Past Test Questions: Ethics
Answers at end. [Items in brackets not covered in 2005 course or text.]
True/False
(True=A, False=B)
1.
Even though
questions about ethics, social-political philosophy, aesthetics, and the
meaning of life deal with different areas of philosophy, they are all issues
addressed in Avalue theory.@
2.
To the extent
that ethics, political philosophy, and aesthetics raise questions about
judgments relating to value, they are concerned with axiology.
3.
Ethics describes
how each person=s background and upbringing affects his or her beliefs
about moral issues.
4.
The philosophical
attempt of ethics to provide a standard for evaluating laws, religions,
customs, and individual preferences is itself based on each philosopher=s personal values.
5.
Because ethics
studies moral values and obligations, it is concerned with consequences of
action, not motives.
6.
Ethical
relativists claim that cultures ultimately share the same basic ethical
principles.
7.
Ethical
relativists claim that even though cultures seem to differ on ethical
standards, they ultimately share the same basic ethical principle--namely,
moral goodness is that which produces happiness.
8.
Ethical
relativists argue that, because all moral values are relative to cultural or
individual choice, no universally valid moral principles hold for all human beings.
9.
For the cultural
relativist, if a moral code of a society says that a certain action is right,
it is right (at least within that society).
10.
According to the
cultural relativist, what people believe about morality depends on the culture
in which they live.
11.
Cultural
relativism commits the Anaturalistic fallacy@ to the
extent that it assumes that, because cultures differ about moral judgments,
they are justified in holding their
beliefs.
12.
Ethical theories
fall into a naturalistic fallacy when
they derive moral obligations (Ashould@ or Aought@) from factual states (Ais@).
13.
To say Abecause people seek happiness, they ought to seek happiness@ is to commit the naturalistic fallacy.
14.
According to
conventional ethical relativism, we should tolerate the values of other
cultures because there is no independent basis for criticizing those values.
15.
According to
ethical subjectivists, moral values are based solely on an
individual=s beliefs.
16.
An ethical
relativist cannot be a moral objectivist.
17.
AObjective@ moral
values are absolute values only when they apply (and are thus limited) to a
person or culture.
18.
Ethical
absolutists argue that, because all
moral values are relative to cultural or individual choice, no universally
valid moral principles hold for all human beings.
19.
It is impossible
for an ethical absolutist to be a moral relativist.
20.
If moral
objectivism is true, then homosexuality must be morally wrong.
21.
[According to
Socrates and Plato, we should act virtuously for the sake of others, regardless
of whether acting morally improves our ability to discern what is good or to
control our passions.]
22.
[According to
Socrates and Plato, we can be truly happy only if we allow our reason or
intellect to guide our emotions and appetites.]
23.
[According to
Socrates, because an immoral person is unable to integrate the various parts of
his/her character or personality, he or she cannot really be happy.]
24.
[According to
Socrates and Plato, even though an immoral person is unable to integrate the
various parts of his/her character or personality, he or she can still really
be happy.]
25.
[The characters
in Plato=s Republic
appeal to the story of the ring of Gyges to make the
point that only a fool would act morally if he or she could get away with
acting immorally.]
26.
[According to Plato,
immoral people cannot really be happy because they are unable to integrate or
harmonize the various parts of their character or personality.]
27.
[In responding to
the story of the ring of Gyges, Plato argues that
immorality can never be in someone=s ultimate
self-interest because immoral people are never truly happy.]
28.
[In Plato=s theory of the state, justice is ultimately achieved
when the ruling class is able to do away with social inequalities by driving
the military and working classes out of society.]
29.
[For Plato, the
moral balance or harmony of the three parts of the soul is parallel to the
condition of political harmony one must seek in the state.]
30.
[According to
Plato, the soul achieves balance or harmony only when reason controls both the
spirited (or courageous) part of the soul and the soul=s appetites.]
31.
[According to
Plato, moral goodness is achieved by eliminating the activities of the lower
parts of the soul and acting solely on the basis of reason.]
32.
In contrast to consequentialist ethics, teleological ethics emphasizes the
individual=s happiness, not society=s.
33.
Teleological
theories of ethics determine the moral value of actions in terms of their
consequences.
34.
In Epicurus= hedonism, moral decisions should be based on whether
actions produce pleasure and avoid pain.
35.
According to the
hedonist Epicurus, we are under a moral obligation to pursue pleasures that are
not mixed with pain (e.g., beauty), to satisfy our natural desires (e.g.,
food), and to avoid vain desires (e.g., fame).
36.
Hedonism is a
form of teleological ethical theory because it recommends that we act to
produce happiness (pleasure) as the consequence of our actions.
37.
The egoistic
hedonist says that, if producing the greatest amount of pleasure for ourselves
means that we have to take into account the pleasure of others, then we are
under a moral obligation to do so.
38.
[If psychological
egoism is true, then no ethical position (including ethical egoism) is
possible.]
39.
[To say that
egoism is non-falsifiable (and thus not a legitimate philosophical theory)
means that it is impossible for everyone to be an egoist.]
40.
Because ethical
egoism claims that we are incapable of doing anything other than promoting our
self-interests, it violates the moral dictum Aought
implies can.@
41.
According to
Hobbes= version of ethical egoism, since we always act so as
to promote what we think is in our own self-interest, it makes no sense to say
that we ought to do anything other
than that.
42.
To say that Aought implies can@ means
that a person can be under a moral obligation to do something only if that
person is physically able to do otherwise.
43.
AOught implies can@
summarizes the moral principle that if someone is physically able to do an
action, he or she is morally obligated to do it.
44.
Because ethical egoism
is concerned only with the pleasure or happiness of the person doing the
action, it is not a form of teleological
ethics.
45.
The ethical
egoist says that, since it is impossible for us to do anything other than
promote our own self-interest, it is pointless for us to develop a moral theory
that indicates what we Aought@ to do.
46.
For the
utilitarian, the whole purpose of ethics and virtuous behavior is the
production and increase of happiness.
47.
According to the
utilitarian principle of morality, one should always act so as to produce the greatest overall and long-term
amount of happiness for the greatest number of people.
48.
Utilitarians claim that actions have value and thus are morally
good insofar as they produce happiness (good consequences) for the greatest
number of people.
49.
Since
utilitarianism is really a form of social hedonism, it cannot be considered as
a consequentialist theory of morality.
50.
Like egoism,
utilitarianism is a form of teleological ethics because it emphasizes using
consequences as the basis for determining the morality of actions.
51.
Though both
Epicurus and Bentham agree that we should do that
which produces pleasure or happiness, they differ on whose pleasure or
happiness should be taken into account.
52.
Although Bentham and Mill differ on how to calculate happiness, they
are both utilitarians because, for them, good actions
are those that produce the greatest amount of happiness for the greatest number
of people.
53.
Because Bentham=s hedonic
calculus does not consider the pleasures or pains that other people
experience as a result of a person=s
action, it is more egoistic than Mill=s
version of utilitarianism.
54.
According to
Mill, the proof that happiness is good (and thus desirable) is that human
beings desire it.
55.
John
Stuart Mill claims that what makes happiness desirable (and thus the basis for
what ought to be desired) is the fact that happiness is desired.
56.
According to J.
S. Mill, we should focus on the quality
of happiness produced by acts and ignore the quantity.
57.
According to J.
S. Mill, the quantity (as opposed to
the quality) of pleasures is
determined by how well those pleasures enhance human fulfillment and
well-being.
58.
According to
Mill, the decision about which pleasures are qualitatively desirable should be
made by people familiar with different kinds of pleasures based on what they
generally desire.
59.
Utilitarians argue that, because all moral values are relative to
cultural or individual choice, no universally valid moral principles hold for
all human beings.
60.
Act utilitarians point out that, because violating a moral rule
sometimes causes more happiness than following the rule, we are not only allowed to violate the rule, but in that
instance we are morally obligated to
violate it.
61.
Rule utilitarians claim that we should follow moral rules even
if we think that violating them would yield better results, because following
moral rules generally yields more overall happiness.
62.
Utilitarianism is
a form of deontological ethics because it uses consequences to determine the
morality of acts.
63.
Teleological
ethical theories characterize moral obligation in terms of categorical rather than hypothetical
imperatives.
64.
A deontological
ethical theory is one that makes judgments about the morality of actions based
on the ends, purposes, or consequences of the actions.
65.
In deontological
ethical theories, morality is the means to achieve what is identified as good
or valuable.
66.
In deontological
ethical theories, moral goodness is defined as doing what we are obligated to
do (our duty).
67.
Divine-command
ethical theorists claim that what makes actions moral or immoral is God=s command that we act or refrain from acting in
certain ways.
68.
Critics of the
divine command theory of ethics point out that, because it is not persuasive
for atheists and agnostics, it cannot be considered an example of a
deontological theory.
69.
In Stoic ethics,
our moral duty is to act in accord with nature and restrain our desires to what
nature dictates.
70.
