Answers at end.
True/False
1. Philosophy contributes to the aim of "faith seeking understanding" by criticizing rationalizations of religious beliefs that appeal to biases or opinions for which there are no good arguments.
2. For theists, ways of reasoning such as the ontological and cosmological arguments are examples of "faith seeking understanding."
3. Since the ontological argument for the existence of God relies on experiencing the reality of God in one's life, it is an a posteriori argument.
4. The ontological argument gets its name from its attempt to prove the existence of God simply by showing how being or existence is implicit in the meaning of the term "God."
5. A posteriori arguments for religious belief claim that religious belief is reasonable, but a priori arguments are those that acknowledge that religious belief cannot be based on reason.
6. To say that the ontological argument for the existence of God is an a priori argument means that it relies on sensible experience for its justification.
7. Anselm's ontological argument is an a priori argument because it relies only on reason, not experience, to show how belief in God's existence makes sense.
8. Anselm's version of the ontological argument is an a priori argument in that it does not rely on experience to prove the existence of God.
9. Anselm's ontological argument assumes that it is greater for God to exist in reality and in one's mind than for God to exist only in one's mind.
10. According to Anselm's ontological argument, if God is the greatest conceivable being, and if it is greater for God to exist in reality and in our minds than solely in our minds, God must exist in reality.
11. Insofar as Anselm's ontological argument is guided by his aim of "faith seeking understanding," it is intended to persuade even the atheist to believe in God.
12. Kant's objection to the ontological argument is based on his observation that saying that something exists or does not exist does not in any way change what the thing is.
13. By noting how existence is not a predicate, Kant wants to show how the proposition "God exists" is an analytic statement.
14. A posteriori propositions are known as true or false only if the predicate of the proposition is contained necessarily and universally in the subject.
15. To say that a being exists contingently means that its existence depends on something else and that it is possible to conceive of the nonexistence of the being.
16. To say that God's existence is necessary (rather than contingent) means that God does not rely or depend on anything else for his existence.
17. The cosmological argument for the existence of God is an a priori argument because it is based on premises that can be known only by means of experience of the world.
18. Thomas Aquinas' cosmological argument is an a posteriori argument because it relies on an appeal to experience to show that God exists.
19. According to Aquinas' cosmological argument, if there is no God, then the existence of the universe would be absurd because there would be no cause or reason for it.
20. For Thomas Aquinas, the first cause of the universe (God) has to have existed at the beginning of time but does not now have to exist in order for the universe to exist now.
21. According to Aquinas' cosmological argument for the existence of God, if there is a cosmos, there must be a cause adequate to account for its existence, and that cause is God.
22. According to the cosmological argument, an endless regress of causes in nature is possible because the universe could have existed for all eternity without having had any cause other than itself.
23. According to Thomas Aquinas, the existence of contingent beings requires the existence of a necessary being without which their existence would be unintelligible.
24. According to the cosmological argument, the existence of contingent beings requires the existence of a necessary being here and now without which their existence would be unintelligible.
25. According to supporters of the cosmological argument (e.g., Aquinas), the cause or ultimate justification for the universe cannot really be known because God is outside of relations of causality.
26. According to Aquinas' argument from contingency, a potential being cannot become an actual being except through the act or agency of another potential being.
27. According to the cosmological argument for the existence of God, because the universe cannot have been its own cause, there must be another cause (namely, God) sufficient to explain the universe's existence.
28. According to Kant, the cosmological argument fails because it assumes that existence is a predicate that adds something to our understanding of the concept of "God."
29. The cosmological argument commits the "fallacy of composition" to the extent that it suggests that just because everything in the universe has a cause, so also does the universe in its entirety.
30. The teleological argument gets its name from the fact that it begins with an analysis of the nature of the concept "God."
31. Because the teleological argument for the existence of God begins with the assumption that God is (by definition) a designing creator, it is an a priori argument.
32. The teleological argument for the existence of God is sometimes called the argument from design because it claims that the order found in the world is caused by a designing and purposive creator.
33. The teleological argument (or argument from design) for God's existence is an a posteriori argument because it is based on our experience of order or purpose in the universe.
34. Supporters of the teleological argument claim that, even if we do not understand the function or purpose of all of the parts of the universe, that is no reason to doubt that the universe has some design.
35. The teleological argument for the existence of God acknowledges that, even if there is no order among things in the universe, the universe as a whole certainly exhibits purpose.
36. The design argument for the existence of God shows how science explains the order and design of the universe without having to introduce an external mind to direct its development.
37. Darwin's criticism of the teleological argument claims that order in the universe does not prove that there is any design or purpose in the universe.
38. If the teleological argument for the existence of God is the most "plausible" explanation for the order of the universe, that means that the Darwinian account of that order is impossible.
39. In criticizing the teleological argument, Darwin claims that the perceived order in the universe can be explained simply as the result of natural causes, not supernatural purposes or designs.
40. Darwin claims that the order we find in the universe is the result of natural selective processes that are guided by divinely-instituted ends, goals, or purposes.
41. As part of his critique of the design argument, Hume claims that even if there is order in the universe, that does not prove that there is any design or purpose in the universe.
42. In criticizing the teleological argument, Hume notes that there is no convincing evidence for believing that the world has either a purpose or an order (other than one we read into it).
43. Hume rejects the design argument by noting that to argue analogously we must understand the analogously related things independently of one another in order to draw the analogy.
44. Hume rejects the teleological argument based on analogy by noting that knowing that the whole universe is good does not necessarily imply that each of its parts is good.
45. According to Hume, the mixture of order and disorder in the world provides no rational support for belief in an infinitely good and powerful God.
46. For Hume, religious skepticism is the only appropriate rational attitude to adopt in the face of the fact that an infinitely good and powerful God's existence is incompatible with real evil.
47. According to Hume, because it is irrational to believe in something for which there are no good reasons, it is irrational to believe in God.
48. By asking "what causes God?" Hume wants to show how God exists necessarily because God depends upon nothing else for His existence.
49. Whereas the agnostic does not claim to believe either that there is or is not a God, the atheist believes firmly that there is no God.
50. Though all atheists are agnostics, not all agnostics are atheists.
51. Atheism is an extreme form of agnosticism.
52. Though pantheists claim they are not atheists, they really are because they deny that God exists.
53. In contrast to traditional theism, pantheism is more concerned with the epistemology of religious belief than with metaphysical issues in the philosophy of religion because, according to pantheism, God is everything.
54. The agnostic's explanation of evil acknowledges that, if God had not chosen to create human beings with free will, the abuse of free will would not have resulted in sin.
55. According to the free will explanation of why evil exists, God created human beings with free will so that they could bring evil on themselves and thus be able to appreciate goodness and to build their characters.
56. A theist is someone who believes that there is a God (even though he or she might not claim to know that God exists).
57. A theodicy is an attempt to explain how an omniscient, omnipotent, all-good God can exist simultaneously with evil in the world.
58. A theodicy is a proof of God's existence based on the belief that both good and evil are matters of perspective.
59. According to Dostoevski, the existence of God and the reality of evil can be intelligibly reconciled only if there is some afterlife that erases or makes up for the suffering we experience in this life.
60. According to Feuerbach, religion keeps us from affirming our own characteristics and abilities, thus alienating what is essential to us by locating those traits in God.
61. Feuerbach argues that hopes and aspirations for human development are frustrated by believing in God, inasmuch as belief in God means alienating what is essentially human from ourselves.
62. In contrast to Feuerbach, Marx claims that religious belief does not cause human alienation as much as it is a symptomatic response to social exploitation.
