Past Test Questions: Ethics
Answers at end. Because these questions draw on different textbooks and topics covered in different semesters, not all of them apply to any particular course in a semester.
True/False
(True=A, False=B)
1.
Even
though
questions about ethics, social-political philosophy, aesthetics, and
the
meaning of life deal with different areas of philosophy, they are all
issues
addressed in "value theory."
2.
To
the extent
that ethics, political philosophy, and aesthetics raise questions about
judgments relating to value, they are concerned with axiology.
3.
Ethics
describes
how each person's background
and upbringing affects his or her beliefs
about moral issues.
4.
The
philosophical
attempt of ethics to provide a standard for evaluating laws, religions,
customs, and individual preferences is itself based on each philosopher's personal
values.
5.
Because
ethics
studies moral values and obligations, it is concerned with consequences
of
action, not motives.
6.
Ethical
relativists claim that cultures ultimately share the same basic ethical
principles.
7.
Ethical
relativists claim that even though cultures seem to differ on ethical
standards, they ultimately share the same basic ethical
principle--namely,
moral goodness is that which produces happiness.
8.
Ethical
relativists argue that, because all moral values are relative to
cultural or
individual choice, no universally valid moral principles hold for all
human beings.
9.
For
the cultural
relativist, if a moral code of a society says that a certain action is
right,
it is right (at least within that society).
10.
According
to the
cultural relativist, what people believe about morality depends on the
culture
in which they live.
11.
Cultural
relativism commits the "naturalistic
fallacy" to the
extent that it assumes that, because cultures differ about moral
judgments,
they are justified in holding their
beliefs.
12.
Ethical
theories
fall into a naturalistic fallacy when
they derive moral obligations ("should" or "ought") from factual
states ("is").
13.
To
say "because people
seek happiness, they ought to seek happiness" is to commit
the naturalistic fallacy.
14.
According
to
conventional ethical relativism, we should tolerate the values of other
cultures because there is no independent basis for criticizing those
values.
15.
According
to
ethical subjectivists, moral values are based solely on an
individual's beliefs.
16.
An
ethical
relativist cannot be a moral objectivist.
17.
"Objective" moral
values are absolute values only when they apply (and are thus limited)
to a
person or culture.
18.
Ethical
absolutists argue that, because all
moral values are relative to cultural or individual choice, no
universally
valid moral principles hold for all human beings.
19.
It is
impossible
for an ethical absolutist to be a moral relativist.
20.
If
moral
objectivism is true, then homosexuality must be morally wrong.
21.
According
to
Socrates and Plato, we should act virtuously for the sake of others,
regardless
of whether acting morally improves our ability to discern what is good
or to
control our passions.
22.
According
to
Socrates and Plato, we can be truly happy only if we allow our reason
or
intellect to guide our emotions and appetites.
23.
According
to
Socrates, because an immoral person is unable to integrate the various
parts of
his/her character or personality, he or she cannot really be happy.
24.
According
to
Socrates and Plato, even though an immoral person is unable to
integrate the
various parts of his/her character or personality, he or she can still
really
be happy.
25.
The
characters
in Plato's Republic
appeal to the story of the ring of Gyges
to make the
point that only a fool would act morally if he or she could get away
with
acting immorally.
26.
According
to Plato,
immoral people cannot really be happy because they are unable to
integrate or
harmonize the various parts of their character or personality.
27.
In
responding to
the story of the ring of Gyges, Plato
argues that
immorality can never be in someone's ultimate
self-interest because immoral people are never truly happy.
28.
In
Plato's theory of the
state, justice is ultimately achieved
when the ruling class is able to do away with social inequalities by
driving
the military and working classes out of society.
29.
For
Plato, the
moral balance or harmony of the three parts of the soul is parallel to
the
condition of political harmony one must seek in the state.
30.
According
to
Plato, the soul achieves balance or harmony only when reason controls
both the
spirited (or courageous) part of the soul and the soul's appetites.
31.
According
to
Plato, moral goodness is achieved by eliminating the activities of the
lower
parts of the soul and acting solely on the basis of reason.
32.
In
contrast to consequentialist ethics,
teleological ethics emphasizes the
individual's happiness, not society's.
33.
Teleological
theories of ethics determine the moral value of actions in terms of
their
consequences.
34.
In
Epicurus' hedonism,
moral decisions should be based on whether
actions produce pleasure and avoid pain.
35.
According
to the
hedonist Epicurus, we are under a moral obligation to pursue pleasures
that are
not mixed with pain (e.g., beauty), to satisfy our natural desires
(e.g.,
food), and to avoid vain desires (e.g., fame).
36.
Hedonism
is a
form of teleological ethical theory because it recommends that we act
to
produce happiness (pleasure) as the consequence of our actions.
37.
The
egoistic
hedonist says that, if producing the greatest amount of pleasure for
ourselves
means that we have to take into account the pleasure of others, then we
are
under a moral obligation to do so.
38.
If
psychological
egoism is true, then no ethical position (including ethical egoism) is
possible.
39.
To
say that
egoism is non-falsifiable (and thus not a legitimate philosophical
theory)
means that it is impossible for everyone to be an egoist.
40.
Because
ethical
egoism claims that we are incapable of doing anything other than
promoting our
self-interests, it violates the moral dictum "ought
implies can."
41.
According
to
Hobbes' version of
ethical egoism, since we always act so as
to promote what we think is in our own self-interest, it makes no sense
to say
that we ought to do anything other
than that.
42.
To
say that "ought implies can" means
that a person can be under a moral obligation to do something only if
that
person is physically able to do otherwise.
43.
"Ought implies can"
summarizes the moral principle that if someone is physically able to do
an
action, he or she is morally obligated to do it.
44.
Because
ethical egoism
is concerned only with the pleasure or happiness of the person doing
the
action, it is not a form of teleological
ethics.
45.
The
ethical
egoist says that, since it is impossible for us to do anything other
than
promote our own self-interest, it is pointless for us to develop a
moral theory
that indicates what we "ought" to do.
46.
For
the
utilitarian, the whole purpose of ethics and virtuous behavior is the
production and increase of happiness.
47.
According
to the
utilitarian principle of morality, one should always act
so as to produce the greatest overall and long-term
amount of happiness for the greatest number of people.
48.
Utilitarians claim that actions have value and thus are
morally
good insofar as they produce happiness (good consequences) for the
greatest
number of people.
49.
Since
utilitarianism is really a form of social hedonism, it cannot be
considered as
a consequentialist theory of morality.
50.
Like
egoism,
utilitarianism is a form of teleological ethics because it emphasizes
using
consequences as the basis for determining the morality of actions.
51.
Though
both
Epicurus and Bentham agree that we should
do that
which produces pleasure or happiness, they differ on whose pleasure or
happiness should be taken into account.
52.
Although
Bentham and Mill differ on how to calculate
happiness, they
are both utilitarians because, for them,
good actions
are those that produce the greatest amount of happiness for the
greatest number
of people.
53.
Because
Bentham's hedonic
calculus does not consider the pleasures or pains that other people
experience as a result of a person's
action, it is more egoistic than Mill's
version of utilitarianism.
54.
According
to
Mill, the proof that happiness is good (and thus desirable) is that
human
beings desire it.
55.
John
Stuart Mill claims that what makes happiness desirable (and thus the
basis for
what ought to be desired) is the fact that happiness is
desired.
56.
According
to J.
S. Mill, we should focus on the quality
of happiness produced by acts and ignore the quantity.
57.
According
to J.
S. Mill, the quantity (as opposed to
the quality) of pleasures is
determined by how well those pleasures enhance human fulfillment and
well-being.
58.
According
to
Mill, the decision about which pleasures are qualitatively desirable
should be
made by people familiar with different kinds of pleasures based on what
they
generally desire.
59.
Utilitarians argue that, because all moral values are
relative to
cultural or individual choice, no universally valid moral principles
hold for
all human beings.
60.
Act utilitarians point out that, because violating a
moral rule
sometimes causes more happiness than following the rule, we are not
only allowed to violate the rule, but in that
instance we are morally obligated to
violate it.
61.
Rule utilitarians claim that we should follow moral
rules even
if we think that violating them would yield better results, because
following
moral rules generally yields more overall happiness.
62.
Utilitarianism
is
a form of deontological ethics because it uses consequences to
determine the
morality of acts.
