeachment and removal from office. Congress, acting with the explicit understanding that Lincoln's actions were illegal, passed legislation retroactively approving and making valid all of his acts, proclamations, and orders.²

The Illusory Claim of "Inherent" Powers

President Lincoln acted at a time of the gravest emergency the United States has ever faced. What happened after 9/11 did not follow his model. Although President George W. Bush initially came to Congress to seek the Authorization for the Use of Military Force, the USA PATRIOT Act, and the Iraq Resolution of 2002, increasingly the executive branch acted unilaterally and in secret by relying on powers and authorities considered "inherent" in the presidency.

On several occasions, the Supreme Court has described the federal government as one of enumerated powers. In 1995 it stated, "We start with first principles. The Constitution creates a Federal Government of enumerated powers."³ It repeated that claim two years later.⁴ In fact, it is incorrect to call the federal government one of enumerated powers. If that were true, the Court would have no power of judicial review, the president would have no power to remove department heads, and Congress would have no power to investigate. Those powers (and other powers routinely used) are not expressly stated in the Constitution.

The framers created a federal government of enumerated and implied powers. Express powers are clearly stated in the text of the Constitution; implied powers are those that can be reasonably drawn from express powers. "Inherent" is sometimes used as synonymous with "implied," but it is radically different. Inherent powers are not drawn from express powers. Inherent power has been defined in this manner: "An authority possessed without it being derived from another. . . . Powers over and beyond those explicitly granted in the Constitution or reasonably to be implied from express powers" (Black 1979, 703).

The purpose of the U.S. Constitution is to specify and confine governmental powers in order to protect individual rights and liberties. Express and implied powers serve that principle. The Constitution is undermined by claims of open-ended authorities that cannot be located, defined, or circumscribed. What "inheres" in the president? The standard collegiate dictionary explains that "inherent" describes the "essential character of something: belonging by nature or habit."⁵ How does one determine what is essential or part of nature? Those words are so nebulous that they invite political abuse, offer convenient justifications for illegal and unconstitutional actions, and endanger individual liberties (Fisher 2007a).

2. 12 Stat. 326 (1861). See also Fisher (2004, 47-49).

3. *United States v. Lopez*, 514 U.S. 549, 552 (1995).

4. *Boerne v. Flores*, 521 U.S. 507, 516 (1997).

5. *Merriam Webster's Collegiate Dictionary*, 10th edition (1993), 601.

Whenever the executive branch justifies its actions on the basis of “inherent” powers, the rule of law is in jeopardy. To preserve a constitutional system, executive officers must identify express or implied powers for their actions. They must do so reasonably and with appropriate respect for the duties of other branches and the rights and liberties of individuals.

It is sometimes argued that if the president functions on the basis of “inherent” powers drawn from Article II, Congress is powerless to pass legislation to limit his actions. Statutory powers, it is said, are necessarily subordinate to constitutional powers. There are several weaknesses with this argument. First, when the president says that he is acting under “inherent” powers drawn from Article II, that is nothing more than a *claim* or an *assertion*. Congress is not prevented from acting legislatively because of executive claims and assertions. Neither are the courts. Second, if the president wants to claim that powers exist under Article II, the door is fully open for Congress to pass legislation pursuant to Article I. Constitutional authority is not justified by presidential ipse dixits. The same can be said of congressional and judicial ipse dixits. When one branch claims a power, the other two branches should not acquiesce. Doing so eliminates the system of checks and balances that the framers provided.

