# Advanced Microeconomic Theory ${ }^{1}$ 

Guoqiang TIAN<br>Department of Economics<br>Texas A\&M University<br>College Station, Texas 77843<br>(gtian@tamu.edu)

August, 2002/Revised: February 2021

[^0]
## Contents

Preface
I Preliminary Knowledge and Methods ..... 3
1 Nature of Modern Economics ..... 7
1.1 Economics and Modern Economics ..... 7
1.1.1 What is economics about? ..... 7
1.1.2 Four Basic Questions in Economics ..... 8
1.1.3 What is Modern Economics? ..... 9
1.1.4 Economics vs. Natural Science ..... 11
1.2 Two Categories of Economic Theory ..... 12
1.2.1 Benchmark Theory and Relatively Realistic Theory ..... 13
1.2.2 The Domain and Scientific Rigor of Economics ..... 18
1.2.3 The Roles of Economic Theory ..... 21
1.2.4 Microeconomic Theory ..... 22
1.3 Economics and Market System ..... 23
1.3.1 Market and Market Mechanism ..... 23
1.3.2 Three Functions of Price ..... 26
1.3.3 The Superiority of the Market System ..... 29
1.4 Government, Market, and Society ..... 35
1.4.1 Three Elements of State Governance and Development ..... 35
1.4.2 Good Market Economies vs. Bad Market Economies ..... 37
1.4.3 The Boundaries of Government-Market-Society ..... 40
1.5 Comprehensive Governance by the Three Arrangements ..... 42
1.5.1 Governance on Rules ..... 43
1.5.2 Incentive Mechanism ..... 44
1.5.3 Social Norms ..... 45
1.5.4 The Hierarchical Structure of the Three Arrangements ..... 47
1.6 Ancient Chinese Thoughts on the Market ..... 49
1.7 A Cornerstone Assumption in Economics ..... 55
1.7.1 Self-love, Selfishness, and Self-interest ..... 55
1.7.2 Practical Rationality of Self-interested Behavior ..... 56
1.7.3 Boundaries of Self-interest and Altruism ..... 57
1.8 Key Points in Economics ..... 59
1.8.1 Scarcity of Resources ..... 60
1.8.2 Information Asymmetries and Decentralization ..... 60
1.8.3 Economic Freedom and Voluntary Exchange ..... 62
1.8.4 Acting under Constraints ..... 63
1.8.5 Incentives and Incentive Compatibility ..... 65
1.8.6 Property Rights as an Incentive Scheme ..... 66
1.8.7 Equality of Opportunity and Equity in Outcome ..... 67
1.8.8 Efficient Allocation of Resources ..... 68
1.9 Understanding Economics Properly ..... 69
1.9.1 On the Scientification of Economics ..... 70
1.9.2 On the Mathematical Feature of Economics ..... 72
1.9.3 Misunderstandings on Economic Theory ..... 72
1.9.4 On Experiments in Economics ..... 75
1.10 Basic Analytical Framework of Modern Economics ..... 80
1.10.1 Specifying Economic Environment ..... 82
1.10.2 Making Behavioral Assumptions ..... 85
1.10.3 Setting-up Institutional Arrangements ..... 87
1.10.4 Determining Equilibrium ..... 89
1.10.5 Making Evaluations ..... 90
1.11 Basic Research Methodologies in Economics ..... 92
1.11.1 Setting up a Benchmark ..... 93
1.11.2 Establishing a Reference System ..... 93
1.11.3 Building Studying Platforms ..... 95
1.11.4 Developing Analytical Tools ..... 97
1.11.5 Constructing Rigorous Analytical Models ..... 97

## CONTENTS

1.11.6 Making Positive and Normative Analysis ..... 98
1.12 Practical Role of the Analytical Framework and Methodologies ..... 99
1.13 Requirements for Learning Economics ..... 102
1.14 Distinguishing Sufficient and Necessary Conditions ..... 103
1.15 The Role of Mathematics and Statistics in Economics ..... 104
1.16 Conversion between Economic and Mathematical Languages ..... 108
1.17 Biographies ..... 109
1.17.1 Adam Smith ..... 109
1.17.2 David Ricardo ..... 111
1.18 Exercises ..... 112
1.19 References ..... 118
2 Preliminary Knowledge and Methods of Mathematics ..... 125
2.1 Basic Set Theory ..... 125
2.1.1 Set ..... 125
2.1.2 Mapping ..... 126
2.2 Basic Linear Algebra ..... 128
2.2.1 Matrix and Vector ..... 128
2.2.2 Matrix Operations ..... 129
2.2.3 Linear Dependence of Vectors ..... 131
2.2.4 Transpose and Inverse of Matrix ..... 132
2.2.5 Solving a Linear System ..... 133
2.2.6 Quadratic Form and Matrix ..... 137
2.2.7 Eigenvalues, Eigenvectors, and Traces ..... 139
2.3 Basic Topology ..... 141
2.3.1 Topological Space ..... 141
2.3.2 Metric Space ..... 142
2.3.3 Open Sets, Closed Sets, and Compact Sets ..... 143
2.3.4 Connectedness of Sets ..... 146
2.3.5 Sequences and Convergence ..... 147
2.3.6 Convex Set and Convexity ..... 148
2.4 Single-Valued Function ..... 149
2.4.1 Continuity of functions ..... 149
2.4.2 Upper Semi-continuity and Lower Semi-continuity ..... 151
2.4.3 Transfer Upper and Lower Continuity ..... 152
2.4.4 Differentiation and Partial Differentiation of Functions ..... 152
2.4.5 Mean Value Theorem and Taylor Expansion ..... 154
2.4.6 Homogeneous Functions and Euler's Theorem ..... 156
2.4.7 Implicit Function Theorem ..... 156
2.4.8 Concave and Convex Function ..... 158
2.4.9 Quasi-concave and Quasi-convex Function ..... 159
2.4.10 Separating and Supporting Hyperplane Theorems ..... 163
2.5 Multi-Valued Function ..... 164
2.5.1 Point-to-Set Mappings ..... 164
2.5.2 Upper Hemi-continuous and Lower Hemi-continuous Correspondence ..... 166
2.5.3 Open and Closed Graphs of Correspondence ..... 169
2.5.4 Transfer Closed-valued Correspondence ..... 170
2.6 Static Optimization ..... 173
2.6.1 Unconstrained Optimization ..... 173
2.6.2 Optimization with Equality Constraints ..... 180
2.6.3 Optimization with Inequality Constraints ..... 184
2.6.4 The Envelope Theorem ..... 186
2.6.5 Maximum Theorems ..... 188
2.6.6 Continuous Selection Theorems ..... 190
2.6.7 Fixed Point Theorems ..... 191
2.6.8 Variation Inequality ..... 194
2.6.9 FKKM Theorems ..... 195
2.7 Dynamic Optimization ..... 197
2.7.1 Calculus of Variation ..... 197
2.7.2 Optimal Control ..... 201
2.7.3 Dynamic Programming ..... 204
2.8 Differential Equations ..... 208
2.8.1 Existence and Uniqueness Theorem of Solutions for Ordinary Differential Equations ..... 210
2.8.2 Some Common Ordinary Differential Equations with Explicit Solutions ..... 211
2.8.3 Higher Order Linear Equations with Constant Coef- ficients ..... 214
2.8.4 System of Ordinary Differential Equations ..... 218
2.8.5 Stability of Simultaneous Differential Equations ..... 222
2.8.6 The Global Stability of Dynamical System ..... 224
2.9 Difference Equations ..... 225
2.9.1 First-order Difference Equations ..... 227
2.9.2 Second-order Difference Equation ..... 230
2.9.3 Difference Equations of Order $n$ ..... 231
2.9.4 Stability of $\boldsymbol{n}$ th-Order Difference Equations ..... 232
2.9.5 Difference Equations with Constant Coefficients ..... 233
2.10 Basic Probability ..... 234
2.10.1 Probability and Conditional Probability ..... 234
2.10.2 Mathematical Expectation and Variance ..... 235
2.10.3 Continuous Distributions ..... 236
2.10.4 Common Probability Distributions ..... 237
2.11 Stochastic Dominance and Affiliation ..... 239
2.11.1 Order Stochastic Dominance ..... 239
2.11.2 Hazard Rate Dominance ..... 243
2.11.3 Reverse Hazard Rate Dominance ..... 244
2.11.4 Likelihood Ratio Dominance ..... 245
2.11.5 Order Statistics ..... 246
2.11.6 Affiliation ..... 247
2.12 Biographies ..... 250
2.12.1 Friedrich August Hayek ..... 250
2.12.2 Joseph Alois Schumpeter ..... 252
2.13 Exercises ..... 254
2.14 References ..... 267
III Game Theory and Market Theory ..... 271
6 Non-Cooperative Game Theory ..... 277
6.1 Introduction ..... 277
6.2 Basic Concepts ..... 277
6.2.1 Strategic Form Representation of Games ..... 278
6.2.2 Extensive Form Representation of Games ..... 281
6.2.3 Mixed Strategies and Behavior Strategies ..... 287
6.3 Static Games with Complete Information ..... 289
6.3.1 Dominant and Dominated Strategies ..... 289
6.3.2 Best Response and Rationalizability ..... 302
6.3.3 Nash Equilibrium ..... 304
6.3.4 Refinements of Nash Equilibrium ..... 312
6.4 Dynamic Games of Complete Information ..... 316
6.4.1 Subgame ..... 318
6.4.2 Backward Induction and Subgame Perfect Nash E- quilibrium ..... 319
6.5 Static Games of Incomplete Information ..... 331
6.5.1 Bayesian Game ..... 332
6.5.2 Bayesian-Nash Equilibrium ..... 336
6.6 Dynamic Games of Incomplete Information ..... 344
6.6.1 Beliefs, Sequential Rationality and Bayes' Rule ..... 346
6.6.2 Weak Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium ..... 351
6.6.3 Sequential Equilibrium ..... 356
6.6.4 Forward Induction ..... 362
6.6.5 Signaling Game ..... 365
6.6.6 Reasonable-Beliefs Refinements in Signaling Games ..... 369
6.7 Existence of Nash Equilibrium ..... 375
6.7.1 Existence of Nash Equilibrium in Continuous Games ..... 375
6.7.2 Existence of Nash Equilibrium in Discontinuous Games376 ..... 376
6.8 Biographies ..... 382
6.8.1 John Forbes Nash Jr. ..... 382
6.8.2 John C. Harsanyi ..... 384
6.9 Exercises ..... 386
6.10 References ..... 408
7 Repeated Games ..... 413
7.1 Introduction ..... 413
7.2 Examples of Repeated Games ..... 416
7.3 Repeated Games with Perfect Monitoring ..... 422
7.3.1 Feasible and Individually Rational Payoffs ..... 423
7.3.2 One-Shot Deviation Principle ..... 428
7.3.3 Automaton Representation of Strategic Behavior ..... 434
7.3.4 Credible Continuation Promises ..... 437
7.3.5 Enforceability, Decomposability, and Self-Generation ..... 442
7.4 Folk Theorems with Perfect Monitoring ..... 448
7.5 Some Variations of Repeated Games ..... 458
7.5.1 Long-Run Players and Short-Run Players ..... 458
7.5.2 Overlapping Generations Games ..... 460
7.5.3 Community Constraints and Social Norms ..... 462
7.6 Repeated Games with Imperfect Public Monitoring ..... 466
7.6.1 Basics of Repeated Games with Imperfect Public Mon- itoring ..... 466
7.6.2 Decomposability and Self-Generation in Imperfect Mon- itoring ..... 471
7.6.3 Potential Efficiency Loss in Repeated Games with Im- perfect Monitoring ..... 476
7.6.4 Private Strategies in Games with Perfect Public Equi- libria ..... 479
7.7 Reputation Mechanism ..... 483
7.8 Biographies ..... 488
7.8.1 John Richard Hicks ..... 488
7.8.2 Thomas Schelling ..... 490
7.9 Exercises ..... 492
7.10 References ..... 506
8 Cooperative Game Theory ..... 511
8.1 Introduction ..... 511
8.2 The Core ..... 512
8.2.1 Coalitional Game with Transferable Payoff ..... 512
8.2.2 The Existence Theorem on Nonempty Cores ..... 518
8.2.3 Coalitional Game without Transferable Payoff ..... 521
8.3 Application of the Core: Market Design ..... 521
8.3.1 Transaction of Homogeneous Goods ..... 522
8.3.2 Matching of Heterogeneous Goods ..... 525
8.3.3 Two-sided Matching: Marriage Market ..... 529
8.4 Stable Set, Bargaining Set, and Shapley Value ..... 533
8.4.1 Stable Set ..... 534
8.4.2 Bargaining Set, Kernel, and Nucleolus ..... 536
8.4.3 Shapley Value ..... 542
8.5 Biographies ..... 545
8.5.1 Robert J. Aumann ..... 545
8.5.2 Reinhard Selten ..... 547
8.6 Exercises ..... 549
8.7 References ..... 556
9 Market Theory ..... 561
9.1 Introduction ..... 561
9.2 Perfect Competition ..... 563
9.2.1 The Competitive Firm ..... 563
9.2.2 The Competitive Firm's Short-Run Supply Function ..... 564
9.2.3 Single-Commodity Market Equilibrium ..... 566
9.2.4 Competitive Market and Returns to Scale of Produc- tion Technology ..... 567
9.2.5 Long-Run Equilibrium ..... 569
9.2.6 Social Welfare under Perfect Competition ..... 570
9.3 Pure Monopoly ..... 572
9.3.1 Monopoly in the Product Market ..... 572
9.3.2 Monopoly in the Long Run ..... 575
9.3.3 Disadvantage of Monopoly: Social Welfare Losses ..... 576
9.3.4 Advantage of Monopoly: Corporate Innovation ..... 577
9.3.5 Price Discrimination of Monopolies ..... 580
9.3.6 First-Degree (Perfect) Price Discrimination ..... 585
9.3.7 Second-Degree (Self-Selection) Price Discrimination ..... 587
9.3.8 Third-Degree (Multi-Market) Price Discrimination ..... 593
9.3.9 Monopolist of Durable Goods ..... 596
9.3.10 Monopoly in an Input Market ..... 600
9.4 Monopolistic Competition ..... 601
9.4.1 Long-run Equilibrium under Monopolistic Competi- tion ..... 602
9.4.2 Social Welfare in Monopolistic Competition ..... 603
9.4.3 Dixit-Stiglitz Model of Monopolistic Competition ..... 603
9.5 Oligopoly ..... 606
9.5.1 Price Competition: Bertrand Model ..... 607
9.5.2 Price Competition with Production Capacity Constraints6 ..... 611
9.5.3 Quantity Competition: Cournot Model ..... 613
9.5.4 Sequential Quantity Competition: Stackelberg Model ..... 616
9.5.5 Dynamic Price Competition and Firm Collusion ..... 617
9.5.6 Price Competition under Horizontal Product Differ- entiation: Hotelling Model ..... 620
9.5.7 Vertical Product Differentiation Model ..... 622
9.5.8 Market Entry Deterrence ..... 623
9.5.9 Price Competition with Asymmetric Information ..... 626
9.5.10 Limit Pricing with Asymmetric Information: Dynam- ic Market Structure ..... 629
9.5.11 Concluding Remarks on the Oligopolistic Market ..... 635
9.6 Biographies ..... 636
9.6.1 Harold Hotelling ..... 636
9.6.2 George J. Stigler ..... 637
9.7 Exercises ..... 640
9.8 References ..... 650
V Externalities and Public Goods ..... 653
14 Externalities ..... 659
14.1 Introduction ..... 659
14.1.1 Consumption Externality ..... 659
14.1.2 Production Externality ..... 661
14.2 Consumption Externality ..... 663
14.3 Production Externality ..... 672
14.4 Solutions to Externalities ..... 674
14.4.1 Pigovian Tax ..... 675
14.4.2 Coase's Approach ..... 676
14.4.3 Missing Market ..... 689
14.4.4 The Compensation Mechanism ..... 690
14.5 Emissions Trading and Efficient Allocation of Pollution Rights 694
14.5.1 Emission Reduction without Trading Market ..... 695
14.5.2 Emissions Trading ..... 695
14.6 Biographies ..... 699
14.6.1 Arthur Pigou ..... 699
14.6.2 Ronald Coase ..... 700
14.7 Exercises ..... 702
14.8 References ..... 711
15 Public Goods ..... 715
15.1 Introduction ..... 715
15.2 Notations and Basic Settings ..... 716
15.3 Discrete Public Goods ..... 719
15.3.1 Efficient Provision of Public Goods ..... 719
15.3.2 Free-Rider Problem ..... 721
15.3.3 Voting for a Discrete Public Good ..... 722
15.4 Continuous Public Goods ..... 724
15.4.1 Efficient Provision of Public Goods ..... 724
15.4.2 Lindahl Mechanism and Equilibrium ..... 727
15.5 Welfare Properties of Lindahl Equilibrium ..... 732
15.5.1 The First Fundamental Theorem of Welfare Economics ..... 732
15.5.2 Economic Core in the Presence of Public Goods ..... 734
15.5.3 The Second Fundamental Theorem of Welfare Eco- nomics ..... 735
15.6 Free-Rider Problem ..... 738
15.7 Biographies ..... 741
15.7.1 Ludwig Mises ..... 741
15.7.2 Douglass North ..... 742
15.8 Exercises ..... 744
15.9 References ..... 756

## Preface

This book is based on my lecture notes, which I used to teach courses at many universities, including Texas A\&M University, Shanghai University of Finance and Economics, Hong Kong University of Science and Technology, Tsinghua University, and Renmin University of China. A Chinese version was published in 2016. This book is rich in content, and comprises a full range of topics, including the most typical themes in modern microeconomic theory up to those at the frontier, such as dynamic mechanism design, auction theory and matching theory that were mainly developed in the last three decades, but not covered in standard microeconomics textbooks. It also constitutes an integration of my study, research, and teaching of microeconomic theory for more than 30 years. The content in this book is suitable for multiple purposes. By selecting different chapters and/or sections, it can serve as the text for a graduate or an advanced undergraduate course in microeconomics, a sequential course of advanced microeconomics for doctoral students, a course in advanced topics in microeconomic theory, or even a course in mathematical economics. It can also be used as an important reference book for researchers.

Economics is a discipline that is seemingly simple, but hard to learn and master well. The main reason why economic issues are challenging to understand and solve is that, besides the common behavior pattern that economic agents at any level (as nation, firm, household, or person) pursues their own interests under normal circumstances, there is information asymmetry in the vast majority of cases given that economic agents are usually privately informed about relevant economic characteristics. For example, a person may say something, but whether or not he or she is telling the
truth is unclear; and even if someone is staring directly at you, seeming to be listening attentively, one cannot be certain if he or she is really listening. Indeed, how best to deal with these two most basic objective realities, and what kinds of economic systems, institutions, incentive mechanisms , or policies should be adopted have become core issues and topics in all branches of economics.

At the same time, economics frequently involves normative statements, i.e., subjective value judgments. Different individuals have dissimilar values and varied opinions. For instance, some people emphasize the efficiency of resource allocations, while others highlight the equality of resource allocations. Individuals also frequently hold divergent views on economic reforms and policies. Consequently, it is easy to cause major controversy, making it challenging to understand and master economics.

In addition, the use of economics is likely to generate strong externality, either positive or negative. Unlike in the case of medical treatment, those who suffer, or even die, from poor medical skills are only a few individuals, while poor economic application may influence all aspects of the economy. As a consequence, a rigorous and systematic training of economics, and especially the main content of microeconomics discussed in this textbook, is not only important for theoretical innovations, but also critical for practical applications. Once faults are made and inappropriate economic policies or rules are implemented, not only will individuals be harmed, but also economic development at the national level. As such, in addition to learning economics well, when making policy suggestions, we should not make decisions with too much concern about your personal interests. Indeed, we should not only be courageous in taking responsibility for being thorough, but also possess a strong sense of social conscience and responsibility.

Modern economics constitutes a dynamically developing and markedly inclusive open discipline. Indeed, it has far surpassed neo-classical economics, and economic practice can provide rich realities for the innovative development of economic theory. From the author's perspective, as long as rigorous inherent logical analysis (not necessarily a mathematical model) is used and rational assumptions (including bounded rationality assumptions) are adopted, such research fits in the category of economics. Under the
framework of modern economics, microeconomics primarily concerns the theory of how individuals make decisions, thereby laying the microfoundation of macroeconomics, as well as almost all other branches of economics. It is a theory about how markets operate, as well as how specific market mechanisms should be modified in the case of market failure. It also focuses on the study of how limited resources are allocated among different uses to better meet the various needs of humanity. Therefore, it can assist one to understand the decisive role of market in resource allocation, and the critical role of government in making the market orderly and efficient, providing public goods and services, and guaranteeing social fairness.

Knowing what an economic theory is, it is also necessary to be cognizant of the scope of its applications. If this is not the case, once it is broadly used to guide the formulation of economic policies, it will produce highly negative social impacts. With limited training of theoretical logic and empirical quantifications, and the lack of understanding in the premise of theory, blind applications will indeed lead to negation of the role of economics and the assertion that the basic assumptions of mainstream economics are too strong, and too much focus is given to mathematics and rigor. Consequently, a false conclusion will be reached that economic theories cannot explain and solve practical problems. In extreme cases, one will disavow the basic role of economics in economic development and marketoriented reforms.

In fact, in most cases, people who hold this view do not know the preconditions of a theory, and thus they are unaware of the scope of application of the theory. Once proven to be incorrect, they blame the theory for being fallacious and of no value. In fact, just like the theories of any discipline, any rigorous economic theory provides preconditions, i.e., it is not valid in all situations. Therefore, unless a theory itself possesses one or more logical inconsistencies, there is nothing right or wrong about the theory, but only whether or not the theory is suitable for a particular economic environment. If there is no rigorism, how can one always reach the result of inherent logic? This is as pointed out by Dani Rodrik ${ }^{2}$. These accusation-

[^1]$s$ usually come from laymen or certain unorthodox marginalists. Indeed, individuals who hold such opinions are often those who have a limited understanding of economic theory and its methodology. Overall, whether the goal is to conduct original research or applied research, it is necessary to learn economics well, thoroughly understand its analytical framework and methods, and adapt the rigor of logical analysis.

As a high-level course in microeconomics, the purpose of advanced microeconomics teaching is to elucidate the inherent logic existing behind common principles and concepts, and to cultivate students' ability and way of thinking to analyze theoretical issues in a rigorous manner. It also aim$s$ to teach students how to characterize the nature of complex economic behaviors and economic phenomena (i.e., through modeling) in order to carry out rigorous economic analyses. This book systematically expounds on the content of modern microeconomics from basic theory, benchmark theory, analytical framework, research methods, to the latest frontier topics . Therefore, all or part of the chapters and sections can be selected for use by doctoral, postgraduate, and senior undergraduate students majoring in economics, finance, statistics, management, applied mathematics, and related disciplines according to the course requirements. This book can also serve as an useful reference book for teachers and scholars engaged in economics teaching and research.

## The characteristics of this book

While the mainstream of the economics profession prior to World War II focused mainly on economic thoughts and lacked scientific rigor, the most attention is currently paid to techniques and rigor, and the profound economic thoughts that exist behind economics are largely neglected. It is the case that many people become lost in mathematical models, and do not know the underlying assumptions and profound insights of these economic theories. Why can we not achieve the dialectical unity of rigorous academics "with deep thoughts and for deep thoughts" ? In fact, rigorous and original research can achieve this unity, numerous highly technical theories and methods also contain profound economic thoughts, and mod-
els can reflect them (e.g., general equilibrium theory, mechanism design theory). As such, when studying economics, one should know well not only the academic contents of economics, but also its systems, in order to master the underlying profound thoughts and wisdom. Although it may not be crucial for it to become a norm for the public to understand these thoughts in a mature modern market system, it remains extremely important in institutional transitional countries where the direction of economic and social transformation is not clear. Combining both, this textbook attempts to advocate pursuing academics both"with deep thoughts and for deep thoughts"

I have comprehensively compiled the biographies of 44 economists who made pioneering contributions to the development of modern microeconomics, in order to enhance understanding of the origin, development, and inheritance of the various economic theories (including the economic theory expressed in advanced mathematics) discussed in this textbook. This was also done to increase readers' interest in learning economic theory, to expand the comprehensiveness of knowledge, and to balance scientific rigor and profound thoughts well.

This textbook also connects with the profound philosophy and wisdom of ancient China, in an effort to achieve more comprehensive ideological and academic thinking, and realize ideological and organic academic integration. To learn economics, it is not sufficient to just be proficient at economics itself, but also to grasp its inherent logic, master its profound ideas, and consequently attain pragmatic wisdom.

## Structure of this textbook

Microeconomics focuses on the study of economic phenomena and economic issues from the analysis of individual economic behavior, and then develops various theories and results under given or designed institutional arrangements, especially under the market system. This textbook arranges thematic chapters according to this logic. Prior to this, however, the textbook presents an introduction to the requisite knowledge and methods to study advanced microeconomic theories

The textbook is divided into seven parts. Part I comprises the general introduction and preparatory knowledge of the textbook. Parts II-IV mainly introduce the benchmark models and theories in ideal economic environments in which a spontaneous market works well, as well as analytical frameworks, methods, and tools. Parts V-VII address market failure in terms of efficiency. They primarily examine how to modify the market in the presence of economic externalities, public goods, and especially private information, in order to achieve efficient allocation of resources. The contents of the textbook are as follows:

There are two chapters in Part I. Chapter 1 primarily introduces the nature and methods of economics, the scope of the textbook, as well as the preparatory knowledge and methods of mathematics. It commences with an overview of the nature, scope, thoughts, analytical framework, and research methods of economics, especially microeconomic theory, as well as the similarities between economic thoughts and Chinese wisdom. These contents aim to increase readers' inclusiveness to all subdisciplines of economics, which is not only essential for the development of various branches of economics, but also within disciplines, such as benchmark theories and relatively realistic theories.

Chapter 2 provides almost all of the commonly used mathematical analytical tools and methods in economics, and particularly in this textbook. It can be used as the basic text or primary reference textbook for courses of mathematical economics for studying advanced macro/micro economics. It can also serve as a manual reference for basic mathematic tools that are needed to study economics.

Part II comprises three chapters, which largely discuss individual decisionmaking, including consumer theory, producer theory, and individual choice under uncertainty. The individual decision-making theory constitutes the micro foundation for the establishment of numerous theoretical models in economics, and it occupies a central position in the way that economists think about problems. Many choices are made in risk and uncertain situations. Since people frequently need to avoid some uncertainties, for example, by purchasing insurance, choice under risk and uncertainty is a critical aspect of economics.

Part III consists of four chapters. It mainly discusses game theory and market theory, including basic game theory, repeated game and reputation mechanism, cooperative game, and market theory of various market structures. Game theory has become an extremely important subdiscipline in mainstream economics, a core field in microeconomics, and the most foundational analytical tool for analyzing various interactive decision problems in economics. For instance, monopolistic competition, and especially the discussion of oligopolistic markets, necessitates the use of a great amount of knowledge and results of game theory, and thus it is discussed together as applications.

Part IV comprises five chapters. It mainly discusses the benchmark market theory in the frictionless situation of perfect competition: general equilibrium theory and social welfare, including the positive theory of competitive equilibrium, the normative theory of competitive equilibrium, economic core, fair allocation, social choice theory, and general equilibrium theory under certainty. General equilibrium theory is one of the most important theories in the history of economic theory development in the past 100 years. It provides a core reference and benchmark for better studying and solving practical problems. This part describes the nature of competitive equilibrium, and explores how to achieve the fair allocation of resources, in order to further demonstrate the universality, optimality, and rationality of the market economy system.

The above four parts mainly describe benchmark models and theories under ideal economic environments in which the market results in efficient allocations, as well as the analytical framework, methods, and tools. However, in many cases, the market is not omnipotent and frequently fails in term of efficiency, especially from the micro- and informationperspective. Indeed, it can face numerous problems, leading to "market failure" . Therefore, it is very important to elucidate where the market fail$s$ and precisely what corrective actions should be taken by governments, regulators, and/or designers. As a consequence, the next three parts of this textbook focus on how to deal with problems caused by market failures, which is closer to reality.

Part V consists of two chapters. It discusses theories of externalities
and public goods, including the typical market failures of externalities and public goods provision. In this part, it will be shown that, in general, these "non-market goods" or "harmful goods" will result in Pareto inefficient allocations, and produce market failure. Due to externalities and the provision of public goods, a primary market is generally not an ideal mechanism for allocating resources.

Part VI has five chapters. The most important three keywords in economics are information, incentive, and efficiency. Therefore, this part is devoted to discussing incentive, information and economic mechanis$m$ design, including principal-agent theory under hidden information and moral hazard, mechanism design under complete information and incomplete information, and dynamic mechanism design. Mechanism design does not attempt to change human nature, which is essentially immutable. As such, mechanism design theory investigates whether and how to design a set of mechanisms (i.e., rules of games or systems) to achieve desired goals under the conditions of individuals pursuing their self-interest, free choice, voluntary exchange, incomplete information and decentralized decision-making, and to compare and assess the advantages and disadvantages of a particular mechanism. Whether or not information is symmetric and incentive is compatible constitute the root causes of different performances of alternative competing mechanisms.

Part VII comprises two chapters, which discusses market design of auction theory and matching theory that are the two frontier subfields of microeconomic theory. Market design, as a relatively new field, can be regarded as the specific expansion and extension of the general mechanism design theory in Part VI, and has a wide range of applications in the real world.

## Teaching tips

As mentioned above, the content of this textbook may be taught at many different levels, and is intended for courses of microeconomics for graduate and advanced undergraduate students, topics of advanced microeconomic theory, or courses in mathematical economics. The rich and fully
expounded-upon content in this textbook also provides a broad range of choices and space for the teaching of microeconomics at different levels, and for the aspects that teachers consider to be the most important. Moreover, teachers can flexibly select relevant chapters and sections to teach according to their teaching needs. The second chapter, about which concerns the knowledge of mathematics, can be also be used as a teaching material or an important reference for mathematical economics.

The following are some suggestions for instructors who choose to use this textbook. (1) For microeconomics sequence I for graduate students and senior undergraduates, consider the following chapters for the teaching of one semester: Chapters 3-5 on individual decision-making and Chapters 68 on game theory. (2) For microeconomics II for graduate students, consider the following chapters for the teaching of one semester: Chapter 9 on market theory, Chapters 10-13 on general equilibrium theory, Chapters 14-15 on externalities and public goods, and Chapters 16-17 on principal-agent theory. (3) For advanced topics in microeconomic theory for graduate students, depending on different foci, the instructor can choose Chapters $18-20$ on mechanism design theory or Chapters 21-22 on market design. Of course, the selection of chapters needs to be based on the preference of instructors, research interests, and constraints on course time. In addition, in teaching advanced microeconomics I, II, or advanced topics in microeconomic theory, it is crucial for students to know the context of Chapter 1 on the nature, category, analytical framework, thoughts and methodologies of economics, and thus students should first either self-study Chapter 1 or be taught it by instructors. In addition, for undergraduates to obtain a general understanding of the scope, ideas, analytical framework, and research methods of economics, they are strongly recommended to read Chapter 1 and the introduction sections of the other chapters.

Doing exercises is the most reliable and effective way to master the content of teaching materials. The exercises at the end of each chapter were written by myself, adapted from classical textbooks and the Doctoral Qualification Examination Question Bank of the Economics Department of world-class universities, or are examples or basic conclusions of original academic papers, indicating their sources whenever possible. I would al-
so like to express my sincere gratitude to the anonymous authors of many exercises in this textbook.

## Research tips

This textbook can also be used as a reference for research. Whether it is to carry out original theoretical, applied or policy-oriented research, it is necessary to learn economics well, master its basic analytical framework and research methods, and establish a solid theoretical and methodological foundation. From the content of textbook, it is possible to learn the most advanced microeconomic theory and engage in relevant research. In general, the study of economics can be broadly divided into two categories. The first category is the study of basic, original, and common theories and tools, most of which have no borders and can generally be applied to any region. The various theories introduced in this textbook basically fall into this category. The second is the attempt to solve pragmatic or realistic issues, i.e., applying the basic principles, analytical frameworks, research methods, and analytical tools of economics to study and solve real-world problems of a nation or region. Indeed, these two are dialectically unified, and it is crucial not to negate the latter by the former, or vice versa. This is the same situation as in basic research in the natural sciences and technological innovation in industry: they are complementary, equally important, and indispensable.

In addition, it should be pointed out that economics, and especially microeconomic theory, mainly provides two categories of theories, both of which possess stringent prerequisites. The first category is to provide various benchmark theories. Most of the theories introduced in Parts II-IV of this textbook belong in this category. The second category is to deliver various relatively more realistic theories. Parts V-VII are more closely associated with reality, and are primarily theories that are proposed to solve practical problems. The first category of theories is primarily based on the economic environments of mature market economies or nations, and provides basic theory in ideal situations. Although it serves an important role in guiding improvement or reform orientation, it deviates from reality, e-
specially concerning economic environments that are still in the process of transition. As a consequence, it is necessary to revise the benchmark theory and consider situations that have frictions and are closer to reality, in order to develop a relatively more realistic economic theory that solves specific practical problems, draws accurate conclusions, and makes predictions with intrinsic logic. For these reasons, these two categories of theories exist in a progressive relationship in the development of disciplines. The basic analytical framework, thoughts, and research methods of economics described in this textbook are not only common to the study of these two types of theories, but can also be employed to better apply economic theory to investigate real-world economic problems. They can even establish a solid theoretical and methodological foundation for the development of economic theories that are suitable for studying transitional economies. This requires the special attention of researchers when using this textbook.

## Acknowledgements

This textbook incorporates, in almost every chapter, some results of my papers published in the past 30 years. Here, first of all, I would like to express my deep gratitude to many collaborators for inspiring my research.

Many people have contributed to the development of this textbook. I would like to express my special thanks to Professors Guoqiang Lou and Darong Dai, who are my assistants to prepare the Chinese and English drafts of this textbook, respectively. The Chinese draft published in 2016 by the China Renmin University Press benefited from the extensive comments and suggestions of Ninghua Du (Chapters 1 and 13), Zhe Yang (Chapters 2, 10, and 11), Cuihong Fan (Chapters 3 and 4), Bingyong Zheng (Chapters 5-7), Qianfeng Tang (Chapter 8), Shanlin Wu (Chapters 9 and 14) and Kang Rong (Chapters 12 and 18-20), who are all from the School of Economic$s$ at Shanghai University of Finance and Economics. My former students, Xiaoyong Cao (Chapters 3-5, 9, and 21), Shaojie Xue (Chapters 6-8, 12-13, 16-17, and 21) and Xinghua Long (Chapters 1-2, 10-11, 14-15, 18-20, and 22), also read relevant chapters of the Chinese draft and provided useful feedback. I also owe a personal debt of gratitude to numerous readers of
the English draft who provided comments and suggestions. Valuable additions, corrections, and comments from Sambuddha Ghosh (Chapter 7), Xiang Han (Chapter 22), Huaxia Zeng (Chapters 12 and 13), Yongchao Zhang (Chapter 5), and Shuguang Zhu (Chapters 18 and 19) have been especially helpful. I also thank Zhe Yang (Chapter 2), Qianfeng Tang (Chapters 3 and 8), Xinghua Long (Chapters 4 and 16), Jun Yu (Chapter 9), Lei Qiao (Chapters 10 and 11), Kang Rong (Chapters 14 and 15), Bingyong Zheng (Chapter 17), Seokjong Ryu (Chapters 18 and 19), Dawen Meng (Chapter 20), Biligbaatar Tumendemberel (Chapter 21), and Man Wah Cheung (Chapter 6) for their important feedback. The most of them mentioned above received their doctoral degrees in economics overseas and are now actively doing research on economic theory.

I would also like to thank the many students and teaching assistants who took my advanced microeconomics courses in various universities. They provided innumerable useful suggestions on the content of the courses. Many economics graduates from Texas A\&M University and Shanghai University of Finance and Economics also participated in the preparation of exercises, document formats, and glossary work. They are Guojing Wang (Chapters 3-4), Jun Hu (Chapters 5-7), Xinghua Long (Chapters 1011), Jianxin Rong (Chapters 15-17), Dazhong Wang (Chapters 12, 14, and 18), Yan Ju (Chapters 7, 8, and 21), Guanfu Fang (Chapters 2 and 6), Liang Hao (Chapters 2-4, $7,9,15,18$, and 19), Youze Yang (Chapters 13-14, 16-17, and 20), Yougong Tian (Chapters 2, 5, 13, and 20), Quanlin Liu (Chapters 12-15), Darong Dai (Chapters 15-18), Chao Huang (Chapters 13-15 and 22), and Zhenhua Jiao (Chapter 22). Jiani Zong assisted with the figures, edited the biographies and figures, and performed other assistant work in preparing the English draft. Liang Hao and Youze Lang participated in the collation of the glossary, as well as the examination of the documents and the standardization of the formats. I am sincerely grateful to them all.

Finally, I would like to thank Shanghai University of Finance and Economics (SUFE) and its previous presidents. In particular, the former president, Professor Tan Min, who appointed me as the Honorary Dean of the School of Economics at SUFE in 2004 and has given me full support to pursue the economics education reform at SUFE. During 2004-2019, I has par-
ticipated in the practice of the reform and development of China's economic education, including the introduction of a large-scale, organized-system of overseas high-level talents, and the reform of the curriculum system with advanced international standards. By now, the School of Economics at SUFE is internationally well-known. According to the Worldwide Economics Departments Research Ranking by Tilburg University, SUFE ranks constantly the first among all the universities in mainland China, top three in Asia, and 50s worldwide in last eight years. During that period, almost every year, I have given doctoral students at SUFE course, entitled Advanced Microeconomics II. Without this opportunity, this textbook would not have been possible.

In short, this textbook is a crystallization of many people's wisdom in a sense. Of course, I am fully responsible for the deficiencies and errors of this textbook.

Guoqiang Tian
In my Xingkong Study in Texas
December, 2020

## Part I

## Preliminary Knowledge and Methods

In order for readers to grasp the content in this textbook more effectively, learn economics, and rigorously understand its profound economic thoughts, theoretical models and proofs, this part introduces the preliminary knowledge and methods of economics and mathematics.

Chapter 1 briefly discusses the nature, essence, category, thoughts, and methods of the discipline of economics. We will fully discuss the ideas and methods of economics, especially those that are involved in this textbook. While the mainstream of the economics profession prior to World War II focused largely on qualitative analysis and economic concepts, to a great extent lacking scientific rigor and quantitative analysis, it currently seems that primary attention is given to techniques and rigor, and the profound economic thoughts behind economics are largely neglected. When studying economics, one should know not only the academic contexts of economics well, but also its systems, in order to master its deep thoughts and wisdom. Combining both, this textbook attempts to advocate pursuing academics "with deep thoughts and for deep thoughts" .

Chapter 2 introduces the basic knowledge and results of mathematics that are indispensable for studying economics, in general, and advanced microeconomic theory, in particular. They are used for rigorous analysis of economic problems and for derivation and proofs of theoretical results. In other words, they provide requisite mathematical knowledge and tools for formalization, axiomatization, and scientification of microeconomic theory.

## Chapter 1

## Nature of Modern Economics

In this chapter, we discuss the nature, role, and methodology of economics, categories of theories, and the scope, preliminary knowledge, concepts, and methods involved in the textbook. We will present the basic terminologies, core assumptions, standard analytical frameworks, methodologies and techniques used in economics, and discuss its research object of the market system, its connection with ancient Chinese economic thought, as well as some key points.

Methodologies and techniques for studying economics include the following: providing benchmarks, establishing reference systems, setting up studying platforms, developing analytical tools, conducting positive and normative analyses, mastering the basic requirements of learning economic theory, understanding the role of economic theory, clarifying necessary and sufficient conditions for a statement, elucidating the role of mathematics and statistics in economics, and becoming familiar with the conversion between economic and mathematical languages.

### 1.1 Economics and Modern Economics

### 1.1.1 What is economics about?

To learn economics well, one must first know its definition and understand its nature, connotation, scope, and concerns.

Economics is a social science that studies how people interact with value in the face of resource scarcity and/or information asymmetries. Specifically, it studies economic behavior and phenomena, and how rational individuals (agents, households, firms, nations, organizations, and government agencies) make trade-off choices with limited resources.

In fact, economics could only come into being due to the fundamental inconsistency and conflict that exists between resource scarcity and individuals' unlimited desires (or wants). The core idea is that individuals, who are under the basic constraint of limited resources (i.e., limited information, capital, time, capacity, freedom etc.) and driven by unlimited desires, must make trade-off choices in resource allocation to make optimal utilization of limited resources to maximize satisfaction of their needs.

As a discipline of social science, economics investigates the problem of choices based on logical analysis and scientific tools, and establishes itself via systematic exploration of the specific topic of choice. Such exploration not only involves the building of theory, but also provides analytical tools for the testing of economic data.

### 1.1.2 Four Basic Questions in Economics

For any economic system, regardless of whether it is a planned economy, wherein the government plays a decisive role, a free economy, wherein the market plays a decisive role, or a semi-market and semi-planned mixed economy, wherein the state-owned economy plays a leading role, all face the following four basic questions regarding the allocation of resources:
(1) What should be produced, and in what quantity?
(2) How should the product be produced?
(3) For whom should it be produced, and how should it be distributed?
(4) Who makes the decisions?

Although these questions must be answered in all economic systems, different economic institutional arrangements provide varied answers. Whether
an institutional arrangement can effectively resolve these problems depends on whether it can effectively deal with the issues induced by information and incentives, and result in efficient or equitable allocations of resources.

Two basic economic institutional arrangements have been used in the real world:
(1) The institutional arrangement of planned economies: Al1 of the four questions are answered by the government, who determines most economic activities and monopolizes decision-making processes and all sectors. The government makes all decisions on market access, product catalogue, infrastructure investment allocation, individual job assignment, product pricing and wages, and it bears all of the risk.
(2) The institutional arrangement of market economies: Most economic activities are organized through the free market. The decisions about what to produce, how to produce and for whom to produce are mainly made by decentralized firms and consumers, and the risk is borne by individuals.

While almost every real-world economic system exists somewhere in between these two extremes, the key factor is which extreme is in the dominant position. Due to the pursuit of personal interests and the presence of private or incomplete information, the fundamental flaw of the planned economic system is that it cannot effectively resolve problems induced by information and incentives, which in turn results in inefficient allocation of resources. On the other hand, the free-market economic system provides a viable solution in these respects in most situations. This is the fundamental reason why countries that once adopted a planned economic system inevitably failed, and why China carried out market-oriented reforms and strove to have the market play the decisive role in resource allocation.

### 1.1.3 What is Modern Economics?

Modern economics, which has developed rapidly since the 1940s and was constructed on the basic recognition of individuals pursuing their self-interest,
systematically studies individuals' economic behavior and economic phenomena by intensively using mathematical tools and adopting scientific methods for rigorous thinking. Specifically, it makes historical and empirical observations of the real world, utilizes the observations towards the formation of theory through rigorous logical analysis, and then again tests the theory in the continuing real world. As a consequence, it is a branch of science equipped with a scientific analytical framework and research methodology. This systematic inquiry not only involves the form of theory, but also provides analytical tools for testing economic data. For brevity, modern economics is simply termed the economics. In the following we will use the both terms interchangeably.

Scientific economic analysis, especially aimed at studying and solving major practical problems affecting the overall situation, is inseparable from "three dimensions and six natures", among which the "three dimensions" are "theoretical logic, practical knowledge, and historical perspective" and the "six natures" are scientific, rigorous, realistic, pertinent, forward-looking, and thought-provoking ". Since social economic issues generally cannot be studied by only using real society and performing experiments on it, we need not only theoretical analysis with inherent logical inferences, but also empirical quantitative analysis or tests with appropriate tools, such as statistics and econometrics. However, only using theory and practice is insufficient, and may cause shortsightedness, because the short-term optimum does not necessary equate to the long-term optimum. As a consequence, historical comparisons from a broad perspective are also requisite for gaining experience and drawing lessons. Indeed, only through the three dimensions of "theoretical logic, practical knowledge, and historical perspective" can we guarantee that its conclusions or reform measures satisfy the "six natures" . Therefore, the "three dimensions and six natures" are indispensable.

Indeed, all knowledge is presented as history, all science is exhibited as logics, and all judgment is understood in the sense of statistics. This is why Joseph Schumpeter (see Section 2.12.2 for his biography) asserted that the difference between an economic scientist and a general economist lies in whether he or she adopts the following three elements when conducting
economic analysis: the first element is theory for logical analysis; the second is history for historical analysis; and the third is statistics for empirical analysis with data. ${ }^{1}$

For theoretical innovations and practical applications, it is of critical importance to correctly understand and master general knowledge of economics and the content of this textbook. It is useful for studying and analyzing economic problems, interpreting economic phenomena and individuals' economic behavior, setting up goals, and identifying the direction of improvements. More importantly, with the support of comparative analysis from the historical perspective and quantitative analysis based on data, we can draw reliable conclusions of inherent logic and make relatively accurate predictions through rigorous inference and analysis.

Economics - a key part of social sciences, is referred to as the "crown" of social sciences due to its extremely general analytical framework, research methods, and analytical tools. Its basic ideas, analytical framework, and research methodologies are potent for studying economic problems and phenomena that occur in different countries, regions, customs and cultures, and can be applied to almost all social sciences. It can even be beneficial if one strives to be a good leader with strong leadership ability, management and work ethic. Indeed, it is lightheartedly referred to as "economic imperialism" or an "omnipotent discipline" due to a bunch of influential works by Gary S. Becker (1930-2014, see Section 13.7.2 for his biography), who applied economic analysis to the entire spectrum of human behavior, including areas previously considered more or less the exclusive domain of sociology, psychology, criminology, demography and education.

### 1.1.4 Economics vs. Natural Science

There are three major differences between economics and natural science:
(1) Economics studies human behavior and needs to impose certain be-

[^2]havioral assumptions; whereas, natural science, in general, does not involve the behavior of human beings (of course, such distinction is not absolute; for example, biology and medicine sometimes involve human behavior. However, these involvements are not from the perspective of rationality, while economics considers human behavior primarily from the perspective of utilitarianism). Once individuals are involved, information is highly incomplete and private (asymmetric) and easy to obscure because their behavior is unpredictable or they reveal information strategically, making it highly challenging to deal with.
(2) In the discussion and study of economic problems, positive analysis of description and normative analysis of value judgment are both needed. As people possess dissimilar values and self-interests, controversies frequently emerge, while natural science generally makes descriptive positive analysis only and the conclusions can be verified through experiments or practice.
(3) Society cannot be simply experimented upon or subjected to tests to form conclusions in economics because policies have broad impacts and large externalities. However, this does not constitute a problem for almost all branches of natural science.

These three differences may make the study of economics more complex and harder. In order to study and solve practical economic problems, one must start from the reality, combine theory with practice, establish the overall and systematic thinking, and adhere to the comprehensive governance concept with general equilibrium analysis as the core, rather than simple controlled experiment (although it is the first step of scientific research). It is essential to adopt the research methodology of "three dimensions and six natures" mentioned above.

### 1.2 Two Categories of Economic Theory

Modern economic theory is an axiomatic way to study economic issues. Similar to mathematics, it relies on logic deductions from presupposed assumptions. It further consists of assumptions/conditions, analytical frameworks and models, and conclusions (interpretations and/or predictions).

Since these conclusions are strictly derived from the assumptions and analytical frameworks and models used, it constitutes an analytical method with inherent logic. This analysis method is highly advantageous for clearly elucidating the problem and can avoid unnecessary complexities and disputes. Economics aims to explain and evaluate observed economic phenomena and make predictions based on economic theory.

### 1.2.1 Benchmark Theory and Relatively Realistic Theory

Economic theory can be divided into two categories by function. One is benchmark economic theory, which provides various benchmarks or reference systems ${ }^{2}$, which is relatively remote from reality and deals with ideal situations. Parts II-IV of the textbook provide such benchmark theories. The second category is a relatively realistic theory that aims to solve practical issues, so that assumptions are closer to reality, which are usually modifications to the benchmark theory. Parts V-VII provide such relatively applied theories. As such, both types of theories are essential, and can be used to draw logical conclusions and make predictions. In addition, a progressive and complementary relationship of development and extension exists between these two categories. The second category of realistic theories is developed by revising the first category of benchmark theories as the reference frame, thus making the theoretical system of economics complete and proximal to the real world.

The benchmark theories are largely built on the economic environment of mature market economies and ideal situations. Their great significance should not be underestimated, misunderstood, or denied. They have demonstrated their critical importance in at least two aspects.

Firstly, although theoretical results of this category do not exist and cannot be realized in practice, they do play a critical role in providing guidance, orientation, and benchmarks. When we tackle a problem, it is necessary to first determine what to do and whether it should be done, and then proceed to the question of how to do it. Benchmark theories answer the question of what to do, or provide the direction and goals of improvement

[^3]towards the ideal situation. Although it is the case that sometimes only a relatively better result can be achieved, the optimal outcome can be approached through the process of continually comparing the outcomes with the benchmark or reference system. This is why it is correctly claimed that it is only through comparing our performances with the best and learning from the best, can we perpetually improve. Therefore, the benchmark theory provides necessary standards for judging what is better and whether it constitutes the right direction, without which what we are doing may not be moving us towards our goals at all. .

Secondly, it establishes the necessary foundations for developing the other category of realistic theories. Any theory, conclusion, or statemen$t$ can only be considered relatively; otherwise, there will be no basis for analysis or evaluation. It is for this reason that benchmark theories are required. This is true for both physics, which is a natural science, and economics, which is a social science. For instance, a world with friction is relative to a world with no friction, information asymmetry is relative to information symmetry, monopoly is relative to competition, technological progress and institutional changes are relative to technological and institutional lock-in, etc. Consequently, we must first develop the benchmark theory under rather ideal situations. This is analogous to basic laws and principles in physics, which only hold under an ideal situation without friction, and do not exist in reality, but nevertheless remain fundamentally important because they provide requisite benchmarks for solving physics problems in reality. Similarly, to study real economic behaviors and phenomena, which include "friction", it is necessary to first be clear about the ideal situation without "friction", and then use it as a benchmark and reference system. Indeed, the rapid development of economics would be impossible without benchmark economic theories.

As an important part of economics, neoclassical economics assumes the regularity conditions of complete information, zero transaction costs, and convexities of consumer preference and production sets, and thus falls into the first category of benchmark economic theory. Neoclassical economics considers ideal situations; although there is no artificially designed social goal, it contends that, as long as individuals are self-interested, the
market of free competition will naturally lead to the efficient allocation of resources. This is regarded as a rigorous statement of the "invisible hand" proposed by Adam Smith (1723-1790, see 1.17 .1 for his biography). It is thus set as the reference system for us to determine the direction and goals for reforms in order to improve the economic, political, and social environment, establish the competitive market system, and let the market play a decisive role in the allocation of resources. The boundary conditions for the market to work well also inform us about when the market will fail, at which time the government will need to step in and play a guiding role.

One may assert that an ideal reference system is far removed from the real economy, and thus deny the role of neoclassical economics and reject the instructive role of economics in economic reform. This, however, constitutes a serious misunderstanding, as it fails to acknowledge that the great gap between reality and the benchmark/reference system only shows the necessity for a nation, such as China, to implement market-oriented reforms and to continuously improve the efficiency of resource allocation. This kind of opinion, which refutes the role of benchmark theory, is similar to the denial of physics by a junior high school student who has just learned several formulas of Newton's three laws and criticizes them for postulating conditions that are totally dissimilar from those in the real world. In these cases, however, the role of benchmark theory is not understood correctly. Indeed, without the benchmark theory in physics concerning free fall and uniform motion, how could we know the magnitude of frictional force so that we could construct a house that is stable ? Furthermore, how could we determine how much frictional force should be overcome to solve problems regarding the taking-off and landing of airplanes or the launching of satellites? It is clear that, without benchmark theory, applied physics cannot be developed. The study of economics follows the same logic, and thus we need directions, structures, goals, and certain fundamentals, which is especially the case for implementing reforms in transitional economies.

To facilitate reforms for transitional economies, goals must be established, and thus benchmarks and reference systems are required for the reform to orientate itself. For the social economic development of a country, it is necessary to transcend rational thinking,theoretical discussion and
theoretical innovation, and determine the direction and goals of the reform in the first place. Moreover, it must be acknowledged that the fundamental institutions that determine the rule of collective decision-making, legal systems, strategies and policies play decisive roles in this process. If basic institutions of the rule of law, legal systems, politics, economy, society, and culture that concern a nation's path of development and long-term stability are not determined, economic theories in the present state-of-the-art may accomplish nothing, and may even have deleterious effects. In the discipline of economics, there is not a universal economic theory that is always applicable for all development stages, but rather there is an optimal one that is best suited for certain development stage under certain institutional environments.

For market-oriented reforms, it is natural and necessary to set neoclassical economic theory - especially economic theory of the first category, such as general equilibrium theory, that demonstrates the market as the optimal economic system - as a benchmark and the competitive market as a reference system for the orientation of these reforms. In this way, the results of the reforms will be continuously improved towards reaching the best possible outcome.

According to the economic environment defined by these benchmarks , reforms of deregulation and delegation for competition neutrality must be carried out, including ownership neutrality, liberalization, privatization, and marketization or reforms against government monopoly of resources and control of market access. In particular, the general equilibrium theory defines the applicable range of market mechanisms and identifies the environments under which the market may fail. With such knowledge, it is possible to identify the areas in which governments could establish rules and institutions to correct market failures.

Therefore, the study of economic problems and reforms, and especially determination of the direction of reforms, must commence from the benchmark of economics. Reforms that run counter to common sense in economics will end up in failure. The benchmark and reference system present the premises on which the market will lead to a more efficient allocation and result in a more prosperous market economy, thereby revealing the di-
rection of the reforms. The fourth part of this textbook stresses the ArrowDebreu general equilibrium theory (Kenneth Joseph Arrow, 1921-2017, see Section 10.8.2 for his biography; Gerald Debreu, 1921-2004, see Section 11.9.2 for his biography) and the rational expectations theory of macroeconomics (referred to as neoclassical macroeconomics), both of which are standard theories of neoclassical economics and rigorously demonstrate that markets of free competition lead to efficient allocation of resources.

Alternative benchmarks and reference systems under different value judgements and goals could lead to markedly divergent outcomes. For example, when students regard a "pass" grade as their benchmark, the result is frequently a failure because a test comprised of questions is a random variable to the students. Just as Confucius and Sun Zi asserted, those who aim at the superior get the medium, those who aim at the medium get the inferior, and those who aim at the inferior lose entirely, which illustrates the critical importance of the choice of benchmark. Meanwhile, given that many benchmark theories are established under ideal conditions, they cannot be simply adopted to solve real problems in practice. In other words, a well-trained economist will not mechanically apply economic theories in the first category. However, concerning the economic reforms implemented in some transitional economies, we may come across some economists who do not analyze the dynamics in the transition, consider only developed countries but not developing countries, and neglect the objective law and constraints in special development stages. As such, both the target and the path selection and schedule arrangement for accomplishing the target are of crucial importance in practice. In addition, although some short-term economic and social problems might be resolved through promoting growth and development per se, market-oriented reforms should not be delayed; otherwise, an emerging economy is likely to be trapped in the transitional status.

It should be pointed out that a benchmark economic theory is established under an exogenously given economic environment that constitutes a relatively ideal situation. In so doing, we are able to address the key issues and draw some benchmark conclusions; otherwise, no question can be scientifically discussed if we do not control for many factors. Therefore, in
neoclassical theories and numerous other economic theories, an economic environment that comprises basic institutions, individual preferences and production technologies must be exogenously-given. Elaborating further, if achieving the market system under the ideal situation is our goal, it is logical to set it as a given institutional arrangement in order to thoroughly elucidate its desirable properties. However, this does not mean that economics only investigates situations in which the institution is given. In fact, many theories in economics are specialized in addressing how the economic environment changes, such as the study of institutional evolution, economic transition, endogenous preferences and technological progress. As such, one should not misinterpret economics as a sort of discipline that provides only benchmark economic theories established under ideal situations.

Theories in the second category constitute relatively more realistic economic theories that aim haw to solve practical problems, and are constructed on presupposed assumptions that more closely approach reality and are modifications of the benchmark theories. According to their functions, they can be further divided into two types: the first kind provides an analytical framework, method, or tools for solving practical problems , such as game theory, mechanism design theory, principal-agent theory, auction theory, matching theory; and the second kind offers specific policy suggestions, such as the Keynesian theory, rational expectations theory, and growth theory in macroeconomics.

### 1.2.2 The Domain and Scientific Rigor of Economics

It can be seen from the definition of the above two categories of economic theories, modern economics is a highly inclusive and open discipline in dynamic development, which far exceeds the scope of neoclassical economics. Through weakening the assumptions of benchmark theories and standardized axiomatic formulation of descriptive theories, economics continuously develops the second category of economic theories, which grants itself great insight, explanatory power, and predictability. In the author's opinion, as long as a study involves rigorous logical analysis (not necessarily us-
ing mathematical models) and adopts rationality assumption (bounded rationality assumption included), it falls into the category of (modern) economics.

Modern economics originated from classical economics, which was developed based on integration of Adam Smith's work by Thomas Robert Malthus (1766-1834, see Section 4.6.1 for his biography) and David Ricardo (1772-1823, see Section Section 1.17 .2 for his biography), including not only benchmark theories, such as neoclassical marginal analysis economics established by Alfred Marshall (1842-1924, see Section 3.11.1 for his biography) and Arrow-Debreu's general equilibrium theory, but also many more realistic economic theories. For instance, the new institutional economics by Douglass C. North (1920-2015, see Section 5.5.1 for his biography) and mechanism design theory by Leonid Hurwicz (1917-2008, see Section 16.10.2 for his biography) have both developed neoclassical theory in a revolutionary manner. Specifically, while neoclassical theory takes institutions as given, North and Hurwicz endogenized institutions, viewing them as changeable, shapeable and designable, and thus formulated various institutional arrangements by complying with human nature for different environments. Indeed, they have both become crucial components of economics. Furthermore, the development of new political economics has, to a large extent, borrowed the analytical methods and tools of the second category of economic theory.

It is important to note that, because theories of the second category strive to develop analytical frameworks, methods, and tools for solving practical problems and offer specific policy recommendations largely based on a mature modern market system, their application must be approached cautiously. In fact, every rigorous economic theory in modern economics possesses a self-consistent logic and consequently must have boundaries and scopes within which they are applicable. This is true for not only original theory but also analytical tools, and for not only the first category of theory that offers benchmarks or reference systems but also the second category of theory that aims to solve practical economic problems. As a consequence, much mathematics is frequently needed, which incurs a common criticism of economics' overemphasis on model details and increasingly heavy involvement of mathematics and statistics, making economic
questions and conclusions per se even more opaque and challenging to understand.

The major reason that modern economics uses a substantial amount of mathematics and statistics is that economists must scientifically (both qualitatively and quantitatively) identify the applicable scope of an economic theory, which is especially the case when proposing economic policies based on the economic theory. Once a theory is adopted for making policy, great negative externalities may come into being if the boundary conditions of the theory are not known. In particular, it is the economists who make policy proposals, rather than the policy-makers and the public, that must have a good knowledge of the details or premises of a rigorous theoretical analysis. To this end, mathematics is needed to thoroughly identify the boundary conditions and applicable scopes of economic theories; simultaneously, economists equipped with the knowledge of mathematics can lay a strong foundation for continuous theoretical innovations. Moreover, the application of a theory or the formulation of a policy will usually require the use of statistics and econometrics for quantitative analyses or empirical tests.

In most cases, as real society cannot be simply used for experiments, a larger historical perspective is useful for viable vertical and horizontal comparisons. In addition, many superfluous disputes can be avoided in the exploration and discussion of certain questions. Hurwicz, for example, believed that the biggest shortcoming of traditional economic theories is the imprecise explanation of concepts, while the greatest significance of the axiomatic method lies in its formalization of the theory, providing a commensurable research paradigm and analytical framework for both discussion and criticism.

As a result, as the basic theoretical foundation for market economies, economics relies heavily on the introduction of research methodology and analytical framework of natural sciences to study social economic behaviors and phenomena. Indeed, using mathematical models as basic analytical tools, it stresses the inherent logic from assumptions and derivations to conclusions, along with the use of statistics, econometrics and computer simulations for data-driven empirical research, laboratory experimental
research, as well as field research. As such, comparing to other humanities and social sciences, modern economics exhibits strong characteristics of positivism and pragmatism, and is more likely to have the flavor of natural sciences.

### 1.2.3 The Roles of Economic Theory

Economic theory has at least three roles.
The first role is to provide various benchmarks and reference systems to establish desired goals in order to create directions to be pursued for improvement. Through reforms, transitions and innovations guided by theory, the economy in the real world is driven increasingly proximal to the ideal state.

The second role is to be used to learn and understand the real economic world, and to explain economic phenomena and economic behaviors in order to solve real problems. Indeed, this is the major content of economics.

The third role is to be used to make logically inherent inferences and predictions. Practice is the sole criterion for testing truth, but not the sole criterion for predicting it. In many cases, problems may still arise if only historical examination and existing data are employed for economic prediction, and thus theoretical analysis with inherent logic is imperative. Through logical analysis of economic theory, it is possible to make logically inherent inferences and predictions on possible outcomes under given economic environments. In so doing, we can solve real economic problems in a better way. As long as the pre-assumptions in a theoretical model are roughly met, scientific conclusions can be obtained and essentially correct predictions and inferences can be made accordingly, so that we may know the outcomes. For instance, the theoretical inference that a planned economy is unfeasible proposed in 1920s by Friedrich Hayek (1899-1992, see Section 2.12.1 for his biography) possesses this kind of insight. A good theory can deduce logically inherent results without requiring social experiments, which can somehow overcome the shortcoming that economics cannot carry out experiments on real society to a great extent. What is necessary, however, is to check whether the assumptions made on economic environ-
ments are reasonable (experimental economics, which has become popular in recent years, is mainly engaged in fundamental theoretical research, such as testing individual behavioral assumptions). For example, we are not allowed to issue currency just for examining the relationship between inflation and unemployment. Similar to the case of astronomers and biologists, most of the time economists can only rely on existing data and phenomena to test and revise theories.

Of course, as indicated above, it would not be helpful to exaggerate the role of economic theory, and expect it to solve key and fundamental problems. What is fundamental, key, and decisive is the basic constitution and institution that determine a nation's fundamental path of development. If the underlying system governing the direction of the country and longterm prosperity in politics, economy, society, and culture is not yet built, the application of economic theory may even lead to deleterious results.

### 1.2.4 Microeconomic Theory

A notable feature of microeconomic theory is that it sets up theoretical models for economic activities of self-interested individuals, especially in market economies, conducts rigorous analysis and examines how the market works on such a basis.

Microeconomics deals with the core issue of pricing. It focuses on such questions as: which factors affect pricing? Do enterprises have pricing power? How can an enterprise get the power of pricing ? How can an enterprise set the optimal price? To elucidate the answers to such a large issue, it is necessary to study the demand, supply, characteristics and functions of the market, and pricing in all kinds of markets and economic environments. As a result, microeconomics is also called the price theory.