63. Marx argues that religion is the means by which we can change society and overcome socio-political alienation.
64. Marx's criticism of religion as "the opium of the masses" is intended more to challenge religious believers to work for social change in God's name rather than to raise doubts about God's existence.
65. Freud argues that religion is based on an infantile, often unconscious longing for a father figure who will protect us from the anxieties of life.
66. According to Freud, the unresolved infantile fears and resentments that account for religious beliefs can be overcome only through a faith in God as our redeemer from such delusions.
67. According to Freud, even though religion deludes us with the image of a father figure who protects us from the anxieties of life, it serves a useful purpose by making us appreciate all that God has done for us.
68. According to Freud, religion avoids dealing with the harsh reality of life by promoting a self-deluding and infantile belief in a father figure who will save us from feelings of helplessness and fear.
69. According to Freud, religious belief is a belief that is not based on experience nor can it be undermined by confrontations with reality.
70. Freud's intent in describing religious belief as a function of wish-fulfillment is to show that the proposition "God exists" is false.
71. Because believers in mystical experiences cannot "prove" the existence of God, they agree with Freud that religious belief is based on delusions.
72. Volitional arguments supporting religious belief are more concerned with the question of whether God exists than with rational justifications for believing in God.
73. Kant's moral argument proves that God exists by identifying God as the summum bonum, the greatest good.
74. To say that Pascal's "wager" is a philosophic argument means that it appeals not to faith or personal beliefs but to what is supported by rational argumentation.
75. Though Pascal's "wager" shows that it is reasonable to believe in God, it does not prove that God exists.
76. Pascal's "wager" proves that God exists.
77. Pascal's wager attempts to prove that God exists by showing how arguments in favor of God's existence are more reasonable than arguments against his existence.
78. Instead of providing a proof that God exists, Pascal's wager shows that believing in God's existence is more rational (using projected consequences as a criterion) than not believing.
79. According to Pascal, even if the chance of God's existence is less than 50-50, belief in God is prudent and rationally justified because of its potential rewards.
80. William James argues that we should always limit our belief to that for which we have evidence and should never commit ourselves to beliefs on insufficient evidence.
81. According to William James, if we have no intellectual basis on which to decide God's existence, our choice to believe must based on whether such a belief satisfies our expectations and gives our lives meaning.
82. William James suggests that, unless we have sufficient evidence to support our belief in the existence of God, we should withhold that belief and adopt agnosticism.
83. Critics argue that mystical experiences might simply be hallucinations or caused by neurological abnormalities.
84. For Kierkegaard, because the moral life is based on objective, rational, and universalizable principles, it is much more "authentic" than one based on the subjective truth of religion.
85. Kierkegaard argues that since religious commitment is absurd, it has to be based on faith, not reason.
86. Kierkegaard claims that unconditioned faith replaces the anguish and ambiguity of human existence with a calming confidence of having been saved by God.
87. When an authentic individual engages in what Kierkegaard calls a "leap of faith," he or she finds peace and tranquillity in the knowledge that God exists.
88. Kierkegaard claims that by making a "leap of faith" a person can prove that God actually exists.
89. According to Kierkegaard angst is the anguish or anxiety implicit in the authentic experience of the ambiguity of human existence.
90. For Kierkegaard, since no convincing arguments can be given to justify existence itself, the only proper (i.e., authentic) response is unconditioned faith in God's promise of salvation.
91. The aesthetic life style (for Kierkegaard) provides no guide for making decisions because those who pursue the aesthetic life acknowledge that human existence is ambiguous.
92. According to Kierkegaard, human existence should not be described in terms of objective facts but in terms of subjective, non-universalizable truths.
93. Kierkegaard claims that authentic religious belief requires that, if we cannot follow the teachings of our church or society, then we should at least follow the dictates of reason in living the moral life.
94. Kierkegaard's "leap of faith" is based on the assumption that religious commitment is justified only if it is consistent with our other (e.g., moral, social) beliefs.
95. Abraham's "leap of faith" was, for Kierkegaard, an ethical but not a religious decision because it was based on Abraham's knowledge of what was morally right.
96. In defining truth in terms of subjectivity, Kierkegaard claims that the truth of statements (even about things about which we are only mildly curious) is based on how we feel about them.
97. According to Kierkegaard, our existence is meaningful
only to the extent that we can give an objective, rational justification
for believing in God's promise of salvation.
Multiple Choice
98. According to Anselm's version of the ontological argument,
God must exist both as an object of belief in people's minds and as a reality
outside of their minds, because:
(a) without being able to believe
in a God who exists apart from their minds, some people would not be able
to make sense of what is in their minds.
(b) a being who exists only in the
mind is not as great as one who exists both in minds and outside of minds.
(c) if God existed only in people's
minds, then those who do not fully understand what or who God is would
not be able to believe in him.
(d) according to the definition of
"God" accepted by believer and atheist alike, God is beyond all understanding
(and thus must be outside of people's minds).
99. According to Anselm's ontological argument, if God
is the greatest conceivable being, then a God who exists only in people's
minds and not in reality (outside of their minds) would not truly be God,
because:
(a) a being who exists only mentally would not
be as great as one who exists mentally and in reality.
(b) only God could know the greatest conceivable
being, and thus only he knows whether he truly exists.
(c) the real existence of God outside of minds
depends on his being thought about by human minds.
(d) for a thing to be God, it has to be conceivable;
and if anything is conceivable, it must exist.
100. According to the ontological argument, if "God" means
the greatest conceivable being, then he exists because:
(a) without God as cause, nothing else could exist
or be conceived to exist.
(b) a being who did not exist would lack a trait
(existence) that the greatest conceivable being would have.
(c) no one fully understands what God is, so no
one can say whether he exists or not.
(d) whether or not God exists does not really
matter to the person of "faith seeking understanding."
101. Which of the following IS NOT an assumption
in Anselm's ontological argument?
(a) That being than which nothing greater can
be conceived exists at least (but not necessarily at most) in the mind.
(b) A being that exists in reality and in the
mind is more perfect than one that exists in the mind alone.
(c) It is greater for something to exist necessarily
only in the mind than contingently in reality.
(d) By "God" we understand that being than which
nothing greater can be conceived.
102. According to Descartes' version of the ontological
argument, if God is defined as an absolutely perfect being, then he must
exist because:
(a) if God does not exist, then there would be
no object outside of people's minds to which they could refer when they
say that they believe.
(b) if the definition of God as absolutely perfect
is accepted only by believers, then anyone who doubts the definition would
also have to doubt whether God exists.
(c) without an argument for the existence
of God, religious believers would not be able to defend their definition
of God as absolutely perfect.
(d) since it is better for a thing to exist than
for it not to exist, any God that did not exist would not, by definition,
be absolutely perfect.
103. One objection to the ontological argument is that
the argument assumes the false premise that real existence adds something
to the concept of God. The premise, it is argued, is false because:
(a) to say that something exists does not in any
way change or enhance what it is.
(b) the concept of a thing, along with the actual
existence of the thing, is greater than the thought of the thing alone.
(c) something that exists necessarily is greater
than that which exists contingently.
(d) even if the world is imperfect, that does
not necessarily mean that its creator (God) is imperfect.
104. Critics of Anselm's ontological argument (e.g., Hume,
Kant) claim that merely having an idea of something (e.g., God) cannot
be the basis for claiming that the thing exists. However, defenders
of the argument reply that:
(a) by saying that God exists, they do not aim
to prove that God exists but only aim to show how no a priori or a posteriori
proofs can make sense of belief in God.
(b) saying that God exists does not add anything
to what God is, since God's existence (the fact that he exists)
is different from his essence (what he is).