Misunderstanding *Curtiss-Wright*

Of all the misconceived and poorly reasoned judicial decisions that have expanded presidential power in the field of national security, thereby weakening the rule of law and endangering individual rights, the *Curtiss-Wright* case of 1936 stands in a class by itself. It is frequently cited by courts and the executive branch for the existence of “inherent” presidential power. In language that is plainly dicta and had no relevance to the issue before the Supreme Court, Justice George Sutherland wrote,

It is important to bear in mind that we are here dealing not alone with an authority vested in the president by an exertion of legislative power, but with such an authority plus the very delicate, plenary and exclusive power of the president as the sole organ of the federal government in the field of international relations—a power which does not require as a basis for its exercise an act of Congress, but which, of course, like every other governmental power, must be exercised in subordination to the applicable provisions of the Constitution.⁶

Justice Sutherland’s distortion of the “sole organ” doctrine will be examined in the next section. Here, it is sufficient to point out that the case before the Court had absolutely nothing to do with presidential power. It concerned only the power of Congress. The constitutional dispute was whether Congress, by joint resolution, could delegate to the president *its* power, authorizing President Franklin D. Roosevelt to declare an arms embargo in a region in South America.⁷ In imposing the embargo, President Roosevelt relied solely on this statutory—not inherent—authority. He acted “under and by virtue

6. *United States v. Curtiss-Wright Corp.*, 299 U.S. 304, 320 (1936).

7. 48 Stat. 811, ch. 365 (1934).

of the authority conferred in me by the said joint resolution of Congress.”⁸ President Roosevelt made no assertion of inherent, independent, exclusive, plenary, or extraconstitutional authority.

Litigation on his proclamation focused on legislative power because, during the previous year, the Supreme Court twice had struck down the delegation by Congress of domestic power to the president.⁹ Therefore, the issue in *Curtiss-Wright* was whether Congress could delegate legislative power more broadly in international affairs than it could in domestic affairs. A district court held that the joint resolution impermissibly delegated legislative authority but said nothing about any reservoir of inherent or independent presidential power.¹⁰ That decision was taken directly to the Supreme Court, where none of the briefs on either side discussed the availability of inherent or independent presidential power. As to the issue of jurisdiction, the Justice Department advised that the question for the Court went to “the very power of Congress to delegate to the Executive authority to investigate and make findings in order to implement a legislative purpose.”¹¹ The joint resolution passed by Congress, said the Justice Department, contained adequate standards to guide the president and did not fall prey to the “unfettered discretion” found by the Court in the two 1935 delegation decisions.¹²

The brief for the private company, *Curtiss-Wright*, also focused solely on the issue of delegated power and did not explore the availability of independent or inherent powers for the president.¹³ A separate brief, prepared for other private parties, concentrated on the delegation of legislative power and did not attempt to locate any freestanding or freewheeling presidential authority.¹⁴ Given President Roosevelt’s stated dependence on statutory authority and the lack of anything in the briefs about inherent presidential power, there was no need for the Supreme Court to discuss independent sources for executive authority.

Anything along those lines would be dicta. The extraneous matter added by Justice Sutherland in his *Curtiss-Wright* opinion has been subjected to highly critical studies by scholars. One article regards Sutherland’s position on the existence of inherent presidential power to be “(1) contrary to American history, (2) violative of our political theory, (3) unconstitutional, and (4) unnecessary, undemocratic, and dangerous” (Patterson 1944, 297). Other scholarly works find similar deficiencies with Sutherland’s dicta (these works are summarized in Fisher 2007b; for a more detailed treatment of the sole-organ doctrine, see Fisher 2006b).

8. 48 Stat. 1745 (1934).

9. *Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan*, 293 U.S. 388 (1935); *Schechter Corp. v. United States*, 295 U.S. 495 (1935).

10. *United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp.*, 14 F.Supp. 230 (S.D. N.Y. 1936).

11. U.S. Justice Department, Statement as to Jurisdiction, *United States v. Curtiss-Wright*, No. 98, Supreme Court, October Term, 1936, at 7.

12. *Id.* at 15.

13. Brief for Appellees, *United States v. Curtiss-Wright*, No. 98, Supreme Court, October Term 1936, at 3.

14. Brief for Appellees Allard, *United States v. Curtiss-Wright*, No. 98, Supreme Court, October Term, 1936.

Federal courts repeatedly cite *Curtiss-Wright* to sustain delegations of legislative power to the president in the field of international affairs and, at times, to support the existence of inherent and independent presidential power for the president in foreign policy. Although some justices of the Supreme Court have described the president's foreign relations power as "exclusive," the Court itself has not denied to Congress its constitutional authority to enter the field and reverse or modify presidential decisions in the area of national security and foreign affairs (see Fisher 2006b, 23-28).