Microeconomics constitutes the core of economics and the theoretical foundation of all branches of economics. It enables us to employ simplified assumptions for in-depth analyses of various aspects of the complex world in order to get some useful insights. It also assists us to extract the most useful information from unrelated entities and consider various issues using the method of economics to develop explanations and predictions that
conform to reality. It is in this sense that all other branches of economics, such as macroeconomics, finance, applied economics, etc., call for support from microeconomic theory.

### 1.3 Economics and Market System

A main purpose of economics is to investigate the objective laws of market and individuals' (e.g., consumers and firms) behavior in the market. Specifically, it examines how self-interested individuals coordinate their economic activities and make optimal choices in the market, how the market allocates social resources, how economic stability and sustainable growth are achieved, etc. Therefore, for the purpose of studying economics comprehensively, one should possess a general understanding of the functions and advantages of modern market mechanisms.

### 1.3.1 Market and Market Mechanism

Here, we briefly introduce the operation and basic functions of the market and how the market coordinates individuals' economic activities without requiring excessive participation or intervention of the government.

Market: The market constitutes a modality of trade in which buyers and sellers conduct voluntary exchanges. It refers not only to the location where buyers and sellers conduct exchanges, but also to all forms of trading activity, such as auction and bargaining mechanisms.

When studying microeconomics, it is crucial to keep in mind that any transaction in the market has both buyers and sellers. In other words, for a buyer of any good, there is a corresponding seller. The final outcome of the market process is determined by the rivalry of relative forces of sellers and buyers in the market. Three forms of competition exist in such a rivalry: consumer-producer competition, consumer-consumer competition, and producer-producer competition. Throughout this textbook, readers will find that the bargaining position of consumers and producers in the market is circumscribed by these three sources of competition in economic transactions. Competition in any form is like a disciplinary mechanism that
guides the market process and has varied impacts on different markets.
Market mechanism: The market mechanism or price mechanism is an economic institution in which individuals make decentralized decisions guided by price. It is worth noting, however, that this is usually a narrow definition of market mechanism. In fact, a mature market mechanism or market system constitutes the set of all systems and mechanisms closely related with the market (including the system of market laws and regulations). As a form of economic organization featuring decentralized decision-making, as well as voluntary cooperation and voluntary exchange of products and services, it is one of the greatest inventions in human history and by far the most successful means for human beings to solve their economic problems. Indeed, the establishment of the market mechanism is not a conscious, purposeful human design, but rather a product of the natural process of evolution. In the opinion of Hayek, market order is a spontaneous order of the economy which has evolved through long-term choices and processes of trial and error. The emergence, development, and further extension of economics are mainly based on the study of the market system. In aggregate, the operation of the market appears wonderous and beyond comprehension. It is genuinely awe-inspiring that, in the market system, decisions on resource allocation are independently made by producers and consumers who pursue their own interests under the guidance of market price without the imposition of any command or order. The market system unknowingly solves the previously mentioned four basic questions which must be faced by all economic systems: what to produce, how to produce, for whom to produce, and who makes the decisions.

Under the market system, firms and individuals make the decisions on voluntary exchange and cooperation. Consumers seek maximal satisfaction of their demands, while firms pursue profits. In order to maximize profits, firms must have meticulous plans for the most efficient utilization of resources. In other words, for resources with similar usage or quality, firms will choose the ones with the lowest possible cost. Although " making the best use of everything" may differ in meaning from the point of view of firms and that of the economy, price makes them related which, as a result, harmonizes the interests of firms and those of the entire soci-
ety, and leads to the efficient allocation of resources. The price level reflects the supply and demand of resources in the economy and the degree of scarcity of resources. For example, in the case of an inadequate timber supply and ample steel supply in the economy, timber will be expensive while steel will be inexpensive; consequently, to reduce expenses and make more profits, firms will strive to use more steel and less timber. In doing so, firms do not take the interests of society into consideration, but the outcome is precisely in accordance with social interests, and it is the role of resource price that achieves this. Resource price coordinates the interests of firms and those of the overall society, and solves the problem of how to produce. The price system also guides firms to make production decisions in the interest of society. Indeed, it is the consumer who has the final say about what to produce. Firms only need consider how to produce products that have a higher price. Yet, in the market system, the price level exactly reflects social needs. For instance, poor harvests and the corresponding rising grain price will encourage farmers to produce more grain. As such, profitpursuing producers "come to the rescue" under this guiding force, and the problem of what to produce is solved. Moreover, the market system also addresses the problem of how to distribute products among consumers. If a consumer really needs a shirt, he or she will offer a higher price for it than will others. Profit-pursuing producers will certainly aim to sell the shirt to the consumer who offers the highest price. In this way, the problem of for whom to produce is solved. Furthermore, all of these decisions are made by producers and consumers in a decentralized manner, and thus the problem of who makes the decision is also resolved.

As such, the market mechanism easily coordinates seemingly incompatible individual interests and public interests. As early as over 200 years ago, Adam Smith, the Father of modern Economics, identified the harmony and wonder of the market mechanism in his masterpiece, The Wealth of Nations (Adam Smith, 1776). He regarded the competitive market mechanism as an "invisible hand" . Under the guidance of this invisible hand, individuals solely pursuing their own interests move towards a common goal, and thus achieve maximization of social welfare:
"... every individual necessarily labours to render the annual revenue of the
society as great as he can. He generally, indeed, neither intends to promote the public interest, nor knows how much he is promoting it ... he intends only his own gain, and he is in this, as in many other cases, led by an invisible hand to promote an end which was no part of his intention. Nor is it always the worse for the society that it was no part of it. By pursuing his own interest, he frequently promotes that of the society more effectually than when he really intends to promote it."

Smith meticulously examined how the market system combines the self-interestedness of individuals with social interests and the division and cooperation of labor. The core of Smith's paradigm is that, if the division of labor and exchange of goods are totally voluntary, then exchange will only occur when we realize that the result of the exchange is mutually beneficial to both parties of exchange. Indeed, as long as there are benefits, individuals driven by self-interest will cooperate voluntarily. In other words, external pressure is not a requisite condition for cooperation. Even if language barriers exist, as long as mutual benefits can be obtained, exchange can take place. In most cases, the market mechanism works so harmoniously that individuals are not even cognizant of its existence. With the metaphor of "the invisible hand" , Smith highlighted the importance of voluntary cooperation and voluntary exchange in economic activities. It is worth noting, however, that the claim that the welfare of society can be achieved by the market system is not yet recognized universally, nor was it during Smith's lifetime. The Arrow-Debreu general equilibrium theory, which will be discussed in this textbook, contains a formal statement of Smith's "invisible hand" and rigorously demonstrates how the market of free competition can lead to the maximization of social welfare, and proves the optimality of the market in allocating resources.

### 1.3.2 Three Functions of Price

As discussed above, the normal operation of the market system is realized via the price mechanism. As analyzed by Milton Friedman (1912-2006, see Section 4.6.2 for his biography), the Nobel Laureate in Economics, price performs three functions in organizing rapidly changing economic activities involving hundreds of millions of individuals:
(1) Transmitting information: price transmits production and consumption information in the most efficient manner;
(2) Providing incentive: price provides incentives for individuals to carry out consumption and production in an optimal way;
(3) Determining income distribution: endowment of resources, price, and the efficiency of economic activities determine the income distribution.

In fact, as early as the Han dynasty of China, Sima Qian (a Chinese historian of the Han dynasty who is considered the father of Chinese historiography) observed and summarized the law of commodity price fluctuation, stating that, for all commodities, "when an article has become extremely expensive, it will surely fall in price, and when it has become extremely cheap, then the price will begin to rise" . Therefore, in the effort to become rich, individuals will make good use of this law to "look for a profitable time to sell" .

## Function 1 of Price: Transmitting Information

Price guides the decision-making of participants and transmits information about changes in supply and demand. When the demand for a certain commodity increases, sellers will notice the increase of sales and thus place more orders with wholesalers. These wholesalers will then place more orders with manufacturers, causing the price to rise, and the manufacturers will then invest more factors of production to produce this commodity. In this way, the message of increasing demand for this commodity is received by all related parties.

The price system also transmits information in a highly efficient manner, and it only transmits information to those who need it. Moreover, the price system not only transmits information, but also produces a certain incentive to ensure the smooth transmission of information so that information will not remain in the hands of those who do not need it. Those who transmit information are internally motivated to look for those who
are in need of that information, while those who need information are internally driven to acquire information. For example, ready-to-wear apparel manufacturers are continually striving to obtain the best kind of cloth and looking for new suppliers. Meanwhile, cotton cloth manufacturers are also always reaching out to clients to attract them with the high quality and inexpensive price of their products by various means of marketing and publicity. Those who are not involved in such activities will surely be indifferent to the prices and supply and demand of cotton cloth. The mechanism design theory, as discussed in Chapter 18 of this textbook, will demonstrate that the competitive market mechanism is the most efficient mechanism in the utilization of information because it requires the least amount of information and thus the lowest transaction cost. In the 1970s, Hurwicz and his collaborators had already proved that, for the neoclassical economic environment of pure exchange, no other economic mechanism can achieve as efficient resource allocation using less information than does the competitive market mechanism.

## Function 2 of Price: Providing Incentive

Price can also provide incentives, so that individuals will react to changes of supply and demand. When the demand of a commodity decreases, an economic society should provide certain incentives so that manufacturers of the commodity will increase production. One of the advantages of the market price system is that prices not only transmit information, but also provide incentives for individuals to respond to the information voluntarily out of self-interest, so that consumers are driven to consume in an optimal way while producers are driven to conduct production in the most efficient manner. The incentive function of price is closely related to the third function of price: determining income distribution. As long as the increased gain brought by increased production (i.e., marginal revenue) exceeds the increased cost (i.e., marginal cost), producers will continue to increase production until the two are equal, and thus maximum profits are realized.

## Function 3 of Price: Determining Income Distribution

In a market economy, an individual's income depends on the resource endowment that he or she owns (e.g., assets, labor) and the outcomes of economic activities in which he or she is engaged. Concerning income distribution, it is always desirable to separate price's function of income distribution from its other functions, in the aim of attaining a more equal income distribution without affecting the other two functions of transmitting information and providing incentive. The three functions, however, are closely related and complementary. Indeed, once price no longer influences income, its functions of transmitting information and providing incentive will disappear. If one's income does not depend on the price of labor or commodities that he or she offers to others, why would he or she bother to acquire the information of price and market demand and supply and respond to such information? If one receives the same income irrespective of how much work he or she performs, then who would strive to do an excellent job? If no benefits are given for innovation and inventions, who would be willing to invest effort in this endeavor? If price has no impact on income distribution, it will also lose its other two critical functions.

### 1.3.3 The Superiority of the Market System

The modern market system is a sophisticated and delicate economic institution that has emerged, gradually taken shape, and been constantly improved in the long-term evolution of human society. The fundamental and decisive role of the market mechanism in resource allocation is the key to the market economy's capacity for optimal resource allocation. Optimality here has the same meaning as the Pareto optimality (efficiency) proposed by Vilfredo Pareto (1848-1923, see his biography in Section 11.9.1) which will be discussed in Chapter 11 in more detail. It means that, under given resource constraints, no other feasible allocation of rescouses exists that can make some participants better off without harming the welfare of others. Even though Pareto optimality fails to consider the issue of social fairness and justice in terms of equality, it provides a basic criterion of whether or not a resource is wasted concerning social benefit for an economic system,
and evaluates social economic effects regarding feasibility. According to this criterion, if an allocation is not efficient, space exists for such allocation to be improved.

Two fundamental theorems of welfare economics, which we will discuss in Part IV on general equilibrium theory, provide a rigorous formal expression of Adam Smith's assessment. As the formal statement of his 'invisible hand', the theorems prove that the free competitive market can maximize social welfare and achieve market optimality in terms of resource allocation. The First Fundamental Theorem of Welfare Economics demonstrates that when individuals pursue their own self-interest, and if economic agents have unlimited or locally non-satiable desire, the competitive market system can achieve Pareto-efficient allocation for economic environments with private divisible goods, complete information, and no externality. The Second Fundamental Theorem of Welfare Economics, on the other hand, proves that for neo-classical economic environments, any Paretoefficient allocation can be achieved by reallocating initial endowments and competitive market equilibrium without the need to introduce other economic systems to replace the market mechanism. Precise statements and rigorous proofs of these theorems will be given in Chapter 11.

The economic core equivalence theorem in Chapter 12, from another perspective, proves that the market system can benefit social stability, and is optimal and unique in terms of resource allocation, being the result of natural selection with objective inherent logic regarding economic activities. The competitive market mechanism can not only lead to efficient allocation of resources, but also solve the problem of social stability and orderliness well. Moreover, it is the product of free and full competition. The basic connotation of the economic core is that, when the allocation of social resources possesses the core property, there will not be any coalition (i.e., a group of agents) that is dissatisfied with the allocation, and wants to improve their welfare by controlling and utilizing their own resources. In this sense, no powers or groups exist that pose a threat to society, and thus society will be relatively stable.

Under the fundamental fact of individuals' pursuit of self-interest, the economic core equivalence theorem reveals that: the equilibrium allocation
by competitive market mechanism has the core property; on the contrary, under some regularity conditions, such as monotonicity, continuity, and convexity (diminishing marginal rate of substitution) of preference, as long as individuals are given enough economic freedom (i.e., the freedom to cooperate and exchange voluntarily) and perfect competition, the outcome will be identical to that of competitive market equilibrium without establishing any institutional arrangements in advance, so they are equivalent. Therefore, the market system is not an invention, but rather an inherent economic rule and a spontaneous order, which is as objective and reliable as any law of nature. The policy implication of this conclusion is that the market should be allowed to fully play its role when the competitive market mechanism is able to attain optimal allocation. Indeed, it is only under the circumstances in which the competitive market is incapable will other mechanisms be designed to compensate for market failures.

Furthermore, the competitive market mechanism is not only optimal and unique concerning social stability maintenance and efficient resource allocation, but also effective in the transmission of information. In the 1970s, Hurwicz and his collaborators proved that, for neoclassical pure exchange economies, there is no other economic mechanism which can lead to such efficient allocation of resources using less information than the competitive market mechanism. In 1982, Jordan further proved that, in pure exchange economies, the market mechanism is the only mechanism that achieves efficient allocation using the least amount of information. Tian (2006) also demonstrated that this conclusion is true not only in pure exchange economies, but also for economies with production, and that the market mechanism is unique. Consequently, an important inference follows: irrespective of whether in a command planned economy, state-owned economy or mixed economy, the amount of information that is needed to realize the efficient allocation of resources is more than that in a competitive market mechanism, and thus those economic systems are not informationally efficient. This conclusion provides a key theoretical explanation for why China needs market-oriented economic reform and privatization of its state-owned economy. The uniqueness result of information efficiency will be explored further in Chapter 18.

Even though the market mechanism cannot perfectly solve the problem of social fairness manifested in the large income and wealth gap between the rich and the poor, as long as the government strives to provide a level playing field with equality of opportunity and equal value of resources for all individuals and allows the market to play its role instead of controlling it, equity and efficient resource allocation can be achieved by the market, as the fairness theorem in Chapter 12 indicates. The above statements and proofs about the optimality, uniqueness, and fairness of the modern competitive free market system in resource allocation and its contribution to social stability are all core aspects of the general equilibrium theory.

Joseph Schumpeter also discussed the optimality of the market mechanism from the perspective of how interactions (dynamic game) between competition and monopoly lead to innovation-driven growth. His innovation theory informed us that valuable competition is not merely price competition, but more importantly, competition in new commodities, new technologies, new markets, new supply sources, and new combinations of ideas, knowledge, and resources. As a consequence, the root of the longterm vitality of the market economy is innovation and creativity, which stems from entrepreneurship and entrepreneurs' constant, creative destabilization of the market equilibrium, which he refers to as 'creative destruction'. Profit-pursuing entrepreneurs and private economies are necessary to cultivate the soil for innovation, and to encourage and protect innovation.

In fact, competition and monopoly, like supply and demand, can form an astonishing unity of opposites through the power of the market, thus revealing the true beauty and power of the market system. Indeed, market competition and enterprise innovation are inseparable. If there is no competition, there will also be no motivation for innovation; this is what occurs in state-owned enterprises in state monopolies. It is the case, of course, that competition results in profit decline. Overall, the fiercer the competition becomes, the more rapidly corporate profits decrease. This provides enterprises with strong incentives to innovate in order to survive. Innovating enterprises may gain a monopoly position, which implies monopoly profits, which will attract more enterprises to participate in the competi-
tion. As a consequence, a repeated cycle of "competition $\rightarrow$ innovation $\rightarrow$ monopoly profit $\rightarrow$ competition" is established, in which market competition tends to achieve an equilibrium, but innovation disrupts it. The market continually goes through such cycles to inspire enterprises to pursue innovation. Through this dynamic process, the market maintains its vitality, and greater economic development and social welfare are obtained. Therefore, in order to encourage innovation, the government should strictly enforce laws regarding intellectual property rights protection

While people may realize the importance of entrepreneurs and entrepreneurship, not all fully recognize the fundamental importance of the institutional basis for the emergence of entrepreneurs and entrepreneurship, and that innovation and development need institutional support. This is because entrepreneurs and entrepreneurship do not appear randomly, but rather entrepreneurship is derivative and superficial. Therefore, it must be built on a basic meta-institution, which necessitates a conducive institutional environment as a prerequisite. As such, Baumol (1990) extended Schumpeter's innovation theory, and argued that innovation and entrepreneurship depend on institutional choice, and are therefore endogenous variables. If the rules of the game that affect the choice of entrepreneurial behaviors are abnormal, innovation and entrepreneurship cannot achieve their full potential. Indeed, so far, three industrial revolutions have occurred in the world: the industrial revolution in Britain; the second industrial revolution led by the United States and Germany; and the third industrial revolution, which takes artificial intelligence manufacturing as the core. The occurrence and development of each industrial revolution are closely related to institutional innovation, which provides critical support for the smooth development of industrial revolutions.

For instance, in order to encourage competition and form positive externalities of technological innovation, anti-monopoly legislation should be enacted and enforced. In addition, protection of intellectual property rights should not last forever, but rather should be limited to a certain number of years so that they will not establish a perpetual oligopoly or monopoly. Therefore, technological innovations operate on the basis of institutional innovations. These two kinds of innovations behave like an action-reaction
pair. Specifically, a good institution can reduce the transaction costs of innovation, create conditions for cooperation, provide incentives for innovation, and facilitate internalization of the benefits of innovation. One goal of constructing a technological innovation system is to promote effective interaction and cooperation among innovative elements.

Innovation comprises transcending rules and regulations, which inevitably poses high risks. High-tech innovation, in particular, means high risks and an extremely low possibility of success for venture capital investment; when it succeeds, however, it brings considerable, and possibly parabolic, returns, which then attracts more investment. Nevertheless, it is impossible for state-owned enterprises to take such high risks due to the fact that they inherently lack the incentive mechanisms that would enable the assumption of such risks. In contrast, it is private enterprises that typically dare to take the most risk out of a strong incentive to pursue their self-interest, and consequently they are the most creative and innovative entities. Therefore, entrepreneurial innovation (not fundamental scientific research) largely takes place within the context of private business. In fact, Sima Qian, a major Chinese philosopher, also affirmed that competition and survival of the fittest constituted fully natural tendencies. He believed that it was not certain trades that were more likely to produce wealth, and that wealth was not exclusively attained by specific people. He asserted that a capable person would accumulate wealth; whereas, incapable people would forfeit it.

What should be noted is, with the emergence of innovation in financial technology and big data method, the deviation between the real economic situation and the ideal state will be decreased. Innovation will push the real market economy toward the ideal state of market economy described by Adam Smith, Friedrich Hayek, Kenneth Joseph Arrow, Gerard Debrue, and Ronald H. Coase (1910-2013, see Section 14.6.2 for his biography). Indeed, the market can be proven to be optimal, irrespective of whether it defines the role of the competitive market as the "invisible hand' à la Adam Smith, general equilibrium in the perfectly competitive market by Arrow and Debrue, the theory with the zero transaction cost in the perfectly competitive market by Coase, or the assertion that competition benefits inno-
vation from Schumpeter. The basic conclusion of these theories is that the perfectly competitive market leads to efficient allocation of resources and social welfare maximization. Of course, the perfectly competitive market merely provides a reference system or an ultimate goal, which means that the more competitive the market is, the better it is; and the more symmetric the information is, the better it is. Such a perfectly competitive market system, however, does not exist in reality because communication costs, transaction costs, and financing costs cannot be zero (although they may approach it).

With the Internet as a medium for finance and big data method, transaction costs are becoming increasingly diminutive. Due to the disruptive innovation and development of financial technology and big data method, to some extent, the perfectly competitive market, as considered by the first category of economic theory, is not just an ideal state but also tends to increasingly approach reality. In particular, financial technology and big data method will greatly reduce the cost of information communication in reality in order to make market economic activities closer to the ideal state of perfect competition and thus more efficient.

### 1.4 Government, Market, and Society

The theoretical conclusion concerning market optimality relies on an implicit assumption about the critical importance of fundamental institutions. In other words, there should be a mature governance structure to regulate the government, the market, and the society.

### 1.4. Three Elements of State Governance and Development

State governance involves three dimensions: government, market, and society. The market mechanism may give an incorrect impression that, in a market economy, one can do whatever one desires in the pursuit of selfinterest; this, however, is not the case. In the world, there is no completely laissez-faire market economy that is totally independent of the government . A well-functioning market requires appropriate and effective integration
of government, market and society, which constitutes a three-dimensional structure of state governance. A completely laissez-faire market without governance and regulation is also not omnipotent. As we shall discuss in Parts V-VII of this textbook, the market frequently fails in certain circumstances, such as monopoly, unfair income distribution, polarization of rich and poor, externality, unemployment, inadequate supply of public goods and information asymmetry, thus resulting in inefficient allocation of resources and various social problems.

The three basic institutional arrangements of government, market and society are the three elements of state governance and benign development: 1) inclusive economic institution; 2) state capacity to plan and implement policies and laws; and 3) an inclusive and transparent civil society with democracy, the rule of law, fairness and justice. Either in short-term response or in long-term governance, the three are all indispensable and essentially necessary and sufficient conditions for a nation's sustainable and benign economic development, social harmony and stability, and long-term peace and stability. Indeed, the practice at all times and all over the world has repeatedly shown that all economic and social achievements or progress were due to the improvement of some aspects of these three elements, and the problems were inevitably caused by the lack of some of them. As such, these three elements are the most fundamental comprehensive governance elements to identify whether a state's governance system and capacity are good or not and whether it can cope with crisis in the short term and maintain stability in the long term. A modern state governance system must be a system that properly deals with the relationship between government and market and between government and society, so that each functions in its respective position and interacts effectively with one another.

Benign development and governance exhibit an inherent dialectical relationship, and must be accurately understood. Economic development primarily focuses on the improvement of a nation's hard power; whereas, governance stresses the construction of soft power. Of course, governance should be all-dimensional from different aspects, including governance systems of the government and the market, social equity and justice, culture, values, etc. How the relationship between the government and the
market and between the government and the society is handled frequently determines the effect of state governance and development. If they cannot be well balanced, a series of major problems and crises may occur, including poor development, an excessive gap between the rich and the poor, unequal opportunities, etc., preventing an inclusive market economy and a tolerant and harmonious society from coming into existence. In this way, in the logic of governance, there is a "good" kind and a"bad" kind of governance that will lead to a good or bad market economy and good or bad social norms, respectively. Therefore, governance should not be taken as being equivalent to rules, controls or regulations, or regarded as the opposition of development, making it difficult to attend to both governance and development simultaneously. To achieve and maintain an efficient market and harmonious society, a limited government should be built that is capable, accountable, effective and caring, leading towards a desired governance that features the principle of the rule of law.

### 1.4.2 Good Market Economies vs. Bad Market Economies

A market economy can be classified into "good market economy" and "bad market economy". Whether it is good or bad depends on the system of state governance and whether the governance boundaries among the government, the market, and the society are clearly and appropriately delineated. In a good market system, the government enables the market to fully play its role, and in case of market failures, the government can take certain remediative actions. This does not mean that the government should directly intervene in economic activities, but rather the government is expected to enact appropriate the design of rules or institutions to correct market failures in order to achieve incentive-compatible outcomes so that individual interests and social interests are consistent. One of the most successful examples of institutional design is the enaction of the basic constitution of the U.S. at its founding, which made the U.S. become the most powerful nation in the world within approximately 100 years.

A good, inclusive, and efficient modern market economy should protect the private interests of individuals to the greatest extent through insti-
tutions or laws, and simultaneously limit and counterbalance the government and its public powers as much as possible. In this sense, it is a contractual and rule-of-law economy constrained by an agreement regarding commodity exchange, rule of market operation, and reputation. Under the constraints of individuals' pursuit of self-interests, of resources and of information asymmetries in an economic society, to build a strong state with prosperous people, individuals should first be endowed with private right$s$, the core of which includes the basic rights to survival, freedom of choice for one to pursue happiness, and private property rights. Through their participation in full competition, voluntary cooperation, and voluntary exchange of the market mechanism and their pursuit of self-interest, efficient allocation of resources and maximization of social welfare can be attained. Therefore, the modern market economy is established upon the basis of the rule of law, which works in two ways: first, it is of fundamental importance to restrict arbitrary government intervention in market economic activities; and second, it further supports and promotes the market in certain ways, including the definition and protection of property rights, enforcement of contracts and laws, maintenance of fair market competition, etc., in order to allow the market to play the decisive role in resource allocation and give full range to the three basic functions of price, i.e., transmitting information, providing incentives, and determining income distribution. In addition, a good market calls for good social norms, for one's pursuit of self-interest should exist on the premise of respect for others' pursuit of self-interest, and self-interest and fair competition function in parallel to one another with no conflict. The spirit of compromise and respect for others' standards of values constitute the foundation for the normal process of exchange.

On the other hand, in a bad market economy, in which there is a lack of adequate ruling and governance capacity in economic and social transitions, and the government is unable to provide sufficient public goods and services to compensate for market failures. The government's excessive economic activities result in public powers that are not effectively counterbalanced, property rights of state-owned enterprises that are not clearly defined, and the government that is involved in numerous rent-seeking and corrupt behaviors so that equity and justice are greatly diminished.

This breeds the so-called the "State Capture", which refers to the phenomenon that, by providing personal interests for government officials, economic agents interfere in decisions on laws, rules and regulations, and thus, without going through fair competition, they convert their personal interests to the basis of rules of the game of the whole market economy. This then leads to policies that produce high monopoly profits for specific individuals at the expense of enormous social costs and the decrease of government credibility. As a result, an inefficient balance in public choice continues over a long period of time. The behavior of striving for social and governmental resources by means of unfair rent-seeking instead of fair competition will not only produce market failures, but more importantly gradually result in bad social norms in the long term. These poor social norms produce a distortion of resource allocation and social values, the decline in moral values, an absence of good faith, the popularity of "false, big, and empty" words and deeds, the frivolity of society and increased factors of instability, which finally result in enormous explicit and implicit transaction costs. Some sociologists refer to such social state as "social corruption", meaning that the social cells of the social organism are dead and experiencing functional failures.

Therefore, in the three-dimensional framework of government, market and society, the government, as an institutional arrangement with great positive and negative externalities, plays a vital role. Indeed, it can make the market efficient, become the impetus for economic development, assist to construct a harmonious society, and realize sustainable development. On the other hand, it may also make the market inefficient, lead to various social conflicts, offer tremendous resistance against the benign development of the society and economy, and exert deleterious social impacts. Although almost all countries in the world have adopted a market economy, a majority have not achieved sound and rapid development. Among numerous reasons for this, the most fundamental one is the lack of reasonable and clearly delineated governance boundaries between the government, the market and the society, so that there is over-playing, under-playing, and mis-playing of the government role. Only when the government appropriately tightens its omnipresent "visible hand", and the functions
and governance scope of the government are appropriately and reasonably defined, can it be expected to define a proper and scientific governance boundary between the government, the market, and the society

### 1.4.3 The Boundaries of Government-Market-Society

How can governance boundaries be best defined among the government , the market, and the society? The answer is to allow the market to do whatever it can do well, while the government does not participate in economic activities directly (however, it is necessary for the government to maintain market order and guarantee strict implementation of contracts and rules). Regarding what the market cannot achieve, or in circumstances in which it is not appropriate for the market to be involved, such as in cases affecting national security, the government can directly participate in economic activities. In other words, when considering the construction of an inclusive and transparent civil society and benign development of an economy, or when transforming government functions and innovating modes of management, the boundaries of the government, the market, and the society should be carefully considered. For instance, the governmen$t$ should exit from competitive sectors. Only in the case of market failure should the government solve problems by itself or be in cooperation with the market. However, the basic dictum is that the government should not directly intervene in economic activities, but instead enact conducive rules and institutions to correct market failures. Because individuals' pursuit of self-interest and private information are at the core of many economic activities, direct intervention in economic activities (e.g., large numbers of state-owned enterprises, and arbitrary restriction of market access and interference with commodity prices) would not frequently generate desired outcomes. In this respect, mechanism design theory can play a key role in making the market more efficient and solving the problem of market failures. In Hurwicz's opinion, "law-making by the U.S. Congress or other legislative bodies equals to designing new mechanisms" .

Under a modern market economy, the basic and sole functions of government can be distilled as "maintenance" and "service", i.e., making
fundamental rules to ensure national security, social stability and economic order, as well as providing public goods and services. Just as Hayek asserted, the government has two basic functions: firstly, the government must be responsible for law enforcement and defense against its enemies; and secondly, the government must provide services that the market is unable to provide or unable to fully provide. He also stated that "it is indeed most important that we keep clearly apart these altogether different tasks of government and do not confer upon it in its service functions the authority which we concede to it in the enforcement of the law and defence against enemies." ${ }^{3}$ This requires that, in addition to undertaking necessary functions, the government should separate its powers regarding market and society. Abraham Lincoln provided the following clear and incisivelydefined functions of the government:
"The legitimate object of government, is to do for a community of people, whatever they need to have done, but can not do, at all, or can not, so well do, for themselves-in their separate, and individual capacities. In all that the people can individually do as well for themselves, government ought not to interfere." ${ }^{4}$

Meanwhile, a good-inclusive-efficient modern market economy and state governance mode require an independent autonomous civil society with a strong ability to coordinate interests as an auxiliary informal institutional arrangement. Otherwise, the explicit and implicit transaction costs of economic activities would be prohibitive, and it would be very challenging to establish the most basic norm of social trust.

In summary, a reasonable and clearly defined governance boundary among the government, the market, and the society is a prerequisite for establishing a good-inclusive-efficient market economic system and achieving benign development that is characterized by efficiency, equity, and harmony. Of course, the transition to an effective modern market system often constitutes a long and arduous process. Due to various constraints, governance boundaries of the government, the market, and the society cannot be clearly defined in a single attempt, but rather a series of transitional institu-

[^4]tional arrangements are frequently requisite. However, with the deepening of transitions, some transitional institutional arrangements may decline in efficiency, and may even degenerate into invalid institutional arrangements or negative ones. If governance boundaries of the government, the market, and the society cannot be timely and appropriately clarified while some temporary, transitional institutional arrangements (e.g., government-led economic development) function as permanent and ultimate institutional arrangements, it is then impossible to achieve an efficient market and an inclusive, transparent society. With the development of modern economic$s$, its analytical framework and research methods play an essential role in the study of how to reasonably and clearly define governance boundaries among the government, the market and the society, and how to carry out comprehensive governance.

### 1.5 Comprehensive Governance by the Three Arrangements

As discussed above, in order to establish a well-functioning and efficient modern market system, it is necessary to coordinate and integrate the relationship of the three basic institutional arrangements, i.e., the government , the market and the society, in order to regulate and guide individuals' economic behavior and conduct comprehensive governance. The government, the market, and the society correspond precisely to the three basic elements of governance, incentive, and social norms in an economy, respectively. Mandatory public governance and formal institutional arrangements, such as market mechanism as an incentive scheme, as two elements of comprehensive governance which overlap, through long-term interactions, may assist to guide and form normative informal institutional arrangements, enhance the predictability and certainty of social and economic activities, and markedly decrease transaction costs. The informal institutional arrangement mentioned here is social norms and culture. The same as with enterprises, the first-class enterprise performs branding, in which its corporate culture plays the key role, the second-class enterprise devel-

### 1.5. COMPREHENSIVE GOVERNANCE BY THE THREE ARRANGEMENTS43

ops technologies, and the third-class enterprise produces. Similarly, it is the position of the government that plays the crucial role in the establishment of good or bad social norms and market economy.

Expressed in another way, the three basic institutional arrangements for comprehensive governance are employed to "enlighten with reason, guide with benefits, and persuade with emotions", all of which are realized and implemented mainly by the government, the market, and the society, respectively, on the level of state governance. To "enlighten with reason" means to work through the stimulus of legal principles and reason; to "guide with benefits" means to link up economic activities with revenue through the stimulus of rewards and penalties, thus becoming an incentive mechanism; and to "persuade with emotions" means to work through the stimulus of emotions and shared beliefs, as sometimes relationships, friendships and emotions, and especially shared beliefs and concepts, can assist to solve large problems, which as a kind of social culture will greatly decrease transaction costs.

### 1.5.1 Governance on Rules

Governance on rules, as the basic institutional arrangement and management rule, is about enforcement. The basic criterion for whether such rules and regulations shall be formulated is whether or not they facilitate a clear definition (according to the possibility of information transparency and symmetry), and whether the costs of information acquisition, supervision, and enforcement are high. If a regulation is too costly concerning supervision, it will not be feasible for enforcement. Protection of property rights, contract implementation, and appropriate supervision all call for relevant rules, which thus require a third party to oversee enforcement of those rules. The third party is then a government agency. In order to maintain market order, the role of the government is inevitable. As the government is also an economic agent, it functions as both a judge and a player, and thus it exerts an enormous influence. This requires procedures and rules to constrain the behavior of the government. Regulations on other economic agents and the market should be the opposite of this. Due to information
asymmetry, regulations in this regard should not be too detailed, so as not to interfere too much with the freedom of choice of economic agents.

Institutional arrangements that "enlighten with reason" and deter people with the threat of sanctions are similar to the thoughts of Legalism in ancient China. However, a major problem of Legalism was that it only aimed to govern economic agents, but applied no restrictions on the government. In this way, it is rule by law, but not rule of law. Moreover, this kind of institutional arrangement only considered cruelty in individuals' struggle for power and profit, but neglected the influence of individuals' consciences and emotions upon behavior. The employment of the heavy hand of Legalism without considering other institutional arrangements will frequently lead to coercive powers, and hinders the formation of a modern market economy.

### 1.5.2 Incentive Mechanism

Incentive mechanisms, such as market mechanisms, are inducing by their nature, have the widest applications, and are a main concern of this textbook. Due to information asymmetry and the high cost of information acquisition, as well as the fact that human nature, especially the nature of self-interest, can hardly be altered, specific operation rules need to mobilize individuals' enthusiasm through incentive mechanisms, such as market mechanisms, to realize incentive compatibility in order to make individuals, who pursue their own interests, strive to achieve the aims of the mechanism designer, as well. As shown in Chapter 7 on repeated game theory, reputation and integrity, we will show that reputation and integrity under the market incentive mechanism are one kind of punishment incentive mechanism. Integrity is essential in engaging in business activities; this does not, however, mean that business owners behave with integrity out of their own will, but rather that they have no choice because, otherwise, they will be forced out of the market. It is also the case that integrity can save economic costs and lower transaction costs.

Institutional arrangements that "guide with benefits" are similar to the precepts of Taoism in ancient China. It asserts that individuals are all

### 1.5. COMPREHENSIVE GOVERNANCE BY THE THREE ARRANGEMENTS45

self-interested and have a limited ideological realm, and these two assertions should be universally recognized. Although it is not difficult to stop "talking" about interests, in reality, it is challenging not to "value" interests. Taoism contends that "the law of nature is beneficial, but not harmful", and emphasizes compliance with natural tendency and governance by noninterference. However, it neglects two necessary conditions for governing by non-interference, i.e., the establishment of basic institutions and the proper role of government.

### 1.5.3 Social Norms

A key factor in understanding institutions and other long-term relationships is the role of shared expectations of behavioral norms and cultural beliefs, as well as the role of sanctions in ensuring compliance with the "rules" Behavioral norms and cultural beliefs mentioned here are the so-called social norms. They are informal institutional arrangements that are implemented by neither forces nor incentives. Solving problems with mandatory laws and inducing incentives in the long term will become a kind of social norms, values, beliefs, and culture that requires neither enforcement nor incentive, such as corporate culture, folk customs, religious faith, ideology, sentiments and concepts. This is an efficient way to minimize transition costs. Especially when the force of collective consciousness is well developed, problems will be much easier to resolve, and working efficiency will be greatly augmented. Otherwise, even if one problem is solved through mandatory commands, inducing incentive mechanisms or personal relationships, new problems will continue to arise in the same way, which will produce large implementation costs. Chapter 7 will discuss the important role of social norms in stimulating voluntary cooperation among individuals.

Even so, social norms that espouse morality and "persuade with emotions" remain largely constrained by the reality of individuals' ideological limitations. Relying on improvement of humanity, social norms lack the power of constraint and possess a limited scope of governance. This kind of institutional arrangement is similar to the philosophy of Confucianism in
ancient China. The concept of the "rule of virtue" in Confucianism overemphasizes ethical relations among people, and deliberately overlooks economic relations. Overall, it is successful in managing families or small communities, but biased in the governance of a nation. Benevolence and morality can be dominant, or at least considerably important, in a family or a small group, but may not be very effective in the lives of general people. Indeed, benevolence is highly personal, and its effect diminishes with the enlargement of the realm. Those who rely on others' benevolence to acquire the necessities of life cannot be satisfied, in most cases. Although all people may need assistance from others, they cannot depend on benevolence alone to meet their needs. Consequently, the experience of managing a family cannot be simply extended to all economic and social activities; otherwise, manifold problems and even disasters may ensue. Especially under the environment of a modern market economy and people's limited ideological development, reliance solely on internal ethical norms, and an absence of external laws and incentive mechanisms, will cause the market economy to move towards a perilous state.

Therefore, all three of these mentioned institutional arrangements have two sides: positive and negative. They also possess varied functions, ranges of application, and limitations. Moreover, if emphasis is placed too heavily on only one of them, serious negative consequences will occur; it is necessary for the three of them to play their own specific roles and complement each other. This condition can be elucidated with the example of friendship. If friends are made solely on the basis of interests, the friendship will disintegrate when the interests are exhausted; if friends are made based on influence, the friendships will end when the influence fails; if friends are established on the basis of power, the friendships will fail when the power dissipates. Of course, only when one makes friends with a sincere heart can the friendship last forever. Making friends with a sincere heart is the best way, but it can be very difficult, and even many couples may not be able to sustain this.

### 1.5. COMPREHENSIVE GOVERNANCE BY THE THREE ARRANGEMENTS47

### 1.5.4 The Hierarchical Structure of the Three Arrangements

Even though this textbook primarily discusses the problem of economic incentives, governance on rules or institution remains the most essential and fundamental among the three kinds of arrangements since it establishes the most basic institutional environment, has strong positive and negative externalities, and determines whether or not the role of government is appropriate, thereby determining the effect of incentive mechanism design and the formation of good or bad social norms. In addition, for the formulation of institutional arrangements of both regulatory governance and incentive mechanisms, the principle should not, and essentially cannot, change the self-interested nature of human beings. Instead, it should make use of individuals' immutable self-interestedness to guide them to perform actions that are beneficial to society. In other words, the design of an institution should conform to the self-interested nature of individuals, rather than attempting to alter it. Moreover, individuals' self-interestedness cannot be simply deemed to be either good or evil, but instead what kinds of institutions that are employed and towards what directions they are guided must be taken carefully into account. Different institutional arrangements will result in individuals' different responses to incentives and various tradeoff choices, thereby leading to markedly dissimilar consequences. As Deng Xiaoping contended, "Good institutions can make bad people unable to run amok arbitrarily, and bad institutions can make good people unable to do good enough, or even go to the opposite side." ${ }^{5}$ Expressed in a colloquial way, bad institutions can turn good people into bad people, but good institutions can turn even bad people to do good things.

Therefore, the utilization of "reason, interest, and emotion," should be synthesized, and vary with individuals, matter, place, and time to analyze and solve problems case by case. The criterion for deciding which aspect to use is determined by the importance of regulations, the degree of information symmetry, and the cost of supervision and law enforcement. All three institutional arrangements possess their own boundary conditions.

[^5]To "enlighten with reason" should depend on the availability of information symmetry and difficulty of legal supervision. Indeed, the law will be meaningless if its cost of supervision and execution is too high.

To sum up this and the previous sections, a well-functioning market needs the government, the market, and the society to be optimally situated so that the three-dimensional structure of state governance can be effectively interconnected and integrated. Defining the boundaries between the government and the market and between the government and the society involves two levels. The first level is defining boundaries. It is first necessary to know the appropriated boundaries among them. The prerequisite for an efficient market and a normal society is to build a limited government that is capable, accountable, effective and caring, and thus the reasonable position of government is vital. The principle here is that the market should be allowed to do whatever it can do, while the government should do what the market cannot do or cannot do well. Consequently, the function of government can be generalized as maintenance and service.

The second level is the identification of priorities. What is the top priority? The answer is fundamental institutions. After knowing the boundaries of the three, it is then necessary to sort them out. Who can best sort them out? The answer is the government. Then, what is the best entity to regulate the position of the government? It must be the rule of law that mainly restricts the government, but not rule by law that mainly restricts the people. Regulatory governance (or institutions) is the most important and foundational arrangement, which establishes the most basic institutional environment, possesses great positive or negative externalities, assesses whether the position of the government is appropriate, and thus determines the effect of the incentive mechanism design and the formation of good or bad social norms. However, is the government willing to limit its power? In general, absolutely not. Therefore, power requires further partitioning, and separation of the responsibilities and power of administrative departments, law-making departments, and judicial departments.

For all of these reasons, the underlying governance system is of determinant importance. Only when the governance boundaries between the government and the market and between the government and the society
are reasonably defined through comprehensive governance by the three dimensions of institution, the rule of law and civil society, can government power be regulated, restricted, and supervised, problems of economic efficiency, social equity and justice be resolved, the phenomena of corruption and bribery be eradicated, and healthy relations among the government, the market, the society, enterprises, and individuals be established. Indeed, in this way, relations of benign interactions are established between all of them. When benign interactions are realized, the government can then augment the efficiency of the market through continuous enaction and enforcement of laws, in order to truly promote the long-term peace and stability of a nation.

### 1.6 Ancient Chinese Thoughts on the Market

Many of the basic concepts of the market economy and conclusions of economics, including the idea that commodity prices are determined by the market and the "invisible hand" of Adam Smith, were stated in a profound way thousands of years ago. Indeed, numerous fundamental ideas, core assumptions and basic conclusions of economics, such as the behavioral assumption of pursuing self-interest, economic freedom, governance by the invisible hand, the social division of labor, the intrinsic relationship between national prosperity and individual wealth and between development and stability, and the relationship between the government and the market have all been discussed by ancient Chinese philosophers. Some examples of this are given as follows:

As early as over 3,000 years ago, Jiang Shang (also known as Jiang Ziya and Jiang Taigong, an ancient Chinese strategist and adviser) believed that "averting risks and pursuing interests" is the innate nature of human beings, i.e., "In general, people hate death and take pleasure in life. They love virtue and incline to profit." He proposed the people-centered concept of dialectical unity between the wealth of the people and the stability and strength of the state, and the fundamental law of state governance, by stating that "the state is not the property of one man but of all people. The man who shares interests with all men will win the state", and provided the fundamental s-
trategy of state governance, i.e., the government should take the common interests, risks, welfare and livelihood of the populace as its own, in order to achieve the incentive-compatible outcome in which the populace shares the same interests and risks as the government. Jiang Shang also provided an incisive answer to the relationship and priority of the wealth of the state and the wealth of the people:"The true king enriches the people. The hegemon enriches the gentry. The state which barely survives enriches its grand ministers. The state which perishes enriches its coffers and fills up its treasuries." His advice was followed by King Wen of the Zhou dynasty, who ordered the granary to be opened to assist the poor and reduce taxes to enrich the people. As a consequence, the Western Zhou became a growing power.

Over 2,600 years ago, Guan Zhong (a Legalist chancellor and reformer of the State of Qi in ancient China) had deep insights on numerous economic issues. The core of his economic thought was "the theory of self-interest" . In Guan Zi: Jinzang (On Maintaining Restraint), he vividly explained social economic activities with individuals pursuing their interests:"All men pursue interests and avert harm. When doing business, merchants hasten on the way day and night and make light of traveling from afar because, for them, interests are on their way. When fishermen go fishing in the sea, though the sea is hundreds of meters deep, they sail against the current for hundreds of miles day and night because, for them, interests are in water. So as long as there is interest, people would climb the mountain regardless of its height and go to sea regardless of its depth. Therefore, if those who know well how to govern the origin of interest, people will naturally admire the state and settle. The governor does not need to push them to go or lead them to come. Without being bothered or disturbed, people will get rich in a natural course. It is like a bird incubating eggs, the process of which is invisible and silent, but the result is noticeable when it is done." Essentially, this constitutes a clear demonstration of Adam Smith's "invisible hand" more than 2,000 years earlier. In his book Guan Zi, Guan Zhong presented the law of demand by stating that "The devaluation comes from the excess, while the value from the scarcity", and also drew the basic conclusion that individuals' wealth leads to national stability, security, prosperity, and power by saying that "Only at times of plenty will people observe the etiquette. Only when they are well-clad and fed will they have a sense of honor and shame." He further
pointed out that "State governance must start with enriching the people. When the people become well-off, the state will be easy to govern. If they are in poverty, the state will be hard to govern." ... "Usually, an orderly state is abundant in prosperity, while a disorderly one is deep in poverty. So, a king versed in ruling a state must give priority to making people wealthy over governance itself." . Furthermore, comprehensive governance is another essential point in Guan Zhong's thought of state management. For example, with respect to vassal kings, Guan Zhong suggested "restraining them with interest, associating with them with trust, admonishing them with military power" so that vassal kings "won't dare to defy the king and will accept his interest, trust his benevolence, and fear his military force." Indeed, it does not require much effort to discern that certain corresponding relations exist between "restraining them with interest, associating with them with trust, admonishing them with military power" mentioned here and the three institutional arrangements previously discussed.

More than 2,500 years ago, Sun Tzu (a military general, strategist, and philosopher in ancient China)'s book entitled The Art of War focused on military strategies and tactics, but its principles and ideas are highly similar to the market behavior and decision-making of firms. The first chapter
"Detail Assessment and Planning" of the book coincides, to a large extent, with the basic analytical framework of economics and can be fully adopted in the context of accomplishing an endeavor. It serves as essential guidance for accomplishing big goals, making optimal decisions, and winning competitions in governing a state and managing an enterprise or organization. He also provided the basic conclusion of information economics: it is possible to achieve the optimal outcome ("the best is first best" ) only under complete information; under information asymmetry, we can, at most, obtain a suboptimal outcome ( "the best is second best" ): "if you know your enemies and know yourself, you will not be imperiled in a hundred battles; if you do not know your enemies but do know yourself, you will win one and lose one; if you do not know your enemies nor yourself, you will be imperiled in every single battle."

In the same period, a more remarkable fact was that Lao Tzu (a famous philosopher of ancient China, the founder of Taoism) presented the
supreme law of comprehensive governance: "Rule a kingdom by the Normal. Fight a battle by (abnormal) tactics of surprise. Win the world by doing nothing." (Chapter 57, Tao Te Ching) This is the essential way of governing a state or administering an organization, which can be abstracted in common parlance as being righteous in deed, flexible in practice and minimal in intervention, and thus the government realizes governing by non-intervention. Lao Tzu considered "Tao" to be the invisible inner law of nature (that is, the fundamental rules and laws of doing things), while "Te" (meaning inherent character, integrity, virtue) to be the concrete embodiment of Tao. He further deemed that the governance of the state and the people should follow the Way of Heaven (referring to the objective laws governing nature or the manifestations of heavenly will), the Virtue of Earth and the Principle of Non-intervention, by stating that "Man models himself after the Earth; The Earth models itself after Heaven; The Heaven models itself after Tao; Tao models itself after nature." (Chapter 25, Tao Te Ching) In addition, he also pointed out that "The difficult (problems) of the world must be dealt with while they are yet easy; the great (problems) of the world must be dealt with while they are yet small." (Chapter 63, Tao Te Ching) In other words, in whatever we do, success lies in the details. All of the above-mentioned statements demonstrate that Lao Tzu's thought of nonintervention does not mean "doing nothing" as is commonly believed. In fact, the non-intervention discussed by Lao Tzu is a relative concept, which requires non-intervention in major aspects, but action and care in specific aspects. Expressed in another way, we should never lose sight of the general goal, and begin by taking action to solve small, immediate practical problems.

Over 2,300 years ago, Shang Yang (an important Chinese statesman) of the State of Qin used the example of the hare to expound on the utmost importance of establishing private property rights and how clearly well-defined property rights can "determine ownership and settle disputes" and assist to establish market order. He came to this conclusion 2,300 years earlier than Coase. In Shang Jun Shu (The Book of Lord Shang), Shang Yang wrote that "when a hare is running, a hundred men chase after it; this is not because the hare can be divided into one hundred shares, but its owner-
ship is not yet determined. On the other hand, hares are sold on the market, but even a thief dare not take one because ownership has been determined. Thus, if ownership is not definite, sages like Yao, Shun, Yu, and Tang would also chase after it; when ownership is definite, even a greedy thief will not dare to take it." The hare is chased because people are driven to strive for its ownership, and even sages would do the same. In contrast, ownership of a captured hare in the market is determined, and thus others cannot simply take it.

Approximately 2,100 years ago, Sima Qian (a Chinese historian of the Han dynasty who is considered the father of Chinese historiography) made a remarkable statement in his work Records of the Grand Historian: Biographies of the Money-makers, "Jostling and joyous, the whole world comes after profit; racing and rioting, after profit the whole world goes," which succeeded Guan Zhong's concept of self-interest. He also demonstrates the economic paradigm of achieving social welfare through the social division of labor based on self-interest, which is similar to that of Adam Smith. Sima Qian investigated the development of social and economic life, and realized the importance of the social division of labor. He wrote that "All of them are commodities coveted by the people, who according to their various customs use them for their bedding, clothing, food, and drink, fashioning from them the goods needed to supply the living and bury the dead." Therefore, "Society obviously must have farmers before it can eat; foresters, fishermen, miners, etc., before it can make use of natural resources; craftsmen before it can have manufactured goods; and merchants before they can be distributed." Moreover, he believed that the entire social economy, composed of agriculture, forestry, industry and commerce, should develop in a natural manner without the constraint of administrative orders.

Also in the Biographies of the Money-makers, Sima Qian continued to write that "What need is there for government directives, mobilizations of labour, or periodic assemblies? Each man has only to be left to utilize his own abilities and exert his strength to obtain what he wishes. Thus, when a commodity is very cheap, it invites a rise in price; when it is very expensive, it invites a reduction. When each person works away at his own occupation and delights in his own business then, like water flowing downward, goods will naturally flow forth ceaselessly day and night without having been summoned, and the people will produce commodities
without having been asked. Does this not tally with reason? Is it not a natural result?"

In addition, Sima Qian's thinking contains great wisdom regarding the philosophy of state governance, the importance of economic freedom, and the priority of several basic institutional arrangements. Sima Qian provided an insightful conclusion in the Biographies of the Money-makers," The highest type of ruler accepts the nature of the people, the next best leads the people to what is beneficial, the next gives them moral instruction, the next forces them to be orderly, and the very worst kind enters into competition with them."

Confucius affirmed that the pursuit of personal material interests on the premise of social ethics is justifiable. He stated, "When a country is well governed, poverty and a mean condition are things to be ashamed of. When a country is ill governed, riches and honor are things to be ashamed of." (The Analects: Tai Bo) By saying so, Confucius encouraged people to pursue a sufficient amount of material wealth. The Analects also recorded Confucius's compliments on his disciple Zigong (Duanmu Ci), who was a merchant. In The Analects: Xian Jin, it states that "The Master said, ‘There is Hui! He has nearly attained to perfect virtue. He is often in want. Ci does not acquiesce in the appointments of Heaven, and his goods are increased by him. Yet his judgments are often correct.' " Here, Confucius compared Yan Hui, his favorite disciple, with Zigong. The former was almost perfect in morality, but frequently lived in poverty, which did not seem to be the right way of living; whereas, the latter, who did not follow the arrangement of destiny and went into business, turned out to be excellent in predicting the market.

These ancient Chinese economic thoughts are profound and historically important. Indeed, what Adam Smith discussed had already been addressed by ancient Chinese philosophers much earlier. Yet, as those ancient Chinese statements just constituted summaries of experience, they did not form rigorous scientific subjects or disciplines, provide boundary conditions and scopes for conclusions, or make logically inherent analyses. As a result, little is currently known about them in the outside world.

In the remaining parts of this chapter, we will present a rough discussion on core assumptions, key points, analytical frameworks, and research methodology of economics to assist you to understand the rigorous analy-
sis of the content covered by this textbook.

### 1.7 A Cornerstone Assumption in Economics

Every social science discipline imposes assumptions on individual behavior as the logical starting point of its theoretical system. As discussed above, the essential distinction of social science and natural science is that the former studies individuals' behavior and needs to make certain assumptions about individuals' behavior, while the latter investigates natural environments and objects. Economics is an important social science discipline since it not only studies and elucidates economic phenomena and enables positive analyses, but also closely examines individual behavior in order to make accurate predictions and value judgments.

### 1.7.1 Self-love, Selfishness, and Self-interest

When discussing individuals' behavior, three terms are often mentioned: self-love, selfishness, and self-interest, which are related to, and also distinct from, each other. Self-love means one's esteem and affection for oneself, which can be positive, as it encourages individuals to live a righteous and productive life, and can also be negative, since it may lead to a tendency towards narcissism, and even self-harm or self-deceit. Self-love can also generate self-interestedness and selfishness.

Selfishness refers to caring only for one's own welfare or advantage at the expense of or in disregard of others. It can lead to manifold harms. For example, being selfish makes one greedy; being greedy makes one overly ambitious; being overly ambitious makes one vain and arrogant; and being vain makes individuals lose themselves, while being arrogant may make individuals ruthless and offensive.

Self-interest means benefiting oneself without at the expense of others while it may or may not benefit others. Therefore, self-interest makes one judicious and rational, while selfishness produces greed. In other words, it may be altruism for the sake of self-interest. To pursue and obtain one's interest, individuals have to choose altruistic behavior. This constitutes the
self-interest assumption adopted in the study of economics. When self-love and self-interest complement one another, individuals will possess clear self-knowledge; whereas, when self-love is related with selfishness, individuals will experience moral decline. Consequently, when individuals are dominated by self-love, it does not necessarily mean that they will disregard others because self-love may also be combined with self-interest.

### 1.7.2 Practical Rationality of Self-interested Behavior

In this textbook, especially in the proof that competitive market mechanisms lead to optimal resource allocation, a key assumption is that individual behavior is driven by self-interest in normal situations. In fact, this is the most basic assumption in economics and forms its cornerstone. Indeed, economics claims that this is also the most accurate description of reality.

This assumption also applies to the handling of relations among nations, groups, households and individuals, being an objective reality or constraint that must be taken into account when studying and solving political, social, and economic problems. For example, when dealing with the relation between two nations, as a citizen, one must protect the interests of his or her own nation and speak and act from the standpoint of that nation, and may be subject to penalties if he or she divulges state secrets. When dealing with the relation between enterprises, as an employee, one must protect the interests of his or her organization, and if he or she leaks firm secrets to competitors, he or she may face negative consequences. The selfinterest assumption is frequently questioned with the following: why are there families if individuals are rationally self-interested and pursue personal interests? In fact, concerning the family, individuals act in the interest of their own families. In other words, under normal circumstances, individuals care about their own families more than they do about the families of others. The discussion on the relationships between individuals follows the same reasoning. In practice, misunderstandings of this assumption are common, one of which is that this applies to only individuals in every case.

It is necessary to assume that individuals are self-interested because this conforms to the basic reality, and more importantly, the risk of doing so is
minimal. Specifically, even if the self-interest assumption is incorrect, serious consequences will not ensue. In contrast, if one adopts the altruistic behavior assumption, once it is proven to be incorrect, the consequences may be quite dire. In fact, the rules of the game adopted under the self-interest assumption also apply to altruistic individuals in most cases, and institutional arrangements or game rules and individuals' trade-offs under the altruistic behavior assumption are much simpler. Furthermore, the choice of behavior assumption is also critical for making optimal judgments of individual behavior in daily life. For example, the costs incurred could be enormous if a selfish, cunning person is misperceived as a simple, selfless and honest person, and trusted with important responsibilities or information.

Acknowledging that individuals are self-interested shows a realistic and responsible attitude towards solving social and economic problems. This is why we need certain government legislation to prevent opportunists from taking advantage of loopholes in institutions under the altruism assumption. As already discussed, if altruism is used as the premise to solve social and economic problems, the consequences may be disastrous. As an additional example, in the organization of production, if we deny the crucial importance of individuals' self-interest and only motivate individuals by emphasizing their contribution to the nation and the group, the result would be that everyone would aim to take advantage of the institutions to benefit from others' contributions, thereby leading to the free-rider problem. In this case, how could any nation become prosperous?

### 1.7.3 Boundaries of Self-interest and Altruism

It should be specially noted that, although the self-interest assumption holds true in most cases, it exhibits certain boundaries in application. For instance, under abnormal circumstances, such as natural or man-made disasters, wars, earthquakes and other major crises, individuals will often demonstrate their altruistic and selfless character, make sacrifices to fight for the nation, and go to great lengths to assist others. This constitutes another form of rationality, i.e., altruism, with which individuals are willing
to sacrifice their lives (even certain animals possess this instinct). For example, when a nation is invaded by another nation, many citizens are willing to sacrifice their lives to protect their country. Under a normal and peaceful environment, however, when engaged in economic activities, individuals normally pursue their own interests. These illustrations demonstrate that self-interest and altruism are not oppositional to each other, but rather constitute natural responses to different situations and environments.

Therefore, we can view self-interest and altruism as relative terms. In fact, such duality can also be witnessed in animals. For example, when wild goats are chased to the edge of a cliff, the old goats sacrifice themselves by making the first jump, so that the goatlings could jump on them and have a greater chance of survival. Adam Smith not only wrote the foundational work of The Wealth of Nations, but also wrote The Theory of Moral Sentiments, which contends that individuals should have sympathy and a sense of justice. These two works complement each other in the overall philosophy of Adam Smith. It is the case that, under the reality of an individual's self-love and self-interest, morality should be a kind of balance, an equilibrium outcome, and a convention realized through the social division of labor and cooperation. Under the guidance of appropriate institutions, individuals voluntarily divide the work by choosing varied specializations and cooperate in order to establish a harmonious, civilized, stable, and orderly society. It is against human nature to regard self-interest as immoral and runs counter to reality; it is not selfish. In fact, the organic combination of moral ethics and self-interest can actually promote social civilization and individuals' decency. The biggest advantage of the modern market is its utilization of the power of self-interest to counteract the weakness of benevolence so that hard-workers can be rewarded. As a consequence, we should not neglect the role of benevolence and morals in the formation of the modern market system.

Overall, self-interested individuals can be benevolent, altruistic, and moral. However, "self-interest" should not be "at others' cost" . There are limitations and boundaries for self-interest and altruism, while selfishness that benefits oneself at the expense of others is the origin of maleficence and greed. Rationally self-interested behavior will conform to social
norms as a requisite constraint. As a society, we collectively agree to educate individuals to pursue their personal interests without violating public order and to protect the public interest based on individual rationality. However, we also disagree with economic idealism that grounds policies in ignorance of the driving force of personal interest in a wayward attempt to protect the public interest. It is the case that self-interested behavior under appropriate legal constraints must be distinguished from selfishness that violates laws and/or harms the interests of others.

It should also be mentioned that, even in the case of self-interested behavior, there are differences in extent. Under ideal situations, the less selfinterested are individuals, the better are the results produced. However, it is also impossible to eliminate self-interest completely. We can prudently state that self-interest is the logical starting point for economics. If all human beings are unselfish and always considerate to others, then economics involving human behavior would be useless, and industrial engineering or input-output analysis may be sufficient. It is from the starting point that self-interest is an objective reality and individuals tend to pursue their own interests concerning economic activities that China has carried out the reform and opening-up, and made the transition from a planned economy to a market economy.

### 1.8 Key Points in Economics

When investigating economic issues, economists commonly use the following basic assumptions, constraints, axioms, and principles:
(1) Scarcity of resources;
(2) Information asymmetry and decentralization: individuals prefer decentralized decision-making;
(3) Economic freedom: voluntary cooperation and voluntary exchange;
(4) Decision-making under constraints;
(5) Incentive compatibility: economic institutions or mechanisms should be used to solve the problem of conflicting
interests among individuals or economic units, i.e., provide individuals with the incentive to do what the institution or mechanism designer wants them to do;
(6) Well-defined property rights;
(7) Equality of opportunity;
(8) Efficient allocation of resources.

The above assumptions and constraints are crucial because relaxing any one of them may result in different outcomes. The consideration and application of these assumptions, constraints, and principles are also useful for people in their daily lives. Although they may appear to be simple, thoroughly understanding and skillfully utilizing them in reality is not easy. In the following, we briefly discuss these key points, conditions, axioms, and principles, respectively.

### 1.8.1 Scarcity of Resources

Economics stems from the fact that resources are limited in the world (at least the Earth's mass is finite). As long as an individual is self-interested, and his or her material desire is unlimited (i.e., the more one possesses, the better), it is impossible to realize distribution according to wants. Therefore, the problem of precisely how to employ limited resources to optimally satisfy wants must be addressed, and economics is needed to achieve this.

### 1.8.2 Information Asymmetries and Decentralization

In addition to the major objective reality of the self-interested nature of individuals, another fundamental objective reality is that, in most cases, information is private or asymmetric among economic agents, so that the effect of institutional arrangements adopted may be inadvertently neutralized. This is a fundamental reason why some core economic problems are difficult to solve. For example, although a person's words may be righteous, it may be challenging to discern if he or she actually means what is said; listeners may appear to concentrate on what you are saying, but you do not know if the message is actually being well-received by them.

The fundamental reason for such phenomena is the presence of private information. Private information, together with the self-interested nature of individuals, frequently leads to conflicts of interest among economic agents. If there is no appropriate governance system to equitably reconcile these differences, dishonesty, cheating, and selfishness in fighting for limited resources may become rampant. This is also the reason why the social sciences, and especially economics, are more complex and challenging to study and master than the natural sciences. Also due to information asymmetry, centralized decision-making is often inefficient; whereas, decentralized decision-making, such as the use of market mechanisms, is required to solve economic problems.

Only when complete information is acquired can the outcome be the first best. However, private information is frequently hard to obtain, and thus an incentive mechanism is needed to obtain truthful information. Since information acquisition also incurs costs, only the second-best outcome can be obtained in most situations. This is a basic conclusion in principal-agent theory, optimal contract theory and optimal mechanism design theory, which will be discussed in Part VI of this textbook. Without appropriate institutional arrangements, incentive distortion will exist, in which inducing information revelation inevitably incurs costs. As a consequence, it is particularly important to achieve information symmetry for the first-best outcome, without which many misunderstandings and inefficiencies may arise. By communicating openly with others, you enable others to understand you (signaling) and also get to know them (screening), which makes information more symmetric, clears up misunderstandings and enables consensus, which is the requisite condition of obtaining desired outcomes.