(c) God is unlike anything else about which we
can have ideas, since God (by definition) cannot be thought without also
thinking his existence.
(d) a perfect thing (e.g., God) might not exist,
but that is no good reason to believe that he does not exist.
105. Kant claims that the ontological argument for God's
existence is flawed because it fails to recognize how:
(a) the causes of our ideas are outside of what
we experience and therefore cannot be thought.
(b) God's existence is beyond anything we can
comprehend and so cannot be proven or disproven.
(c) saying that something exists or does not exist
does not change what it is or our concept of it.
(d) it suggests that, if God does not exist, then
the devil (the worst possible being) must exist.
106. According to one version of the ontological argument,
God must exist because necessary existence is greater than contingent or
merely possible existence. But critics point out that this same way
of thinking can be used to prove that God not only does not exist but also
that it is impossible that God exists, because:
(a) the sheer fact that one can conceive of a
greatest being does not mean that such a being exists.
(b) necessary non-existence is greater than contingent
or merely possible non-existence.
(c) if there were a best conceivable being, there
would also be a worst conceivable being (the devil).
(d) the concept of God's necessary existence is
no greater than the concept of God's contingent or possible existence,
since both concepts are in our minds alone and say nothing about reality.
107. In Anselm's version of the ontological argument,
a non-existing God would lack a characteristic or predicate that an existing
God would have, and therefore a non-existing God would be inferior to an
existing one. But in his refutation of the argument, Kant notes that
because existence is not a predicate, knowing or not knowing about the
existence or non-existence of something does not affect our being able
to know the thing. In other words, the point Kant makes is this:
(a) thinking of God and thinking of God's existing
in no way adds anything to the concept.
(b) to think of God as not existing is impossible,
since by our thinking of him he must exist.
(c) God certainly does not need us to think of
him in order to exist; but unless we think of him, we cannot know that
he exists.
(d) adding existence to the concept of God does
not change God, but it does change our understanding or idea of God.
108. According to Descartes' version of the ontological
argument, a being who lacks existence would not be as great a being as
one who exists; and since God is perfect, he must necessarily exist.
Against this reasoning Hume replies:
(a) We can know nothing about God because our
finite minds are incapable of knowing anything with certainty about an
infinitely existing God.
(b) Even though even an atheist would agree with
the definition of God as an absolutely perfect being, not everyone would
equate that with the greatest conceivable being.
(c) If we can conceive of God's existence, we
can likewise conceive of his non-existence; and that is all that is needed
to show that the idea of God alone cannot prove he exists.
(d) An a priori argument for the existence
of God can prove that he actually exists but not that it is possible for
him to exist (which would have to be proven a posteriori).
109. Hume rejects the ontological argument for God's existence
by pointing out that it is wrong to think that, based merely on a definition,
idea, or meaning one can make claims about reality. He supports this
by saying:
(a) as long as someone believes in God, that is
all he or she needs to prove that God exists.
(b) without first believing that something (e.g.,
God) exists, one cannot have a definition or idea of it.
(c) if something (e.g., God) is conceivable as
existing, it can likewise be conceived of as not existing.
(d) if the definition or idea of something (e.g.,
God) is not only possible but logically necessary, then the existence of
that thing is not only possible but logically necessary as well.
110. "If everything that exists in the world (including
the world itself) is not the cause of its own existence, then there must
be a cause of the world's existence which itself does not need to be caused
by anything else: that uncaused cause is God." This line of argument
is called:
(a) the existential argument.
(b) the cosmological argument.
(c) the ontological argument.
(d) the teleological argument.
111. Thomas Aquinas points out that the cosmological argument
does not assume that there was some original creation that long ago began
the causal sequence of events in history, for reason alone cannot rule
out the possibility that the universe has existed for an infinite time.
Besides, if one assumed that God originally created the world long ago,
that could not be used as an argument for the existence of God, because
that would prove only that:
(a) what we think of as God must be the same as
the universe.
(b) God would have had to have a cause (which would
have been the universe itself).
(c) God may have existed at the moment of creation,
but not necessarily now.
(d) there is no rational justification for thinking
that the universe has any cause at all.
112. According to Thomas Aquinas' discussion of the cosmological
argument for God's existence, there must be an ultimate cause or reason
for the existence of the world (namely, God). If there were no such
cause, then there would be no way to explain why:
(a) anything (including the world) exists at all.
(b) God exists.
(c) everything always has to be explained.
(d) God would choose to create a world at all.
113. According to Aquinas, the universe must have a cause
which itself has no cause and therefore has existed for all eternity.
Hume rejects this argument by pointing out that there would be no need
to postulate the existence of a cause independent of the universe if we
were simply to acknowledge the possibility that:
(a) the universe itself might have existed for
all eternity and thus is its own cause.
(b) the universe itself causes God, who then re-creates
the universe (e.g., in the Big Bang).
(c) because every thing in the universe is its
own cause, every thing has always existed.
(d) nothing other than God could be its own cause.
114. According to supporters of the cosmological argument,
there is an explanation for the existence of the things we experience in
the world. Thomas Aquinas, for example, concludes that the ultimate
cause of existence is itself not created by anything else, because:
(a) without that ultimate cause there would be
no way to explain why anything happens at all.
(b) the ultimate cause cannot be known as the cause
of itself since it would be known only by God.
(c) if there is an ultimate cause (God), then there
would be no reason for the world to exist.
(d) God's infinity consists not in being the ultimate
cause but in the infinite regress associated with there not being an ultimate
cause.
115. Thomas Aquinas argues that the world now exists because
God now exists as its cause. God could not have created the world a long
time ago and then withdrawn from any further involvement in it, because:
(a) if God caused the world, then something must
have caused God, and something else caused it, etc.
(b) God cares about his creation and would not
abandon it simply because it can exist on its own now.
(c) God's existence depends on the world's existence
just as much as the world depends on God.
(d) the present existence of the world is not
necessary; it relies on a being that now exists to make it exist.
116. "From the principle of sufficient reason it follows
that there must be a reason, not only for the existence of everything in
the world but for the world itself." Advocates of the cosmological
argument conclude from this that, as the sufficient reason for the world's
existence, God himself needs no sufficient reason because he is eternal
and uncaused. To this particular point critics reply:
(a) The principle of sufficient reason itself
depends on there being a God to guarantee the truth of the principle, and
that merely begs the question about God's existence.
(b) The question of who causes God is not at issue
here; what is at issue is whether God created the universe at some particular
time or whether the universe has existed for all eternity.
(c) If God can be uncaused and eternal, so can
the world, in which case the world can be its own sufficient reason.
(d) The fact that God created the world billions
of years ago does not prove that he continues to exist.
117. According to Aquinas, an infinite causal regress
(saying A is caused by B, which itself is caused by C, and so on infinitely)
fails to account rationally for the existence of things in the world
because:
(a) that would mean that the world has existed
for all eternity.
(b) every thing in the world would be existing
for all eternity.
(c) such a regress itself would never change.
(d) it, in effect, denies that existence ultimately
can be explained.
[The following quote summarizing Thomas Aquinas' cosmological
argument applies to Questions 118 & 119]:
"(1) Since objects or events exist, and since no object
of experience contains within itself the reason of its existence, the totality
of objects must have a reason external to itself. That reason must
be an existent being. This being is either itself the reason for
its own existence, or it is not. If it is, well and good. (2)
If it is not, then we must proceed farther. But if we proceed to
infinity in that sense, then there's no explanation of existence at all."
118. To the first part of this argument Hume would reply:
(a) only things that exist necessarily could be
the reason for the existence of contingent beings; such necessary beings
are infinite.