63.
Teleological
ethical theories characterize moral obligation in terms of categorical
rather than hypothetical
imperatives.
64.
A
deontological
ethical theory is one that makes judgments about the morality of
actions based
on the ends, purposes, or consequences of the actions.
65.
In
deontological
ethical theories, morality is simply a means to achieve what is previously or independently identified
as good
or valuable.
66.
In
deontological
ethical theories, moral goodness is defined as doing what we are
obligated to
do (our duty).
67.
Divine-command
ethical theorists claim that what makes actions moral or immoral is God's command that
we act or refrain from acting in
certain ways.
68.
Critics
of the
divine command theory of ethics point out that, because it is not
persuasive
for atheists and agnostics, it cannot be considered an example of a
deontological theory.
69.
In
Stoic ethics,
our moral duty is to act in accord with nature and restrain our desires
to what
nature dictates.
70.
A
person who has
a moral obligation to do something is not physically able or free to do
anything else.
71.
According
to
Kant, "heteronomy" is
allowing someone or something other than oneself (e.g., God, our
natural desire
for happiness) to decide the moral laws that one will follow.
72.
Kant
rejects all
forms of hypothetical imperatives because (he claims) no rational agent
can
ever be obligated to act morally.
73.
Kant
claims that
moral obligation cannot be based on a "hypothetical imperative" such
as "if you want to be happy, then you must do X," because what people
want to do is never really connected with what they actually do.
74.
According
to
Kant, morality presumes that I, as a rational being, am able to do what
is
morally right because it is morally
right.
75.
Kant
claims that
an act is morally good if it is one's duty
to do it--even if it is
not done because it is one's duty.
76.
According
to
Kant, my actions are morally good only if my motives or intentions in
so acting
are for the sake of or because it is
my duty to act in those
ways.
77.
According
to
Kant, before we can decide what is morally valuable,
we must decide what we are obligated
to do.
78.
Kant's categorical imperative states that we
should always act for the sake of doing our duty except
when doing our duty conflicts with deeply held personal or
religious values.
79.
For
Kant, the only
time someone is morally permitted to act contrary to the dictates of a
moral
law is when such a universalizable maxim
comes into
conflict with one's deeply held
religious beliefs.
80.
To
act
virtuously, Kant argues, means to act for the sake of doing one's duty--even if that
means going against one's religious
beliefs.
81.
Because
the
categorical imperative does not admit of any exceptions, Kant concludes
that it
is impossible for anyone to do anything that would violate it.
82.
Even
though the
categorical imperative does not admit of any exceptions, Kant
acknowledges that
it is possible for people to violate it (that is, to be immoral).
83.
In
Kantian
ethics, "ought implies can" refers
to the claim that no one can be morally obligated to do something
unless he or
she is able to do it.
84.
"Ought implies can" means
that someone is morally responsible only for those actions that he/she
is able
to do.
85.
"Ought implies can"
summarizes the moral principle that if someone is physically able to do
an
action (e.g., kill someone), he or she is morally obligated to do it.
86.
To
say that a
moral imperative is categorical means
(for Kant) that the demand should be obeyed without exception,
regardless of
the negative consequences of acting on it.
87.
From
Kant's perspective,
utilitarian consequentialism
assumes that ethical reasoning is and should be based on a categorical
(rather
than a hypothetical) imperative.
88.
According
to
Kant, an action which has a motive or intention that cannot be
successfully
universalized might be moral or immoral depending on whether the action
is done
freely.
89.
According
to
Kant, I can be morally obligated to do an action only if everyone else
in the
same type of situation is likewise obligated.
90.
A
maxim is a
subjective principle of action or working rule which, according to
Kant, we are
morally bound or obligated to obey.
91.
According
to
Kant, a good will is a will to do what we are morally obligated to do
(that is,
our duty) regardless of the
consequences.
92.
For
Kant, I
determine whether I am morally obligated to act a certain way by seeing
whether
the motive of my action can be universalized without contradiction or
without
being unacceptable to me and others.
93.
According
to
Kant, we should treat people as ends-in-themselves (and never as means
alone)
because of the good consequences of doing so.
94.
Kant
notes that
we should respect moral agents as ends in themselves because of their
ability
to act simply for the sake of doing their duty.
95.
For
Buddhists,
the aim of moral behavior is personal enlightenment but not an enhanced
sense
of individuality.
96.
In
Buddhist
ethics, patience and moderation help us see ourselves and others as
tied
together in the universe.
97.
Buddhism
is a
form of ethical egoism because it recommends that we always act with an
aim to
achieving happiness through personal enlightenment rather than by
merely
following moral rules.
98.
According
to
Hume and Moore, ethical theories fall into a naturalistic
fallacy when they derive moral obligations ("should" or "ought") from factual
states ("is").
99.
Utilitarians commit a "naturalistic
fallacy" by thinking
that certain behavior is morally
desirable because it has consequences that are desired.
100.
According
to emotivism (or "positivism"), value
judgments are simply expressions of positive or negative feelings about
something
and thus are neither true nor false.
101.
According
to logical positivists, ethical judgments
are meaningful (and thus can be justified) because they describe a fact
about
the world--namely, certain actions produce happiness and ought to be
done.
102.
For
Sartre, individuals who use God’s will to
determine good and evil s the standard for morality adopt for which
they are
not responsible and for which they are not accountable.
103.
According
to Sartre, every time I do something, I
identify that kind of action as a standard of morality for all human
beings.
104.
According
to Sartre, nothing that a human being does,
not even acting in "bad faith," allows
that person to transcend human subjectivity.
105.
According
to existentialist ethics, because there is
no absolute foundation upon which moral judgments are based, we cannot
justifiably be held responsible for our choice of any set of values.
106.
Moral
systems--even
those that value humility and passivity--are
expressions (Nietzsche maintains) of the will to power, the will to
overcome.
107.
Even
though Nietzsche suggests that all reality is
interpreted, he does not claim that truth itself is an expression of
the will
to power.
108.
According
to Nietzsche, moral systems are attempts by
the masses of weak people to keep strong individuals from exercising
their
creativity and passion.
109.
For
Nietzsche, because morality is an expression of a
slave mentality, no creative ("master") individual
can really be called excellent,
honorable, or noble.
110.
Nietzsche
claims that those who adopt the master
morality promote the common good and peace in society in order to
develop all
forms of life as expressions of the will to power.
111.
Nietzsche
rejects utilitarianism because it gives
equal value to all individuals, even those who do not deserve it.
112.
Nietzsche
rejects moral theories such as Christian,
utilitarian, and Kantian ethics because they fail to treat all human
beings as
essentially equal.
113.
Nietzsche
claims that religion stands in the way of
true human development to the extent that religious beliefs prevent us
from
making the authentic commitment to God necesssary
for
true salvation.
114.
Because
anti-foundationalists reject the view that
moral judgments
should be made on unchanging, abstract principles, they claim that
there is no
way to determine the morality of actions.
115.
According
to Aristotle, because moral virtues are
habits, they cannot be taught but only learned in living according to
them.
116.
According
to Aristotle, in a good or happy life
someone is able to fulfill himself or herself through behavior that
combines
moderation, good fortune, and wisdom.
117.
In
Aristotle's virtue
ethics, the golden mean is the
abstract, unchanging foundation on which we make moral judgments by
calculating
the point of moderation between virtue and vice.
118.
The
golden mean, for Aristotle, is the mid-point
between pursuing happiness and doing one's duty.
119.
According
to Aristotle, because happiness is not only
the goal of all human beings but also defined by anyone as he/she sees
fit,
there is no ultimate standard of ethics.
120.
In
Aristotle's virtue
ethics, moral value is a purely private matter, unconnected to how
people
interact with others in the community.
121.
For
Aristotle, morality is not simply a private or
personal matter: it also involves the social dimensions of life.
122.
According
to virtue ethics, moral behavior is not an indifferent
application of abstract principles but a balance of reason and
emotional
sensitivity.
123.
According
to Carol Gilligan, the ethic of care
characteristic of feminist ways of thinking emphasizes the obligation
not to
interfere in the lives of others.
124.
Feminine
moral development, according to Carol
Gilligan, occurs as a person moves from (1) caring only for herself,
through
(2) caring for others, to (3) adopting care as a universal moral
principle.
125.
