

tuership Award, Zhejiang Univ., China, 2001; Best Paper Award, *China Econ. Q.*, 2002.

**Editorial Duties** Assoc. Ed., *China Econ. Rev.*, 1991–, *Modern China Stud.*, 1992, *Amer. Rev. China Stud.*, 1999, *China Econ. Q.*, 2001–; Chief-Ed. in Charge, *Popular Economics Books for Institutional Transition in China* series, 1993; Co-Ed., *Annals of Econ. and Fin.*, 2000–.

**Principal Fields of Interest** D7 Analysis of Collective Decision-Making; D5 General Equilibrium and Disequilibrium; P2 Socialist Systems and Transitional Economies.

**Publications Books:** 1. *Market Economics for the Masses* (with F. Zhang), (Shanghai People's Publ. House, Hong Kong's Intelligent Book, 1993); 2. *Incentive-Compatibility, Informational Efficiency, and Economic Mechanism Design* (Peking Univ. Press, 2000); 3. *Characterizations of Fixed Point Theorems, Optimization, and General Equilibria* (Peking Univ. Press, 2000).

**Articles:** 1. 'Implementation of the Lindahl correspondence by a single-valued, feasible and continuous mechanism', *REStud.*, 56, Oct. 1989; 2. 'Completely feasible and continuous implementation of the Lindahl correspondence with a message space of minimal dimension', *JET*, 51, Aug. 1990; 3. 'Implementation of Lindahl allocations with nontotal-nontransitive preferences', *J Pub E*, 46, Feb. 1991; 4. 'A general-equilibrium intertemporal model of an open economy' (with J.S. Chipman), *ET*, 2, 1992; 5. 'Necessary and sufficient conditions for maximization of a class of preference relations', *REStud.*, 60, Oct. 1993; 6. 'Characterizations of the existence of equilibria in games with discontinuous and nonquasi-concave payoffs' (with M. Baye, J. Zhou), *REStud.*, 60, Oct. 1993; 7. 'An implementable and informationally efficient state-ownership system with variable returns'

(with Q. Li), *JET*, 64, Oct. 1994; 8. 'Ratio-Lindahl and ratio equilibria with many goods' (with Q. Li), *Games and Econ. Behav.*, 7, Nov. 1994; 9. 'Implementation of linear cost share equilibrium allocations', *JET*, 64, Dec. 1994; 10. 'Nash implementation of the Lindahl correspondence with decreasing returns to scale technology' (with Q. Li, S. Nakamura), *IER*, 36, Feb. 1995; 11. 'Transfer continuities, generalizations of the Weierstrass Theorem and maximum theorem – a full characterization' (with J. Zhou), *J Math E*, 24, March 1995; 12. 'Continuous and feasible implementation of rational expectation Lindahl allocations', *Games and Econ. Behav.*, 16, Sept. 1996; 13. 'Virtual implementation in incomplete information environments with general sets of alternatives and types', *J Math E*, 28, Oct. 1997; 14. 'Double implementation in economies with production technologies unknown to the designer', *ET*, 13, 1999; 15. 'Implementation of balanced linear cost share equilibrium solution in Nash and strong Nash equilibria', *J Pub E*, 76, May 2000; 16. 'Incentive mechanism design for production economies with both private and public ownership', *Games and Econ. Behav.*, 33, Nov. 2000; 17. 'A theory of ownership arrangements and smooth transition to a free market economy', *J. Inst. and Theoretical Econ.*, 157, Sept. 2001.

**Principal Contributions** Most of my research has been in the areas of economic mechanism design theory, general equilibrium theory, and economics of transitions. I have provided various well-behaved mechanisms that implement some well-known social choice rules. I have also fully characterized Bayesian implementation in certain types of economic environments. I gave some characterization results on the existence of equilibria of economic games by weakening conditions imposed in the existing

literature. I studied the non-neoclassical individuals' choice problem by providing necessary and sufficient conditions for the existence of maximal elements of a function, weak or strict preferences. I also generalized some key mathematical theorems that are closely related to mathematical economics, such as the Knaster-Kuratowski-Mazurkiewicz lemma, the maximum theorem, fixed points theorems, and minimax inequalities, by relaxing continuity, convexity, and/or compactness conditions. I studied the issue of smooth transition to a free market economy. I have developed a theoretical model that determines the optimal ownership arrangement in an imperfect market and government institutional environment, especially in transitional economies. In addition, I have made contributions in monetary economics, international trade, dynamic economics, and econometrics.

## TIAN, Guoqiang

**Born** 1956, Gong An County, Hubei, China.

**Current Posts** Prof. Econ., Lewis Faculty Fell., Texas A&M Univ., College Station, TX, USA, 1995–, 1996–; Res. Fell., Private Enterprise Res. Center, Texas A&M Univ., 1995–; Special-Term Prof., Tsinghua Univ., Beijing, China, 2002–.

**Past Posts** Lect., Huazhong Univ. Sc. and Tech., Dept Maths, Wuhan, China, 1980–82; Asst Prof. Econ., Assoc. Prof. Econ., Texas A&M Univ., 1987–91, 1991–95.

**Degrees** MA (Maths) Huazhong Univ. Sc. and Tech., 1982; PhD Univ. Minnesota, 1987.

**Offices and Honours** Alfred P. Sloan Doctoral Dissertation Fellowship, 1986; Pres., Chinese Econ. Soc., USA, 1991–92, Chinese Profs Social Sc. in US, 1995–97; Fell., Chinese Econ. Soc., 1992; Chair, Fell. Council, Chinese Econ. Soc., 1992–95; Hon. mem., Chinese Econ. Soc., 1993; Natl Chinese Book Award, 1994; Lecture-ship Award, Tamkang Univ., Taiwan, 1996; Advisor, Intl Tech. and Econ. Inst., Devlp. Res. Center of State Council, Beijing, China, 2000–; Zhu Ke Zhen Lec-