The False "Sole Organ" Doctrine

Another defective argument for inherent presidential power is Justice Sutherland's reference in *Curtiss-Wright* to a speech given by Representative John Marshall on March 7, 1800: "The President is the sole organ of the nation in its external relations, and its sole representatives with foreign nations."¹⁵ When one reads Marshall's entire speech and understands it in the context of a House effort to either impeach or censure President John Adams, nothing said by Marshall gives any support to independent, exclusive, plenary, inherent, or extraconstitutional power for the president. Marshall's only objective was to defend the authority of President Adams to carry out an extradition treaty. In that sense, the president was not the sole organ in formulating the treaty or making national policy. He was the sole organ in *implementing* it. Marshall was stating what should have been obvious. Under the express language of Article II, it is the president's duty to "take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed." Under Article VI, all treaties made "shall be the supreme Law of the Land."

Far from being an argument for inherent or plenary power, Marshall was relying on the express constitutional duty of the president to carry out the law. He emphasized that President Adams was not attempting to make foreign policy single-handedly. He was carrying out a policy made jointly by the president and the Senate (for treaties). On other occasions, the president might be charged with carrying out a policy made by statute. In that sense, the president was the sole organ in implementing national policy as decided by the two branches.

Even in carrying out a treaty, Marshall said, the president could be restrained by a subsequent statute. Congress "may prescribe the mode" of carrying out a treaty.¹⁶ For example, legislation in 1848 provided that in all cases of treaties of extradition between the United States and another country, federal and state judges were authorized to determine whether the evidence was sufficient to sustain the charge against the individual to be extradited.¹⁷

In his capacity as chief justice of the Supreme Court, Marshall held firm to his position that the making of foreign policy is a joint exercise by the executive and

15. 299 U.S. at 320.

16. 10 *Annals of Cong.* 614 (1800).

17. 9 Stat. 320 (1846), upheld in *In Re Kaine*, 55 U.S. 103, 111-14 (1852).

legislative branches, through treaties and statutes, and not a unilateral or exclusive authority of the president. With the war power, he looked solely to Congress—not to the president—for constitutional authority to take the country to war. He had no difficulty in identifying the branch that possessed the war power: “The whole powers of war being, by the Constitution of the United States, vested in congress, the acts of that body can alone be resorted to as our guides in this enquiry.”¹⁸ When a presidential proclamation issued in time of war conflicted with a statute enacted by Congress, Marshall ruled that the statute prevails.¹⁹

Despite this clear meaning of Marshall’s use of “sole organ,” the Justice Department has repeatedly cited *Curtiss-Wright* as authority for inherent presidential power, as it did on January 19, 2006, in offering a legal defense for the National Security Agency surveillance program. The department associated the sole-organ doctrine with inherent power, pointing to “the President’s well-recognized inherent constitutional authority as commander in chief and sole organ for the Nation in foreign affairs.”²⁰ Later in this analysis, the department stated, “the President’s role as sole organ for the Nation in foreign affairs has long been recognized as carrying with it preeminent authority in the field of national security and foreign intelligence.”²¹ Only by relying on the misconceptions of the dicta by Justice Sutherland in *Curtiss-Wright* could language like that be used. Nothing in Marshall’s speech offers any support for inherent or preeminent authority of the president.

Usurping the War Power

Beginning with President Harry S. Truman’s war against North Korea in 1950, presidents over the last half century have claimed the constitutional authority to take the country to war without seeking either a declaration of war or statutory authorization from Congress. Nothing is more destructive to the rule of law than allowing presidents to claim that the commander in chief clause empowers them to initiate war. With that single step, all other rights, freedoms, and procedural safeguards are diminished and sometimes extinguished.