Sarah
Hoagland argues that male-dominated ethics
emphasizes competing interests, sacrifice, compromise, and duty instead
of
caring.
126.
Feminist
ethicists argue that abortion and euthanasia
are always morally justified, because whatever a person decides for
herself is
more important than any other consideration.
127.
Drawing
on insights like those developed in ancient
Greek virtue ethics, feminists point out that the aim of ethics should
be to
protect individual rights and to treat everyone in the same impartial,
just
way.
128.
Natural-law
ethics and virtue ethics cannot provide
any insights into how to handle situations regarding abortion or
euthanasia,
because such moral dilemmas require us to make some decision about how
to act.
129.
Abortion
and euthanasia are more properly issues of social
philosophy rather than ethics,
because they indicate how individuals are related to society through
government
and law.
Multiple
Choice
130.
Ethics,
political philosophy, and aesthetics are areas
of philosophy that address topics that are likewise addressed in fields
like
psychology, political science, sociology, and anthropology. But instead
of
concentrating on what different people call the good life, moral
duties, social
obligations, or beauty, these areas of philosophy search for:
(a) reasons
why different people should or should not think about such topics as
they do.
(b) the
personal or social causes of why different people think about such
topics as
they do.
(c) ways of
getting people to question and ultimately to reject ways they have been
raised.
(d) a basic principle
by which
both philosophy and the social sciences can be reduced to the physical
sciences
(especially physics).
(a) how a
rational resolution
of conflicting beliefs is unattainable due to the different backgrounds
of
people.
(b) the ways in
which
individuals can be excused from being held responsible for their
actions.
(c) the reasons
that can be
given as to why certain beliefs should be adopted and certain actions
done.
(d) the
difference between an
individual's religious
training and the requirements of the laws
of his state and nation.
132.
Ethical
judgments are usually distinguished from
judgments of personal preference, taste, or prejudice by means of
showing that
ethical judgments:
(a) can be
explained in terms
of the particular customs or practices of a group or culture.
(b) are intended
primarily to
rationalize already accepted practices in a society.
(c) serve only as
ideals and
cannot be the bases upon which people live daily.
(d) need to be
supported by
reasons that should be universally intelligible or acceptable.
133.
From
a
philosophical perspective, religious teachings or revelations cannot
(by
themselves) serve as standards of morality because:
(a) the appeal to
the will of
God as the reason for one's behavior
cannot provide a motive for acting morally
or immorally, even for religious believers.
(b) interpretations
of
religious revelations often conflict with one another and thus provide
no
definite basis for making moral judgments and have no persuasive power
for
non-believers.
(c) some
religious beliefs
(even those based on the Scriptures) are not only factually wrong but,
if
followed, would result in immoral behavior.
(d) religious
teachings are
usually interpreted and enforced through civil laws that become the
bases for
personal or social morality.
134.
Unlike
religion,
law, social custom, or personal preference, ethics is not concerned
with
describing our behavior in terms of faith, social order, or individual
likes
and dislikes. Instead, it focuses on:
(a) explaining
why we might
or might not be justified in applying those other sets of beliefs to
moral
issues.
(b) showing how
religion,
law, and social custom are culturally relative, but personal preference
is
subjective.
(c) describing
how each
person's background
and upbringing affects his or her beliefs
about moral issues.
(d) showing how
motives are
more crucial in making moral judgments than consideration of
consequences,
character, or the act itself.
135.
"Why be moral?" is a metaethical
question rather than an ethical
question inasmuch as it is concerned with:
(a) why someone
would want to
have a balanced personality or be a superior individual.
(b) non-moral
reasons for why
someone should be moral.
(c) how it is
morally wrong for someone to be immoral.
(d) what makes
actions moral
or immoral, right or wrong.
(a) since no one
ever has a
particular perspective, no one ever criticizes values in other cultures.
(b) claims about
cultural
differences are as judgmental as they are descriptive.
(c) all cultural
differences
can be reduced to basic differences in human nature.
137.
According
to the
cultural relativist, the attempt to evaluate the moral beliefs of one's own culture
is bound to fail because:
(a) obviously
some cultures
have better systems of moral beliefs than others.
(b) values are
not determined
by one's culture as
much as they are by the individual's personal
beliefs and prejudices.
(c) even within a
particular
culture's belief
system, no actions are really ever identified
as good or bad.
(d) in order to
make such an
evaluation, one has to use the very values which are themselves being
judged.
(a) universally
binding moral
values are interpreted differently from culture to culture.
(b) cultural
differences show
how there is no set of moral values that obligates all peoples in all
cultures.
(c) although
moral
differences among cultures are objective, all people share the same
subjective
values.
(d) our
toleration of
obviously cruel cultures is relative to our culture (and is thus an
absolute
value).
(a) objective or
absolute but not subjective.
(b) subjective or
absolute but not objective.
(c) subjective or
objective but not absolute.
(d) absolute but
not subjective or objective.
140.
Because
absolutists argue that the quality or value of something is independent
of
being designated or recognized as such, they treat ethical judgments:
(a) as relative
to one's own
conscience or set of values.
(b) as true or
false
depending on one's society or on
how one is raised.
(c) as
inaccessible to the
human mind, ultimately unknowable and practically meaningless.
(d) as facts
about the world
which are true or false regardless of human judgments.
(a) It is possible for a subjectivist to be a
relativist.
(b) It is possible for a relativist to be an
objectivist.
(c) It is possible for an absolutist to be a
subjectivist.
(d) It is possible for an objectivist to be
an
absolutist.
(a) If cultural values are always right, no
culture
could be said to improve itself or develop morally.
(b) The fact that cultures disagree on moral
values
does not prove that they ought to disagree.
(c) If ethical values apply only within one's culture, then
no one could ever be said to act
immorally.
(d) Saying which values apply to individuals
is
difficult because people belong to different (sub)cultures.
(a) If relativism is correct, then we will
not be able
to resolve ethical disputes by appealing to arguments.
(b) If relativism is correct, then moral
criticism,
moral progress, and toleration are morally unjustifiable.
(c) If relativism is correct, then no one can
do
anything that reduces suffering, since “can implies ought.”
(d) Because it is difficult to identify the
“cultures”
an individual belongs to, it is not helpful to say that an individual’s
values
are determined by his or her culture.
(a) are seldom if
ever aware
of what those values are or how they are necessary for existence.
(b) disagree on
how those
more or less universal values are implemented in practices.
(c) do not adopt
sets of
moral values at all; if they did, all individuals and cultures would be
relativistic.
(d) cannot
survive very long
unless they establish practices that differentiate themselves from
others.
(a) it implies
that all cultures ultimately share the same set
of moral values.
(b) it indicates
how toleration cannot be a moral virtue in any
culture.
(c) it prevents
the relativist from being able to identify the
boundaries of one's culture or
subculture.
(d) it commits
the naturalistic fallacy, concluding that we
ought to tolerate based on the fact that we differ.
(a) agreeing with
me about
moral values and thus would have no grounds for criticizing me.
(b) assuming that
if they
tolerated me, I would in turn tolerate them.
(c) imposing one
of their
values (namely, toleration of others) on me.
(d) preventing me
from
producing the greatest amount of happiness for the greatest number of
people.
(a) we could not
hope to
resolve moral disputes, all toleration and criticism of moral beliefs
would be
unjustified, and there could be no real moral reform or progress.
(b) we could not
individually
make judgments about what we should or should not do, present arguments
to
support our beliefs, or for that matter even have moral beliefs.
(c) we could not
tolerate
people who have beliefs different from our own, we would have to force
our
values on others, and any moral reform or progress would be purely
private or
subjective.
(d) we could not
reduce
suffering or consider the welfare of non-human beings as morally
significant.
(a) It is obvious that different cultures
have
different beliefs; relativism is a proper response to ethnocentrism.
(b) There is ultimately only one right way to
think
about morality, one fact of the matter that does not vary from person
to
person: namely, relativism.
(c) Relativism is the only viable alternative
to the
absolutist belief that there is only one moral standard.
(d) With the decline of religion, fewer
people believe
that there is an objective set of beliefs or truths about what is right
and
wrong.
(a) the
subjective, personal
beliefs of an individual cannot be the basis for any moral theory.
(b) even though
cultural
relativism is an absolutist position, it is not an objectivist position.