(b) what we know about objects of experience is
that they are caused; therefore we can conclude that objects beyond our
experience are uncaused.
(c) just as scientists cannot predict subatomic
causal interactions, so the philosopher cannot predict what causal interactions
God has with the world.
(d) because the concept of cause is limited to
our observations of particular things, we cannot conclude anything about
whether the totality of things has any cause.
119. A second problem Hume would have with this argument
by has to do with Aquinas' implicit assumption that everything has a reason
or cause for its existence which can also be said of the totality
of the universe. Hume would respond to this by:
(a) denying that, for God, everything has to have
a reason or cause for its existence.
(b) claiming that existence cannot justifiably
be predicated of a subject as part of its definition.
(c) challenging the assumption that the existence
of the universe can be explained.
(d) arguing that the principle that everything
has a reason or cause applies only to the universe taken as a totality
and not as an infinite series of particular events or objects.
120. The cosmological argument for the existence of God
claims that there has to be a cause of the universe (God) which itself
is uncaused. Hume objects to this line of argument by pointing out that:
(a) the very notion of a being who has always
existed is an impossibility.
(b) God does not need to cause himself, he only
needs to cause the universe.
(c) if God needs no cause, then perhaps neither
does the universe: perhaps it has always existed.
(d) even if God caused the universe, that does
not explain why so many people fail to recognize that fact.
121. Hume rejects the cosmological argument for God's
existence because it ignores the possibility that the causal sequence of
events in the universe might stretch back infinitely. If the universe
has always existed, he argues, it would not need a divine origin.
In reply, defenders of the cosmological argument claim that:
(a) the universe cannot have existed infinitely
(eternally) because nothing can exist eternally.
(b) though things in the universe have existed
eternally, the universe as a totality has not always existed.
(c) though the universe as a totality has always
existed, individual things in it have not always existed.
(d) regardless of whether the universe had an
origin, something (God) must be causing it to exist now.
122. Which of the following IS NOT an objection
typically raised against the "first cause" version of the cosmological
argument for the existence of God?
(a) Why not say that there was no first cause
and that the universe has always existed?
(b) If God can be his own cause, why can't the
universe (or matter in general) cause itself?
(c) The imperfections in the universe indicate
that an all-good, all-powerful God cannot be its cause.
(d) Just because individual things in the universe
have causes, that does not mean that the universe in its entirety has a
cause (fallacy of composition).
123. The contingency version of the cosmological argument
attempts to avoid a problem with the "first cause" version of the argument
by noting that, even if the universe was originally created long ago, that
still does not guarantee that God currently exists. To prove that
God exists now, the argument goes, we have to recognize:
(a) that since the universe's non-existence is
a possibility, its current actual existence must depend on there being
a necessarily existing being (God) who causes it.
(b) that the so-called "first cause" of the universe
could itself have had a cause, and that one could have had a cause, and
so on endlessly back in time.
(c) how the notion of first cause is itself something
that "depends on" something that itself cannot be explained: that is why
the argument is called the argument from contingency.
(d) how the first cause of the universe depends
on the non-existence of the universe prior to God's creating it; in this
sense, God depends on the universe.
124. To the argument that things in the universe could
not simply have happened by chance but rather happened according to laws
of nature formulated by God, Hume replies that:
(a) the laws of nature could have been designed
by some mind other than God.
(b) without the laws of nature, there would be
nothing that proves or disproves God's existence.
(c) because the laws of nature order our experiences
in determinate sequences, that proves that something must cause those laws
(namely, God).
(d) laws of nature are statistical averages of
possibilities of chance events.
125. Hume claims that the teleological argument fails
to prove that God exists because it assumes that the world can be explained
by appealing to an analogy with human artifacts. The analogy fails,
he says, because:
(a) it is based solely on our experiences with
past human artifacts, not future ones.
(b) we cannot say that the world has to have a
maker in the first place.
(c) no religious believer accepts arguments regarding
God based on analogies.
(d) like all other artifacts, the universe might
well be the result of mere chance.
126. In criticizing the teleological argument, Hume asks,
"Could a peasant if the Aeneid were read to him, pronounce that poem to
be absolutely faultless, or even assign to it its proper rank among the
productions of human wit, he who had never seen any other production?"
Hume's point is that:
(a) we know that the universe has no particular
cause, even though we are unable to prove it.
(b) just because the world exhibits a certain
amount of order, that does not mean that it also has a design or purpose.
(c) the world, just like Virgil's poem, is full
of major flaws that could be detected only if we had infinite intellects.
(d) our limited intelligence prevents us from
deciding whether or not God's creation of the world is praiseworthy.
127. To the argument that the intricacy and order of things
in the universe could not simply have resulted from chance but rather must
have been caused by God, Hume (among others) replies that:
(a) the order of things in the world follows laws
of nature that could not have been designed by any mind other than an infinite
mind, God.
(b) though the laws of nature are based on generalizations
of experience, the divine cause of those laws is knowable without having
to rely on experience.
(c) laws of nature simply summarize our experiences
and do not imply that there are, in the world itself, orderly sequences
or that something must cause those sequences.
(d) since laws of nature are statistical averages
of possibilities of chance events, they are in no way based on actual experiences
and cannot provide knowledge of the world or its cause.
128. According to one classic statement employing the
teleological argument, "It is not necessary that a machine be perfect,
in order to show with what design it was made; still less necessary, where
the only question is, whether it were made with any design at all."
The problem with applying this view to the question of God's design in
creating the universe, from Hume's standpoint, is that:
(a) it presumes what needs to be proven, namely,
that the universe is like a machine.
(b) because no machine is perfect, no universe
could be designed so as to exhibit the characteristics of a perfect machine.
(c) some machines do not have any design at all.
(d) as long as people are inclined to see design
or purpose in the universe, there is no argument that will persuade them
otherwise.
129. Hume raises a number of objections against using
the teleological argument as a basis for believing in the existence of
God. Which of the following IS NOT one of these objections?
(a) The argument assumes that the universe is
like other things we have experienced; but since we did not experience
the creation of the universe, we cannot be sure that universes have causes.
(b) The argument assumes that the world's existence
can be explained rationally by appeal to God as its cause; but why not
think that the world is a result of pure chance and has no reason for being?
(c) The argument shows at best that a very powerful
and very wise source could be the cause of the (finite) world, but not
an all-powerful, wise, and good one.
(d) The argument assumes that, since God has existed
for all eternity, so the world also must have existed for all eternity.
130. Which of the following IS NOT a criticism
raised by Hume against the teleological argument?
(a) Our inability to appreciate the order or design
of the world is due to our fallen, sinful natures.
(b) We cannot use analogy in discussing the universe
because we do not experience universes.
(c) Even if we argue analogously, we cannot conclude
that its creator is wise or good.
(d) The claim that the universe is ordered is
doubtful since humans imagine order even when there is none.
131. Hume claims that the teleological (or design) argument
fails to prove that God exists because it assumes that, just as there is
a connection between objects (e.g., watches) and their makers, so also
there is a connection between the universe and its maker (God).
To assume such an analogy, Hume argues, is unjustified because:
(a) as pantheists point out, God is the universe,
not some external cause.
(b) it would require that we know from experience
that universes always have creators.
(c) if God is "beyond" our experience, then he
also cannot be a personal being who cares about us.
(d) no argument from analogy can be based on experience.
132. Hume argues that, even if we accept the doubtful
claim that there is order and design in the universe, that would not prove
that an all-wise and all-powerful God is its cause, because:
(a) for us to be able to say that there is order
and design in the universe, we would have to compare our universe with
other universes that lack order and design (which we cannot do).