Excessive intervention of governments in economic activities and the over-playing of governments' role will lead to inefficiency, which is essentially resultant from information asymmetry. Many problems exist regarding governments' information acquisition and discrimination. If decisionmakers are able to possess all relevant information, centralized decisionmaking featuring direct control would not be problematic, i.e., all that would be required is optimal decision-making. However, it is impossible for decision-
makers to have all related information. This is why we prefer decentralized decision-making. This is also the reason why economists call for the design of various incentive mechanisms, and that a decentralized decision-making method featuring indirect control should be used to stimulate individuals to do as decision-makers desire or to achieve the goals that decision-makers want to be attained. We will focus on the issue of information and incentive in Parts VI and VII.

It is worth mentioning that centralized decision-making also offers certain advantages, especially concerning decision-making involving rapid major changes. For instance, centralized decision-making is more efficient when a nation, group, or enterprise is establishing a vision, orientation and/or strategies, or making major decisions. Such major changes, however, might bring about enormous successes or disasters. For example, the decision of adopting the reform and opening-up policy has led to the rapid development of the Chinese economy. In contrast, the decision of the Cultural Revolution almost drove the Chinese economy to collapse. One viable solution to this problem is to take public opinion into deep consideration when making decisions and select great leaders.

### 1.8.3 Economic Freedom and Voluntary Exchange

Due to economic agents' pursuit of their own interests and information asymmetry, institutional arrangements of the mandatory "stick" style are often not effective. Consequently, it is necessary to provide individuals with more freedom of economic choice, which is the most important right among the three private rights (right to survival, freedom of choice for one to pursue happiness, and private property rights). To achieve this, we should mobilize economic agents with economic freedom based on voluntary cooperation and exchange through inductive incentive mechanisms, such as the market. Therefore, the freedom of economic choice ( "deregulation" ) plays a vital role in market mechanisms, with decentralized decision-making ("decentralization") being a prerequisite for the normal operation of market mechanisms and also a core precondition to ensure efficient allocation of resources under competitive market mecha-
nisms.
In fact, the Economic Core Equivalence Theorem, which will be discussed in Chapter 12, reveals that once full economic freedom is given and free competition, voluntary cooperation and exchange are allowed, even without the establishment of any institutional arrangement in advance, the outcome of resource allocation driven by the self-interested behavior of individuals will be theoretically consistent with equilibrium allocation of a perfectly competitive market. The essence of the Economic Core Equivalence Theorem can be summarized as follows: under the rationality assumption, as long as economic freedom and competition are given, even if institutional arrangements are not considered, the economic core obtained will constitute a competitive market equilibrium

China's reform and opening-up over the past 40 years have confirmed this assertion in practice. When analyzing the reasons for China's remarkable economic achievements, the critical factor is the provision to individuals of more freedom of economic choice. Indeed, reform practices from rural to urban areas indicate that wherever there are looser policies and a greater degree of economic freedom provided for producers and consumers , higher levels of economic efficiency prevail. China's so-called miraculous economic growth stems from the government's delegation of powers to the market; whereas, its imperfect market today is the result of excessive government intervention and inadequate or inappropriate government regulation and institutional arrangements.

### 1.8.4 Acting under Constraints

Acing under constraints is one of the most fundamental principles in economics, and is well expressed in the saying that "one must bow under the eaves" . In fact, everything has its own objective constraints. Individuals, then, make trade-off choices under these existing constraints. Moreover, individuals' choices are determined by both objective constraints and subjective preferences. Constraints include material constraints, information constraints and incentive constraints, all of which can make it difficult for economic agents to achieve their goals. In economics, one embodimen-
$t$ of the basic idea of constraints is the budget set (or opportunity set) of consumer theory, as will be discussed in Chapter 3, which states that an individual's budget is constrained by the prices of the commodities and his or her income. For an enterprise, constraints include available technologies and prices of inputs, under which the goal of maximum profit requires firms to determine the quantity of production, technologies to be adopted, the quantity of each input, pricing for products, responses to competitors' decisions, etc. The development of a person, or even a nation, must contend with various constraints, including political, social, cultural, environmental, and resource constraints. Furthermore, if constraint conditions are not clearly identified and understood, it is difficult to perform tasks and achieve goals.

When introducing a reform measure or an institutional arrangement, it is essential to consider feasibility and meet the objective constraints. In addition, the implementation risk is expected to be reduced to a minimum so that social, political, and economic turmoil will not result. Therefore, feasibility is a requisite condition to judge whether a reform measure or institutional arrangement is conducive to economic development and the smooth transformation of economic systems. In a nation's economic transition, to make a feasible institutional arrangement, it must conform to the institutional environment of the specific stage of the country's development.

Participation constraint is critical when considering optimal contract design (cf. Chapters 16 and 17), which means that an economic agent can benefit, or at least will not experience harm, from economic activities; otherwise, he or she will not participate in, or may even oppose, the rules or policies to be implemented. Individuals who pursue the maximization of self-interest will not automatically accept an institutional arrangement, but instead will make a choice between acceptance and refusal. Only under an institutional arrangement in which the individual's benefit is not less than his or her reserve level (or he or she does not accept the arrangement) will the individual be willing to work, produce, trade, distribute, and consume. Moreover, if a reform measure or an institutional arrangement does not meet the participation constraint, individuals may give up. Of course, if everyone is reluctant to accept the reform measure or institutional arrange-
ment, it cannot be successfully implemented. Mandatory reform may also arouse opposition and cause social instability, so that development will not be possible. Consequently, participation constraint is closely related to social stability, and is an essential factor of social stability in development.

### 1.8.5 Incentives and Incentive Compatibility

The incentive is one of the core concepts in economics. Each individual has his or her own self-interest; to obtain interests from some activity, one must also pay the corresponding cost. Through a comparison between benefits and costs, individuals may be willing (have an incentive) to get something done or do it well, or be reluctant or unwilling to get it done or do it well, and thus will have a rational incentive response to the rules of the game. This, however, frequently leads to incentive-incompatible conflicts of interest among individuals or between individuals and society, and produces chaos. The concept of incentive compatibility has been discussed by Adam Smith in The Theory of Moral Sentiments, in which he stated that "...in the great chess-board of human society, every single piece has a principle of motion of its own, altogether different from that which the legislature might choose to impress upon it. If those two principles coincide and act in the same direction, the game of human society will go on easily and harmoniously, and is very likely to be happy and successful. If they are opposite or different, the game will go on miserably, and the society must be at all times in the highest degree of disorder." ${ }^{6}$ The reason for this is that, under given institutional arrangements or rules of the game, individuals will make optimal choices according to their own interests, but such choices will not automatically satisfy the interests or goals of others and society. In addition, information asymmetry makes it challenging to implement social optimum by command. A good institutional arrangement or rule is able to guide self-interested individuals to act subjectively for themselves, but objectively for others, making individuals' social and economic behavior beneficial to the nation and the individuals, as well as to themselves. This is core content of economics.

Everything that an individual does involves interests and costs (i.e.,

[^6]benefits and costs), making incentive a ubiquitous issue that must be dealt with in daily work and life. As long as the benefits and costs are not equal, there will be different incentive reactions. To maximize profits, an enterprise has the incentive to use resources in the most efficient way and provide incentives to guide employees to expend the greatest effort. Outside of the enterprise, changes of profits provide an incentive for resource holders to modify their ways of using the resource; whereas, inside of the enterprise, incentive influences the way that the resource is used and the effort that employees invest in the work. To make management efficient, the role of incentive in organizations must be clear, as well as how to construct incentives to guide subordinates to exert the greatest effort in the work.

Since the interests of individuals, society and economic organizations cannot be identical, how can self-interest, mutual benefits, and social interests be organically combined? This requires incentive compatibility, with which the reform measures and institutional arrangements adopted can drive individuals' incentive for production and work. As a consequence, to implement a goal of one's own or that of society, appropriate rules of the game must be defined, under which when individuals pursue their selfinterest, the goal can also be achieved. In other words, it unifies the selfinterest of individuals and mutual benefits among individuals so that when pursuing one's self-interest, each individual can assist in attaining the goal intended by society or other individuals. We will focus on the issue of how to achieve incentive compatibility in Part V of the textbook.

### 1.8.6 Property Rights as an Incentive Scheme

Property rights are an important component of a market economy. In the previous section about ancient Chinese thoughts on the market, we mentioned that over 2,300 years ago, Shang Yang of the State of Qin utilized the example of the hare to expound on the crucial importance of establishing private property rights, and how a clear definition of property rights can
"determine ownership and settle disputes", and assist to establish the market order.

Property rights determine how a resource or economic good is owned
and used. A clear definition of property rights will enable a clear definition of the attribution of profits, thus providing incentives for property owners to consume and produce in the most efficient way, to provide quality products and good services, to build reputation and credibility, and to maintain their own commodities, housing, and equipment. If property rights are not unequivocally defined, however, the enterprises' incentive will be diminished, giving rise to incentive distortion and moral risk. For example, unclear property rights in state-owned enterprises will lead to inefficiency, induce wide-spread corruption, such as rent-seeking and interest transfer, squeeze the private economy, impede innovation, and lead to unfair competition. In the market mechanism, incentives are given to individuals mainly in forms of property possession and profit acquisition. The Coase Theorem, which will be discussed in Chapter 14, is a benchmark theorem in property rights theory. It claims that when there is neither transaction cost nor income effect, as long as property rights are clearly defined, an efficient allocation of resources can be achieved through voluntary coordination and cooperation.

### 1.8.7 Equality of Opportunity and Equity in Outcome

"Equality in outcome" is a goal that an ideal society aims to achieve. However, for human society with self-interested behavior, this "outcome equality" often produces low efficiency. Then, in what sense can equality or equity be consistent with economic efficiency? The answer is that if one uses "equality of opportunity" as the value judgment standard, equity and efficiency can be consistent. "Equality of opportunity" means that no barrier should exist to hinder individuals from pursuing their goals, and there should be a level playing field for every individual. The Fairness Theorem, to be discussed in Chapter 12, informs us that as long as individuals' initial endowments are of equal value, through the operation of a competitive market, allocation of resources that is not only efficient, but also equitable, can be attained even if individuals pursue self-interest. A concept similar to "equality of opportunity" is "individual equality" (also known as "all men are created equal" ), which means that, al-
though individuals are born with different values, genders, physical conditions, cultural backgrounds, capacities, ways of life, etc., "individual equality" requires deep respect for such individual differences.

As individuals hold heterogeneous preferences, the seemingly equal distribution of, for example, milk and bread, may not satisfy everyone, and then the difference between equality and equity must be emphasized. Although both promote fairness, equality achieves this through treating everyone the same irrespective of need, while equity achieves this through treating people differently depending on need. Therefore, beside equal allocation that defines equality as absolute equalitarianism, the concept of equity in other senses should also be used in the discussion of economic issues. For instance, equitable allocation, which will be discussed in Chapter 12, considers both subjective needs and objective factors, such as income, which means that everyone is satisfied with their own allotment.

### 1.8.8 Efficient Allocation of Resources

Whether resources are efficiently allocated is a basic criterion to evaluate the effectiveness of an economic system. In economics, efficient allocation of resources usually refers to Pareto efficiency/optimality, which means that no other feasible allocation exists, such that at least one individual is better off without making any one worse off. As such, it requires not only efficient consumption and production, but also production of products that can best meet the needs of consumers.

It is worth mentioning that, concerning economic efficiency, we should distinguish between three types of efficiency: a firm's production efficiency; industrial production efficiency; and allocation efficiency of an economy. By stating that a firm's production is efficient, we mean that, with a given input, the output is a maximum, or with a given output, its input$s$ are a minimum. Industry is the aggregation of all firms' production for a particular commodity, the efficiency of which can be similarly defined. However, the efficiency of a firm does not imply the efficiency of an industry. The reason for this is that if the production materials of firms with outdated technologies are given to those firms with advanced technologies,
there will be more outputs for the whole industry. At the same time, even if production of the entire industry is efficient, the allocation of resources may not be (Pareto) efficient.

The concept of Pareto efficiency in allocating resources is applicable to any economic institution. Indeed, it provides a basic criterion of value judgment for an economic institution from the perspective of social welfare, and assesses the economic performance from the perspective of feasibility. It can also be applied to a planned economy, a market economy, or a mixed economy. The First Fundamental Theorem of Welfare Economics, which will be introduced in Chapter 11, proves that when individuals pursue their own self-interest, a perfectly competitive market will lead to the efficient allocation of resources.

### 1.9 Understanding Economics Properly

An accurate and thorough understanding of economics can assist individuals to correctly use basic principles and analytical methods of economics to study various economic issues under different economic environments, behavioral assumptions, and institutional arrangements. The different schools and theories of economics per se show inclusiveness, specificity, universality, and generality of the analytical framework and methodologies of economics. Under different economic environments, various assumptions and specific models are required. Only in this way will the developed theory be able to explain different economic phenomena and individuals' behavior, and more importantly, make logically inherent analyses, draw conclusions of inherent logic, and make scientific predictions and reasoning under various economic environments that are close to the theoretical assumptions. However, due to the complexity of economic environments, for the sake of semantic and logic clarity, economics employs various rigorous mathematical tools to construct economic models in order to develop various economic theories. Rigorous mathematical tools are often difficult to master, which results in frequent misunderstandings and criticisms of economics. In addition to the common misunderstandings of benchmark theories discussed previously, misunderstandings exist about
economics concerning the following several aspects.

### 1.9.1 On the Scientification of Economics

One of the primary misunderstandings is that economics is not a science and includes numerous conflicting theories. A common criticism is that too many different economic theories exist that come from different economic schools in economics, making it difficult to discern which is correct and which is not. Those who hold such an opinion, however, fail to fully comprehend that all economic theories do not diverge from the two basic categories of theory discussed previously. Indeed, it is precisely due to the complexity of objective reality, and dissimilar economic, political, social and cultural environments in different countries and regions, different thoughts and preferences of people, and various economic goals that people pursue, that different theoretical economic models and economic institutional arrangements need to be developed.

It may be easy to understand that different economic theories or models should be developed for different economic, social, and political environments. However, it is challenging for many to comprehend why different economic theories are developed under the same economic environment . Consequently, some individuals, while disavowing economics and its scientific characteristics, sharply criticize economists by stating that "100 economists will have 101 opinions" . Actually, it is they who do not realize that it is analogous to the fact that we need different maps for different purposes, such as traffic, travel, military, etc., even though there is only one Earth. It is the case that, in the same given economic environment, we may need to develop distinct economic theories and different economic institutional arrangements for various goals.

The fact that different opinions of economists will arise for the same problem merely demonstrates the precision and thoroughness of economics because, when the premises and the environment change, the conclusions should vary accordingly; this is especially true in the case of the second category of economic theory that aims to solve practical problems. Furthermore, as different individuals will also have dissimilar subjective judge-
ments of values, there are few universally correct conclusions that satisfy everyone and apply in all situations. Just as medicines will vary according to the disease, when considering economic problems, case-by-case analyses must be conducted according to the specific time, place, people, and occasion involved. The major difference in the analogy to medicine is that, while an incorrect prescription for a condition may result in serious health problems or the death of an individual, an incorrect choice of economic policy, with large externalities, will influence an entire group of individuals or even a nation.

Although different economic theories and models exist, both the benchmark economic theory, which provides a benchmark or reference system, and the second category of economic theory, that aims to solve practical problems, they definitely do not constitute different "economics" .

The basic analytical framework and methodologies of (modern) economics, just like those of mathematics, physics, chemistry, engineering, etc., are not bounded by regions or nations. The foundational principles, methodologies, and analytical framework can be used to investigate a variety of economic issues under all economic environments and institutions, and to study economic behavior and phenomena in specific areas and time periods. The analytical framework and methodologies that will be introduced later can be used to conduct comparative analyses on almost every economic phenomenon and issue. In fact, this is precisely where the power and wonder of the analytical framework of economics lies: its essence and core require that the economic, political, and social environment conditions at a specific time and place must be considered and clearly defined when carrying out research. Economics can be used to investigate economic issues and phenomena under human behavior as manifested in different nations, regions, and cultures. Its basic analytical framework and methodologies can also be applied to elucidate other social phenomena and human decision-making processes. Indeed, it has been proven that, due to the $u$ niversality and generality of the analytical framework and methodologies of economics, in the past few decades, various analytical methods and theories have been successfully extended to other disciplines, including political science, sociology, and the humanities.

### 1.9.2 On the Mathematical Feature of Economics

In addition to the criticisms that the assumptions of economic theory do not conform with reality and economics is not a science, another common criticism is that economics pays too much attention to details and involves an increasing amount of mathematics, statistics and models, and this makes questions more incomprehensible. However, the reason that economics uses so much mathematics and statistics is to achieve rigor and quantifiability of empirical studies. Although decision-makers in government and the general public do not need to understand details or premises of rigorous theoretical analysis, economists who make policy suggestions must thoroughly understand these. As economic theory will generate great externalities once adopted, blind application without considering premises may produce serious problems and perhaps catastrophic consequences. This is why mathematics should be employed to rigorously define the boundary conditions of a theory. In addition, the application of a theory or enactment of a policy often requires the tools of statistics and econometrics to carry out quantitative analyses or empirical tests. Moreover, because the real economic society is so complicated, the use of mathematical models in economic theories can assist to depict the real economic world for people to understand problems to be solved in reality. We will discuss the role of mathematics in economics later in this chapter.

### 1.9.3 Misunderstandings on Economic Theory

Each theory or model in economics that aims to solve practical problems adopts axiomatic analysis, which comprises a set of presupposed assumptions on economic environments, behavior patterns and institutions, and conclusions based on these assumptions. Considering the complexity of economic environments and the diversity of individual preferences in the real world, the more general are the presupposed assumptions of a theory, the more powerful is the theory. If the presupposed assumptions of a theory are too restrictive, the theory will lose generality, and thus offer less utility in reality. As economics is employed to serve the society and the government, the theory must be of some breadth and depth. Consequent-
ly, a necessary requirement for a good theory is its generality, in which the more general it is, the larger explanatory power it will have and the more useful it will be. The general equilibrium theory, which studies competitive markets, constitutes such a theory. It proves that the existence of competitive equilibrium leads to efficient resource allocation under the condition of very general individual preferences and production technologies.

Even so, theories of social sciences, and especially those of economics, like all theorems in mathematics, are subject to boundary conditions. As discussed previously, because of the great externalities of economic theories, when discussing or applying an economic theory, it is necessary to focus on its presupposed assumptions and application scope. This is because the conclusions of any economic theory are not absolute, but rather only hold when the assumptions are satisfied. Whether or not this point is recognized when discussing economic issues is a basic criterion of whether an economist is well-trained. As economic issues are closely correlated with daily life, even ordinary people can give their opinions about economic problems, such as inflation, business climate, balance or imbalance of supply and demand, unemployment, the stock market, and the housing market. For this reason, many people do not regard economics as a science. Indeed, economics would not be a science if it did not take into account constraints or base itself on accurate data and rigorous theoretical logical analysis. A well-trained economist always discusses issues based on economic theories and is fully cognizant of the boundary conditions of the relationship among economic variables and the inherent logic of the corresponding conclusions. It is crucial to fully understand the boundary conditions of economic theories; otherwise, one will not be able to distinguish between the theory and the reality, but instead tend towards one of two extremes: either simply applying the theory to reality, irrespective of constraints in reality; or completely denying the value of economic theory.

The first extreme viewpoint overestimates the role of theory and misuses it. For example, some people disregard the realistic objective constraints that face a nation. They blindly or mechanically apply the two categories of economic theories to solve the nation's problem, and indiscriminately copy models to study the problem, assuming that the inclusion of mathematical
models will produce valid theories. Conclusions and suggestions obtained by copying economic theories or models, whether they be benchmark economic theory, or the second category of economic theory that closely reflects reality, if blindly applied without taking into consideration various constraints and boundary conditions created by the nation's actual situation and economic institutional environment will frequently lead to serious problems. In fact, irrespective of how general the theory and behavioral assumption are, they always have application boundaries and limitations, and thus must not be used indiscriminately. Indeed, especially for those theories developed based on an ideal state that exists far from reality and primarily for the purposes of establishing a reference system, benchmark and goal, they should not be applied directly or incorrect conclusions will result. In addition, without a sense of social responsibility or strong training in economics, a person may overestimate the role of theory and blindly apply economic theory to the real economy without taking the premises into account, which could bring severe consequences, negatively influence social and economic development, and lead to great negative externalities. For instance, the conclusion of the First Fundamental Theorem of Welfare Economics that a competitive market leads to the efficient allocation of resources is subject to a series of preconditions, and its misapplication will produce severe policy errors and damage to the real economy.

The other extreme viewpoint completely denies the role of theory. People holding such a point of view underestimate or deny the pragmatic utility of economics, including its behavioral assumptions, analytical framework, basic principles, and research methodology. In fact, just as in the case of the benchmark theory of economics, no discipline in the world exists whose assumptions and principles coincide with reality perfectly (like the concepts of free fall without air resistance and fluid motion without friction in physics). However, this is not a reason to deny the scientific features and usefulness of a discipline, including economics. We learn economics to acquire not only its basic principles and utility, but also its approaches towards thinking, asking, and solving questions. As discussed previously, the value of benchmark theories lies not in the direct explanation of reality, but in the provision of a study platform and reference system for develop-
ing new theories to explain the real world. With these methods, economists can become enlightened on how to solve economic problems in reality. Furthermore, as discussed in the previous section, a theory applicable to one nation or region may not be applicable to another due to different environments. Instead of applying the theory mechanically and indiscriminately, it is necessary to modify the original theory to develop new theories according to given economic environments and individual behavior patterns.

There is also another extreme viewpoint, in which certain people contend that market failures may occur under any circumstance, and that the market has externalities. In claiming this, they deny the practical significance of economic theory, believing that economics is highly hypothetical, and that these assumptions are superfluous because the market does not have boundaries.

It is also sometimes stated that a certain theory or conclusion has been overturned. As not all of the conditions of a certain theory are in accordance with reality, the theory is deemed to be incorrect and thus supplanted. In general, this statement is not correct. Assumptions, even those in the second category of theories that aim to solve practical problems, cannot fully coincide with reality or cover every possible case. Indeed, a theory may be applicable to the economic environment of one location but inapplicable to that of another. As long as there is no inherent logic error present, however, it cannot be concluded that the theory is fallacious and needs to be abandoned. It may only be stated that it is not applicable to a certain place or a particular time.

Another common mistake is attempting to draw a general theoretical conclusion based solely on certain specific examples. This constitutes a methodological error. Of course, we do not deny the unique role of history, culture, and paradigms of each country in the establishment of its own discourse of economics.

### 1.9.4 On Experiments in Economics

Another criticism about economics is that it is not an experimental science at all, and thus the scientific feature of economics is negated. Such view-
point constitutes a misunderstanding. First of all, as with the rapid development of experimental economics in recent years, economics is using increasing numbers of laboratory experiments, field experiments, and computer simulation experiments to investigate various economic problems. Experimental economics also tests individuals' behavior and rationality of behavioral assumptions through these experimental methods, and consequently constitutes an important tool to determine whether or not an economic theory fits objective reality. Theorists have also obtained crucial information from experiments in order to promote the advancement of theories (important discussions of numerous economists on how to understand experiments in economics can be found on the website of Al Roth). Furthermore, experiments in economics are already transitioning more from the laboratory toward field experiments (see relevant discussion by John List).

Indeed, from an empirical perspective, in real economic activities, experiments in economics provide an indispensable advantage to verify policies and systems, especially concerning the need for institutional transitions. After continual exploration by early scholars, and the systematic synthesis of methodologies and tools of experiments in economics by Vernon Smith, winner of the 2002 Nobel Memorial Prize in Economic Sciences, experimental economics as an important empirical tool has received increasing attention in market mechanism design. When external environments change rapidly and new technologies abound, reform becomes inevitable; however, the strategic risks and social costs of various policy suggestions must be carefully considered. Therefore, it is a difficult and key objective in institutional reform to identify a way to comprehensively examine problems in advance that might arise out of new proposals regarding institutions. For instance, in the earlier days of the reform and opening-up, China took various measures, including the "special economic zone policy'", "pioneering pilot scheme", "typical example as the lead", etc. Although economic experiments are consistent with such measures in the guiding aim of lowering the risk and cost of the reform, major differences in methodology remain between economic experiments and pilot experiments for the accumulation of experience.

In comparison with the pilot method, firstly, the economic experimen$t$ is liable to focus on a single research question, so that each experiment examines the effects of only one policy and the characteristics of only one mechanism. Secondly, the economic experiment employs relatively normal techniques and tools. Indeed, there are multiple influential factors in real economic activities, while the methodology of economic experiments is able to control factors that are irrelevant to the research question in order to focus more closely on the effect of one factor on certain economic phenomena. In comparison with the pilot method, it is also less costly to carry out economic experiments. It is also worth noting that the relation between genetics and economic behavior is meaningful and promising. Once the relation between the two is accurately determined, the foundation will be established for economics to become a discipline of science, just as a natural science.

It must also be admitted that some economic theories, such as general equilibrium theory that can be used for comprehensive analysis cannot easily be tested by social experiments since policy mistakes may result in enormous risks to economy and society. This is the greatest difference from natural sciences. As in natural sciences, natural phenomena and objects can be studied through experiments, and theories can be tested and further developed in the laboratory. Astronomy might be the only exception to this, but it involves no individual behavior. In all cases, once individual behavior is involved, the situation will at least become relatively more complicated. Moreover, extreme precision can be attained in the application of theories in natural sciences. For instance, in the construction of buildings or bridges, and the manufacturing of missiles or nuclear weapons, accuracy of any degree is attainable since all of the parameters are controllable, and the interrelationship between variables is amenable to experimentation. In economics, however, numerous factors affecting economic phenomena are uncontrollable.

Economists are also frequently criticized for inaccurate economic forecasts. This can be explained from two perspectives. From the subjective perspective, it is due to whether or not specific economists have had systematic and rigorous training in economics. If not, they may be unable
to discern the main causes of problems or make correct logical analyses and inferences when they discuss and attempt to solve economic problems, and thus will prescribe solutions to economic problems that will be unsuccessful. From the objective perspective, some economic factors that influence economic results may suddenly and uncontrollably change, thus causing predictions to be inaccurate, even though they may be made by welltrained economists with excellent economic insight. Moreover, an economic issue involves not only human behavior, which increases complexity, but numerous other uncontrollable factors, as well. Although an economist might be knowledgeable and talented, his or her predictions may still deviate because certain uncontrollable factors that influence economic results may change. For instance, even for a good economist with sound judgment, his or her economic forecasts might become inaccurate once sudden changes occur in the economic, political, or social environment. It is also the case that some people assert that no matter how economics develops and what the reason may be, inaccurate prediction is the norm, and accurate prediction is attributable to chance. In principle, this is true since economic fluctuations are random variables. However, since the probability for an event to occur and the capability of economists vary, a well-trained economist can better judge the probability of an event and be more likely to be accurate in his or her prediction. This constitutes the subjective factor of inaccurate prediction as mentioned above.

How can the problem that economic theory cannot experiment on society under many circumstances be overcome? The answer is logically inherent analysis, based on which inherent conclusions and inferences can be drawn, and comparisons and empirical data tests can be carried out through both horizontal and vertical perspectives of history. In this way, when conducting economic analysis or providing policy suggestions, according to the three dimensions of economic analysis discussed previously, there should first be theoretical analysis of inherent logic to define the applicable boundary conditions and scope. Meanwhile, tools of statistics, econometrics and/or experimental economics should be used to perform empirical quantitative analyses or tests, and the invaluable perspective of history should be taken into account to conduct vertical and horizon-
tal comparative analysis. Therefore, when carrying out economic analysis or identifying policy suggestions, there must be theoretical analysis of inherent logic, historical comparative analysis, and empirical quantitative analysis based on data and statistics; and all three are indispensable, which makes the analysis have six natures: scientific, rigorous, realistic, pertinent, forward-looking, and thought-provoking. This three-in-one study methodology, to a large extent, overcomes the challenge that many economic theories cannot or cannot easily experiment on society.

The method of logically inherent analysis of economics aims to fully understand and characterize relevant circumstances (economic environment, situation, and status quo) for a problem to be solved to ascertain what the problem is and its causes, apply appropriate economic theories accordingly, draw conclusions, and make accurate forecasts and inferences or give the direction of reforms. As long as the status quo accords with the causes (economic environments and behavioral assumptions) presupposed in the economic model, logically inherent conclusions can be reached according to economic theories, and thus solutions can be obtained or certain institutional arrangements can be suggested for different circumstances (varying with time, place, individual, and case). The method of logically inherent analysis can assist to make academic inferences on possible results under circumstances in which real economic and social environments, behavior patterns of economic agents, and economic institutional arrangements are given, and thus provide useful guidance for solving real economic problems. In other words, once the problem and its causes are clearly identified, and the appropriate economic theory is applied, if such a theory exists, then the optimal solution can be implemented, and logically inherent conclusions can be drawn in order to make accurate predictions and inferences or provide appropriate reform measures. Otherwise, severely harmful consequences might arise.

It is true that the result of an economic theory may not be tested by experiments on society under many circumstances, and data do not provide the sole basis for analysis. Although practice is the sole criterion for testing truth, but not for predicting it. It is logically inherent analysis and historic comparison that should be relied upon, and thus theory becomes
indispensable. Like a doctor prescribing medications for a patient or a mechanic repairing an automobile, the most challenging and crucial task is the accurate diagnosis of the disease or the cause of the failure. The criterion for a good physician lies in whether he or she can accurately find the true cause of the problem. Once the cause is identified and a remedy identified, it is relatively easy to administer appropriate treatment. For economic problems, however, the prescription is economic theories. Once we truly understand the characteristics of an economic environment, thoroughly investigate the situation, and reasonably characterize individuals' behavior, the likelihood of success should rise dramatically.

### 1.10 Basic Analytical Framework of Modern EconomicS

For performing most tasks in life, basic laws exist. The way that economics studies and solves problems is similar to how people deal with personal, household, economic, political, and social affairs. In order to do something well and establish and maintain good relationships with others, the first task is to understand national conditions and customs, i.e., to know the real environment, behavior, and personality of the persons with whom you interact. On such a basis, one determines the optimal way of dealing with them and performing tasks, and make an incentive response after weighing the advantages and disadvantages to obtain the best outcome. Finally, one must make a value judgement on the choice, and evaluate the rules of the particular game being played. The basic analytical framework and research methods of economics follow this mode precisely to study economic phenomena, human behavior, and how people assess trade-offs and make decisions. Of course, a major difference between these two is the rigorous reasoning of economics, which uses formal models to identify the logical relationship between presupposed assumptions and conclusions. Such analytical framework offers great generality and consistency.

A standard academic work needs first to delineate all of the problems to be studied and/or resolved, or the economic phenomena to be elucidat-
ed. In other words, economists should first identify research objectives and their significance, provide readers with information regarding an overview and progress of the issues under investigation through a literature review, and illustrate the work's innovation concerning technical analyses and/or theoretical conclusions. Subsequent to this, they should discuss how to address the issues raised and draw conclusions.

Although economic issues under study may be quite dissimilar, the basic analytical framework used is essentially identical, which is an axiomatic approach to investigate economic problems. The analytical framework for a standard economic theory in economics consists of the following five steps: (1) specifying economic environments; (2) making behavioral assumptions; (3) establishing institutional arrangements; (4) determining equilibrium outcomes; and (5) making evaluations. All economics papers written with clarity and logical consistency comprise these five parts, especially the first four parts, irrespective of the conclusion and whether or not the author realized it. In this way, writing an economics paper constitutes innovative writing with a logical structure and analysis in such steps. Once these components are understood, the basic writing pattern of academic economics papers is known, and it will be substantially easier to learn economics. These five steps are also quite beneficial for understanding economic theory and its proofs, and finding research topics and conducting research.

Prior to discussing the five components in detail, it is first necessary to define the term "institution" . An institution is usually defined as a set of rules related to social, political, and economic activities that dominate and restrict the behavior of various social classes (Schultz, 1968; Ruttan, 1980; North, 1990). When people consider an issue, it is normal to consider certain factors as exogenously-given variables or parameters, and others as endogenous or dependent variables. These endogenous variables depend on the exogenous variables, and thus are functions of those exogenous variables. In line with the classification method of Davis-North (1971, pp 6-7) and the issue to be studied, any institution can be divided into two categories: institutional environment and institutional arrangement. An institutional environment is the set of a series of basic economic, political, social,
and legal rules that form the basis for establishing production, exchange, and distribution rules. Among these rules, the basic rules and policies that govern economic activities, and property and contract rights, constitute the economic institutional environment. An institutional arrangement is the set of rules that dominate potential cooperation and competition existing among economic participants. It can be interpreted as the generally known the rules of the game, with different rules of the game leading to dissimilar incentive reactions of individuals. In the long term, institutional environment and institutional arrangement will affect each other and evolve. Yet, in most cases, as Davis-North points out, people usually regard economic institutional environments as an exogenously-given variable, and consider economic institutional arrangements (e.g., the market system) as exogenous or endogenous, depending on the issue under study or discussion.

### 1.10.1 Specifying Economic Environment

The primary component of the analytical framework of economics aims to specify the economic environment where the issue or object to be studied lies. An economic environment is usually composed of economic agents, their characteristics, the institutional environment of the economic society, the information structure, etc., which are treated as exogenous variables and parameters. They are the embodiment of the basic idea of constraints.

How can we best specify the economic environment? It can be divided into the following two levels: (1) objective and realistic description of economic environment; and (2) concise and acute characterization of the essential features. The former constitutes science and the latter is art, and the two must be combined and balanced. Overall, the more clear and accurate is the description of an economic environment, the greater is the likelihood of reaching correct theoretical conclusions. In addition, the more refined and acute is the characterization of an economic environment, the easier it is to reach and fully comprehend the theoretical conclusions. Only by combining these two levels together can the essence of issues under study be elucidated, as discussed below:

Description of economic environment: The first step in every econom-
ic theory of economics is to give an approximately objective description of the economic environment where the issue or object to be studied is situated. A reasonable, useful economic theory should accurately describe the specific economic environment. Although different nations and areas have distinct economic environments, which usually lead to dissimilar conclusions, the basic analytical framework and methodologies used are identical. As stated previously, a common initial task of studying economic issues is to describe the economic environment under investigation. Overall, the more clear and accurate is the description of the economic environment, the higher is the probability of obtaining correct theoretical conclusions.

Characterization of economic environment: When describing the economic environment, a question that is equal in importance to a clear and accurate description of the economic environment is how to concisely characterize the economic environment in order to capture the essence of a problem. Because most facts and phenomena in reality may be largely irrelevant to the economic issue to be analyzed and solved, a completely objective description of the economic environment may not only be unhelpful, but may also be confusing and overwhelming. Of course, if we precisely depict all aspects, a highly accurate and truthful description of the economic environment is achieved, but this result presents innumerable irrelevant facts without identifying the key points of the problem to be investigated. In order to avoid trivial aspects and focus on the most critical and central issues, it is necessary to characterize the economic environment specifically according to the demands of the issue to be studied. For example, when discussing consumer behavior in Chapter 3, we simply describe consumers as a composition of preference relation, consumption space, and income (or initial endowment) regardless of gender, age, race, or beauty. When discussing producer theory in Chapter 4, a producer is characterized as the production possibilities set. When studying transitional economies, we cannot simply mimic and apply conclusions derived under a mature market economic environment, but must determine the basic features of transitional economies, even though the basic analytical framework and methodologies of economics can still be applied.

A common criticism of economics is that it is useless because it relies
on a few simple assumptions to summarize complex situations. In fact, this is also the basic research methodology of physics. In the study of the relationship between two physical variables, both theoretical research and experimental operations fix other variables that will influence the object of study. In many cases, clarifying every aspect (especially unrelated aspects) is superfluous and may even lead to a loss of focus. This is similar to the previously described analogy of different kinds of maps. A tourist map may be needed for travelling, a traffic map may be useful for driving, and a military map may be appropriate for military exercises. Each of these maps describes only certain characteristics of a region, and does not present an aggregate picture of the real world. Indeed, people need a tourist map, traffic map, and military map according to different purposes. If we were to depict the entire real world into one map, although it completely describes the objective reality, how can it be a useful map for any one purpose?

Therefore, economics is not only a science of objective description, but also the art of abstracting and depicting real economic environments. Economics utilizes concise and profound characterizations of economic environments to describe the causes of problems and conduct inherently logical analyses, and thus obtain logical conclusions and inferences. A good economist should be able to accurately grasp the most essential characteristics of the current economic situation in his or her study. It is only when we truly clarify the causes and current situation that we can address specific problems with appropriate solutions (the economic theory adopted). Of course, to achieve this, one needs to have basic training in economics.

Determining how to describe the economic environment frequently lead$s$ to divergent theoretical results, and can even produce new schools of thought. Because economic environments are markedly complex, in many cases, economics can not only carry out descriptive analysis, like in natural science, but must also refine and characterize the behavior of the economic environment in an abstract manner to identify the most important characteristics. This, however, often makes economists possess a degree of subjective judgment. Different subjective judgments will lead to dissimilar specifications of economic environments, which will in turn lead to various economic theories, economic schools, and/or theoretical results. For
example, there are many schools in macroeconomics: the Keynesian school, the post-Keynesian school, the rational expectations school (or neoclassical macroeconomics), the monetarism school, the supply school, and the new institutional school. In fact, the antagonism between these schools is not as great as commonly believed by non-economists and the media. Indeed, the schools have numerous factors in common: the same basic analytical framework, the same research method (using the economic model and market equilibrium to analyze the market), and the same object (studying the interaction and change law of macroeconomic variables under the arrangement of the market system). It is also the case that they all believe in the market system. Moreover, it is agreed upon that, in terms of the long-term or general trend of economic operation, there will be an optimal market equilibrium. The differences among these theories are primarily resultan$t$ from the differences in describing the economic environment, especially whether the impact on or interference to the economic system comes from the demand side or the supply side, whether information about economic fluctuation is sufficient, and whether the differences are caused by different assumptions on the time effect of the interference, such as lag or instant.

### 1.10.2 Making Behavioral Assumptions

The second basic component of the analytical framework of economics is to make assumptions regarding the behavior mode of economic agents. This is the key difference between economics and natural science. Indeed, the assumption is of critical importance and constitutes the foundation of economics. Whether an economic theory is convincing and has practical value and whether an institutional arrangement or economic policy is conducive to sustainable and rapid economic development primarily depends on whether the individual behavior assumed truly reflects the behavior of most individuals. It also depends on whether the institutional arrangement and individuals' behavior are incentive-compatible, i.e., whether individuals' reaction to the incentive is also beneficial to others or society.

In general, under a given environment and rules of the game, individuals will make trade-off choices according to their behavioral disposition.

Therefore, when deciding the rules of the game, policies, regulations or institutional arrangements, it is necessary to take into account the behavioral pattern of participants and make correct judgments. Just as when dealing with different individuals in our daily lives, it is necessary to know whether or not they are selfless and honest. Different rules of the game should be instituted when faced with different people. When interacting with an honest person who tends to tell the truth, the best way to deal with him or her, or the rules of the game imposed on him or her, may be comparatively simple. When facing totally selfless individuals, the rules to deal with them can be even simpler, since it is not necessary to take precautions or invest much energy (in designing the rules of game) to interact with them, and the rules may seem not as important. In contrast, when encountering a cunning and dishonest person, the best way to deal with him or her will be quite different and requires substantial energy, and thus the rules will be much more complicated. As such, making accurate judgments about individuals' behavior is a crucial step for the study of how individuals react to incentives and make trade-off choices. When investigating economic problems, such as economic choice, and interactions between economic variables and how they change, it is also important to determine the behavioral pattern of economic agents.

As mentioned above, under normal circumstances, a logical and realistic assumption about individuals' behavior used by economists is the selfinterest assumption, or the stronger rationality assumption, i.e., economic agents pursue the maximization of benefits. Bounded rationality means to make the best choice according to the knowledge and information possessed by an agent, which belongs to the category of rationality assumption. In consumer theory, which will be discussed later, we assume that consumers pursue utility/satisfaction maximization; in producer theory, we assume that producers pursue profit maximization; and in game theory, various equilibrium solution concepts have been introduced to describe the behavior of economic agents, which are given based on different behavioral assumptions. Overall, any economic agent, in his or her contact with others, implicitly assumes others' behavior.

The assumption of (bounded) rationality is largely reasonable. From
a practical point of view, as mentioned previously, there are three basic kinds of institutional arrangements: mandatory regulation (for situations with small operation costs and relatively easy information symmetry); incentive mechanism (for cases of information asymmetry); and social norms (composed of ideology, beliefs, morals, customs, etc., that are norms of self-discipline). If individuals are all selfless and highly developed ideologically, there will be no need for rigid "stick-style" regulations that "enlighten with reason" or the flexible market system that "guides with interest" .

### 1.10.3 Setting-up Institutional Arrangements

The third basic component of the analytical framework of economics is to set up economic institutional arrangements, which are usually referred to as institutions or rules of the game. Different institutions or rules of the game should be taken for different situations, environments, and individuals with varied goals and behavioral patterns. When the situation or environment changes, the rules of the game will also change accordingly. When an economic environment is given, agents need to decide on the economic rules of the game, which is termed the economic institutional arrangement. Determination of institutional arrangement is important for accomplishing anything in this context. Economics studies and provides various economic institutional arrangements or economic mechanisms according to different economic environments and behavioral assumptions. Depending on the issue under discussion, an economic institutional arrangement could be exogenously-given (in which case it will degenerate into the institutional environment, such as a perfectly competitive market under which we study consumer or producer problems) or endogenously-determined.

As discussed previously, there are three basic kinds of institutional arrangements that guide individuals' behavior: mandatory regulatory governance or government intervention; institutional norm of incentive mechanism; and didactic social norm. The three means play different roles and possess respective applicable ranges and limitations. Didactic social norm relies on the improvement of humanity and lacks a constraining force;
mandatory regulatory governance or government intervention incurs high information costs, and over-intervention will harm individual freedom; compared with the other two means, the incentive mechanism is the most effective. This is why economists focus closely on institutions.

Therefore, for the enaction of an institutional arrangement, irrespective of whether regulatory governance or incentive mechanism is present, the purpose is not to change the self-interested nature of individuals, but rather to make use of such immutable self-interestedness in order to guide individuals to engage in action that will objectively benefit society. In other words, mechanism design should follow the nature of individuals, but not attempt to change such nature. There is no good or evil in the discussion of individuals' self-interestedness, and the key lies in how to guide it with institutions. Different institutional arrangements will induce dissimilar incentive reactions and trade-off choices, and thus could produce markedly divergent results.

Any theory of economics involves economic institutional arrangements. Standard economics mainly focuses on the market system and studies how individuals make trade-off decisions in a market system (e.g., consumer theory, producer theory, and general equilibrium theory) and under what economic environments market equilibrium exists. It also makes value judgments on the results of resource allocation under different market structures (the criterion is based on whether resource allocation is efficient and equitable). In these investigations, the market system is normally assumed to be exogenously-given. In this way, it is possible to simplify the problem in order to focus on the study of individuals' economic behavior and how individuals make trade-off choices.

Of course, as the exogeneity assumption of institutional arrangements is not entirely reasonable in many cases, different economic institutional arrangements should be established, depending on particular economic environments and individuals' behavioral patterns. As will be discussed in Parts V-VII of the textbook, there will be market failures (i.e., inefficient allocation of resources and non-existence of market equilibrium) in many situations, and thus we will need to find an alternative or better economic mechanism. In that case, it is necessary to treat institutional arrangements
as endogenously-determined by the economic environment and individual behavior. As a consequence, economists should provide a range of alternative economic institutional arrangements for various purposes.

When studying the economic behavior and choice issues of a specific economic organization, economic institutional arrangements should especially be endogenously-determined. New institutional economics, transition economics, theory of the firm, and in particular the economic mechanism design theory, information economics, optimal contract theory, auction theory, and matching theory that have developed in the last few decades, provide various economic institutional arrangements for a broad range, from the state to individuals, according to different economic environments and behavioral assumptions. Part VI presents detailed discussions on the issue of incentive design in economic institutional arrangements.

### 1.10.4 Determining Equilibrium

The fourth basic component of the analytical framework of economics is to make trade-off choices and determine the "optimal" outcome. Given the economic environment, institutional arrangement (rules of the game) and other constraints that must be adhered to, individuals will respond to incentives based on their own behavior, and assess and choose an outcome from available and feasible outcomes. Such an outcome is termed an equilibrium. Equilibrium means that, among various feasible and available choices, the one that is ultimately chosen is called an equilibrium. Those who are self-interested will choose the optimal one for themselves; whereas, those who are altruistic may choose an outcome that is favorable to others. For this reason, equilibrium, which refers to a state without deviation incentives for all economic agents, is a static concept.

The equilibrium defined above may be the most general definition in economics. It embraces equilibria in textbooks that are reached by independent decisions under the drive of self-interested motivation and manifold technology or budget constraints. For instance, under the market system, for the producer, a profit-maximizing production plan under the constrain$t$ of production technology is called an equilibrium production plan; for
the consumer, a utility-maximizing consumption bundle established under the budget constraint is called an equilibrium consumption bundle. When producers, consumers, and their interactions reach a state at which there is no incentive for deviations, a competitive market equilibrium for each commodity is obtained.

It should be noted that equilibrium is also a relative concept. The equilibrium outcome depends on economic environments, participants' behavior patterns (whether regarding rationality assumption, bounded rationality assumption, or other behavioral assumptions), and the rules of the game by which individuals react to incentives. Indeed, it constitutes the "optimal" choice relative to these factors. Moreover, due to bounded rationality, it may not be the optimal choice in objective reality, but is nevertheless the "optimal" one chosen by individuals according to their preferences and the information that they possess at the time.

### 1.10.5 Making Evaluations

The fifth basic component of the analytical framework of economics is to make evaluations and value judgments on equilibrium outcomes and institutional arrangements. After making their choices, individuals usually hope to evaluate the equilibrium that then arises and compare it with the ideal outcome (e.g., efficient allocation, equitable allocation, incentive compatibility, informational efficiency, etc.), in order to make further assessments and value judgments on economic institutional arrangements. They also strive to determine whether or not the adopted economic institutional arrangement has led to a certain "optimal" outcome, and test whether the theoretical result is consistent with the empirical evidence, whether it can provide accurate predictions, and whether it is of pragmatic significance. Finally, they assess the economic institution and rules adopted to discern if there is room for improvement. Overall, in order to achieve better results, after completing the task, we should evaluate the effects, whether it is worth continuing, and whether there is a possibility for improvement. Therefore, it is necessary to make evaluations and value judgments on equilibrium outcomes under institutional arrangements and trade-off choices in
order to identify the institutions that are best suited to the development of a nation.

When making evaluations on economic mechanisms or institutional arrangements, one of the most important criterion adopted in economics is whether the institutional arrangement is in accordance with the principle of efficiency. Certainly, as economic environments and individuals' behavioral patterns, as well as science and technology, continue to change, the precise Pareto optimality may never be fully realized. Just like Newton's three laws of motion, free fall, and fluid flow without friction in physics, Pareto optimality is an ideal state and provides the direction for improvement regarding economic efficiency. As long as the improvement of economic efficiency is desired, individuals will continually strive to approach this goal as closely as possible. With the ideal standard of Pareto optimality, we have a benchmark against which to compare, measure, and evaluate various economic institutional arrangements in the real world. Furthermore, it enables us to determine how far they are from this ideal goal for improvement of economic efficiency in order to continue to approach Pareto optimality.

Nonetheless, Pareto optimality is not the sole criterion for social value, equality or equity is also used. The market system achieves efficient allocation of resources, but it also faces numerous problems, such as social injustice resultant from an enormous wealth gap. There are a variety of definitions of equality, equity, and fairness. Equitable allocation, which will be introduced in Chapter 12, takes both objective equality and subjective factors into consideration, and more importantly, it can achieve equitable and efficient outcomes simultaneously. This is the basic conclusion of the Fairness Theorem, which will be discussed in Chapter 12. Another important criterion for evaluating an economic institutional arrangement is incentive compatibility.

In summary, the five components discussed above constitute the analytical framework underlying almost all standard economic theories and models, regardless of how much mathematics is used, or whether the insti-
tutional arrangement is exogenously-given or endogenously-determined. In the study of economic issues, one should first define the economic environment, and then examine how the self-interested behavior of individuals affects each other under exogenously-given or endogenously-determined mechanisms. Economists usually take"equilibrium","efficiency","information",
"incentive compatibility" and "equity" as key aspects to observe the effects of different mechanisms on individual behavior and economic organizations, explain how individual behavior achieves equilibrium, and evaluate and compare the equilibrium. Using such a basic analytical framework in the analysis of economic issues is not only compatible in methodology, but may also lead to surprising (but logically consistent) conclusions.

### 1.11 Basic Research Methodologies in Economics

We have discussed the five components of the basic analytical framework of economics: (1) specifying economic environment; (2) making behavioral assumptions; (3) establishing institutional arrangements; (4) determining equilibrium; and (5) making evaluations. In general, any economic theory consists of these five aspects. Discussion of the five components naturally leads to the question of how to combine them appropriately, gradually deepen the study of various economic phenomena, and develop new economic theories. This is what we will discuss in this section: the basic research methodology and key points, which include setting up benchmarks , establishing reference systems, building studying platforms, developing analytical tools, constructing rigorous models, and conducting positive and normative analyses.

The research methodology of economics aims to firstly provide basic studying platforms for all levels and aspects, and then establish benchmarks and reference systems in order to present the criteria to evaluate equilibrium outcomes and institutional arrangements. Building a studying platform, setting benchmarks, and establishing reference systems are of great importance to the construction and development of any discipline, and economics is no exception to this.

### 1.11.1 Setting up a Benchmark

Evaluations or judgements can only be relative, and not absolute, and thus there should be a benchmark, which also applies to the discussion of economic issues. In economics, benchmark refers to a relatively ideal state or simple economic environment. As discussed in the first section of this chapter, to investigate a realistic economic issue and develop a new theory, we usually need to first consider it under a relatively ideal economic environment to develop a simple result or theory. Subsequently, we discuss the result in a non-ideal economic environment, which is closer to reality, develop a more general theory, and compare it with that developed under the benchmark situation.

In this sense, benchmarks are relative to non-ideal economic environments and new theories to be developed that are closer to reality. For instance, a complete information environment is the benchmark for the study of incomplete information. When investigating economic issues under private information, the situation of complete information must first be understood (even though it is highly unrealistic). Only when we are clear about the situation of complete information can we adeptly study economic issues taking place under the circumstance of private information. This is the case with theoretical research in economics. We start from the ideal state or simple scenarios prior to considering more realistic or general scenarios. In addition, we learn from others' research results before innovating the existing theories. In fact, new theories are always developed on the basis of prior research findings and results. An example of this is that Newton's mechanics makes Einstein's theory of relativity possible, while the theory of relativity makes it possible for Chen-Ning Yang and Tsung-Dao Lee to put forward the non-conservation of parity.

### 1.11.2 Establishing a Reference System

A reference system refers to economic theories or systems generated in an ideal situation, such as the general equilibrium theory, i.e., a perfectly competitive market will lead to efficient resource allocation. Establishing a reference system is of key importance to the construction and development of a new
discipline, including economics. Although economic theories set as the reference system may include many assumptions that do not accord with reality, at least they can assist in the following: (1) simplifying the issue and capturing its characteristics directly; (2) establishing a comparative measurement criterion that is conductive to the assessment of the gap between the existing system and the ideal system, understanding the reality, and establishing the direction of improvement; and (3) studying how to reform or carry out further theoretical innovation, which can be used as a reference system for additional analysis.

Although an economic theory as a reference system might possess numerous unrealistic assumptions, they remain highly useful and can serve as a reference for further analysis. The importance of the reference system does not lie in whether or not it accurately describes the real world, but rather in establishing the measurement for a better understanding of reality. This is similar to our practice of setting role models in life. In addition, like a mirror, it assists to reveal the gap between theoretical models or realistic economic institutions and the ideal state. It is critically important in the sense that it identifies the direction of efforts and adjustments, and the extent of those adjustments. If a person has no goal and is unaware of the gap and approximate direction that should be followed, how can he or she make improvements or reach any goal?

General equilibrium theory is such a reference system. As we know, a perfectly competitive market will lead to efficient allocations of resources. Even if there is no such market in reality, if we make efforts in that direction, efficiency will be enhanced. This is why we have institutional arrangements, such as anti-trust laws, to protect market competition. By virtue of the reference system with perfect competition and complete information as the benchmark, we can study what outcomes can be obtained from economic institutional arrangements that are closer to reality (e.g., some monopolistic or transitional economic institutional arrangements) where assumptions in the general equilibrium theory are not valid (incomplete information, imperfect competition, externalities), and compare them with the results obtained from general equilibrium theory in the ideal state. In this way, we will know whether an economic institutional arrangement (be
it theoretical or realistic) is efficient in allocating resources and using information, and how far away the economic institutional arrangement adopted in reality is from the ideal situation. Based on this, we can make appropriate policy suggestions or reform measures. In this sense, general equilibrium theory also serves as a reference theory that provides a criterion for evaluating institutional arrangements and the corresponding economic policies or pointing out the direction of reforms in practice.

Therefore, we should hold lofty ideals, which let us know our goals and the best direction to go. Even if we cannot get there eventually, by only learning from the best and comparing our performance with the best, we can do better and better, and continue to at least approach the ideal.

### 1.11.3 Building Studying Platforms

A studying platform in economics consists of certain basic economic theories, models or methods, which provide the basis for deeper analysis. The methodology of economics is very similar to that of physics, i.e., simplifying the issue first to capture the core essence of the issue. In cases in which many factors produce an economic phenomenon, the impact of every factor must be elucidated. This can be achieved by investigating the effect of one factor at a time, while holding all other factors constant. The theoretical foundation of economics is microeconomics, and the most fundamental theory in microeconomics is individual choice theory; individual choice theory further comprises consumer theory and producer theory, which are the basic studying platform and cornerstone of economics. This is why almost all economics textbooks start from the discussion of consumer theory and firm theory. They provide the fundamental theories that explain how individuals make choices as consumers and firms, and establish the studying platform for further study of individual choice.

In general, the equilibrium choice of an individual depends not only on one's own choice, but also on others' choices. In order to investigate individual choice, it is necessary to determine what are the most important factors in an individual's decision making in the absence of influence by other agents. Consumer theory and producer theory are developed through this
approach. It is assumed that economic agents are in the institutional arrangement of a perfectly competitive market. Therefore, every agent will take price as given, and individual choice will not be influenced by others' choices. The optimal choice is determined by subjective factors (e.g., the pursuit of utility or profit maximization) and objective factors (e.g., budget line or production constraints).

This methodology that involves simplification and idealization of the question establishes a basic platform for deepening research. It is like the approach in physics: in order to study a problem, we examine the essence first, start with the simplest situation that excludes frictions from consideration, and then gradually deepen the research and consider more general and complicated cases. In microeconomics, theories of market structures, such as monopolies, oligopolies and monopolistic competition, are generated from more general cases, in which producers can influence each other. To study the choice issue under the more general situation in which economic agents can influence each other's decision-making, economists have developed a very powerful analytical tool: game theory.

General equilibrium theory is a more sophisticated studying platfor$m$ based on consumer theory and producer theory. Consumer theory and producer theory provide a fundamental platform for investigating individual choice problems; whereas, general equilibrium theory provides a core platform for analyzing how to reach market equilibrium through interactions of individuals and all markets. Mechanism design theory provides an even higher-level platform for studying, designing, and comparing various institutional arrangements and economic mechanisms. It can be used to study and prove the optimality and uniqueness of perfectly competitive market mechanisms in resource allocation and information requirement, and more importantly, in the case of market failure, it offers methods of how to design alternative mechanisms. Under some regularity conditions, the institutional arrangement of a perfectly competitive market will not only lead to efficient allocation of resources, but also prove the most efficient concerning information requirements (mechanism operation cost, transaction cost), as it requires the least amount of information. Under other circumstances of market failure, it is necessary to design a variety of alterna-
tive mechanisms for different economic environments. Furthermore, the studying platform also creates conditions for providing reference system$s$ for evaluating various kinds of economic institutional arrangements. In other words, it provides a criterion for measuring the gap between reality and the ideal state.

### 1.11.4 Developing Analytical Tools

For the research of economic phenomena and economic behavior, we also need various analytical tools besides the analytical framework, benchmark, reference system, and studying platform. economics necessitates not only qualitative analysis, but also quantitative analysis, to find the boundary conditions for each theory to be true, so that the theory will not be misapplied. Consequently, a series of powerful analytical tools should be provided, which are usually given as mathematical models or diagrams. The power of these tools lies in their ability to support us to deeply analyze intricate economic phenomena and economic behavior through a simple and clear diagram or mathematical structure. Examples of this include the demand-supply curve, game theory, principal-agent theory for investigating information asymmetry, Paul A. Samuelson's (1915-2009, see Section 3.11.2 for his biography) overlapping generations model, dynamic optimality theory, etc. Of course, exceptions exist which are not expressed with analytical tools. For instance, Coase's theory is established and demonstrated through words and basic logical deduction only.

### 1.11.5 Constructing Rigorous Analytical Models

Logical and rigorous theoretical analysis is needed when we explain economic phenomena or economic behavior, and make conclusions or economic inferences. As mentioned above, each theory holds true under certain conditions. We need to establish rigorous analytical models that clearly identify the conditions under which a theory holds true. A lack of related mathematical knowledge will make it difficult to achieve an accurate understanding of the connotations of a definition, or to have discussions on related issues, as well as defining boundary conditions or constraints.

Therefore, it is not surprising that mathematics and mathematical statistics are used as basic analytical tools; indeed, they are also among the most important research methods in economics.

### 1.11.6 Making Positive and Normative Analysis

According to the research method, economic analysis can be divided into two categories: positive or descriptive analysis; and normative or value judgement analysis. Another major difference between economics and natural science is that the latter essentially only performs positive analysis, while the former involves both positive and normative analysis.

Positive analysis explains how an economy operates. It only gives facts and provides explanations (thus verifiable), but does not make value judgements about economic phenomena or offer means of revision. For example, an important task of economics is to describe, compare, and analyze such phenomena as production, consumption, unemployment and price, and to predict possible outcomes of different policies. Consumer theory, producer theory, and game theory are typical examples of the positive approach.

Normative analysis, on the other hand, makes value judgments on economic phenomena. It not only explains how an economy operates, but also attempts to identify the means of revision. As a consequence, it always involves the value judgments and opinions of the economists, and is thus not verifiable through facts. For instance, certain economists may place more emphasis on economic efficiency, while others may focus on equality or social justice. If we are cognizant of the differences between the two methods, many disputes can be avoided when discussing economic issues. Economic mechanism design theory is a typical example of the normative approach.

Positive analysis is the foundation for normative analysis, while normative analysis is the extension of positive analysis. In this sense, the foremost task of economics is to make positive analysis, and then normative analysis follows. General equilibrium theory includes both the former (e.g., the existence, stability, and uniqueness of competitive equilibrium) and the latter (the First and Second Fundamental Theorems of Welfare Economics).

### 1.12 Practical Role of the Analytical Framework and Methodologies

The most basic analytical framework and research methods of economics that have been discussed are of practical utility. Even though these analytical frameworks and methodologies may appear simple, it is not easy to comprehend and use them in our lives, studies, and research. However, once the idea is mastered, lifelong benefits will ensue. For example, one will be able to think scientifically. It will also be possible to investigate esoteric pure economic theories, as well as come up with viable solutions to solve practical issues in one's life and work.

First of all, from the perspective of studying economics, if the analytical framework and methodologies are mastered, abstract models and intricate mathematics will not be confusing. This is because, irrespective of the profundity of the mathematics used, how many formulae are employed, and how complicated are the economic models that are used in an economic theory, it still uses the above analytical framework and methodologies. If the basic analytical framework and methodologies are grasped and employed as the main paradigm, you will be able to maintain your focus and understand its general idea. Therefore, incomprehensible technical details can be temporarily put aside, and the framework and conclusion understood first; only then can we fully comprehend the details. In other words, it is necessary to first grasp the primary point and general idea, know its objectives, line of thinking as well as conclusions, and then consider the details. Moreover, once the basic analytical framework and methodologies are mastered, one possesses the correct idea of economics and cannot be misled. This, of course, can have a markedly positive effect on your study of economics. The reason why some people criticize economics and its methodologies is that their judgements are mostly not based on methods of scientific analysis, and may even rely only on subjective assumptions. If the basic analytical framework and methodologies are not understood, it is possible that their judgments will make you confused, lose direction when studying economics, and/or resist or even disregard the study of economics.

Second, regarding economic research, once the basic analytical framework and methodologies are understood, it will be easier to carry out research. It is the case that many people who strive to do economic research, even though they understand economics quite well and have read a large number of related papers, they still find it difficult to conduct research. Either they do not know how to do research, or their research findings are not significant or widely recognized. In fact, research would become relatively easier, as long as the basic analytical framework and methodologies are understood, and one possesses basic mathematic knowledge and the ability to carry out logical analysis. Conducting research is, to a certain extent, step-by-step writing with inherent logic according to the five components of the basic analytical framework. The basic analytical framework and methodologies can greatly assist you to improve your research and innovative abilities.

For example, if you are interested in a specific economic issue or phenomenon, or you want to put forward a new theory with stronger explanatory power to guide the resolution of a pragmatic economic issue, it is necessary to reasonably and precisely describe the economic environment and economic agent's behavior, employ existing analytical tools or develop new ones to build as simple a model as possible, and then perform the deduction and proof. On the other hand, if you only intend to extend and improve the original theory, it is necessary to determine whether the original assumptions about the economic environment, behavior, and models fit the reality and whether or not the assumptions can be relaxed to derive novel or more general conclusions or even pathbreaking theories. In this case, it might be easier to carry out the work of extensions and improvements. Of course, it is also possible to modify the specification of economic environments or other components in order to reach a different, or perhaps more important, conclusion. This is how the school of macroeconomics and numerous theories under information asymmetry were developed. If an economic theory is to be criticized, one should criticize which parts of its analytical framework are unreasonable, illogical, or unrealistic, and in what way, rather than censuring economics and its methodologies in aggregate.