(c) the fact that
moral
beliefs differ among cultures does not imply that moral beliefs ought
to
differ.
(d) moral rules
intended to
reduce suffering and promote human flourishing are adopted in all
cultures.
150.
Suppose
that human well-being is the correct standard
for evaluating ethical theories and judgments. Would this mean that we
have to
reject the cultural relativist's claim that each culture has a right to
decide its
own values?
(a) No: no culture can
impose its
values on any other culture, even if those values promote human
well-being.
(b) No: all cultures are different in what
they value
(indeed, that is what makes them different in the first place); so the
destruction of cultural differences would mean the end of cultures.
(c) Yes: but each culture would have to
decide whether "promoting
well-being" for its
members is really what it wants.
(d) Yes: any culture that would not satisfy
basic
material and social needs of all of its members would not be as good as
it
should be.
(a) The fact that people agree in their moral
beliefs
does not make the beliefs justified or correct.
(b) Since people in different cultures hold
different
beliefs, they try to satisfy their needs differently.
(c) Even if people agree on what they
believe, it is
difficult (if not impossible) to get them to live according to what
they
believe.
(d) Only those beliefs which have universal
support
should be accepted as true.
(a) it ignores
the fact that
not all cultures and individuals respect and tolerate the rights and
values of
others.
(b) it assumes
that no set of
moral values can be the basis for behavior unless its absolute
principles are
fixed and cannot be changed or modified.
(c) it commits
the
naturalistic fallacy by reasoning from the fact that values differ to
the claim
that people are morally justified in acting on their cultural or
individual
beliefs.
(d) it endorses
the logical positivist
claim that moral statements are neither analytic (true by definition)
nor
synthetic (true by empirical observation).
(a) suggests that
tolerating
different viewpoints has value only for relativists, not objectivists.
(b) assumes that
all persons
universally ought to value
toleration, even those who do not actually do so.
(c) fails to
indicate how
toleration can be a value only for consequentialists,
not deontologists.
(d) treats
toleration as a
value that no one ought to adopt,
even though most individuals and cultures in fact do.
(a) each culture
determines
the basic values necessary for the culture's
existence.
(b) no culture
can exist very
long unless it establishes practices that distinguish it from others.
(c) prejudices
within our own
society often determine our moral views.
(d) cultures
differ in how
more or less universal values are implemented in practices.
(a) Immoral behavior may in fact be in one's own
self-interest; but morality is not immediately
concerned with the individual as much as with society.
(b) Harmonious integration of the parts of one's personality
is what makes someone truly happy and
constitutes human excellence and moral virtue.
(c) Since there is no objective moral
standard (as the
ring of Gyges story shows), whatever
someone believes
is in his or her self-interest is morally acceptable.
(d) Virtue is the ability to do what one does
well, so
if someone is able to promote his or her self interest (even through
immorality), then that person is virtuous.
(a) those who are
in power
determine morality depending on what they choose to believe benefits
them.
(b) personal
integrity (i.e.,
harmonizing the parts of our soul) is based on knowing our function in
society.
(c) only the
rulers (vs. law
enforcers or workers) can really be moral since only the rulers act on
reason.
(d) morality is less concerned with doing
what is
actually right than with doing what seems
to be right according to one's society: that
is what the Gyges
ring story is about.
(a) showing why
someone
should care about having an integrated personality or contributing to
the
harmonious operation of society.
(b) understanding
how ethics
is more concerned with intellectual judgments about actions and their
consequences, and less with moral motivation.
(c) recognizing
that personal
morality has little or nothing to do with social morality; that is, one's private moral
judgments have no social parallels.
(d) indicating
how the
judgments of society concerning who is happy and who is not should be
used in
telling who is moral and who is not.
(a) what makes
certain actions moral or immoral.
(b) how
individuals should or
should not be held responsible for the ways in which their consciences
have
been formed.
(c) why someone
should behave
in a certain way, even when he agrees it is a morally unacceptable way
to act.
(d) why someone
chooses to
act in ways that conflict with the recommendations of others.
(a) not everyone
agrees that
beauty, prudence, honor, justice, courage, and knowledge are
pleasurable.
(b) pain and
pleasure is
always relative to the individual.
(c) even
pleasures such as
courage and knowledge have as much pain associated with them as vain
desires.
(d) some
pleasures (e.g.,
satisfaction of vain desires) are associated with pain (e.g.,
disappointment).
(a) pleasures are
the
fulfillment of our desires; and insofar as we are determined by nature
to
fulfill our desires, we must seek after pleasure.
(c) we cannot
make decisions
based on whether our actions produce pleasure without knowing
beforehand
whether we are justified in doing so.
(d) simple
pleasures (as
opposed to extreme pleasures) are easier to satisfy, less prone to
disappointment, and make us appreciate luxuries all the more.
(a) hedonism is
not a way of
life or a way of deciding how to act morally; it is merely a way of
thinking.
(b) if pursuing
certain goals
causes someone pleasure, that is all that matters; how others are
affected or
how they respond to the individual's acts
is unimportant.
(c) hedonism
recommends that
those kinds of endeavors that cause pain or unhappiness be avoided; it
does not
say that any successful effort whatsoever is desirable.
(d) no one
intentionally
pursues or should pursue pleasure for its own sake; we should avoid
worrying
about morality as well.
(a) it must be
shown to be false.
(b) it would
allow for the possibility that it could be false.
(c) it must be
able to explain all behavior in terms of
self-interest.
(d) it would have
to show how believing in the theory is in one's self-interest.
(a) such systems
of belief are simply true, as the failure of
all attempted falsifications of them shows.
(b) people who
believed in them would be determined by fate to
act always in their own self-interest.
(c) any attempt
to falsify them would be explained in their
terms, supposedly confirming their truth.
(d) there are no
explanations
of human behavior other than those proposed by these systems of belief.
164.
If
psychological
egoism is true, then no ethical system (including ethical egoism) is
possible
because:
(a) ethics would
then be
merely a means by which individuals impose their values on
others--exactly as
Nietzsche says happens in Christianity.
(b) if we are
determined to
act only in our self-interest, then it makes no sense to say we ought to act either in our self-interest
or, for that matter, in any other way either.
(c) psychological
egoism is a
theory of why people are motivated to act morally, whereas ethical
egoism is a
theory of how moral distinctions are determined.
(d) without some
means to
decide which acts are morally good or bad, there is no way to explain
why people
act the way they do.
165.
Ethical
egoists
dismiss psychological egoism because (they say) psychological egoism
undermines
the possibility for any ethical behavior by ignoring one of the basic
principles of ethical reasoning, namely:
(a) is implies
ought.
(b) the end never
justifies
the means.
(c) the
naturalistic fallacy.
(d) ought implies
can.
166.
Critics
argue
that ethical egoism cannot resolve conflicts between parties pursuing
their own
self-interests nor provide a dispassionate point of view from which an
impartial moral judgment can be made. Egoists respond that:
(a) completely
impartial,
dispassionate judgments are impossible; it's best
to appeal to self-interests.
(b) because our
own
self-interests are always the same as others', we
should promote their happiness first.
(c) only by
developing all of
our capacities harmoniously can we overcome our pursuit of pleasures.
(d) the only "moral point of
view" that
ultimately counts is that of the ideal observer, God.
167.
"Always act in
those kinds of ways that generally
produce the greatest amount of happiness." This
describes:
(a) act
utilitarianism.
(b) ethical
egoism.
(c) rule
utilitarianism.
(d) hedonism.
168.
Bentham's
utilitarianism is different from J. S. Mill's version in
virtue of Mill's emphasis on:
(a) the happiness
of all
creatures affected by actions, versus the happiness experienced by
humans.
(b) how actions
done to
achieve happiness are in fact desired as opposed to being desirable.
(c) the concern
for the qualitative character of happiness
versus simply the quantitative.
(d) the number of
people
affected versus the intensity of pleasure experienced by those affected.
169.
If,
as Mill
suggests, some pleasures are qualitatively better than others, pleasure
itself
is not the sole criterion for deciding what is valuable (and thus
morally
obligating). That criterion, he says, is decided by finding out:
(a) what
competent judges
prefer.
(b) what duty
requires of us.
(c) what we can
universally
will without contradiction.
(d) what Bentham's hedonic
calculus would recommend.
170.
J. S.
Mill argues
that some pleasures or happiness are qualitatively better than others.