The British model gave the king the absolute power to make war. The framers repudiated that form of government because their study of history convinced them that executives go to war not for the national interest but to satisfy personal desires of fame. The resulting military adventures were disastrous to their countries, both in lives lost and treasures squandered. John Jay warned in Federalist No. 4 that “absolute monarchs will often make war when their nations are to get nothing by it, but for purposes and objects merely personal, such as a thirst for military glory, revenge for personal affronts,

18. *Talbot v. Seeman*, 5 U.S. 1, 28 (1801).

19. *Little v. Barreme*, 2 Cr. (6 U.S.) 170, 179 (1804).

20. Office of Legal Counsel, U.S. Department of Justice, “Legal Authorities Supporting the Activities of the National Security Agency Described by the President,” January 19, 2006, at 1.

21. *Id.* at 30.

ambition, or private compacts to aggrandize or support their particular families or partisans. These and a variety of other motives, which affect only the mind of the sovereign, often lead him to engage in wars not sanctified by justice or the voice and interests of his people.”

Congress, and only Congress, is the branch of government authorized to decide whether to initiate war. That constitutional principle was bedrock to the framers. They broke cleanly and crisply with the British model that allowed kings to control everything abroad, including wars. The framers created a Constitution dedicated to popular control through elected representatives. They dreaded placing the war power in the hands of a single person. They distrusted human nature, especially executives who leaned toward war. Contrary to the July 2008 Baker-Christopher war powers report, the Constitution is not “ambiguous” about placing the war power with Congress (see Fisher 2008c, 44-45; 2009; for testimony and other articles on the war power and War Powers Resolution, see http://www.loc.gov/law/help/usconlaw/constitutional_law.php).

At the Philadelphia Convention, only one delegate (Pierce Butler of South Carolina) was prepared to give the president the power to make war. He argued that the president “will have all the requisite qualities, and will not make war but when the Nation will support it.” Roger Sherman, a delegate from Connecticut, objected: “The Executive shd. be able to repel but not to commence war.” Elbridge Gerry of Massachusetts said that he “never expected to hear in a republic a motion to empower the Executive alone to declare war.” George Mason of Virginia spoke “agst giving the power of war to the Executive, because not [safely] to be trusted with it; . . . He was for clogging rather than facilitating war” (Farrand 1937, 2:318-19).

The debates at the Philadelphia Convention and the state ratification conventions underscore the principle that the president had certain defensive powers to repel sudden attacks, but anything of an offensive nature (taking the country from a state of peace to a state of war) was reserved to Congress. That understanding prevailed from 1789 to 1950, when President Truman went to war against North Korea without ever coming to Congress for authority.

The president is commander in chief, but that title was never intended to give the president sole power to initiate war and determine its scope. Such an interpretation would nullify the express powers given to Congress under Article I and undercut the framers’ determination to place the power of war with the elected representatives of Congress. Eight clauses in Article I specifically define the military powers of Congress. Part of the purpose of the commander in chief clause is to preserve civilian supremacy. As explained by Attorney General Edward Bates, whatever soldier leads U.S. armies in battle, “he is subject to the orders of the *civil magistrate*, and he and his army are always ‘subordinate to the civil power.’”²² Military commitments are not in the hands of admirals and generals but are exercised by civilian leaders, including members of Congress. Lawmakers need to authorize military commitments and can, at any time, limit and terminate them.

22. 10 Op. Att’y Gen. 74, 79 (1861).

Seeking “Authority” from the United Nations

When President Truman went to war against North Korea, he claimed as “authority” two resolutions adopted by the United Nations (UN) Security Council. Nothing in the legislative history of the UN Charter justifies that interpretation. It is impossible to argue under the Constitution that the president and the Senate, through the treaty process, may create a procedure that allows the president to circumvent Congress (including the House of Representatives) and obtain “authority” from an international or regional body.

During Senate action on the UN Charter, it was never contemplated that the president could use the Security Council as a substitute for Congress. All parties working on the charter recalled what had happened with the Versailles Treaty and the failure of the United States to join the League of Nations. President Woodrow Wilson opposed a series of Senate amendments to the treaty, including language requiring that Congress “shall by act of joint resolution” provide approval for any military action by the League (Fisher 2004, 82).