A person who has
a moral obligation to do something is not physically able or free to do
anything else.
71.
According to
Kant, Aheteronomy@ is
allowing someone or something other than oneself (e.g., God, our natural desire
for happiness) to decide the moral laws that one will follow.
72.
Kant rejects all
forms of hypothetical imperatives because (he claims) no rational agent can
ever be obligated to act morally.
73.
Kant claims that
moral obligation cannot be based on a "hypothetical imperative" such
as "if you want to be happy, then you must do X," because what people
want to do is never really connected with what they actually do.
74.
According to
Kant, morality presumes that I, as a rational being, am able to do what is
morally right because it is morally
right.
75.
Kant claims that
an act is morally good if it is one=s duty
to do itCeven if it is not done because it is one=s duty.
76.
According to
Kant, my actions are morally good only if my motives or intentions in so acting
are for the sake of or because it is my duty to act in those
ways.
77.
According to
Kant, before we can decide what is morally valuable,
we must decide what we are obligated
to do.
78.
Kant=s categorical imperative states that we
should always act for the sake of doing our duty except when doing our duty conflicts with deeply held personal or
religious values.
79.
For Kant, the only
time someone is morally permitted to act contrary to the dictates of a moral
law is when such a universalizable maxim comes into
conflict with one=s deeply held religious beliefs.
80.
To act
virtuously, Kant argues, means to act for the sake of doing one=s dutyCeven if that means going against one=s religious beliefs.
81.
Because the
categorical imperative does not admit of any exceptions, Kant concludes that it
is impossible for anyone to do anything that would violate it.
82.
Even though the
categorical imperative does not admit of any exceptions, Kant acknowledges that
it is possible for people to violate it (that is, to be immoral).
83.
In Kantian
ethics, Aought implies can@ refers
to the claim that no one can be morally obligated to do something unless he or
she is able to do it.
84.
AOught implies can@ means
that someone is morally responsible only for those actions that he/she is able
to do.
85.
AOught implies can@
summarizes the moral principle that if someone is physically able to do an
action (e.g., kill someone), he or she is morally obligated to do it.
86.
To say that a
moral imperative is categorical means
(for Kant) that the demand should be obeyed without exception, regardless of
the negative consequences of acting on it.
87.
From Kant=s perspective, utilitarian consequentialism
assumes that ethical reasoning is and should be based on a categorical (rather
than a hypothetical) imperative.
88.
According to
Kant, an action which has a motive or intention that cannot be successfully
universalized might be moral or immoral depending on whether the action is done
freely.
89.
According to
Kant, I can be morally obligated to do an action only if everyone else in the
same type of situation is likewise obligated.
90.
A maxim is a
subjective principle of action or working rule which, according to Kant, we are
morally bound or obligated to obey.
91.
According to
Kant, a good will is a will to do what we are morally obligated to do (that is,
our duty) regardless of the
consequences.
92.
For Kant, I
determine whether I am morally obligated to act a certain way by seeing whether
the motive of my action can be universalized without contradiction or without
being unacceptable to me and others.
93.
According to
Kant, we should treat people as ends-in-themselves (and never as means alone)
because of the good consequences of doing so.
94.
Kant notes that
we should respect moral agents as ends in themselves because of their ability
to act simply for the sake of doing their duty.
95.
For Buddhists,
the aim of moral behavior is personal enlightenment but not an enhanced sense
of individuality.
96.
In Buddhist
ethics, patience and moderation help us see ourselves and others as tied
together in the universe.
97.
Buddhism is a
form of ethical egoism because it recommends that we always act with an aim to
achieving happiness through personal enlightenment rather than by merely
following moral rules.
98.
[According to
Hume and Moore, ethical theories fall into a naturalistic fallacy when they derive moral obligations (Ashould@ or Aought@) from factual states (Ais@).]
99.
Utilitarians commit a Anaturalistic
fallacy@ by thinking that certain behavior is morally
desirable because it has consequences that are desired.
100. [According to emotivism (or Apositivism@), value
judgments are simply expressions of positive or negative feelings about something
and thus are neither true nor false.]
101. [According to logical positivists, ethical judgments
are meaningful (and thus can be justified) because they describe a fact about
the world--namely, certain actions produce happiness and ought to be done.]
102. [For Sartre, individuals who use God’s will to
determine good and evil s the standard for morality adopt for which they are
not responsible and for which they are not accountable.]
103. [According to Sartre, every time I do something, I
identify that kind of action as a standard of morality for all human beings.]
104. [According to Sartre, nothing that a human being does,
not even acting in Abad faith,@ allows
that person to transcend human subjectivity.]
105. [According to existentialist ethics, because there is
no absolute foundation upon which moral judgments are based, we cannot
justifiably be held responsible for our choice of any set of values.]
106. [Moral systemsCeven
those that value humility and passivityCare
expressions (Nietzsche maintains) of the will to power, the will to overcome.]
107. [Even though Nietzsche suggests that all reality is
interpreted, he does not claim that truth itself is an expression of the will
to power.]
108. [According to Nietzsche, moral systems are attempts by
the masses of weak people to keep strong individuals from exercising their
creativity and passion.]
109. [For Nietzsche, because morality is an expression of a
slave mentality, no creative (Amaster@) individual can really be called excellent,
honorable, or noble.]
110. [Nietzsche claims that those who adopt the master
morality promote the common good and peace in society in order to develop all
forms of life as expressions of the will to power.]
111. [Nietzsche rejects utilitarianism because it gives
equal value to all individuals, even those who do not deserve it.]
112. [Nietzsche rejects moral theories such as Christian,
utilitarian, and Kantian ethics because they fail to treat all human beings as
essentially equal.]
113. [Nietzsche claims that religion stands in the way of
true human development to the extent that religious beliefs prevent us from
making the authentic commitment to God necesssary for
true salvation.]
114.
Because anti-foundationalists reject the view that moral judgments
should be made on unchanging, abstract principles, they claim that there is no
way to determine the morality of actions.
115. [According to Aristotle, because moral virtues are
habits, they cannot be taught but only learned in living according to them.]
116. According to Aristotle, in a good or happy life
someone is able to fulfill himself or herself through behavior that combines
moderation, good fortune, and wisdom.
117. In Aristotle=s virtue
ethics, the golden mean is the
abstract, unchanging foundation on which we make moral judgments by calculating
the point of moderation between virtue and vice.
118. The golden mean, for Aristotle, is the mid-point
between pursuing happiness and doing one=s duty.
119. According to Aristotle, because happiness is not only
the goal of all human beings but also defined by anyone as he/she sees fit,
there is no ultimate standard of ethics.
120. In Aristotle=s virtue
ethics, moral value is a purely private matter, unconnected to how people
interact with others in the community.
121. For Aristotle, morality is not simply a private or
personal matter: it also involves the social dimensions of life.
122. According to virtue ethics, moral behavior is not an indifferent
application of abstract principles but a balance of reason and emotional
sensitivity.
123. According to Carol Gilligan, the ethic of care
characteristic of feminist ways of thinking emphasizes the obligation not to
interfere in the lives of others.
124. Feminine moral development, according to Carol
Gilligan, occurs as a person moves from (1) caring only for herself, through
(2) caring for others, to (3) adopting care as a universal moral principle.
125. [Sarah Hoagland argues that male-dominated ethics
emphasizes competing interests, sacrifice, compromise, and duty instead of
caring.]
126. Feminist ethicists argue that abortion and euthanasia
are always morally justified, because whatever a person decides for herself is
more important than any other consideration.
127. Drawing on insights like those developed in ancient
Greek virtue ethics, feminists point out that the aim of ethics should be to
protect individual rights and to treat everyone in the same impartial, just
way.
128. [Natural-law ethics and virtue ethics cannot provide
any insights into how to handle situations regarding abortion or euthanasia,
because such moral dilemmas require us to make some decision about how to act.]
129. [Abortion and euthanasia are more properly issues of social philosophy rather than ethics,
because they indicate how individuals are related to society through government
and law.]
Multiple Choice
130. Ethics, political philosophy, and aesthetics are areas
of philosophy that address topics that are likewise addressed in fields like
psychology, political science, sociology, and anthropology. But instead of
concentrating on what different people call the good life, moral duties, social
obligations, or beauty, these areas of philosophy search for:
(a) reasons
why different people should or should not think about such topics as they do.
(b) the
personal or social causes of why different people think about such topics as
they do.
(c) ways of
getting people to question and ultimately to reject ways they have been raised.
(d) a basic principle by which
both philosophy and the social sciences can be reduced to the physical sciences
(especially physics).
131. Ethics and law have sometimes been distinguished in
the following way: the law attempts to resolve conflict in society by
regulating behavior, whereas ethics is concerned with determining the rules for
resolving conflict both in belief and in the behavior or action based on those
beliefs. Ethics thus emphasizes:
(a) how a rational resolution
of conflicting beliefs is unattainable due to the different backgrounds of
people.
(b) the ways in which
individuals can be excused from being held responsible for their actions.