Finally, understanding economics, its methodologies, and analytical frame-
work may assist us to have a greatly improved thinking process, and deal with everyday concerns and other individuals in a much better manner. Indeed, it can make you more thoughtful, insightful, and capable in your work. It is frequently stated that economics is esoteric and metaphysical since it involves so much difficult mathematics that seems remote from practice. Some people wonder "What will it be used for?" In fact, the basic approach of dealing with others and events in our daily lives is similar to the basic framework in economic analysis. For example, when one is in a new place preparing to perform a task or cooperate with others, the first thing one needs to do is to become familiar with the local environment and situation, which is similar to "specifying the economic environment" in the framework. It is then necessary to know the local culture and customs, the behavioral patterns and personalities of your counterparts, etc., which is similar to "making behavioral assumptions". Subsequently, by taking all of the information together, one can decide on one's rules for dealing with people, which is similar to "establishing economic institutional arrangements". The next step is to choose the optimal scheme by making tradingoffs among feasible options, which is similar to the "determining equilibrium". The final step is to summarize and reflect on your decisions, actions, and your ways of dealing with people, circumstances, and events to assess whether they constitute the most effective approaches, whether they achieve the best outcomes, whether they are fair and reasonable, whether individuals' enthusiasm is engendered, whether people have reactions to the incentive, and whether the intended goal of incentive compatibility is achieved, which is similar to "making evaluations". In addition, when the environment and conditions are changed, or the subject with which you are working is altered, the rules should be changed accordingly. If you can act in accordance with the five aspects, and adjust the rules with changes in conditions, better results will certainly be produced. Not only may this be one of the best ways to deal with daily life and work, certain conclusions of economic theories can also assist you to better think about and solve problems.

### 1.13 Requirements for Learning Economics

There are three basic requirements for learning and mastering economic theory:

1. The first requirement is to master the basic concepts and definitions, which is a reflection of logical thinking and a clear mind. This is the prerequisite not only for the discussion and analysis of questions and logically inherent analysis, but also for a strong command of economics. Otherwise, different definitions of terms may produce substantial confusion and lead to unnecessary controversies.
2. One should be able to clearly state all theorems or propositions, and also be definitive about the basic conclusions and their conditions. Otherwise, even a small misunderstanding about an economic theory in application to the analysis of issues may lead to serious problems. Since any theory or institution has its proper scope of application, if we go beyond that, problems are liable to arise, bringing about tremendous negative externalities. In many cases, social or economic problems occur solely because economists misapply some theories without a solid understanding of their applicable conditions. In this sense, a good economist is similar to a qualified physician who needs to master the properties and efficacies of different kinds of medicines when prescribing for his or her patients.
3. One must also grasp how the basic theorems or propositions are proven (ideas and processes). A good economist, like a good physician, should know what the problem is and why it is present, understand its pathology, as well as be able to determine appropriate medicines. Then, he or she can gain a deeper understanding and a better command of the theories that he or she has learned.

If these requirements are met, it would be easy to refresh your memory, even if the proofs of some conclusions are forgotten. Economics relies primarily upon the analysis of inherent logic, which also constitutes the power of economic theory. This is why it is so crucial to accurately grasp the theories and their scopes of application.

### 1.14 Distinguishing Sufficient and Necessary Conditions

When discussing economic issues, it is also important to distinguish between sufficient conditions and necessary conditions, which can assist people to think clearly and avoid superfluous debates. A necessary condition is a condition that is indispensable in order for an assessment to be true. A sufficient condition, on the other hand, is a condition that guarantees that the assessment is true. For instance, some people often negate the market economy based on examples of severely underdeveloped countries, which adopt a market economy but remain poor. From this, they contend that a nation should not embark on the path of a market economy. These people, however, do not realize the difference between sufficient and necessary conditions: the adoption of a market economy is a necessary condition, rather than a sufficient condition, for a nation to become developed and prosperous. In other words, if a country aims to be prosperous, it must adopt a market economy. Indeed, it is the case that, without exception, all wealthy nations in the world are market economies. One must also admit, however, that the market mechanism does not necessarily lead to national prosperity. To be sufficient, other supplementary systems are needed, such as the rule of law, strong state capacity, a suitable political system, etc.

Indeed, as discussed previously, a distinction exists between a good market economy and a bad market economy. The reason for this is that, although (based on observations of reality) the market mechanism is critical for national prosperity, many other factors also influence the prosperity of a nation, such as the degree of government intervention, the political system, the legal framework, religions, cultures and social structures, all of which contribute to the labelling of the market mechanism as either good or bad.

### 1.15 The Role of Mathematics and Statistics in Economics

Mathematics and statistics are of extreme significance for people to possess a thorough knowledge of nature and to successfully manage their daily affairs. As the well-known statistician, C. Radhakrishna Rao, pointed out, mathematics is a type of logic employed to deduce results on a given premise; whereas, statistics is a rational method acquired through experience and a kind of logic used to verify the premise with a given result. Rao believes that "All knowledge is, in final analysis, history. All sciences are, in the abstract sense, mathematics. All judgements are, in their rationale, statistics." 7 This assertion profoundly and comprehensively depicts the significance of mathematics and statistics, and their respective connotations.

Mathematics and statistics are also essential in economics. Almost every branch in economics uses mathematics, statistics, and econometrics to a greater or lesser extent. The reasons for this include the following: economics is increasingly becoming a science; mathematical analytical tools are being increasingly used; and social systems are becoming increasingly complex and influential. Therefore, when investigating economic problem$s$, it is necessary to have a rigorous theoretical model for inherently logical analysis, and determine the range for a theoretical conclusion to be true; then, empirical tests for the given results must be performed by means of econometric analysis. As a consequence, it is not surprising that mathematics and mathematical statistics are used as basic analytical tools, and have become the most important analytical tools in economics. Those who study and conduct research on economics must possess a thorough knowledge of both mathematics and mathematical statistics.

Modern economics mainly adopts the mathematical language to make assumptions about economic environments and individual behavior patterns, uses mathematical expressions to illustrate logical relations between economic variables and economic rules, constructs mathematical models to study economic issues, and finally follows the logic of mathematical lan-

[^7]guage to deduce conclusions. Without related mathematical knowledge, it is difficult to grasp the essence of concepts and discuss related issues, and certainly conduct research and determine necessary boundaries or constraints when reaching conclusions. Consequently, it is necessary to master sufficient mathematical knowledge if one intends to learn economics well, engage in research on economics, and become a good economist.

People with little knowledge of mathematics are unlikely to be able to master the basic theories and analytical tools of economics or understand advanced economic textbooks or papers. In fact, they may use certain excuses, such as it is more important to produce economic thoughts, or mathematics is not generally needed to approach practical economic issues. Of course, no one could refute the importance of economic thoughts since they constitute the output of research. Without the tools of mathematics, however, how could the boundary conditions and the applicable scope of economic thoughts or conclusions be identified? Without knowledge of conditions and scope, how could we protect against the misapplication of economic thoughts or conclusions? Moreover, what are the odds for us to develop such profound economic thoughts without using mathematical models, as Adam Smith and Ronald H. Coase did? Even so, economists have never ceased investigating what conditions are required for their conclusions to hold. Without strict arguments, the thoughts or conclusions could not be widely acknowledged. As mentioned above, the economic thoughts presented by philosophers in ancient China, such as Jiang Shang, Lao Tzu, Sun Tzu, Guan Zhong and Sima Qian, are extremely profound, and some of the ideas of Adam Smith had already been put forward by these philosophers much earlier. However, their thoughts have never been known to the outside world because they were just observations or conclusions of experience that did not form a scientific system or involve logically inherent analyses using scientific methods.

There is another misunderstanding that research of economic issues with mathematics is remote from reality. In fact, however, most mathematical knowledge is developed on the basis of practical demands. People who possess basic knowledge of physics, physical science history, or history of mathematical thought will know that both primary and advanced
mathematics originated from the demands of scientific development and reality. As such, why cannot mathematics be used to investigate practical economic issues? The foundation of mathematics and economics is absolutely essential for one to be a good economist. If one understands mathematics well and masters fundamental analytical frameworks and research methodologies of economics, economics can be learned more easily and study efficiency will be markedly improved.

The primary functions of mathematics in the theoretical analysis of economics are as follows: (1) it makes the language more precise and the statement of assumptions clearer, which can reduce superfluous disputes resulting from ambiguous definitions. (2) It makes the analytical logic more rigorous and makes it possible to definitively state the boundary, application scope and conditions for a conclusion to hold true, and accurately identify the direction of theoretical innovation beyond the limitations of the original theory. Otherwise, the abuse of a theory may occur. For example, when discussing the issue of property rights, some people may quote the Coase theorem, assuming that as long as the transaction cost is zero, there will be efficient allocation of resources. Surprisingly, many people still exist (including Coase himself when providing his assessments) who do not know that this conclusion is normally false if the utility (payoff) function is not quasi-linear. (3) Mathematics can assist to obtain results that cannot be easily attained through intuition. For example, from intuition, according to the laws of supply and demand, competitive markets will achieve market equilibrium through the adjustment of market prices according to the "invisible hand" as long as the supply and the demand are not equal. Yet, this conclusion does not always hold. For example, Scarf (1960) gave counterexamples of market instability. (4) It helps to improve and extend existing economic theory. Examples of this are manifold in the study of economic theory. For instance, economic mechanism design theory constitutes an improvement and extension of general equilibrium theory.

Qualitative theoretical analysis and quantitative empirical analysis are both requisite for studying economic problems. Statistics and econometrics play a key role in these analyses. Statistics focuses more on data collection, description, sorting and providing statistical methods; econometrics
identifies economic structures through economic theory, and focuses more on testing economic theory, evaluating economic policy, making economic forecasts, and identifying causal relationships between economic variables; big data analysis can process data faster, better and more efficiently, and use these data to discover new opportunities, provide new products and services, and has great cost advantages. In order to better estimate economic models and reach more accurate predictions, theoretical econometricians and statisticians have continually developed increasingly powerful econometric tools and big data analytic tools.

It is, however, worth noting that economics is not mathematics. Mathematics in economics is used as a tool to elucidate economic problems. Economists employ mathematics to express their opinions and theories more rigorously, and to assess interdependent relationships among economic variables. With the metrication of economics and the precision of various assumptions, economics has become a veritable social science with a rigorous system.

However, a person with a strong knowledge of mathematics does not necessarily become a good economist. This also requires a deep understanding of the analytical frameworks and research methodologies of economics, and acute intuitions of actual economic environments and economic issues. The study of economics not only calls for the understanding of terms, concepts and results from the perspective of mathematics (including geometry), but more importantly, one must strive vigorously to grasp economic meanings and underlying economic thoughts. This is, of course, also the case when those are given by mathematical language and/or geometric figures. As a consequence, confusion must be avoided regarding mathematical formulas or symbols in the study of economics. For all of these reasons, we often state that, in order to become a good economist, one needs to pursue academics with a good mastery of both scientific rigor and underlying profound thoughts.

### 1.16 Conversion between Economic and Mathematical Languages

The product of economic research is economic inferences and conclusions. A standard economics paper usually consists of three parts: (1) it raises questions, states the significance, and identifies the research objective; (2) it establishes economic models and rigorously expresses and proves the inferences; and (3) it uses non-technical language to explain the conclusions and provides policy suggestions. In other words, an economic conclusion is usually obtained through the following three stages: non-mathematical language stage $\rightarrow$ mathematical language stage $\rightarrow$ non-mathematical language stage. The first stage proposes economic ideas, concepts or conjectures, which may stem from economic intuition or historical and foreign experience. As they have not yet been proven by theories, they can be regarded as primary products of general production. The first stage is critical because it is the origin of theoretical research and creation.

The second stage verifies whether or not the proposed economic ideas or conjectures hold true. The verification requires economists to give formal and rigorous proofs through axiomatic analysis by introducing economic models and analytical tools, and if possible, to test them with empirical data. The conclusions and inferences obtained are usually expressed in mathematical language or technical terms, which may not be understandable to non-experts. Therefore, they may not be adopted by the public, government administrations, or policy-makers. For this reason, these conclusions expressed by technical language can be regarded as intermediate products of general production.

Economic studies should serve the real economic world. Therefore, the third stage aims to express the conclusions and inferences in non-expert language rather than expert language, making them more decipherable to the general public. Policy implications and profound meanings of conclusions and insightful inferences conveyed through non-expert language constitute the final products of economics. It is notable that, in both the first and the third stages, economic ideas and conclusions are presented in common, non-technical and non-mathematical language; whereas, the
third phase is a kind of enhancement of the first phase. In fact, the threestage form of common language - technical language - common language is a normal research method that is widely adopted by numerous disciplines.

### 1.17 Biographies

### 1.17.1 Adam Smith

Adam Smith (1723-1790) is well-known as the father of economics. Adam Smith finished his study of Latin, Greek, mathematics, and ethics at the University of Glasgow in Britain. Subsequently, he worked at the University of Glasgow as a Professor in Logics and Moral Philosophy, and held the honorary position of Lord Rector. The Wealth of Nations, published in 1776, is Smith's most influential work and also a great contribution to the establishment of economics as an independent discipline. This book is widely considered to be the most influential work among all publications in the field of economics. His main academic thinking was strongly influenced by Bernard de Mandeville (1670-1731), Francis Hutcheson (16941764), David Hume (1711-1776), J. Vanderlint (year of birth unknown, died in 1740), George Berkeley (1685-1753), and others.

Smith suggested that the economic development of human society was the outcome of the spontaneous actions of tens of millions of individuals whose behavior followed the power of instinct and was driven by their selfinterested nature. Smith regarded this power as the "invisible hand", which is his idea of allowing the rule of the market to play the decisive role in the organization of economic society. The Wealth of Nations denied the attention to land in physiocracy, but valued labor as the most important aspect and believed that the division of labor could increase the efficiency of production.

Thomas Robert Malthus and David Ricardo focused on summarizing Smith's theories into a theory known as the classical economics in the twentieth century (where economics thus originated). Malthus further extended Smith's theories to the problem of surplus of population. Ricardo, on the other hand, put forward the iron law of wages, suggesting that the surplus
of population may lead to the consequence that workers' livelihood cannot be guaranteed. Smith assumed that the increase in wages would accompany the increase in production, which seems more correct from today's perspective. Theories involved in his book not only set up the division of labor theory, but also pioneered in certain areas, including monetary theory, theory of value, theory of distribution, capital accumulation theory, theory of taxation, etc. In addition, Marx's labor theory of value, which was built upon the basis of Ricardo's political economy, also received indirect influence from Smith's theory.

Before the foundational work, The Wealth of Nations, Smith wrote The Theory of Moral Sentiments (first published in 1759). In this book, he mainly argued that people should have sympathy and a sense of justice, which may occur particularly under unusual circumstances (for example, when people are suffering or when a nation is invaded). He strove diligently to prove how self-interested individuals controlled their emotions and behavior, and especially their selfish sentiment and behavior, so that incentive compatibility between social interest and self-interest could be achieved. Indeed, the system of economic theory built by Smith in The Wealth of Nations is based on his arguments in The Theory of Moral Sentiments.

Smith worked on the two works simultaneously, and revised them repeatedly until his death. They became two organic and complementary components in his academic thinking system. The Theory of Moral Sentiments states the problem of morality, while The Wealth of Nations states the problem of economic development. Smith regarded The Wealth of Nations as a continuation of his thinking in The Theory of Moral Sentiments. The two books, however, differ in mood, scope of discussion, structural arrangement, and emphasis. For example, the control for self-interested behavior in The Theory of Moral Sentiments relied on sympathy and a sense of justice; whereas, in The Wealth of Nations, it relied on the competitive mechanism. Nonetheless, the discussions about the motivation of self-interested behavior were essentially identical. It can be suggested that individuals' sympathy, sense of justice, and pursuit of self-interest just constitute different reactions to different circumstances (unusual or usual). In The Theory of Moral Sentiments, Smith regarded "sympathy" as the core of judgemen-
t , but when it is viewed as the motivation of an individual's behavior, a completely different outcome will result.

### 1.17.2 David Ricardo

David Ricardo (1772-1823), a representative of Classical Political Economy, together with Thomas Robert Malthus (1766-1834), integrated Smith's theory into classical economics. Ricardo was born to a Jewish family, and his father was a stock broker. He attended a business college in the Netherlands at 12-years-old and worked on a stock exchange with his father at 14. He was engaged in stock exchange work independently in 1793, and by the time he was 25 , he had amassed a wealth of two million pounds. After that, he began to study mathematics and physics. When he first read Adam Smith's The Wealth of Nations in 1799, he began to study economic issues. At the age of 37 , he published his first paper in economics and did very well in this field. During the 14 years of his short academic life, he left numerous works, papers, notes, letters, and speeches. Among those, the most famous one is the Principles of Political Economy and Taxation published in 1817. It has been claimed that Ricardo was somewhat conceited. He stated that his point of view was different from Smith and Malthus, who enjoyed great prestige then and, in Britain, there would be less than 25 people who could fully comprehend his book. In 1819, Ricardo was elected as a member of parliament.

Starting with Bentham's version of utilitarianism, Ricardo established a theoretical system based on the labor theory of value and centered on the theory of distribution. He insisted in the principle which stated that the value of a commodity was determined by the labor cost contained in it. He also criticized Smith's theory of value by contending that labor that could decide value constituted socially necessary labor. In addition, labor that could decide the value of a commodity was not only direct living labor, but also labor in factors of production. Ricardo suggested that all value was produced by labor and was distributed among three classes: wages that were decided by the value of the essential means of subsistence of workers; profit was the surplus when wages were deducted; and land rent was the
surplus when wages and profit were deducted.
Based on the labor theory of value, Ricardo established the theory of comparative advantage. In On the Principles of Political Economy and Taxation, he clearly stated that "The value of a commodity, or the quantity of any other commodity for which it will exchange, depends on the relative quantity of labour which is necessary for its production" . He further asserted that "the exchangeable value of these commodities, or the rule which determines how much of one shall be given in exchange for another, depends almost exclusively on the comparative quantity of labour expended on each" . The profit of each party in international trade is also fully correlated with the exchangeable value of all commodities in the international market, i.e., the relative price level.

Ricardo regarded the free flow of factors of production, such as capital and labor, among regions and industries within a country as the fundamental reason of equalized rate of profit. The flow of factors between nations, however, would inevitably be interrupted by force or even totally stopped due to various reasons. Ricardo concluded that it was the immobility of factors between countries that decided "the same rule which regulates the relative value of commodities in one country, does not regulate the relative value of the commodities exchanged between two or more countries" . Since there are numerous reasons for different relative values of one commodity in different countries, there is room for profit for all of the participating countries in international trade. Its main premise, however, is that each country is cognizant of its advantages compared with others, i.e., they are certain about their own comparative advantages.

### 1.18 Exercises

Exercise 1.1 (Economics and the three dimensions of scientific economic analysis)
Answer the following questions:

1. What is the definition of economics?
2. What are the two great objective realities facing the study of economic problems?
3. What is modern economics?
4. What are the "three dimensions and six natures" ?
5. Why does scientific economic analysis need the "three dimensions and six natures" ?

Exercise 1.2 (Differences between economics and natural science) Answer the following questions:

1. What are the main differences between economics and natural science?
2. Why do these differences make economic research more complex and difficult?

Exercise 1.3 (Two basic categories of economic theory) Answer the following questions:

1. Which two categories of economic theories can be classified according to their functions?
2. Describe the connotation and function of each category, as well as the relationship between these two categories.
3. How should we correctly regard and deal with the interaction between these two kinds of economic theory?

Exercise 1.4 (The fundamental functions of economic theory) Answer the following questions:

1. What are the three main functions of economic theory?
2. Why is there not a best kind of economic theory that is always right and fits every development stage, but instead a kind that fits certain institutional environments the best?
3. What are two common misunderstandings of economic theories?

Exercise 1.5 (Market and market mechanism) Answer the following questions:

1. From the perspectives of information and incentive, what are the advantages of the market economic system compared with the planned economic system?
2. Under the condition of the market economy, what are the three basic functions of price?
3. What is the superiority of the market system?
4. What are the three development stages that an economy will experience? How can efficiency-driven and further innovation-driven development be realized? What is the basic economic institution behind this?

## Exercise 1.6 (The dialectical relationship between competition and monopoly)

Answer the following questions:

1. Why do people want to introduce the competitive mechanism in the view of social resource allocation, while enterprises desire monopolies? Please also state the dialectical relationship between competition and monopoly.
2. What does the Innovation Theory of Schumpeter tell us? Please state the importance of innovation-driven development.
3. Why do innovation and entrepreneurship depend on institutional choice, and therefore constitute endogenous variables?

Exercise 1.7 (The boundaries among the government, the market, and the society)
Answer the following questions:

1. Why is it necessary to reasonably define the boundaries between the government and the market and between the government and the society?
2. How should the boundaries between the government and the market and between the government and the society be generally defined?
3. Why does a well-governed nation need to reasonably define not only the boundaries between the government and the market, but also those between the government and the society?

## Exercise 1.8 (The three basic institutional arrangements for state governance and benign developmen

 Answer the following questions:1. What are the three elements of state governance and benign development?
2. What are the three basic institutional arrangements for state governance?
3. State the range of application and limitation of each of the three basic institutional arrangements. Which one is the most basic and important?

Exercise 1.9 (The logic of development and governance) Answer the following questions:

1. How shall we correctly understand the logic of development and governance and the dialectical relationship between the two?
2. Explain the achievements and limitations of economic reform in China according to this framework.

Exercise 1.10 (Ancient Chinese Economic Thought) Answer the following questions:

1. Provide five examples that indicate the thought of the market economy in ancient China.
2. Why could not those numerous deep economic thoughts in ancient China form a scientific economic theory?

Exercise 1.11 (The cornerstone assumptions of economics) Answer the following questions:

1. State the relationship and distinction between self-love, selfishness, and self-interest.
2. Why does economics use the self-interest assumption as the most basic, important, and central assumption?
3. How shall we regard self-interestedness and altruism?

Exercise 1.12 (Key points in economics) Answer the following questions:

1. What are the key points of economics? Please state each of them generally.
2. State the meanings, advantages, and limitations of centralized and decentralized decision-making.
3. Why are economic freedom and competition crucial to economic development?
4. Why is acting under constraints one of the most fundamental principles in economics?
5. What is the relationship between incentive and information?
6. Why are clearly defined property rights crucial to the efficient allocation of resources?
7. Discuss the differences between equity in outcome and equality of opportunity. Which one does not conflict with efficiency?

Exercise 1.13 (Proper understanding of economics) Answer the following questions:

1. How shall we regard the scientific nature of economics?
2. How shall we regard the mathematical nature of economics?
3. How shall we regard economic theory correctly?
4. How shall we regard the critics that contend that economics cannot be tested through experimentation?

Exercise 1.14 (Basic analytical framework of (modern) economics) Answer the following questions:

1. What are the components that constitute the basic analytical framework of a standard modern economic theory?
2. Why do different economic environments need different economic theories?
3. Why are different economic theories needed even for the same economic reality or environment under many circumstances?
4. Why should evaluation be included in the analytical framework?
5. Taking Coase theorem as an example, expound on its economic analytical framework.
6. What are practical usages of the basic analytical framework and research methodologies of economics?

Exercise 1.15 (Benchmark and reference system) Answer the following questions:

1. What are the definitions of benchmark and reference system?
2. Why are setting-up benchmarks and establishing reference systems the premise of discussing economic problems?
3. What are typical examples of reference systems?

Exercise 1.16 (Methodologies) Answer the following questions:

1. When considering the problem of economic reform, why is it important to distinguish necessary conditions from sufficient conditions?
2. Why are both positive and normative analysis needed when discussing economic problems?
3. How shall we regard the role of mathematics and statistics in economics?
4. How shall we complete the conversion between economic and mathematical languages?

### 1.19 References

## Books and Monographs:

Acemoglu, D., and Robinson, J. A. (2012). Why Nations Fail: The Origins of Power, Prosperity and Poverty. First Edition. New York: Crown.

Andrei Shleifer, Robert W. Vishny(2002). The Grabbing Hand: Government Pathologies and their Cures. Harvard University Press.

Hayek, F. (1973). Law, Legislation and Liberty (Volume II and III). University of Chicago Press.

Hurwicz, L. and S. Reiter (2006) Designing Economic Mechanisms. Cambridge University Press.

Kornai, J. (1992). The Socialist System: The Political Economy of Communism. First Edition. Princeton University Press.

Debreu, G. (1959). Theory of Value, Wiley.
Friedman, M. and R. Friedman (1980). Free to Choose, HBJ.
Kreps, D. M. (2013). Microeconomic Foundation I: Choice and Competitive Markets, Princeton University Press.

Luenberger, D. (1995). Microeconomic Theory, McGraw-Hill.
Mas-Colell, A., M. D. Whinston, and J. Green (1995). Microeconomic Theory, Oxford University Press.

Jehle, G. A., and P. Reny (2011). Advanced Microeconomic Theory, AddisonWesley.

Olson, M. (1965). The Logic of Collective Action, Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

Olson, M. (1982).The Rise and Decline of Nations, Yale University Press.
Olson, M. (2000). The Power and Prosperity, Outgrowing Communist and Capitalist Dictatorships, Basic Books.

Rawls，J．（1971）．A Theory of Justice，Cambridge：Harvard University Press．

Rubinstein，Ariel（2005）．Lecture Notes in Microeconomics（modeling the economic agent），Princeton University Press．

Smith，Adam（1759）．The Theory of Moral Sentiments．

Smith，Adam（1776）．（An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations）The Wealth of Nations．W．Strahan and T．Cadell．Reprint－ ed，Oxford：Clarendon Press．

Varian，H．R．（1992）．Microeconomic Analysis（Third Edition），W．W．Nor－ ton and Company．

田国强（2010）．序：从国富到民富——从发展型政府转向公共服务型政府．见王一江．民富论．北京：中信出版社．（Tian，G．（2010）．From the Wealth of Nations to the Wealth of People：A Transition from Development－oriented Government to Public－service－oriented Gov－ ernment．Preface to The Wealth of People by Wang，Yijiang．Beijing： Citic Press．）

田国强（2014）．中国改革：历史，逻辑和未来．北京：中信出版社．（Tian， G．（2014）．The Reform of China：History，Logic，and Future．Beijing： Citic Press．）

田国强，张凡（1993）．大众市场经济学．上海：上海人民出版社．（Tian，G． \＆Zhang，F．（1993）．Public Market Economics．Shanghai：Shanghai People＇s Publishing House．）

王一江（2010）．民富论．北京：中信出版社．（Wang，Y．（2010）．The Wealth of the People．Beijing：Citic Press．）

## Papers：

Baumol，W．J．（1990）．＂Entrepreneurship：Productive，Unproductive，and Destructive，＂Journal of Political Economy，Vol 98，893－921．

Hellman，Joel S．（2009）．＂Strategies to Combat State Capture and Ad－ ministrative Corruption in Transition Economies＂，Comparative E－ conomic and Social Systems，No． 2.

Roland，G．（2005）．＂Understanding Institutional Change：Fast－Moving and Slow－Moving Institutions＂，Nanjing Business Review．No． 5.

Arrow，K．and G．Debreu（1954）．＂Existence of Equilibrium for a Com－ petitive Economy＂，Econometrica，Vol．22，No．3，265－290．

Coase，R．（1960）．＂The Problem of Social Cost＂，Journal of Law and Economics，No．3，1－44．

Lincoln，A．（1854）．＂Fragment on Government（July 1，1854）＂．Life and Works of Abraham Lincoln，Volume 3，ed．Marion Mills Miller（1907）．

Modigliani，F．and M．Miller（1958）．＂The Cost of Capital，Corporation Fi－ nance and the Theory of Investment＂，American Economic Review， Vol．48，No．3，261－297．

Rothschild，M．and J．E．Stiglitz（1971）．＂Increasing Risk II：Its Economic Consequences＂，Journal of Economic Theory，Vol．3，No．1，66－84．

Scarf，H．（1960）．＂Some Examples of Global Instability of the Competitive Equilibrium＂，International Economic Review，Vol．1，No．3，157－172．

钱颖一．理解现代经济学．经济社会体制比较，2002年第2期．（Qian，Y． （2002）．＂Understanding Modern Economics＂．Comparative Eco－ nomic and Social Systems，No．2．）

钱颖一．市场与法治．经济社会体制比较，2000年第3期．（Qian，Y．（2000）．
＂Market and the Rule of Law＂．Comparative Economic and Social Systems，No．3．）

田国强．内生产权所有制理论与经济体制的平稳转型．经济研究，1996年第11期．（Tian，G．（1996）．＂The Theory of Endogenous Property Right－ s and the Smooth Transition of Economic System＂．Economic Re－ search Journal，No．11．）

田国强．现代经济学的基本分析框架与研究方法．经济研究，2005年第2期． （Tian，G．（2005）．＂The Basic Analytical Framework and Methodolo－ gies in Modern Economics＂．Economic Research Journal，

田国强．和谐社会的构建与现代市场体系的完善——效率，公平与法治．经济研究，2007年第3期．（Tian，G．（2007）．＂The Construction of a Harmonious Society and Improvement of Modern Market System－ Efficiency，Justice，and Rule of Law＂．Economic Research Journal， No．3．）

田国强。从拨乱反正，市场经济到和谐社会构建——效率，公平与和谐发展的关键是合理界定政府与市场的边界。《文汇报》，《解放日报》及上海管理科学研究院＂中国改革开放与发展30年＂征文优秀论文稿，2008年7月．（Tian，G．（2008）．＂From Bringing Order out of Chaos，Market Economy，to the Construction of a Harmonious Society－The Key to Efficiency，Justice，and Harmonious Development is the Reasonable Definition of the Boundaries between Governmen－ $t$ and Market＂．Excellent Paper in Call for Papers on＂30 Years of China＇s Reform and Opening up and Development＂by Wenhui Pa－ per，Jiefang Daily，and Shanghai Institution for Management Science Research，July．）

田国强．经济学的思想与方法．论文稿， 2009 年10月．（Tian，G．（2009）． ＂The Thought and Methodology of Economics＂．Manuscript，Oc－ tober．）

田国强．中国经济发展中的深层次问题．学术月刊，2011 年第3 期．（Tian， G．（2011）．＂Deep－Seated Problems in the Economic Development of China＂．Academic Monthly，No．3．）

田国强．中国下一步的改革与政府职能转变．人民论坛•学术前沿， 2012 年第3 期．（Tian，G．（2012）．＂China＇s Reform and Transition of the Gov－ ernment Role in the Next Step＂．People＇s Forum：Academic Fron－ tiers，No．3．）

田国强．中国经济转型的内涵特征与现实瓶颈解读．人民论坛，2012年第35期．（Tian，G．（2012）．＂An Interpretation of the Connotative Features and Realistic Bottlenecks of China＇s Economic Transition＂．People＇s Forum，No．35．）

田国强．世界变局下的中国改革与政府职能转变．学术月刊，2012年第6期．
＂China＇s Reform and Transition of the Government Role under the Global Context of Change＂．Academic Monthly，No．6．）

田国强．中国改革的未来之路及其突破口．比较，2013年第1期．（Tian，G． （2013）．＂The Future Path and Point to Break in for China＇s Reform＂． Comparative Studies，No．1．）

田国强．＂中等收入陷阱＂与国家公共治理模式重构．人民论坛，2013年第8 期．（Tian，G．（2013）．＂The＇Middle－Income Trap＇and Reconstruc－ tion of the State Governance Mode＂．People＇s Forum，No．8．）

田国强．法治：现代治理体系的重要基石．人民论坛•学术前沿， 2013年第23 期．（Tian，G．（2013）．＂The Rule of Law：the Most Important Cornerstone of Modern Governance System＂．People＇s Forum：Aca－ demic Frontiers，No．23．）

田国强。现代国家治理视野下的中国政治体制改革。学术月刊，2014年第3期．（Tian，G．（2014）．＂The Reform of China＇s Political System from the Perspective of Modern State Governance＂．Academic monthly， No．3．）

田国强．近现代中国的四次社会经济大变革——国企改革的镜鉴与反思．探索与争鸣，2014年第6 期．（Tian，G．（2014）．＂The Fourth Great Social and Economic Reform in Modern China：Lessons and Reflections on the Reform of State－owned Enterprises＂．Exploration and Free View， No．6．）

田国强．当前中国经济增速的合理区间探讨——发展和治理两大逻辑如何统筹兼顾．人民论坛•学术前沿， 2015 年第 6 期．（Tian，G．（2015）．
＂Discussion on the Reasonable Range of China＇s Economic Growth Rate：How to Consider the Logic of both Development and Gover－ nance＂．People＇s Forum：Academic Frontiers，No．6．）

田国强．重构新时期政商关系的抓手．人民论坛•学术前沿，2015年第5期．（Tian，G．（2015）．＂The Handle for Reconstructing the Relationship between Politics and Business in the New Era＂．People＇s Forum： Academic Frontiers，No．5．）

田国强，夏纪军，陈旭东．破除中国模式迷思，坚持市场导向改革．比较， 2010年第50辑．（Tian，G．，Xia，J．，\＆Chen，X．（2010）．＂Breaking the Myth of China＇s Mode and Insisting on Market－Oriented Reform＂．Compar－ ative Studies，Vol．50．）

田国强，杨立岩．对＂幸福一收入之谜＂的一种解释：理论与实证．经济研究， 2006 年第11期．（Tian，G．and Yang，L．（2006）．＂A Solution to the Happiness－Income Puzzle：Theory and Evidence＂．Economics Research Journal，No． 11.

王一江．国家与经济．比较，2005年第18辑。（Wang，J．＂State and Econo－ my＂．Comparative Studies，Vol．18．）

## Chapter 2

## Preliminary Knowledge and Methods of Mathematics

This chapter provides self-contained mathematical knowledge and results that constitute indispensable tools of modern economics, in general, and advanced microeconomic theory, in particular. It includes basic knowledge and results of topology, linear algebra, mathematical analysis, fixed point theory, static optimization, dynamic optimization, differential equations, difference equations, probability theory, and stochastic dominance and affiliation. Readers with more mathematics training will also find this chapter useful as an important reference course for most of the principal mathematical theorems that arise in modern economics.

We begin with the basic mathematical knowledge that you will frequently encounter.

### 2.1 Basic Set Theory

This section introduces some basic concepts and results of set theory.

### 2.1.1 Set

A set $S$ is a collection of elements. According to the number of elements, a set can be a finite set, for example, $S=\{1,3,5,7,9\}$; an infinite countable set, for example, $S=\mathcal{N}$, where $\mathcal{N}$ is the set of all natural numbers; or an
infinite uncountable set, for example, $S=\mathcal{R}$, where $\mathcal{R}$ is the set of all real numbers. A countable set can be either finite or infinite. A set can also be described with some properties, for example, $S=\{1,3,5,7,9\}=\{x: x<$ $\left.10, x \in \mathcal{N}, \frac{x}{2} \notin \mathcal{N}\right\}$. The empty set $\varnothing$ is a set consisting of no elements.

A subset $T$ of a set $S$ is also a set, and any element in $T$ belongs to $S$, denoted by $T \subseteq S$. If $T$ is a subset of $S$ and $S$ has at least one element that does not belong to $T$, then $T$ is a proper subset of $S$. If $T$ and $S$ are subsets of each other, then these two sets are equal, i.e., $T=S$.

The union of two sets $T$ and $S$ is denoted by $T \cup S=\{x: x \in T$ or $x \in$ $S\}$; the intersection of two sets $T$ and $S$ is denoted by $T \cap S=\{x: x \in$ $T$ and $x \in S\}$.

The complement set of $S$ in the universal set $U$ is denoted by $S^{c}=\{x$ : $x \in U, x \notin S\}$. The complement set of the universal set $U$ is the empty set, and the complement of the empty set is the universal set. The difference between sets $S$ and $T$ is denoted by $S \backslash T$ or $S-T$, which is defined as $S \backslash T=S-T=\{x: x \in S, x \notin T\}$.

The complement of the union or the intersection of any number of sets satisfies De Morgan's law:

$$
\begin{aligned}
& \left(\bigcup_{i \in I} A_{i}\right)^{c}=\bigcap_{i \in I} A_{i}^{c} ; \\
& \left(\bigcap_{i \in I} A_{i}\right)^{c}=\bigcup_{i \in I} A_{i}^{c} .
\end{aligned}
$$

The product of sets $T$ and $S$ is denoted by $S \times T=\{(s, t) \mid s \in S, t \in T\}$. The $n$-dimensional real space is defined as $\mathcal{R}^{n}=\underbrace{\mathcal{R}}_{\text {p } \times \mathcal{R} \times \mathcal{R} \times \cdots \times \mathcal{R}}$. product of $n$ spaces

### 2.1.2 Mapping

Definition 2.1.1 (Mapping) Given sets $A$ and $B$, if for each element $x$ in $A$, there always exists an element $y$ in $B$ related to it, then this relation is called a mapping or function, denoted by $f: A \rightarrow B$. The set $A$ is called the domain of $f$, and the set $B$ is called the range.

The image of $f$ is the set of points in the range into which some points
in the domain are mapped, i.e., $I=\{y: y=f(x)$, for some $x \in A\}$.
The following definition gives the types of mapping.
Definition 2.1.2 Given sets $A$ and $B$, and a mapping $f: A \rightarrow B$, we call $f$ a surjection if $\{y \in B: f(x)=y, x \in A\} \equiv f(A)=B$; an injection if $f(x) \neq f\left(x^{\prime}\right)$ holds for all $x \neq x^{\prime}$; a bijection if $f$ is both a surjection and an injection.

If there is a bijection $f$ between sets $A$ and $B$, then $A$ and $B$ are equivalent, denoted by $A \sim B$. Next, we will discuss the number of elements of a set.

Definition 2.1.3 Let $J_{n}=\{1,2, \cdots, n\}$ be the set of the first $n$ positive integers, and $J$ the set of all positive integers.
(1) A set $A$ is a finite set, if there exists a certain $n$ such that $A \sim$ $J_{n}$;
(2) A set $A$ is a countably infinite set, if $A \sim J$;
(3) A set $A$ is countable, if it is either a finite set or an countably infinite set;
(4) A set $A$ is uncountable, if it is not countable.

Both sets of natural and rational numbers are countable sets, but the real number set is not. The following conclusion shows that the set of all binary numbers is not countable.

Theorem 2.1.1 Suppose that $A$ is a set consisting of all sequences made up of 0 and 1. Then, it is uncountable.

Refer to the proof of Theorem 2.14 in Rudin (1976)'s Principles of Mathematical Analysis.

Since real numbers can be represented in binary, the set of real numbers is equivalent to the set $A$ above, which is uncountable. Any interval $(a, b)$ is equivalent to the real space since $f=\frac{y}{1-|y|}$ with

$$
y=\frac{x-\frac{(a+b)}{2}}{\frac{(b-a)}{2}}
$$

is a bijection of them, and thus any real interval is uncountable.

### 2.2 Basic Linear Algebra

### 2.2.1 Matrix and Vector

We use $\mathcal{R}^{n}$ to represent a set of all $n$-tuple real numbers. Its elements are called the points or vectors. $\mathbf{x}=\left(\begin{array}{c}x_{1} \\ \cdots \\ x_{n}\end{array}\right)$ represents a column vector, and $x_{i}$ is the $i$ th component of the vector $\mathbf{x} . \boldsymbol{x}^{\prime}=\left(x_{1}, \cdots, x_{n}\right)$, a row vector, is defined as the transpose of $\mathbf{x}$. If not expressly specified, vectors refer to column vectors, in general.

The inequality signs $\geqq, \geq$ and $>$ about vectors are defined as follows. Let $\mathbf{a}, \mathbf{b} \in \mathcal{R}^{n}$, then $\mathbf{a} \geqq \mathbf{b}$ represents that $a_{s} \geqq b_{s}$ for all $s=1, \cdots, n ; \boldsymbol{a} \geq \boldsymbol{b}$ represents that $\boldsymbol{a} \geqq \boldsymbol{b}$, but $\boldsymbol{a} \neq \boldsymbol{b} ; \boldsymbol{a}>\boldsymbol{b}$ represents that for all $s=1, \cdots, n$, $a_{s}>b_{s}$.

In economics, it is usually required to solve the system of linear equations, which can now be easily expressed and solved by linear algebra.

We consider a system of $m$ linear equations with $n$ variables $\left(x_{1}, x_{2}, \cdots, x_{n}\right)$ :

$$
\begin{aligned}
& a_{11} x_{1}+a_{12} x_{2}+\cdots+a_{1 n} x_{n}=d_{1} \\
& a_{21} x_{1}+a_{22} x_{2}+\cdots+a_{2 n} x_{n}=d_{2} \\
& \cdots \\
& a_{m 1} x_{1}+a_{m 2} x_{2}+\cdots+a_{m n} x_{n}=d_{m}
\end{aligned}
$$

where the letter with double subscript, $a_{i j}$, denotes the coefficient appearing in $i$ th equation and attached to the $j$ th variable $x_{j}$, and $d_{j}$ denotes the constant term on the right side of the $j$ th equation.

This can be expressed more succinctly in the following matrix form:

$$
A \boldsymbol{x}=\boldsymbol{d},
$$

where $A, \boldsymbol{x}, \boldsymbol{d}$ are, respectively:

$$
\begin{gathered}
A=\left[\begin{array}{cccc}
a_{11} & a_{12} & \cdots & a_{1 n} \\
a_{21} & a_{22} & \cdots & a_{2 n} \\
\cdots & \cdots & \cdots & \cdots \\
a_{m 1} & a_{m 2} & \cdots & a_{m n}
\end{array}\right] \\
\boldsymbol{x}=\left(\begin{array}{c}
x_{1} \\
x_{2} \\
\cdots \\
x_{n}
\end{array}\right) \\
\boldsymbol{d}=\left(\begin{array}{c}
d_{1} \\
d_{2} \\
\cdots \\
d_{m}
\end{array}\right)
\end{gathered}
$$

$A$ is called the coefficient matrix of a $m \times n$ system of equations, which consists of $m$ rows and $n$ columns; $\mathbf{x}$ is called a variable vector, and $\mathbf{d}$ is a constant vector. An $n$-dimensional vector can be viewed as a special $n \times 1$ matrix.

As a shorthand device, the array in matrix $A$ can be written more simply as

$$
A=\left[a_{i j}\right]_{m \times n}(i=1,2, \cdots, m ; j=1,2, \cdots, n) .
$$

### 2.2.2 Matrix Operations

Here, we provide a brief introduction to some common matrix operations.
Equality of Two Matrices: $A=B$ if and only if $a_{i j}=b_{i j}$ holds for all $i=1,2, \cdots, m, j=1,2, \cdots, n$.

Addition and Subtraction of Matrices: $A \pm B=\left[a_{i j}\right] \pm\left[b_{i j}\right]=\left[a_{i j} \pm b_{i j}\right]$. Note that addition and subtraction make sense only if the dimensions of matrices are identical.

Scalar Multiplication of Matrices: $\lambda A=\lambda\left[a_{i j}\right]=\left[\lambda a_{i j}\right]$.
Matrix Multiplication: Given two matrices $A_{m \times n}$ and $B_{p \times q}$, matrix multiplication requires a compatibility condition: the number of columns

## 130CHAPTER 2. PRELIMINARY KNOWLEDGE AND METHODS OF MATHEMATICS

in matrix $A$ is the same as the number of rows in matrix $B$, i.e., $n=p$. If the compatibility condition is satisfied, the dimension of the product of $A B$ is $m \times q$. $A B$ is defined as:

$$
A B=C
$$

with $c_{i j}=a_{i 1} b_{1 j}+a_{i 2} b_{2 j}+\cdots+a_{i n} b_{n j}=\sum_{l=1}^{n} a_{i l} b_{l j}$. Obviously, the matrix product of $A B$ is not necessarily equal to $B A$.

## Identity Matrix

A square matrix is a matrix with the same number of rows and columns, which is assumed to be $n$.

An identity matrix of order $n$, denoted by $I_{n}$, is a square matrix with ones in its principal diagonal and zeros everywhere else.

It possesses the following properties:

## Property 1:

$$
I_{m} A_{m \times n}=A_{m \times n} I_{n}=A_{m \times n}
$$

## Property 2:

$$
A_{m \times n} I_{n} B_{n \times p}=\left(A_{m \times n} I_{n}\right) B_{n \times p}=A_{m \times n} B_{n \times p}
$$

## Property 3:

$$
\left(I_{n}\right)^{k}=I_{n}
$$

This matrix is analogous to 1 in real space.
Idempotent Matrices: A matrix $A$ is said to be idempotent if $A A=A$.

## Null Matrix

A null or zero matrix (not necessarily a square matrix) -denoted by 0 , plays the role of the number 0 .

A $m \times n$ null matrix is simply a matrix whose elements are all zero.
Null matrices obey the following rules of operation:

$$
A_{m \times n}+0_{m \times n}=A_{m \times n} ;
$$

$$
\begin{aligned}
& A_{m \times n} 0_{n \times p}=0_{m \times p} \\
& 0_{q \times m} A_{m \times n}=0_{q \times n}
\end{aligned}
$$

Remark 2.2.1
(1) $C D=C E, C \neq 0$ does not imply that $D=E$,
e.g.,

$$
C=\left[\begin{array}{ll}
2 & 3 \\
6 & 9
\end{array}\right] D=\left[\begin{array}{ll}
1 & 1 \\
1 & 2
\end{array}\right] \quad E=\left[\begin{array}{cc}
-2 & 1 \\
3 & 2
\end{array}\right] .
$$

(2) Even if $A$ and $B \neq 0$, we still have $A B=0$, e.g.,

$$
A=\left[\begin{array}{ll}
2 & 4 \\
1 & 2
\end{array}\right], B=\left[\begin{array}{cc}
-2 & 4 \\
1 & -2
\end{array}\right]
$$

### 2.2.3 Linear Dependence of Vectors

One of the most important properties among vectors is linear dependence.

Definition 2.2.1 (Linear Dependence) A set of vectors $\boldsymbol{v}^{1}, \cdots, \boldsymbol{v}^{n}$ is linear$l y$ dependent, if and only if there exists a vector $\boldsymbol{v}^{i}$, which is a linear combination of the others, i.e., $\boldsymbol{v}^{i}=\sum_{j \neq i} \alpha_{j} \boldsymbol{v}^{j}$.

Example 2.2.1 The following three vectors

$$
\boldsymbol{v}^{1}=\left[\begin{array}{l}
2 \\
7
\end{array}\right], \boldsymbol{v}^{2}=\left[\begin{array}{l}
1 \\
8
\end{array}\right], \boldsymbol{v}^{3}=\left[\begin{array}{l}
4 \\
5
\end{array}\right]
$$

are linearly dependent, since

$$
3 \boldsymbol{v}^{1}-2 \boldsymbol{v}^{2}=\left[\begin{array}{c}
6 \\
21
\end{array}\right]-\left[\begin{array}{c}
2 \\
16
\end{array}\right]=\left[\begin{array}{l}
4 \\
5
\end{array}\right]=\boldsymbol{v}^{3}
$$

or

$$
3 \boldsymbol{v}^{1}-2 \boldsymbol{v}^{2}-\boldsymbol{v}^{3}=\mathbf{0}
$$

where $\mathbf{0}=\left[\begin{array}{l}0 \\ 0\end{array}\right]$ is a zero vector.

### 2.2.4 Transpose and Inverse of Matrix

The transpose of a $m \times n$ matrix $A$ is a matrix which is obtained by interchanging the rows and columns of the matrix $A$. Formally, we have

Definition 2.2.2 (Transpose of Matrix) $B=\left[b_{i j}\right]_{n \times m}$ is said to be the transpose of the matrix $A=\left[a_{i j}\right]_{m \times n}$, denoted by $A^{\prime}$ or $A^{T}$, if $a_{j i}=b_{i j}$ for all $i=1, \cdots, n$ and $j=1, \cdots, m$.

Definition 2.2.3 We have the following types of matrices regarding the transpose of a matrix:

The matrix $A$ is said to be symmetric if $A^{\prime}=A$.
The matrix $A$ is said to be antisymmetric if $A^{\prime}=-A$.
The matrix $A$ is said to be orthogonal if $A^{\prime} A=I$.
Properties of Transpose:
a) $\left(A^{\prime}\right)^{\prime}=A$;
b) $(A+B)^{\prime}=A^{\prime}+B^{\prime}$;
c) $(\alpha A)^{\prime}=\alpha A^{\prime}$, where $\alpha$ is a real number;
d) $(A B)^{\prime}=B^{\prime} A^{\prime}$.

We now discuss the inverse of a square matrix. The inverse of matrix $A$, denoted by $A^{-1}$, should satisfy

$$
A A^{-1}=A^{-1} A=I .
$$

While the transpose of matrix always exists, the inverse does not necessarily exist.

Remark 2.2.2 The following statements are true:

1) Not every square matrix has an inverse, i.e., squareness is a necessary, but not sufficient, condition for the existence of an inverse. If a square matrix $A$ has an inverse, $A$ is said to be
nonsingular. If $A$ has no inverse, it is said to be a singular matrix
2) If $A$ is nonsingular, then $A$ and $A^{-1}$ are inverse of each other, i.e., $\left(A^{-1}\right)^{-1}=A$.
3) If $A$ is $n \times n$, then $A^{-1}$ is also $n \times n$.
4) The inverse of $A$ is unique.
5) $A A^{-1}=I$ implies that $A^{-1} A=I$.
6) Suppose that $A$ and $B$ are nonsingular matrices with dimension $n \times n$.
(a) $(A B)^{-1}=B^{-1} A^{-1}$
(b) $\left(A^{\prime}\right)^{-1}=\left(A^{-1}\right)^{\prime}$

### 2.2.5 Solving a Linear System

Consider a system of $n$ equations with $n$ unknowns:

$$
A \boldsymbol{x}=\boldsymbol{d}
$$

If $A$ is nonsingular, then multiplying both sides by $A^{-1}$ gives:

$$
A^{-1} A \boldsymbol{x}=A^{-1} \boldsymbol{d}
$$

Therefore, $\boldsymbol{x}=A^{-1} \boldsymbol{d}$ is the unique solution of the linear system $A \boldsymbol{x}=\boldsymbol{d}$, where $A^{-1}$ is unique.

Prior to applying the method of inverse matrix to solve linear systems, it is necessary to first determine whether or not the matrix is nonsingular. Secondly, we shall solve it by the Cramer's rule.

There are two ways to test the nonsingularity of a square matrix $A$. The first is to determine whether or not the row or column vectors of a matrix are linearly independent; the second is to discern whether the determinant of a square matrix is equal to zero.

An $n \times n$ square matrix $A$ could be written as a set of vectors in terms
of rows.

$$
A=\left[\begin{array}{cccc}
a_{11} & a_{12} & \cdots & a_{1 n} \\
a_{21} & a_{22} & \cdots & a_{2 n} \\
\cdots & \cdots & \cdots & \cdots \\
a_{n 1} & a_{n 2} & \cdots & a_{n n}
\end{array}\right]=\left[\begin{array}{c}
\mathbf{v}^{1^{\prime}} \\
\mathbf{v}^{2^{\prime}} \\
\cdots \\
\mathbf{v}^{n^{\prime}}
\end{array}\right]
$$

where $\mathbf{v}^{i^{\prime}}=\left[a_{i 1}, a_{i 2}, \cdots, a_{i n}\right], i=1,2, \cdots, n$. Whether a square matrix $A$ is nonsingular is determined by whether the vectors $\mathbf{v}^{i^{\prime}}, i=1,2, \cdots, n$ are linearly independent.

## Determinant of a Matrix

The determinant of an $n$th order square matrix $A=\left(a_{i j}\right)$, denoted by $|A|$ or $\operatorname{det}(A)$, is a uniquely defined scalar associated with that matrix. Determinants are defined only for square matrices. Prior to giving the definition of an $n$th order square matrix $A$, we give the definition of $A$ with 2th and 3th orders, respectively.

For a $2 \times 2$ matrix:

$$
A=\left[\begin{array}{ll}
a_{11} & a_{12} \\
a_{21} & a_{22}
\end{array}\right],
$$

its determinant is defined as follows:

$$
|A|=\left|\begin{array}{ll}
a_{11} & a_{12} \\
a_{21} & a_{22}
\end{array}\right|=a_{11} a_{22}-a_{12} a_{21}
$$

In view of the dimension of matrix $A,|A|$ as defined in the above is called a second-order determinant.

For a $3 \times 3$ matrix $A$, its third-order determinant is defined as

$$
\begin{aligned}
|A| & =\left|\begin{array}{lll}
a_{11} & a_{12} & a_{13} \\
a_{21} & a_{22} & a_{23} \\
a_{31} & a_{32} & a_{33}
\end{array}\right|=a_{11}\left|\begin{array}{ll}
a_{22} & a_{23} \\
a_{32} & a_{33}
\end{array}\right|-a_{12}\left|\begin{array}{ll}
a_{21} & a_{23} \\
a_{31} & a_{33}
\end{array}\right|+a_{13}\left|\begin{array}{ll}
a_{21} & a_{22} \\
a_{31} & a_{32}
\end{array}\right| \\
& =a_{11} a_{22} a_{33}-a_{11} a_{23} a_{32}-a_{12} a_{21} a_{33}+a_{12} a_{23} a_{31}+a_{13} a_{21} a_{32}-a_{13} a_{22} a_{31} .
\end{aligned}
$$

From the definition of the determinant for matrix $A$ with 2th or 3th order, it is defined as the sum of all possible products, in which each product
consists of elements in different rows and columns. This is also true for a general $n$th order square matrix $A$. Then, for a $n \times n$ matrix $A$, its determinants is defined as:

$$
|A|=\sum_{\left(\alpha_{1}, \cdots, \alpha_{n}\right)}(-1)^{I\left(\alpha_{1}, \cdots, \alpha_{n}\right)} a_{1 \alpha_{1}} a_{2 \alpha_{2}} \cdots a_{n \alpha_{n}},
$$

where $\left(\alpha_{1}, \cdots, \alpha_{n}\right)$ is the permutation of $(1, \cdots, n)$, and $I\left(\alpha_{1}, \cdots, \alpha_{n}\right)$ is the number of inversion times when reordering $(1, \cdots, n)$,

For example, $(2,1,3)$ is reordered once by $(1,2,3)$, and $(2,3,1)$ is reordered twice by $(1,2,3)$.

There is a simple method to calculate the determinant of a matrix, i.e., the Laplace expansion:

$$
|A|=\sum_{k=1}^{n}(-1)^{l+k} a_{l k} \times \operatorname{det}\left(M_{l k}\right), \text { for any } l \in\{1, \cdots, n\},
$$

where $M_{l k}$ is the $n-1$ th order square matrix that results from $A$ by deleting the $l$-th row and the $k$-th column, called the minor of $a_{l k}$.

The Laplace expansion of an $n$ th-order determinant will reduce the problem to one of evaluating $n$ minors, each of which is of the $(n-1)$ th order, and the repeated application of the process will methodically lead to increasingly lower orders of determinants, eventually culminating in the basic second-order determinants. Then, the value of the original determinant is calculated.

Even though one can expand $|A|$ by any row or any column, concerning the numerical calculation, a row or column with largest number of 0's or 1's is always preferable for this purpose, because 0 times its cofactor is simply 0.

## Basic Properties of Determinants

1. The determinant of a matrix $A$ has the same value as that of its transpose $A^{\prime}$, i.e., $|A|=\left|A^{\prime}\right|$. Therefore, row independence is equivalent to column independence.
2. The multiplication of any one row (or column) by a scalar $k$ will change the value of the determinant $k$-fold.
3. The interchange of any two rows (columns) will alter the sign, but not the numerical value, of the determinant.
4. A scale of any row (column) added to any other row (column) does not change the value or the sign of the determinant.
5. If two rows (or columns) are proportional, i.e., they are linearly dependent, then the determinant will vanish.
6. $\operatorname{det}(A B)=\operatorname{det}(A) \operatorname{det}(B)$.
7. $\operatorname{det}\left(A^{-1}\right)=\frac{1}{\operatorname{det}(A)}$. As a consequence, a necessary condition for the existence of $A^{-1}$ is that $\operatorname{det}(A) \neq 0$.

Using these properties, we can simplify the matrix (e.g., by applying Property 4, we can make a row or column have as many zero elements as possible), and the Laplace expansion of a determinant will become a much more manageable task.

Next, we provide a formula for solving the inverse of a nonsingular square matrix. Let $A^{-1}=\left(d_{i j}\right)$, then

$$
d_{i j}=\frac{1}{\operatorname{det}(A)}(-1)^{i+j} \operatorname{det}\left(M_{i j}\right) .
$$

The Cramer's Rule given below summarizes how to solve a linear system. For a system of linear equations:

$$
A \boldsymbol{x}=\boldsymbol{d}
$$

where

$$
\begin{gathered}
A=\left[\begin{array}{cccc}
a_{11} & a_{12} & \cdots & a_{1 n} \\
a_{21} & a_{22} & \cdots & a_{2 n} \\
\cdots & \cdots & \cdots & \cdots \\
a_{n 1} & a_{n 2} & \cdots & a_{n n}
\end{array}\right], \\
\boldsymbol{d}^{\prime}=\left(d_{1}, \cdots, d_{n}\right), \\
\boldsymbol{x}^{\prime}=\left(x_{1}, \cdots, x_{n}\right) .
\end{gathered}
$$

The solution is:

$$
x_{j}=\frac{\operatorname{det}\left(A_{j}\right)}{\operatorname{det}(A)},
$$

where:

$$
A_{j}=\left[\begin{array}{ccccccc}
a_{11} & \cdots & a_{1 j-1} & b_{1} & a_{1 j+1} & \cdots & a_{1 n} \\
a_{21} & \cdots & a_{2 j-1} & b_{2} & a_{2 j+1} & \cdots & a_{2 n} \\
\cdots & \cdots & \cdots & \cdots & \cdots & \cdots & \cdots \\
a_{n 1} & \cdots & a_{n j-1} & b_{n} & a_{n j+1} & \cdots & a_{n n}
\end{array}\right]
$$

which is obtained by replacing the $j$ th column of $|A|$ with constant terms $d_{1}, \cdots, d_{n}$. This result is the statement of Cramer's rule.

### 2.2.6 Quadratic Form and Matrix

A function $q$ with $n$ variables is called a quadratic form if it has the following expression:

$$
\begin{array}{cc}
q\left(x_{1}, x_{2}, \cdots, x_{n}\right)=a_{11} x_{1}^{2}+2 a_{12} x_{1} x_{2}+\cdots & +2 a_{1 n} x_{1} x_{n} \\
+a_{22} x_{2}^{2}+\cdots & +2 a_{2 n} x_{2} x_{n} \\
\cdots & \\
& +a_{n n} x_{n}^{2} .
\end{array}
$$

Let $a_{j i}=a_{i j}, i<j$, and then $q\left(x_{1}, x_{2}, \cdots, x_{n}\right)$ can be written as

$$
\begin{aligned}
q\left(x_{1}, x_{2}, \cdots, x_{n}\right)= & a_{11} x_{1}^{2}+a_{12} x_{1} x_{2}+\cdots+a_{1 n} x_{1} x_{n} \\
& +a_{12} x_{2} x_{1}+a_{22} x_{2}^{2}+\cdots+a_{2 n} x_{2} x_{n} \\
& \cdots \\
& +a_{n 1} x_{n} x_{1}+a_{n 2} x_{n} x_{2}+\cdots+a_{n n} x_{n}^{2} \\
= & \sum_{i=1}^{n} \sum_{j=1}^{n} a_{i j} x_{i} x_{j} \\
= & \mathbf{x}^{\prime} A \mathbf{x}
\end{aligned}
$$

where

$$
A=\left[\begin{array}{cccc}
a_{11} & a_{12} & \cdots & a_{1 n} \\
a_{21} & a_{22} & \cdots & a_{2 n} \\
\cdots & \cdots & \cdots & \cdots \\
a_{n 1} & a_{n 2} & \cdots & a_{n n}
\end{array}\right]
$$

is called a matrix of quadratic form. Since $a_{i j}=a_{j i}, A$ is an $n$ th-order symmetric square matrix.

Definition 2.2.4 For a matrix of quadratic form $A$, the quadratic form $q\left(u_{1}, u_{2}, \cdots, u_{n}\right)=$ $u^{\prime} A u$ is said to be
(a) positive definite (PD) if $q(u)>0$ for all $u \neq 0$;
(b) positive semidefinite (PSD) if $q(u) \geqq 0$ for all $u \neq 0$;
(c) negative definite (ND) if $q(u)<0$ for all $u \neq 0$;
(d) negative semidefinite (NSD) if $q(u) \leqq 0$ for all $u \neq 0$.

Otherwise, $q$ is called the indefinite (ID).
Sometimes, we say that a matrix $D$ is, for instance, positive definite if the corresponding quadratic form $q(u)=u^{\prime} D u$ is positive definite.

A necessary and sufficient condition for a matrix of quadratic form $A$ to be positive definite is that all of its minors are positive, i.e.,

$$
\begin{gathered}
\left|A_{1}\right|=A_{11}>0 \\
\left|A_{2}\right|=\left|\begin{array}{cc}
a_{11} & a_{12} \\
a_{21} & a_{22}
\end{array}\right|>0 \\
\cdots \\
\left|A_{n}\right|=\left|\begin{array}{cccc}
a_{11} & a_{12} & \cdots & a_{1 n} \\
a_{21} & a_{22} & \cdots & a_{2 n} \\
\cdots & \cdots & \cdots & \cdots \\
a_{n 1} & a_{n 2} & \cdots & a_{n n}
\end{array}\right|>0
\end{gathered}
$$

A necessary and sufficient condition for a quadratic form $A$ to be negative definite is that its minors alternate in sign starting from negative, namely,

$$
\left|A_{1}\right|<0,\left|A_{2}\right|>0,\left|A_{3}\right|<0, \cdots,(-1)^{n}\left|A_{n}\right|>0 .
$$

### 2.2.7 Eigenvalues, Eigenvectors, and Traces

If a square matrix $A$ and a real number $\lambda$ satisfy the equation $A \boldsymbol{x}=\lambda \boldsymbol{x}$, then $\lambda$ is called the eigenvalue of $A$, and the vector $\boldsymbol{x}$ is called the eigenvector of $A$ belonging to the eigenvalue $\lambda$.

Eigenvalues and some properties of matrix, such as positive or negative definiteness, have close connections. The following theorem characterizes the relation between the eigenvalues and positive (or negative) definiteness.

Theorem 2.2.1 A Matrix of quadratic form $A$ is
positive definite, if and only if eigenvalues $\lambda_{i}>0$ for all $i=1,2, \cdots, n$;
negative definite, if and only if eigenvalues $\lambda_{i}<0$ for all $i=1,2, \cdots, n$;
positive semi-definite, if and only if eigenvalues $\lambda_{i} \geqq 0$ for all $i=$

$$
1,2, \cdots, n
$$

negative semi-definite, if and only if eigenvalues $\lambda_{i} \leqq 0$ for all $i=$ $1,2, \cdots, n ;$
indefinite, if at least one eigenvalue is positive and at least one eigenvalue is negative.

For a symmetric matrix $A$, there is a convenient decomposition method. Matrix $A$ is diagonalizable if there exist a non-singular matrix $P$ and a diagonal matrix $D$, such that

$$
P^{-1} A P=D
$$

Matrix $U$ is orthogonal matrix if $U^{\prime}=U^{-1}$.
Theorem 2.2.2 (The Spectral Theorem for Symmetric Matrices) Suppose that $A$ is a symmetric matrix of order $n$ and $\lambda_{1}, \cdots, \lambda_{n}$ are its eigenvalues. Then, there exists an orthogonal matrix $U$, such that

$$
U^{-1} A U=\left[\begin{array}{lll}
\lambda_{1} & & 0 \\
& \ddots & \\
0 & & \lambda_{n}
\end{array}\right]
$$

or

$$
A=U\left[\begin{array}{lll}
\lambda_{1} & & 0 \\
& \ddots & \\
0 & & \lambda_{n}
\end{array}\right] U^{\prime} .
$$

Usually, $U$ is the orthogonal matrix formed by eigenvectors. It has the property $U^{\prime} U=I$. "Orthogonal" means that for any column $u$ of the matrix $U, u^{\prime} u=1$.