The need for advance approval by Congress for any military commitment was recognized by those who drafted the UN Charter (Fisher 2004, 84-87). In the midst of Senate debate on the charter, President Truman cabled from Potsdam his pledge to seek advance approval from Congress for any agreement he entered into with the UN for military operations: “When any such agreement or agreements are negotiated it will be my purpose to ask the Congress for appropriate legislation to approve them” (Fisher 2004, 91). Approval meant action by both Houses, and in advance. The Senate supported the charter with that understanding.

Each nation had to decide, consistent with its “constitutional processes,” how to implement the provision in the charter regarding the use of military force. To do that, Congress passed the United Nations Participation Act of 1945. Without the slightest ambiguity, Section 6 of that statute required that the use of the agreements “shall be subject to the approval of the Congress by appropriate Act or joint resolution.”²³ Yet five years later, without ever coming to Congress for authorization, Truman went to war against North Korea by relying on UN resolutions (Fisher 1995, 21; 2004, 97-104).

Truman’s action became a precedent for other presidents seeking “authority” from the UN for military initiatives, including President George H. W. Bush in 1990 (for Iraq) and President Bill Clinton in 1994 and 1995 (for Haiti and Bosnia). The unconstitutionality of using the UN Charter to bypass congressional control applies to other treaties, such as mutual security pacts. It was a violation of the Constitution for President Clinton, after failing to obtain Security Council support for the war in Kosovo, to use NATO for “authority.” No plausible argument can be made to require the president to seek the “approval” of each of the NATO countries but not from Congress (Fisher 1997, 1237).

23. 59 Stat. 621, sec. 6 (1945).

Invoking the State Secrets Privilege

Especially in recent years, the executive branch has invoked the “state secrets privilege” to prevent litigants from challenging actions that appear to be illegal and unconstitutional. These civil cases include the extraordinary rendition lawsuits of Maher Arar and Khaled El-Masri and the National Security Agency surveillance cases brought against the administration and telecoms. The rule of law is threatened if judges accept the standards of “deference” or “utmost deference” when evaluating executive claims. Assertions of “national security” documents are only that: assertions. When judges fail to assert their independence in these cases, it is possible for an administration to violate statutes, treaties, and the Constitution without any effective challenge in court.

Congress has full authority to act legislatively to redress this problem. The House and the Senate have in the past year held hearings on this issue, and on August 1, 2008, the Senate Judiciary Committee reported its bill.²⁴ The Justice Department relies on the Supreme Court’s decision in *United States v. Reynolds* (1953), the first time the Court recognized the state secrets privilege. The history of that litigation makes plain that the executive branch misled the courts about the presence of “state secrets” in the document sought by the plaintiffs. When the document, a U.S. Air Force accident report, was declassified and made public, it was evident that the report contained no state secrets (Fisher 2006a).

Secret Law

Increasingly, the executive branch operates on the basis of secret executive orders, memoranda, directives, and legal memos. On March 31, 2008, the Bush administration declassified and released a Justice Department legal memo prepared five years earlier on military interrogation of alien unlawful combatants outside the United States. Other legal memos remain secret. A society cannot remain faithful to the rule of law when governed by secret law, especially policies that promote broad and unchecked presidential power. If legal memos contain sensitive information, items can be redacted and the balance of the document made public. No plausible case can be made for withholding legal reasoning. Secret policy means that the rule of law is not statute or treaty, enacted in public, but confidential executive policies unknown to citizens or even to members of Congress. The public and executive agencies cannot comply with secret law. Lawmakers are unable to review and amend legal interpretations never released by the executive branch.²⁵

24. S. Rept. No. 11-442, 110th Cong., 2nd sess. (2008).

25. The issue of secret legal memos was explored at a hearing on April 30, 2008, before the Senate Judiciary Committee. See also Fisher (2008d).