But,
critics claim, this means that a criterion that is more fundamental
than
happiness could be used in making moral judgments, since:
(a) pleasures
that are not
mixed with pain are better than those in which there is an element of
pain.
(b) the criterion
for
evaluating pleasures can be nothing other than how much happiness they
give us.
(c) a
qualitatively superior
form of pleasure would produce the greatest amount of happiness.
(d) the criterion
for ranking
pleasures or happiness cannot be pleasure or happiness itself.
171.
Though
J. S. Mill
agrees with Bentham that happiness is the
goal of
ethical behavior, he points out that "it is
better to be a human being dissatisfied than a pig satisfied." By this remark
he indicates how:
(a) some kinds of
happiness
are more desirable or valuable than others for social or cultural
reasons.
(b) according to
the
utilitarian principle, the greatest happiness is determined by the
greatest
number.
(c) happiness ought to be desired (and thus is desirable)
because people, in fact,
desire to be happy.
(d) uncultivated
people are
as competent to judge what happiness is as are cultivated people.
172.
According
to J.
S. Mill, "Of
two pleasures, if there be one to which all or almost
all who have experience of both give a decided preference, that is the
more
desirable pleasure." The decision
about which pleasures are qualitatively
desirable should thus be made by those familiar with different kinds of
pleasures based on:
(a) whether the
pleasures are
egoistic (benefiting only the individual) or altruistic (benefiting
others).
(b) what those
persons
generally desire.
(c) each person's doing his or
her moral duty.
(d) whether doing
that which produces
happiness is also doing that which produces pleasure.
173.
In
deciding how
far we have to calculate the consequences of our actions, Mill says
that the
utilitarian recommends that we should realistically consider only:
(a) the rules of
desire determined by the person of practical
wisdom.
(b) those persons
most likely to be affected by our actions.
(c) how our
behavior follows necessarily from human nature
itself.
(d) the motive of
the agent,
and not necessarily the consequences of our actions.
174.
Which
of the
following IS NOT a typical argument
raised against utilitarian ethical theories?
(a) Utilitarianism permits treating
individuals
unjustly if more happiness is produced by doing so.
(b) It is difficult (if not impossible) to
compare and
calculate the happiness produced by alternative acts.
(c) Utilitarians
are unaware
of the distinction between actual, foreseeable, and intended
consequences.
(d) For utilitarians,
expediency is the fundamental moral principle: the ends justify the
means.
175.
Which
of the
following IS NOT an objection
critics raise against the utilitarian use of happiness as a criterion
for
making moral judgments?
(a) Happiness cannot be used as a criterion
for
morality because no one makes moral judgments that way.
(b) There is no easy way to compare different
types of
happiness to calculate the "greatest amount."
(c) Utilitarians
cannot
calculate happiness because future consequences of actions are never
fully
known.
(d) Utilitarianism rewards doing what is
expedient,
even if it is unjust: the end justifies the means.
176.
One
objection
raised against utilitarianism is that we can never know what we are
morally
obliged to do since we can never know all the consequences of our
actions. Mill
and other utilitarians reply to this by:
(a) pointing out
that no moral theory is ever able to indicate
what we should not do.
(b) agreeing that
we may not
know perfectly what the consequences will be, but we can determine them
well
enough to know what to do.
(c) rejecting the
claim: we,
in fact, can know all of the consequences of our actions if we
investigate the
matter well enough.
(d) redefining "consequences" so that
they are limited to what we intend to do and not to what actually
happens.
177.
Some
theorists
argue that the utilitarian claim that we are morally obligated to
contribute to
famine relief ignores one central fact about human nature, namely, that
we are
more inclined to help members of our own family or culture than others,
and
therefore should not be expected to do what we are not inclined to do
in the
first place. To this the utilitarian responds:
(a) taking care
of those near
us produces more overall happiness than taking care of others.
(b) the amount of
need in
some cultures is greater than in others; our own needs are greatest.
(c) while such
feelings may be significant psychologically, they
are irrelevant morally.
(d) our moral
obligations to
promote the happiness of our family, friends, and immediate culture are
more
important than even obligations to protect the lives of others.
178.
One consequentialist argument against famine relief
notes that
feeding famine victims is not our moral responsibility, because it
causes more
harm than good insofar as it wastes our own resources, makes the
starving more
dependent on us, and creates conditions for more famine in the future.
Which of
the following IS NOT a response
utilitarian supporters of famine relief would
typically give in return?
(a) Feeding both the starving and ourselves
would
require us to become more efficient, knowledgeable, and industrious
(all
beneficial effects).
(b) We have a responsibility to other human
beings to
save them from starvation regardless of future consequences; after all,
we do
not know what those consequences may be.
(c) In feeding the starving we can--indeed,
we are morally
required to--demand that cultures receiving the food adopt farming and
distribution programs to prevent future famine.
(d) Recipients of food can be required to
adopt social
changes (e.g., birth control programs) in order to support themselves
and not
have to rely on others.
179.
Some
critics of
utilitarianism have argued that injustices against minorities would be
permitted under utilitarian principles, since the violation of the
rights of a
few might produce more overall happiness than respecting those rights. Utilitarians respond that, on the contrary,
injustices
against minorities would not be encouraged under their principles,
because:
(a) according to
utilitarian principles, minorities have no
rights.
(b) if unjust
practices became the rule in a society, there
would be more unhappiness.
(c) minorities do
not
experience happiness and unhappiness in the same way as the majority of
society.
(d) calculation
of the
greatest amount of happiness for the greatest number of people does not
necessarily have to include consideration of all members of a society.
180.
Act utilitarians point out that sometimes violating
a moral
rule causes more happiness than following the rule. In such cases, they
argue,
violating the rule is permitted:
(a) only if no
other
violations of the rule occur again.
(b) as long as no
one
affected by the action experiences any unhappiness.
(c) as long as the
person's intention or
motive is to do his/her duty regardless
of the consequences.
(d) and even
morally required
by the utilitarian principle itself.
181.
Act utilitarians say that we should always do that
specific
action that produces the greatest happiness, even if this means
violating moral
rules. Rule utilitarians challenge this,
arguing that
we should follow moral rules even if we think that violating them would
yield
better results, because:
(a) following
moral rules
generally yields more overall happiness than the unhappiness created by
allowing for the rare exceptions to rules.
(b) we should not
become
slaves to any moral rules; morality is a matter of personal choices.
(c) acting in
general to
produce the greatest amount of happiness for the greatest number of
people is
not always the morally right thing to do.
(d) even if we
follow moral rules, we will always cause
unhappiness to someone.
182.
Critics
sometimes
claim that, for utilitarianism, motive seems to have nothing to do with
the
morality of an action. Mill responds to this by pointing out that:
(a) good
consequences cannot
follow from an act done by someone with an evil motive.
(b) bad
consequences often
follow from actions which are done with the best motives in mind.
(c) consequences
determine
the morality of an action; the person's motive
affects only our judgment of the person doing the act, not the act
itself.
(d) the only way
to determine
what motive I have in acting is to determine the consequences of my
action.
183.
In
reply to those
who object that utilitarianism permits lying if it produces happiness,
J. S.
Mill responds in what is now called a rule utilitarian way: "Any, even
unintentional deviation from truth weakens
the trustworthiness of human assertion, which is the principal support
of all
social well-being, civilization, virtue, and everything on which human
happiness on the largest scale depends." Mill's basic point
is that:
(a) insignificant
("white") lies
sometimes do cause happiness, so they are
morally permissible.
(b) even
occasional white
lies are immoral because they cause more harm than good in the long run.
(c) we would be
morally
obligated to tell the truth even if, as a rule, it did not cause
happiness.
(d) lying is
immoral because
it generally causes unhappiness; but if someone who is qualified to
judge the
difference between happiness and unhappiness approves the lie, it is OK.
184.
Rule utilitarians have argued that injustices against
minorities
would be permitted under act utilitarian principles, since the
violation of the
rights of a few might produce more overall happiness in certain
situations than
respecting those rights. They argue that, by contrast, under rule
utilitarianism injustices against minorities would not be encouraged
because:
(a) individuals
and minorities have rights only in deontological
ethics, not in teleological ethics.
(b) rule
utilitarianism indicates how to act in general, not how
to act in specific situations.
(c) if unjust
practices
became the rule in a society, there would be more unhappiness.