The power operation of symmetric matrix has a convenient form:

$$
A^{k}=U\left[\begin{array}{lll}
\lambda_{1}^{k} & & 0 \\
& \ddots & \\
0 & & \lambda_{n}^{k}
\end{array}\right] U^{\prime}
$$

If the eigenvalues of $A$ are nonzero real numbers, then the inverse of $A$ can be reformulated as follows:

$$
A^{-1}=U\left[\begin{array}{ccc}
\lambda_{1}^{-1} & & 0 \\
& \ddots & \\
0 & & \lambda_{n}^{-1}
\end{array}\right] U^{\prime} .
$$

Another common concept about square matrix is the trace. The trace of an $n$ th-order $A$ is $\operatorname{tr}(A)=\sum_{i}^{n} a_{i i}$. It also has following properties:
(1) $\operatorname{tr}(A)=\lambda_{1}+\cdots+\lambda_{n}$;
(2) If $A$ and $B$ have the same dimension, then $\operatorname{tr}(A+B)=$ $\operatorname{tr}(A)+\operatorname{tr}(B)$;
(3) If $a$ is a real number, $\operatorname{tr}(a A)=a \cdot \operatorname{tr}(A)$;
(4) $\operatorname{tr}(A B)=\operatorname{tr}(B A)$, if $A B$ is a square matrix;
(5) $\operatorname{tr}\left(A^{\prime}\right)=\operatorname{tr}(A)$;
(6) $\operatorname{tr}\left(A^{\prime} A\right)=\sum_{i=1}^{n} \sum_{j=1}^{n} a_{i j}^{2}$.

### 2.3 Basic Topology

Topology is a branch of mathematics that studies the basic properties of topological spaces and various kinds of mathematical structures defined on them. This branch is originated from the study of the set of points on real axis, manifolds, metric spaces, and functional analysis.

There are two branches of topology. The one that focuses on using the analysis method is called the general topology, point-set topology, or analytic topology. If further subdivided, point-set topology also has a branch: differential topology. The other branch emphasizes the use of algebraic method, called the algebraic topology. However, these branches tend to be unified. Topology is broadly applied in functional analysis, Lie Group, differential geometry, differential equations, and many other branches of mathematics.

Here, we provide a very brief introduction to basic knowledge of pointset topology, and apply it to establish some important conclusions about the properties of sets and continuous mappings between sets.

### 2.3.1 Topological Space

Definition 2.3.1 Suppose that $X$ is a nonempty set. We call a family of subsets of $X$, denoted by $\tau$, a topology of $X$ if
(1) both $X$ and the empty set belong to $\tau$;
(2) the union of any number of members in $\tau$ is in $\tau$;
(3) the intersection of a finite number of members in $\tau$ is in $\tau$.

The set $X$ together with its topology $\tau$ is called the topological space, denoted by $(X, \tau)$; members in $\tau$ are called the open sets of this topological space.

Example: Examples of topological spaces:
(1) (Discrete Topology) Suppose that $X$ is a nonempty set. $\tau=$ $2^{X}$ gives a discrete topology.
(2) (Trivial Topology) Suppose that $X$ is a nonempty set. $\tau=$ $\{X, \varnothing\}$ gives a trivial topology.
(3) (Euclidean Topology) Suppose that $R$ is the set of all real numbers. $\tau$, defined as a collection of open sets, gives the Euclidean topology (see the following definition).
(4) (Quotient Topology) Suppose that $X$ is a nonempty set. By a given equivalence relation $R$, we partition $X$ into disjoint subsets, all of which make up a new collection, denoted by $X / R$. We specify the subset $U$ of $X / R$ as an open set, and then $X / R$ gives a quotient topology if and only if the union of any elements of $U$ is an open set belonging to $X$.

Although the study object of topology can be an arbitrary type of sets , for convenience of understanding and application, in the following, we primarily introduce some commonly used topological spaces, especially metric spaces in a finite dimensional real space.

### 2.3.2 Metric Space

We first illustrate the definitions of metric and metric space. Metric is a measure of distance. A metric space $(X, d)$ is composed of a set $X$ and the metric $d$ defined on the elements of $X$. The metric space may be of finite or infinite dimensions, depending on the topology structure defined on $X$.

The metric should satisfy three basic assumptions. For any $\boldsymbol{p}, \boldsymbol{q}, \boldsymbol{r} \in X$, we have
(1) $d(\boldsymbol{p}, \boldsymbol{q})>0$ if and only if $\boldsymbol{p} \neq \boldsymbol{q}$;
(2) $d(\boldsymbol{p}, \boldsymbol{q})=d(\boldsymbol{q}, \boldsymbol{p})$;
(3) $d(\boldsymbol{p}, \boldsymbol{q}) \leqq d(\boldsymbol{p}, \boldsymbol{r})+d(\boldsymbol{r}, \boldsymbol{q})$.

Remark 2.3.1 If the metrics on the same set are different, then the corresponding metric spaces are different. For example,
(1) Metric Space 1: $\left(X=\mathcal{R}^{n}, d_{1}\right), \forall \boldsymbol{x}^{1}, \boldsymbol{x}^{2} \in X, d_{1}\left(\boldsymbol{x}^{1}, \boldsymbol{x}^{2}\right)=$ $\sqrt{\sum_{i}\left(x_{i}^{1}-x_{i}^{2}\right)^{2}}$, and it is called the $n$-dimensional Euclidean space.
(2) Metric Space 2: $\left(X=\mathcal{R}^{n}, d_{2}\right), \forall \boldsymbol{x}^{1}, \boldsymbol{x}^{2} \in X, d_{2}\left(\boldsymbol{x}^{1}, \boldsymbol{x}^{2}\right)=$ $\sum_{i}\left|x_{i}^{1}-x_{i}^{2}\right|$.
(3) Metric Space 3: $\left(X=\mathcal{R}^{n}, d_{3}\right), \forall \boldsymbol{x}^{1}, \boldsymbol{x}^{2} \in X, d_{3}\left(\boldsymbol{x}^{1}, \boldsymbol{x}^{2}\right)=$ $\max \left\{\left|x_{1}^{1}-x_{1}^{2}\right|, \cdots,\left|x_{n}^{1}-x_{n}^{2}\right|\right\}$.

Although the remaining discussions in this section are also true for general metric spaces, we mainly focus on Euclidean spaces for convenience of statement.

### 2.3.3 Open Sets, Closed Sets, and Compact Sets

With the concept of metric, we can clearly define proximity between points. In an $n$-dimensional Euclidean space, given $x^{0} \in \mathcal{R}^{n}$, the set of all points of distances less than $\epsilon$ from $x^{0}$ is called an open ball with radius $\epsilon$ and center $x^{0}$, denoted by $B_{\epsilon}\left(x^{0}\right)$. A related concept is closed ball, which is given by the set of all points of distances less than or equal to $\epsilon$, denoted by $B_{\epsilon}^{*}\left(x^{0}\right)$.

Next, we give the definition of closed sets and compact sets.
Definition 2.3.2 The set $S \subseteq \mathcal{R}^{n}$ is an open set if for any $\boldsymbol{x} \in S$, there always exists an $\epsilon>0$, such that $B_{\epsilon}(\boldsymbol{x}) \subseteq S$.

Based on the definition of open sets, the following theorem gives some basic properties of open sets:

Theorem 2.3.1 (Open Sets in $\mathcal{R}^{n}$ ) In terms of open sets, the following conclusions are true.
(1) The empty set $\varnothing$ is an open set.
(2) The universal space $\mathcal{R}^{n}$ is an open set.
(3) The union of open sets is an open set.
(4) The intersection of a finite number of open sets is an open set.

Proof. (1) Since $\varnothing$ has no elements, the proposition "for each point in $\emptyset$, there is an $\epsilon, \cdots$, satisfies the definition of an empty set.
(2) For any point $x$ in $\mathcal{R}^{n}$ and any $\epsilon>0$, according to the definition of an open ball, the set $B_{\epsilon}(\boldsymbol{x})$ is a subset in $\mathcal{R}^{n}$. Therefore, $B_{\epsilon}(\boldsymbol{x}) \subseteq \mathcal{R}^{n}$, and then $\mathcal{R}^{n}$ is open.
(3) For all $i \in I$, let $S_{i}$ be an open set. We need to show that $\cup_{i \in I} S_{i}$ is an open set. Suppose that $\boldsymbol{x} \in \cup_{i \in I} S_{i}$. Then, for some $i^{\prime} \in I$, we have $\boldsymbol{x} \in S_{i^{\prime}}$.

Since $S_{i^{\prime}}$ is open, we have $B_{\epsilon}(\boldsymbol{x}) \subseteq S_{i^{\prime}}$ for an $\epsilon>0$. It then follows that $B_{\epsilon}(\boldsymbol{x}) \subseteq \cup_{i \in I} S_{i}$, and thus $\cup_{i \in I} S_{i}$ is open.
(4) Suppose that $B=\bigcap_{k=1}^{n} B_{k}$. If $B=\emptyset$, it is clear that $B$ is an open set. If $B \neq \emptyset$, for any $\boldsymbol{x} \in B$, obviously, we have: for any $k \in\{1, \cdots, n\}, x \in B_{k}$. Since $B_{k}$ is an open set, there must exist an $\epsilon_{k}>0$, such that $B_{\epsilon_{k}}(\boldsymbol{x}) \subseteq B_{k}$. Let $\epsilon=\min \left\{\epsilon_{1}, \cdots, \epsilon_{n}\right\}$. Then, for any $k \in\{1, \cdots, n\}, B_{\epsilon}(\boldsymbol{x}) \subseteq B_{k}$, and thus $B_{\epsilon}(\boldsymbol{x}) \subseteq B$. Therefore, $B$ is an open set.

The following theorem shows the relationship between open sets and open balls.

Theorem 2.3.2 (Each open set is a union of open balls) Suppose that $S \subseteq$ $\mathcal{R}^{n}$ is an open set. Then, for each $\boldsymbol{x} \in S$, there exists an $\epsilon_{\boldsymbol{x}}>0$, such that $B_{\epsilon_{\boldsymbol{x}}}(\boldsymbol{x}) \subseteq S$, and also

$$
S=\bigcup_{x \in S} B_{\epsilon_{x}}(\boldsymbol{x})
$$

Proof. Suppose that $S \subseteq \mathcal{R}^{n}$ is an open set. Then, it follows from the definition of open sets that for any $\boldsymbol{x} \in S$, there exists an $\epsilon_{\boldsymbol{x}}>0$, such that $B_{\epsilon_{\boldsymbol{x}}}(\boldsymbol{x}) \subseteq S$. We now need to show that $\boldsymbol{x}^{\prime} \in S$ implies that $\boldsymbol{x}^{\prime} \in$ $\cup_{\boldsymbol{x} \in S} B_{\epsilon_{\boldsymbol{x}}}(\boldsymbol{x})$, and $\boldsymbol{x}^{\prime} \in \cup_{\boldsymbol{x} \in S} B_{\epsilon_{\boldsymbol{x}}}(\boldsymbol{x})$ implies $\boldsymbol{x}^{\prime} \in S$.

If $x^{\prime} \in S$, then it follows from the definition of open balls with centre $\boldsymbol{x}^{\prime}$ that $\boldsymbol{x}^{\prime} \in B_{\epsilon_{x^{\prime}}}(\boldsymbol{x})$. But $\boldsymbol{x}^{\prime}$ belongs to any union containing this open ball. Therefore, we have $x^{\prime} \in \cup_{x \in S} B_{\epsilon_{x}}(x)$.

If $\boldsymbol{x}^{\prime} \in \cup_{\boldsymbol{x} \in S} B_{\epsilon_{\boldsymbol{x}}}(\boldsymbol{x})$, then $\boldsymbol{x}^{\prime} \in B_{\epsilon_{\boldsymbol{x}^{\prime}}}(\boldsymbol{x})$. Since $B_{\epsilon_{\boldsymbol{x}^{\prime}}}(\boldsymbol{x}) \subseteq S$, it follows that $\boldsymbol{x} \in S$.

We now discuss closed sets, and first provide the definition of closed sets based on the definition of open sets.

Definition 2.3.3 (Closed Sets in $\mathcal{R}^{n}$ ) If the complement of $S$, i.e., $S^{c}$, is an open set, then $S$ is a closed set.

We also have some conclusions about the basic properties of closed sets.
Theorem 2.3.3 (Closed Sets in $\boldsymbol{R}^{n}$ ) In terms of closed sets, the following conclusions are true.
(1) The empty set $\varnothing$ is a closed set.
(2) The universal space $\mathcal{R}^{n}$ is a closed set.
(3) The intersection of any collection of closed sets is a closed set.
(4) The union of a finite number of closed sets is a closed set.

Proof. (1) Since $\varnothing=\left\{\mathcal{R}^{n}\right\}^{c}$, and $\mathcal{R}^{n}$ is an open set, it follows from the definition of closed sets that $\varnothing$ is a closed set.
(2) Since $\left\{\mathcal{R}^{n}\right\}^{c}=\varnothing$, and $\varnothing$ is an open set, it follows from the definition of closed sets that $\mathcal{R}^{n}$ is a closed set.
(3) Suppose that for all $i \in I, S_{i}$ is a closed set in $\mathcal{R}^{n}$. Then, it is necessary to show that $\cap_{i \in I} S_{i}$ is closed. Since $S_{i}$ is closed, its complement $S_{i}^{c}$ is an open set. The union $\cup_{i \in I} S_{i}^{c}$ is also open. It follows from the De Morgan's laws that $i \in I,\left(\cup_{i \in I} S_{i}^{c}\right)^{c}=\cap_{i \in I} S_{i}$ holds. Since $\cup_{i \in I} S_{i}^{c}$ is open, then its complement $\cap_{i \in I} S_{i}$ is closed.
(4) Let $C_{1}$ and $C_{2}$ be closed sets, and denote $C=C_{1} \cup C_{2}$. Since $C_{1}$ and $C_{2}$ are closed, $C_{k}^{c}=B_{k}, k=1,2$, are open. It follows from the properties of open sets above that $B_{1} \cap B_{2}$ is an open set, and thus $C=\left(B_{1} \cap B_{2}\right)^{c}$ is a closed set.

Next, we discuss the concept of point sets related to open and closed sets.

Definition 2.3.4 For set $S$ in $\mathcal{R}^{n}$, a point $\boldsymbol{x} \in \mathcal{R}^{n}$ is called the limit point (or cluster point or accumulation point) of $S$ if for any $\epsilon>0, B_{\epsilon}(\boldsymbol{x}) \cap S \neq \varnothing$, i.e., every neighbourhood of $x$ contains at least one point of $S$ different from $x$ itself. The collection of all limit points of set $S$ is denoted by $\partial S$. For set $S$, a point $\boldsymbol{x} \in S$ is called an interior point of $S$, if there is an $\epsilon>0$, such that $B_{\epsilon}^{*}(\boldsymbol{x}) \subseteq S$.

Now, we can redefine the open set as follows: a set is open if every element in the set is an interior point. Similarly, closed sets can also be defined as follows: a set is called the closed set if all limit points of the set belong to itself. In addition, for any set $S$ in a metric space, the smallest closed set containing $S$ is called the closure of the set, denoted by $\bar{S}=$ $S \bigcup \partial S$ or cl $S$. Obviously, if $S$ is closed, $\bar{S}=S$.

Definition 2.3.5 (Bounded Set) If a set $S$ in $\mathcal{R}^{n}$ is contained in a ball (open or closed ball) with radius $\epsilon$, then $S$ is said to be bounded. In other words,
if for some $\boldsymbol{x} \in \mathcal{R}^{n}$, there is an $\epsilon>0$, such that $S \subseteq B_{\epsilon}(\boldsymbol{x})$, and then $S$ is bounded.

Definition 2.3.6 (Compact Set) If a set $S \subseteq \mathcal{R}^{n}$ is closed and bounded, then it is compact.

The compact set is a crucial concept in mathematical analysis, but the definition of compact sets given above only applies to finite dimensional spaces. The definition of compact sets for infinite dimensional spaces is based on the concept of open cover. Whether a set is in finite or infinite dimension, another way to define compact sets exists, i.e., a set is compact if each open cover of a set has a finite subcover.

We first introduce the concept of open covering.
Definition 2.3.7 (Open Cover) For a set $S$ and a collection of open sets $\left\{G_{\alpha}\right\}$ in metric space $X$, if $S \subseteq \cup_{\alpha} G_{\alpha}$, then $\left\{G_{\alpha}\right\}$ is called a open cover of $S$; if the index set $\{\alpha\}$ is finite, it is called a finite open cover.

Next, we discuss an important feature of the compact set. The following Heine-Borel theorem, also known as the finite covering theorem, proves that the above two ways of definition are consistent for compact sets in finite dimensional spaces.

Theorem 2.3.4 (Heine-Borel Theorem or Finite Covering Theorem) For a set $S \subseteq \mathcal{R}^{n}$, the following two arguments are consistent:
(1) $S$ is a bounded closed set;
(2) Any open cover of $S$ has a finite subcover $\left\{G_{\alpha}\right\}$. In other words, for $\left\{G_{\alpha}\right\}$, there is a finite set $\{1, \cdots, n\} \subseteq\{\alpha\}$, such that $S \subseteq$ $\bigcup_{i=1}^{n} G_{i}$.

Refer to the proof of Theorem 2.41 in Rudin's Principles of Mathematical Analysis.

### 2.3.4 Connectedness of Sets

Definition 2.3.8 (Connected Set) For a set $S$ in metric spaces, if there do not exist two sets $A$ and $B$, such that $A \cap \bar{B}=B \cap \bar{A}=\varnothing$, and $S \subseteq A \cup B$, then $S$ is called a connected set.

The following theorem illustrates the characteristic of connected sets.
Theorem 2.3.5 The set $S \subseteq \mathcal{R}^{1}$ is connected if and only if it satisfies the following property: for any $x, y \in S$, if $x<z<y$, then $z \in S$.

Refer to the proof of the Theorem 2.47 in Rudin's Principles of Mathematical Analysis. Obviously, the whole real space is connected, and intervals in real space, such as $(a, b)$ and $[a, b]$, are all connected sets.

### 2.3.5 Sequences and Convergence

Definition 2.3.9 (Sequence in $\mathcal{R}^{n}$ ) Let $Z$ be the set of positive integers. A sequence in $\mathcal{R}^{n}$ is a function which maps $Z$ into $\mathcal{R}^{n}$, represented by $\left\{\boldsymbol{x}^{k}\right\}_{k \in Z}$, and for each $k \in Z, x^{k} \in \mathcal{R}^{n}$.

For all sufficiently large $k$, if each element of sequence $\left\{\boldsymbol{x}^{k}\right\}$ can arbitrarily approach a point in $\mathcal{R}^{n}$, then we conclude that the sequence converges to this point. Formally, we have the following definition:

Definition 2.3.10 (Convergent Sequence) If for each $\epsilon>0$, there is a $\bar{k}$, such that for all $k \in Z$ larger than $\bar{k}, \boldsymbol{x}^{k} \in B_{\epsilon}(\boldsymbol{x})$, then we call that the sequence $\left\{\boldsymbol{x}^{k}\right\}_{k \in Z}$ converges to $\boldsymbol{x} \in \mathcal{R}^{n}$.

Like subsets of a set, we have the concept of subsequences of a sequence.

Definition 2.3.11 (Subsequence) If $J$ is an infinite subset of $Z$, then $\left\{\boldsymbol{x}^{k}\right\}_{k \in J}$ is called a subsequence of $\left\{\boldsymbol{x}^{k}\right\}_{k \in Z}$ in $\mathcal{R}^{n}$.

Definition 2.3.12 (Bounded Sequences) If for $M \in \mathcal{R}$ and any $k \in Z$, $\left\|x^{k}\right\| \leqq M$, then the sequence $\left\{\boldsymbol{x}^{k}\right\}_{k \in Z}$ in $\mathcal{R}^{n}$ is bounded.

The following is a property of the subsequence of a bounded sequence.
Theorem 2.3.6 (Bounded Sequences) Each bounded sequence in $\mathcal{R}^{n}$ has a convergent subsequence.

### 2.3.6 Convex Set and Convexity

The convex set is an important type of set, which is widely used in economics. For example, sets of budget constraints of indivisible goods are generally convex sets and possess a strong economic meaning.

We first define convex sets.
Definition 2.3.13 If for any two elements $\boldsymbol{x}^{1}, \boldsymbol{x}^{2} \in S$ and any $t \in[0,1]$, we have $t \boldsymbol{x}^{1}+(1-t) \boldsymbol{x}^{2} \in S$, then the set $S \subseteq \mathcal{R}^{n}$ is a convex set.

If $\boldsymbol{z}=t \boldsymbol{x}^{1}+(1-t) \boldsymbol{x}^{2}, t \in(0,1)$, then point $\boldsymbol{z}$ is called the weighted average or convex combination of $\boldsymbol{x}^{1}$ and $\boldsymbol{x}^{2}$. If $\boldsymbol{z}=\sum_{l=1}^{k} \alpha^{l} \boldsymbol{x}^{l}, \boldsymbol{x}^{l} \in S, \alpha^{l} \in$ $[0,1], l \in\{1, \cdots, k\}, \sum_{l} \alpha^{l}=1$, then $\boldsymbol{z}$ is also a convex combination of $\left\{\boldsymbol{x}^{l}\right\}$.

We have the following theorems about convex sets.
Theorem 2.3.7 If both sets $S$ and $T$ are convex, then their intersection $T \cap S$ is also convex.

Any set can be convexified, i.e., it has a convex hull, denoted by co $S$.
Definition 2.3.14 The convex hull of a set $S \subseteq \mathcal{R}^{n}$ is the smallest convex set containing $S$, denoted by co $S$.

The following theorem illustrates how to convexify a set.
Theorem 2.3.8 For a set $S \subseteq \mathcal{R}^{n}$, its convex hull is
$\operatorname{coS}=\left\{\boldsymbol{y} \in \mathcal{R}^{n}: \boldsymbol{y}=\sum_{l=1}^{k} \alpha^{l} \boldsymbol{x}^{l}, \boldsymbol{x}^{l} \in S, \forall \alpha^{l} \in[0,1], \in\{1, \cdots, k\}, \sum_{l} \alpha^{l}=1\right\}$,
i.e., the convex hull of $S$ is formed by the set of all convex combinations of finite points in $S$.

The points of the convex hull are made up of convex combinations of finite points. The following Caratheodory theorem simplifies the way of convexification in finite dimensional real space.

Theorem 2.3.9 (Caratheodory Theorem) If the set is in a finite dimensional real space, i.e., $S \subseteq \mathcal{R}^{n}$, the points of its convex hull co $S$ can be written as the convex combination of at most $n+1$ points in $S$.

The following theorems show that the convex hull of a compact set is a compact set.

Theorem 2.3.10 If $S \subseteq \mathcal{R}^{n}$ is a compact set, then its convex hull co $S$ is also a compact set.

See A3.1 of Kreps (2013) for the proof of the above three theorems.
Every point in a convex hull is a convex combination of finite points in a set, but this does not mean that it must be a convex combination formed by other points. If a point is not a convex combination formed by other points, we define such a point as the extreme point. For compact sets, the structure of the convex hull will be more simplified. The following Krein-Milman theorem characterizes the convex hull of compact sets.

Theorem 2.3.11 (Krein-Milman Theorem) If a set $S$ is a compact set of a finite dimensional real space, and $E X(S)$ is the set of the extreme points of set $S$, then $c o S=\operatorname{co} E X(S)$, which means that the convex hull of a compact set is composed of finite convex combinations of all of the extreme points.

### 2.4 Single-Valued Function

### 2.4.1 Continuity of functions

Continuity of functions can be defined in any topological space $X$.
Definition 2.4.1 (Continuity) A function $f: X \rightarrow \mathcal{R}$ is continuous at $x_{0} \in$ $X$ if

$$
\lim _{x \rightarrow x_{0}} f(\boldsymbol{x})=f\left(\boldsymbol{x}_{0}\right),
$$

or equivalently, the upper contour set of $f$ at $x_{0}$

$$
U\left(\boldsymbol{x}_{0}\right) \equiv\left\{\boldsymbol{x}^{\prime} \in X: f\left(\boldsymbol{x}^{\prime}\right) \geqq f\left(\boldsymbol{x}_{0}\right)\right\}
$$

and its lower contour set

$$
L\left(\boldsymbol{x}_{0}\right) \equiv\left\{\boldsymbol{x}^{\prime} \in X: f\left(\boldsymbol{x}^{\prime}\right) \leqq f\left(\boldsymbol{x}_{0}\right)\right\}
$$

are both the closed subsets of $X$.

When we suppose $X \subseteq \mathcal{R}^{n}$, it can be equivalently defined: for any $\epsilon>0$, there is $\delta>0$, such that for any $\boldsymbol{x} \in X$ with $\left|\boldsymbol{x}-\boldsymbol{x}_{0}\right|<\delta$, we have

$$
\left|f(\boldsymbol{x})-f\left(\boldsymbol{x}_{0}\right)\right|<\epsilon
$$

In economics, it is usually assumed that $X \subseteq \mathcal{R}^{n}$. If $f$ is continuous at any $\boldsymbol{x} \in X$, we say the function $f: X \rightarrow \mathcal{R}$ is continuous on $X$.

Although the three definitions of continuity are all equivalent, the second definition is easier to verify. The idea of continuity is quite intuitive. If we draw the function, the curve has no disconnected point.

Since the function is continuous, then the change of $f(x)$ is small when $x$ changes slightly.

The following theorem illustrates the relationship between the continuity of functions and the open sets.

Theorem 2.4.1 (Continuity and Inverse Image) Let $D$ be a subset of $\mathcal{R}^{m}$. Then, the following conditions are equivalent.
(1) $f: D \rightarrow \mathcal{R}^{n}$ is continuous.
(2) For each open ball $B$ in $\mathcal{R}^{n}, f^{-1}(B)$ is also open in $D$.
(3) For each open set $S$ in $\mathcal{R}^{n}, f^{-1}(S)$ is also open in $D$.

Proof. We will show that $(1) \Rightarrow(2) \Rightarrow(3) \Rightarrow(1)$.
$(1) \Rightarrow(2)$. Suppose that (1) holds, and $B$ is an open ball in $\mathcal{R}^{n}$. Picking any $\boldsymbol{x} \in f^{-1}(B)$, we have $f(\boldsymbol{x}) \in B$. Since $B$ is open in $\mathcal{R}^{n}$, then there is an $\varepsilon>0$, such that $B_{\varepsilon}(f(\boldsymbol{x})) \subseteq B$, and it follows from the continuity of $f$ that there is a $\delta$, such that $f\left(B_{\delta}(\boldsymbol{x}) \cap D\right) \subseteq B_{\varepsilon}(f(\boldsymbol{x})) \subseteq B$. Therefore, $B_{\delta}(\boldsymbol{x}) \cap D \subseteq f^{-1}(B)$. Since $\boldsymbol{x} \in f^{-1}(B)$ is arbitrary, it can be seen that $f^{-1}(B)$ is open in $D$, and thus (2) is established.
$(2) \Rightarrow(3)$. Suppose that (2) holds, and $S$ is open in $\mathcal{R}^{n}$. Then, $S$ can be written as a union of open balls $B_{i}(i \in I)$, such that $S=\cup_{i \in I} B_{i}$. Therefore, $f^{-1}(S)=f^{-1}\left(\cup_{i \in I} B_{i}\right)=\cup_{i \in I} f^{-1}\left(B_{i}\right)$. It follows from (2) that each set $f^{-1}\left(B_{i}\right)$ is open in $D$, and then $f^{-1}(S)$ is the union of open sets in $D$. Therefore, $f^{-1}(S)$ is also open in $D$. Since $S$ is an arbitrary open set in $\mathcal{R}^{n}$, (3) is established.
$(3) \Rightarrow(1)$. Suppose that (3) holds. Take $\mathbf{x} \in D$ and $\varepsilon>0$. Then, since $B_{\varepsilon}(f(\boldsymbol{x}))$ is open in $\mathcal{R}^{n}$, it follows from (3) that $f^{-1}\left(B_{\varepsilon}(f(\boldsymbol{x}))\right)$ is open in $D$. Since $\boldsymbol{x} \in f^{-1}\left(B_{\varepsilon}(f(\boldsymbol{x}))\right)$, there is a $\delta>0$, such that $B_{\delta}(\boldsymbol{x}) \cap D \subseteq$ $f^{-1}\left(B_{\varepsilon}(f(\boldsymbol{x}))\right.$, which means that $f\left(B_{\delta}(\boldsymbol{x}) \cap D\right) \subseteq B_{\varepsilon}(f(\boldsymbol{x}))$. Therefore, $f$ is continuous at $\boldsymbol{x}$. Since $\boldsymbol{x}$ is arbitrary, (1) is established.

We have the following conclusion for a continuous function whose domain is a compact set.

Theorem 2.4.2 (The continuous image of a compact set is a compact set) Suppose that $f: D \subseteq \mathcal{R}^{m} \rightarrow \mathcal{R}^{n}$ is a continuous function. If $S \subseteq D$ is a compact set in $D$, then its image $f(S) \subseteq \mathcal{R}^{n}$ is compact in $\mathcal{R}^{n}$.

### 2.4.2 Upper Semi-continuity and Lower Semi-continuity

The upper semi-continuity and lower semi-continuity of functions are weaker than continuity. Suppose that $X$ is an arbitrary topological space.

Definition 2.4.2 A function $f: X \rightarrow \mathcal{R}$ is said to be upper semi-continuous at point $x_{0} \in X$ if we have

$$
\limsup _{x \rightarrow x_{0}} f(\boldsymbol{x}) \leqq f\left(\boldsymbol{x}_{0}\right)
$$

or equivalently, the upper contour set $U\left(\boldsymbol{x}_{0}\right)$ of $f$ is a closed set of $X$.
When we suppose $X \subseteq \mathcal{R}^{n}$, it can be equivalently defined: for any $\epsilon>0$, there is a $\delta>0$, such that for any $\boldsymbol{x} \in X$ with $\left|\boldsymbol{x}-\boldsymbol{x}_{0}\right|<\delta$, we have

$$
f(\boldsymbol{x})<f\left(\boldsymbol{x}_{0}\right)+\epsilon
$$

A function $f: X \rightarrow \mathcal{R}$ is said to be upper semi-continuous on $X$ if $f$ is upper semi-continuous at every point $\boldsymbol{x} \in X$.

Definition 2.4.3 A function $f: X \rightarrow \mathcal{R}$ is said to be lower semi-continuous on $X$ if $-f$ is upper semi-continuous.

It is clear that a function $f: X \rightarrow \mathcal{R}$ is continuous on $X$ if and only if it is both upper and lower semi-continuous.

### 2.4.3 Transfer Upper and Lower Continuity

A weaker concept of continuity is transfer continuity. It is used to completely characterize the extreme values of functions or preferences (see a series of papers by Tian (1992, 1993, 1994), Tian \& Zhou (1995), and Zhou \& Tian (1992)). Suppose that $X$ is an arbitrary topological space.

Definition 2.4.4 A function $f: X \rightarrow \mathcal{R}$ is said to be transfer (weakly) upper continuous on $X$, if for any points $\boldsymbol{x}, \boldsymbol{y} \in X, f(\boldsymbol{y})<f(\boldsymbol{x})$ means that there exists a point $\boldsymbol{x}^{\prime} \in X$ and a neighbourhood $\mathcal{N}(\boldsymbol{y})$ of $\boldsymbol{y}$, such that $f(\boldsymbol{z})<f\left(\boldsymbol{x}^{\prime}\right)\left(f(\boldsymbol{z}) \leqq f\left(\boldsymbol{x}^{\prime}\right)\right)$ for all $\boldsymbol{z} \in \mathcal{N}(\boldsymbol{y})$.

Definition 2.4.5 A function $f: X \rightarrow \mathcal{R}$ is said to be transfer (weakly) lower continuous on $X$, if $-f$ is transfer (weakly) upper continuous on $X$.

Remark 2.4.1 It is clear that the upper (lower) semi-continuity of a function implies transfer upper (lower) continuity (let $\boldsymbol{x}^{\prime}=\boldsymbol{x}$ ); while transfer upper (lower) continuity implies the transfer weakly upper (lower) continuity of the function, and the converse may not be true. We will then prove that a function $f$ has the maximal (minimal) value on the compact set $X$ if and only if $f$ is transfer weakly upper continuous on $X$, and the set of maximal (minimal) points of $f$ is compact if and only if $f$ is transfer upper (lower) continuous on $X$.

### 2.4.4 Differentiation and Partial Differentiation of Functions

The differentiability of a function in one-dimensional real space measures sensitivity to the change of a function's value with respect to a change in an independent variable. Let $X$ be a subset of $\mathcal{R}$.

Definition 2.4.6 (Derivative) The derivative of $f: X \rightarrow \mathcal{R}$ at point $x_{0} \in X$ is defined as

$$
f^{\prime}\left(x_{0}\right)=\lim _{\Delta x \rightarrow 0} \frac{f\left(x_{0}+\Delta x\right)-f\left(x_{0}\right)}{\Delta x}
$$

where $\Delta x=x-x_{0}$.
Obviously, if a function has a derivative at a point, then it must be continuous; however, this may not be true for the converse.

We may use the derivatives to find the limit of a continuous function of which the numerator and denominator approach to zero (or infinity), i.e., we have the following L'Hopital rule:

Theorem 2.4.3 (L'Hopital Rule) Suppose that $f(x)$ and $g(x)$ are differentiable on an open interval $I$, except possibly at $c$. If $\lim _{x \rightarrow c} f(x)=\lim _{x \rightarrow c} g(x)=0$ or $\lim _{x \rightarrow c} f(x)=\lim _{x \rightarrow c} g(x)= \pm \infty, g^{\prime}(x) \neq 0$ for all $x$ in $I$ with $x \neq c$, and $\lim _{x \rightarrow c} \frac{f^{\prime}(x)}{g^{\prime}(x)}$ exists. Then,

$$
\lim _{x \rightarrow c} \frac{f(x)}{g(x)}=\lim _{x \rightarrow c} \frac{f^{\prime}(x)}{g^{\prime}(x)}
$$

Higher order derivatives and partial derivatives are widely used in economics.

Definition 2.4.7 (Higher Order Derivative) The $n$th order derivative of $f$ : $X \rightarrow \mathcal{R}$ at $x_{0} \in X$ is defined as

$$
f^{[n]}\left(x_{0}\right)=\lim _{\Delta x \rightarrow 0} \frac{f^{[n-1]}\left(x_{0}+\Delta x\right)-f^{[n-1]}\left(x_{0}\right)}{\Delta x}
$$

In a multidimensional real space $X \subseteq \mathcal{R}^{n}$, we can define the concept of partial differentiation of a function $f: X \rightarrow \mathcal{R}, f\left(x_{1}, \cdots, x_{n}\right)$, to measure the degree of change of the function value with respect to a change of one of $n$ independent variables, with the others being held constant.

Definition 2.4.8 (Partial Derivative) The partial derivative of $f: X \rightarrow \mathcal{R}, X \subseteq$ $\mathcal{R}^{n}$ with respect to $x_{i}$ at $\boldsymbol{x}^{0}=\left(x_{1}^{0}, \cdots, x_{n}^{0}\right) \in X$ is defined as

$$
\frac{\partial f\left(\boldsymbol{x}^{0}\right)}{\partial x_{i}}=\lim _{\Delta x_{i} \rightarrow 0} \frac{f\left(x_{1}^{0}, \cdots, x_{i}^{0}+\Delta x_{i}, \cdots, x_{n}^{0}\right)-f\left(\boldsymbol{x}_{0}\right)}{\Delta x_{i}}
$$

We characterize the degree of change of a multidimensional function in different directions in the way of the matrix, which is called the gradient vector.

Definition 2.4.9 (Gradient Vector) Let $f$ be a function defined on $\mathcal{R}^{n}$ that has partial derivatives. Define the gradient of $f$ as a vector

$$
D f(\boldsymbol{x})=\left[\frac{\partial f(\boldsymbol{x})}{\partial x_{1}}, \frac{\partial f(\boldsymbol{x})}{\partial x_{2}}, \cdots, \frac{\partial f(\boldsymbol{x})}{\partial x_{n}}\right] .
$$

## 154CHAPTER 2. PRELIMINARY KNOWLEDGE AND METHODS OF MATHEMATICS

Suppose that $f$ has second-order partial derivative. We define the Hessian matrix of $f$ at $\boldsymbol{x}$ as an $n \times n$ matrix $D^{2} f(\boldsymbol{x})$ :

$$
D^{2} f(\boldsymbol{x})=\left[\frac{\partial^{2} f(\boldsymbol{x})}{\partial x_{i} \partial x_{j}}\right] .
$$

If all of the second-order partial derivatives are continuous, then

$$
\frac{\partial^{2} f(\boldsymbol{x})}{\partial x_{i} \partial x_{j}}=\frac{\partial^{2} f(\boldsymbol{x})}{\partial x_{j} \partial x_{i}},
$$

and thus the above matrix is a symmetric matrix.

### 2.4.5 Mean Value Theorem and Taylor Expansion

Theorem 2.4.4 (Férmat lemma) Let $X$ be a subset of $\mathcal{R}$. Suppose that
(i) $f: X \rightarrow \mathcal{R}$ is well-defined in a neighborhood $N\left(x_{0}\right)$ of $x_{0}$, and $f(x) \leqq f\left(x_{0}\right)$ or $f(x) \geqq f\left(x_{0}\right)$ in this neighborhood;
(ii) $f(x)$ is derivable at point $x_{0}$.

Then, we have

$$
f^{\prime}\left(x_{0}\right)=0 .
$$

Theorem 2.4.5 (Rolle Theorem) Suppose that $f$ is continuous on $[a, b]$, differentiable on $(a, b)$, and $f(a)=f(b)$. Then, there exists at least one point $c \in(a, b)$, such that $f^{\prime}(c)=0$.

From the Roll Theorem, we can have the well-known and useful Lagrange's Theorem or the Mean-Value Theorem.

Theorem 2.4.6 (The Mean-Value Theorem or the Lagrange Formula) Suppose that $f:[a, b] \rightarrow \mathcal{R}$ is continuous on $[a, b]$ and differentiable on $(a, b)$. Then, there exists $c \in(a, b)$, such that

$$
f^{\prime}(c)=\frac{f(b)-f(a)}{(b-a)} .
$$

The above mean value theorem is also true for multivariate $\boldsymbol{x}$. If function $f$ : $\mathcal{R}^{n} \rightarrow \mathcal{R}$ is differentiable, then there is $\boldsymbol{z}=t \boldsymbol{x}+(1-t) \boldsymbol{y}$ with $0 \leqq t \leqq 1$, such that

$$
f(\boldsymbol{y})=f(\boldsymbol{x})+D f(\boldsymbol{z})(\mathbf{y}-\mathbf{x})
$$

Proof. Let $g(x)=f(x)-\frac{f(b)-f(a)}{b-a} x$. Then, $g$ is continuous on $[a, b]$, differentiable on $(a, b)$, and $g(a)=g(b)$. Therefore, by Rolle or Férmat's Theorem, there exists a point $c \in(a, b)$, such that $g^{\prime}(c)=0$, and therefore $f^{\prime}(c)=\frac{f(b)-f(a)}{b-a}$.

A variation of the above mean-value theorem is in the form of integral calculus:

Theorem 2.4.7 (Mean-Value Theorem of Integral Calculus) If $f:[a, b] \rightarrow$ $\mathcal{R}$ is continuous on $[a, b]$, then there exists a number $c \in(a, b)$, such that

$$
\int_{a}^{b} f(x) d x=f^{\prime}(c)(b-a)
$$

The second variation of the mean-value theorem is the generalized meanvalue theorem:

## Theorem 2.4.8 (Cauchy's Theorem or the Generalized Mean-Value Theorem)

If $f$ and $g$ are continuous on $[a, b]$ and differentiable on $(a, b)$, then there exists $a$ point $c \in(a, b)$, such that $(f(b)-f(a)) g^{\prime}(c)=(g(b)-g(a)) f^{\prime}(c)$.

Taylor's expansion is a useful method for solving approximation.
Consider a continuously differentiable function $f: \mathcal{R}^{n} \rightarrow \mathcal{R}, \boldsymbol{x}, \boldsymbol{y} \in \mathcal{R}^{n}$. By the mean-value theorem, we know that there exist $\boldsymbol{z}, \boldsymbol{w} \in \operatorname{co}(\mathbf{x}, \mathbf{y})$, such that the following two equations hold:

$$
\begin{gathered}
f(\boldsymbol{y})=f(\boldsymbol{x})+D f(\boldsymbol{z})(\boldsymbol{y}-\boldsymbol{x}) \\
f(\boldsymbol{y})=f(\boldsymbol{x})+D f(\boldsymbol{x})(\boldsymbol{y}-\boldsymbol{x})+\frac{1}{2}(\boldsymbol{y}-\boldsymbol{x})^{\prime} D^{2} f(\boldsymbol{w})(\boldsymbol{y}-\boldsymbol{x})
\end{gathered}
$$

where $(\mathbf{y}-\mathbf{x})^{\prime}$ is the transpose of the vector $(\mathbf{y}-\mathbf{x})$.
Generally, we have the following theorem:
Theorem 2.4.9 (Taylor's Theorem) Given any function $f(x): \mathcal{R} \rightarrow \mathcal{R}$, if there exists $(n+1)$ th order derivative at $x_{0}$, then the function can be expanded
at $x_{0}$ :

$$
\begin{aligned}
f(x) & =f\left(x_{0}\right)+f^{\prime}\left(x_{0}\right)\left(x-x_{0}\right)+\frac{1}{2!} f^{\prime \prime}\left(x_{0}\right)\left(x-x_{0}\right)^{2}+\cdots+\frac{1}{n!} f^{(n)}\left(x_{0}\right)\left(x-x_{0}\right)^{n}+R_{n} \\
& \equiv P_{n}+R_{n},
\end{aligned}
$$

where $P_{n}$ represents the $n$-th order polynomial, and $R_{n}$ is the Lagrange's remainder:

$$
R_{n}=\frac{f^{(n+1)}(P)}{(n+1)!}\left(x-x_{0}\right)^{n+1},
$$

where $P$ is a point between $x$ and $x_{0}$, and $n!$ is the factorial of $n$ :

$$
n!\equiv n(n-1)(n-2) \cdots(3)(2)(1) .
$$

We have the following approximation of function by Taylor's expansion. If $\boldsymbol{y}$ approximates $\boldsymbol{x}$, then

$$
\begin{gathered}
f(\boldsymbol{y}) \approx f(\boldsymbol{x})+D f(\boldsymbol{x})(\boldsymbol{y}-\boldsymbol{x}), \\
f(\boldsymbol{y}) \approx f(\boldsymbol{x})+D f(\boldsymbol{x})(\mathbf{y}-\mathbf{x})+\frac{1}{2}(\mathbf{y}-\mathbf{x})^{\prime} D^{2} f(\boldsymbol{x})(\mathbf{y}-\mathbf{x}) .
\end{gathered}
$$

### 2.4.6 Homogeneous Functions and Euler's Theorem

Definition 2.4.10 Let $X=\mathcal{R}^{n}$. A function $f: X \rightarrow \mathcal{R}$ is said to be homogeneous of degree $k$ if for any $\mathrm{t}, f(t \boldsymbol{x})=t^{k} f(\boldsymbol{x})$.

An important result concerning homogeneous function is Euler's theorem.

Theorem 2.4.10 (Euler's Theorem) A function $f: \mathcal{R}^{n} \rightarrow \mathcal{R}$ is homogeneous of degree $k$ if and only if

$$
k f(\boldsymbol{x})=\sum_{i=1}^{n} \frac{\partial f(\boldsymbol{x})}{\partial x_{i}} x_{i} .
$$

### 2.4.7 Implicit Function Theorem

If a variable $y$ is clearly expressed as a function of $\boldsymbol{x}$, we call $y=f\left(x_{1}, x_{2}, \cdots, x_{n}\right)$ an explicit function. In many cases, $y$ is not an explicit function, and the
relationship between $y$ and $x_{1}, \cdots, x_{n}$ is expressed by an equation:

$$
F\left(y, x_{1}, x_{2}, \cdots, x_{n}\right)=0
$$

For a domain $D$, if for each vector $\mathbf{x} \in D$, there is a unique determined value $y$ satisfying the above equation, then $y$ is an implicit function of $\mathbf{x}$, denoted by $y=f\left(x_{1}, x_{2}, \cdots, x_{n}\right)$. Then, the pertinent question is how to determine whether there is a unique value $y$ satisfying this equation for every $\mathbf{x}$ in a certain domain. The following implicit function theorem indicates that, under certain conditions, the implicit function $y=f\left(x_{1}, x_{2}, \cdots, x_{n}\right)$ determined by $F\left(y, x_{1}, x_{2}, \cdots, x_{n}\right)=0$ not only exists , but is also differentiable.

Theorem 2.4.11 (Implicit Function Theorem) Let $X=\mathcal{R}^{n}$. Suppose that $a$ function $F\left(y, x_{1}, x_{2}, \cdots, x_{n}\right)=0$ satisfies the following four conditions:
(a) $F_{y}, F_{x_{1}}, F_{x_{2}}, \cdots, F_{x_{n}}$ are continuous in the domain $X$ containing $\left(y^{0}, x_{1}^{0}, x_{2}^{0}, \cdots, x_{n}^{0}\right) ;$
(b) $F\left(y, x_{1}, x_{2}, \cdots, x_{n}\right)$ has continuous partial derivatives with respect to $\boldsymbol{x}$ and $y$ in the domain $X$;
(c) $F\left(y^{0}, x_{1}^{0}, x_{2}^{0}, \cdots, x_{n}^{0}\right)=0$;
(d) The partial derivative $F_{y}$ of $F\left(y, x_{1}, x_{2}, \cdots, x_{n}\right)$ with respect to $y$ at $\left(y^{0}, x_{1}^{0}, x_{2}^{0}, \cdots, x_{n}^{0}\right)$ is not equal to zero.

Then:
(1) In a neighbourhood $N\left(\boldsymbol{x}^{0}\right)$ of $\left(x_{1}^{0}, x_{2}^{0}, \cdots, x_{n}^{0}\right)$, the function $y=$ $f\left(x_{1}, x_{2}, \cdots, x_{n}\right)$ of $\left(x_{1}, x_{2}, \cdots, x_{n}\right)$ can be defined implicitly, which satisfies $F\left(y\left(x_{1}, \cdots, x_{n}\right), x_{1}, x_{2}, \cdots, x_{n}\right)=0$ and $y^{0}=$ $f\left(x_{1}^{0}, x_{2}^{0}, \cdots, x_{n}^{0}\right)$.
(2) $y=f\left(x_{1}, x_{2}, \cdots, x_{n}\right)$ is continuous in $N\left(\boldsymbol{x}^{0}\right)$.
(3) $y=f\left(x_{1}, x_{2}, \cdots, x_{n}\right)$ has continuous partial derivatives in $N\left(\boldsymbol{x}^{0}\right)$, which is given by:

$$
\frac{\partial y}{\partial x_{i}}=-\frac{F_{i}}{F_{y}}, \quad i=1, \cdots, n
$$

### 2.4.8 Concave and Convex Function

Concave functions, convex functions, and quasi-concave functions are common functions in economics and possess strong economic significance. They also hold a special position in optimization problems.

Let $X \subseteq \mathcal{R}^{n}$ be a convex set.
Definition 2.4.11 For a function $f: X \rightarrow \mathcal{R}$, if for any $\boldsymbol{x}, \boldsymbol{x}^{\prime} \in X$ and any $t \in[0,1]$, we have

$$
f\left(t \boldsymbol{x}+(1-t) \boldsymbol{x}^{\prime}\right) \geqq t f(\boldsymbol{x})+(1-t) f\left(\boldsymbol{x}^{\prime}\right)
$$

then, $f$ is said to be concave on $X$.
If for all $\boldsymbol{x} \neq \boldsymbol{x}^{\prime} \in X$ and $0<t<1$, we have

$$
f\left(t \boldsymbol{x}+(1-t) \boldsymbol{x}^{\prime}\right)>t f(\boldsymbol{x})+(1-t) f\left(\boldsymbol{x}^{\prime}\right),
$$

then $f$ is said to be strictly concave on $X$.
Definition 2.4.12 If $-f$ is (strictly) concave on $X$, then $f: X \rightarrow \mathcal{R}$ is called a (strictly) convex function on $X$.

Remark 2.4.2 We have the following results:
(1) A linear function is both convex and concave.
(2) The sum of two concave (convex) functions is still concave (convex).
(3) The sum of a concave (convex) function and a strictly concave (convex) function is strictly concave (convex).

The statement that the function $f: X \rightarrow \mathcal{R}$ is concave on $X$ is equivalent to the statement that for any $\boldsymbol{x}_{1}, \cdots, \boldsymbol{x}_{m} \in X$ and any $t_{i} \in[0,1]$, we have

$$
f\left(t_{1} \boldsymbol{x}_{1}+t_{2} \boldsymbol{x}_{2}+\cdots+t_{m} \boldsymbol{x}_{m}\right) \geqq t_{1} f\left(\boldsymbol{x}_{1}\right)+\cdots+t_{m} f\left(\boldsymbol{x}_{m}\right) .
$$

This formula is also called the Jensen's inequality. If $t_{i}$ is regarded as the probability of $\boldsymbol{x}_{i}$, when $f: X \rightarrow \mathcal{R}$ is concave on $X$, Jensen's inequal-
ity implies that the expectation of function value with respect to a random variable is not greater than the function value with respect to the expectation of the random variable, i.e.,

$$
f(E(X)) \geqq E(f(X)) .
$$

When a function is twice differentiable, its convexity or concavity can be determined by whether the second-order partial derivative matrix is positive (negative) definite

Remark 2.4.3 A function $f$ defined on $X$ has a continuous second-order partial derivative. Then, it is a concave (convex) function if and only if its Hessian matrix $D^{2} f(\boldsymbol{x})$ is negative (positive) semi-definite on $X$. It is strictly concave (convex) if and only if its Hessian matrix $D^{2} f(\boldsymbol{x})$ is negative (positive) definite on $X$.

Remark 2.4.4 The strict concavity of the function $f(\boldsymbol{x})$ can be determined by testing whether the principal minors of the Hessian matrix change signs alternately, i.e.,

$$
\begin{array}{r}
\left|\begin{array}{ll}
f_{11} & f_{12} \\
f_{21} & f_{22}
\end{array}\right|
\end{array}>0,
$$

and so on, where $f_{i j}=\frac{\partial^{2} f}{\partial x_{i} \partial x_{j}}$. This algebraic condition is very useful for testing second-order conditions of optimality.

### 2.4.9 Quasi-concave and Quasi-convex Function

Quasi-concave functions are frequently used in economics, which are weaker than concavity.

Let $X \subseteq \mathcal{R}^{n}$ be a convex set.

Definition 2.4.13 For a function $f: X \rightarrow \mathcal{R}$, if for any $\boldsymbol{x}, \boldsymbol{x}^{\prime} \in X$ and any $t \in[0,1]$, we have

$$
f\left(t \boldsymbol{x}+(1-t) \boldsymbol{x}^{\prime}\right) \geqq \min \left\{f(\boldsymbol{x}), f\left(\boldsymbol{x}^{\prime}\right)\right\},
$$

then $f$ is said to be quasi-concave on $X$.
If for any $\boldsymbol{x}, \boldsymbol{x}^{\prime} \in X$ and any $t \in[0,1]$, we have

$$
f\left(t \boldsymbol{x}+(1-t) \boldsymbol{x}^{\prime}\right)>\min \left\{f(\boldsymbol{x}), f\left(\boldsymbol{x}^{\prime}\right)\right\},
$$

and then $f$ is strictly quasi-concave on $X$.
If $-f$ is (strictly) quasi-concave on $X$, then the funciton $f: X \rightarrow \mathcal{R}$ (strictly) quasi-convex on $X$.

Remark 2.4.5 The following facts are clear:
(1) If a function $f$ is (strictly) concave (convex), then it is (strictly) quasi-concave (convex);
(2) The function $f$ is (strictly) quasi-concave if and only if $-f$ is (strictly) quasi-convex;
(3) An arbitrary (strictly) monotone function defined on an interval of one-dimensional real number space is both (strictly) quasi-concave and (strictly) quasi-convex;
(4) The sum of two quasi-concave (convex) functions is generally not a quasi-concave (convex) function.

The following theorem correlates the quasi-concavity of a function to the convexity of upper contour set.

Theorem 2.4.12 (Quasi-concavity and Upper Contour Sets) $f: X \rightarrow \mathcal{R}$ is a quasi-concave function if and only if for any $y \in \mathcal{R}$, the upper contour set $S(y) \equiv\{\boldsymbol{x} \in X: f(\boldsymbol{x}) \geqq y\}$ is a convex set.

Proof. Necessity: Let $\boldsymbol{x}^{1}$ and $\boldsymbol{x}^{2}$ be two points of $S(y)$ (if $S(y)$ is the empty set, then it is clearly convex). We need to show: all convex combinations $\boldsymbol{x}^{t} \equiv t \boldsymbol{x}^{1}+(1-t) \boldsymbol{x}^{2}, t \in[0,1]$ are in $S(y)$.

Since $\boldsymbol{x}^{1} \in S(y)$ and $\boldsymbol{x}^{2} \in S(y)$, by the definition of upper contour set, we have $f\left(\boldsymbol{x}^{1}\right) \geqq y$ and $f\left(\boldsymbol{x}^{2}\right) \geqq y$.

Now, for any $\boldsymbol{x}^{t}$, since $f$ is quasi-concave, then:

$$
f\left(\boldsymbol{x}^{t}\right) \geqq \min \left[f\left(\boldsymbol{x}^{1}\right), f\left(\boldsymbol{x}^{2}\right)\right] \geqq y .
$$

Therefore, $f\left(\boldsymbol{x}^{t}\right) \geqq y$, and then $\boldsymbol{x}^{t} \in S(y)$. Consequently, $S(y)$ must be a convex set.

Sufficiency: we need to show: if for all $y \in \mathcal{R}, S(y)$ is a convex set, then $f(\boldsymbol{x})$ is a quasi-concave function. Let $\boldsymbol{x}^{1}$ and $\boldsymbol{x}^{2}$ be two arbitrary points in $X$. Without loss of generality, suppose $f\left(\boldsymbol{x}^{1}\right) \geqq f\left(\boldsymbol{x}^{2}\right)$. Since for all $y \in \mathcal{R}, S(y)$ is a convex set, then $S\left(f\left(\boldsymbol{x}^{2}\right)\right)$ must be convex. It is also clear that $\boldsymbol{x}^{2} \in S\left(f\left(\boldsymbol{x}^{2}\right)\right)$, and since $f\left(\boldsymbol{x}^{1}\right) \geqq f\left(\boldsymbol{x}^{2}\right)$, we have $\boldsymbol{x}^{1} \in S\left(f\left(\boldsymbol{x}^{2}\right)\right)$. As such, for any convex combination of $\boldsymbol{x}^{1}$ and $\boldsymbol{x}^{2}$, we must have $\boldsymbol{x}^{t} \in$ $S\left(f\left(\boldsymbol{x}^{2}\right)\right)$. It follows from the definition of $S\left(f\left(\boldsymbol{x}^{2}\right)\right)$ that $f\left(\boldsymbol{x}^{t}\right) \geqq f\left(\boldsymbol{x}^{2}\right)$. As a consequence, we must have

$$
f\left(\boldsymbol{x}^{t}\right) \geqq \min \left[f\left(\boldsymbol{x}^{1}\right), f\left(\boldsymbol{x}^{2}\right)\right] .
$$

Therefore, $f(\boldsymbol{x})$ is quasi-concave.

The following theorem characterizes the properties of quasi-concave functions, i.e., quasi-concavity is robust to monotonic transformations.

Theorem 2.4.13 Suppose that the function $f: X \rightarrow \mathcal{R}$ is quasi-concave on $X$, and $h: \mathcal{R} \rightarrow \mathcal{R}$ is a monotonically non-decreasing function. Then, the composite function $h(f(\boldsymbol{x}))$ is also quasi-concave. If $f$ is strictly quasi-concave and $h$ is strictly increasing, then the composite function is strictly quasi-concave.

Similar to concavity, when a function is differentiable, we have the following result.

Proposition 2.4.1 Suppose that $f: \mathcal{R} \rightarrow \mathcal{R}$ is differentiable. Then, $f$ is quasiconcave if and only if for any $x, y \in \mathcal{R}$, we have

$$
\begin{equation*}
f(y) \geqq f(x) \Rightarrow f^{\prime}(x)(y-x) \geqq 0 \tag{2.4.1}
\end{equation*}
$$

When there are two or more variables, the above proposition becomes:

Proposition 2.4.2 Suppose that $f: \mathcal{R}^{n} \rightarrow \mathcal{R}$ is differentiable. Then, $f$ is quasiconcave if and only if for any $\boldsymbol{x}, \boldsymbol{y} \in \mathcal{R}$, we have

$$
\begin{equation*}
f(\boldsymbol{y}) \geqq f(\boldsymbol{x}) \Rightarrow \sum_{j=1}^{n} \frac{\partial f(\boldsymbol{x})}{\partial x_{j}}\left(y_{j}-x_{j}\right) \geqq 0 . \tag{2.4.2}
\end{equation*}
$$

When a function $f$ defined on a convex set $X$ has continuous secondorder partial derivatives, the bordered Hessian determinant is defined as follows:

$$
|B|=\left|\begin{array}{ccccc}
0 & f_{1} & f_{2} & \cdots & f_{n} \\
f_{1} & f_{11} & f_{12} & \cdots & f_{1 n} \\
f_{2} & f_{21} & f_{22} & \cdots & f_{2 n} \\
\cdots & \cdots & \cdots & \cdots & \cdots \\
f_{n} & f_{n 1} & f_{n 2} & \cdots & f_{n n}
\end{array}\right|
$$

The principal minors of the bordered Hessian determinant $B$ are as follows:

$$
\left|B_{1}\right|=\left|\begin{array}{cc}
0 & f_{1} \\
f_{1} & f_{11}
\end{array}\right|,\left|B_{2}\right|=\left|\begin{array}{ccc}
0 & f_{1} & f_{2} \\
f_{1} & f_{11} & f_{12} \\
f_{2} & f_{21} & f_{22}
\end{array}\right|, \cdots,\left|B_{n}\right|=|B| .
$$

Then, the necessary condition for $f: X \rightarrow \mathcal{R}$ to be a quasi-concave function is

$$
\left|B_{1}\right| \leqq 0,\left|B_{2}\right| \geqq 0,\left|B_{3}\right| \leqq 0, \cdots, \quad(-1)^{n}\left|B_{n}\right| \geqq 0 .
$$

The sufficient condition for $f: X \rightarrow \mathcal{R}$ to be a strictly quasi-concave function is:

$$
\left|B_{1}\right|<0,\left|B_{2}\right|>0,\left|B_{3}\right|<0, \cdots, \quad(-1)^{n}\left|B_{n}\right|>0 .
$$

The necessary condition for $f: X \rightarrow \mathcal{R}$ to be a quasi-convex function is:

$$
\left|B_{1}\right| \leqq 0,\left|B_{2}\right| \leqq 0, \cdots,\left|B_{n}\right| \leqq 0 .
$$

The sufficient condition for $f: X \rightarrow \mathcal{R}$ to be a strictly quasi-concex function is:

$$
\left|B_{1}\right|<0,\left|B_{2}\right|<0, \cdots,\left|B_{n}\right|<0
$$

### 2.4.10 Separating and Supporting Hyperplane Theorems

The separating hyperplane theorem also has crucial applications in economics. First, recall that if $X \subseteq \mathcal{R}^{n}$ is a compact set, then it is bounded and closed. $X$ is convex set, if for any $\boldsymbol{x}, \boldsymbol{x}^{\prime} \in X$ and any $0 \leqq t \leqq 1$, $t \boldsymbol{x}+(1-t) \boldsymbol{x}^{\prime} \in X$. The convex set implies that the connections between any two points in the set belong to this set.

Theorem 2.4.14 (Separating Hyperplane Theorem) Suppose that $A, B \subseteq \mathcal{R}^{m}$ are convex, and $A \cap B=\emptyset$. Then, there is a vector $\boldsymbol{p} \in \mathcal{R}^{m}, \boldsymbol{p} \neq 0$ and $c \in \mathcal{R}$, such that

$$
\boldsymbol{p} \boldsymbol{x} \leqq c \leqq \boldsymbol{p} \boldsymbol{y} \quad \forall \boldsymbol{x} \in A, \forall \boldsymbol{y} \in B
$$

Moreover, suppose that $B \subseteq \mathcal{R}^{m}$ is convex and closed, $A \subseteq \mathcal{R}^{m}$ is convex and compact, and $A \cap B=\emptyset$. Then, there is a vector $\boldsymbol{p} \in \mathcal{R}^{m}, \boldsymbol{p} \neq 0$ and $c \in \mathcal{R}$, such that $A, B$ are strictly separated, i.e.,

$$
\boldsymbol{p} \boldsymbol{x}<c<\boldsymbol{p} \boldsymbol{y} \quad \forall \boldsymbol{x} \in A, \forall \boldsymbol{y} \in B .
$$

Theorem 2.4.15 (Supporting Hyperplane Theorem) Suppose that $A \subseteq \mathcal{R}^{m}$ are convex, and $\boldsymbol{y} \in \mathcal{R}^{m}$ is not an interior of $A$ (i.e., $\boldsymbol{y} \notin \operatorname{int} A$ ). Then, there is a vector $\boldsymbol{p} \in \mathcal{R}^{m}$ with $\boldsymbol{p} \neq 0$, such that

$$
\boldsymbol{p} \boldsymbol{x} \leqq \boldsymbol{p} \boldsymbol{y} \quad \forall \boldsymbol{x} \in A
$$

Unlike the Separating Hyperplane Theorem, the Supporting Hyperplane Theorem above does not need to assume that the intersection of two sets $A$ and $\{y\}$ is an empty set.

Definition 2.4.14 Let $C \subseteq \mathcal{R}^{m}$. $C$ is called a cone if for any $\boldsymbol{x} \in C$ and $\lambda \in \mathcal{R}$, we have $\lambda \boldsymbol{x} \in C$.

Proposition 2.4.3 A cone $C$ is convex if and only if $\boldsymbol{x}, \boldsymbol{y} \in C$ implies that $\boldsymbol{x}+$ $\boldsymbol{y} \in C$.

Proposition 2.4.4 Let $C \subseteq \mathcal{R}^{m}$ be a closed and convex cone, and $K \subseteq \mathcal{R}^{m}$ be a compact and convex cone. Then, $C \cap K \neq \emptyset$ if and only if for any $\boldsymbol{p} \in C$, there is $\boldsymbol{z} \in K$, such that

$$
\boldsymbol{p} \cdot \boldsymbol{z} \leqq 0 .
$$

### 2.5 Multi-Valued Function

Set-valued mapping refers to the situation in which the image of a mapping may not be a single point, but rather a set.