(c) the reasons that can be
given as to why certain beliefs should be adopted and certain actions done.
(d) the difference between an
individual=s religious training and the requirements of the laws
of his state and nation.
132. Ethical judgments are usually distinguished from
judgments of personal preference, taste, or prejudice by means of showing that
ethical judgments:
(a) can be explained in terms
of the particular customs or practices of a group or culture.
(b) are intended primarily to
rationalize already accepted practices in a society.
(c) serve only as ideals and
cannot be the bases upon which people live daily.
(d) need to be supported by
reasons that should be universally intelligible or acceptable.
133.
From a
philosophical perspective, religious teachings or revelations cannot (by
themselves) serve as standards of morality because:
(a) the appeal to the will of
God as the reason for one=s behavior cannot provide a motive for acting morally
or immorally, even for religious believers.
(b) interpretations of
religious revelations often conflict with one another and thus provide no
definite basis for making moral judgments and have no persuasive power for
non-believers.
(c) some religious beliefs
(even those based on the Scriptures) are not only factually wrong but, if
followed, would result in immoral behavior.
(d) religious teachings are
usually interpreted and enforced through civil laws that become the bases for
personal or social morality.
134.
Unlike religion,
law, social custom, or personal preference, ethics is not concerned with
describing our behavior in terms of faith, social order, or individual likes
and dislikes. Instead, it focuses on:
(a) explaining why we might
or might not be justified in applying those other sets of beliefs to moral
issues.
(b) showing how religion,
law, and social custom are culturally relative, but personal preference is
subjective.
(c) describing how each
person=s background and upbringing affects his or her beliefs
about moral issues.
(d) showing how motives are
more crucial in making moral judgments than consideration of consequences,
character, or the act itself.
135.
AWhy be moral?@ is a metaethical
question rather than an ethical
question inasmuch as it is concerned with:
(a) why someone would want to
have a balanced personality or be a superior individual.
(b) non-moral reasons for why
someone should be moral.
(c) how it is morally wrong for someone to be immoral.
(d) what makes actions moral
or immoral, right or wrong.
136.
According to the
cultural relativist Ruth Benedict, AThe very
eyes with which we see a problem are conditioned by the long traditional habits
of our own society.@ Because of this, she concludes:
(a) since no one ever has a
particular perspective, no one ever criticizes values in other cultures.
(b) claims about cultural
differences are as judgmental as they are descriptive.
(c) all cultural differences
can be reduced to basic differences in human nature.
(d) organized behavior within
a particular society prevents its own members from seeing when they have
problems.
137.
According to the
cultural relativist, the attempt to evaluate the moral beliefs of one=s own culture is bound to fail because:
(a) obviously some cultures
have better systems of moral beliefs than others.
(b) values are not determined
by one=s culture as much as they are by the individual=s personal beliefs and prejudices.
(c) even within a particular
culture=s belief system, no actions are really ever identified
as good or bad.
(d) in order to make such an
evaluation, one has to use the very values which are themselves being judged.
138.
Whereas cultural relativists argue that moral
values vary from culture to culture, ethical
relativists claim that:
(a) universally binding moral
values are interpreted differently from culture to culture.
(b) cultural differences show
how there is no set of moral values that obligates all peoples in all cultures.
(c) although moral
differences among cultures are objective, all people share the same subjective
values.
(d) our toleration of
obviously cruel cultures is relative to our culture (and is thus an absolute
value).
139.
Ethical
relativists believe that moral values vary from person to person or group to
group, but they do not believe that there is a universal, unchanging standard
of moral values. In short, they argue, moral values might be:
(a) objective or absolute but not subjective.
(b) subjective or absolute but not objective.
(c) subjective or objective but not absolute.
(d) absolute but not subjective or objective.
140.
Because
absolutists argue that the quality or value of something is independent of
being designated or recognized as such, they treat ethical judgments:
(a) as relative to one=s own conscience or set of values.
(b) as true or false
depending on one=s society or on how one is raised.
(c) as inaccessible to the
human mind, ultimately unknowable and practically meaningless.
(d) as facts about the world
which are true or false regardless of human judgments.
141.
Which of the
following characterizations is FALSE?
(a) It is possible for a subjectivist to be a
relativist.
(b) It is possible for a relativist to be an objectivist.
(c) It is possible for an absolutist to be a
subjectivist.
(d) It is possible for an objectivist to be an
absolutist.
142.
Which of the
following IS NOT a common objection
to the cultural version of ethical relativism?
(a) If cultural values are always right, no culture
could be said to improve itself or develop morally.
(b) The fact that cultures disagree on moral values
does not prove that they ought to disagree.
(c) If ethical values apply only within one=s culture, then no one could ever be said to act
immorally.
(d) Saying which values apply to individuals is
difficult because people belong to different (sub)cultures.
143.
Which of the
following IS NOT an objection that
can be raised against ethical relativism?
(a) If relativism is correct, then we will not be able
to resolve ethical disputes by appealing to arguments.
(b) If relativism is correct, then moral criticism,
moral progress, and toleration are morally unjustifiable.
(c) If relativism is correct, then no one can do
anything that reduces suffering, since “can implies ought.”
(d) Because it is difficult to identify the “cultures”
an individual belongs to, it is not helpful to say that an individual’s values
are determined by his or her culture.
144.
Critics of
ethical relativism often note that individuals and cultures seldom differ on
certain basic values: only their belief systems differ. In other words, there
are in fact universally held values, but individuals and cultures:
(a) are seldom if ever aware
of what those values are or how they are necessary for existence.
(b) disagree on how those
more or less universal values are implemented in practices.
(c) do not adopt sets of
moral values at all; if they did, all individuals and cultures would be
relativistic.
(d) cannot survive very long
unless they establish practices that differentiate themselves from others.
145.
From the fact
that cultures or individuals have different moral values, ethical relativists
often conclude that we should tolerate such differences and not impose our
values on others. But such a conclusion is unjustified because:
(a) it implies that all cultures ultimately share the same set
of moral values.
(b) it indicates how toleration cannot be a moral virtue in any
culture.
(c) it prevents the relativist from being able to identify the
boundaries of one=s culture or subculture.
(d) it commits the naturalistic fallacy, concluding that we
ought to tolerate based on the fact that we differ.
146.
Suppose one of my
moral values is intolerance of those whom I consider immoral, and I think it is
important to stop them from acting on their beliefs. Ethical relativists could
not justifiably criticize me because they would be:
(a) agreeing with me about
moral values and thus would have no grounds for criticizing me.
(b) assuming that if they
tolerated me, I would in turn tolerate them.
(c) imposing one of their
values (namely, toleration of others) on me.
(d) preventing me from
producing the greatest amount of happiness for the greatest number of people.
147.
Critics argue
that if moral relativism is correct, some beliefs and practices would not make
senseCspecifically:
(a) we could not hope to
resolve moral disputes, all toleration and criticism of moral beliefs would be
unjustified, and there could be no real moral reform or progress.
(b) we could not individually
make judgments about what we should or should not do, present arguments to
support our beliefs, or for that matter even have moral beliefs.
(c) we could not tolerate
people who have beliefs different from our own, we would have to force our
values on others, and any moral reform or progress would be purely private or
subjective.
(d) we could not reduce
suffering or consider the welfare of non-human beings as morally significant.
148.
[Which of the
following IS NOT a reason typically
proposed to explain why people endorse moral relativism?
(a) It is obvious that different cultures have
different beliefs; relativism is a proper response to ethnocentrism.
(b) There is ultimately only one right way to think
about morality, one fact of the matter that does not vary from person to
person: namely, relativism.
(c) Relativism is the only viable alternative to the
absolutist belief that there is only one moral standard.
(d) With the decline of religion, fewer people believe
that there is an objective set of beliefs or truths about what is right and
wrong.]
149.
Ethical
relativists often base their position on cultural value differences. Such a
strategy is flawed because:
(a) the subjective, personal
beliefs of an individual cannot be the basis for any moral theory.
(b) even though cultural
relativism is an absolutist position, it is not an objectivist position.
(c) the fact that moral
beliefs differ among cultures does not imply that moral beliefs ought to
differ.
(d) moral rules intended to
reduce suffering and promote human flourishing are adopted in all cultures.
150.
Suppose that human well-being is the correct standard
for evaluating ethical theories and judgments. Would this mean that we have to
reject the cultural relativist=s claim that each culture has a right to decide its
own values?
(a) No: no culture can impose its
values on any other culture, even if those values promote human well-being.
(b) No: all cultures are different in what they value
(indeed, that is what makes them different in the first place); so the
destruction of cultural differences would mean the end of cultures.
(c) Yes: but each culture would have to decide whether
Apromoting well-being@ for its
members is really what it wants.
(d) Yes: any culture that would not satisfy basic
material and social needs of all of its members would not be as good as it
should be.
151.