(d) calculation
of the
greatest amount of happiness for the greatest number of people does not
necessarily have to include consideration of all members of a society.
185.
Rule utilitarians argue that we should always do
those things
that as a rule promote happiness. In a specific case where following
the rules
would probably cause unhappiness, rule utilitarians
say:
(a) people follow
rules that
promote their own happiness more than rules promoting general happiness.
(b) we should
abide by rules
because it is our duty, not because of the consequences of following
rules.
(c) the long-term
effect of
violating moral rules would be more unhappiness, so we should follow
the rule.
(d) we should
follow rules in
specific cases only if happiness results; otherwise we should violate
rules.
186.
Rule utilitarians argue that we should always do
those things
that, as a rule, promote happiness. In specific cases where following
the rules
would be unjust and cause unhappiness, rule utilitarians
point out that:
(a) any act of
injustice will
cause someone unhappiness, and therefore violations of rules are still
immoral.
(b) actual
consequences of
our actions are often unforeseen, so we have to rely on the intended
consequences.
(c) exceptions
can be built
into the rules to allow for occasional short-term injustice and
long-term
happiness.
(d) the only
people who can
make a judgment about what is just/unjust are those who know which
actions
promote, as a rule, happiness.
187.
The deontological theory of ethics called
divine law theory is sometimes confused with natural law theory because
both
often refer to God. But unlike in natural law theory, a person is, in
fact,
morally obligated to act in a certain way under divine law theory:
(a) if he/she believes that it is what God commands.
(b) if God should require him/her to act in certain
ways.
(c) if acting in
accord with
the person's nature is
morally correct.
(d) if God really
does command
it, regardless of whether it conflicts with human nature.
188.
Divine
command
theorists are often charged with circular reasoning, in that they say
we ought
to do what God commands because he commands it, and (they claim) we
know that
God's commands are
always good because:
(a)
God's arbitrary
acts of will are not intended to confirm
the faith of believers but to persuade skeptics.
(b) reason itself
is a God-instilled inclination that cannot
fail to persuade non-believers.
(c) even though
Scriptures conflict and sometimes need
interpretation, God's real commands
are clear.
(d) the very fact
that God commands something makes it good.
189.
Divine
command
theorists point out that every ethical theory must have two components:
a
theory of value and a theory of obligation. In the case of divine
command
theory, value is determined by:
(a) what God
wills, and obligation is determined by God's rewards and
punishment.
(b)
God's will that we be happy, and
obligation is determined by our acceptance of God's will.
(c) our
interpretation of God's will,
and obligation is determined by social agreement with our
interpretation.
(d) what we believe
God wills for us, and obligation is determined by what we know
God wills for us.
190.
Critics
of the
divine-command theory of ethics raise a number of objections against
it. Which
of the following IS NOT one of those
objections?
(a) If God's
command is the basis for determining what is moral, then it makes no
sense to
say that God's commands are
good; that is, God's commands are
arbitrary.
(b) Because secular (non-religious) moral
systems do
not provide a motive or reason for acting morally, they are able to
identify what is moral in a way that the divine
command theory does not.
(c) Religion is not only unnecessary for
morality but
is even a hindrance, because it creates false hopes and distracts
people from
doing good things for one another for its own sake.
(d) Acting in a certain way simply because it
is
required by God does not encourage people to see why
they should do what they do, and in this sense religious ethics
is not as deep-seated as secular ethics.
191.
Stoics
like Epictetus and Marcus Aurelius
describe the good life in
terms of a rational understanding of the law of nature, because insofar
as we
understand natural law:
(a) we can change
nature to accommodate our interests.
(b) we can get
pleasure out of the pure act of knowing.
(c) we can limit
our desires to things within our control.
(d) we can remain
indifferent about what we choose to do.
192.
For
the Stoic a
meaningful life is one in which she commits herself to do her duty,
whatever it
might be. Limiting herself to doing her duty (regardless of what that
entails)
means:
(a) recognizing
how her freedom is limited by what she chooses
to desire.
(b) passively
resigning
herself to accept whatever happens as out of her control and unaffected
by her
action.
(c) committing
herself with
all her power to take responsibility for what she does as her own.
(d) not caring
what she does
or how she does it, as long as she thinks she won't be
disappointed by taking unnecessary chances.
193.
Epictetus' Stoic claim
that we should be happy with whatever
life offers us differs from Epicureanism in that:
(a) Epicureanism says that happiness consists
in the
unrestrained pursuit of pleasure (hedonism), whereas Stoicism says that
we can
achieve pleasure only by desiring things that will not disappoint us.
(b) Epicureanism says that life can be
meaningful only
if we are happy (regardless of whether we satisfy our desires), but
Stoicism
says that we can be happy only if we satisfy our desires.
(c) Epicureanism says that only those things
that
benefit us can make us happy, whereas
Stoicism says
only by doing things that benefit others can we be happy.
(d) Epicureanism says we should desire things
that do
not disappoint us, whereas Stoicism says that we cannot be disappointed
in life
if we limit our desires to what we control.
194.
Which
of the
following IS NOT one of Kant's objections to
consequentialist
ways of making moral decisions?
(a) Consequences are often out of our
control, so the
morality of actions cannot be based on consequences.
(b) To think we have moral obligations at all
is
merely the result of education or socialization.
(c) Opinions
differ on what happiness is, so we could never agree on the moral
principles
for achieving it.
(d) Inasmuch as we are naturally determined
to pursue
happiness, we cannot be morally obligated to do it.
195.
Kant
claims that
moral obligation cannot be based on a "hypothetical
imperative" such as "if you
want to be happy, then you must do X,"
because:
(a) a moral
imperative or
command must be directed to a specific individual and require a
specific
action.
(b) what people
want to do is
never really connected with what they actually do.
(c) happiness can
vary from
person to person, is often out of our reach, and is not a
freely-desired goal.
(d) a good will
acts for the sake of doing one's duty (which
is always to produce happiness however
it is defined).
196.
According
to
Kant, virtuous actions are those that are done for the sake of doing one's duty--which
means acting for the right reason or
with the right motive or intention. Kant limits the discussion of the
moral
character of actions to motives or intentions and does not consider
consequences crucial, because:
(a) the
consequences are
often out of our control and are valued differently by different people.
(b) only those
actions based on universalizable
motives are moral actions.
(c) moral
decisions are conditioned by one's culture and
by how one is raised.
(d) every time
someone acts,
he or she has a motive; but there are not always consequences to acts.
197.
According
to
Kant, morality presumes that I, as a rational being, am able to do what
is
morally right because it is morally
right. So, unless doing my duty is my motive in acting, my action is
not
morally good, because:
(a) actions that
are done
solely for the sake of doing my duty do not promote happiness as much
as
actions done because they are morally right.
(b) acting with motives other than doing my
duty--for
example, acting out of instinct, passion, or interest--is not universalizable and thus cannot be the basis for
rational
behavior.
(c) if my motive
in acting is
that I am willing to take responsibility for the consequences of my
action,
then my action is morally good.
(d) sometimes
doing my duty
conflicts with doing the right thing--especially when doing the right
thing
involves acting in accord with my religious beliefs.
198.
For
Kant, lying
is immoral because the maxim on which it is based (e.g., "lie when you
think you can get away with it") cannot be
universalized without contradiction; for
if the maxim were universalized:
(a) no one could
be trusted
to tell the truth, and there would be no way to distinguish
truth-telling and
lying.
(b) everyone
would tell the
truth, and that would be a world no one would be willing to live in.
(c) everyone
would be under a
moral obligation to lie, and that in itself would be a contradiction.
(d) no one could
act "for the sake of
doing his or her duty" because to do
so would treat people as means.
199.
According
to
Kant, an action which has a motive or intention that cannot be
successfully
universalized:
(a) might be
moral or immoral, depending on the consequences of
the action.
(b) might be
moral or
immoral, depending on whether the act is considered acceptable in the
person's society.
(c) is immoral.
(d) might be
moral or
immoral, depending on whether the action is done freely.
200.
Kant
claims that
I can determine whether all other rational beings are obligated to do
what I am
obligated to do by trying to see whether:
(a) certain
practices are
universally accepted throughout different cultures.
(b) other
examples of my
action yield good consequences.
(c) the action
would be
universally good for all individuals.