Abuse of Signing Statements

A form of secret law appeared in a signing statement by President Bush on December 30, 2005. Congress, responding to criticism of abusive interrogations of detainees, passed legislation prohibiting cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment of persons held in U.S. custody.²⁶ In signing the bill, President Bush stated that the provision would be interpreted “in a manner consistent with the constitutional authority of the president to supervise the unitary executive branch and as Commander in Chief.”²⁷ References to the unitary executive theory and the commander in chief clause are far too general to understand either the nature of the objection or the scope of the claimed presidential authority. Other signing statements are generally impossible to comprehend and analyze because they are couched in such abstract references as the appointments clause, the presentment clause, the recommendations clause, and other shortcut citations.²⁸ Constitutional concerns deepen when presidents raise objections at the time they sign a bill and proceed to adopt policies—as with the interrogation of detainees—unknown to the country or to Congress.

Signing statements encourage the belief that the law is not what Congress places in a bill but what presidents say about the language. In 1971, President Richard M. Nixon signed a bill that included a provision calling for the withdrawal of U.S. troops from Southeast Asia. The signing statement expressed the view that the provision “does not represent the policies of the Administration.”²⁹ A year later, a federal district court instructed President Nixon that the law was what he signed, not what he said about it.³⁰ When he signed the bill, it established U.S. policy “to the exclusion of any different executive or administration policy, and had binding force and effect on every officer of the Government, no matter what their private judgments on that policy, and illegalized the pursuit of an inconsistent executive or administration policy.”³¹ No executive statement, including that of the president, “denying efficacy to the legislation could have either validity or effect.”³²

“Authorizing” What Is Illegal

To provide assurance to the public and other branches, administrations will often announce that what it has done is fully authorized. That pattern was illustrated when the Bush administration, having violated the FISA (Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act)

26. Detainee Treatment Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-148, 119 Stat. 2680, 2739 (2005), codified at 42 U.S.C.A. 2000dd (West, Supp. 2007).

27. 41 *Weekly Comp. Pres. Doc.* 1919 (2005); see also Bumiller (2006).

28. “Presidential Signing Statements,” Findings of the Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations, House Armed Services Committee, August 18, 2008, available at <http://www.fas.org/sgp/congress/2008/signing.pdf>.

29. *Public Papers of the Presidents*, 1971, at 1114.

30. *DaCosta v. Nixon*, 55 F.R.D. 145 (E.D.N.Y. 1972).

31. *Id.* at 146.

32. *Id.* See also Fisher (2007c, 183).

statute by not seeking approval from the FISA Court, publicly stated that its Terrorist Surveillance Program was “authorized,” regularly “reauthorized,” and was “legal” and “lawful.” Those words implied that the administration was acting in compliance with the rule of law, or “consistent” with the law, when it was in fact operating squarely against it and doing so in secret (Fisher 2008b, 291-98, 300-302). Justice Robert Jackson reminded us what is meant by the rule of law: “With all its defects, delays and inconveniences, men have discovered no technique for long preserving free government except that the Executive be under the law, and that the law be made by parliamentary deliberation.”³³

Overreaching Executive Privilege

In the past, the executive branch recognized that the president should not invoke executive privilege to defeat the rule of law. In particular, it was improper to block congressional access to information when “wrongdoing” had been committed by executive officials. The Supreme Court has noted that the power of Congress to conduct investigations “comprehends probes into departments of the Federal Government to expose corruption, inefficiency, or waste.”³⁴ Attorney General William Rogers told a Senate committee in 1958 that the withholding of documents from Congress “can never be justified as a means of covering mistakes, avoiding embarrassment, or for political, personal, or pecuniary reasons.”³⁵ In 1982, Attorney General William French Smith said that he would not try “to shield [from Congress] documents which contain evidence of criminal or unethical conduct by agency officials from proper review.”³⁶ During a news conference in 1983, President Ronald Reagan remarked, “We will never invoke executive privilege to cover up wrongdoing.”³⁷ In a memo of September 28, 1994, White House Counsel Lloyd Cutler stated that executive privilege would not be asserted with regard to communications “relating to investigations of personal wrongdoing by government officials,” either in judicial proceedings or in congressional investigations and hearings.³⁸

Those statements promote a basic principle. A privilege exerted by the executive branch should not be used to conceal corruption, criminal or unethical conduct, or wrongdoing by executive officials. A privilege should not be used to shield government officials who violate the law. Yet in the last two years, when Congress attempted to investigate several activities within the Justice Department, including the firings of U.S. attorneys, the administration decided that a privilege would protect top White House

33. *Youngstown Co. v. Sawyer*, 343 U.S. 579, 655 (1952).