AEven if people have similar needs, sentiments,
emotions, and attitudes, there is still the question of whether these should or
should not be satisfied or accepted as legitimate.@ How is such a claim intended as a criticism of
personal or cultural relativism?
(a) The fact that people agree in their moral beliefs
does not make the beliefs justified or correct.
(b) Since people in different cultures hold different
beliefs, they try to satisfy their needs differently.
(c) Even if people agree on what they believe, it is
difficult (if not impossible) to get them to live according to what they
believe.
(d) Only those beliefs which have universal support
should be accepted as true.
152.
According to the
cultural or subjective relativist, the fact that moral values vary from culture
to culture or from individual to individual implies that no absolute or
objective moral standards should be applied to all people in all times or
cultures. The problem with this line of argument is that:
(a) it ignores the fact that
not all cultures and individuals respect and tolerate the rights and values of
others.
(b) it assumes that no set of
moral values can be the basis for behavior unless its absolute principles are
fixed and cannot be changed or modified.
(c) it commits the
naturalistic fallacy by reasoning from the fact that values differ to the claim
that people are morally justified in acting on their cultural or individual
beliefs.
(d) it endorses the logical positivist
claim that moral statements are neither analytic (true by definition) nor
synthetic (true by empirical observation).
153.
Relativists think
that if we recognize how moral values differ from individual to individual or
culture to culture, we will see that there is no neutral, objective, or
universal moral standard. From this they conclude that we should tolerate the value systems of others. But this conclusion seems to
contradict their fundamental belief because it:
(a) suggests that tolerating
different viewpoints has value only for relativists, not objectivists.
(b) assumes that all persons
universally ought to value
toleration, even those who do not actually do so.
(c) fails to indicate how
toleration can be a value only for consequentialists,
not deontologists.
(d) treats toleration as a
value that no one ought to adopt,
even though most individuals and cultures in fact do.
154.
Critics of
ethical relativism often note that cultures seldom differ on certain basic
values: only their belief systems differ. In other words:
(a) each culture determines
the basic values necessary for the culture=s
existence.
(b) no culture can exist very
long unless it establishes practices that distinguish it from others.
(c) prejudices within our own
society often determine our moral views.
(d) cultures differ in how
more or less universal values are implemented in practices.
155.
[According to
Plato, no one would choose to act immorally if he/she knew how acting immorally
is really not in his/her self-interest. But it is apparent that evil people
appear (at least on the surface) to benefit from their immorality. So how can
acting morally really be in one=s own self-interest? Plato=s answer:
(a) Immoral behavior may in fact be in one=s own self-interest; but morality is not immediately
concerned with the individual as much as with society.
(b) Harmonious integration of the parts of one=s personality is what makes someone truly happy and
constitutes human excellence and moral virtue.
(c) Since there is no objective moral standard (as the
ring of Gyges story shows), whatever someone believes
is in his or her self-interest is morally acceptable.
(d) Virtue is the ability to do what one does well, so
if someone is able to promote his or her self interest (even through
immorality), then that person is virtuous.]
156.
[For Plato,
acting morally benefits society at the same time as it promotes our own
self-interest because:
(a) those who are in power
determine morality depending on what they choose to believe benefits them.
(b) personal integrity (i.e.,
harmonizing the parts of our soul) is based on knowing our function in society.
(c) only the rulers (vs. law
enforcers or workers) can really be moral since only the rulers act on reason.
(d) morality is less concerned with doing what is
actually right than with doing what seems
to be right according to one=s society: that is what the Gyges
ring story is about.]
157.
[For most Greeks,
the question Awhy be moral?@ is much
more important than the question Awhat is
moral?@ Plato=s parallel between the parts of the soul and the parts
of society collapses the two questions into one by:
(a) showing why someone
should care about having an integrated personality or contributing to the
harmonious operation of society.
(b) understanding how ethics
is more concerned with intellectual judgments about actions and their
consequences, and less with moral motivation.
(c) recognizing that personal
morality has little or nothing to do with social morality; that is, one=s private moral judgments have no social parallels.
(d) indicating how the
judgments of society concerning who is happy and who is not should be used in
telling who is moral and who is not.]
158.
To say that Plato=s question AWhy be
moral?@ is not a moral, but rather a meta-ethical question
means that it is a question about:
(a) what makes certain actions moral or immoral.
(b) how individuals should or
should not be held responsible for the ways in which their consciences have
been formed.
(c) why someone should behave
in a certain way, even when he agrees it is a morally unacceptable way to act.
(d) why someone chooses to
act in ways that conflict with the recommendations of others.
159.
Epicurus says
that the pursuit of pleasure is good, but not all pleasures ought to be pursued
equally because:
(a) not everyone agrees that
beauty, prudence, honor, justice, courage, and knowledge are pleasurable.
(b) pain and pleasure is
always relative to the individual.
(c) even pleasures such as
courage and knowledge have as much pain associated with them as vain desires.
(d) some pleasures (e.g.,
satisfaction of vain desires) are associated with pain (e.g., disappointment).
160.
Epicurus proposes
that, even though decision-making should be based on the pursuit of pleasure,
not all pleasures ought to be pursued equally, because:
(a) pleasures are the
fulfillment of our desires; and insofar as we are determined by nature to
fulfill our desires, we must seek after pleasure.
(b) we ought not to get pleasure out of fulfilling certain
desires.
(c) we cannot make decisions
based on whether our actions produce pleasure without knowing beforehand
whether we are justified in doing so.
(d) simple pleasures (as
opposed to extreme pleasures) are easier to satisfy, less prone to
disappointment, and make us appreciate luxuries all the more.
161.
[Every time we
succeed in any endeavor, we experience pleasure in having accomplished our
goals. But what if our goals involve causing harm to oneself or to others?--Wouldn=t that indicate that the hedonistic pursuit of
pleasure is wrong and should not be the basis of a moral system? To this a
hedonist like Epicurus would reply:
(a) hedonism is not a way of
life or a way of deciding how to act morally; it is merely a way of thinking.
(b) if pursuing certain goals
causes someone pleasure, that is all that matters; how others are affected or
how they respond to the individual=s acts
is unimportant.
(c) hedonism recommends that
those kinds of endeavors that cause pain or unhappiness be avoided; it does not
say that any successful effort whatsoever is desirable.
(d) no one intentionally
pursues or should pursue pleasure for its own sake; we should avoid worrying
about morality as well.]
162.
Critics have
claimed that Hobbes= egoistic theory of human motivation (including his
denial that anyone can ever act in a purely altruistic way) is not properly a
scientific theory because it fails to fulfill Popper=s falsifiability criterion
for scientific theories. Specifically, in order for Hobbes= position to be considered a legitimate theory:
(a) it must be shown to be false.
(b) it would allow for the possibility that it could be false.
(c) it must be able to explain all behavior in terms of
self-interest.
(d) it would have to show how believing in the theory is in one=s self-interest.
163.
[Fatalism,
determinism, and egoism may explain experience but they cannot be considered
acceptable theories because they
violate the falsifiability criterion for legitimate
theorizing. They cannot be proven false because:
(a) such systems of belief are simply true, as the failure of
all attempted falsifications of them shows.
(b) people who believed in them would be determined by fate to
act always in their own self-interest.
(c) any attempt to falsify them would be explained in their
terms, supposedly confirming their truth.
(d) there are no explanations
of human behavior other than those proposed by these systems of belief.]
164.
If psychological
egoism is true, then no ethical system (including ethical egoism) is possible
because:
(a) ethics would then be
merely a means by which individuals impose their values on others--exactly as
Nietzsche says happens in Christianity.
(b) if we are determined to
act only in our self-interest, then it makes no sense to say we ought to act either in our self-interest
or, for that matter, in any other way either.
(c) psychological egoism is a
theory of why people are motivated to act morally, whereas ethical egoism is a
theory of how moral distinctions are determined.
(d) without some means to
decide which acts are morally good or bad, there is no way to explain why people
act the way they do.
165.
Ethical egoists
dismiss psychological egoism because (they say) psychological egoism undermines
the possibility for any ethical behavior by ignoring one of the basic
principles of ethical reasoning, namely:
(a) is implies ought.
(b) the end never justifies
the means.
(c) the naturalistic fallacy.
(d) ought implies can.
166.
Critics argue
that ethical egoism cannot resolve conflicts between parties pursuing their own
self-interests nor provide a dispassionate point of view from which an
impartial moral judgment can be made. Egoists respond that:
(a) completely impartial,
dispassionate judgments are impossible; it=s best
to appeal to self-interests.
(b) because our own
self-interests are always the same as others=, we
should promote their happiness first.
(c) only by developing all of
our capacities harmoniously can we overcome our pursuit of pleasures.
(d) the only Amoral point of view@ that
ultimately counts is that of the ideal observer, God.
167.
AAlways act in those kinds of ways that generally
produce the greatest amount of happiness.@ This
describes:
(a) act utilitarianism.
(b) ethical egoism.
(c) rule utilitarianism.
(d) hedonism.
168.