(d) the motive of
my action
can be universalized without contradiction or without being
unacceptable to
some people.
201.
For
Kant, the
morality of an action is determined by our motive, and the only pure
moral
motive is:
(a) doing that
which we think
is going to produce the greatest amount of happiness for the most
people.
(b) acting in a
way that is
consistent with our religious beliefs and conscience.
(c) choosing to
have as our
motive that which other people often actually have as their motive in
acting.
(d) willing to do
that which
all other rational beings could accept and will without contradiction.
202.
According
to
Kant, acting morally means acting on an intention that a reasonable
person
could will all persons to adopt as the motive for their actions.
Critics claim
that this makes Kant a consequentialist,
insofar as universalizability considers
the consequences of everyone
acting that way. Kant rejects this by pointing out that:
(a) to say that
an intention
must be universalizable does not mean that
everyone's intentions
need to be considered, only the
intentions of those who are going to be affected by the action.
(b) the intended consequences of actions are often not the same
as their actual consequences.
(c) intentions,
not
consequences, identify moral actions; if an intention cannot be
universalized
for any reason (including unacceptable consequences), it cannot be the
basis
for a moral act.
(d) if people
actually did
their moral duty, then the consequences of their doing so would be
better than
if they only intended to do their
duty.
203.
Kant
suggests
that the maxim upon which an action
is based, and not the individual action itself, is the key for
determining
whether an action is morally good, because:
(a) a specific
action is, by definition, not universalizable.
(b) our actions
are always based on some maxim or other.
(c) without
maxims we would not know what to do.
(d) our maxims
are subjective
rules of behavior upon which actions are based.
204.
Kant
argues that
acting in accord with duty does not make an action morally worthwhile;
rather
it is acting for the sake of or
because it is one's duty that
makes the act morally worthy. By this
distinction he indicates how:
(a) actions that
are done
freely are always morally good actions.
(b) the moral
value of an action is determined by our motives,
not by the consequences of our actions.
(c) the
consequences of our
actions might be good or bad depending on how much happiness is
produced.
(d) acting in a
self-interested way differs from acting based on maxims.
205.
Which
of the
following IS NOT an objection raised
against Kant's
ethical theory?
(a) Just because someone is concerned with
promoting
happiness instead of doing his/her duty, that does not mean that
his/her action
lacks moral value.
(b) Just because I am naturally inclined to
pursue
happiness, that does not mean that I can't act
from duty.
(c) Just because the exact consequences of
actions are
unknown or are not in our complete control, that
does
not mean that we are not responsible for or should not consider those
consequences.
(d) In moral dilemmas, rules often conflict;
in such
cases, Kantian ethics is of no help.
206.
Critics
of Kant
note that his focus on the universal rules adopted by rational agents
ignores
how:
(a) the attempt
to universalize practices creates rules, and the
existence of rules inhibits creativity.
(b) his moral
rules are contrary to standard cultural practices
because they promote feminine values.
(c) we always
control the consequences of our actions, and we
seldom know our motives in acting.
(d) our moral
rules often conflict, and human beings are not
simply rational (universalizable) beings.
207.
According
to
Sartre's
existentialist ethics, moral judgments are not based
on any absolute foundation: we are responsible for the values we
choose. He
argues that moral values established other than through human choice:
(a) contradict
the principle on which the ability to make moral
distinctions is based.
(b) are immoral
if the consequences are bad for us.
(c) in fact never
are used by people (even mistakenly) to make
moral judgments.
(d) ought to be
grounded in the will of God or in generally
accepted social practices.
208.
When
Sartre says
that "there is no
human nature," what he means
is that:
(a) as
self-conscious beings, we can and do determine the kinds
of beings that we are.
(b) there can be
no basis for
deciding between anguish and despair.
(c) human beings
do not have
genetic characteristics that identify them biologically as members of a
species.
(d) existentialism
can accept
the existence of God only as the a priori foundation of ethical
judgments.
209.
Sartre
claims
that, for human beings, "existence
precedes essence"; in other
words:
(a) when human
beings are rational, they fulfill their essence
of being human.
(b) human beings
are
essentially determined to exist according to certain God-given
directives.
(c) human beings
are free to choose even not to act in any way
whatsoever.
(d) human beings
are
condemned to be free and to become anything they choose through their
actions.
210.
If,
as Sartre's
existentialism claims, "man is
responsible for his passion," then no matter
what we as human beings do, we do it:
(a) against our
wills.
(b) without
thought.
(c) freely.
(d) out of scorn
for God.
211.
Existentialism
differs from Stoicism concerning our choice of values. The Stoic says
we should
care about doing our duty; but what that duty is is
ultimately due to nature. Here the existentialist would object,
claiming:
(a) nature
restricts our
choices, but we still have an effect on human values by the choices we
make.
(b) nature has
meaning only
because we consider it valuable, but our choices are not determined by
it.
(c) the brute facticity of nature limits our choices and
actions so much
that freedom is an illusion.
(d) nature
determines our
choices and duties but it does not force us to act according to them.
212.
Nietzsche
argues
that the task of true morality is to indicate how human beings, as part
of
nature, can move "beyond good and
evil" by
means of the attempt to:
(a) overcome and
gradually do
away with our natural inclinations of aggression and struggle.
(b) show our
nobility through
self-restraint and compassion for the less fortunate.
(c) accept
tolerantly our own
weaknesses as indications of our place within God's plan.
(d) make moral
distinctions
the explicit products of the exercise of human will.
213.
According
to
Nietzsche, members of the herd endorse the slave values of sympathy,
kindness,
and the "common" good because:
(a) they feel
that they
should be treated kindly and compassionately since they are not
responsible for
their lack of power.
(b) they believe
that, if
they treat the master-morality overmen
kindly, those
noble individuals will not harm them.
(c) they fear
that a lack of
sympathy or kindness, or failure to consider the common good, will
cause the
men of nobility to feel threatened by them.
(d) they prefer
following God's will rather
than struggling against it (like the overmen
are constantly having to do).
214.
Critics
of
morality (e.g., Callicles or Nietzsche)
argue that
recommending that people act morally (that is, with self-restraint,
moderation,
or concern for others) is itself an attempt by "common" people to
impose their will on their superiors. They
conclude, therefore, that doing something because
it is moral makes no sense, since:
(a) even common
people admit
that no one should act morally unless it produces happiness for him or
her.
(b) only a
personality that
harmonizes the competing interests of reason, emotion, and appetite is
moral.
(c) the "all too human" values
of ordinary people do not provide any guidance for how people should act.
(d) that would
require us to
affirm our power to decide values by restricting that power.
215.
The "first principle" of
Nietzsche's version of
humanism is this: "The weak and
the failures shall perish. They ought even
to be helped to perish. What is more harmful than
vice?--Practical sympathy and pity for all the failures and all the
weak:
Christianity." In Nietzsche's
trans-valuation of humanism, Christianity is:
(a) Nietzsche's
attempt to reintroduce values into his theory of the will to power.
(b) an afterlife
project that
Nietzsche endorses as promoting the overman.
(c) the means by
which noble
aims filter down from masters to slaves.
(d) that which
frustrates the
prospects of human advancement.
216.
Nietzsche
claims
that "because life is
precisely Will to Power," the attempt to
bend all wills to a common good,
avoiding violence and exploitation in order to achieve peace in
society, is:
(a) "the fundamental principle of society" and the
necessary means for the development of all life.
(b) the goal of
the noble
class.
(c) "the Will to the denial of life," which itself
invites dissolution and decay.
(d) the dark
night of
barbarism in which "all who are
born after us belong to a higher history
than any history hitherto."
217.
According
to
Nietzsche, everything that exists or happens is an expression of the
will to
power--even the
resentment of weak people toward creative,
self-determining individuals. What Nietzsche objects to about "slave" resentment is
not its effort but rather:
(a) its
unwillingness to
acknowledge itself as the active source of its values.
(b) its ability
to destroy
the will to power by promoting values of passivity and weakness.
(c) its
willingness to think
that the will to power is more important than the will to truth.
(d) its inability
to free
itself from the external forces that determine it to say "No" to creativity.
218.
Nietzsche's critique of "slave
morality" includes an
attack on the belief in the existence of
God, because as long as God exists:
(a) human beings
will
continue to experience guilt for their failing to live up to God's call for them
to improve themselves in accord with
His law.