(b) an infinite being is not needed to create
our finite universe, only a very wise and powerful being or a group of
beings that may not even still exist.
(c) an all-wise and all-powerful God could not
create a world that is imperfect, and since our universe is imperfect,
no God could have created it.
(d) we cannot say that God designed the world
with any order and purpose in mind unless we know what such order or purpose
would be.
133. Defenders of the teleological argument for the existence
of God claim that, just as a watch has a watch-maker, so the world has
a world-maker (God) who designs it. Hume rejects this analogy because,
he says:
(a) neither the universe nor watches have order
or purpose; we only imagine them that way.
(b) imperfections in a watch are due to the fact
that watch-makers are not perfect, but because God is perfect, the universe
he creates actually does not contain imperfections.
(c) even if the universe exhibits the order and
purpose of a designing mind, that does not mean that the universe has a
cause.
(d) we have no experience of universes being created,
so we don't know if our universe has a creator.
134. "Could a peasant, if the Aeneid were read
to him, pronounce that poem to be absolutely faultless, or even assign
to it its proper rank among the productions of human wit, he who had never
seen any other production?" In this comment Hume is pointing out
how:
(a) comparing the world to a poem is like comparing
the work of God to the work of peasants.
(b) even if God is perfect, he has nonetheless
created all orders of beings, including imperfect thinkers (like ourselves)
who are poorly qualified to judge His work.
(c) assigning the universe to "its proper rank"
means comparing it to other things in our experience; insofar as it is
better than anything else, it is the comparative best.
(d) it is impossible for us to tell, based on our
limited experience, whether the system of the world contains any great
flaws or deserves any considerable praise.
135. "When two species of objects have always been observed
to be conjoined together, I can infer, by custom, the existence of one
wherever I see the existence of the other; and this I call an argument
from experience. But how this argument can have place where the objects,
as in the present case, are single, individual, without parallel or specific
resemblance, may be difficult to explain. . . . To ascertain this reasoning
it were requisite that we had experience of the origin of worlds; and it
is not sufficient, surely, that we have seen ships and cities arise from
human art and contrivance." In this passage Hume:
(a) raises questions about the argument from analogy
in proving God's existence.
(b) says that we can prove the existence of God
based on experience.
(c) shows how the use of the argument from analogy
proves that God does not exist.
(d) denies that the existence of an infinite God
follows from the existence of a finite world.
136. One of the classic arguments against the existence
of God is the problem of evil. Which of the following IS NOT
a typical response religious believers give to this argument?
(a) Evil is not real; it only seems real from our
limited perspective.
(b) Evil is not due to God but to the abuse of
freedom by human beings.
(c) Evil is necessary so that we can identify good
and be motivated to achieve the good.
(d) Evil is an incoherent, impossible concept,
and so not even God could know what evil is.
137. Religious believers sometimes claim that the existence
of evil in the world is not due to God but rather to human failings (sin).
Therefore, they point out, the existence of evil cannot be used as an argument
against the belief in God. To such a strategy, skeptics about the
existence of God reply:
(a) this way of reasoning assumes that there is
a God and then tries to place the blame for evil on human beings; but the
point of the criticism is to challenge the original assumption itself.
(b) since no one really believes in the reality
of evil, no one can use the existence of evil as the basis for not believing
in the reality of God.
(c) sin is a misuse of human freedom; though God
is responsible for having created human beings as free, he is not responsible
for how they use that freedom.
(d) evil is due neither to God nor human beings;
it is the activity of the devil.
138. Against religious believers who argue that evil is
needed to highlight the good, critics (e.g., Hume) reply that this makes
evil something good and does not explain:
(a) how the pragmatic truth of the claim "God
exists" depends on satisfying our expectations.
(b) why we continue to believe in God even though
there are good reasons to doubt his existence.
(c) why there is so much evil or why God does
not give us this knowledge without making us suffer.
(d) the difference between the question "is there
a God?" and "should I believe in God?"
139. Religious believers sometimes argue that evil does
not necessarily prove there is no God; rather, evil exists so that we can
appreciate goodness and improve ourselves in response to it. Critics
respond to this by noting that:
(a) God could have made us more sensitive to good
without our having to endure so much suffering.
(b) evil is not real; it only seems real from
our perspective.
(c) any suffering we experience in this life will
be more than compensated in an afterlife.
(d) no one really believes that people become
better through responding to challenges.
140. Religious believers sometimes claim that God is not
responsible for evil in the world; it is due to the misuse by human beings
of their free will. Which of the following IS NOT a
typical objection to this argument?
(a) God could have created us with more intelligence
(hightening our sensitivity to immorality) without affecting our freedom,
but he chose not to; why?
(b) Why doesn't God (who presumably is an all-loving
father) intervene in the world when we sin in order to prevent suffering
that often outweighs our errors.
(c) If God had created us like himself, then we
would not have been truly human; we are as good as human beings can be.
(d) Even if moral evil is due to our sins, how
can the non-moral evil (e.g., disease, natural disasters) experienced by
innocent children be caused by their abuse of free will?
141. The "aesthetic totality" solution to the problem
of evil argues that, without evil in the world, we would not be able to
identify the good nor would we appreciate the good as much as we do.
If everything were good (the argument goes), then life would not be interesting.
To this, critics reply:
(a) since each person has his/her own meaning
for good and evil, God could not have given us all the same appreciation
of the distinction without making us all the same.
(b) God could have created in us appreciation
of the good without our suffering to learn it.
(c) since there is no suffering in heaven (or
happiness in hell), there is no knowledge of good or evil there; so we
must be in heaven, since we now experience the good.
(d) shadows and tragedies are necessary components
of the total beauty of the universe.
142. Some people claim that the apparently needless suffering
and deaths of small children do have a purpose in God's grand scheme: it
inspires others to do the good. Furthermore, the argument goes, innocent
children will be rewarded in an afterlife. To this, critics reply:
(a) it is unjust to punish an innocent to make
a point to others, and no amount of reward will erase that unjust suffering.
(b) guilty people suffer just as much as innocent
people; why should the innocents be given special consideration?
(c) unless we have some guidance about what is
good, we will suffer and die just like the small children; would that be
fair to the rest of us?
(d) since all human beings (as descendents of
Adam) are tainted with original sin, they are all guilty, even so-called
innocent children.
143. Religious believers often claim that God is an all-loving
father. But critics raise numerous objections against such a belief,
arguing that such a portrait of God is contradicted by the existence of
evil in the world. Which of the following IS NOT one of these typical
objections?
(a) God could have created us with more intelligence
(heightening our sensitivity to immorality) without affecting our freedom,
but he chose not to; why?
(b) Why doesn't God intervene in the world when
we sin in order to minimize the amount of suffering that often exceeds
the severity of our errors?
(c) Even if moral evil is due to our sins, how
can the non-moral evil (e.g., disease, natural disasters) experienced by
innocent children be caused by their abuse of free will?
(d) If God had created us perfect like himself,
then we would not have been truly human; so God created us as perfect as
we can be.
144. Religious believers often note that evil is not caused
by God but is rather the result of the misuse of human freedom. To
this, critics reply that, if God is all-knowing and all-powerful, he is
in fact ultimately responsible for our sinful failings because:
(a) God creates us in his image, which means he
creates us with the ability to choose good or evil.
(b) if God had created us already in heaven, we
would have no reason to develop moral characters.
(c) if we never experienced evil, we would not
be able to recognize or appreciate the good.
(d) knowing even before we exist how we will misuse
our freedom, God nonetheless still creates us.