Bentham=s utilitarianism is different from J. S. Mill=s version in virtue of Mill=s emphasis on:
(a) the happiness of all
creatures affected by actions, versus the happiness experienced by humans.
(b) how actions done to
achieve happiness are in fact desired as opposed to being desirable.
(c) the concern for the qualitative character of happiness
versus simply the quantitative.
(d) the number of people
affected versus the intensity of pleasure experienced by those affected.
169.
If, as Mill
suggests, some pleasures are qualitatively better than others, pleasure itself
is not the sole criterion for deciding what is valuable (and thus morally
obligating). That criterion, he says, is decided by finding out:
(a) what competent judges
prefer.
(b) what duty requires of us.
(c) what we can universally
will without contradiction.
(d) what Bentham=s hedonic calculus would recommend.
170.
J. S. Mill argues
that some pleasures or happiness are qualitatively better than others. But,
critics claim, this means that a criterion that is more fundamental than
happiness could be used in making moral judgments, since:
(a) pleasures that are not
mixed with pain are better than those in which there is an element of pain.
(b) the criterion for
evaluating pleasures can be nothing other than how much happiness they give us.
(c) a qualitatively superior
form of pleasure would produce the greatest amount of happiness.
(d) the criterion for ranking
pleasures or happiness cannot be pleasure or happiness itself.
171.
Though J. S. Mill
agrees with Bentham that happiness is the goal of
ethical behavior, he points out that Ait is
better to be a human being dissatisfied than a pig satisfied.@ By this remark he indicates how:
(a) some kinds of happiness
are more desirable or valuable than others for social or cultural reasons.
(b) according to the
utilitarian principle, the greatest happiness is determined by the greatest
number.
(c) happiness ought to be desired (and thus is desirable) because people, in fact,
desire to be happy.
(d) uncultivated people are
as competent to judge what happiness is as are cultivated people.
172.
According to J.
S. Mill, AOf two pleasures, if there be one to which all or almost
all who have experience of both give a decided preference, that is the more
desirable pleasure.@ The decision about which pleasures are qualitatively
desirable should thus be made by those familiar with different kinds of
pleasures based on:
(a) whether the pleasures are
egoistic (benefiting only the individual) or altruistic (benefiting others).
(b) what those persons
generally desire.
(c) each person=s doing his or her moral duty.
(d) whether doing that which produces
happiness is also doing that which produces pleasure.
173.
[In deciding how
far we have to calculate the consequences of our actions, Mill says that the
utilitarian recommends that we should realistically consider only:
(a) the rules of desire determined by the person of practical
wisdom.
(b) those persons most likely to be affected by our actions.
(c) how our behavior follows necessarily from human nature
itself.
(d) the motive of the agent,
and not necessarily the consequences of our actions.]
174.
[Which of the
following IS NOT a typical argument
raised against utilitarian ethical theories?
(a) Utilitarianism permits treating individuals
unjustly if more happiness is produced by doing so.
(b) It is difficult (if not impossible) to compare and
calculate the happiness produced by alternative acts.
(c) Utilitarians are unaware
of the distinction between actual, foreseeable, and intended consequences.
(d) For utilitarians,
expediency is the fundamental moral principle: the ends justify the means.]
175.
Which of the
following IS NOT an objection
critics raise against the utilitarian use of happiness as a criterion for
making moral judgments?
(a) Happiness cannot be used as a criterion for
morality because no one makes moral judgments that way.
(b) There is no easy way to compare different types of
happiness to calculate the Agreatest amount.@
(c) Utilitarians cannot
calculate happiness because future consequences of actions are never fully
known.
(d) Utilitarianism rewards doing what is expedient,
even if it is unjust: the end justifies the means.
176.
One objection
raised against utilitarianism is that we can never know what we are morally
obliged to do since we can never know all the consequences of our actions. Mill
and other utilitarians reply to this by:
(a) pointing out that no moral theory is ever able to indicate
what we should not do.
(b) agreeing that we may not
know perfectly what the consequences will be, but we can determine them well
enough to know what to do.
(c) rejecting the claim: we,
in fact, can know all of the consequences of our actions if we investigate the
matter well enough.
(d) redefining Aconsequences@ so that
they are limited to what we intend to do and not to what actually happens.
177.
Some theorists
argue that the utilitarian claim that we are morally obligated to contribute to
famine relief ignores one central fact about human nature, namely, that we are
more inclined to help members of our own family or culture than others, and
therefore should not be expected to do what we are not inclined to do in the
first place. To this the utilitarian responds:
(a) taking care of those near
us produces more overall happiness than taking care of others.
(b) the amount of need in
some cultures is greater than in others; our own needs are greatest.
(c) while such feelings may be significant psychologically, they
are irrelevant morally.
(d) our moral obligations to
promote the happiness of our family, friends, and immediate culture are more
important than even obligations to protect the lives of others.
178.
One consequentialist argument against famine relief notes that
feeding famine victims is not our moral responsibility, because it causes more
harm than good insofar as it wastes our own resources, makes the starving more
dependent on us, and creates conditions for more famine in the future. Which of
the following IS NOT a response utilitarian supporters of famine relief would
typically give in return?
(a) Feeding both the starving and ourselves would
require us to become more efficient, knowledgeable, and industrious (all
beneficial effects).
(b) We have a responsibility to other human beings to
save them from starvation regardless of future consequences; after all, we do
not know what those consequences may be.
(c) In feeding the starving we can--indeed, we are morally
required to--demand that cultures receiving the food adopt farming and
distribution programs to prevent future famine.
(d) Recipients of food can be required to adopt social
changes (e.g., birth control programs) in order to support themselves and not
have to rely on others.
179.
Some critics of
utilitarianism have argued that injustices against minorities would be
permitted under utilitarian principles, since the violation of the rights of a
few might produce more overall happiness than respecting those rights. Utilitarians respond that, on the contrary, injustices
against minorities would not be encouraged under their principles, because:
(a) according to utilitarian principles, minorities have no
rights.
(b) if unjust practices became the rule in a society, there
would be more unhappiness.
(c) minorities do not
experience happiness and unhappiness in the same way as the majority of
society.
(d) calculation of the
greatest amount of happiness for the greatest number of people does not
necessarily have to include consideration of all members of a society.
180.
Act utilitarians point out that sometimes violating a moral
rule causes more happiness than following the rule. In such cases, they argue,
violating the rule is permitted:
(a) only if no other
violations of the rule occur again.
(b) as long as no one
affected by the action experiences any unhappiness.
(c) as long as the person=s intention or motive is to do his/her duty regardless
of the consequences.
(d) and even morally required
by the utilitarian principle itself.
181.
Act utilitarians say that we should always do that specific
action that produces the greatest happiness, even if this means violating moral
rules. Rule utilitarians challenge this, arguing that
we should follow moral rules even if we think that violating them would yield
better results, because:
(a) following moral rules
generally yields more overall happiness than the unhappiness created by
allowing for the rare exceptions to rules.
(b) we should not become
slaves to any moral rules; morality is a matter of personal choices.
(c) acting in general to
produce the greatest amount of happiness for the greatest number of people is
not always the morally right thing to do.
(d) even if we follow moral rules, we will always cause
unhappiness to someone.
182.
Critics sometimes
claim that, for utilitarianism, motive seems to have nothing to do with the
morality of an action. Mill responds to this by pointing out that:
(a) good consequences cannot
follow from an act done by someone with an evil motive.
(b) bad consequences often
follow from actions which are done with the best motives in mind.
(c) consequences determine
the morality of an action; the person=s motive
affects only our judgment of the person doing the act, not the act itself.
(d) the only way to determine
what motive I have in acting is to determine the consequences of my action.
183.
In reply to those
who object that utilitarianism permits lying if it produces happiness, J. S.
Mill responds in what is now called a rule utilitarian way: AAny, even unintentional deviation from truth weakens
the trustworthiness of human assertion, which is the principal support of all
social well-being, civilization, virtue, and everything on which human
happiness on the largest scale depends.@ Mill=s basic point is that:
(a) insignificant (Awhite@) lies sometimes do cause happiness, so they are
morally permissible.
(b) even occasional white
lies are immoral because they cause more harm than good in the long run.
(c) we would be morally
obligated to tell the truth even if, as a rule, it did not cause happiness.
(d) lying is immoral because
it generally causes unhappiness; but if someone who is qualified to judge the
difference between happiness and unhappiness approves the lie, it is OK.
184.
Rule utilitarians have argued that injustices against minorities
would be permitted under act utilitarian principles, since the violation of the
rights of a few might produce more overall happiness in certain situations than
respecting those rights. They argue that, by contrast, under rule
utilitarianism injustices against minorities would not be encouraged because:
(a) individuals and minorities have rights only in deontological
ethics, not in teleological ethics.
(b) rule utilitarianism indicates how to act in general, not how
to act in specific situations.
(c) if unjust practices
became the rule in a society, there would be more unhappiness.