### 2.5.1 Point-to-Set Mappings

Suppose that $X$ and $Y$ are two subsets of a topological vector space (e.g., the Euclidean space).

Point-to-set mapping is also called a correspondence or multi-valued function. A correspondence $F$ maps points $\boldsymbol{x}$ in a domain $X$ into sets in $Y$ (e.g., maps point $x$ in $X \subseteq \mathcal{R}^{n}$ into the range $Y \subseteq \mathcal{R}^{m}$ ), denoted by $F: X \rightarrow 2^{Y}$. One also uses $F: X \rightrightarrows Y$ or $F: X \rightarrow \rightarrow Y$ to denote the multi-valued mapping $F: X \rightarrow 2^{Y}$.

Definition 2.5.1 Let $F: X \rightarrow 2^{Y}$ be a correspondence.
(1) If $F(\boldsymbol{x})$ is non-empty for every $\boldsymbol{x} \in X$, then the correspondence $F$ is said to be non-empty valued;
(2) If $F(\boldsymbol{x})$ is a convex set for every $\boldsymbol{x} \in X$, then the correspondence $F$ is said to be convex valued;
(3) If $F(\boldsymbol{x})$ is a closed set for every $\boldsymbol{x} \in X$, then the correspondence $F$ is said to be closed valued;
(4) If $F(\boldsymbol{x})$ is compact for every $\boldsymbol{x} \in X$, then the correspondence $F$ is said to be compact valued;
(5) If $F(\boldsymbol{x})$ is open for every $\boldsymbol{x} \in X$, then the correspondence $F$ is said to have open upper sections;
(6) If the preimage $F^{-1}(\boldsymbol{y})=\{\boldsymbol{x} \in X: \boldsymbol{y} \in F(\boldsymbol{x})\}$ is open for every $\boldsymbol{y} \in Y$, then the correspondence $F$ is said to have open lower sections.

Definition 2.5.2 Let $F: X \rightarrow 2^{X}$ be a correspondence from $X$ to $X$ itself.
(1) $F$ is said to be $F S$-convex if for any $\boldsymbol{x}_{1}, \cdots, \boldsymbol{x}_{m} \in X$ and its convex combination $\boldsymbol{x}_{\lambda}=\sum_{i=1}^{m} \lambda_{i} \boldsymbol{x}_{i},{ }^{1}$ we have

$$
\boldsymbol{x}_{\lambda} \in \bigcup_{i=1}^{m} F\left(\boldsymbol{x}_{i}\right)
$$

(2) $F$ is said to be SS-convex if for any $\boldsymbol{x} \in X, \boldsymbol{x} \notin \operatorname{co} F(\boldsymbol{x}) .^{2}$

Remark 2.5.1 It is easy to verify that correspondence $P: X \rightarrow 2^{X}$ is SSconvex if and only if correspondence $G: X \rightarrow 2^{X}$ defined by $G(\boldsymbol{x})=$ $X \backslash P(\boldsymbol{x})$ is FS-convex.

Specially, for function $f: X \rightarrow \mathcal{R}$, define upper contour set

$$
U_{w}(\boldsymbol{x})=\{\boldsymbol{y} \in X: f(\boldsymbol{y}) \geqq f(\boldsymbol{x})\}, \forall \boldsymbol{x} \in X,
$$

strict upper contour set

$$
U_{s}(\boldsymbol{x})=\{\boldsymbol{y} \in X: f(\boldsymbol{y})>f(\boldsymbol{x})\}, \forall \mathbf{x} \in X
$$

lower contour set

$$
L_{w}(\boldsymbol{x})=\{\boldsymbol{y} \in X: f(\boldsymbol{y}) \leqq f(\boldsymbol{x})\}, \forall \boldsymbol{x} \in X,
$$

and strict lower contour set

$$
L_{s}(\boldsymbol{x})=\{\boldsymbol{y} \in X: f(\boldsymbol{y})<f(\boldsymbol{x})\}, \forall \boldsymbol{x} \in X .
$$

The following equivalence results are used later.
Proposition 2.5.1 The following arguments are equivalent:
(1) $f: X \rightarrow \mathcal{R}$ is quasi-concave;
(2) $U_{w}: X \rightarrow 2^{X}$ is a convex-valued correspondence;

[^8](3) $U_{s}: X \rightarrow 2^{X}$ is a convex-valued correspondence;
(4) $U_{s}: X \rightarrow 2^{X}$ is SS-convex;
(5) $U_{w}: X \rightarrow 2^{X}$ is FS-convex.

Proof. It is clear that: (1) implies (2); (2) implies (3); (3) implies (4); and (5) implies (1). We just need to show that (4) implies (5). Suppose that this is not the case, and there is a finite set $\left\{\boldsymbol{x}_{1}, \boldsymbol{x}_{2}, \cdots, \boldsymbol{x}_{m}\right\} \subset X$ and certain convex combination, $\boldsymbol{x}_{\lambda}=\sum_{j=1}^{m} \lambda_{j} \boldsymbol{x}_{j}$, such that $\boldsymbol{x}_{\lambda} \notin \cup_{j=1}^{m} U\left(\boldsymbol{x}_{j}\right)$. Therefore, for all $j$, we have $\boldsymbol{x}_{\lambda} \in L_{s}\left(\boldsymbol{x}_{j}\right)$, i.e., $\boldsymbol{x}_{j} \in U_{s}\left(\boldsymbol{x}_{\lambda}\right)$, and thus $\boldsymbol{x}_{\lambda} \in$ co $U_{s}\left(\boldsymbol{x}_{\lambda}\right)$, which is a contradiction.

### 2.5.2 Upper Hemi-continuous and Lower Hemi-continuous Correspondence

Intuitively, a correspondence is continuous if a small change in $x$ only leads to a small change in the set $F(\boldsymbol{x})$. Unfortunately, giving a formal definition of continuity for correspondences is not so simple. Figure 2.1 shows a continuous correspondence.

The notions of hemi-continuity are usually defined in terms of sequences (see Debreu (1959) and Mask-Collell et al. (1995)). Although they are relatively easy to verify, they depend on the assumption that a correspondence is compact-valued. The following definitions are more formal (see Border, 1985).

Definition 2.5.3 For a correspondence $F: X \rightarrow 2^{Y}$ and a point $x, F$ is said to be upper hemi-continuous at $\boldsymbol{x}$ if for each open set $U$ containing $F(\boldsymbol{x})$, there is an open set $N(\boldsymbol{x})$ containing $\boldsymbol{x}$, such that $F\left(\boldsymbol{x}^{\prime}\right) \subseteq U$ for all $\boldsymbol{x}^{\prime} \in N(\boldsymbol{x})$.
$F$ is said to be upper hemi-continuous on $X$ if the correspondence $F$ is upper hemi-continuous at every $\boldsymbol{x} \in X$, or equivalently, for every open subset $V$ of $Y,\{\boldsymbol{x} \in X: F(\boldsymbol{x}) \subset V\}$ is always an open subset of $X$.

Remark 2.5.2 Upper hemi-continuity captures the idea that $F(\boldsymbol{x})$ should not "suddenly contain new points" when passing through a point $x$, i.e., $F(\boldsymbol{x})$ does not jump if $\boldsymbol{x}$ changes slightly. In other words, if one starts at a point $\boldsymbol{x}$ and moves slightly to $\boldsymbol{x}^{\prime}$, upper hemi-continuity at $\boldsymbol{x}$ implies that there is no point in $F\left(\boldsymbol{x}^{\prime}\right)$ that is not close to some points in $F(\boldsymbol{x})$.


Figure 2.1: Continuous correspondence

Definition 2.5.4 For a correspondence $F: X \rightarrow 2^{Y}$ and a point x, correspondence $F$ is said to be lower hemi-continuous at $x$ if for every open set $V$, $F(\boldsymbol{x}) \cap V \neq \emptyset$, there exists a neighborhood $N(\boldsymbol{x})$ of $\boldsymbol{x}$, such that $F\left(\boldsymbol{x}^{\prime}\right) \cap V \neq \emptyset$ for all $\boldsymbol{x}^{\prime} \in N(\boldsymbol{x})$.

If $F$ is lower hemi-continuous at every $\boldsymbol{x}$, or equivalently, the set $\{x \in$ $X: F(\boldsymbol{x}) \cap V \neq \emptyset\}$ is open in $X$ for every open set $V$ of $Y$, then $F$ is said to be lower hemi-continuous on $X$.

Remark 2.5.3 Lower hemi-continuity captures the idea that any element in $F(\boldsymbol{x})$ can be "approached" from all directions, i.e., $F(\boldsymbol{x})$ does not suddenly become much smaller if one changes $\boldsymbol{x}$ slightly. In other words, if one starts at $\boldsymbol{x}$ and $\boldsymbol{y} \in F(\boldsymbol{x})$, lower hemi-continuity at $\boldsymbol{x}$ implies that if one moves slightly from $\boldsymbol{x}$ to $\boldsymbol{x}^{\prime}$, there is some $\boldsymbol{y}^{\prime} \in F\left(\boldsymbol{x}^{\prime}\right)$ that is close to $\boldsymbol{y}$.

Combining the concepts of upper and lower hemi-continuity, we can define the continuity of a correspondence.

Definition 2.5.5 A correspondence $F: X \rightarrow 2^{Y}$ is said to be continuous at $\boldsymbol{x} \in X$ if it is both upper hemi-continuous and lower hemi-continuous at $\boldsymbol{x} \in X$. The correspondence $F: X \rightarrow 2^{Y}$ is said to be continuous on $X$ if it is both upper hemi-continuous and lower hemi-continuous on $X$.

Figure 2.2 shows a correspondence that is upper hemi-continuous, but not lower hemi-continuous. To see why it is upper hemi-continuous, imagine an open interval $U$ that encompasses $F(x)$. Now, consider moving s-
lightly to the left of $x$ to a point $x^{\prime}$. Clearly, $F\left(x^{\prime}\right)=\{\hat{y}\}$ is in the interval. Similarly, if we move to a point $x^{\prime}$ slightly to the right of $x$, then $F(x)$ will be in the interval so long as $x^{\prime}$ is sufficiently close to $x$. Therefore, it is upper hemi-continuous. On the other hand, it is not lower hemi-continuous. To see this, consider the point $y \in F(x)$, and let $U$ be a very small interval around $y$ that does not include $\hat{y}$. If we take any open set $N(x)$ containing $x$, then it will contain some point $x^{\prime}$ to the left of $x$. However, then $F\left(x^{\prime}\right)=\{\hat{y}\}$ will contain no points near $y$, i.e., it will not intersect $U$. Therefore, the correspondence is not lower hemi-continuous.

Figure 2.3 shows a correspondence that is lower hemi-continuous, but not upper hemi-continuous. To see why it is lower hemi-continuous: For any $0<x^{\prime}<x$, note that $F\left(x^{\prime}\right)=\{\hat{y}\}$. Let $x_{n}=x^{\prime}-1 / n, y_{n}=\hat{y}$. Then, $x_{n}>$ 0 for sufficiently large $n, x_{n} \rightarrow x^{\prime}, y_{n} \rightarrow \hat{y}$, and $y_{n} \in F\left(x_{n}\right)=\{\hat{y}\}$. It is thus lower hemi-continuous. It is also clearly lower hemi-continuous for $x_{i}>\mathbf{x}$. Consequently, it is lower hemi-continuous on $X$. On the other hand, it is not upper hemi-continuous. If we start at $x$ by noting that $F(x)=\{\hat{y}\}$, and make a small move to the right to a point $x^{\prime}$, then $F\left(x^{\prime}\right)$ suddenly contains many points that are not close to $\hat{y}$. Therefore, this correspondence fails to be upper hemi-continuous.


Figure 2.2: The correspondence is upper hemi-continuous, but not lower hemi-continuous

Remark 2.5.4 In fact, the notions of upper and lower hemi-continuous correspondence both reduce to the standard notion of continuity for a function if $F(\cdot)$ is a single-valued correspondence, i.e., a function. In other words,


Figure 2.3: The correspondence is lower hemi-continuous, but not upper hemi-continuous
$F(\cdot)$ is a single-valued upper (or lower) hemi-continuous correspondence if and only if it is a continuous function.

Remark 2.5.5 Based on the following two facts, both notions of hemi-continuity can be characterized by sequences.
(a) If a correspondence $F: X \rightarrow 2^{Y}$ is compact-valued, then it is upper hemi-continuous if and only if for any $\left\{\boldsymbol{x}_{k}\right\}$ and $\left\{\boldsymbol{y}_{k}\right\}$, where $\boldsymbol{x}_{k} \rightarrow \boldsymbol{x}, \boldsymbol{y}_{k} \in F\left(\mathbf{x}_{k}\right)$, there exists a converging subsequence $\left\{\boldsymbol{y}_{k_{m}}\right\}$, such that $\boldsymbol{y}_{k_{m}} \rightarrow \boldsymbol{y}$ and $\boldsymbol{y} \in F(\boldsymbol{x})$.
(b) A correspondence $F: X \rightarrow 2^{Y}$ is lower hemi-continuous at $\boldsymbol{x}$ if and only if for any $\left\{\boldsymbol{x}_{k}\right\}$ and $\boldsymbol{y} \in F(\boldsymbol{x})$, where $\boldsymbol{x}_{k} \rightarrow \boldsymbol{x}$, there is a sequence $\left\{\boldsymbol{y}_{k}\right\}$, such that $\boldsymbol{y}_{k} \rightarrow \boldsymbol{y}$ and $\boldsymbol{y}_{k} \in F\left(\boldsymbol{x}_{k}\right)$.

### 2.5.3 Open and Closed Graphs of Correspondence

Definition 2.5.6 A correspondence $F: X \rightarrow 2^{Y}$ is said to be sequentially closed at $\boldsymbol{x}$ if for any $\left\{\boldsymbol{x}_{k}\right\}$ and $\left\{\boldsymbol{y}_{k}\right\}$, where $\boldsymbol{x}_{k} \rightarrow \boldsymbol{x}$ and $\boldsymbol{y}_{k} \rightarrow \boldsymbol{y} \boldsymbol{y}_{k} \in F\left(\boldsymbol{x}_{k}\right)$, we have $\boldsymbol{y} \in F(\boldsymbol{x}) . F$ is said to be sequentially closed or has a closed graph if $F$ is sequentially closed for all $x \in X$, or equivalently graph

$$
G r(F)=\{(\boldsymbol{x}, \boldsymbol{y}) \in X \times Y: \boldsymbol{y} \in F(\boldsymbol{x})\} \text { is closed. }
$$

Regarding the relationship between upper hemi-continuity and closed graph, we have the following results.

Proposition 2.5.2 Let $F: X \rightarrow 2^{Y}$ be a correspondence.
(i) Suppose that $Y$ is compact, and $F: X \rightarrow 2^{Y}$ is closed-valued. If $F$ has a closed graph, it is upper hemi-continuous.
(ii) Suppose that $X$ and $Y$ are closed, and $F: X \rightarrow 2^{Y}$ is closedvalued. If $F$ is upper hemi-continuous, then it has a closed graph.

Because of fact (i), a correspondence with a closed graph is sometimes used to define a hemi-continuous correspondence in the literature. However, one should keep in mind that they are not the same, in general. For example, let $F: \mathcal{R}_{+} \rightarrow 2^{\mathcal{R}}$ be defined by

$$
F(x)= \begin{cases}\left\{\frac{1}{x}\right\}, & \text { if } x>0 \\ \{0\}, & \text { if } x=0\end{cases}
$$

The correspondence is sequentially closed, but not upper hemi-continuous. Moreover, define $F: \mathcal{R}_{+} \rightarrow 2^{\mathcal{R}}$ by $F(x)=(0,1)$. Then, $F$ is upper hemicontinuous, but not sequentially closed.

Definition 2.5.7 A correspondence $F: X \rightarrow 2^{Y}$ is said to be open if its graph

$$
\operatorname{Gr}(F)=\{(\boldsymbol{x}, \boldsymbol{y}) \in X \times Y: \boldsymbol{y} \in F(\boldsymbol{x})\} \text { is open } .
$$

Proposition 2.5.3 Let $F: X \rightarrow 2^{Y}$ be a correspondence. Then,
(1) if a correspondence $F: X \rightarrow 2^{Y}$ has an open graph, then it has open upper and lower sections.
(2) If a correspondence $F: X \rightarrow 2^{Y}$ has open lower sections, then it must be lower hemi-continuous.

### 2.5.4 Transfer Closed-valued Correspondence

The concepts of transfer closedness, transfer openness, transfer convexity, and others for multivalued mapping (correspondence) introduced in Tian
(1992, 1993) and Zhou and Tian (1992) weaken the conditions for establishing some basic mathematical theorems in nonlinear analysis and the existence of equilibrium solutions of optimization problems. They can be employed to obtain many characterization results, such as necessary and sufficient conditions for the existence of the maximal element of preference relations and the existence of Nash equilibrium. These conclusions are provided in the corresponding chapters of this textbook.

Denote by int $D$ and $c l D$ the set of interior points, and the closure of set $D$, respectively.

Definition 2.5.8 A correspondence $G: X \rightarrow 2^{Y}$ is said to be transfer closedvalued on $X$ if for any $\boldsymbol{x} \in X, \boldsymbol{y} \notin G(\boldsymbol{x})$ implies that there is an $\boldsymbol{x}^{\prime} \in X$, such that $\boldsymbol{y} \notin c l G\left(\boldsymbol{x}^{\prime}\right)$.

Definition 2.5.9 A correspondence $P: X \rightarrow 2^{Y}$ is said to have transfer open upper sections on $X$ if for any $\boldsymbol{x} \in X$ and $\boldsymbol{y} \in Y, \boldsymbol{y} \in P(\boldsymbol{x})$ implies that there is a point $\boldsymbol{x}^{\prime} \in X$, such that $\boldsymbol{y} \in \operatorname{int} P\left(\boldsymbol{x}^{\prime}\right)$.

Remark 2.5.6 If a correspondence is closed-valued, then it is a transfer closed-valued (it is obtained by letting $\boldsymbol{x}^{\prime}=\boldsymbol{x}$ ); if a correspondence has open upper sections, then it has the transfer open upper sections (let $\boldsymbol{x}^{\prime}=$ $\boldsymbol{x})$. Furthermore, the correspondence $P: X \rightarrow 2^{Y}$ has transfer open upper sections in $X$ if and only if $G: X \rightarrow 2^{Y}$ defined by $G(\boldsymbol{x})=Y \backslash P(\boldsymbol{x})$ is transfer closed-valued in $X$.

Remark 2.5.7 For any function $f: X \rightarrow \mathcal{R}$, the correspondence $G: X \rightarrow$ $2^{Y}$ defined by

$$
G(\boldsymbol{x})=\{\boldsymbol{y} \in X: f(\boldsymbol{y}) \geqq f(\boldsymbol{x})\}, \forall \boldsymbol{x} \in X
$$

is transfer closed-valued if and only if $f$ is transfer upper continuous on $X$.

The following proposition significantly weakens the various continuity conditions involved when proving many optimization problems.

Proposition 2.5.4 (Tian (1992)) Let $X$ and $Y$ be two topological spaces, $G$ : $X \rightarrow 2^{Y}$ be a correspondence from point to set. Then,

$$
\bigcap_{x \in X} c l G(x)=\bigcap_{x \in X} G(\mathrm{x})
$$

if and only if $G$ is transfer closed-valued on $X$.
Proof. Sufficiency: We need to show

$$
\bigcap_{\boldsymbol{x} \in X} \operatorname{cl} G(\boldsymbol{x})=\bigcap_{x \in X} G(\boldsymbol{x}) .
$$

It is clear that

$$
\bigcap_{\boldsymbol{x} \in X} G(\boldsymbol{x}) \subseteq \bigcap_{\boldsymbol{x} \in X} c l G(\boldsymbol{x}),
$$

and thus we just need to show that

$$
\bigcap_{\boldsymbol{x} \in X} c l G(\boldsymbol{x}) \subseteq \bigcap_{x \in X} G(\boldsymbol{x}) .
$$

Suppose that this is not the case. Then, there is a $\boldsymbol{y}$, such that $\boldsymbol{y} \in \bigcap_{\boldsymbol{x} \in X} \mathrm{cl} G(\boldsymbol{x})$, but $\boldsymbol{y} \notin \bigcap_{\boldsymbol{x} \in X} G(\boldsymbol{x})$. Therefore, there is a $\boldsymbol{z} \in X$, such that $\boldsymbol{y} \notin G(\mathbf{z})$. Note that $G$ is transfer closed-valued on $X$, and then there exists a $\boldsymbol{z}^{\prime} \in X$, such that $\boldsymbol{y} \notin \operatorname{cl} G\left(\boldsymbol{z}^{\prime}\right)$, and thus $\boldsymbol{y} \notin \bigcap_{\boldsymbol{x} \in X} \operatorname{cl} G(\boldsymbol{x})$, which is a contradiction.

Necessity: Suppose that

$$
\bigcap_{x \in X} c l G(x)=\bigcap_{x \in X} G(x) .
$$

If $\boldsymbol{y} \notin G(\boldsymbol{x})$, then

$$
y \notin \bigcap_{\boldsymbol{x} \in X} c l G(\boldsymbol{x})=\bigcap_{x \in X} G(\boldsymbol{x}),
$$

and thus $y \notin c l G\left(\boldsymbol{x}^{\prime}\right)$ for some $\boldsymbol{x}^{\prime} \in X$. Consequently, $G$ is a transfer closedvalued correspondence on $X$.

Similarly, we can define transfer convexity.
Definition 2.5.10 (Transfer FS-convex) Let $X$ be a topological space, and $Z$ be a convex subset of $X$. A correspondence $G: X \rightarrow 2^{Z}$ is said to be transfer FS-convex on $X$ if for any finite set $\left\{\boldsymbol{x}_{1}, \boldsymbol{x}_{2}, \cdots, \boldsymbol{x}_{n}\right\} \subseteq X$, there is
a corresponding finite set $\left\{\boldsymbol{y}_{1}, \boldsymbol{y}_{2}, \cdots, \boldsymbol{y}_{n}\right\} \subseteq Z$, such that for any subset $\left\{\boldsymbol{y}_{i 1}, \boldsymbol{y}_{i 2}, \cdots, \boldsymbol{y}_{i s}\right\}(1 \leqq s \leq n)$, we have

$$
c o\left\{\boldsymbol{y}_{i 1}, \boldsymbol{y}_{i 2}, \cdots, \boldsymbol{y}_{i s}\right\} \subseteq \bigcup_{r=1}^{s} G\left(\boldsymbol{y}_{i r}\right)
$$

Definition 2.5.11 (Transfer SS-convex) Let $X$ be a topological space, and $Z$ be a convex subset of the topological space. A correspondence $P: Z \rightarrow$ $2^{X}$ is said to be transfer SS-convex on $X$ if for any finite set $\left\{\boldsymbol{y}_{1}, \boldsymbol{y}_{2}, \cdots, \boldsymbol{y}_{n}\right\} \subseteq$ $X$, there exists a finite set $\left\{\boldsymbol{y}_{1}, \boldsymbol{y}_{2}, \cdots, \boldsymbol{y}_{n}\right\} \subseteq Z$, such that for any subset $\left\{\boldsymbol{y}_{i 1}, \boldsymbol{y}_{i 2}, \cdots, \boldsymbol{y}_{i s}\right\}(1 \leqq s \leqq n)$ and any $\boldsymbol{y}_{i 0} \in c o\left\{\boldsymbol{y}_{i 1}, \boldsymbol{y}_{i 2}, \cdots, \boldsymbol{y}_{i s}\right\}$, and we have $\boldsymbol{x}_{i r} \notin P\left(\boldsymbol{y}_{i 0}\right)$.

Remark 2.5.8 Unlike FS-convex and SS-convex, when defining the transfer FS-convex and transfer SS-convex, we do not assume that correspondences are mapping from itself to itself. It is clear that when $X=Z$ and picking $\boldsymbol{y}_{i}=\boldsymbol{x}_{i}$, FS-convex implies transfer FS-convex and SS-convex implies transfer SS-convex. Similarly, it is not difficult to verify that the correspondence $P: X \rightarrow 2^{Z}$ is transfer SS-convex if and only if $G: X \rightarrow 2^{X}$ defined by $G(\boldsymbol{x})=Z \backslash P(\boldsymbol{x})$ is transfer FS-convex.

### 2.6 Static Optimization

The optimization problem constitutes a core issue in economics. Rationality is a key assumption about individual decision-makers in economics. Individuals pursue maximizing their personal interests, and the basic analysis is to solve optimization problems. This section introduces various methods for solving static optimization problems.

### 2.6.1 Unconstrained Optimization

The optimization problem discusses whether an objective function can reach the maximum or minimum on a given set. Let $X$ be an arbitrary topological space. First, we give the following concepts:

Definition 2.6.1 (Local Optimum) If $f\left(\boldsymbol{x}^{*}\right) \geqq f(\boldsymbol{x})\left(f\left(\boldsymbol{x}^{*}\right)>f(\mathbf{x})\right)$ for al$1 \boldsymbol{x}$ in some neighbourhood of $\boldsymbol{x}^{*}$, then the function is said to have local maximum (unique local maximum) at point $\boldsymbol{x}^{*}$.

If $f(\tilde{\boldsymbol{x}}) \leqq f(\boldsymbol{x})(f(\tilde{\boldsymbol{x}})<f(\mathbf{x}))$ for all $\boldsymbol{x} \neq \tilde{\boldsymbol{x}}$ in some neighbourhoods of $\tilde{\boldsymbol{x}}$, then the function is said to have local minimum (unique local minimum) at $\tilde{\boldsymbol{x}}$.

Definition 2.6.2 (Global Optimum) If $f\left(\boldsymbol{x}^{*}\right) \geqq f(\boldsymbol{x})\left(f\left(\boldsymbol{x}^{*}\right)>f(\boldsymbol{x})\right)$ for all $\boldsymbol{x}$ in the domain of the function, then the function is said to have global (unique) maximum at $\boldsymbol{x}^{*}$; if $f\left(\boldsymbol{x}^{*}\right) \leqq f(\boldsymbol{x})\left(f\left(\boldsymbol{x}^{*}\right)<f(\boldsymbol{x})\right)$ for all $\boldsymbol{x}$ in the domain of the function, then the function is said to have global (unique) minimum at $\boldsymbol{x}^{*}$.

A classical conclusion about global optimization is the so-called the Weierstrass theorem.

Theorem 2.6.1 (Weierstrass Theorem) Any upper (lower) semi-continuous function must reach its maximum (minimum) on a compact set, and the set of maximal points is compact.

Transfer continuity can be used to generalize the Weierstrass Theorem by providing sufficient and necessary conditions for a function $f$ to reach global maximum (minimum) on a compact set $X$, sufficient and necessary conditions for the set of global maximal (minimal) points to be compact, and characterising a function that has a global maximum (minimum) value on arbitrary sets in Tian (1992, 1993, 1994), Tian \& Zhou (1995), and Zhou \&Tian (1992).

Theorem 2.6.2 (Tian-Zhou Theorem I) Suppose that $X$ is a compact set in an arbitrary topological space. The function $f: X \rightarrow \mathcal{R}$ has a maximum (minimum) on $X$ if and only if $f$ is transfer weakly upper (lower) continuous on $X$.

Proof. Since $f$ is transfer weakly upper continuous on $X$ if and only if $-f$ is transfer weakly lower continuous, we just need to show the case in which the function has a maximal point.

Sufficiency: We prove it by contradiction. Suppose that $f$ does not have a maximum on $X$. Then, for each $\boldsymbol{y} \in X$, there is $\boldsymbol{x} \in X$, such that $f(\boldsymbol{x})>$
$f(\boldsymbol{y})$. It follows from the transfer weak upper continuity of $f$ that there is a $\boldsymbol{x}^{\prime} \in X$ and a neighbourhood $\mathcal{N}(\boldsymbol{y})$ of $\boldsymbol{y}$, such that $f\left(\boldsymbol{x}^{\prime}\right) \geqq f\left(\boldsymbol{y}^{\prime}\right)$ for all $\boldsymbol{y}^{\prime} \in \mathcal{N}(\mathbf{y})$. Therefore, we have $X=\cup_{\mathbf{y} \in X} \mathcal{N}(\boldsymbol{y})$. Since $X$ is compact, there is a finite number of points $\left\{\boldsymbol{y}_{1}, \boldsymbol{y}_{2}, \cdots, \boldsymbol{y}_{n}\right\}$, such that $X=\cup_{i=1}^{n} \mathcal{N}\left(\boldsymbol{y}_{i}\right)$. Let $\mathbf{x}_{i}^{\prime}$ be the corresponding points, such that $f\left(\mathbf{x}_{i}^{\prime}\right) \geqq f\left(\boldsymbol{y}^{\prime}\right)$ for all $\boldsymbol{y}^{\prime} \in \mathcal{N}\left(\boldsymbol{y}_{i}\right)$. $f$ must have the maximum in the finite subset $\left\{\boldsymbol{x}_{1}^{\prime}, \boldsymbol{x}_{2}^{\prime}, \cdots, \boldsymbol{x}_{n}^{\prime}\right\}$. Without loss of generality, suppose $\boldsymbol{x}_{1}^{\prime}$ satisfying $f\left(\boldsymbol{x}_{1}^{\prime}\right) \geqq f\left(\boldsymbol{x}_{i}^{\prime}\right)$ for $\forall i=1,2, \cdots, n$. It follows from the previous assumption that $f$ has no maximum on $X$, i.e., $x_{1}^{\prime}$ is not the maximal point of $f$ on $X$. Therefore, there exists $\boldsymbol{x} \in X$, such that $f(\boldsymbol{x})>f\left(\boldsymbol{x}_{1}^{\prime}\right)$. However, since $X=\cup_{i=1}^{n} \mathcal{N}\left(\boldsymbol{y}_{i}\right)$, there is $j$, such that $\boldsymbol{x} \in$ $\mathcal{N}\left(\boldsymbol{y}_{j}\right)$, and then $f\left(\boldsymbol{x}_{j}^{\prime}\right) \geqq f(\boldsymbol{x})$. Therefore, $f(\boldsymbol{x})>f\left(\boldsymbol{x}_{1}^{\prime}\right) \geqq f\left(\boldsymbol{x}_{j}^{\prime}\right) \geqq f(\boldsymbol{x})$, which is a contradiction. As a consequence, $f$ has a maximum on $X$.

Necessity: We prove this in a straightforward manner. Let $\boldsymbol{x}^{\prime}$ be a maximal point of $f$. Then, $f\left(\boldsymbol{x}^{\prime}\right) \geqq f\left(\boldsymbol{y}^{\prime}\right)$ holds for all $\boldsymbol{y}^{\prime} \in X$.

In many cases, when proving the existence of competitive equilibrium and the existence of equilibrium in a game, we not only need to prove the existence of optimal points, but also prove that the set of the optimal points is compact.

Theorem 2.6.3 (Tian-Zhou Theorem II) Suppose that $X$ is a compact set in an arbitrary topological space, and $f: X \rightarrow \mathcal{R}$ is a function. The set of maximal (minimal) points of $f$ on $X$ is nonempty and compact if and only if $f$ is transfer upper (lower) continuous on $X$.

Proof. We only need to prove the case with a set of maximal points.
Necessity: Suppose that the set of maximal points of $f$ on $X$ is nonempty and compact. If $f(\boldsymbol{y})<f(\boldsymbol{x})$ for any $\boldsymbol{x}, \boldsymbol{y} \in X$, then $\boldsymbol{y}$ cannot be a maximal point of $f$ on $X$. It follows from the compactness of the set of maximal points that there is a neighbourhood $\mathcal{N}(\boldsymbol{y})$ of $\boldsymbol{y}$ that does not contain any maximal points of $f$ on $X$. Let $x^{\prime}$ be a maximal point of $f$ on $X$, and then $f(\boldsymbol{z})<f\left(\boldsymbol{x}^{\prime}\right)$ for all $\boldsymbol{z} \in \mathcal{N}(\boldsymbol{y})$. Therefore, $f$ is transfer upper continuous on $X$.

Sufficiency: First, note that $G: X \rightarrow 2^{Y}$ defined by

$$
G(\boldsymbol{x})=\{\mathbf{y} \in X: f(\boldsymbol{y}) \geqq f(\boldsymbol{x})\}, \forall \boldsymbol{x} \in X
$$

is a transfer closed-valued correspondence if and only if $f$ is transfer upper continuous on $X$. Since $f$ is transfer upper continuous on $X$, according to Proposition 2.5.4, we have $\bigcap_{\boldsymbol{x} \in X} c l G(\boldsymbol{x})=\bigcap_{\boldsymbol{x} \in X} G(\boldsymbol{x})$, and thus the set of maximal points is closed.

Since $f$ has a maximal point on any finite subset $\left\{\boldsymbol{x}_{1}, \boldsymbol{x}_{2}, \cdots, \boldsymbol{x}_{m}\right\} \subseteq X$, let $f\left(\boldsymbol{x}_{1}\right) \geqq f\left(\boldsymbol{x}_{i}\right)$ hold for all $\forall i=1, \cdots, m$. Then, we have $\boldsymbol{x}_{1} \in G\left(\boldsymbol{x}_{i}\right)$ for all $i=1, \cdots, m$, and thus

$$
\varnothing \neq \bigcap_{i=1}^{m} G\left(\boldsymbol{x}_{i}\right) \subseteq \bigcap_{i=1}^{m} c l G\left(\boldsymbol{x}_{i}\right),
$$

i.e., the class of sets $\{c l G(\boldsymbol{x}): \boldsymbol{x} \in X\}$ has the property of finite intersection on $X$. Since $\{c l G(\boldsymbol{x}): \boldsymbol{x} \in X\}$ is a collection of closed sets in compact set $X, \varnothing \neq \bigcap_{x \in X} c l G(\boldsymbol{x})=\bigcap_{x \in X} G(\boldsymbol{x})$. This implies that there is $\boldsymbol{x}^{*} \in X$, such that $f\left(\boldsymbol{x}^{*}\right) \geqq f(\boldsymbol{x})$ for all $\boldsymbol{x} \in X$. Since the set of maximal points $\bigcap_{x \in X}$ cl $G(\boldsymbol{x})$ is a closed subset of the compact set $X$, it is also compact.

In order to easily determine whether a function has an extreme point, the following gives the method of finding extreme values by the differential method. We first provide the necessary conditions for interior extreme points without constraints, and then give the sufficient conditions.

## Necessary Conditions for Optimization

Generally, there are two necessary conditions for the interior extreme point, i.e., first- and second-order necessary conditions.

Theorem 2.6.4 (The first-order necessary condition for interior extreme points)
Suppose that $X \subseteq \mathcal{R}^{n}$. If a differentiable function $f(\boldsymbol{x})$ reaches a local maximum or minimum at an interior point $\boldsymbol{x}^{*} \in X$, then $\boldsymbol{x}^{*}$ is the solution to the following system of simultaneous equations:

$$
\frac{\partial f\left(\boldsymbol{x}^{*}\right)}{\partial x_{1}}=0,
$$

$$
\begin{gathered}
\frac{\partial f\left(\boldsymbol{x}^{*}\right)}{\partial x_{2}}=0 \\
\vdots \\
\frac{\partial f\left(\boldsymbol{x}^{*}\right)}{\partial x_{n}}=0
\end{gathered}
$$

Proof. Suppose that $f(\boldsymbol{x})$ reaches the local extreme value at an interior point $\boldsymbol{x}^{*}$, then we need to prove that $D f\left(\boldsymbol{x}^{*}\right)=0$. Although this proof is not the simplest one, it will be very useful when considering the second-order condition.

Choose any vector $z \in \mathcal{R}^{n}$, and then construct a familiar univariate function of any scalar $t$ :

$$
g(t)=f\left(\boldsymbol{x}^{*}+t \boldsymbol{z}\right)
$$

First, for $t \neq 0, \boldsymbol{x}^{*}+t \boldsymbol{z}$ gives a vector that is different from $\boldsymbol{x}^{*}$. For $t=0, \boldsymbol{x}^{*}+t \boldsymbol{z}$ is equal to $\boldsymbol{x}^{*}$, and thus $g(0)$ is exactly the value of $f$ at $\boldsymbol{x}^{*}$. According to the assumption that $f$ attains an extremum at $\boldsymbol{x}^{*}, g(t)$ must reach a local extreme at $t=0$. It follows from the Fermat Theorem given by Proposition 2.4.4 that $g^{\prime}(0)=0$. Taking the derivative of $g(t)$ by the Chain Rule gives:

$$
g^{\prime}(t)=\sum_{i=1}^{n} \frac{\partial f\left(\boldsymbol{x}^{*}+t \boldsymbol{z}\right)}{\partial x_{i}} z_{i}
$$

When $t=0$ and using $g^{\prime}(0)=0$, we have

$$
g^{\prime}(0)=\sum_{i=1}^{n} \frac{\partial f\left(\boldsymbol{x}^{*}\right)}{\partial x_{i}} z_{i}=D f\left(\boldsymbol{x}^{*}\right) \boldsymbol{z}=0
$$

Since the above equation holds for any vector $\boldsymbol{z}$, including the unit vector, this means that each partial derivative of $f$ must equal to zero, i.e.,

$$
D f\left(\boldsymbol{x}^{*}\right)=0
$$

Theorem 2.6.5 (The second-order necessary conditions for interior extreme points) Suppose that $f(\boldsymbol{x})$ is twice continuously differentiable on $X \subseteq \mathcal{R}^{n}$.
(1) If $f(\boldsymbol{x})$ reaches a local maximum at the interior point $\boldsymbol{x}^{*}$, then the Hessian
matrix $\boldsymbol{H}\left(\boldsymbol{x}^{*}\right)$ is negative semi-definite.
(2) If $f(\boldsymbol{x})$ reaches a local minimum at the interior point $\tilde{\boldsymbol{x}}$, then $\boldsymbol{H}(\tilde{\boldsymbol{x}})$ is positive semi-definite.

Proof. Let $g(t)=f(\boldsymbol{x}+t \boldsymbol{z}), \boldsymbol{z} \in \mathcal{R}^{n}$ and $\boldsymbol{x}$ be a stationary point of $f$. If $f$ attains a stationary point at $\boldsymbol{x}$, then $g$ gets a stationary point at $t=0$. Moreover, for any $t$, we have

$$
g^{\prime}(t)=\sum_{i=1}^{n} \frac{\partial f(\boldsymbol{x}+t \boldsymbol{z})}{\partial x_{i}} z_{i} .
$$

We have the second-order derivatives:

$$
g^{\prime \prime}(t)=\sum_{i=1}^{n} \sum_{j=1}^{n} \frac{\partial^{2} f(\boldsymbol{x}+t \boldsymbol{z})}{\partial x_{i} \partial x_{j}} z_{i} z_{j} .
$$

Now, suppose that $f$ reaches maximum at $\boldsymbol{x}=\boldsymbol{x}^{*}$. Since $g^{\prime \prime}(0) \leqq 0$, then the value of $g^{\prime \prime}(t)$ at $\boldsymbol{x}^{*}$ and $t=0$ is

$$
g^{\prime \prime}(0)=\sum_{i=1}^{n} \sum_{j=1}^{n} \frac{\partial^{2} f\left(\boldsymbol{x}^{*}\right)}{\partial x_{i} \partial x_{j}} z_{i} z_{j} \leqq 0,
$$

or $\boldsymbol{z}^{T} \boldsymbol{H}(\boldsymbol{x}) \boldsymbol{z} \leqq 0$. Since $\boldsymbol{z}$ is arbitrary, this implies that $\boldsymbol{H}\left(\boldsymbol{x}^{*}\right)$ is negative semi-definite. Similarly, if $f$ is minimized at $\boldsymbol{x}=\tilde{\boldsymbol{x}}$, then $g^{\prime \prime}(0) \geqq 0$ and $\boldsymbol{H}(\tilde{\boldsymbol{x}})$ is positive semi-definite.

## Sufficient Conditions for Optimization

## Theorem 2.6.6 (The First-Order Sufficient Conditions for Maximization)

Suppose that $f(\boldsymbol{x})$ is differentiable on $X \subseteq \mathcal{R}$. Then, we have:
(1) If $f_{i}\left(\boldsymbol{x}^{*}\right)=0$, and if $f^{\prime}(x)$ changes its sign from positive to negative from the immediate left of the point $x_{0}$ to its immediate right, then $f(\boldsymbol{x})$ has a local maximum at $\boldsymbol{x}^{*}$.
(2) If $f_{i}(\tilde{\boldsymbol{x}})=0$, and $f^{\prime}(x)$ changes its sign from negative to positive from the immediate left of the point $x_{0}$ to its immediate right, then $f(\boldsymbol{x})$ has a local minimum at $\tilde{\boldsymbol{x}}$.
(3) There is no extreme point if $f^{\prime}(x)$ has the same sign on some neighborhood.

## Theorem 2.6.7 (The Second-Order Sufficient Conditions for Maximization)

Suppose that $f(\boldsymbol{x})$ is twice continuously differentiable on $X \subseteq \mathcal{R}^{n}$. Then, we have:
(1) If $f_{i}\left(\boldsymbol{x}^{*}\right)=0$, and $(-1)^{i} D_{i}\left(\boldsymbol{x}^{*}\right)>0, i=1, \cdots, n$, then $f(\boldsymbol{x})$ has a local maximum at $\boldsymbol{x}^{*}$.
(2) If $f_{i}(\tilde{\boldsymbol{x}})=0$, and $D_{i}(\tilde{\boldsymbol{x}})>0, i=1, \cdots, n$, then $f(\boldsymbol{x})$ has a local minimum at $\tilde{\boldsymbol{x}}$.

## Global Optimization

The local optimum is, in general, not the same as the global optimum. However, under certain conditions, these two are consistent with each other.

Theorem 2.6.8 (Local and Global Optimum) Suppose that $f$ is a concave and twice continuously differentiable function on $X \subseteq \mathcal{R}^{n}$, and $\boldsymbol{x}^{*}$ is an interior point of $X$. Then, the following three statements are equivalent:
(1) $D f\left(\boldsymbol{x}^{*}\right)=0$.
(2) $f$ has a local maximum at $\boldsymbol{x}^{*}$.
(3) $f$ has a global maximum at $\boldsymbol{x}^{*}$.

Proof. It is clear that $(3) \Rightarrow(2)$, and it follows from the previous theorem that $(2) \Rightarrow(1)$. We just need to prove that $(1) \Rightarrow(3)$.

Suppose that $D f\left(\boldsymbol{x}^{*}\right)=0$. Then, that $f$ is concave implies that for all $\boldsymbol{x}$ in the domain, we have:

$$
f(\boldsymbol{x}) \leqq f\left(\boldsymbol{x}^{*}\right)+D f\left(\boldsymbol{x}^{*}\right)\left(\boldsymbol{x}-\boldsymbol{x}^{*}\right)
$$

These two formulas mean that for all $\boldsymbol{x}$, we must have

$$
f(\boldsymbol{x}) \leqq f\left(\boldsymbol{x}^{*}\right)
$$

Therefore, $f$ reaches a global maximum at $\boldsymbol{x}^{*}$.

## Theorem 2.6.9 (Strict Concavity/Convexity and Uniqueness of Global Optimum)

 Let $X \subseteq \mathcal{R}^{n}$.(1) If a strictly concave function $f$ defined on $X$ reaches a local maximum value at $\boldsymbol{x}^{*}$, then $\boldsymbol{x}^{*}$ is the unique global maximum point.
(2) If a strictly convex function $f$ reaches a local minimum value at $\tilde{\boldsymbol{x}}$, then $\tilde{\boldsymbol{x}}$ is the unique global minimum point.

Proof. Proof by contradiction. If $x^{*}$ is a global maximum point of function $f$, but not unique, then there is a point $\boldsymbol{x}^{\prime} \neq \boldsymbol{x}^{*}$, such that $f\left(\boldsymbol{x}^{\prime}\right)=$ $f\left(\boldsymbol{x}^{*}\right)$. Suppose that $\boldsymbol{x}^{t}=t \boldsymbol{x}^{\prime}+(1-t) \boldsymbol{x}^{*}$. Then, strict concavity requires that for all $t \in(0,1)$,

$$
f\left(\boldsymbol{x}^{t}\right)>t f\left(\boldsymbol{x}^{\prime}\right)+(1-t) f\left(\boldsymbol{x}^{*}\right) .
$$

Since $f\left(\boldsymbol{x}^{\prime}\right)=f\left(\boldsymbol{x}^{*}\right)$,

$$
f\left(\boldsymbol{x}^{t}\right)>t f\left(\boldsymbol{x}^{\prime}\right)+(1-t) f\left(\boldsymbol{x}^{\prime}\right)=f\left(\boldsymbol{x}^{\prime}\right)
$$

This contradicts the assumption that $x^{\prime}$ is a global maximum point of $f$. Consequently, the global maximum point of a strictly concave function is unique. The proof of part (2) is similar, and thus omitted.

Theorem 2.6.10 (The sufficient condition for the uniqueness of global optimum) Suppose that $f(\boldsymbol{x})$ is twice continuously differentiable on $X \subseteq \mathcal{R}^{n}$. We have:
(1) If $f(\boldsymbol{x})$ is strictly concave and $f_{i}\left(\boldsymbol{x}^{*}\right)=0, i=1, \cdots, n$, then $\boldsymbol{x}^{*}$ is a unique global maximum point of $f(\boldsymbol{x})$.
(2) If $f(\boldsymbol{x})$ is strictly convex and $f_{i}(\tilde{\boldsymbol{x}})=0, i=1, \cdots, n$, then $\tilde{\boldsymbol{x}}$ is a unique global minimum point of $f(\boldsymbol{x})$.

### 2.6.2 Optimization with Equality Constraints

## Equality-Constrained Optimization

An optimization problem with equality-constraints has the following form : Suppose that a function of $n$ variables defined on $X \subseteq \mathcal{R}^{n}$ with $m$
constraints, where $m<n$. The optimization problem is:

$$
\begin{gathered}
\max _{x_{1}, \cdots, x_{n}} f\left(x_{1}, \cdots, x_{n}\right) \\
\text { s.t. } g^{1}\left(x_{1}, \cdots, x_{n}\right)=0, \\
g^{2}\left(x_{1}, \cdots, x_{n}\right)=0, \\
\vdots \\
g^{m}\left(x_{1}, \cdots, x_{n}\right)=0 .
\end{gathered}
$$

The most important conclusion of the equality-constrained optimization problem is the Lagrange theorem, which gives a necessary condition for a point to be the solution of the optimization problem.

The Lagrange function of the above equality-constrained problem is defined as:

$$
\begin{equation*}
\mathcal{L}(\boldsymbol{x}, \lambda)=f(\boldsymbol{x})+\sum_{j=1}^{m} \lambda_{j} g^{j}(\boldsymbol{x}), \tag{2.6.3}
\end{equation*}
$$

where $\lambda_{1}, \cdots, \lambda_{m}$ are called the Lagrange multipliers.
The following Lagrange theorem presents how to solve optimization problems under equality constraints.

## Theorem 2.6.11 (First-Order Necessary Condition for Interior Extremum)

 Suppose that $f(\boldsymbol{x})$ and $g^{j}(\boldsymbol{x}), j=1, \cdots, m$, are continuously differentiable functions defined on $X \subseteq \mathcal{R}^{n}, \boldsymbol{x}^{*}$ is an interior point of $X$ and an extreme point (maximal or minimal point) of $f$ ——here $f$ is subject to the constraint of $g^{j}\left(\boldsymbol{x}^{*}\right)=0$, where $j=1, \cdots, m$. If the gradient $D g^{j}\left(\boldsymbol{x}^{*}\right)=0, j=1, \cdots, m$, are linearly independent, then there is a unique $\lambda_{j}^{*}, j=1, \cdots, m$, such that:$$
\frac{\partial \mathcal{L}\left(\boldsymbol{x}^{*}, \lambda^{*}\right)}{\partial x_{i}}=\frac{\partial f\left(\boldsymbol{x}^{*}\right)}{\partial x_{i}}+\sum_{i=1}^{m} \lambda_{j}^{*} \frac{\partial g^{j}\left(\boldsymbol{x}^{*}\right)}{\partial x_{i}}=0, \quad i=1, \cdots, n .
$$

The following proposition gives the sufficient conditions for interior extreme values with equality constraints.

## Proposition 2.6.1 (Second-Order Necessary Condition for Interior Extremum)

Suppose that $f$ and $g^{1}, \cdots, g^{m}$ are twice continuously differentiable functions, and $\mathrm{x}^{*}$ satisfies the necessary conditions of Theorem 2.6.10. Let the bordered Hessian determinant
$\left|\bar{H}_{r}\right|=\operatorname{det}\left(\begin{array}{cccccc}0 & \cdots & 0 & \frac{\partial g^{1}}{\partial x_{1}} & \cdots & \frac{\partial g^{1}}{\partial x_{r}} \\ \vdots & \ddots & \vdots & \vdots & \ddots & \vdots \\ 0 & \cdots & 0 & \frac{\partial g^{m}}{\partial x_{1}} & \cdots & \frac{\partial g^{m}}{\partial x_{r}} \\ \frac{\partial g^{1}}{\partial x_{1}} & \cdots & \frac{\partial g^{m}}{\partial x_{1}} & \frac{\partial^{2} \mathcal{L}}{\partial x_{1} \partial x_{1}} & \cdots & \frac{\partial^{2} \mathcal{L}}{\partial x_{1} \partial x_{r}} \\ \vdots & \ddots & \vdots & \vdots & \ddots & \vdots \\ \frac{\partial g^{1}}{\partial x_{r}} & \cdots & \frac{\partial g^{m}}{\partial x_{r}} & \frac{\partial^{2} \mathcal{L}}{\partial x_{r} \partial x_{1}} & \cdots & \frac{\partial^{2} \mathcal{L}}{\partial x_{r} \partial x_{r}}\end{array}\right), r=m+1,2, \cdots, n$
take value at $x^{*}$. Thus
(1) If $(-1)^{r-m+1}\left|\bar{H}_{r}\left(\boldsymbol{x}^{*}\right)\right|>0, r=m+1, \cdots, n$, then $\mathrm{x}^{*}$ is the local maximum of the optimization problem.
(2) If $(-1)^{m}\left|\bar{H}_{r}\left(\boldsymbol{x}^{*}\right)\right|<0, r=m+1, \cdots, n$, then $\mathbf{x}^{*}$ is the local minimum of the optimization problem.

In particular, when there is only one equality constraint, i.e., $m=1$, the bordered Hessian determinant $|\bar{H}|$ becomes:

$$
|\bar{H}|=\left|\begin{array}{ccccc}
0 & g_{1} & g_{2} & \cdots & g_{n} \\
g_{1} & \mathcal{L}_{11} & \mathcal{L}_{12} & \cdots & \mathcal{L}_{1 n} \\
g_{2} & \mathcal{L}_{21} & \mathcal{L}_{22} & \cdots & \mathcal{L}_{2 n} \\
\cdots & \cdots & \cdots & \cdots & \cdots \\
g_{n} & \mathcal{L}_{n 1} & \mathcal{L}_{n 2} & \cdots & \mathcal{L}_{n n}
\end{array}\right| .
$$

where $\mathcal{L}_{i j}=f_{i j}-\lambda g_{i j}$. The first-order condition is

$$
\lambda=\frac{f_{1}}{g_{1}}=\frac{f_{2}}{g_{2}}=\cdots=\frac{f_{n}}{g_{n}} .
$$

The principal minors of the bordered Hessian are

$$
\left|\bar{H}_{2}\right|=\left|\begin{array}{ccc}
0 & g_{1} & g_{2} \\
g_{1} & \mathcal{L}_{11} & \mathcal{L}_{12} \\
g_{2} & \mathcal{L}_{21} & \mathcal{L}_{22}
\end{array}\right|, \quad\left|\bar{H}_{3}\right|=\left|\begin{array}{cccc}
0 & g_{1} & g_{2} & g_{3} \\
g_{1} & \mathcal{L}_{11} & \mathcal{L}_{12} & \mathcal{L}_{13} \\
g_{2} & \mathcal{L}_{21} & \mathcal{L}_{22} & \mathcal{L}_{23} \\
g_{3} & \mathcal{L}_{31} & \mathcal{L}_{32} & \mathcal{L}_{33}
\end{array}\right|, \cdots
$$

This leads to the following two conclusions.

## Conditions for Maximum with Equality Constraints

(1) $\mathcal{L}_{\lambda}=\mathcal{L}_{1}=\mathcal{L}_{2}=\cdots=\mathcal{L}_{n}=0$ [First-order Necessary Condition];
(2) $\left|\bar{H}_{2}\right|<0,\left|\bar{H}_{3}\right|<0,\left|\bar{H}_{4}\right|<0, \cdots,\left|\bar{H}_{n}\right|<0$.

## Conditions for Minimum with Equality Constraints

(1) $\mathcal{L}_{\lambda}=\mathcal{L}_{1}=\mathcal{L}_{2}=\cdots=\mathcal{L}_{n}=0$ [First-order Necessary Condition];
(2) $\left|\bar{H}_{2}\right|>0,\left|\bar{H}_{3}\right|<0,\left|\bar{H}_{4}\right|>0, \cdots,(-1)^{n}\left|\bar{H}_{n}\right|>0$.

Note that when the constraint function $g$ is linear, $g(\mathbf{x})=a_{1} x_{1}+\cdots+$ $a_{n} x_{n}=c$, all of the twice partial derivatives of $g$ are equal to zero, and thus the bordered determinant $|B|$ and the bordered Hessian determinant have the following relations:

$$
|B|=\lambda^{2}|\bar{H}|
$$

Therefore, the sequential principal minors of the bordered determinant have the same signs. As such, as long as the objective function is strictly quasiconcave, the first-order necessary condition is also a sufficient condition to have the maximum value.

### 2.6.3 Optimization with Inequality Constraints

Consider an optimization problem with inequality constraints:

$$
\begin{array}{ll} 
& \max f(\boldsymbol{x}) \\
\text { s.t. } & g_{i}(\boldsymbol{x}) \leqq d_{i}, \quad i=1,2, \cdots, k .
\end{array}
$$

If for a point $\boldsymbol{x}$ that makes all constraints held with equality, $D g_{1}(\boldsymbol{x})$, $D g_{2}(\boldsymbol{x}), \cdots, D g_{k}(\boldsymbol{x})$ are linearly independent, then $\boldsymbol{x}$ is said to satisfy the strong version of constrained qualification. Here, the symbol $D$ represents the partial differential operator.

Theorem 2.6.12 (Kuhn-Tucker Theorem) Suppose that $\boldsymbol{x}$ solves the inequalityconstrained maximization problem and satisfies the constrained qualification condition. Then, there is a set of Kuhn-Tucker multipliers $\left(\lambda_{i} \geqq 0, i=1, \cdots, k\right)$, such that

$$
D f(\boldsymbol{x})=\sum_{i=1}^{k} \lambda_{i} D g_{i}(\boldsymbol{x})
$$

Moreover, we have the complementary slackness conditions:

$$
\begin{aligned}
\lambda_{i} & \geqq 0, \quad \text { for all } i=1,2, \cdots, k . \\
\lambda_{i} & =0, \quad \text { if } g_{i}(\boldsymbol{x})<d_{i} .
\end{aligned}
$$

Comparing the Kuhn-Tucker theorem with Lagrange multipliers in the equality-constrained optimization problem, we see that the major difference is that the signs of the Kuhn-Tucker multipliers are nonnegative, while the signs of the Lagrange multipliers can be positive or negative. This additional information can be useful in various occasions.

The Kuhn-Tucker theorem only provides a necessary condition for a maximum. The following theorem states conditions that guarantee that the above first-order conditions are sufficient.

Theorem 2.6.13 (Kuhn-Tucker Sufficiency) Suppose that $f$ is concave, and $g_{i}, i=1, \cdots, k$, are convex. If $\boldsymbol{x}$ satisfies the Kuhn-Tucker first-order conditions, then $\boldsymbol{x}$ is a global solution to the constrained maximization problem.

We can weaken the conditions in the above theorem when there is only
one constraint. Let $C=\left\{\boldsymbol{x} \in \mathcal{R}^{n}: g(\boldsymbol{x}) \leqq d\right\}$. We have the following propositions.

Proposition 2.6.2 Suppose that $f$ is quasi-concave, and the set $C$ is convex (this is true if $g$ is quasi-convex). If $\boldsymbol{x}$ satisfies the Kuhn-Tucker first-order conditions, then $\boldsymbol{x}$ is a global solution to the constrained maximization problem.

Sometimes, we require $\boldsymbol{x}$ to be nonnegative. Suppose that we have the following optimization problem:

$$
\begin{array}{cl}
\max & f(\boldsymbol{x}) \\
\text { s.t. } & g_{i}(\boldsymbol{x}) \leqq d_{i}, \quad i=1,2, \cdots, k, \\
& \boldsymbol{x} \leqq 0
\end{array}
$$

Then, the Lagrange function in this case is given by

$$
L(\boldsymbol{x}, \lambda)=f(\boldsymbol{x})+\sum_{l=1}^{k} \lambda_{l}\left[d_{l}-g_{l}(\boldsymbol{x})\right]+\sum_{j=1}^{n} \mu_{j} x_{j}
$$

where $\mu_{1}, \cdots, \mu_{n}$ are the multipliers associated with constraints $x_{j} \geqq 0$. The first-order conditions are

$$
\begin{aligned}
\frac{L(\boldsymbol{x}, \lambda)}{\partial x_{i}} & =\frac{\partial f(\boldsymbol{x})}{\partial x_{i}}-\sum_{l=1}^{k} \lambda_{l} \frac{\partial g_{l}(\boldsymbol{x})}{\partial x_{i}}+\mu_{i}=0, \quad i=1,2, \cdots, n . \\
\lambda_{l} & \geqq 0, \quad l=1,2, \cdots, k . \\
\lambda_{l} & =0, \quad \text { if } g_{l}(\boldsymbol{x})<d_{l} . \\
\mu_{i} & \geqq 0, \quad i=1,2, \cdots, n . \\
\mu_{i} & =0, \quad \text { if } x_{i}>0
\end{aligned}
$$

Eliminating $\mu_{i}$, we can equivalently write the above first-order conditions with nonnegative choice variables as
$\frac{L(\boldsymbol{x}, \lambda)}{\partial x_{i}}=\frac{\partial f(\boldsymbol{x})}{\partial x_{i}}-\sum_{l=1}^{k} \lambda_{l} \frac{\partial g_{l}(\boldsymbol{x})}{\partial x_{i}} \leqq 0$, with equality if $x_{i}>0, i=1,2, \cdots, n$,
or in matrix notation,

$$
D f-\lambda D g \leqq 0
$$

$$
\boldsymbol{x}[D f-\lambda D g]=0,
$$

where we have written the product of two vectors $\boldsymbol{x}$ and $\mathbf{y}$ as the inner product, i.e., $\boldsymbol{x y}=\sum_{i=1}^{n} x_{i} y_{i}$. Therefore, if we are at an interior optimum, we have

$$
D f(\boldsymbol{x})=\lambda D g .
$$

### 2.6.4 The Envelope Theorem

## The Envelope Theorem without Constraints

Consider the following maximization problem:

$$
M(\boldsymbol{a})=\max _{\boldsymbol{x}} f(\boldsymbol{x}, \boldsymbol{a}) .
$$

The function $M(\boldsymbol{a})$ gives the maximum of the objective function as a function of parameter $\boldsymbol{a}$.

Let $\mathbf{x}(\boldsymbol{a})$ be the value of $\boldsymbol{x}$ that solves the maximization problem. Then, we can also write $M(\boldsymbol{a})=f(\mathbf{x}(\boldsymbol{a}), \boldsymbol{a})$. It is often of interest to know how $M(\boldsymbol{a})$ changes as a changes. The Envelope Theorem gives us the answer:

$$
\frac{d M(\boldsymbol{a})}{d \boldsymbol{a}}=\left.\frac{\partial f(\boldsymbol{x}, \boldsymbol{a})}{\partial \boldsymbol{a}}\right|_{x=\boldsymbol{x}(\boldsymbol{a})}
$$

The conclusion is particularly useful. This expression informs us that the derivative of $M$ with respect to $a$ is given by the partial derivative of $f$ with respect to $\boldsymbol{a}$, holding x fixed at the optimal choice. This is the meaning of the vertical bar to the right of the derivative. The proof of the envelope theorem is a relatively straightforward calculation.

## The Envelope Theorem with Constraints

Now, consider a more general parameterized constrained maximization problem of the form:

$$
\begin{array}{ll} 
& M(\boldsymbol{a})=\max _{x_{1}, x_{2}} g\left(x_{1}, x_{2}, \boldsymbol{a}\right) \\
\text { s.t. } & h\left(x_{1}, x_{2}, \boldsymbol{a}\right)=0 .
\end{array}
$$

The Lagrangian for this problem is

$$
\mathcal{L}=g\left(x_{1}, x_{2}, \boldsymbol{a}\right)-\lambda h\left(x_{1}, x_{2}, \boldsymbol{a}\right),
$$

and the first-order conditions for interior points are

$$
\begin{align*}
\frac{\partial g}{\partial x_{1}}-\lambda \frac{\partial h}{\partial x_{1}} & =0,  \tag{2.6.4}\\
\frac{\partial g}{\partial x_{2}}-\lambda \frac{\partial h}{\partial x_{2}} & =0 \\
h\left(x_{1}, x_{2}, \mathbf{a}\right) & =0
\end{align*}
$$

These conditions determine the optimal choice functions $\left(x_{1}(\boldsymbol{a}), x_{2}(\boldsymbol{a})\right)$, which, in turn, determine the maximum value function

$$
\begin{equation*}
M(\boldsymbol{a}) \equiv g\left(x_{1}(\boldsymbol{a}), x_{2}(\boldsymbol{a}), \boldsymbol{a}\right) . \tag{2.6.5}
\end{equation*}
$$

The Envelope Theorem gives us a formula for the derivative of the value function with respect to a parameter in the maximization problem. Specifically, the formula is

$$
\begin{aligned}
\frac{d M(\boldsymbol{a})}{d \boldsymbol{a}} & =\left.\frac{\partial \mathcal{L}(\mathbf{x}, \boldsymbol{a})}{\partial \boldsymbol{a}}\right|_{\mathbf{x}=\mathbf{x}(\boldsymbol{a})} \\
& =\left.\frac{\partial g\left(x_{1}, x_{2}, \boldsymbol{a}\right)}{\partial \boldsymbol{a}}\right|_{x_{i}=x_{i}(\boldsymbol{a})}-\left.\lambda \frac{\partial h\left(x_{1}, x_{2}, \boldsymbol{a}\right)}{\partial \boldsymbol{a}}\right|_{x_{i}=x_{i}(\boldsymbol{a})}
\end{aligned}
$$

As previously, special focus should be given to the interpretation of these partial derivatives: they are the derivatives of $g$ and $h$ with respect to $\boldsymbol{a}$, holding $x_{1}$ and $x_{2}$ fixed at their optimal values.

### 2.6.5 Maximum Theorems

In optimization problems, we usually need to check if an optimal solution is continuous in parameters, e.g., to check the continuity of the demand function. We can apply the so-called the maximum theorem to these problems.