145. Some religious believers have suggested that the
presence of evil in the world actually makes us better people, because
our struggles against evil builds character. If that is the case,
then there is a reason for the presence of evil--a reason which makes evil
actually desireable: in short, it's good that there is evil in the world.
Against this way of thinking, critics raise the objection:
(a) this does not explain why we are fascinated
with the "beauty" of pure evil.
(b) no amount of effort or struggle builds character;
you're born with a good character.
(c) there is no real evil in the world, only what
appears from our perspective as evil.
(d) much less evil is needed to challenge us to
make great efforts, so why is there so much?
146. Religious believers deny that the so-called problem
of evil is an argument against the existence of an all-good, all-powerful
God. They note (1) that things or events are evil only from our
perspective and (2) that evil is necessary to highlight the good and to
make us appreciate the good. Against these attempts to defend God,
though, critics reply:
(a) God does not have to be defended nor do his
ways need to be justified; we should simply accept the fact that God is
the source of all that is good and leave it at that.
(b) if evil is not real but only a matter of perspective,
then so is good; if there is no reason to blame God for bad things that
happen to us, there is no reason to credit him for good things either.
(c) the presence of evil in our lives challenges
us to work harder and to improve ourselves; thus evil is really something
beneficial, another gift from God, and thus not really evil.
(d) though the concept of an all-good, all-powerful
God seems impossible or incoherent, it is not: it is a problem only for
us because we have limited intellects.
147. Which of the following strategies acknowledges that
there is a problem regarding the existence of God and evil in the world
but then simply avoids providing an answer to the problem?
(a) Arguing that God exists, but he is not all-powerful,
all-knowing, and/or all-good.
(b) Claiming that God acts in ways too mysterious
for our understanding.
(c) Denying that there is any real evil in the
world.
(d) Arguing that no God exists, and that evil
is simply natural.
148. Dostoyevsky claims that the existence of God and
the problem of evil cannot be rationally reconciled in a theodicy, because
to do so would make evil something that makes sense and thus should be
accepted as part of one's life. Instead, Dostoyevsky suggests that
the proper response to the problem of evil is to:
(a) portray God as either not all-powerful or
not all-good (or both).
(b) have faith in God despite being justified
in doubting him because of the existence of evil.
(c) explain how suffering is the result of human
sinfulness and misuse of free will.
(d) hope that there is an afterlife in which all
earthly sufferings are balanced by happiness.
149. Dostoevsky argues that we should choose not to relinquish
our belief in the reality of evil because to do so would be to trivialize
it. As long as we believe in the reality of evil, we must continue
to question why God permits it. To such questioning, God remains
silent because:
(a) we do not want Him to explain why there is
evil in the world, because if we understood it we would no longer experience
reasons for despair.
(b) any attempted explanation would "make sense"
of evil, which is precisely what cannot be done.
(c) there is really not a distinction in the world
itself between good and evil; it is only a human construct.
(d) God has provided explanations through the
Scriptures about why there is evil in the world (it is due to human sin
and weakness); it's just that we are not listening.
150. One of Dostoevsky's characters claims, "It's not
that I don't accept God, it's the world created by him I don't and cannot
accept." In terms of attempted theodicies, this means that:
(a) the existence of evil proves that God does
not exist.
(b) the fact that God is perfect indicates how
evil is simply in our perception of things.
(c) the world cannot be perfect (like God is)
and thus needs to be rejected.
(d) acknowledging God's existence does not deny
or ignore evil in the world.
151. Dostoevsky also comments: "If all must suffer to
pay for the eternal harmony, what have children to do with it? It's
beyond all comprehension why they should suffer, why they should pay for
the harmony." The harmony he refers to is the harmony:
(a) that balances the evil in the world with the
happiness of an afterlife.
(b) between crime or sin (human failure) and the
punishment that such failure requires.
(c) that balances suffering with forgiveness,
injustice with mercy.
(d) between human lack of understanding of God's
ways and theodicies showing that God's existence is compatible with the
existence of evil.
152. Dostoyevsky writes, "It's not worth the tears of
one tortured child who beat himself on the breast with his little fist
and prayed in his stinking outhouse, with his unexpiated tears to ‘dear,
kind God'! It's not worth it, because those tears are unatoned for.
. . . What do I care for a hell for oppressors? What good can hell
do, since those children have already been tortured?" The point Dostoyevsky
makes here is that:
(a) like all evil, suffering is a matter of perspective:
our idea of pain is not the same as God's.
(b) there is no rational explanation (or theodicy)
for how God and evil can exist simultaneously.
(c) we can believe in God only if we recognize
how suffering in this life is balanced off in heaven.
(d) the "good" provided by the threat of hell
is that it makes some people act morally.
153. According to Feuerbach, religion has played a significant
role in human history by pointing out how human existence aspires to what
it has not yet achieved. Belief in God (he says) now stands in the
way of human fulfillment, however, because it prevents us from seeing how
God is simply:
(a) the infinite, positive counterpart to Satan
and the forces of evil.
(b) the source of human existence and the inspiration
to human endeavors.
(c) the cause of human suffering and thus the reason
why we must rely only on ourselves.
(d) the infinite extension of humanity, idealized
and alienated from our essence.
154. Marx criticizes Feuerbach for not explaining why
human beings are so alienated from themselves that they are willing to
escape from reality through the "opium" of religion. The real source
for why people turn to the illusions of religion, Marx claims, is:
(a) a tendency to idealize familial and social
relations in order to protect religious beliefs.
(b) a willingness to avoid the misery caused by
social inequities, structures, and relations.
(c) the inability to reconcile an all-knowing God
with human freedom.
(d) the fact that people are unwilling to implement
religious teachings into their lives.
155. According to Marx, religion is "the opium of the
masses" insofar as religious beliefs:
(a) make us dissatisfied with social inequalities
and prompt us to call for social change.
(b) alienate us from one another by emphasizing
just how transcendent God really is.
(c) create in us a mentality that we are not individuals
in God's eyes, only human masses.
(d) desensitize us to the human misery caused
by social structures we should change.
156. Freud argues that religious beliefs are born out
of infantile fears of helplessness and a longing for a father figure to
protect us from the anxieties of life. But (a critic might say) what
is wrong with someone's having such a delusion? As long as it makes
people feel better, what's the harm? To this, Freud answers:
(a) As long as religion provides people with the
means for redirecting their lives to productive ends, it is a viable way
of dealing with frustration and anxiety.
(b) Because religion suggests that people are
ultimately powerless to change things in their lives, it prevents them
from developing the maturity to cope with reality.
(c) The problem is not with religion as such,
but only with those forms of religion that make people feel better; fatalistic
or depressing religions are realistic and OK.
(d) To say that religion is a delusion does not
mean that it is not true; it is only to say that, for some immature people,
religion can become a way of avoiding reality.
157. By referring to religious belief as a illusion, Freud
tries to show how our wanting something to be true often has the effect
of making us believe that it is true. In the case of religion, what
we want to believe is that:
(a) our faith in God and an afterlife is enough
to overcome our illusion that there is no God.
(b) there is some God, heaven, or reward that
compensates for earthly frustrations and death.
(c) all of the wishes and hopes that we have can
be fulfilled by God in this life.
(d) our fear of death and abandonment in a godless
world can be overcome through psychoanalytic enlightenment.
158. According to Freud, "What is characteristic of illusions
is that they are derived from human wishes. In this respect they
come near to psychiatric delusions. But they differ from them too.