(d) calculation of the
greatest amount of happiness for the greatest number of people does not
necessarily have to include consideration of all members of a society.
185.
Rule utilitarians argue that we should always do those things
that as a rule promote happiness. In a specific case where following the rules
would probably cause unhappiness, rule utilitarians
say:
(a) people follow rules that
promote their own happiness more than rules promoting general happiness.
(b) we should abide by rules
because it is our duty, not because of the consequences of following rules.
(c) the long-term effect of
violating moral rules would be more unhappiness, so we should follow the rule.
(d) we should follow rules in
specific cases only if happiness results; otherwise we should violate rules.
186.
Rule utilitarians argue that we should always do those things
that, as a rule, promote happiness. In specific cases where following the rules
would be unjust and cause unhappiness, rule utilitarians
point out that:
(a) any act of injustice will
cause someone unhappiness, and therefore violations of rules are still immoral.
(b) actual consequences of
our actions are often unforeseen, so we have to rely on the intended
consequences.
(c) exceptions can be built
into the rules to allow for occasional short-term injustice and long-term
happiness.
(d) the only people who can
make a judgment about what is just/unjust are those who know which actions
promote, as a rule, happiness.
187.
The deontological theory of ethics called
divine law theory is sometimes confused with natural law theory because both
often refer to God. But unlike in natural law theory, a person is, in fact,
morally obligated to act in a certain way under divine law theory:
(a) if he/she believes that it is what God commands.
(b) if God should require him/her to act in certain
ways.
(c) if acting in accord with
the person=s nature is morally correct.
(d) if God really does command
it, regardless of whether it conflicts with human nature.
188.
Divine command
theorists are often charged with circular reasoning, in that they say we ought
to do what God commands because he commands it, and (they claim) we know that
God=s commands are always good because:
(a)
God=s arbitrary acts of will are not intended to confirm
the faith of believers but to persuade skeptics.
(b) reason itself is a God-instilled inclination that cannot
fail to persuade non-believers.
(c) even though Scriptures conflict and sometimes need
interpretation, God=s real commands are clear.
(d) the very fact that God commands something makes it good.
189.
Divine command
theorists point out that every ethical theory must have two components: a
theory of value and a theory of obligation. In the case of divine command
theory, value is determined by:
(a) what God wills, and obligation is determined by God=s rewards and punishment.
(b)
God=s will that we be happy, and
obligation is determined by our acceptance of God=s will.
(c) our interpretation of God=s will,
and obligation is determined by social agreement with our interpretation.
(d) what we believe
God wills for us, and obligation is determined by what we know God wills for us.
190.
Critics of the
divine-command theory of ethics raise a number of objections against it. Which
of the following IS NOT one of those
objections?
(a) If God=s
command is the basis for determining what is moral, then it makes no sense to
say that God=s commands are good; that is, God=s commands are arbitrary.
(b) Because secular (non-religious) moral systems do
not provide a motive or reason for acting morally, they are able to identify what is moral in a way that the divine
command theory does not.
(c) Religion is not only unnecessary for morality but
is even a hindrance, because it creates false hopes and distracts people from
doing good things for one another for its own sake.
(d) Acting in a certain way simply because it is
required by God does not encourage people to see why they should do what they do, and in this sense religious ethics
is not as deep-seated as secular ethics.
191.
Stoics like Epictetus and Marcus Aurelius describe the good life in
terms of a rational understanding of the law of nature, because insofar as we
understand natural law:
(a) we can change nature to accommodate our interests.
(b) we can get pleasure out of the pure act of knowing.
(c) we can limit our desires to things within our control.
(d) we can remain indifferent about what we choose to do.
192.
[For the Stoic a
meaningful life is one in which she commits herself to do her duty, whatever it
might be. Limiting herself to doing her duty (regardless of what that entails)
means:
(a) recognizing how her freedom is limited by what she chooses
to desire.
(b) passively resigning
herself to accept whatever happens as out of her control and unaffected by her
action.
(c) committing herself with
all her power to take responsibility for what she does as her own.
(d) not caring what she does
or how she does it, as long as she thinks she won=t be
disappointed by taking unnecessary chances.]
193.
[Epictetus= Stoic claim that we should be happy with whatever
life offers us differs from Epicureanism in that:
(a) Epicureanism says that happiness consists in the
unrestrained pursuit of pleasure (hedonism), whereas Stoicism says that we can
achieve pleasure only by desiring things that will not disappoint us.
(b) Epicureanism says that life can be meaningful only
if we are happy (regardless of whether we satisfy our desires), but Stoicism
says that we can be happy only if we satisfy our desires.
(c) Epicureanism says that only those things that
benefit us can make us happy, whereas Stoicism says
only by doing things that benefit others can we be happy.
(d) Epicureanism says we should desire things that do
not disappoint us, whereas Stoicism says that we cannot be disappointed in life
if we limit our desires to what we control.]
194.
Which of the
following IS NOT one of Kant=s objections to consequentialist
ways of making moral decisions?
(a) Consequences are often out of our control, so the
morality of actions cannot be based on consequences.
(b) To think we have moral obligations at all is
merely the result of education or socialization.
(c) Opinions
differ on what happiness is, so we could never agree on the moral principles
for achieving it.
(d) Inasmuch as we are naturally determined to pursue
happiness, we cannot be morally obligated to do it.
195.
Kant claims that
moral obligation cannot be based on a Ahypothetical
imperative@ such as Aif you
want to be happy, then you must do X,@
because:
(a) a moral imperative or
command must be directed to a specific individual and require a specific
action.
(b) what people want to do is
never really connected with what they actually do.
(c) happiness can vary from
person to person, is often out of our reach, and is not a freely-desired goal.
(d) a good will acts for the sake of doing one=s duty (which is always to produce happiness however
it is defined).
196.
According to
Kant, virtuous actions are those that are done for the sake of doing one=s duty--which means acting for the right reason or
with the right motive or intention. Kant limits the discussion of the moral
character of actions to motives or intentions and does not consider
consequences crucial, because:
(a) the consequences are
often out of our control and are valued differently by different people.
(b) only those actions based on universalizable
motives are moral actions.
(c) moral decisions are conditioned by one=s culture and by how one is raised.
(d) every time someone acts,
he or she has a motive; but there are not always consequences to acts.
197.
According to
Kant, morality presumes that I, as a rational being, am able to do what is
morally right because it is morally
right. So, unless doing my duty is my motive in acting, my action is not
morally good, because:
(a) actions that are done
solely for the sake of doing my duty do not promote happiness as much as
actions done because they are morally right.
(b) acting with motives other than doing my duty--for
example, acting out of instinct, passion, or interest--is not universalizable and thus cannot be the basis for rational
behavior.
(c) if my motive in acting is
that I am willing to take responsibility for the consequences of my action,
then my action is morally good.
(d) sometimes doing my duty
conflicts with doing the right thing--especially when doing the right thing
involves acting in accord with my religious beliefs.
198.
For Kant, lying
is immoral because the maxim on which it is based (e.g., Alie when you think you can get away with it@) cannot be universalized without contradiction; for
if the maxim were universalized:
(a) no one could be trusted
to tell the truth, and there would be no way to distinguish truth-telling and
lying.
(b) everyone would tell the
truth, and that would be a world no one would be willing to live in.
(c) everyone would be under a
moral obligation to lie, and that in itself would be a contradiction.
(d) no one could act Afor the sake of doing his or her duty@ because to do so would treat people as means.
199.
According to
Kant, an action which has a motive or intention that cannot be successfully
universalized:
(a) might be moral or immoral, depending on the consequences of
the action.
(b) might be moral or
immoral, depending on whether the act is considered acceptable in the person=s society.
(c) is immoral.
(d) might be moral or
immoral, depending on whether the action is done freely.
200.
Kant claims that
I can determine whether all other rational beings are obligated to do what I am
obligated to do by trying to see whether:
(a) certain practices are
universally accepted throughout different cultures.
(b) other examples of my
action yield good consequences.
(c) the action would be
universally good for all individuals.
(d) the motive of my action
can be universalized without contradiction or without being unacceptable to
some people.
201.
For Kant, the
morality of an action is determined by our motive, and the only pure moral
motive is:
(a) doing that which we think
is going to produce the greatest amount of happiness for the most people.
(b) acting in a way that is
consistent with our religious beliefs and conscience.
(c) choosing to have as our
motive that which other people often actually have as their motive in acting.
(d) willing to do that which
all other rational beings could accept and will without contradiction.
202.
According to
Kant, acting morally means acting on an intention that a reasonable person
could will all persons to adopt as the motive for their actions. Critics claim
that this makes Kant a consequentialist, insofar as universalizability considers the consequences of everyone
acting that way. Kant rejects this by pointing out that:
(a) to say that an intention
must be universalizable does not mean that everyone=s intentions need to be considered, only the
intentions of those who are going to be affected by the action.
(b) the intended consequences of actions are often not the same as their actual consequences.
