Locke Notes 2

Substance is the supposed substratum supporting accidents, uniting qualities; we infer (by custom) that there are substances. Our idea of substance in general is based on our experience that certain simple ideas constantly go together and thus must be united by a substratum in which they inhere and by which they are supported: if something is a quality, there must be something that it is a quality of. By abstracting from our complex ideas of particular substances, we come to have the abstract idea of substance in general. Since it has no inherent properties, it is not like kinds of substances (e.g., gold, oxygen). Since an object is distinct from each of its properties (and thus distinct from all of its properties), and since properties cannot exist on their own but must inhere in a substance, an object is a substance distinct from all of its properties.

[Problems: why think that just because an object is distinct from each of its properties that it is also distinct from all of its properties (fallacy of composition)? And if substance has no properties, then what does it mean to say that we have an idea of it (a know-not-what thing)? And if we do not already have an innate idea of sameness, then how can we recognize which particular things are alike as kinds? How to compare primary and secondary qualities based on the inability to know the substance?]

The relational idea of causality comes from noticing how ideas come into our experience united as they are; that is, they must be caused. Cause itself is traceable to the notion of power (which we get through our experience of our own ability to cause changes through acts of will). We get the idea of mental or material identity by considering something as existing at a determinate time and place: that is, the principle of individuation is existence itself (II.27.3); its essence (essentia) is its "very being" (III.3.15). The relational ideas of identity (or an individual) and difference are based on our experience of the continuity of all of its component parts (if it is a body) or the arrangement and organization of the particles needed to maintain its life (if it is an organism, e.g., a human being). The identity of a person or self is a "forensic term," a designation regarding moral responsibility, what one attributes to or "owns" up to as his own (II.27.17). It is a function of memory, the continuity of consciousness, not his/her body or some mental substance or mind. Consciousness identifies a substance (material or spiritual) as a unity, person or self. A person could act in two bodies (reincarnation) or have two souls, and two persons (or personalities) could inhabit the same soul. But the same could not be said for a human being, for a human being (man) is a determinate living organism of a certain arrangement of material particles. Mind could be a function of matter (we just don't know).

Because ideas are private, they can be communicated only in terms of signs (words). Ideas are natural signs, words are conventional signs. The primary purpose of language is to communicate our ideas. A meaningful use of a word corresponds to our having an idea. Since complex ideas seldom agree from individual to individual and do not necessarily correspond to the essence of things in the world, it is difficult to fix a standard meaning for the terms that refer to them. No recognized authority determines the precise meaning of such words: hence, it is one thing to say that names stand for ideas and another thing to say precisely for what ideas they stand. [This is precisely what Hobbes wants to correct; it is also what would make Locke's ethics a demonstrative science.]

A general word is the sign of a general idea (which is formed by abstraction and which is universal in its signification). Though there are no purely universal things (there are only particulars), there is an objective foundation for universal ideas insofar as there are likenesses among things--at least likenesses that are of interest or concern to us that we form general concepts of. There are no natural kinds, however, only real resemblances among things. A nominal essence is the abstract idea of common observable characteristics of a thing. The real essence of a thing is the internal constitution (or primary qualities) of the minute particles by means of which the thing is identified as what it is. But substance in general is, in principle, unknowable. So the particular substance of a thing is not what Locke means by substance in general, because a particular substance has particular primary qualities: that is, regarding a particular thing, substance is the same as its real essence.

[Problem: are things of the same kind united only by names (nominalism) or are there real universals (moderate realism)? Locke's answer: real essences are unknown (but would in principle be knowable if we had greater abilities); so we must rely on nominal essences (or definitions) to get clear in communication.]

We know matters relating only to our ideas. Specifically, knowledge is the perception of agreement between ideas, or the perception of the agreement between ideas and things in the world. Forms of agreement include: identity/diversity (e.g., red is red, red is not blue)--this Locke says is the "first act" of the mind (IV.1.4, IV.9.3), relations (e.g., the interior angles of a triangle equal 180 degrees, murder is wrong), coexistence (necessary connection: e.g., gold is malleable), and real existence (e.g., this dog exists). Our knowledge of coexistence is limited to what we know in terms of necessary connections (nominal essences). For example, the complex idea of gold includes the connection between yellowness and its other properties; but unless I know what that connection necessarily entails, my knowledge is really only opinion. This is not to say that such knowledge is not available in principle, only that with our current knowledge of the minute particles of bodies, we don't yet see the connection. A natural science, though, should be possible someday.

Moral Philosophy: Because the necessary relations of the agreement or disagreement of ideas in moral propositions rely on nominal essences (moral terms do not exist apart from our thinking), they can be known demonstratively, much as mathematics is. Here the nominal essence is the real essence, unlike in empirical science. The truth or validity of a moral rule is independent of whether or not people abide by the rule. But we cannot formulate just any moral order, for the moral good is the conformity of our actions to a law backed up by sanctions (ultimately divine law, instead of civil law or the law of opinion). Divine law is known through the light of nature, reason, clarified somewhat by divine revelation. Self-evident moral principles are based on the rationally knowable relations between God and human beings.