. . . In the case of delusions, we emphasize as essential their contradiction
with reality. Illusions need not necessarily be false." By
applying this distinction to religious beliefs, Freud concludes:
(a) all religious doctrines are illusions, and
some are so improbable that they are delusions.
(b) all religious doctrines are delusions because
there is no way they could be true.
(c) some religious doctrines are known to be true;
false ones are illusions, not delusions.
(d) religious doctrines can be neither illusions
nor delusions since they are only beliefs.
159. Volitional arguments differ from rational arguments
for the existence of God because volitional arguments:
(a) focus on how belief in God makes a difference
in one's life instead of focusing on whether God exists.
(b) justify belief in God by showing how such
a belief is shared by other people in one's culture.
(c) attempt to prove God's existence by appeal
to sensible or mystical experiences.
(d) are based on what one would hope would be
true even though it is known to be false.
160. Religious believers sometimes argue that mystical
experiences prove that God exists, because such experiences:
(a) provide the mystic with rational arguments
to convince others about God's existence.
(b) reveal how having a sense of one's own personal
identity is important for religious belief.
(c) happen only after someone has decided to change
his/her life for the better.
(d) put the mystic in touch with some awe-inspiring
Other that makes his/her own existence meaningful.
161. By saying that causality is a function of how our
minds structure experience, Kant denies the possibility of saying that
there could be a cause for the world that we experience, because:
(a) the cause of our experience of the world cannot
be explained in any way other than by postulating the existence of God.
(b) without supposing that there is some cause
for why we experience the world as we do, we cannot explain how things
are experienced in causal relations.
(c) there would be no sense in talking about a
cause of experience if causality is a relation limited to or contained
within experience.
(d) none of the things that we experience in the
world really has a cause; "cause" applies only to things beyond our experience.
162. Kant's moral argument for the existence of
God is based on the practical assumption that most people believe that
there is a real difference between moral right and wrong. Kant uses
this belief as the basis for his argument for God's existence by claiming
that:
(a) any belief in God that is based on an assumption--even
the assumption that there is a difference between moral right and wrong--is
a hypothetical, not a categorical, imperative.
(b) a God who is less than all good might not
be concerned with morality; therefore, if there is morality at all, God
must be perfectly good.
(c) there must be a being who reconciles virtuous
efforts with appropriate rewards; otherwise, there is no greatest good
as a standard for morality.
(d) God is the cause for the development of moral
distinctions in human history.
163. Kant's moral argument for God's existence assumes
that no a posteriori or a priori proof succeeds and that
only a practical argument can justify belief in God. That is why
Kant says that his argument ultimately depends not on some theoretical
proof but on an assumption, namely, that:
(a) moral distinctions are based on God's laws.
(b) no one can be happy without being virtuous.
(c) morality (distinguishing right/wrong) makes
sense.
(d) the summum bonum is good only in God's
eyes.
164. Pascal's wager assumes that the probability of God's
existence is 50-50; either God exists or he doesn't. Some critics
counter by saying that the probability of the kind of Christian (infinite)
God Pascal claims we should believe in is much less than 50%, and so we
have more reason not to believe in such a being. Pascal's answer
to this is:
(a) even if the probability is very small, the
payoff is worth believing in such a God.
(b) the probability of there being such a God is
even greater than 50-50.
(c) since the probability of someone's believing
in God is 50-50, so is God's existence.
(d) because the probability of our being sure
that God exists is zero, the probability that he exists is 50-50.
165. At issue in the discussion of Pascal's wager is whether
it is reasonable to believe in the existence of God without
convincing evidence. Since the religious believer could be wrong,
isn't it philosophically irresponsible to believe without that evidence?
To this Pascal says:
(a) in the absence of a proof one way or the other,
we in fact choose to live our lives based on something: why not use the
anticipated rewards of religious belief as that basis?
(b) it would be contrary to human nature to believe
in the existence of a God for whom we have no evidence.
(c) God would not reward a believer with eternal
happiness if the person adopts the belief as a result of considering the
possible rewards of such a belief.
(d) the Christian life is fulfilling enough that,
even if there is no God or afterlife, people should adopt Christianity
for its own sake.
166. Critics of Pascal's wager argue that it reduces religious
belief simply to going with the odds, and it overlooks strong evidence
against God's existence (such as the fact of evil in the world).
To such points, Pascal replies that:
(a) belief in God (even if there is only a small
chance of his existence) is prudent and rationally justified--and thus
presumably respected by God--because of its potential rewards.
(b) even though there are convincing, rational
arguments proving that God does not exist, we simply wish that God would
exist as a protective father figure, and that is good enough as a basis
for belief.
(c) there is no real question about whether belief
is justified: the probability of God's existence is much greater than 50-50,
because evil is simply a matter of human perspective.
(d) belief in God's existence is rationally justified
only if God, in fact, exists; so if God, in fact, does not really exist,
then it would make no sense to believe that he does exist.
167. William Clifford argues that we should never believe
anything unless we have sufficient evidence. William James
replies that sometimes we are justified in believing certain things on
insufficient evidence (e.g., that there is a God)—but only if our decision
about whether or not to adopt such beliefs:
(a) is unavoidable and could make a real difference
in our lives.
(b) is itself something for which we have sufficient
evidence.
(c) is consistent with other things we believe.
(d) is something we could learn to live with and
regarding which our conscience would not bother us.
168. In answering the question of whether people are justified
in religious beliefs, William James points out that there is a difference
between beliefs that are meaningful and those that are true. For
if a belief is not meaningful in the first place, then it makes no sense
to ask whether it is true. The difference, he says, can be summarized
this way:
(a) though meaningful beliefs can make a practical
difference in one's life, they do not necessarily do so; but true beliefs
always make a practical difference in one's life.
(b) meaningful beliefs are consistent with, and
satisfy expectations regarding, other parts of our experience; true beliefs
make a practical difference in one's life.
(c) a belief can be true without being meaningful,
insofar as truth is something independent of people's beliefs, whereas
meaningfulness is not.
(d) meaningful beliefs make a practical difference
in one's life; true beliefs are consistent with, and satisfy expectations
regarding, other parts of our experience.
169. According to William James, we are justified in believing
in something (e.g., God) on insufficient evidence only when our decision
cannot be made on purely intellectual grounds and only when our making
the decision is:
(a) based on the kind of solid rational argumentation
that sufficient evidence would provide.
(b) unavoidable, important for how we live our
lives, and something we could go either way on.
(c) something we can otherwise avoid and is not
all that important one way or the other.
(d) unintelligible and meaningless to everyone
else.
170. According to William James, actions based on beliefs
for which there are no conclusive answers (e.g., the belief in God) might
be considered rational actions when and only when such a choice of action:
(a) makes a practical, real difference in how
we live or what meaning we attach to our lives.
(b) produces the greatest amount of happiness
for the greatest number of people.
(c) is based on a theoretical explanation of why
people act the way they do.
(d) would be what most people in the world agree
on, regardless of culture or background.
171. William James says that our passional engagement
or involvement in living commits us to making choices in situations where
no intellectual or rational grounds are sufficient to indicate what ought
to be done. These situations, however, are limited only to those
in which we are faced with what he calls a "genuine option"--that is, an
option in which:
(a) we have a choice between, on the one hand,
something that is meaningful and, on the other hand, something that is
true.
(b) belief in God is something for which we do
not have convincing evidence but which "works" for us by being consistent
with social teachings and practices.
(c) we are forced to make some decision; making
the decision has a significant impact on our lives; and both alternatives
are equally appealing.
(d) doing what works has the "cash value" of being
something that someone can justify with rational arguments.