34. *Watkins v. United States*, 354 U.S. 178, 187 (1957).

35. “Freedom of Information and Secrecy in Government,” hearing before the Subcommittee on Constitutional Rights of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 85th Cong., 2nd sess. 5 (1958).

36. Letter of November 30, 1982, to Congressman John Dingell, reprinted in H. Rept. No. 698, 97th Cong., 2nd sess. 41 (1982).

37. *Public Papers of the Presidents*, 1983, I, at 239.

38. Memorandum for all Executive Department and Agency General Counsels from Lloyd N. Cutler, Special Counsel to the President, “Congressional Requests to Departments and Agencies for Documents Protected by Executive Privilege,” September 28, 1994, at 1.

officials, both past and present. That interpretation provided those individuals with total immunity against any congressional investigation. Legislative efforts to exercise the power of contempt against those officials would be ineffective. Under this policy, the U.S. attorney, who is required under law to take a contempt citation to a grand jury to investigate possible wrongdoing, is prohibited from discharging that statutory duty. Through this policy, the investigative power of Congress to probe agency corruption is neutralized. Existing checks would come only from the executive department investigating itself.

On July 31, 2008, District Judge John D. Bates rejected a number of Justice Department arguments that were used to block the House contempt votes. Most importantly, he rejected the claim of absolute immunity from compelled congressional process for senior presidential aides. He found clear precedent and persuasive policy reasons to conclude that “the Executive cannot be the judge of its own privilege.”³⁹

This case did not concern matters of national security, an area where the executive branch frequently claims special and exclusive privileges to keep documents from Congress and the judiciary. The Justice Department relies heavily on the Supreme Court’s 1988 decision in *Egan*.⁴⁰ The Court acknowledged the president’s responsibilities to protect documents bearing on national security. Yet, as noted by District Judge Vaughn R. Walker in a recent ruling, the Court in *Egan* specifically said that presidential power is broad “unless Congress specifically has provided otherwise.”⁴¹ To Judge Walker, the Court’s decision in *Egan* “recognizes that the authority to protect national security information is neither exclusive nor absolute in the executive branch.”⁴²

Watch What You Inherit

Individuals elected to the presidency need to be wary of plans that have been developed by executive agencies during the previous administration and are placed before them, in the early weeks and months, urging quick action. An example is the 1952-53 covert operation to remove Prime Minister Mohammad Mosadegh of Iran. The British and the American Central Intelligence Agency proposed to President Truman that he authorize the action, but Truman refused. When President Dwight D. Eisenhower entered the White House, he supported the plan and Mosadegh was subsequently removed and the Shah placed in power (Kinzer 2003). This U.S. intervention undermined the reputation of the United States as a country that supported democratic

39. Committee on the Judiciary, *U.S. House of Representatives v. Harriet Miers*, Civil Action No. 08-0409 (JDB), (D.D.C. July 31, 2008), at 91.

40. *Department of the Navy v. Egan*, 484 U.S. 518 (1988).

41. *In re: National Security Agency Telecommunications Records Litigation*, MDL Docket No. 06-1791 VRW (D. Cal. July 2, 2008), at 22.

42. *Id.* For additional analysis of *Egan* and why Congress has access to sensitive and classified documents, see Fisher (2008a, 219). For example, *Egan* was a matter of statutory construction, not constitutional interpretation.

government and the rule of law. Toward the end of Eisenhower's eight years in government, another covert plan was readied and presented to the incoming president, John F. Kennedy. The plan was the "Bay of Pigs."

