1. What does Kant mean by saying that, "just as the paralogisms of pure reason formed the basis of a dialectical psychology, so the antinomy of pure reason will exhibit to us the transcendental principles of a pretended pure rational cosmology"?
2. What does Kant mean by saying that "if the conditioned is given, the entire sum of conditions, and consequently the absolutely unconditioned (though which alone the unconditioned has been possible) is also given"?
3. In his discussion of the second antinomy, Kant notes that space and time do not consist of simple parts. How does he justify this? And why is this helpful for understanding the first and second antinomies?
4. What role does the concept of causality play in the third antinomy? And how does Kant's appeal to transcendental freedom resolve the antinomy?
5. According to Kant's account of the fourth antinomy, the cause of the world cannot exist either in the world or outside it; why not?
6. How is transcendental idealism different from empirical idealism? And how is this difference important (particularly, in how it distinguishes between the representations of things and things in themselves) for not conflating coherent dreams with genuine appearances?
7. What is the difference between the empirical and intellectual concepts of causality? And how is this distinction the basis for the harmony between nature and freedom?
8. How does reason's framing for itself an order according to its own ideas open up the possibility for a moral sense of "ought" in the determination of the will itself?
9. Kant says that, even though "we cannot afford to dispense with the existence of a necessary being," we cannot conclude that this proves that God exists, because the claim that God exists is a judgment. Why is this latter point significant?
10. "Just as the understanding unifies the manifold in the object by means of concepts, so reason unifies the manifold of concepts by means of ideas." How does Kant explain what this means by noting that transcendental ideas of reason are only regulative and not constitutive?
11. What does it mean to say that Kant was an empirical realist as well as a transcendental idealist?
12. How do the discussions of modern philosophers about matter and knowledge inform (even if only negatively) present day philosophy?