172. Both Blaise Pascal and William James say that it
is reasonable to believe in the existence of God even when
empirical evidence or demonstrated proof is lacking. They differ,
however, in the following way:
(a) for Pascal, not believing in God ignores all
of the convincing evidence for his existence; for James, believing in God
ignores all of the convincing evidence against God's existence.
(b) for Pascal, belief in God is justified in
terms of possible afterlife rewards; for James, belief is justified in
terms of how well it satisfies expectations or is consistent with our other
beliefs.
(c) for Pascal, belief is a bet, a wager for which
one cannot give any justification one way or the other; for James, religious
belief is justified by the fact that most people believe in God.
(d) for Pascal, the religious life is so fulfilling
that, even if there is no afterlife, people should believe for its own
sake; for James, that is not enough: there must be an afterlife.
173. According to Kierkegaard, the truly authentic ("religious")
individual acts "by virtue of the absurd," that is:
(a) based on whatever the person thinks is required
by a "leap of faith."
(b) based on what everyone else would recognize
as a universalizable and shared truth.
(c) without being able to distinguish the aesthetic,
moral, and religious life.
(d) without being able to fully explain his/her
actions in socially acceptable or rationally justifiable ways.
174. For Kierkegaard, the truth about the possibility
that there is a God who makes our existence meaningful must be subjective
rather than objective. In other words, the questioning of whether
there is a God is itself meaningful only in terms of the answer one discovers.
That fact recognizes:
(a) how our interest in believing in the existence
of God is much more than intellectual curiosity about some fact that is
independent of our search for an answer.
(b) how the distinction between subjective and
objective truth is a function of whether one believes in the existence
of God or not.
(c) how belief in the existence of God is something
purely personal and private, regardless of whether there is any justification
at all in believing that there is a God.
(d) how the questioning of whether there is a
God can come to an end once someone acknowledges that there is no true
answer to the question.
175. According to Kierkegaard, religious belief entails
a leap of faith (like that of Abraham) which cannot be rationally justified
or known--even in hindsight--to be correct. For if we could know
that our belief could be understood rationally, justified morally, or accepted
socially, then:
(a) we could understand why no leap of faith can
ever merit salvation.
(b) we would know that religious belief is always
forced, momentous, and live.
(c) we could see why the religious life is to be
preferred over the aesthetic and moral life.
(d) we would not have to rely on faith at all but
could instead believe based on reasons.
176. According to Kierkegaard, the attempt to understand
God rationally is contrary to the "leap of faith" required in a religious
commitment, because:
(a) if knowledge of God could be reasoned to,
there would be no need for passionate faith.
(b) no other argument for God's existence is as
rational as the leap of faith argument.
(c) a religious commitment has to be based on
a belief that is rationally intelligible; otherwise, no one would understand
what it means to believe.
(d) after all, most of us believe because our
parents or society tell us what to believe.
177. Though they differ about how important religious
belief should be in the lives of human beings, Kierkegaard and Hume agree
on one fundamental point, namely:
(a) people are rationally justified in believing
in God if that is what they choose to do.
(b) belief in the existence of God is rational
only if it is socially recognized as appropriate.
(c) religious beliefs are justifiable based not
on social practices but on rational argument.
(d) there is no rational justification for belief
in the existence of God.
178. According to Kierkegaard, the "ethical" person is
someone who acts based on morally defensible principles. The life
of such a person, he maintains, is inauthentic because:
(a) one is ethical not by acting on objective
universal principles but by doing what society says.
(b) ethical principles are objective and universal,
not crucial in the individual's decisions.
(c) moral principles summarize Christian (i.e.,
middle class, bourgeois) values.
(d) moral principles are true precisely because
they are objective and rational.
179. According to Kierkegaard, religious faith requires
a leap beyond what is socially acceptable and rationally justifiable because:
(a) most religious practices are simply excuses
for socializing with people who could care less about giving a rational
justification for their actions.
(b) unless a person believes in what his or her
society and religious upbringing says is right, he or she is unable to
understand how life can be meaningful.
(c) even if someone makes a leap of faith and
believes that God will save him or her, that in no way diminishes the meaninglessness
of human existence.
(d) socially acceptable action requires no faith
at all, and rationally justifiable action applies only to the universal
(whereas faith in salvation is particular).
180. An objection typically raised against Kierkegaard's
treatment of religious belief is that it fails to distinguish between someone
who has a justified belief and someone who is insane. To this objection,
Kierkegaard replies:
(a) unlike insanity, justified religious belief
can be defended by appealing to universal, moral principles.
(b) insane people do not believe anything, but
religious individuals have beliefs that others can adopt too.
(c) an insane person's acts are intelligible only
to himself; the true believer's acts make sense to others.
(d) like existence itself, religious belief has
no ultimate rational justification; so there is really no way to distinguish
it from insanity.
181. For Kierkegaard the anxiety associated with the ambiguity
of human existence undermines our belief that life is meaningful in virtue
of scientific, rational, and ethical truths. Which of the following
beliefs WOULD NOT be characteristic of authentic human existence?
(a) What we believe to be true has significance
for us only to the extent that it is true for us as existing individuals.
(b) Human significance is not defined in terms
of fulfilling a universal essence or nature.
(c) The gulf between the finite and the infinite
can be bridged only by a leap of faith.
(d) Religious commitment provides a person with
the calming confidence of a felt salvation.
182. Kierkegaard notes that the truth about human existence
is not knowable as are other facts about the world, because those other
things are facts concerning which we do not really care. What makes
our beliefs true, though, is not only that we care about them but also
that:
(a) they are based on an objective, impersonal
relation between the belief and the world.
(b) even after adopting those beliefs we continue
to experience anxiety and doubt about them.
(c) after adopting the belief we are comforted
in the knowledge that God's grace has saved us.
(d) faith in God allows us to believe anything
we want and that will make it true.
Answers:
1. T
2. T 3. F 4. T 5. F 6. F 7. T 8. T 9. T 10. T 11. F 12. T 13. F 14. F 15. T 16. T 17. F 18. T 19. T 20. F |
21. T
22. F 23. T 24. T 25. F 26. T 27. T 28. F 29. T 30. F 31. F 32. T 33. T 34. T 35. F 36. F 37. T 38. F 39. T 40. F |
41. T
42. T 43. T 44. F 45. T 46. T 47. T 48. F 49. T 50. F 51. F 52. F 53. F 54. F 55. F 56. T 57. T 58. F 59. F 60. T |
61. T
62. T 63. F 64. F 65. T 66. F 67. F 68. T 69. T 70. T 71. F 72. F 73. F 74. T 75. T 76. F 77. F 78. T 79. T 80. F |
81. T
82. F 83. T 84. F 85. T 86. F 87. F 88. F 89. T 90. T 91. F 92. T 93. F 94. F 95. F 96. F 97. F 98. B 99. A 100. B |
101. C
102. D 103. A 104. C 105. C 106. B 107. A 108. C 109. C 110. B 111. C 112. A 113. A 114. A 115. D 116. C 117. D 118. D 119. C 120. C |
121. D
122. C 123. A 124. D 125. B 126. D 127. C 128. A 129. D 130. A 131. B 132. B 133. D 134. D 135. A 136. D 137. A 138. C 139. A 140. C |
141. B
142. A 143. D 144. D 145. D 146. B 147. B 148. B 149. B 150. D 151. A 152. B 153. D 154. B 155. D 156. B 157. B 158. A 159. A 160. D |
161. C
162. C 163. C 164. A 165. A 166. A 167. A 168. D 169. B 170. A 171. C 172. B 173. D 174. A 175. D 176. A 177. D 178. B 179. D 180. D |
181. D
182. B |