(c) intentions, not
consequences, identify moral actions; if an intention cannot be universalized
for any reason (including unacceptable consequences), it cannot be the basis
for a moral act.
(d) if people actually did
their moral duty, then the consequences of their doing so would be better than
if they only intended to do their
duty.
203.
Kant suggests
that the maxim upon which an action
is based, and not the individual action itself, is the key for determining
whether an action is morally good, because:
(a) a specific action is, by definition, not universalizable.
(b) our actions are always based on some maxim or other.
(c) without maxims we would not know what to do.
(d) our maxims are subjective
rules of behavior upon which actions are based.
204.
Kant argues that
acting in accord with duty does not make an action morally worthwhile; rather
it is acting for the sake of or
because it is one=s duty that makes the act morally worthy. By this
distinction he indicates how:
(a) actions that are done
freely are always morally good actions.
(b) the moral value of an action is determined by our motives,
not by the consequences of our actions.
(c) the consequences of our
actions might be good or bad depending on how much happiness is produced.
(d) acting in a
self-interested way differs from acting based on maxims.
205.
Which of the
following IS NOT an objection raised against Kant=s
ethical theory?
(a) Just because someone is concerned with promoting
happiness instead of doing his/her duty, that does not mean that his/her action
lacks moral value.
(b) Just because I am naturally inclined to pursue
happiness, that does not mean that I can=t act
from duty.
(c) Just because the exact consequences of actions are
unknown or are not in our complete control, that does
not mean that we are not responsible for or should not consider those
consequences.
(d) In moral dilemmas, rules often conflict; in such
cases, Kantian ethics is of no help.
206.
Critics of Kant
note that his focus on the universal rules adopted by rational agents ignores
how:
(a) the attempt to universalize practices creates rules, and the
existence of rules inhibits creativity.
(b) his moral rules are contrary to standard cultural practices
because they promote feminine values.
(c) we always control the consequences of our actions, and we
seldom know our motives in acting.
(d) our moral rules often conflict, and human beings are not
simply rational (universalizable) beings.
207.
[According to
Sartre=s existentialist ethics, moral judgments are not based
on any absolute foundation: we are responsible for the values we choose. He
argues that moral values established other than through human choice:
(a) contradict the principle on which the ability to make moral
distinctions is based.
(b) are immoral if the consequences are bad for us.
(c) in fact never are used by people (even mistakenly) to make
moral judgments.
(d) ought to be grounded in the will of God or in generally
accepted social practices.]
208.
[When Sartre says
that Athere is no human nature,@ what he means is that:
(a) as self-conscious beings, we can and do determine the kinds
of beings that we are.
(b) there can be no basis for
deciding between anguish and despair.
(c) human beings do not have
genetic characteristics that identify them biologically as members of a
species.
(d) existentialism can accept
the existence of God only as the a priori foundation of ethical judgments.]
209.
[Sartre claims
that, for human beings, Aexistence precedes essence@; in other words:
(a) when human beings are rational, they fulfill their essence
of being human.
(b) human beings are
essentially determined to exist according to certain God-given directives.
(c) human beings are free to choose even not to act in any way
whatsoever.
(d) human beings are
condemned to be free and to become anything they choose through their actions.]
210.
[If, as Sartre=s existentialism claims, Aman is responsible for his passion,@ then no matter what we as human beings do, we do it:
(a) against our wills.
(b) without thought.
(c) freely.
(d) out of scorn for God.]
211.
[Existentialism
differs from Stoicism concerning our choice of values. The Stoic says we should
care about doing our duty; but what that duty is is
ultimately due to nature. Here the existentialist would object, claiming:
(a) nature restricts our
choices, but we still have an effect on human values by the choices we make.
(b) nature has meaning only
because we consider it valuable, but our choices are not determined by it.
(c) the brute facticity of nature limits our choices and actions so much
that freedom is an illusion.
(d) nature determines our
choices and duties but it does not force us to act according to them.]
212.
[Nietzsche argues
that the task of true morality is to indicate how human beings, as part of
nature, can move Abeyond good and evil@ by
means of the attempt to:
(a) overcome and gradually do
away with our natural inclinations of aggression and struggle.
(b) show our nobility through
self-restraint and compassion for the less fortunate.
(c) accept tolerantly our own
weaknesses as indications of our place within God=s plan.
(d) make moral distinctions
the explicit products of the exercise of human will.]
213.
[According to
Nietzsche, members of the herd endorse the slave values of sympathy, kindness,
and the Acommon@ good because:
(a) they feel that they
should be treated kindly and compassionately since they are not responsible for
their lack of power.
(b) they believe that, if
they treat the master-morality overmen kindly, those
noble individuals will not harm them.
(c) they fear that a lack of
sympathy or kindness, or failure to consider the common good, will cause the
men of nobility to feel threatened by them.
(d) they prefer following God=s will rather than struggling against it (like the overmen are constantly having to do).]
214.
[Critics of
morality (e.g., Callicles or Nietzsche) argue that
recommending that people act morally (that is, with self-restraint, moderation,
or concern for others) is itself an attempt by Acommon@ people to impose their will on their superiors. They
conclude, therefore, that doing something because
it is moral makes no sense, since:
(a) even common people admit
that no one should act morally unless it produces happiness for him or her.
(b) only a personality that
harmonizes the competing interests of reason, emotion, and appetite is moral.
(c) the Aall too human@ values
of ordinary people do not provide any guidance for how people should act.
(d) that would require us to
affirm our power to decide values by restricting that power.]
215.
[The Afirst principle@ of
Nietzsche=s version of humanism is this: AThe weak and the failures shall perish. They ought even to be helped to perish. What is more harmful than
vice?--Practical sympathy and pity for all the failures and all the weak:
Christianity.@ In Nietzsche=s
trans-valuation of humanism, Christianity is:
(a) Nietzsche=s
attempt to reintroduce values into his theory of the will to power.
(b) an afterlife project that
Nietzsche endorses as promoting the overman.
(c) the means by which noble
aims filter down from masters to slaves.
(d) that which frustrates the
prospects of human advancement.]
216.
[Nietzsche claims
that Abecause life is precisely Will to Power,@ the attempt to bend all wills to a common good,
avoiding violence and exploitation in order to achieve peace in society, is:
(a) Athe fundamental principle of society@ and the necessary means for the development of all life.
(b) the goal of the noble
class.
(c) Athe Will to the denial of life,@ which itself invites dissolution and decay.
(d) the dark night of
barbarism in which Aall who are born after us belong to a higher history
than any history hitherto.@]
217.
[According to
Nietzsche, everything that exists or happens is an expression of the will to
powerCeven the resentment of weak people toward creative,
self-determining individuals. What Nietzsche objects to about Aslave@ resentment is not its effort but rather:
(a) its unwillingness to
acknowledge itself as the active source of its values.
(b) its ability to destroy
the will to power by promoting values of passivity and weakness.
(c) its willingness to think
that the will to power is more important than the will to truth.
(d) its inability to free
itself from the external forces that determine it to say ANo@ to creativity.]
218.
[Nietzsche=s critique of Aslave
morality@ includes an attack on the belief in the existence of
God, because as long as God exists:
(a) human beings will
continue to experience guilt for their failing to live up to God=s call for them to improve themselves in accord with
His law.
(b) human beings will always
have someone to fall back on and blame for their failings, rather than take
responsibility for their destiny.
(c) there will always be the
possibility that God could aid the individuals of the slave or herd mentality
against the noble individual (the overman).
(d) there is always the
possibility that God may bring peace to the world and thus destroy the need for
the overman.]
219.
Anti-foundationalists (AFs) reject
both teleological and deontological ethical theorizing because they (AFs):
(a) deny that there is any
one set of values, practices, or principles that should guide our moral
decisions.
(b) think that teleological
and deontological theories ultimately do not appeal to any moral principles.
(c) agree with logical
positivists: moral judgments are merely expressions of feeling or emotion.
(d) deny that anyone can
justifiably make a moral decision that is not always already self-interested.
220.
Moral virtue, for
Aristotle, entails acting in accord with the dictates of reason as determined
by:
(a) an objective, shared
standard of right and wrong equally applicable to all people.
(b) a mean or point of moderation
between the extremes of morally good and morally evil behavior.
(c) the mean or point of
moderation between the extremes of possible alternative ways of acting.
(d) the denial of one=s own interests in favor of the good of one=s community.
221.
According to
Aristotle, a happy life is a life of virtue, one in which the individual
contributes to the good of his or her community and is respected for such
contributions. A morally good person is thus someone who:
(a) appreciates how moral
values vary from culture to culture and from individual to individual.
(b) recognizes how his or her
own well-being is intimately linked to the good of the community.
(c) can live a life of
moderation without having to be sensitive to or involved in social or civic
affairs.
(d) contemplates philosophical principles in order to understand
the truths of nature.
222.
For Aristotle, AMoral states are the results of activities like the
states themselves. It is our duty, therefore, to keep a certain character in
our activities, since our moral states depend on the differences in our
activities.@ This Acertain character@ is:
(a) activity in accordance
with reason (i.e., sensitive to the social and personal dimensions of human
existence).