(b) human beings
will always
have someone to fall back on and blame for their failings, rather than
take
responsibility for their destiny.
(c) there will
always be the
possibility that God could aid the individuals of the slave or herd
mentality
against the noble individual (the overman).
(d) there is
always the
possibility that God may bring peace to the world and thus destroy the
need for
the overman.
219.
Anti-foundationalists (AFs)
reject
both teleological and deontological ethical theorizing because they (AFs):
(a) deny that
there is any
one set of values, practices, or principles that should guide our moral
decisions.
(b) think that
teleological
and deontological theories ultimately do not appeal to any moral
principles.
(c) agree with
logical
positivists: moral judgments are merely expressions of feeling or
emotion.
(d) deny that
anyone can
justifiably make a moral decision that is not always already
self-interested.
220.
Moral
virtue, for
Aristotle, entails acting in accord with the dictates of reason as
determined
by:
(a) an objective,
shared
standard of right and wrong equally applicable to all people.
(b) a mean or
point of moderation
between the extremes of morally good and morally evil behavior.
(c) the mean or
point of
moderation between the extremes of possible alternative ways of acting.
(d) the denial of
one's own interests
in favor of the good of one's community.
221.
According
to
Aristotle, a happy life is a life of virtue, one in which the
individual
contributes to the good of his or her community and is respected for
such
contributions. A morally good person is thus someone who:
(a) appreciates
how moral
values vary from culture to culture and from individual to individual.
(b) recognizes
how his or her
own well-being is intimately linked to the good of the community.
(c) can live a
life of
moderation without having to be sensitive to or involved in social or
civic
affairs.
(d) contemplates
philosophical principles in order to understand
the truths of nature.
222.
For
Aristotle, "Moral states
are the results of activities like the
states themselves. It is our duty, therefore, to keep a certain
character in
our activities, since our moral states depend on the differences in our
activities." This "certain
character" is:
(a) activity in
accordance
with reason (i.e., sensitive to the social and personal dimensions of
human
existence).
(b) the point at
which the
individual's "golden mean" rule
cancels out the society's own
definition of "moderation."
(c) neither
excess nor
deficiency, but rather the alternation of the two (where one takes over
sometimes, and the other at other times).
(d) the point of moderation in action between
virtue
and vice, the individual's good as
opposed to the social definition of the
good.
223.
Which
of the
following characterizes Aristotle's view
of ethical behavior?
(a) "One should act
so as to produce the greatest amount of
happiness for the greatest number of people."
(b) "Refrain from
harming living things, from taking what
is not given, from misusing the senses."
(c) "Virtue is a
habit or acquired ability to choose what
is moderate or the mean as determined by reason."
(d) "Always treat
humanity, whether in yourself or others,
as an end and never merely as a means."
224.
Virtue
ethics and
feminist ethics are often understood as challenges to ethical
theorizing,
because instead of discussing morality in terms of rules or principles,
such
anti-foundationalist approaches focus on:
(a) denying the
distinction
between moral acts/judgments and the rules/principles on which they are
based.
(b) developing a
good
character and maintaining personal relationships.
(c) the actual
consequences
of our actions instead of the consequences most people would predict.
(d) what nature
itself
necessitates rather than what duty and the principle of double effect
require.
225.
Feminists
(e.g.,
Gilligan, Noddings) note that while
male-oriented
moral theories emphasize abstract principles, justice, and
impartiality,
feminist morality focuses on how ethics should be more concerned with:
(a) calculating
the consequences of our actions.
(b) acting in
ways for which
we take responsibility.
(c) caring for
persons in
specific situations.
(d) doing our
duty,
regardless of consequences.
226.
"My thesis about
traditional ethics is this: (1) The focus
and direction of traditional ethics, indeed its
function, has not been individual integrity and agency (ability to make
choices
and act) but rather social organization and control. (2) The values
around
which traditional ethics revolves are antagonistic, the values of
dominance and
subordination. As a result, (3) traditional ethics undermines rather
than
promotes individual moral ability and agency. And (4) these aspects of
traditional ethics combine to legitimize oppression by redefining it as
social
organization. Appeal to rules and principles is
at the
heart of this endeavor." In this
passage:
(a) Sarah Hoagland shows how male-dominated
ethics
emphasizes competing interests, sacrifice and compromise, and duty
instead of
caring.
(b) Plato points out how totalitarian
political
systems value traditions more highly when those traditions focus on
domination
and oppression.
(c) Kant portrays ethical values as products
of the
antagonism between those who emphasize motives and those who emphasize
consequences.
(d) Ayn Rand
expresses
disappointment in ethical systems that value the rights of the
individual over
the rights of the State.
227.
Feminists
have
argued that the emphasis of virtue ethics on making moral judgments on
a
case-by-case basis is more in keeping with the spirit of morality than
(masculine) emphases on abstract principles of justice, because:
(a) virtue
requires that we
make moral judgments without considering the circumstances or
situations.
(b) morality is
about doing
what is right, which means doing that which can be defended universally.
(c) ethics should
be about
doing our duty, which (as Kant notes) varies from person to person.
(d) a full life
balances
reason and the emotional particularities of caring for others and our
relationships.
228.
Progress
through
the feminine stages of knowing described by Mary Field Belenky
and others is marked, in part, by a movement from subjective experience
and
intuition through a stage of shared experience and empathy. Though this
latter
stage includes intuition, it is considered just as objective as
masculine proof
strategies, since:
(a) it relies on
communication with others to determine whether one's personal
feelings are justified.
(b) it, like
masculine
strategies of reasoning, begins with accepting the testimony of experts
as the
truth.
(c) it, like the
masculine
model, acknowledges that rationality and knowledge are ultimately
subjective.
(d) it emphasizes
objective
logic and reasoning instead of emotion, feeling, or personal experience.
229.
Masculine
and
feminine models of thinking differ about the importance of an individual's intuition.
In the masculine model, knowledge is abstract and universal: individual
intuition
is either merely an example of
general knowledge or a threat to it. But in the feminine model,
individual
intuition is necessary because knowledge
is:
(a) arrived at
only after
critically examining the facts and discarding irrelevant personal
testimony.
(b) inherently
and
unavoidably a product of insights and feelings shared by individuals
with one
another.
(c) based on what
an
individual learns from authorities, tradition, or his or her society.
(d) whatever an
individual
personally feels is correct, regardless of what others may say or feel.
230.
According
to
Carol Gilligan, feminine ways of thinking about moral decisions are
based on an "ethics of care" rather
than (male) impersonal, abstract principles. That is, women think of
ethical
situations:
(a) as opportunities to deny that there is
any right
or wrong way to act and to show how the very act of making ethical
distinctions
is itself a form of male domination.
(b) as
opportunities to
replace so-called universal abstract
principles of ethical judgment with more specific abstract principles
(e.g.,
principles that apply only to one's
culture).
(c) not as
questions with
true or false answers, but as conflicts that need to be resolved in
order to
maintain stable interpersonal relationships.
(d) not as gender
(masculine-feminine)
conflicts, but as problems that can be solved by calculating the
foreseen
consequences for those affected by actions.
231.
According
to the
(feminist) ethics of care, emotional involvement and sensitivity to the
differing needs of other people in different situations are necessary
elements
in making objective moral judgments
because:
(a) morality is
based on
nothing more than how each individual feels about things.
(b) sensitivity
and caring
are subjective expressions of rational, objective, unemotional ways of
thinking.
(c) particular
needs and
situations seem to differ, but they are similar enough for general
moral
judgments.
(d) without
sympathetic,
emotional involvement, we cannot understand exactly what action occurs
or why
it is done.
232.
Critics
of
feminist ethics point out that, while an ethics of care might sound
nice, it is
less useful than an ethics of justice for addressing problems generated
in
modern Western societies. To this criticism, feminists reply that:
(a) without being
able to
rely on traditional ethical theories (e.g., utilitarianism, Kantian
duty
ethics), we would not know how to make moral decisions.
(b) social
practices should
focus on cultivating relations with others rather than encouraging
competition
and self-interested individualism.
(c) marketplace
competition
and rational self-interested behavior are matters of economic and
political
concern and are thus not issues that are of ethical significance.
(d) being
responsible for or
caring for others in our society is best accomplished by encouraging
competition and self-interested individualism.
Answers:
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