## Berge's Maximum Theorem

Theorem 2.6.14 (Berge's Maximum Theorem) Let $A$ and $X$ be two topological spaces. Suppose that $f: A \times X \rightarrow \mathcal{R}$ is a continuous function, and the constraint set $F: A \rightarrow 2^{X}$ is a continuous correspondence with non-empty compact values. Then, the maximum value function (also called the marginal function)

$$
M(\boldsymbol{a})=\max _{\boldsymbol{x} \in F(\boldsymbol{a})} f(\boldsymbol{x}, \boldsymbol{a})
$$

is a continuous function on $A$, and the maximum correspondence

$$
\mu(\boldsymbol{a})=\arg \max _{\boldsymbol{x} \in F(\boldsymbol{a})} f(\boldsymbol{x}, \boldsymbol{a})
$$

is upper hemi-continuous.

## Walker's Maximum Theorem

In many cases of optimization problems, the preference of an economic agent may not be represented by a utility function. Walker (1979) generalized Berge's maximum theorem to the case of maximal element under the open preference relation. Walker's maximum theorem allows the preference relations and constraint sets to vary with parameters.

Theorem 2.6.15 (Walker's Maximum Theorem) Let $A$ and $Y$ be two topological spaces. Suppose that $U: Y \times A \rightarrow 2^{Y}$ is a correspondence with an open graph. The constraint set $F: A \rightarrow 2^{Y}$ is a continuous and non-empty compact-valued correspondence. Define the maximum correspondence $\mu: A \rightarrow 2^{Y}$ as

$$
\mu(\boldsymbol{a}):=\{\boldsymbol{y} \in F(\boldsymbol{a}): U(\boldsymbol{y}, \boldsymbol{a}) \cap F(\boldsymbol{a})=\emptyset\},
$$

$\mu$ is a compact-valued upper semi-continuous correspondence.

## Tian-Zhou Maximum Theorem

Both Berge's and Walker's maximum theorems depend on the continuity (or open graph) of the constraint correspondence and the objective function (preference correspondence).

Tian and Zhou (1995) relaxed these assumptions, and generalized and characterized Berge's and Walker's maximum theorems. We first give the following definition of transfer continuity.

Definition 2.6.3 Let $A$ and $Y$ be two topological spaces, and $F: A \rightarrow 2^{Y}$ be a correspondence. A function $u: A \times Y \rightarrow \mathcal{R} \cup\{\infty\}$ is said to be quasitransfer upper continuous in $(a, y)$ with respect to $F$ if, for every $(\boldsymbol{a}, \boldsymbol{y}) \in A \times Y$ with $\boldsymbol{y} \in F(\boldsymbol{a}), u(\boldsymbol{a}, \boldsymbol{z})>u(\boldsymbol{a}, \boldsymbol{y})$ for some $\boldsymbol{z} \in F(\boldsymbol{a})$ implies that there is a neighbourhood $\mathcal{N}(\boldsymbol{a}, \boldsymbol{y})$ of $(\boldsymbol{a}, \boldsymbol{y})$, such that for any $\left(\boldsymbol{a}^{\prime}, \boldsymbol{y}^{\prime}\right) \in \mathcal{N}(\boldsymbol{a}, \boldsymbol{y})$ with $\boldsymbol{y}^{\prime} \in F\left(\boldsymbol{a}^{\prime}\right)$, there is a $\boldsymbol{z}^{\prime} \in F\left(\boldsymbol{a}^{\prime}\right)$, such that

$$
u\left(\boldsymbol{a}^{\prime}, \boldsymbol{z}^{\prime}\right)>u\left(\boldsymbol{a}^{\prime}, \boldsymbol{y}^{\prime}\right) .
$$

The following definition is a natural generalization of transfer upper continuity.

Definition 2.6.4 Let $A$ and $Y$ be two topological spaces, and $F: A \rightarrow 2^{Y}$ be a correspondence. A function $u: A \times Y \rightarrow \mathcal{R} \cup\{\infty\}$ is said to be transfer upper continuous on $F$ if, for every $(\boldsymbol{a}, \boldsymbol{y}) \in A \times Y$ with $\boldsymbol{y} \in F(\boldsymbol{a})$, $u(\boldsymbol{a}, \boldsymbol{z})>u(\boldsymbol{a}, \boldsymbol{y})$ for some $\boldsymbol{z} \in F(\boldsymbol{a})$ implies that there is a point $\boldsymbol{z}^{\prime} \in Y$ and a neighbourhood $\mathcal{N}(\boldsymbol{y})$ of $\boldsymbol{y}$, such that for any $\boldsymbol{y}^{\prime} \in \mathcal{N}(\boldsymbol{y})$ with $\boldsymbol{y}^{\prime} \in F(\boldsymbol{a})$, we have $u\left(\boldsymbol{a}, \boldsymbol{z}^{\prime}\right)>u\left(\boldsymbol{a}, \boldsymbol{y}^{\prime}\right)$ and $\boldsymbol{z}^{\prime} \in F(\boldsymbol{a})$.

Theorem 2.6.16 (Tian-Zhou Maximum Theorem) Let $A$ and $Y$ be two topological spaces, and $u: A \times Y \rightarrow \mathcal{R} \cup\{\infty\}$ be a function. Suppose that $F: A \rightarrow 2^{Y}$ is a compact and closed valued correspondence. Then, the maximum correspondence $\mu: A \rightarrow 2^{Y}$ is a nonempty, compact-valued and closed correspondence if and only if $u$ is transfer upper continuous in $y$ on $F$, and quasi-transfer upper continuous in $(a, y)$ with respect to $F$. Moreover, if $F$ is upper hemi-continuous, then the correspondence of extreme value $\mu$ is also upper hemi-continuous.

This theorem relaxes the upper semi-continuity of the objective function and the constraint correspondence in Berge's maximum theorem.

### 2.6.6 Continuous Selection Theorems

The continuous selection theorem is a powerful tool to prove the existence of equilibrium, and it is closely related to the fixed point theorem, which will be introduced below. The basic conclusion of the continuous selection theorem is that if a correspondence is lower hemi-continuous with nonempty convex values, there is a continuous function so that for all points in the domain, the function value is a subset of the correspondence.

Definition 2.6.5 Let $X \subseteq \mathcal{R}^{n}, Y \subseteq \mathcal{R}^{m}$ and $F: X \rightarrow 2^{Y}$ be a correspondence. If for any $\boldsymbol{x} \in X$, we have $f(\boldsymbol{x}) \in F(\boldsymbol{x})$, then the single valued function $f: X \rightarrow Y$ is said to be a selection corresponding to $F$.

Theorem 2.6.17 (Michael(1956)) Let $X \subseteq \mathcal{R}^{n}$ be compact. Suppose that $F$ : $X \rightarrow 2^{\mathcal{R}^{m}}$ is a lower hemi-continuous correspondence with closed and convex values. Then, $F$ has a continuous selection, i.e., there exists a single-valued continuous function $f: X \rightarrow \mathcal{R}^{m}$, such that $f(\boldsymbol{x}) \in F(\boldsymbol{x})$ for all $\boldsymbol{x} \in X$.

For the infinite dimension space, we have the following Browder Theorem.

Theorem 2.6.18 (Browder, (1968)) Let $X$ be a Hausdorff compact space, and $Y$ be a locally convex topological vector space. Suppose that $F: X \rightarrow 2^{Y}$ is a correspondence with open lower sections and convex values. Then, $F$ has a continuous selection, i.e., there is a single-valued continuous function $f: X \rightarrow Y$, such that $f(\boldsymbol{x}) \in F(\boldsymbol{x})$ for all $\boldsymbol{x} \in X$.

Since the open lower section of a correspondence implies the lower hemi-continuity of the correspondence (see Proposition 2.5.3), we then have the following result.

Corollary 2.6.1 (Yannelis-Prabhakar (1983)) Let $X \subseteq \mathcal{R}^{n}$. Suppose that $F$ : $X \rightarrow 2^{\mathcal{R}^{m}}$ is a correspondence with open lower sections and convex values. Then, $F$ has a continuous selection, i.e., there is a single-valued continuous function $f: X \rightarrow Y$, such that $f(\boldsymbol{x}) \in F(\boldsymbol{x})$ for all $\boldsymbol{x} \in X$.

### 2.6.7 Fixed Point Theorems

The fixed point theorem plays a crucial role in proving the existence of equilibrium. It is the most commonly used method for determining whether there is a solution of equilibrium equations. John von Neumann (1903-1957, see Section 5.8.1 for his biography) was the first to propose results that are essentially the fixed point theorem in two papers published in 1928 and 1937, respectively.

Definition 2.6.6 Let $X$ be a topological space, and $f: X \rightarrow X$ be a singlevalued function from $X$ to itself. If there is a point $x^{*} \in X$, such that $f\left(\boldsymbol{x}^{*}\right)=\boldsymbol{x}^{*}$, then $\mathrm{x}^{*}$ is called a fixed point of function $f$.

Definition 2.6.7 Let $X$ be a topological space, and $F: X \rightarrow 2^{X}$ is a correspondence from $X$ to itself. If there is a point $\boldsymbol{x}^{*} \in X$, such that $\boldsymbol{x}^{*} \in F\left(\boldsymbol{x}^{*}\right)$, then $x^{*}$ is called a fixed point of correspondence $f$.

There are some important fixed point theorems which are widely used in economics.

## Brouwer's Fixed Theorem

Brouwer's fixed point theorem is one of the most fundamental and important fixed point theorems.

Theorem 2.6.19 (Brouwer's Fixed Theorem) Let $X$ be a non-empty, compact, and convex subset of $\mathcal{R}^{m}$. If a function $f: X \rightarrow X$ is continuous on $X$, then $f$ has a fixed point, i.e., there is a point $\boldsymbol{x}^{*} \in X$, such that $f\left(\boldsymbol{x}^{*}\right)=\boldsymbol{x}^{*}$ (See Figure 2.4).

Example 2.6.1 If $f:[0,1] \rightarrow[0,1]$ is continuous, then $f$ has a fixed point $\mathbf{x}$. To see this, let $g(\mathbf{x})=f(\mathbf{x})-\mathbf{x}$. Then, we have

$$
\begin{gathered}
g(0)=f(0) \geqq 0 \\
g(1)=f(1)-1 \leqq 0 .
\end{gathered}
$$

From the mean-value theorem, there is a point $\mathbf{x}^{*} \in[0,1]$, such that $g\left(\mathbf{x}^{*}\right)=$ $f\left(\mathrm{x}^{*}\right)-\mathrm{x}^{*}=0$.


Figure 2.4: The intersection point of $45^{\circ}$ line and the curve of a function is a fixed point. There are three fixed points in this example

## Kakutani's Fixed Point Theorem

In applications, mapping is often a correspondence, and thus Brouwer's fixed point theorem cannot be used directly, and Kakutani's fixed point theorem is commonly used instead.

Theorem 2.6.20 (Kakutani's Fixed Point Theorem (1941)) Let $X \subseteq \mathcal{R}^{m}$ be a non-empty, compact, and convex subset. If a correspondence $F: X \rightarrow 2^{X}$ is an upper hemi-continuous correspondence with non-empty compact and convex values on $X$, then $F$ has a fixed point, i.e., there is a point $\boldsymbol{x}^{*} \in X$, such that $\boldsymbol{x}^{*} \in F\left(\boldsymbol{x}^{*}\right)$.

## Browder's Fixed Point Theorem

It follows from Theorem 2.6.16 that we have the following Browder's Fixed Point Theorem.

Theorem 2.6.21 (Browder (1968)) Let $X \subseteq \mathcal{R}^{n}$ be a compact and convex subset. Suppose that a correspondence $F: X \rightarrow 2^{\mathcal{R}^{m}}$ is convex-valued with open lower sections. Then, $F$ has a fixed point, i.e., there is a point $\boldsymbol{x}^{*} \in X$, such that $\boldsymbol{x}^{*} \in F\left(\boldsymbol{x}^{*}\right)$.

## Michael's Fixed Point Theorem

It follows from Theorem 2.6.17 that Michael's Fixed Point Theorem is given as follows.

Theorem 2.6.22 (Michael (1956)) Let $X \subseteq \mathcal{R}^{n}$ be a compact and convex subset. Suppose that $F: X \rightarrow 2^{\mathcal{R}^{m}}$ is a lower hemi-continuous correspondence with closed and convex values. Then, $F$ has a fixed point, i.e., there is a point $\boldsymbol{x}^{*} \in X$, such that $\boldsymbol{x}^{*} \in F\left(\boldsymbol{x}^{*}\right)$.

## Tarsky's Fixed Point Theorem

Tarsky's fixed point theorem is a very different type of fixed point theorem. It does not require the function to have any kind of continuity, but only requires that the function be monotonic and non-decreasing, and be defined on the domain composed of intervals. It is becoming increasingly important in applications of economics, especially in games with a monotonic payoff function.

Theorem 2.6.23 (Tarsky's Fixed Point Theorem (1955)) Let $[0,1]^{n}$ be the $n$ times product of interval $[0,1]$. If $f:[0,1]^{n} \rightarrow[0,1]^{n}$ is a non-decreasing function, then $f$ has a fixed point, i.e., there is a point $\boldsymbol{x}^{*} \in X$, such that $f\left(\boldsymbol{x}^{*}\right)=\boldsymbol{x}^{*}$.

## Contraction Mapping Theorem

In numerous dynamic economic models, we not only need to prove the existence of equilibrium, but also prove the uniqueness of equilibrium. The contraction mapping principle is an important tool to solve this problem. It is also the most basic and simple theorem of existence in functional analysis. Indeed, many of the existence theorems in mathematical analysis are its special cases. Its basic conclusion is that a contraction mapping from a complete metric space to itself has a unique fixed point.

Definition 2.6.8 Let $(X, d)$ be a complete metric space, and $f: X \rightarrow X$ be a single-valued function from $X$ to itself. If for any point $\boldsymbol{x}, \boldsymbol{x}^{\prime} \in X$, there is $\alpha \in(0,1)$, such that $d\left(f(\boldsymbol{x}), f\left(\boldsymbol{x}^{\prime}\right)\right)<\alpha d\left(\boldsymbol{x}, \boldsymbol{x}^{\prime}\right)$, then $f$ is a contraction mapping.

Theorem 2.6.24 (Banach Contraction Mapping Theorem) Suppose that $f$ : $X \rightarrow X$ is a contraction mapping from a complete metric space $X$ to itself. Then, $f$ has a unique fixed point on $X$.

## Characterization of the Existence of Fixed Points

All of the above fixed-point theorems are only sufficient conditions for the existence of fixed points. Tian (2017) introduced a series of concepts of recursive transfer continuity, and provided a sufficient and necessary condition for the existence of fixed points.

We first introduce the concept of diagonal transfer continuity introduced by Baye, Tian and Zhou (1993).

Definition 2.6.9 A function $\varphi: X \times X \rightarrow R \cup\{ \pm \infty\}$ is said to be diagonally transfer continuous in $y$ if, whenever $\varphi(x, y)>\varphi(y, y)$ for $x, y \in X$, there exists a point $z \in X$ and a neighborhood $\mathcal{V}_{y} \subset X$ of $y$, such that $\varphi\left(z, y^{\prime}\right)>$ $\varphi\left(y^{\prime}, y^{\prime}\right)$ for all $y^{\prime} \in \mathcal{V}_{y}$.

We now define the concept of recursive diagonal transfer continuity.
Definition 2.6.10 (Recursive Diagonal Transfer Continuity) A function $\varphi$ : $X \times X \rightarrow R \cup\{ \pm \infty\}$ is said to be recursively diagonally transfer continuous in $y$ if, whenever $\varphi(x, y)>\varphi(y, y)$ for $x, y \in X$, there exists a point $z^{0} \in X\left(\right.$ possibly $\left.z^{0}=y\right)$ and a neighborhood $\mathcal{V}_{y}$ of $y$, such that $\varphi\left(z, y^{\prime}\right)>$ $\varphi\left(y^{\prime}, y^{\prime}\right)$ for all $y^{\prime} \in \mathcal{V}_{y}$ and for any finite subset $\left\{z^{1}, \ldots, z^{m}\right\} \subseteq X$ with $z^{m}=z$ and $\varphi\left(z, z^{m-1}\right)>\varphi\left(z^{m-1}, z^{m-1}\right), \varphi\left(z^{m-1}, z^{m-2}\right)>\varphi\left(z^{m-2}, z^{m-2}\right)$, $\ldots, \varphi\left(z^{1}, z^{0}\right)>\varphi\left(z^{0}, z^{0}\right)$ for $m \geqq 1$.

Theorem 2.6.25 (Tian's Fixed Point Theorem (2017)) Let $X$ be a nonempty and compact subset of a metric space $(E, d)$, and $f: X \rightarrow X$ be a function. Then, $f$ has a fixed point if and only if the function $\varphi: X \times X \rightarrow R \cup\{ \pm \infty\}$, defined by $\varphi(x, y)=-d(x, f(y))$, is recursively diagonally transfer continuous in $y$.

### 2.6.8 Variation Inequality

Ky-Fan minimax inequality is one of the most prominent results in nonlinear analysis. It is equivalent to many important mathematical theorems in a
certain sense, such as KKM lemma, Sperner lemma, Brouwer's fixed point theorem, and Kakutani's fixed point theorem (which can be derived from each other). In numerous disciplines, such as variation inequalities, mathematical programming, partial differential equations and economic models, it can be used to prove the existence of equilibrium solutions.

Theorem 2.6.26 (Ky-Fan minimax inequality) Let $X \subseteq \mathcal{R}^{m}$ be a nonempty, convex and compact set, and let $\phi: X \times X \rightarrow R$ be a function that satisfies the following conditions:
(1) for all $\boldsymbol{x} \in X, \phi(\boldsymbol{x}, \boldsymbol{x}) \leqq 0$;
(2) $\phi$ is lower semi-continuous in $\boldsymbol{y}$;
(3) $\phi$ is quasi-concave in $\boldsymbol{x}$.

Then, there exists a point $\boldsymbol{y}^{*} \in X$, such that $\phi\left(\boldsymbol{x}, \boldsymbol{y}^{*}\right) \leqq 0$ holds for all $\boldsymbol{x} \in X$.
Ky-Fan inequality has been generalized in various forms in mathematical literature. Tian (2017) fully characterized the existence of solutions to Ky-Fan inequalities, and provided the sufficient and necessary conditions for the existence of Ky -Fan inequalities.

Definition 2.6.11 Let $X$ be a topological space. A function $\phi: X \times X \rightarrow$ $R \cup\{ \pm \infty\}$ is said to be $\gamma$-recursively transfer lower semicontinuous in $y$ if, whenever $\phi(x, y)>\gamma$ for $x, y \in X$, there exists a point $z^{0} \in X$ (possibly $\left.z^{0}=y\right)$ and a neighborhood $\mathcal{V}_{y}$ of $y$, such that $\phi\left(z, \mathcal{V}_{y}\right)>\gamma$ for any sequence of points $\left\{z^{1}, \ldots, z^{m-1}, z\right\}$ with $\phi\left(z, z^{m-1}\right)>\gamma, \phi\left(z^{m-1}, z^{m-2}\right)>\gamma, \ldots$, $\phi\left(z^{1}, z^{0}\right)>\gamma, m=1,2, \ldots$. Here, $\phi\left(z, \mathcal{V}_{y}\right)>\gamma$ means that $\phi\left(z, y^{\prime}\right)>\gamma$ for all $y^{\prime} \in \mathcal{V}_{y}$.

Theorem 2.6.27 (Tian, 2017) Let $X$ be a compact subset in a topological space, $\gamma \in \mathcal{R}$, and $\phi: X \times X \rightarrow R \cup\{ \pm \infty\}$ be a function satisfying $\phi(\boldsymbol{x}, \boldsymbol{x}) \leqq \gamma, \forall \boldsymbol{x} \in$ $X$. Then, there is a point $\boldsymbol{y}^{*} \in X$, such that $\phi\left(\boldsymbol{x}, \boldsymbol{y}^{*}\right) \leqq \gamma$ for all $\boldsymbol{x} \in X$ if and only if $\phi$ is $\gamma$-recursively diagonally transfer lower hemi-continuous in $\boldsymbol{y}$.

### 2.6.9 FKKM Theorems

The Knaster-Kuratowski-Mazurkiewicz (KKM) lemma is quite basic and is, in certain ways, more useful than Brouwer's fixed point theorem.

Theorem 2.6.28 (KKM Theorem) Let $X \subseteq \mathcal{R}^{m}$ be a convex set. Suppose that $F: X \rightarrow 2^{X}$ is a correspondence, such that
(1) $F(\boldsymbol{x})$ is closed for all $\boldsymbol{x} \in X$;
(2) $F$ is FS-convex, i.e., for any $\boldsymbol{x}_{1}, \cdots, \boldsymbol{x}_{m} \in X$ and its convex combination $\boldsymbol{x}_{\lambda}=\sum_{i=1}^{m} \lambda_{i} \boldsymbol{x}_{i}$, we have

$$
\boldsymbol{x}_{\lambda} \in \bigcup_{i=1}^{m} F\left(\boldsymbol{x}_{i}\right)
$$

then

$$
\bigcap_{\boldsymbol{x} \in X} F(\boldsymbol{x}) \neq \varnothing
$$

The following is a generalized version of the KKM lemma by Ky Fan (1984).

Theorem 2.6.29 (FKKM Theorem) Suppose that $X \subseteq \mathcal{R}^{m}$ is a convex set, $\varnothing \neq X \subseteq Y$, and $F: X \rightarrow 2^{Y}$ is a correspondence, such that
(1) $F(\boldsymbol{x})$ is closed for all $\boldsymbol{x} \in X$;
(2) $F\left(\boldsymbol{x}_{0}\right)$ is compact for some $\boldsymbol{x}_{0} \in X$;
(3) $F$ is FS-convex, i.e., for any $\boldsymbol{x}_{1}, \cdots, \boldsymbol{x}_{m} \in X$ and its convex combination $\boldsymbol{x}_{\lambda}=\sum_{i=1}^{m} \lambda_{i} \boldsymbol{x}_{i}$, we have

$$
\boldsymbol{x}_{\lambda} \in \bigcup_{i=1}^{m} F\left(\boldsymbol{x}_{i}\right)
$$

Then,

$$
\bigcap_{x \in X} F(x) \neq \varnothing
$$

This theorem has numerous generalizations. Tian (2017) also provided the sufficient and necessary conditions for establishing the FKKM theorem:

Theorem 2.6.30 (Tian, 2017) Let $X$ be a nonempty compact set in a topological space $T$, and $F: X \rightarrow 2^{X}$ be a correspondence satisfying $\boldsymbol{x} \in F(\boldsymbol{x})$ for all $\boldsymbol{x} \in X$.

Then, $\cap_{\boldsymbol{x} \in X} F(\boldsymbol{x}) \neq \emptyset$ if and only if the correspondence $\phi: X \times X \rightarrow \mathcal{R} \cup\{ \pm \infty\}$ defined by

$$
\phi(\boldsymbol{x}, \boldsymbol{y})= \begin{cases}\gamma, & \text { if }(\boldsymbol{x}, \boldsymbol{y}) \in G \\ +\infty, & \text { otherwise }\end{cases}
$$

is $\gamma$-recursively transfer semi-continuous with respect to $\boldsymbol{y}$, where $\gamma \in \mathcal{R}$ and $G=\{(\boldsymbol{x}, \boldsymbol{y}) \in X \times Y: \boldsymbol{y} \in F(\boldsymbol{x})\}$.

### 2.7 Dynamic Optimization

We generally encounter various constraints when making optimal decisions, and the constrained optimization problems in the last section are all among different variables in the same period. However, individuals usually need to make decisions in a dynamic environment, and early decisions will affect decisions in later periods. Dynamic optimization, dynamic programming, and optimal control provide analytical frameworks and tools for solving optimization problems in dynamic environments. In this section, we discuss the calculus of variation, optimal control, and the basic results of dynamic programming. We focus mainly on continuous cases of dynamic optimization problems defined on $X \subseteq \mathcal{R}$.

### 2.7.1 Calculus of Variation

A general dynamic optimization problem has the following form:

$$
\begin{array}{r}
\max \int_{t_{0}}^{t_{1}} F\left[t, \boldsymbol{x}(t), \boldsymbol{x}^{\prime}(t)\right] d t \\
\text { s.t. } \quad \boldsymbol{x}\left(t_{0}\right)=\boldsymbol{x}_{0}, \boldsymbol{x}\left(t_{1}\right)=\boldsymbol{x}_{1} . \tag{2.7.7}
\end{array}
$$

The above optimization problem is to choose a function $\boldsymbol{x}(t)$ subject to the constraints in (2.7.7) to maximize the objective function (2.7.6). Calculus of variation is a common method to solve such problems. Let $x^{*}(t)$ be the solution to the above optimization problem, and the necessary condition is that the solution must satisfy the Euler equation:

$$
\begin{equation*}
F_{\boldsymbol{x}}\left[t, \boldsymbol{x}^{*}(t), \boldsymbol{x}^{\prime *}(t)\right]=\frac{d F_{\boldsymbol{x}^{\prime}}\left[t, \boldsymbol{x}^{*}(t), \boldsymbol{x}^{\prime *}(t)\right]}{d t}, t \in\left[t_{0}, t_{1}\right] . \tag{2.7.8}
\end{equation*}
$$

Next, we will derive the Euler equation of dynamic optimization.
We say the function satisfying the constraint (2.7.7) is admissible. Let $\boldsymbol{x}(t)$ be admissible, and let $\boldsymbol{h}(t)=\boldsymbol{x}(t)-\boldsymbol{x}^{*}(t)$ be the difference between $\boldsymbol{x}(t)$ and the optimal selection. We then have $\boldsymbol{h}\left(t_{0}\right)=\boldsymbol{h}\left(t_{1}\right)=0$.

For any constant $a, \boldsymbol{y}(t)=\boldsymbol{x}^{*}(t)+a \boldsymbol{h}(t)$ is also admissible. In this way, the dynamic optimization problem can be transformed into solving under what conditions $a=0$ is the optimal choice under dynamic optimization.

$$
\begin{align*}
g(a) & =\int_{t_{0}}^{t_{1}} F\left[t, \boldsymbol{y}(t), \boldsymbol{y}^{\prime}(t)\right] d t \\
& =\int_{t_{0}}^{t_{1}} F\left[t, \boldsymbol{x}^{*}(t)+a \boldsymbol{h}(t), \boldsymbol{x}^{\prime *}(t)+a \boldsymbol{h}^{\prime}(t)\right] d t . \tag{2.7.9}
\end{align*}
$$

The first-order condition of optimization is obtained by differentiating (2.7.9) with respect to $a$ and then is set to 0 :

$$
\begin{align*}
g^{\prime}(0) & =\int_{t_{0}}^{t_{1}} F_{\boldsymbol{x}}\left[t, \boldsymbol{x}^{*}, \boldsymbol{x}^{\prime *}(t)\right] \boldsymbol{h}(t)+F_{\boldsymbol{x}^{\prime}}\left[t, \boldsymbol{x}^{*}, \boldsymbol{x}^{\prime *}(t)\right] \boldsymbol{h}^{\prime}(t) d t \\
& =0 . \tag{2.7.10}
\end{align*}
$$

Using integration by parts on the second part of the right side of the equation (2.7.10) yields:

$$
\begin{equation*}
\int_{t_{0}}^{t_{1}}\left\{F_{\boldsymbol{x}}\left[t, \boldsymbol{x}^{*}, \boldsymbol{x}^{\prime *}(t)\right]-\frac{d F_{\boldsymbol{x}^{\prime}}\left[t, \boldsymbol{x}^{*}(t), \boldsymbol{x}^{\prime *}(t)\right]}{d t}\right\} \boldsymbol{h}(t) d t=0 . \tag{2.7.11}
\end{equation*}
$$

If equation (2.7.11) holds for any continuous function $\boldsymbol{h}(t)$ that satisfies the constraint $\boldsymbol{h}\left(t_{0}\right)=\boldsymbol{h}\left(t_{1}\right)=0$, the Euler equation (2.7.8) also holds (see Kamiem \& Schwartz (1991)).

Example 2.7.1 (Kamien \& Schwartz (1991)) Suppose that an enterprise receives an order, requiring $B$ units of products delivered at time $T$. Assume that the production capacity of the enterprise is limited, and the unit cost of production is proportional to the output. In addition, completed products
need to be stocked, and the inventory cost per unit is a constant. Business managers need to consider production problems from now (time 0 ) to delivery date (time $T$ ). Suppose that at time $t \in[0, T]$, the inventory of the enterprise is $x(t)$, and the change of inventory depends on the production of the enterprise, i.e., $\dot{x}(t) \equiv x^{\prime}(t)=y(t)$, where $y(t)$ is the productivity at time $t$. At $t$, the cost of the enterprise is $c_{1} x^{\prime}(t) x^{\prime}(t)+c_{2} x(t)$ or $c_{1} u(t) u(t)+c_{2} x(t)$, where $c_{1} u(t)$ is the unit cost of production when the yield is $u(t)$, and $c_{2}$ is the unit cost of inventory. The goal of the enterprise is to minimize costs (including both production costs and inventory costs), and therefore the dynamic optimization problem is

$$
\begin{array}{lr} 
& \min \int_{0}^{T}\left[c_{1} x^{\prime 2}(t)+c_{2} x(t)\right] d t  \tag{2.7.12}\\
\text { s.t. } & x(0)=0, x(T)=B, x^{\prime}(t) \geqq 0 .
\end{array}
$$

In expression (2.7.12), $u(t)$ is called a control variable, and $x(t)$ is called a state variable. Using the calculus of variation to solve the optimization problem, we have

$$
F\left[t, x(t), x^{\prime}(t)\right]=c_{1} x^{\prime 2}(t)+c_{2} x(t) .
$$

The Euler equation is:

$$
c_{2}=2 c_{1} x^{\prime \prime *}(t) .
$$

With the constraint conditions: $x^{*}(0)=0, x^{*}(T)=B$, we solve the above Euler equation and obtain:

$$
x^{*}(t)=\frac{c_{2}}{4 c_{1}} t(t-T)+B t / T, \quad t \in[0, T] .
$$

Integrating the Euler equation (2.7.8) yields:

$$
\begin{equation*}
F_{x}=F_{x^{\prime} t}+F_{x^{\prime} x} x^{\prime}+F_{x^{\prime} x^{\prime}} x^{\prime \prime} \tag{2.7.13}
\end{equation*}
$$

Now, we introduce the Hamilton equations to avoid taking secondorder derivatives. Let $\boldsymbol{p}(t)=F_{\boldsymbol{x}^{\prime}}\left[t, \boldsymbol{x}(t), \boldsymbol{x}^{\prime}(t)\right]$, and the Hamilton equation
is:

$$
\begin{equation*}
H(t, \boldsymbol{x}, \boldsymbol{p})=-F\left(t, \boldsymbol{x}, \boldsymbol{x}^{\prime}\right)+\boldsymbol{p} \boldsymbol{x}^{\prime} . \tag{2.7.14}
\end{equation*}
$$

In equation (2.7.14), $\boldsymbol{p}(t)$ can be regarded as the shadow price. The total differential of equation (2.7.14) is:

$$
d H=-F_{t} d t-F_{\boldsymbol{x}} d \boldsymbol{x}-F_{\boldsymbol{x}^{\prime}} d \boldsymbol{x}^{\prime}+\boldsymbol{p} d \boldsymbol{x}^{\prime}+\boldsymbol{x}^{\prime} d \boldsymbol{p}=-F_{t} d t-F_{\boldsymbol{x}} d \boldsymbol{x}+\boldsymbol{x}^{\prime} d \boldsymbol{p} .
$$

The partial derivatives of equation (2.7.14) with respect to $x$ and $p$, respectively, are:

$$
\begin{aligned}
& \partial H / \partial \boldsymbol{x}=-F_{\boldsymbol{x}} ; \\
& \partial H / \partial \boldsymbol{p}=\boldsymbol{x}^{\prime} .
\end{aligned}
$$

Since $-F_{\boldsymbol{x}}=-\left(d F_{x^{\prime}} / d t\right)=-\boldsymbol{p}^{\prime}$, we have two Euler equations under firstorder conditions:

$$
\begin{aligned}
& \partial H / \partial \boldsymbol{x}=-\boldsymbol{p}^{\prime} ; \\
& \partial H / \partial \boldsymbol{p}=\boldsymbol{x}^{\prime} .
\end{aligned}
$$

The Euler equations are only the necessary conditions for solving dynamic optimization, and the sufficient conditions involve the second-order conditions. After deriving the first-order conditions by the calculus of variation, it is clear that the second-order condition is:

$$
g^{\prime \prime}(0)=\int_{t_{0}}^{t_{1}}\left[F_{\boldsymbol{x} \boldsymbol{x}} h^{2}+2 F_{\boldsymbol{x} \boldsymbol{x}^{\prime}} \boldsymbol{h} \boldsymbol{h}^{\prime}+F_{\boldsymbol{x}^{\prime} \boldsymbol{x}^{\prime}}\left(\boldsymbol{h}^{\prime}\right)^{2}\right] d t \leqq 0 .
$$

It is easy to verify that if the objective function $F$ is concave in $\boldsymbol{x}$ and $\boldsymbol{x}^{\prime}$, then the second-order condition is satisfied.

Denote $F=F\left(t, \boldsymbol{x}, \boldsymbol{x}^{\prime}\right), F^{*}=F\left(t, \boldsymbol{x}^{*}, \boldsymbol{x}^{\prime *}\right)$, and let $\boldsymbol{h}(t)=\boldsymbol{x}(t)-\boldsymbol{x}^{*}(t)$.

Then, we have $\boldsymbol{h}^{\prime}(t)=\boldsymbol{x}^{\prime}(t)-\boldsymbol{x}^{\prime *}(t)$, and thus

$$
\begin{aligned}
\int_{t_{0}}^{t_{1}}\left(F-F^{*}\right) d t & \leqq \int_{t_{0}}^{t_{1}}\left[\left(\boldsymbol{x}-\boldsymbol{x}^{*}\right) F_{\boldsymbol{x}}^{*}+\left(\boldsymbol{x}^{\prime}-\boldsymbol{x}^{* \prime}\right) F_{\boldsymbol{x}^{\prime}}^{*}\right] d t \\
& =\int_{t_{0}}^{t_{1}}\left(\boldsymbol{h} F_{\boldsymbol{x}}^{*}+\boldsymbol{h}^{\prime} F_{\boldsymbol{x}^{\prime}}^{*}\right) d t \\
& =\int_{t_{0}}^{t_{1}} \boldsymbol{h}\left(F_{\boldsymbol{x}}^{*}-d F_{\boldsymbol{x}^{\prime}}^{*} / d t\right) d t=0
\end{aligned}
$$

It can be proven (see Kamiem \& Schwartz (1991, p.43)) that the first-order condition, i.e., the Euler equation, will be met as long as $F_{x^{\prime} x^{\prime}} \leqq 0$, and thus the dynamic maximization problem is solved. Regarding dynamic minimization, the first-order condition is also a sufficient condition if the second-order condition satisfies $F_{x^{\prime} x^{\prime}} \geqq 0$.

### 2.7.2 Optimal Control

We have two types of variables in the previous example: state variable and control variable. We can also discuss the dynamic optimization problem using the analytical framework of optimal control.

The optimal control problem can be generally expressed as follows:

$$
\begin{array}{ll} 
& \max \int_{t_{0}}^{t_{1}} f[t, \boldsymbol{x}(t), \boldsymbol{u}(t)] d t \\
\text { s.t. } & \boldsymbol{x}^{\prime}(t)=g(t, \boldsymbol{x}(t), \boldsymbol{u}(t)), \\
& \boldsymbol{x}\left(t_{0}\right)=\boldsymbol{x}_{0} . \tag{2.7.17}
\end{array}
$$

In the above statement, $\boldsymbol{x}(t)$ is a state variable, $\boldsymbol{u}(t)$ is a control variable that affects the change of the state variable, and the objective (2.7.15) is a function of the state variable and the control variable.

The necessary and sufficient conditions for optimal control are given below. Analogously to the optimization problem under static constraints, the dynamic Lagrange equation is established as:

$$
\begin{equation*}
L=\int_{t_{0}}^{t_{1}}\left\{f[t, \boldsymbol{x}(t), \boldsymbol{u}(t)]+\lambda_{t}\left[g(t, \boldsymbol{x}(t), \boldsymbol{u}(t))-\boldsymbol{x}^{\prime}(t)\right]\right\} d t \tag{2.7.18}
\end{equation*}
$$

where $\lambda_{t}$ is the multiplier of the constraint on the change in state at time $t$,
commonly known as costate variable. Integrating by parts gives:
$L=\int_{t_{0}}^{t_{1}}\left\{f[t, \boldsymbol{x}(t), \boldsymbol{u}(t)]+\lambda_{t} g(t, \boldsymbol{x}(t), \boldsymbol{u}(t))+\boldsymbol{x}(t) \lambda_{t}^{\prime}\right\} d t-\lambda_{t_{1}} \boldsymbol{x}\left(t_{1}\right)+\lambda_{t_{0}} \boldsymbol{x}\left(t_{0}\right)$.

The necessary conditions for the optimal control problem can be derived by using a similar process of deducing the calculus of variation. Assuming that $\boldsymbol{u}^{*}(t)$ is the optimal control function, we introduce a new control function $\boldsymbol{u}^{*}(t)+a \boldsymbol{h}(t)$, which reduces to the original optimal control function when $a=0$. The optimal state function $\boldsymbol{x}^{*}(t)$ can be determined by giving the optimal control function $\boldsymbol{u}^{*}(t)$ and the initial state $\boldsymbol{x}\left(t_{0}\right)=\boldsymbol{x}_{0}$. Denote the state variable generated by control function $\boldsymbol{u}^{*}(t)+a \boldsymbol{h}(t)$ and initial state $\boldsymbol{x}_{0}$ as $\boldsymbol{y}(t, a)$, which satisfy: $\boldsymbol{y}(t, a)=\boldsymbol{x}^{*}(t), \boldsymbol{y}(t, 0)=\boldsymbol{x}_{0}$, and $d \boldsymbol{y}(t, a) / d t=g\left(t, \boldsymbol{y}(t, a), \boldsymbol{u}^{*}(t)+a \boldsymbol{h}(t)\right)$. Set the function:

$$
\begin{align*}
J(a)= & \int_{t_{0}}^{t_{1}} f\left[t, \boldsymbol{y}(t, a), \boldsymbol{u}^{*}(t)+a \boldsymbol{h}(t)\right] d t \\
= & \int_{t_{0}}^{t_{1}}\left\{f\left[t, \boldsymbol{y}(t, a), \boldsymbol{u}^{*}(t)+a \boldsymbol{h}(t)\right]\right. \\
& \left.+\lambda_{t}\left[g\left(t, \boldsymbol{y}(t, a), \boldsymbol{u}^{*}(t)+a \boldsymbol{h}(t)\right)+\boldsymbol{y}^{\prime}(t, a) \lambda_{t}^{\prime}\right]\right\} d t \\
& -\lambda_{t_{1}} \boldsymbol{y}\left(t_{1}, a\right)+\lambda_{t_{0}} \boldsymbol{y}\left(t_{0}, a\right) . \tag{2.7.19}
\end{align*}
$$

The derivative of the function (2.7.19) at $a=0$ is:

$$
J^{\prime}(a)=\int_{t_{0}}^{t_{1}}\left[\left(f_{\boldsymbol{x}}+\lambda g_{\boldsymbol{x}}+\lambda^{\prime}\right) \boldsymbol{y}_{a}+\left(f_{\boldsymbol{u}}+\lambda g_{\boldsymbol{u}}\right) \boldsymbol{h}\right] d t-\lambda_{t_{1}} \boldsymbol{y}^{\prime}\left(t_{1}, 0\right) .
$$

Here, $\lambda(t)$ is required to be differentiable, and the optimization needs to satisfy the following three conditions:

The first one is the first-order condition with respect to the control variable:

$$
\begin{equation*}
f_{\boldsymbol{u}}[t, \boldsymbol{x}(t), \boldsymbol{u}(t)]+\lambda g_{\boldsymbol{u}}(t, \boldsymbol{x}(t), \boldsymbol{u}(t))=0 . \tag{2.7.20}
\end{equation*}
$$

The second one is the first-order condition with respect to the costate variable:

$$
\begin{equation*}
\lambda^{\prime}(t)=-f_{\boldsymbol{x}}[t, \boldsymbol{x}(t), \boldsymbol{u}(t)]-\lambda(t) g_{\boldsymbol{x}}[t, \boldsymbol{x}(t), \boldsymbol{u}(t)], \lambda\left(t_{1}\right)=0 . \tag{2.7.21}
\end{equation*}
$$

The third one is the state function:

$$
\begin{equation*}
\boldsymbol{x}^{\prime}(t)=g(t, \boldsymbol{x}(t), \boldsymbol{u}(t)), \boldsymbol{x}\left(t_{0}\right)=\boldsymbol{x}_{0} \tag{2.7.22}
\end{equation*}
$$

The Hamilton equation for optimal control, which is similar to the Lagrange equation for constrained optimizations, is defined as:

$$
\begin{equation*}
H(t, \boldsymbol{x}(t), \boldsymbol{u}(t)) \equiv f(t, \boldsymbol{x}(t), \boldsymbol{u}(t))+\lambda(t) g(t, \boldsymbol{x}(t), \boldsymbol{u}(t)) \tag{2.7.23}
\end{equation*}
$$

We then have: 1) the optimal control condition,

$$
\begin{equation*}
\partial H / \partial \boldsymbol{u}=0: \quad \partial H / \partial \boldsymbol{u}=f_{\boldsymbol{u}}+\lambda g_{\boldsymbol{u}}=0 \tag{2.7.24}
\end{equation*}
$$

i.e., the equation (2.7.20);
2) the costate (multiplier) equation,

$$
\begin{equation*}
-\partial H / \partial \boldsymbol{x}=\lambda^{\prime}: \quad \lambda^{\prime}(t)=-\partial H / \partial \boldsymbol{x}=-\left(f_{\boldsymbol{x}}+\lambda g_{\boldsymbol{x}}\right) \tag{2.7.25}
\end{equation*}
$$

i.e., the equation (2.7.21);
3) the state equation,

$$
\begin{equation*}
\partial H / \partial \lambda=\boldsymbol{x}^{\prime}: \quad \boldsymbol{x}^{\prime}(t)=\partial H / \partial \lambda=g \tag{2.7.26}
\end{equation*}
$$

i.e., the equation (2.7.20).

Example 2.7.2 Consider Example 2.7.1 again. The problem is

$$
\begin{array}{ll} 
& \min \int_{0}^{T}\left[c_{1} u^{2}(t)+c_{2} x(t)\right] d t \\
\text { s.t. } & x^{\prime}(t)=u(t), x(0)=0, x(T)=B, x^{\prime}(t) \geqq 0 .
\end{array}
$$

It follows from the above three conditions of optimization that:

$$
2 c_{1} u(t)=-\lambda(t) ; \lambda^{\prime}(t)=-c_{2} ; x^{\prime}(t)=u(t), x(0)=0, x(T)=B
$$

and thus we have:

$$
x^{* \prime \prime}(t)=\frac{c_{2}}{2 c_{1}}, \quad t \in[0, T]
$$

$$
\begin{gathered}
x^{*}(t)=\frac{c_{2}}{4 c_{1}} t(t-T)+B t / T, \quad t \in[0, T], \\
u^{*}(t)=\frac{c_{2}}{2 c_{1}} t+k, t \in[0, T] ; \quad k=\frac{-c_{2}}{4 c_{1}} T+B / T .
\end{gathered}
$$

The second-order conditions of optimal control can be similarly derived. If the objective function and the state function $f$ and $g$ are concave with respect to $\boldsymbol{x}$ and $\boldsymbol{u}$, then the first-order necessary conditions are also the sufficient conditions, and one can refer to Kamien \& Schwartz (1991) for the proof.

### 2.7.3 Dynamic Programming

The third method of dealing with dynamic optimization is dynamic programming proposed by Richard Bellman, and its basic logic can be summarized as Bellman's principle of optimality. An optimal path satisfies the property that whatever the states and the control variables are prior to a certain time, the selection of decision function must constitute an optimal policy from now to the end with regard to the current state.

The general form of dynamic programming problems is:

$$
\begin{array}{ll} 
& \max \int_{0}^{T} f(t, \boldsymbol{x}(t), \boldsymbol{u}(t)) d t+\phi(\boldsymbol{x}(T), T) \\
\text { s.t. } & \boldsymbol{x}^{\prime}(t)=g(t, \boldsymbol{x}(t), \boldsymbol{u}(t)), \boldsymbol{x}(0)=a, \quad t \in[0, T] . \tag{2.7.28}
\end{array}
$$

Define the value function $J\left(t_{0}, \boldsymbol{x}_{0}\right)$ as the maximal value starting at time $t_{0}$ in state $\boldsymbol{x}_{0}$ :

$$
\begin{align*}
J\left(t_{0}, \boldsymbol{x}_{0}\right) & =\max _{\boldsymbol{u}} \int_{t_{0}}^{T} f(t, \boldsymbol{x}(t), \boldsymbol{u}(t)) d t+\phi(\boldsymbol{x}(T), T)  \tag{2.7.29}\\
\text { s.t. } \quad \boldsymbol{x}^{\prime}(t) & =g(t, \boldsymbol{x}(t), \boldsymbol{u}(t)), \boldsymbol{x}\left(t_{0}\right)=\boldsymbol{x}_{0}, t \in\left[t_{0}, T\right] . \quad \forall t_{0} \in[0, T] .
\end{align*}
$$

When $t_{0}=T$, the value function is $J(T, \boldsymbol{x}(T))=\phi(\boldsymbol{x}(T), T)$.
We can break up the equation (2.7.29) and obtain:

$$
\begin{equation*}
J\left(t_{0}, \boldsymbol{x}_{0}\right)=\max _{u}\left\{\int_{t_{0}}^{t_{0}+\Delta t} f d t+\int_{t_{0}+\Delta t}^{T} f d t+\phi(\boldsymbol{x}(T), T)\right\} . \tag{2.7.30}
\end{equation*}
$$

At time $t_{0}+\Delta t$, the state changes to $x_{0}+\Delta x$, and it follows from Bellman's
principle of optimality that the equation (2.7.30) is equivalent to:

$$
\begin{align*}
J\left(t_{0}, \boldsymbol{x}_{0}\right)= & \max _{\boldsymbol{u}} \int_{t_{0}}^{t_{0}+\Delta t} f d t+\max _{\boldsymbol{u}}\left(\int_{t_{0}+\Delta t}^{T} f d t+\phi(\boldsymbol{x}(T), T)\right) \\
= & \max _{\boldsymbol{u}} \int_{t_{0}}^{t_{0}+\Delta t} f d t+J\left(t_{0}+\Delta t, \boldsymbol{x}_{0}+\Delta \boldsymbol{x}\right)  \tag{2.7.31}\\
& \boldsymbol{x}^{\prime}=g, \boldsymbol{x}\left(t_{0}+\Delta t\right)=\boldsymbol{x}_{0}+\Delta \boldsymbol{x}
\end{align*}
$$

The equation (2.7.31) depicts Bellman's principle of optimality. Expanding the right side of (2.7.31) by Taylor's theorem yields:

$$
\begin{align*}
J\left(t_{0}, \boldsymbol{x}_{0}\right)= & \max _{\boldsymbol{u}}\left[f\left(t_{0}, \boldsymbol{x}_{0}, \boldsymbol{u}\right) \Delta t+J\left(t_{0}, \boldsymbol{x}_{0}\right)+J_{t}\left(t_{0}, \boldsymbol{x}_{0}\right) \Delta t\right. \\
& \left.+J_{\boldsymbol{x}}\left(t_{0}, \boldsymbol{x}_{0}\right) \Delta \boldsymbol{x}+\text { h.o.t }\right] . \tag{2.7.32}
\end{align*}
$$

Let $\Delta t \rightarrow 0$, equation (2.7.32) becomes:

$$
0=\max _{\boldsymbol{u}}\left[f(t, \boldsymbol{x}, \boldsymbol{u})+J_{t}(t, \boldsymbol{x})+J_{\boldsymbol{x}}(t, \boldsymbol{x}) \boldsymbol{x}^{\prime}\right]
$$

and then we have

$$
\begin{equation*}
-J_{t}(t, \boldsymbol{x})=\max _{\boldsymbol{u}}\left[f(t, \boldsymbol{x}, \boldsymbol{u})+J_{\boldsymbol{x}}(t, \boldsymbol{x}) g(t, \boldsymbol{x}, \boldsymbol{u})\right] \tag{2.7.33}
\end{equation*}
$$

Compared to the method of optimal control, $J_{x}(t, \boldsymbol{x})$ on the right side of (2.7.33) plays the role of the costate variable $\lambda$. We just define $\lambda(t)=$ $J_{x}(t, \boldsymbol{x})$, and thus the economic meaning behind the costate variables is the marginal contribution of states to the value function.

The derivative of (2.7.33) with respect to $\boldsymbol{x}$ gives:

$$
\begin{equation*}
-J_{t \boldsymbol{x}}\left(t, \boldsymbol{x}^{*}\right)=f_{\boldsymbol{x}}\left(t, \boldsymbol{x}^{*}, \mathbf{u}^{*}\right)+J_{\boldsymbol{x}}\left(t, \boldsymbol{x}^{*}\right) g_{\boldsymbol{x}} . \tag{2.7.34}
\end{equation*}
$$

Since

$$
\lambda^{\prime}(t)=\frac{d J_{\boldsymbol{x}}(t, \boldsymbol{x})}{d t}=J_{t x}+J_{x x} g
$$

together with (2.7.34), we obtain:

$$
\begin{equation*}
-\lambda^{\prime}(t)=f_{x}+\lambda g_{x} \tag{2.7.35}
\end{equation*}
$$

The equation (2.7.35) is just the first-order condition for optimal control with respect to the state variable:

$$
-\partial H / \partial \boldsymbol{x}=\lambda^{\prime} .
$$

The derivative of the right side of (2.7.33) with respect to $u$ gives:

$$
f_{\mathrm{u}}+J_{x} g_{u}=0,
$$

and this is the first-order condition for optimal control with respect to control variables:

$$
\frac{\partial H}{\partial \boldsymbol{u}}=f_{u}+\lambda g_{u}=0 .
$$

Then, optimal control and dynamic programming are essentially consistent.

In the discrete case, the method of dynamic programming may be more convenient. The following results are given only for an infinite time horizon.

Suppose that the state set $S \subseteq \mathcal{R}^{n}$ is a nonempty and compact set, and $U: S \times S \rightarrow \mathcal{R}$ is a bounded continuous function, which generally represents the utility function in a period. Given the initial state $s_{0}=\boldsymbol{z}$, the general dynamic optimization problem is:

$$
\begin{array}{ll} 
& \max _{\left\{s_{t}\right\}} \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \delta^{t} U\left(\boldsymbol{s}_{t}, \boldsymbol{s}_{t+1}\right) \\
\text { s.t. } \quad \boldsymbol{s}_{t} \in S, \quad \forall t, \\
& \boldsymbol{s}_{0}=\boldsymbol{z} . \tag{2.7.37}
\end{array}
$$

It can be proven by using the contraction mapping theorem that there is a sequence of maximum points in the problem (2.7.36), and thus there exists a maximum value denoted by $V(z)$. Function $V: S \rightarrow \mathcal{R}$ is called the value function of problem (2.7.36). Like function $U(\cdot, \cdot)$, the value function is also continuous. In addition, if $S$ is a convex set and $U(\cdot, \cdot)$ is concave, then $V(\cdot)$ is also concave, and it is equivalent to Bellman's principle of optimality, i.e.,
it is the solution to the following Bellman equation:

$$
V(s)=\max _{\hat{s} \in S} U(s, \hat{s})+\delta V(\hat{\boldsymbol{s}}) .
$$

The equivalence results provide the basis for solving the dynamic optimization problem by the Bellman method. The following theorem reveals that the value function is the only function satisfying the Bellman equation.

Theorem 2.7.1

$$
\begin{equation*}
f(\boldsymbol{s})=\max _{\hat{s} \in S} U(\boldsymbol{s}, \hat{\boldsymbol{s}})+\delta V(\hat{\boldsymbol{s}}) \tag{2.7.38}
\end{equation*}
$$

i.e., $f(\cdot)=V(\cdot)$.

Proof. Using (2.7.38) repeatedly gives: for each $T$,

$$
\begin{aligned}
f(\boldsymbol{z})= & \max _{\left\{s_{t}\right\}_{t=0}^{T}} \sum_{t=0}^{T-1} \delta^{t} U\left(s_{t}, s_{t+1}\right)+\delta^{T} f\left(\boldsymbol{x}_{T}\right) \\
\text { s.t. } & \boldsymbol{s}_{t} \in S, \quad \forall t, \\
& \boldsymbol{s}_{0}=\boldsymbol{z}
\end{aligned}
$$

When $T \rightarrow \infty$, the contribution of $\delta^{T} f\left(\boldsymbol{x}_{T}\right)$ to the above summation is increasingly negligible, and thus $f(\cdot)=V(\cdot)$.

The above theorem provides a way to calculate the value function. Starting from any continuous function $f_{0}(\cdot): S \rightarrow \mathcal{R}$, one can imagine $f_{0}(\hat{s})$ as a trial "value" function which gives the estimated value from time 0 . Then, let

$$
f_{1}(\boldsymbol{s})=\max _{\hat{s} \in S} U(s, \hat{\boldsymbol{s}})+\delta f_{0}(\hat{\boldsymbol{s}})
$$

holds for any $s \in S$, and thus we obtain a new value function $f_{1}(\hat{s})$.
Value function $V(\cdot)$ can be also found by the iterative method. If $f_{1}(t)=$ $f_{0}(t)$, then $f_{0}(t)$ satisfies the Bellman equation. It follows from the above theorem that $f_{0}(t)=V(t)$. If $f_{1}(t) \neq f_{0}(t)$, we obtain a new value function from $f_{1}(t)$, and also obtain the whole sequence of functions $\left\{f_{r}(\cdot)\right\}_{r=0}^{\infty}$. Then, it can be shown that

$$
\lim _{r \rightarrow \infty} f_{r}(s)=V(s)
$$

i.e., it will converge to the value function as $r$ increases to infinity.

If the function is differentiable, there is a similar first-order condition called the Euler equation of dynamic optimization:

$$
\begin{equation*}
0=\frac{\partial U\left(s_{t}^{*}, s_{t+1}^{*}\right)}{\partial s_{t+1}}+\delta \frac{\partial U\left(s_{t+1}^{*}, s_{t+2}^{*}\right)}{\partial s_{t+1}}, \quad t=0,1,2, \cdots . \tag{2.7.39}
\end{equation*}
$$

The first-order condition of optimal decision gives:

$$
\begin{equation*}
0=\frac{\partial U[\boldsymbol{x}, g(\boldsymbol{x})]}{\partial g}+\delta V^{\prime}[g(\boldsymbol{x})], \tag{2.7.40}
\end{equation*}
$$

where $g(\boldsymbol{x})$ is the state of the next periods determined by $\boldsymbol{x}$ following Bellman's principle of optimality. It follows from the envelope theorem that

$$
\begin{equation*}
V^{\prime}(\boldsymbol{x})=U_{\boldsymbol{x}}[\boldsymbol{x}, g(\boldsymbol{x})] . \tag{2.7.41}
\end{equation*}
$$

The Euler equation is derived from these two equations above.

### 2.8 Differential Equations

We first provide the general concept of ordinary differential equations defined on Euclidean spaces.

Definition 2.8.1 An equation,

$$
\begin{equation*}
F\left(x, y, y^{\prime}, \cdots, y^{(n)}\right)=0, \tag{2.8.42}
\end{equation*}
$$

which constitutes independent variable $x$, unknown function $y=y(x)$ of the independent variable, and its first derivative $y^{\prime}=y^{\prime}(x)$ to the $n$th order derivative $y^{(n)}=y^{(n)}(x)$, is called an ordinary differential equation.

If the highest order derivative in the equation is $n$, the equation is also called the $\boldsymbol{n}$ th-order ordinary differential equation.

If for all $x \in I$, the function $y=\psi(x)$ satisfies

$$
F\left(x, \psi(x), \psi^{\prime}(x), \cdots, \psi^{(n)}(x)\right)=0
$$

then $y=\psi(x)$ is called a solution to the ordinary differential equation (2.8.42).

Sometimes, the solutions of ordinary differential equations are not u nique, and even infinite solutions may exist. For example, $y=\frac{C}{x}+\frac{1}{5} x^{4}$ is the solution of the ordinary differential equation $\frac{d y}{d x}+\frac{y}{x}=x^{3}$, where $C$ is an arbitrary constant. Next, we introduce the concept of general solutions and particular solutions of ordinary differential equations.

Definition 2.8.2 The solution of the $n$ th-order ordinary differential equation (2.8.42)

$$
\begin{equation*}
y=\psi\left(x, C_{1}, \cdots, C_{n}\right) \tag{2.8.43}
\end{equation*}
$$

which contains $n$ independent arbitrary constants, $C_{1}, \cdots, C_{n}$, is called the general solution to ordinary differential equation (2.8.42). Here, independence means that the Jacobi determinant

$$
\frac{D\left[\psi, \psi^{(1)}, \cdots, \psi^{(n-1)}\right]}{D\left[C_{1}, \cdots, C_{n}\right]} \stackrel{\text { def }}{=}\left|\begin{array}{cccc}
\frac{\partial \psi}{\partial C_{1}} & \frac{\partial \psi}{\partial C_{2}} & \cdots & \frac{\partial \psi}{\partial C_{n}} \\
\frac{\partial \psi^{(1)}}{\partial C_{1}} & \frac{\partial \psi^{(1)}}{\partial C_{2}} & \cdots & \frac{\partial \psi^{(1)}}{\partial C_{n}} \\
\vdots & \vdots & \vdots & \vdots \\
\frac{\partial \psi^{(n-1)}}{\partial C_{1}} & \frac{\partial \psi^{(n-1)}}{\partial C_{2}} & \cdots & \frac{\partial \psi^{(n-1)}}{\partial C_{n}}
\end{array}\right|
$$

is not identically equal to 0 .
If a solution of an ordinary differential equation, denoted $y=\psi(x)$, does not contain any constant, it is called a particular solution. Obviously, a general solution becomes a particular solution when the arbitrary constants are determined. In general, the restrictions of some initial conditions determine the value of any constants. For example, for ordinary differential equation (2.8.42), if there are some given initial conditions:

$$
\begin{equation*}
y\left(x_{0}\right)=y_{0}, y^{(1)}\left(x_{0}\right)=y_{0}^{(1)}, \cdots, y^{(n-1)}\left(x_{0}\right)=y_{0}^{(n-1)} \tag{2.8.44}
\end{equation*}
$$

then the ordinary differential equation (2.8.42) and the initial value conditions (2.8.44) are said to be the Cauchy problem or initial value problem for
$n$ th-order ordinary differential equations. Then, the pertinent question is what conditions the function $F$ should satisfy so that the above ordinary differential equations are uniquely solvable. This problem is the existence and uniqueness of solutions for ordinary differential equations.

### 2.8.1 Existence and Uniqueness Theorem of Solutions for Ordinary Differential Equations

We first consider an ordinary differential equation of first-order $y^{\prime}=f(x, y)$ that satisfies initial condition $\left(x_{0}, y_{0}\right)$, i.e., $y\left(x_{0}\right)=y_{0}$. Let $y(x)$ be a solution to the differential equation.

Definition 2.8.3 Let a function $f(x, y)$ be defined on $D \subseteq \mathcal{R}^{2}$. We say that $f$ satisfies the local Lipschitz condition with respect to $y$ at the point $\left(x_{0}, y_{0}\right) \in$ $D$, if there exists a neighborhood $U \subseteq D$ of $\left(x_{0}, y_{0}\right)$, and a positive number $L$, such that

$$
|f(x, y)-f(x, z)| \leqq L|y-z|, \forall(x, y),(x, z) \in U .
$$

If there is a positive number $L$, such that

$$
|f(x, y)-f(x, z)| \leqq L|y-z|, \forall(x, y),(x, z) \in D,
$$

we say that $f(x, y)$ satisfies global Lipschitz condition with respect to $y$ in $D \subseteq \mathcal{R}^{2}$.

The following lemma characterizes the properties of the function satisfying the Lipschitz condition.

Lemma 2.8.1 Suppose that $f(x, y)$ defined on $D \subseteq \mathcal{R}^{2}$ is continuously differentiable. If there is an $\epsilon>0$, such that $f_{y}(x, y)$ is bounded on $U=\{(x, y)$ : $\left.\left|x-x_{0}\right|<\epsilon,\left|y-y_{0}\right|<\epsilon\right\}$, then $f(x, y)$ satisfies the local Lipschitz condition with respect to $y$. If $f_{y}(x, y)$ is bounded on $D$, then $f(x, y)$ satisfies the global Lipschitz condition with respect to $y$.

Theorem 2.8.1 If $f$ is continuous on an open set $D$, then for any $\left(x_{0}, y_{0}\right) \in D$, there always exists a solution $y(x)$ of the differential equation, and it satisfies $y^{\prime}=$ $f(x, y)$ and $y\left(x_{0}\right)=y_{0}$.

The following is the theorem on the uniqueness of the solution for differential equations.

Theorem 2.8.2 Suppose that $f$ is continuous on an open set $D$, and satisfies the global Lipschitz condition with respect to $y$. Then, for any $\left(x_{0}, y_{0}\right) \in D$, there always exists a unique solution $y(x)$ satisfying $y^{\prime}=f(x, y)$ and $y\left(x_{0}\right)=y_{0}$.

For $n$th order ordinary differential equations, $y^{(n)}=f\left(x, y, y^{\prime}, \cdots, y^{(n-1)}\right)$, if the Lipschitz condition is changed to for $y, y^{\prime}, \cdots, y^{(n-1)}$ instead of for $y$, we have similar conclusions about the existence and uniqueness of solution. See Ahmad and Ambrosetti (2014) for the specific proof of existence and uniqueness.

### 2.8.2 Some Common Ordinary Differential Equations with Explicit Solutions

Generally, we aim to obtain the concrete form of solutions, i.e., explicit solutions, for differential equations. However, in many cases, there is no explicit solution. Here, we present some common cases in which differential equations can be solved explicitly.

## Case of Separable Equations

Consider a separable differential equation $y^{\prime}=f(x) g(y)$, and $y\left(x_{0}\right)=y_{0}$. It can be rewritten as:

$$
\frac{d y}{g(y)}=f(x) d x
$$

Integrating both sides, we then obtain the solution to the differential equation.

For example, for $\left(x^{2}+1\right) y^{\prime}+2 x y^{2}=0, y(0)=1$, using the above solving procedure, we obtain the solution as

$$
y(x)=\frac{1}{\ln \left(x^{2}+1\right)+1} .
$$

In addition, the differential equation with the form $y^{\prime}=f(y)$ is called an autonomous system, since $y^{\prime}$ is only determined by $y$.

## Homogeneous Type of Differential Equation

Some differential equations with constant coefficients have explicit solutions.

Definition 2.8.4 We call function $f(x, y)$ a homogeneous function of degree $\boldsymbol{n}$ if for any $\lambda, f(\lambda x, \lambda y)=\lambda^{n} f(x, y)$.