(b) the point at which the
individual=s Agolden mean@ rule
cancels out the society=s own definition of Amoderation.@
(c) neither excess nor
deficiency, but rather the alternation of the two (where one takes over
sometimes, and the other at other times).
(d) the point of moderation in action between virtue
and vice, the individual=s good as opposed to the social definition of the
good.
223.
Which of the
following characterizes Aristotle=s view
of ethical behavior?
(a) AOne should act so as to produce the greatest amount of
happiness for the greatest number of people.@
(b) ARefrain from harming living things, from taking what
is not given, from misusing the senses.@
(c) AVirtue is a habit or acquired ability to choose what
is moderate or the mean as determined by reason.@
(d) AAlways treat humanity, whether in yourself or others,
as an end and never merely as a means.@
224.
Virtue ethics and
feminist ethics are often understood as challenges to ethical theorizing,
because instead of discussing morality in terms of rules or principles, such
anti-foundationalist approaches focus on:
(a) denying the distinction
between moral acts/judgments and the rules/principles on which they are based.
(b) developing a good
character and maintaining personal relationships.
(c) the actual consequences
of our actions instead of the consequences most people would predict.
(d) what nature itself
necessitates rather than what duty and the principle of double effect require.
225.
Feminists (e.g.,
Gilligan, Noddings) note that while male-oriented
moral theories emphasize abstract principles, justice, and impartiality,
feminist morality focuses on how ethics should be more concerned with:
(a) calculating the consequences of our actions.
(b) acting in ways for which
we take responsibility.
(c) caring for persons in
specific situations.
(d) doing our duty,
regardless of consequences.
226.
[AMy thesis about traditional ethics is this: (1) The focus and direction of traditional ethics, indeed its
function, has not been individual integrity and agency (ability to make choices
and act) but rather social organization and control. (2) The values around
which traditional ethics revolves are antagonistic, the values of dominance and
subordination. As a result, (3) traditional ethics undermines rather than
promotes individual moral ability and agency. And (4) these aspects of
traditional ethics combine to legitimize oppression by redefining it as social
organization. Appeal to rules and principles is at the
heart of this endeavor.@ In this passage:
(a) Sarah Hoagland shows how male-dominated ethics
emphasizes competing interests, sacrifice and compromise, and duty instead of
caring.
(b) Plato points out how totalitarian political
systems value traditions more highly when those traditions focus on domination
and oppression.
(c) Kant portrays ethical values as products of the
antagonism between those who emphasize motives and those who emphasize
consequences.
(d) Ayn Rand expresses
disappointment in ethical systems that value the rights of the individual over
the rights of the State.]
227.
Feminists have
argued that the emphasis of virtue ethics on making moral judgments on a
case-by-case basis is more in keeping with the spirit of morality than
(masculine) emphases on abstract principles of justice, because:
(a) virtue requires that we
make moral judgments without considering the circumstances or situations.
(b) morality is about doing
what is right, which means doing that which can be defended universally.
(c) ethics should be about
doing our duty, which (as Kant notes) varies from person to person.
(d) a full life balances
reason and the emotional particularities of caring for others and our
relationships.
228.
[Progress through
the feminine stages of knowing described by Mary Field Belenky
and others is marked, in part, by a movement from subjective experience and
intuition through a stage of shared experience and empathy. Though this latter
stage includes intuition, it is considered just as objective as masculine proof
strategies, since:
(a) it relies on
communication with others to determine whether one=s personal feelings are justified.
(b) it, like masculine
strategies of reasoning, begins with accepting the testimony of experts as the
truth.
(c) it, like the masculine
model, acknowledges that rationality and knowledge are ultimately subjective.
(d) it emphasizes objective
logic and reasoning instead of emotion, feeling, or personal experience.]
229.
Masculine and
feminine models of thinking differ about the importance of an individual=s intuition.
In the masculine model, knowledge is abstract and universal: individual intuition
is either merely an example of
general knowledge or a threat to it. But in the feminine model, individual
intuition is necessary because knowledge
is:
(a) arrived at only after
critically examining the facts and discarding irrelevant personal testimony.
(b) inherently and
unavoidably a product of insights and feelings shared by individuals with one
another.
(c) based on what an
individual learns from authorities, tradition, or his or her society.
(d) whatever an individual
personally feels is correct, regardless of what others may say or feel.
230.
According to
Carol Gilligan, feminine ways of thinking about moral decisions are based on an
Aethics of care@ rather
than (male) impersonal, abstract principles. That is, women think of ethical
situations:
(a) as opportunities to deny that there is any right
or wrong way to act and to show how the very act of making ethical distinctions
is itself a form of male domination.
(b) as opportunities to
replace so-called universal abstract
principles of ethical judgment with more specific abstract principles (e.g.,
principles that apply only to one=s
culture).
(c) not as questions with
true or false answers, but as conflicts that need to be resolved in order to
maintain stable interpersonal relationships.
(d) not as gender (masculine-feminine)
conflicts, but as problems that can be solved by calculating the foreseen
consequences for those affected by actions.
231.
According to the
(feminist) ethics of care, emotional involvement and sensitivity to the
differing needs of other people in different situations are necessary elements
in making objective moral judgments
because:
(a) morality is based on
nothing more than how each individual feels about things.
(b) sensitivity and caring
are subjective expressions of rational, objective, unemotional ways of
thinking.
(c) particular needs and
situations seem to differ, but they are similar enough for general moral
judgments.
(d) without sympathetic,
emotional involvement, we cannot understand exactly what action occurs or why
it is done.
232.
Critics of
feminist ethics point out that, while an ethics of care might sound nice, it is
less useful than an ethics of justice for addressing problems generated in
modern Western societies. To this criticism, feminists reply that:
(a) without being able to
rely on traditional ethical theories (e.g., utilitarianism, Kantian duty
ethics), we would not know how to make moral decisions.
(b) social practices should
focus on cultivating relations with others rather than encouraging competition
and self-interested individualism.
(c) marketplace competition
and rational self-interested behavior are matters of economic and political
concern and are thus not issues that are of ethical significance.
(d) being responsible for or
caring for others in our society is best accomplished by encouraging
competition and self-interested individualism.
Answers: [Items
in brackets not covered in 2005 course or text.]
1.
A 2.
A 3.
B 4.
B 5.
B 6.
B 7.
B 8.
A 9.
A 10. A 11. A 12. A 13. A 14. A 15. A 16. B 17. B 18. B 19. A 20. B 21. [B] 22. [A] 23. [A] 24. [B] 25. [A] 26. [A] 27. [A] 28. [B] 29. [A] 30. [A] |
31. [B] 32. B 33. A 34. A 35. A 36. A 37. A 38. [A] 39. [B] 40. B 41. A 42. A 43. B 44. B 45. B 46. A 47. A 48. A 49. B 50. A 51. A 52. A 53. B 54. A 55. A 56. B 57. B 58. A 59. B 60. A |
61. A 62. B 63. B 64. B 65. B 66. A 67. A 68. B 69. A 70. B 71. A 72. B 73. B 74. A 75. B 76. A 77. A 78. B 79. B 80. B 81. B 82. A 83. A 84. A 85. B 86. A 87. B 88. B 89. A 90. B |
91. A 92. A 93. B 94. A 95. A 96. A 97. B 98. [A] 99. A 100. [A] 101. [A] 102. [A] 103. [A] 104. [A] 105. [B] 106. [A] 107. [B] 108. [A] 109. [B] 110. [B] 111. [A] 112. [B] 113. [B] 114. [B] 115. [A] 116. A 117. B 118. B 119. B 120. B |
121. A 122. A 123. B 124. A 125. [A] 126. B 127. B 128. [B] 129. [B] 130. A 131. C 132. D 133. B 134. A 135. B 136. B 137. D 138. B 139. C 140. D 141. C 142. C 143. C 144. B 145. D 146. C 147. A 148. [B] 149. C 150. D |
151. A 152. C 153. B 154. D 155. [B] 156. [B] 157. [A] 158. C 159. D 160. D 161. [C] 162. B 163. [C] 164. B 165. D 166. A 167. C 168. C 169. A 170. D 171. A 172. B 173. [B] 174. [C] 175. A 176. B 177. C 178. B 179. B 180. D |
181. A 182. C 183. B 184. C 185. C 186. B 187. D 188. D 189. A 190. B 191. C 192. [C] 193. [D] 194. B 195. C 196. A 197. B 198. A 199. C 200. D 201. D 202. C 203. A 204. B 205. B 206. D 207. [A] 208. [A] 209. [D] 210. [C] |
211. [B] 212. [D] 213. [A] 214. [D] 215. [D] 216. [C] 217. [A] 218. [B] 219. A 220. C 221. B 222. A 223. C 224. B 225. C 226. [A] 227. D 228. [A] 229. B 230. C 231. D 232. B |