Reviving Structural Checks

The framers did not depend solely on the presidency or federal courts to protect individual rights and liberties. They distrusted human nature and chose to place their faith in a system of checks and balances and separated powers. The rule of law finds protection when political power is not concentrated in a single branch and when all three branches exercise the powers assigned them, including the duty to resist encroachments of another branch. The rule of law is always at risk when Congress and the judiciary defer to claims and assertions by executive authorities. That is the lesson of the last two centuries and particularly of the past seven years.

James Madison looked to a political system in which ambition would counteract ambition. With Congress (and the judiciary), there is often a lack of ambition to assert institutional powers and duties. That invites executive initiatives at the expense of individual rights and constitutional values. Just as the Vietnam War helped spell defeat for the Democrats in 1968, so did the Korean War put an end to 20 years of Democratic control of the White House. "Korea, not crooks or Communists, was the major concern of the voters," wrote Stephen Ambrose (1983, 1:569). The Iraq War is widely seen as a major contribution to Republicans losses in the 2006 and 2008 elections.

Although Eisenhower initially believed that Truman's decision to intervene in Korea was "wise and necessary" (Eisenhower 1963, 82), he came to realize that it was a serious mistake, politically and constitutionally, for a president to commit the nation to war without congressional support and approval. To Eisenhower, national commitments would be stronger if entered into jointly by both branches. Therefore, it was his practice to ask Congress for specific authority to deal with national security crises. He stressed the important of *collective* action by the two branches: "I deem it necessary to seek the cooperation of the Congress. Only with that cooperation can we give the reassurance needed to deter aggression."⁴³

In 1954, when Eisenhower was under pressure to intervene in Indochina, he refused to act unilaterally. He told reporters at a press conference, "There is going to be no involvement of America in war unless it is a result of the constitutional process that is placed upon Congress to declare it. Now, let us have that clear; and that is the answer."⁴⁴ He told Secretary of State John Foster Dulles that in "the absence of some kind of arrangement getting support of Congress," it "would be completely unconstitutional & indefensible" to give any assistance to the French in Indochina.⁴⁵

Also in 1954, Eisenhower concluded that he lacked the authority to become involved militarily in the Formosa Straits. In a memorandum to Dulles, he observed that

43. *Public Papers of the Presidents*, 1957, at 11.

44. *Public Papers of the Presidents*, 1954, at 306.

45. *Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS)*, 1952-54, vol. 13, part 1, at 1242.

"it is doubtful that the issue can be exploited without congressional approval."⁴⁶ One issue was whether Eisenhower could order an attack on airfields in China. He said that "to do that you would have to get congressional authorization, since it would be war. If congressional authorization were not obtained there would be logical grounds for impeachment. Whatever we do must be in a Constitutional manner."⁴⁷ Sherman Adams, Eisenhower's chief of staff, later recalled that Eisenhower was determined "not to resort to any kind of military action without the approval of Congress" (1961, 109).

In his memoirs, Eisenhower explained the choice between invoking executive prerogatives and seeking congressional support. On New Year's Day 1957, he met with Secretary of State Dulles and congressional leaders of both parties. House majority leader John McCormack (D-MA) asked Eisenhower whether he, as commander in chief, already possessed sufficient authority to carry out military actions in the Middle East without congressional authority. Eisenhower replied that "greater effect could be had from a consensus of Executive and Legislative opinion, and I spoke earnestly of the desire of the Middle East countries to have reassurance now that the United States would stand ready to help. . . . Near the end of this meeting I reminded the legislators that the Constitution assumes that our two branches of government should get along together" (1965, 179).

During a press conference in 1957, President Eisenhower was asked whether he, as commander in chief, could send troops wherever he wanted without seeking the approval of Congress. Instead of identifying independent or inherent powers, he pointed to the practical importance of interbranch collaboration.⁴⁸ Eisenhower understood that lawyers and policy advisors in the executive branch could always cite various precedents and authorities to justify unilateral presidential action. It was his judgment that a commitment by the United States would have much greater impact, on allies and enemies alike, if they represented the collective judgment of both branches.

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46. Id., vol. 14, part 1, at 611.

47. Id. at 618.

48. *Public Papers of the Presidents*, 1957, at 177-78.

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