Attempts to Undermine the Foundations of Morality

• Existentialism: We are free to choose our moral principles.  If we choose unreason, then there will be no point in asking for reasons for why we act.

• Hume and the Naturalistic Fallacy: No "is" implies an "ought": no factual claims (e.g., about whether actions produce pleasure) can be the basis for statements about what we are obligated to do.  This is called the naturalistic fallacy because it takes something that is part of nature and tries to make a claim that transcends nature.  Even if we are rational (Kant), that does not mean that we ought to be rational.

 
• G. E. Moore: Since the good cannot be defined in terms of any natural quality (it certainly is not tautologically pleasure or duty), then the attempt to define the good in terms of other facts must result in a fallacy. The alternative: good is a simple quality, like yellow; you either know it or you don't.

• Logical Positivism: moral statements are neither analytic (true by definition) nor synthetic (true by observation); they merely express a feeling or a command.  They are not true or false except insofar as they tell us about the feelings of someone.  [Problem: since the principle of meaningfulness itself is not meaningful based on the criterion, it is a meaningless or nonsensical position.]

• Attack against the whole idea that morality has foundations: even if there are no ultimate foundations of morality, that does not mean that there is no morality.  For morality might be simply the set of values we have selected that gives our lives some order but that is constantly under revision.

• Cultural Relativism: There are no objective moral values, because moral values are the habituated products of cultures or social groups.  Two formulations:

• There are no universally held values.
Objection: this is simply not true: no culture tolerates indiscriminate lying, stealing, violence, complete isolation or values suffering as an end in itself.  What counts as lying, etc. may vary; but these disagreements are factual, not ethical.
 
• No value or set of values ought to be universally applied to all people.
Objections: even if there were differences in moral beliefs, that would not provide a justification for such differences.  Knowing about those differences might make us more tolerant.  And knowing that some widely held beliefs seem to be aimed at promoting the survival of the society might indicate that at the basis of morality are practical considerations.  But this makes sense only if we begin with the assumption that social survival itself is something we ought to pursue.

Besides, if relativism is correct, then we will not be able to resolve ethical disputes by appealing to arguments. Criticism of blatantly immoral behaviorwould not be justified, moral progress could not occur, and not even tolerationof other viewpoints would be justifiable. Furthermore, if someone says that an individual's values are determined by his or her culture, we often have great difficulty in deciding exactly which culture (or sub-culture) the person supposedly belongs to, and therefore cannot be sure about which set of values should be applied.