Differential equations have the form of homogeneous functions if $M(x, y) d x+$ $N(x, y) d y=0$, where $M(x, y)$ and $N(x, y)$ are homogeneous functions with the same order.

By variable transformation $z=\frac{y}{x}$, the above differential equations can be transformed into separable form. Suppose that $M(x, y)$ and $N(x, y)$ are homogeneous functions of degree $n$, and $M(x, y) d x+N(x, y) d y=$ 0 is transformed to $z+x \frac{d z}{d x}=-\frac{M(1, z)}{N(1, z)}$, then the final form is $\frac{d z}{d x}=$ $-\frac{z+\frac{M(1, z)}{N(1, z)}}{x}$, where $z+\frac{M(1, z)}{N(1, z)}$ is a function of $z$.

## Exact Differential Equation

Given a simply connected and open subset $D \subseteq \mathcal{R}^{2}$ and two functions $M$ and $N$, which are continuous and satisfy $\frac{\partial M(x, y)}{\partial y} \equiv \frac{\partial N(x, y)}{\partial x}$ on $D$, then the implicit first-order ordinary differential equation of the form

$$
M(x, y) d x+N(x, y) d y=0
$$

is called the exact differential equation or the total differential equation. The nomenclature of "exact differential equation" refers to the exact derivative of a function. Indeed, when $\frac{\partial M(x, y)}{\partial y} \equiv \frac{\partial N(x, y)}{\partial x}$, the solution is $F(x, y)=C$, where the constant $C$ is determined by the initial value, and $F(x, y)$ satisfies $\frac{\partial F}{\partial x}=M(x, y)$ or $\frac{\partial F}{\partial y}=N(x, y)$.

It is clear that a separable differential equation is a special case of an exact differential equation $y^{\prime}=f(x) g(y)$ or $\frac{1}{g(y)} d y-f(x) d x=0$, and then we have $M(x, y)=-f(x), N(x, y)=\frac{1}{g(y)}$, and $\frac{\partial M(x, y)}{\partial y}=\frac{\partial N(x, y)}{\partial x}=0$.

For example, $2 x y^{3} d x+3 x^{2} y^{2} d y=0$ is an exact differential equation, of which the general solution is $x^{2} y^{3}=C$, and $C$ is a constant.

When solving differential equations with explicit solutions, we usually convert differential equations into the form of exact differential equations.

## First-Order Differential Linear Equation

Consider the first-order linear differential equation of the following form:

$$
\begin{equation*}
\frac{d y}{d x}+p(x) y=q(x) \tag{2.8.45}
\end{equation*}
$$

When $q(x)=0$, the above differential equation (2.8.45) is a separable differential equation, and its solution is assumed to be $y=\psi(x)$.

Suppose that $\psi_{1}(x)$ is a particular solution of the differential equation (2.8.45). Then, $y=\psi(x)+\psi_{1}(x)$ is clearly also the solution of the equations (2.8.45).

It is easy to show that the solution to $\frac{d y}{d x}+p(x) y=0$ is $y=C e^{-\int p(x) d x}$. Next, we find the general solution to the differential equation (2.8.45).

Suppose that

$$
y=c(x) e^{-\int p(x) d x}
$$

and differentiating this gives

$$
y^{\prime}=c^{\prime}(x) e^{-\int p(x) d x}+c(x) p(x) e^{-\int p(x) d x}
$$

then substituting this back into the original differential equation, we have

$$
c^{\prime}(x) e^{-\int p(x) d x}+c(x) p(x) e^{-\int p(x) d x}=p(x) c(x) e^{-\int p(x) d x}+q(x),
$$

and thus

$$
c^{\prime}(x)=q(x) e^{\int p(x) d x} .
$$

We have

$$
c(x)=\int q(x) e^{\int p(x) d x} d x+C .
$$

## 214CHAPTER 2. PRELIMINARY KNOWLEDGE AND METHODS OF MATHEMATICS

Therefore, the general solution is

$$
y(x)=e^{-\int p(x) d x}\left(\int q(x) e^{\int p(x) d x} d x+C\right) .
$$

## Bernoulli Equation

The following differential equation is called the Bernoulli equation:

$$
\begin{equation*}
\frac{d y}{d x}+p(x) y=q(x) y^{n} \tag{2.8.46}
\end{equation*}
$$

where $n$ (with $n \neq 0,1$ ) is a natural number.
Multiplying both sides by $(1-n) y^{(-n)}$ gives:

$$
(1-n) y^{(-n)} \frac{d y}{d x}+(1-n) y^{(1-n)} p(x)=(1-n) q(x) .
$$

Let $z=y^{(1-n)}$, and get:

$$
\frac{d z}{d x}+(1-n) z p(x)=(1-n) q(x)
$$

which becomes a first-order linear differential equation whose explicit solution can be obtained.

Differential equations with explicit solutions have other forms, such as some special forms of Ricatti equations, and equations similar to $M(x, y) d x+$ $N(x, y) d y=0$, but not satisfying

$$
\frac{\partial M(x, y)}{\partial y} \equiv \frac{\partial N(x, y)}{\partial x} .
$$

### 2.8.3 Higher Order Linear Equations with Constant Coefficients

Consider a differential equation of degree $n$ with constant coefficients

$$
\begin{equation*}
y^{(n)}+a_{1} y^{(n-1)}+\cdots+a_{n-1} y^{\prime}+a_{n} y=f(x) . \tag{2.8.47}
\end{equation*}
$$

If $f(x) \equiv 0$, then the differential equation (2.8.47) is called the constant coefficient homogeneous differential equation of degree $\boldsymbol{n}$; otherwise, it is called the constant coefficients nonhomogeneous differential equation.

There is a method for finding the general solution $y_{g}(x)$ of a constant coefficient homogeneous differential equation of degree $n$. The general solution is the sum of $n$ bases of solutions $y_{1}, \cdots, y_{n}$, i.e., $y_{g}(x)=C_{1} y_{1}(x)+$ $\cdots+C_{n} y_{n}(x)$, where $C_{1}, \cdots, C_{n}$ are arbitrary constants. These arbitrary constants are uniquely determined by initial-value conditions. Find a function $y(x)$ satisfying

$$
y(x)=y_{0_{0}}, y^{\prime}(x)=y_{0_{1}}, \cdots, y^{(n-1)}(x)=y_{0_{n-1}}, \text { when } x=x_{0},
$$

where $x_{0}, y_{0_{0}}, y_{0_{1}}, \cdots, y_{0_{n-1}}$ are given initial values.
The procedures for solving the fundamental solution of homogeneous differential equations are given below:
(1) Solve the characteristic equation with respect to $\lambda$ :

$$
\lambda^{n}+a_{1} \lambda^{n-1}+\cdots+a_{n-1} \lambda+a_{n}=0 .
$$

Suppose that the roots of the characteristic equation are $\lambda_{1}, \cdots, \lambda_{n}$. Some roots may be complex, and some are multiple.
(2) If $\lambda_{i}$ is the non-multiple real characteristic root, then the fundamental solution corresponding to this root is $y_{i}(x)=e^{\lambda_{i} x}$.
(3) If $\lambda_{i}$ is the real characteristic root of multiplicity $k$, then there are $k$ fundamental solutions:

$$
y_{i_{1}}(x)=e^{\lambda_{i} x}, y_{i_{2}}(x)=x e^{\lambda_{i} x}, \cdots, y_{i_{k}}(x)=x^{k-1} e^{\lambda_{i} x} .
$$

(4) If $\lambda_{j}$ is the non-multiple complex characteristic root, $\lambda_{j}=\alpha_{j}+$ $i \beta_{j}, i=\sqrt{-1}$, its complex conjugate denoted by $\lambda_{j+1}=\alpha_{j}-i \beta_{j}$ is also the characteristic root, and thus there are two fundamental solutions generated by these complex conjugate roots $\lambda_{j}, \lambda_{j+1}$ :

$$
y_{j_{1}}=e^{\alpha_{j} x} \cos \beta_{j} x, \quad y_{j_{2}}=e^{\alpha_{j} x} \sin \beta_{j} x .
$$

(5) If $\lambda_{j}$ is the complex characteristic root of multiplicity $l, \lambda_{j}=\alpha_{j}+i \beta_{j}$, its complex conjugate is also the complex characteristic root of multiplicity
$l$, and thus these $2 l$ complex roots generate $2 l$ fundamental solutions:

$$
\begin{gathered}
y_{j_{1}}=e^{\alpha_{j} x} \cos \beta_{j} x, y_{j_{2}}=x e^{\alpha_{j} x} \cos \beta_{j} x, \cdots, y_{j_{l}}=x^{l-1} e^{\alpha_{j} x} \cos \beta_{j} x \\
y_{j_{l+1}}=e^{\alpha_{j} x} \sin \beta_{j} x, y_{j_{l+2}}=x e^{\alpha_{j} x} \sin \beta_{j} x, \cdots, y_{j_{2 l}}=x^{l-1} e^{\alpha_{j} x} \sin \beta_{j} x .
\end{gathered}
$$

The following is a general method for solving nonhomogeneous differential equations.

The general form of solution to nonhomogeneous differential equations is $y_{n h}(x)=y_{g}(x)+y_{p}(x)$, where $y_{g}(x)$ is the corresponding general solution of the homogeneous equation, and $y_{p}(x)$ is the particular solution of the nonhomogeneous equation.

Next, we will provide some procedures for solving for particular solutions of nonhomogeneous equations.
(1) If $f(x)=P_{k}(x) e^{b x}$, and $P_{k}(x)$ is the polynomial of degree $k$, then the form of particular solutions is:

$$
y_{p}(x)=x^{s} Q_{k}(x) e^{b x},
$$

where $Q_{k}(x)$ is also a polynomial of degree $k$. If $b$ is not a characteristic root corresponding to the characteristic equation, then $s=0$; if $b$ is a characteristic root of multiplicity $m$, then $s=m$.
(2) If $f(x)=P_{k}(x) e^{p x} \cos q x+Q_{k}(x) e^{p x} \sin q x$, and $P_{k}(x)$ and $Q_{k}(x)$ are all polynomials of degree $k$, then the form of particular solutions is:

$$
y_{p}(x)=x^{s} R_{k}(x) e^{p x} \cos q x+x^{s} T_{k}(x) e^{p x} \sin q x,
$$

where $R_{k}(x)$ and $T_{k}(x)$ are also polynomials of degree $k$. If $p+i q$ is not a root of the characteristic equation, then $s=0$; if $p+i q$ is a characteristic root of multiplicity $m$, then $s=m$.
(3) A general method for solving nonhomogeneous differential equations is called the the variation of parameters or the method of undeterminedcoefficients.

Suppose that the general solution of a homogeneous equation is given
as follows:

$$
y_{g}=C_{1} y_{1}(x)+\cdots+C_{n} y_{n}(x),
$$

where $y_{i}(x)$ is the fundamental solution. Regard constants $C_{1}, \cdots, C_{n}$ as the functions with respect to $x$, such as $u_{1}(x), \cdots, u_{n}(x)$. Therefore, the form of particular solutions to the nonhomogeneous equation can be expressed as

$$
y_{p}(x)=u_{1}(x) y_{1}(x)+\cdots+u_{n}(x) y_{n}(x)
$$

where $u_{1}(x), \cdots, u_{n}(x)$ are the solutions of the following equations

$$
\begin{gathered}
u_{1}^{\prime}(x) y_{1}(x)+\cdots+u_{n}^{\prime}(x) y_{n}(x)=0, \\
u_{1}^{\prime}(x) y_{1}^{\prime}(x)+\cdots+u_{n}^{\prime}(x) y_{n}^{\prime}(x)=0, \\
\vdots \\
u_{1}^{\prime}(x) y_{1}^{(n-2)}(x)+\cdots+u_{n}^{\prime}(x) y_{n}^{(n-2)}(x)=0, \\
u_{1}^{\prime}(x) y_{1}^{(n-1)}(x)+\cdots+u_{n}^{\prime}(x) y_{n}^{(n-1)}(x)=f(x) .
\end{gathered}
$$

(4) If $f(x)=f_{1}(x)+f_{2}(x)+\cdots+f_{r}(x)$, and $y_{p 1}(x), \cdots, y_{p r}(x)$ are the particular solutions corresponding to $f_{1}(x), \cdots, f_{r}(x)$, then

$$
y_{p}(x)=y_{p 1}(x)+\cdots+y_{p r}(x) .
$$

Here, we provide an example to familiarize the application of this method.

Example 2.8.1 Solve $y^{\prime \prime}-5 y^{\prime}+6 y=t^{2}+e^{t}-5$.
The characteristic roots are $\lambda_{1}=2$ and $\lambda_{2}=3$. The general solution of the homogeneous equation is thus:

$$
y(t)=C_{1} e^{2 t}+C_{2} e^{3 t} .
$$

Next, to find a particular solution of the nonhomogeneous equation, its form is written as:

$$
y_{p}(t)=a t^{2}+b t+c+d e^{t} .
$$

We first substitute this particular solution in the initial equation to determine the coefficients $a, b, c, d$ :

$$
2 a+d e^{t}-5\left(2 a t+b+d e^{t}\right)+6\left(a t^{2}+b t+c+d e^{t}\right)=t^{2}-5+e^{t} .
$$

The coefficients of both sides should be consistent, and thus we obtain:

$$
6 a=1, \quad-5 \times 2 a+6 b=0, \quad 2 a-5 b+6 c=-5, \quad d-5 d+6 d=1,
$$

Therefore, $d=1 / 2, \quad a=1 / 6, \quad b=5 / 18$, and $\quad c=-71 / 108$.
Finally, the general solution of the nonhomogeneous differential equation is:

$$
y(t)=C_{1} e^{2 t}+C_{2} e^{3 t}+\frac{t^{2}}{6}+\frac{5 t}{18}-\frac{71}{108}+\frac{e^{t}}{2}
$$

### 2.8.4 System of Ordinary Differential Equations

The general form is:

$$
\dot{\boldsymbol{x}}(t)=A(t) \boldsymbol{x}(t)+\boldsymbol{b}(t), \quad \boldsymbol{x}(0)=\boldsymbol{x}_{0},
$$

where $t$ (time) is an independent variable, $\boldsymbol{x}(t)=\left(x_{1}(t), \cdots, x_{n}(t)\right)^{\prime}$ is a vector of dependent variables, $A(t)=\left(a_{i j}(t)\right)_{[n \times n]}$ is an $n \times n$ matrix of real varying coefficients, and $\boldsymbol{b}(t)=\left(b_{1}(t), \cdots, b_{n}(t)\right)^{\prime}$ is an $n$-dimensional varying vector.

Consider the case that $A$ is a constant coefficient matrix and $\boldsymbol{b}$ is a constant vector, also called the system of differential equations with constant coefficients:

$$
\begin{equation*}
\dot{\boldsymbol{x}}(t)=A \boldsymbol{x}(t)+\boldsymbol{b}, \quad \boldsymbol{x}(0)=\boldsymbol{x}_{0}, \tag{2.8.48}
\end{equation*}
$$

where $A$ is assumed to be nonsingular.
The system of differential equations (2.8.48) can be solved by the following two steps.

Step 1: consider the system of homogeneous equations (i.e., $\boldsymbol{b}=0$ ):

$$
\begin{equation*}
\dot{\boldsymbol{x}}(t)=A \boldsymbol{x}(t), \quad \boldsymbol{x}(0)=\boldsymbol{x}_{0} . \tag{2.8.49}
\end{equation*}
$$

Its solution is denoted by $\boldsymbol{x}_{c}(t)$.
Step 2: find a particular solution $x_{p}$ to the nonhomogeneous equation (2.8.48). The constant vector $\boldsymbol{x}_{p}$ is a particular solution so that $A \boldsymbol{x}_{p}=-\boldsymbol{b}$, i.e., $\boldsymbol{x}_{p}=-A^{-1} \boldsymbol{b}$.

Given the general solution of the homogeneous equation and the particular solution to the nonhomogeneous equation, the general solution of the system of differential equations (2.8.49) is:

$$
\boldsymbol{x}(t)=\boldsymbol{x}_{c}(t)+\boldsymbol{x}_{p} .
$$

There are two methods for solving the system of homogeneous differential equations (2.8.49).

The first one is that we can eliminate $n-1$ dependent variables, and thus the system of differential equations becomes the differential equation of order $n$, such as the following example.

Example 2.8.2 The system of differential equation is:

$$
\left\{\begin{array}{l}
\dot{x}=2 x+y, \\
\dot{y}=3 x+4 y .
\end{array}\right.
$$

We differentiate the first equation to eliminate $y$ and $\dot{y}$. Since $\dot{y}=3 x+$ $4 y=3 x+4 \dot{x}-4 \cdot 2 x$, we obtain the corresponding quadratic homogeneous differential equation:

$$
\ddot{x}-6 \dot{x}+5 x=0,
$$

thus the general solution is $x(t)=C_{1} e^{t}+C_{2} e^{5 t}$. Since $y(t)=\dot{x}-2 x, y(t)=$ $-C_{1} e^{t}+3 C_{2} e^{5 t}$.

The second method is to rewrite the homogeneous differential equation (2.8.49) as:

$$
\boldsymbol{x}(t)=e^{A t} \boldsymbol{x}_{0},
$$

where

$$
e^{A t}=I+A t+\frac{A^{2} t^{2}}{2!}+\cdots .
$$

Now, we solve $e^{A t}$ in three different cases.

## Case 1: $A$ has different real eigenvalues

Matrix $A$ has different real eigenvalues, which means that its eigenvectors are linearly independent. Therefore, $A$ can be diagonalized, namely,

$$
A=P \Lambda P^{-1}
$$

where $P=\left[v_{1}, v_{2}, \cdots, v_{n}\right]$ consists of the eigenvectors of $A$, and $\Lambda$ is a diagonal matrix whose diagonal elements are the eigenvalues of $A$, and thus we have

$$
e^{A}=P e^{\Lambda} P^{-1}
$$

Therefore, the solution to the system of differential equation (2.8.49) is:

$$
\begin{aligned}
\boldsymbol{x}(t) & =P e^{\Lambda t} P^{-1} \boldsymbol{x}_{0} \\
& =P e^{\Lambda t} \boldsymbol{c} \\
& =c_{1} v_{1} e^{\lambda_{1} t}+\cdots+c_{n} v_{n} e^{\lambda_{n} t},
\end{aligned}
$$

where $\boldsymbol{c}=\left(c_{1}, c_{2}, \cdots, c_{n}\right)$ is a vector of arbitrary constants, and it is determined by the initial value, i.e., $c=P^{-1} \boldsymbol{x}_{0}$.

## Case 2: $A$ has multiple real eigenvalues, but no complex eigenvalues

First, consider a simple case in which $A$ has only one eigenvalue of multiplicity $m$. In this case, there are at most $m$ linearly independent eigenvectors, which means that the matrix $P$ cannot be constructed as a matrix consisting of linearly independent eigenvectors, and thus $A$ can not be diagonalized.

Therefore, the solution has the following form:

$$
\boldsymbol{x}(t)=\sum_{i=1}^{m} c_{i} h_{i}(t),
$$

where $h_{i}(t), \forall i$, are quasi-polinomials, and $c_{i}, \forall i$, are determined by initial
conditions. For example, when $m=3$, we have:

$$
\begin{aligned}
& h_{1}(t)=e^{\lambda t} v_{1}, \\
& h_{2}(t)=e^{\lambda t}\left(t v_{1}+v_{2}\right), \\
& h_{3}(t)=e^{\lambda t}\left(t^{2} v_{1}+2 t v_{2}+3 v_{3}\right),
\end{aligned}
$$

where $v_{1}, v_{2}, v_{3}$ are determined by the following conditions:

$$
(A-\lambda I) v_{i}=v_{i-1}, v_{0}=0 .
$$

If $A$ has more than one multiple real eigenvalues, then the solution of the differential equation (2.8.49) can be obtained by summing up the solutions corresponding to each eigenvalue.

## Case 3: $A$ has complex eigenvalues

Since $A$ is a real matrix, complex eigenvalues will be generated in the form of conjugate pairs.

If an eigenvalue of $A$ is $\alpha+\beta i$, then its conjugate complex $\alpha-\beta i$ is also an eigenvalue.

Now, consider a simple case: $A$ has only one pair of complex eigenvalues, $\lambda_{1}=\alpha+\beta i$ and $\lambda_{2}=\alpha-\beta i$.

Let $\mathbf{v}_{1}$ and $\mathbf{v}_{2}$ be the eigenvectors corresponding to $\lambda_{1}$ and $\lambda_{2}$. Then, we have $\mathbf{v}_{2}=\bar{v}_{1}$, where $\bar{v}_{1}$ refers to the conjugation of $\mathbf{v}_{1}$. The solution of the differential equation (2.8.49) can be expressed as:

$$
\begin{aligned}
\boldsymbol{x}(t) & =e^{A t} \boldsymbol{x}_{0} \\
& =P e^{\Lambda t} P^{-1} \boldsymbol{x}_{0} \\
& =P e^{\Lambda t} \boldsymbol{c} \\
& =c_{1} v_{1} e^{(\alpha+\beta i) t}+c_{2} v_{2} e^{(\alpha-\beta i) t} \\
& =c_{1} v_{1} e^{\alpha t}(\cos \beta t+i \sin \beta t)+c_{2} v_{2} e^{\alpha t}(\cos \beta t-i \sin \beta t) \\
& =\left(c_{1} v_{1}+c_{2} v_{2}\right) e^{\alpha t} \cos \beta t+i\left(c_{1} v_{1}-c_{2} v_{2}\right) e^{\alpha t} \sin \beta t \\
& =h_{1} e^{\alpha t} \cos \beta t+h_{2} e^{\alpha t} \sin \beta t,
\end{aligned}
$$

where $h_{1}=c_{1} v_{1}+c_{2} v_{2}$ and $h_{2}=i\left(c_{1} v_{1}-c_{2} v_{2}\right)$.
If $A$ has many pairs of conjugate complex eigenvalues, then the solution of the differential equation (2.8.49) is obtained by summing up the solutions corresponding to all eigenvalues.

### 2.8.5 Stability of Simultaneous Differential Equations

Consider the following simultaneous differential equations system:

$$
\begin{equation*}
\dot{\boldsymbol{x}}=f(t, \boldsymbol{x}), \tag{2.8.50}
\end{equation*}
$$

where $t$ (time) is an independent variable, $\boldsymbol{x}=\left(x_{1}, \cdots, x_{n}\right)$ are dependent variables, and $f(t, \boldsymbol{x})$ is continuously differentiable with respect to $\boldsymbol{x} \in \mathcal{R}^{n}$ and satisfies the initial condition $\boldsymbol{x}(0)=\boldsymbol{x}_{0}$. Such simultaneous differential equations are called the planar dynamic systems. If $f\left(t, \boldsymbol{x}^{*}\right)=0$, the point $x^{*}$ is called the stationary point of the above dynamical system.

Definition 2.8.5 A simultaneous differential equation system $\mathbf{x}^{*}$ is locally stable if there is $\delta>0$ and a unique path of $\mathbf{x}=\phi\left(t, \mathbf{x}_{0}\right)$, such that $\lim _{t \rightarrow \infty} \phi\left(t, \mathbf{x}_{0}\right)=\mathbf{x}^{*}$ whenever $\left|\mathbf{x}^{*}-\mathbf{x}_{0}\right|<\delta$.

Consider the case of a simultaneous differential equations system with two variables $x=x(t)$ and $y=y(t)$ :

$$
\left\{\begin{array}{l}
\frac{d x}{d t}=f(x, y) \\
\frac{d y}{d t}=g(x, y)
\end{array}\right.
$$

Let $\mathcal{J}$ be the Jacobian

$$
\mathcal{J}=\left(\begin{array}{ll}
\frac{\partial f}{\partial x} & \frac{\partial f}{\partial y} \\
\frac{\partial g}{\partial x} & \frac{\partial g}{\partial y}
\end{array}\right)
$$

evaluated at $\left(x^{*}, y^{*}\right)$, and $\lambda_{1}$ and $\lambda_{2}$ be the eigenvalues of this Jacobian.
Then, the stability of the stationary point is characterized as follows:
(1) It is a (locally) stable ( or unstable) node if $\lambda_{1}$ and $\lambda_{2}$ are different real numbers and are negative (or positive);
(2) It is a (locally) saddle point if eigenvalues are real numbers but with opposite signs, i.e., $\lambda_{1} \lambda_{2}<0$;
(3) It is a (locally) stable (or unstable) focus if $\lambda_{1}$ and $\lambda_{2}$ are complex numbers, and $\operatorname{Re}\left(\lambda_{1}\right)<0\left(\right.$ or $\left.\operatorname{Re}\left(\lambda_{1}\right)>0\right)$;
(4) It is a center if $\lambda_{1}$ and $\lambda_{2}$ are complex, and $\operatorname{Re}\left(\lambda_{1}\right)=0$;
(5) It is a (locally) stable (or unstable) improper node if $\lambda_{1}$ and $\lambda_{2}$ are real, $\lambda_{1}=\lambda_{2}<0$ (or $\lambda_{1}=\lambda_{2}>0$ ), and the Jacobian is not a diagonal matrix;
(6) It is a (locally) stable (or unstable) star node if $\lambda_{1}$ and $\lambda_{2}$ are real, $\lambda_{1}=\lambda_{2}<0$ (or $\lambda_{1}=\lambda_{2}>0$ ), and the Jacobian is a diagonal matrix.

Figure 2.5 below depicts six types of stationary points.


Node


Center


Saddle Point


Improper Node


Focus


Star Node

Figure 2.5: Types of stationary points

### 2.8.6 The Global Stability of Dynamical System

In a dynamic system, the Lyapunov method studies the global stability of stationary points.

Let $\overline{\boldsymbol{x}}\left(t, \boldsymbol{x}_{0}\right)$ be the unique solution of the dynamic system (2.8.50), and $B_{r}(\boldsymbol{x})=\left\{\boldsymbol{x}^{\prime} \in D:\left|\boldsymbol{x}^{\prime}-\boldsymbol{x}\right|<r\right\}$ be an open ball of radius $r$ centered at $\boldsymbol{x}$.

The following is the definition of stability of stationary points.
Definition 2.8.6 The stationary point $\boldsymbol{x}^{*}$ of the dynamic system (2.8.50)
(1) is globally stable if for any $r>0$, there is a neighbourhood $U$ of $x^{*}$, such that

$$
\overline{\boldsymbol{x}}\left(t, \boldsymbol{x}_{0}\right) \in B_{r}\left(\boldsymbol{x}^{*}\right), \forall \boldsymbol{x}_{0} \in U .
$$

(2) is globally asymptotically stable if for any $r>0$, there is a neighbourhood $U^{\prime}$ of $x^{*}$, such that

$$
\lim _{t \rightarrow \infty} \overline{\boldsymbol{x}}\left(t, x_{0}\right)=x^{*}, \forall x_{0} \in U .
$$

(3) is globally unstable if it is neither globally stable nor asymptotically globally stable.

Definition 2.8.7 Let $\boldsymbol{x}^{*}$ be the stationary point of the dynamic system (2.8.50), $Q \subseteq \boldsymbol{R}^{n}$ be an open set containing $\boldsymbol{x}^{*}$, and $V(\boldsymbol{x}): Q \rightarrow \mathcal{R}$ be a continuously differentiable function. If it satisfies:
(1) $V(\boldsymbol{x})>V\left(\boldsymbol{x}^{*}\right), \forall \boldsymbol{x} \in Q, \boldsymbol{x} \neq \boldsymbol{x}^{*}$;
(2) $\dot{V}(\boldsymbol{x})$ is defined as:

$$
\begin{equation*}
\dot{V}(\boldsymbol{x}) \stackrel{\text { def }}{=} \nabla V(\boldsymbol{x}) f(t, \boldsymbol{x}) \leqq 0, \forall \boldsymbol{x} \in Q, \tag{2.8.51}
\end{equation*}
$$

where $\nabla V(\boldsymbol{x})$ is the gradient of $V$ with respect to $\boldsymbol{x}$,
thus it is called a Lyapunov function.
The following is the Lyapunov theorem about the stationary point of dynamic systems.

Theorem 2.8.3 If there exists a Lyapunov function $V$ for the dynamic system (2.8.50), then the stationary point $\boldsymbol{x}^{*}$ is globally stable.

If the Lyapunov function (2.8.51) of the dynamic system satisfies $\dot{V}(\boldsymbol{x})<$ $0, \forall \boldsymbol{x} \in Q, \boldsymbol{x} \neq \boldsymbol{x}^{*}$, then the stationary point $\boldsymbol{x}^{*}$ is asymptotically globally stable.

### 2.9 Difference Equations

Difference equations can be regarded as discretized differential equations, and many of their properties are similar to those of differential equations.

Let $y$ be a real-valued function defined on natural numbers. $y_{t}$ means the value of $y$ at $t$, where $t=0,1,2, \cdots$, which can be regarded as time points.

Definition 2.9.1 The first-order difference of $y$ at $t$ is:

$$
\Delta y(t)=y(t+1)-y(t)
$$

The second-order difference of $y$ at $t$ is:

$$
\Delta^{2} y(t)=\Delta(\Delta y(t))=y(t+2)-2 y(t+1)+y(t)
$$

Generally, the $\boldsymbol{n} \mathbf{t h}$ - order difference of $y$ at $t$ is:

$$
\Delta^{n} y(t)=\Delta\left(\Delta^{n-1} y(t)\right), n>1
$$

Definition 2.9.2 The difference equation is a function of $y$ and its differences $\Delta y, \Delta^{2} y, \cdots, \Delta^{n-1} y$,

$$
\begin{equation*}
F\left(y, \Delta y, \Delta^{2} y, \cdots, \Delta^{n} y, t\right)=0, t=0,1,2, \cdots \tag{2.9.52}
\end{equation*}
$$

If $n$ is the highest order of nonzero coefficient in the formula (2.9.52), the above equation is called an $\boldsymbol{n}$ th-order difference equation.

If $F\left(\psi(t), \Delta \psi(t), \Delta^{2} \psi(t), \cdots, \Delta^{n} \psi(t), t\right)=0$ holds for $\forall t$, then we call function $y=\psi(k)$ a solution of the difference equation. Similar to differential equations, the solutions of difference equations also have general solutions

## 226CHAPTER 2. PRELIMINARY KNOWLEDGE AND METHODS OF MATHEMATICS

and particular solutions. The general solutions usually contain some arbitrary constants that can be determined by initial conditions.

The difference equations can also be expressed in the following form by variable conversion:

$$
\begin{equation*}
F(y(t), y(t+1), \cdots, y(t+n), t)=0, t=0,1,2, \cdots . \tag{2.9.53}
\end{equation*}
$$

The following is mainly about difference equations with constant coefficients. A common expression is written as:
$f_{0} y(t+n)+f_{1} y(t+n-1)+\cdots+f_{n-1} y(t+1)+f_{n} y(t)=g(t), t=0,1,2, \cdots$,
where $f_{0}, f_{1}, \cdots, f_{n}$ are real numbers, and $f_{0} \neq 0, f_{n} \neq 0$.
Dividing both sides of the equation by $f_{0}$, and making $a_{i}=\frac{f_{i}}{f_{0}}$ for $i=$ $0, \cdots, n, \quad r(t)=\frac{g(t)}{f_{0}}$, the $n$th order difference equation can be written in a simpler form:
$y(t+n)+a_{1} y(t+n-1)+\cdots+a_{n-1} y(t+1)+a_{n} y(t)=r(t), t=0,1,2 \cdots$.

Here, we provide three procedures that are usually used to solve $n$th order linear difference equations:

Step 1: find the general solution of the homogeneous difference equation

$$
y(t+n)+a_{1} y(t+n-1)+\cdots+a_{n-1} y(t+1)+a_{n} y(t)=0,
$$

and let the general solution be $Y$.
Step 2: find a particular solution $y^{*}$ of the difference equation (2.9.53).
Step 3: the solution of the difference equation (2.9.53) is

$$
y(t)=Y+y^{*} .
$$

The following are solutions of first-order, second-order, and $n$ th-order difference equations, respectively.

### 2.9.1 First-order Difference Equations

The first-order difference equation is defined as:

$$
\begin{equation*}
y(t+1)+a y(t)=r(t), t=0,1,2, \cdots . \tag{2.9.56}
\end{equation*}
$$

The corresponding homogeneous difference equation is:

$$
y(t+1)+a y(t)=0,
$$

and the general solution is $y(t)=c(-a)^{t}$, where $c$ is an arbitrary constant.

To obtain a particular solution for a nonhomogeneous difference equation, consider $r(t)=r$, namely, the case that does not change over time.

Obviously, a particular solution is as follows:

$$
\begin{gathered}
y^{*}=\frac{r}{1+a}, a \neq-1, \\
y^{*}=r t, a=-1 .
\end{gathered}
$$

Therefore, the solution of the nonhomogeneous difference equation(2.9.56) is:

$$
y(t)=\left\{\begin{array}{ccc}
c(-a)^{t}+\frac{r}{1+a}, & \text { if } & a \neq-1,  \tag{2.9.57}\\
c+r t, & \text { if } & a=-1
\end{array}\right.
$$

If the initial condition $y(0)=y_{0}$ is known, the solution of the difference equation (2.9.56) is:

$$
y(t)=\left\{\begin{array}{cl}
\left(y_{0}-\frac{r}{1+a}\right) \times(-a)^{t}+\frac{r}{1+a}, & \text { if } a \neq-1  \tag{2.9.58}\\
y_{0}+r t, & \text { if } a=-1
\end{array}\right.
$$

If $r$ depends on $t$, a particular solution is:

$$
y^{*}=\sum_{i=0}^{t-1}(-a)^{t-1-i} r(i),
$$

thus the solution of the difference equation (2.9.56) is:

$$
y(t)=(-a)^{t} y_{0}+\sum_{i=0}^{t-1}(-a)^{t-1-i} r(i), \quad t=1,2, \cdots .
$$

For a general function $r(t)=f(t)$, the coefficients of $A_{0}, \cdots$, $A_{m}$ can be determined by using the method of undetermined-coefficients, namely, considering $y^{*}=f\left(A_{0}, A_{1}, \cdots, A_{m} ; t\right)$. The following is to solve for a particular solution in a case in which $r(t)$ is a polynomial.

Example 2.9.1 Solve the following difference equation:

$$
y(t+1)-3 y(t)=t^{2}+t+2 .
$$

The homogeneous equation is:

$$
y(t+1)-3 y(t)=0,
$$

The general solution is:

$$
Y=C 3^{t} .
$$

Using the method of undetermined-coefficients to obtain the particular solution of the nonhomogeneous equation, suppose that the particular solution has the following form:

$$
y^{*}=A t^{2}+B t+D
$$

Substitute $y^{*}$ into the nonhomogeneous difference equation, and derive

$$
A(t+1)^{2}+B(t+1)+D-3 A t^{2}-3 B t-3 D=t^{2}+t+2,
$$

or

$$
-2 A t^{2}+2(A-B) t+A+B-2 D=t^{2}+t+2 .
$$

Since equality holds for each $t$, we must have:

$$
\left\{\begin{array}{l}
-2 A=1 \\
2(A-B)=1 \\
A+B-2 D=2
\end{array}\right.
$$

which gives $A=-\frac{1}{2}, B=-1$ and $D=-\frac{3}{4}$, and thus we have a particular solution: $y^{*}=-\frac{1}{2} t^{2}-t-\frac{3}{4}$. As a consequence, a particular solution of the nonhomogeneous equation is $y(t)=Y+y^{*}=C 3^{t}-\frac{1}{2} t^{2}-t-\frac{3}{4}$.

We can also solve the case with an exponential function by using the method of undetermined-coefficients.

Example 2.9.2 Consider the first-order difference equation:

$$
y(t+1)-3 y(t)=4 e^{t} .
$$

Suppose that the form of particular solution is $y^{*}=A e^{t}$. Then, substituting it into the nonhomogeneous difference equation gives: $A=\frac{4}{e-3}$. Therefore, the general solution of the first-order difference equation is: $y(t)=$ $Y+y^{*}=C 3^{t}+\frac{4 e^{t}}{e-3}$.

Here, we provide some of the common ways for finding particular solutions:
(1) when $r(t)=r$, a usual form of particular solution is: $y^{*}=A$;
(2) when $r(t)=r+c t$, a usual form of particular solution is: $y^{*}=A_{1} t+A_{2} ;$
(3) when $r(t)=t^{n}$, a usual form of particular solution is: $y^{*}=$ $A_{0}+A_{1} t+\cdots+A_{n} t^{n}$;
(4) when $r(t)=c^{t}$, a usual form of particular solution is: $y^{*}=$ $A c^{t}$;
(5) when $r(t)=\alpha \sin (c t)+\beta \cos (c t)$, a usual form of particular solution is: $y^{*}=A_{1} \sin (c t)+A_{2} \cos (c t)$.

### 2.9.2 Second-order Difference Equation

The second-order difference equation is defined as:

$$
y(t+2)+a_{1} y(t+1)+a_{2} y(t)=r(t)
$$

The corresponding homogeneous differential equation is:

$$
y(t+2)+a_{1} y(t+1)+a_{2} y(t)=0 .
$$

Then, its general solution depends on the roots of the following linear equation:

$$
m^{2}+a_{1} m+a_{2}=0
$$

which is called the auxiliary equation or characteristic equation of secondorder difference equations. Let $m_{1}$ and $m_{2}$ be the roots of this equation. Since $a_{2} \neq 0$, both $m_{1}$ and $m_{2}$ are not 0 .

Case 1: $m_{1}$ and $m_{2}$ are different real roots.

The general solution of the homogeneous equation is $Y=C_{1} m_{1}^{t}+$ $C_{2} m_{2}^{t}$, where $C_{1}$ and $C_{2}$ are arbitrary constants.

Case 2: $m_{1}$ and $m_{2}$ are the same real roots.

The general solution of the homogeneous equation is $Y=\left(C_{1}+\right.$ $\left.C_{2} t\right) m_{1}^{t}$.

Case 3: $m_{1}$ and $m_{2}$ are two complex roots, i.e., $r(\cos \theta \pm i \sin \theta)$ with $r>$ $0, \theta \in(-\pi, \pi]$. The general solution of the homogeneous equation is $Y=C_{1} r^{t} \cos \left(t \theta+C_{2}\right)$.

For a general function $r(t)$, it can be solved by the method of undeterminedcoefficients.

### 2.9.3 Difference Equations of Order $n$

The general $n$ th-order difference equation is defined as:
$y(t+n)+a_{1} y(t+n-1)+\cdots+a_{n-1} y(t+1)+a_{n} y(t)=r(t), t=0,1,2, \cdots$.

The corresponding homogeneous equation is:

$$
y(t+n)+a_{1} y(t+n-1)+\cdots+a_{n-1} y(t+1)+a_{n} y(t)=0,
$$

and its characteristic equation is:

$$
m^{n}+a_{1} m^{n-1}+\cdots+a_{n-1} m+a_{n}=0 .
$$

Let its $n$ characteristic roots be $m_{1}, \cdots, m_{n}$.
The general solutions of the homogeneous equations are the sum of the bases generated by these eigenvalues, and its concrete forms are as follows:

Case 1: The formula generated by a single real root $m$ is $C_{1} m^{k}$.

Case 2: The formula generated by the real root $m$ of multiplicity $p$ is:

$$
\left(C_{1}+C_{2} t+C_{3} t^{2}+\cdots+C_{p} t^{p-1}\right) m^{t} .
$$

Case 3: The formula generated by a pair of nonrepeated conjugate complex roots $r(\cos \theta \pm i \sin \theta)$ is:

$$
C_{1} r^{t} \cos \left(t \theta+C_{2}\right) .
$$

Case 4: The formula generated by a pair of conjugate complex roots $r(\cos \theta \pm$ $i \sin \theta$ ) of multiplicity $p$ is:

$$
r^{t}\left[C_{1,1} \cos \left(t \theta+C_{1,2}\right)+C_{2,1} t \cos \left(t \theta+C_{2,2}\right)+\cdots+C_{p, 1} t^{p-1} \cos \left(t \theta+C_{p, 2}\right)\right] .
$$

The general solution of the homogeneous difference equation is obtained by summing up all formulas generated by eigenvalues.

A particular solution $y^{*}$ of a nonhomogeneous difference equation can be generated by the method of undetermined-coefficients.

A particular solution is:

$$
y^{*}=\sum_{s=1}^{n} \theta_{s} \sum_{i=0}^{\infty} m_{s}^{i} r(t-i),
$$

where

$$
\theta_{s}=\frac{m_{s}}{\Pi_{j \neq s}\left(m_{s}-m_{j}\right)} .
$$

### 2.9.4 Stability of $\boldsymbol{n}$ th-Order Difference Equations

Consider an $n$ th-order difference equation
$y(t+n)+a_{1} y(t+n-1)+\cdots+a_{n-1} y(t+1)+a_{n} y(t)=r(t), t=0,1,2, \cdots$.

The corresponding homogeneous equation is:

$$
\begin{equation*}
y(t+n)+a_{1} y(t+n-1)+\cdots+a_{n-1} y(t+1)+a_{n} y(t)=0, t=0,1,2, \cdots . \tag{2.9.61}
\end{equation*}
$$

Definition 2.9.3 The difference equation (2.9.55) is asymptotically stable, if an arbitrary solution $Y(t)$ of the homogeneous equation (2.9.61) satisfies $\left.Y(t)\right|_{t \rightarrow \infty}=0$.

Let $m_{1}, \cdots, m_{n}$ be the solution of their characteristic equation:

$$
\begin{equation*}
m^{n}+a_{1} m^{n-1}+\cdots+a_{n-1} m+a_{n}=0 . \tag{2.9.62}
\end{equation*}
$$

Theorem 2.9.1 Suppose that the modulus of all eigenvalues of the characteristic equation are less than 1. Then, the difference equation (2.9.60) is asymptotically stable.

When the following inequality conditions are satisfied, the modulus of all eigenvalues of the characteristic equation are less than 1.

$$
\left|\begin{array}{cc}
1 & a_{n} \\
a_{n} & 1
\end{array}\right|>0,
$$

$$
\begin{aligned}
& \left|\begin{array}{cccc}
1 & 0 & a_{n} & a_{n-1} \\
a_{1} & 1 & 0 & a_{n} \\
a_{n} & 0 & 1 & a_{1} \\
a_{n-1} & a_{n} & 0 & 1
\end{array}\right|>0, \\
& \left|\begin{array}{cccccccc}
1 & 0 & \cdots & 0 & a_{n} & a_{n-1} & \cdots & a_{1} \\
a_{1} & 1 & \cdots & 0 & 0 & a_{n} & a_{n-1} \cdots & a_{2} \\
\vdots & \vdots & \ddots & \vdots & \vdots & \vdots & \ddots & \vdots \\
a_{n-1} & a_{n-2} & \cdots & 1 & 0 & 0 & \cdots & a_{n} \\
a_{n} & 0 & \cdots & 0 & 1 & a_{1} & \cdots & a_{n-1} \\
a_{n-1} & a_{n} & \cdots & 0 & 0 & 1 & \cdots & a_{n-2} \\
\vdots & \vdots & \ddots & \vdots & \vdots & \vdots & \ddots & \vdots \\
a_{1} & a_{2} & \cdots & a_{n} & 0 & 0 & \cdots & 1
\end{array}\right|>0 .
\end{aligned}
$$

### 2.9.5 Difference Equations with Constant Coefficients

The difference equation with constant coefficients is defined as:

$$
\begin{equation*}
\boldsymbol{x}(t)=A \boldsymbol{x}(t-1)+\boldsymbol{b}, \tag{2.9.63}
\end{equation*}
$$

where $\boldsymbol{x}=\left(x_{1}, \cdots, x_{n}\right)^{\prime}, \boldsymbol{b}=\left(b_{1}, \cdots, b_{n}\right)^{\prime}$. Suppose the matrix $A$ is diagonalizable, the corresponding eigenvalues are $\lambda_{1}, \cdots, \lambda_{n}$, and the matrix $P$ formed by linearly independent eigenvectors, such that

$$
A=P^{-1}\left(\begin{array}{cccc}
\lambda_{1} & 0 & \cdots & 0 \\
0 & \lambda_{2} & \cdots & 0 \\
\vdots & \vdots & \ddots & \vdots \\
0 & 0 & \cdots & \lambda_{n}
\end{array}\right) P
$$

Similar to the discussion of obtaining the solutions of ordinary differential equations, we can find the general solutions of the difference equation with constant coefficients. Moreover, a necessary and sufficient condition for the differential equation (2.9.63) to be (asymptotically) stable is that the modulus of all eigenvalues $\lambda_{i}$ are less than 1 . When the modulus of all eigenvalues $\lambda_{i}$ are less than 1 , the stationary point $\boldsymbol{x}^{*}=\lim _{t \rightarrow \infty} \boldsymbol{x}(t)=$

$$
(I-A)^{-1} \boldsymbol{b} .
$$

### 2.10 Basic Probability

Risk and uncertainty, as well as some of their basic operations, are broadly used in economics. This section briefly introduces knowledge involved in the textbook.

### 2.10.1 Probability and Conditional Probability

Compared with other fields of mathematics, the development of probability theory occurred relatively late. However, probability theory has developed rapidly and become a very important field in mathematics since its axiomatization.

When dealing with probabilities, we must clearly define the probability space. Classical probability (i.e., explaining probability as the same possibility) is often associated with permutation and combination. Since statistics requires obtaining data from sampling, the randomness in probability theory is revealed.

Let the probability of random variable $X_{a}$ be $X_{a s}$ be $\pi_{s}, s \in S$, where $S$ can be either discrete or continuous. When $S=\{1, \cdots, n\}$, where $n$ can be finite or infinite, this situation is about a discrete random variable. If $S$ is an interval of the real space, then it is called a continuous random variable.

If there is a correlation between two random variables, then the value of a random variable provides information for the value of the other random variable, which gives the concept of conditional probability.

When the two random variables, $X_{a}$ and $X_{b}$, have the joint probability distribution $\pi_{s s^{\prime}}$, with the known information that $X_{a}=X_{a s}$, the probability of $X_{b}=X_{b s^{\prime}}$ is called a conditional probability:

$$
P\left(X_{b}=X_{b s^{\prime}} \mid X_{a}=X_{a s}\right)=\frac{\pi_{s s^{\prime}}}{\sum_{t^{\prime} \in S} \pi_{s t^{\prime}}} .
$$

This formula is also called the Bayes rule.

### 2.10.2 Mathematical Expectation and Variance

The (mathematical) expectation of random variable $X_{a}$ is the weighted average of all possible values, and is defined and denoted by

$$
E\left(X_{a}\right) \equiv \bar{X}_{a}=\sum_{s \in S} \pi_{s} X_{a s},
$$

which in a continuous case is defined by integral instead of summation, and it will be discussed in the next subsection.

The operation rule of expected utility is that if $X_{a}$ and $X_{b}$ are two random variables, then we have

$$
E\left(a X_{a}+b X_{b}\right)=a \bar{X}_{a}+b \bar{X}_{b} .
$$

The variance of a random variable $X_{a}$ measuring the degree of variation of its value is defined as

$$
\operatorname{Var}\left(X_{a}\right) \equiv \sigma_{X_{a}}^{2}=\sum_{s \in S} \pi_{s}\left(X_{a s}-\bar{X}_{a}\right)^{2}
$$

Therefore, the larger is the variance, the greater is the variation degree.
There may be some correlations between the two random variables, $X_{a}$ and $X_{b}$. Suppose that the value space of $X_{a}$ is $\left\{X_{a s}\right\}_{s \in S}$, and that of $X_{b}$ is $\left\{X_{b s^{\prime}}\right\}_{s^{\prime} \in S^{\prime}}$. Then, their covariance measures the correlations between their values.

Let $\pi_{s s^{\prime}}$ be the probability of $X_{a}=X_{a s}$ and $X_{b}=X_{b s^{\prime}}$. Covariance, denoted by $\operatorname{Cov}\left(X_{a}, X_{b}\right)$, is defined as:

$$
\operatorname{Cov}\left(X_{a}, X_{b}\right)=\sum_{s \in S, s^{\prime} \in S^{\prime}} \pi_{s s^{\prime}}\left(X_{a s}-\bar{X}_{a}\right)\left(X_{b s^{\prime}}-\bar{X}_{b}\right)
$$

or

$$
\operatorname{Cov}\left(X_{a}, X_{b}\right)=E\left(X_{a}-\bar{X}_{a}\right)\left(X_{b}-\bar{X}_{b}\right)=E\left(X_{a} X_{b}\right)-E\left(X_{a}\right) E\left(X_{b}\right)
$$

If two random variables $X_{a}$ and $X_{b}$ are independent, then $\pi_{s s^{\prime}}=\pi_{s} \pi_{s^{\prime}}$, and thus we have $\operatorname{Cov}\left(X_{a}, X_{b}\right)=0$.

The following operation is for deriving the variance of linear combinations:

$$
\operatorname{Var}\left(\sum_{a \in A} \alpha_{a} X_{a}\right)=\sum_{a \in A, b \in A} \alpha_{a} \alpha_{b} \operatorname{Cov}\left(X_{a}, X_{b}\right) .
$$

### 2.10.3 Continuous Distributions

When a random variable $X$ takes values over [ $a, b$ ], its probability distribution function $F$ on support $[a, b]$ is defined by

$$
F(x)=\operatorname{Prob}[X \leqq x],
$$

which is the probability that $X$ takes values not exceeding $x$. By definition, the function $F$ is nondecreasing and satisfies $F(a)=0$ and $F(b)=1$. Here, $a$ and $b$ can be any real number, and thus it is possible that $a=-\infty$ and $b=\infty$.

The derivative of $F$ is called the probability density function and is denoted by $f \equiv F^{\prime}$. We assume that $f$ is continuous, and $f(x)>0$ for all $x \in(a, b)$.

The expectation of $X$ is then defined by

$$
E(X)=\int_{a}^{b} x f(x) d x
$$

If $u:[a, b] \rightarrow \mathcal{R}$ is an arbitrary function, the expectation of $u(X)$ is defined by

$$
E[u(X)]=\int_{a}^{b} u(x) f(x) d x
$$

which can also be written as

$$
E[u(X)]=\int_{a}^{b} u(x) d F(x) .
$$

The conditional expectation of $X$ given that $X<x$ is

$$
E[X \mid X<x]=\frac{1}{F(x)} \int_{a}^{x} t f(t) d t
$$

and thus

$$
F(x) E[X \mid X<x]=\int_{a}^{x} t f(t) d t=x F(x)-\int_{a}^{x} F(t) d t
$$

in which the second equality is obtained by integrating by parts.

### 2.10.4 Common Probability Distributions

Next, we review some common distributions, as well as their expectations and variances.

## Binomial Distribution

Assume that there are many balls in a box with two colors. The proportion of red balls is $p$, and that of black balls is $1-p$. The value of the random variable $X$ is 1 if the red ball is drawn; otherwise, it is 0 . If it is taken only once, the probability distribution of the random variable is $p(X=1)=p$ and $p(X=0)=1-p$.

The expectation and variance are:

$$
E(X)=p ; \quad \operatorname{Var}(X)=p(1-p) .
$$

If we draw $n$ times (the ball is put back into the box at each time), the random variable is defined as the number of times that the red ball is drawn.

The probability distribution of random variables is

$$
p(X=k)=\frac{n!}{k!(n-k)!} p^{k}(1-p)^{n-k} .
$$

Its expectation and variance are:

$$
E(X)=n p ; \quad \operatorname{Var}(X)=n p(1-p) .
$$

## Poisson Distribution

If the probability of a random variable $X$ is

$$
P(X=k)=e^{-\lambda} \frac{\lambda^{k}}{k!},
$$

then $X$ follows a Poisson distribution with parameter $\lambda$, and its expectation and variance are:

$$
E(X)=\lambda ; \quad \operatorname{Var}(X)=\lambda .
$$

## Uniform Distribution

If the probability density function of a random variable $X$ is

$$
f(x)=\frac{1}{b-a}, x \in[a, b],
$$

then $X$ follows a uniform distribution over $[a, b]$. Its expectation and variance are:

$$
E(X)=\frac{b+a}{2} ; \quad \operatorname{Var}(X)=\frac{(b-a)^{2}}{12} .
$$

## Normal Distribution

If the probability density function of a random variable $X$ is

$$
f(x)=\frac{1}{\sqrt{2 \pi} \sigma} e^{-\frac{(x-\mu)^{2}}{2 \sigma^{2}}}, x \in(-\infty, \infty),
$$

then $X$ follows a normal distribution with parameters $\left(\mu, \sigma^{2}\right)$.
The expectation and variance are:

$$
E(X)=\mu ; \quad \operatorname{Var}(X)=\sigma^{2} .
$$

## Exponential Distribution

If the probability density function of a random variable $X$ is

$$
f(x)=\lambda e^{-\lambda x}, x \in[0, \infty)
$$

then $X$ follows an exponential distribution with parameter $\lambda$, and its expectation and variance are

$$
E(X)=\frac{1}{\lambda} ; \quad \operatorname{Var}(X)=\frac{1}{\lambda^{2}}
$$

### 2.11 Stochastic Dominance and Affiliation

### 2.11.1 Order Stochastic Dominance

## First-Order Stochastic Dominance

Definition 2.11.1 (First-Order Stochastic Dominance) Given two distribution functions $F$ and $G$ with support $[a, b]$, we say that $F$ first-order stochastically dominates $G$ if for all $x \in[a, b], F(x) \leqq G(x)$.

First-order stochastic dominance means that for any outcome $x$, the probability of obtaining at least $x$ under $F(\cdot)$ is at least as high as that under $G(\cdot)$. For example, considering two assets, first-order stochastic dominance means that when two assets are greater than a certain constant return, the probability of one asset's return is higher than that of the other. This is analogous to the monotonicity concept under certainty.

There is another test criterion for $F$ to first-order stochastically dominate $G$. The following theorem shows that these two criterions are equivalent.

Theorem 2.11.1 $F(\cdot)$ first-order stochastically dominates $G(\cdot)$ if and only if for any nondecreasing function $u:[a, b] \rightarrow \mathcal{R}$, we have

$$
\int_{a}^{b} u(z) d F(z) \geqq \int_{a}^{b} u(z) d G(z) .
$$

Proof. Define $H(z)=F(z)-G(z)$. We need to prove that $H(z) \leqq 0$ if and only if $\int_{a}^{b} u(z) d H(z) \geqq 0$ for any increasing and differentiable function $u(\cdot)$.

Sufficiency: We prove this by way of contradiction. Suppose that there is a $\hat{z}$, such that $H(\hat{z})>0$. We choose a weakly increasing and differentiable function $u(z)$ as

$$
u(z)= \begin{cases}0, & z \leqq \hat{z}, \\ 1, & z>\hat{z},\end{cases}
$$

then immediately $\int_{a}^{b} u(z) d H(z)=-H(\hat{z})<0$, which is a contradiction.
Necessity: Since a monotonic function is differentiable almost everywhere, in finding integration, we may just assume that $u$ is differentiable, and we have
$\int_{a}^{b} u(z) d H(z)=[u(z) H(z)]_{a}^{b}-\int_{a}^{b} u^{\prime}(z) H(z) d z=0-\int_{a}^{b} u^{\prime}(z) H(z) d z \geqq 0$,
in which the first equality is obtained by integration by parts, the second equality is based on

$$
F(a)=G(a)=0, F(b)=G(b)=1,
$$

while the inequality is based on the assumptions that $u(\cdot)$ is weakly increasing $\left(u^{\prime}(\cdot) \geqq 0\right)$ and $H(z) \leqq 0$.

For any two probability distributions $F$ and $G$, as long as an agent's utility is (weakly) increasing in outcomes, he or she prefers the one that first-order stochastically dominates the other one.

## Second-Order Stochastic Dominance

Definition 2.11.2 (Second-Order Stochastic Dominance) Given two distribution functions $F$ and $G$ defined on $[a, b]$, which have the same expectation, we say that $F(\cdot)$ second-order stochastically dominates $G(\cdot)$ if

$$
\int_{a}^{z} F(r) d r \leqq \int_{a}^{z} G(r) d r
$$

for all $z$.

It is clear that first-order stochastic dominance implies second-order stochastic dominance. In addition, second-order stochastic dominance im-
plies not only monotonicity, but also lower risk. To show this, we introduce the notion of "mean-preserving spreads" .

Suppose that $X$ is a random variable with distribution function $F$. Let $Z$ be a random variable whose distribution conditional on $X=x, H(\cdot \mid X=$ $x)$, is, such that for all $x, E[Z \mid X=x]=0$. Suppose that $Y=X+Z$ is the random variable obtained from first drawing $X$ from $F$ and then for each realization $X=x$, drawing a $Z$ from the conditional distribution $H(\cdot \mid X=x)$ and adding it to $X$. Let $G$ be the distribution of $Y$ so defined. We will then say that $G$ is a mean-preserving spread of $F$.

While random variables $X$ and $Y$ have the same mean, i.e., $E[X]=$ $E[Y]$, variable $Y$ is "more spread-out" than $X$ since it is obtained by adding a "noise" variable $Z$ to $X$. Now, suppose that $u:[a, b] \rightarrow \mathcal{R}$ is a concave function. Using Jensen's inequality, we have

$$
\begin{aligned}
E_{Y}[u(Y)] & =E_{X}\left[E_{Z}[u(X+Z)] \mid X=x\right] \\
& \leqq E_{X}\left[u\left(E_{Z}[X+Z \mid X=x]\right)\right] \\
& =E_{X}[u(X)]
\end{aligned}
$$

As such, similar to Theorem 2.11.1, we have the following conclusion for second-order stochastic dominance.

Theorem 2.11.2 If distributions $F(\cdot)$ and $G(\cdot)$ defined on $[a, b]$ have the same mean, then the following statements are equivalent.
(1) $F(\cdot)$ second-order stochastically dominates $G(\cdot)$;
(2) for any nondecreasing concave function $u: \mathcal{R} \rightarrow \mathcal{R}$, we have $\int_{a}^{b} u(z) d F(z) \geqq$ $\int_{a}^{b} u(z) d G(z)$;
(3) $G(\cdot)$ is a mean-preserving spread of $F(\cdot)$.

PROOF. (3) $\Rightarrow$ (2): It is obtained by using

$$
\begin{aligned}
\int_{a}^{b} u(z) d F(z) & =\int_{a}^{b} u\left(\int_{a}^{b}(x+z) d H_{z}(x)\right) d F(z) \\
& \geqq \int_{a}^{b}\left(\int_{a}^{b} u(x+z) d H_{z}(x)\right) d F(z) \\
& =\int_{a}^{b} u(z) d G(z)
\end{aligned}
$$

in which the inequality follows from the concavity of $u(\cdot)$.
$\mathbf{( 1 )} \Rightarrow \mathbf{( 2 ) : ~ F o r ~ e x p o s i t i o n a l ~ c o n v e n i e n c e , ~ w e ~ s e t ~} b=1$. We have

$$
\begin{aligned}
& \int_{a}^{b} u(z) d F(z)-\int_{a}^{b} u(z) d G(z) \\
= & -u^{\prime}(1) \int_{a}^{b}(F(z)-G(z)) d z+\int_{a}^{b}\left(\int_{a}^{z}(F(x)-G(x)) d x\right) u^{\prime \prime}(z) d z \\
= & \int_{a}^{b}\left(\int_{a}^{z}(F(x)-G(x)) d x\right) u^{\prime \prime}(z) d z \\
\geqq & 0,
\end{aligned}
$$

in which the inequality follows from the definition of second-order stochastic dominance, i.e.,

$$
\int_{a}^{z} F(r) d r \leqq \int_{a}^{z} G(r) d r,
$$

and also $u^{\prime \prime}(\cdot) \leqq 0$ for any $z$. We thus have

$$
\int_{a}^{b} u(z) d F(z)-\int_{a}^{b} u(z) d G(z) \geqq 0
$$

$\mathbf{( 1 )} \Rightarrow \mathbf{( 3 )}$ : We just show the case with discrete distributions.
Define

$$
\begin{aligned}
& S(z)=G(z)-F(z), \\
& T(x)=\int_{a}^{x} S(z) d z
\end{aligned}
$$

By the definition of second-order stochastic dominance, we have $T(x) \geqq 0$ and $T(1) \geqq 0$, which imply that there exists some $\hat{z}$, such that $S(z) \geqq 0$ for $z \leqq \hat{z}$ and $S(z) \leqq 0$ for $z \geqq \hat{z}$.

Since the random variable follows a discrete distribution, $S(z)$ must be a step function. Let $I_{1}=\left(a_{1}, a_{2}\right)$ be the first interval over which $S(z)$ is positive, and $I_{2}=\left(a_{3}, a_{4}\right)$ be the first interval over which $S(z)$ is negative. If no such $I_{1}=\left(a_{1}, a_{2}\right)$ exists, then $S(z) \equiv 0$, and thus statement (3) is immediate. If $I_{1}=\left(a_{1}, a_{2}\right)$ does exist, then $I_{2}=\left(a_{3}, a_{4}\right)$ must exist, as well.

Therefore, $S(z) \equiv \gamma_{1}>0$ for $z \in I_{1}$, and $S(z) \equiv-\gamma_{2}<0$ for $z \in I_{2}$. By $T(x) \geqq 0$, we must have $a_{2}<a_{3}$. If $\gamma_{1}\left(a_{2}-a_{1}\right) \geqq \gamma_{2}\left(a_{4}-a_{3}\right)$, then there exist $a_{1}<\hat{a}_{2} \leqq a_{2}$ and $\hat{a}_{4}=a_{4}$, such that $\gamma_{1}\left(\hat{a}_{2}-a_{1}\right)=\gamma_{2}\left(\hat{a}_{4}-a_{3}\right)$.

If $\gamma_{1}\left(a_{2}-a_{1}\right)<\gamma_{2}\left(a_{4}-a_{3}\right)$, then there exists $a_{3}<\hat{a}_{4} \leqq a_{4}$, such that $\gamma_{1}\left(\hat{a}_{2}-a_{1}\right)=\gamma_{2}\left(\hat{a}_{4}-a_{3}\right)$.

Letting

$$
S_{1}(z)= \begin{cases}\gamma_{1}, & \text { if } a_{1}<z<\hat{a_{2}} \\ -\gamma_{2}, & \text { if } a_{3}<z<\hat{a_{4}} \\ 0, & \text { otherwise }\end{cases}
$$

If $F_{1}=F+S_{1}$, then $F_{1}$ is a mean-preserving spread of $F$. Letting $S^{1}=$ $G-F_{1}$, we can similarly construct $S_{2}(z)$ and $F_{2}$. Since $S(z)$ is a step function, then there exists an $n$, such that $F_{0}=F, F_{n}=G$, and $F_{i+1}$ is a mean-preserving spread of $F_{i}$. Furthermore, a finite summation of meanpreserving spreads is still a mean-preserving spread.

Although a continuous function can be arbitrarily approximated by step functions, the formal proof is complicated. Rothschild and Stiglitz (1971) provided a complete proof for the case with continuous distributions.

### 2.11.2 Hazard Rate Dominance

Let $F$ be a distribution function with support $[a, b]$. The hazard rate of $F$ is the function $\lambda:[a, b) \rightarrow \mathcal{R}_{+}$defined by

$$
\lambda(x) \equiv \frac{f(x)}{1-F(x)}
$$

If we interpret $F$ as the probability that some event will occur prior to time $x$, then the hazard rate at $x$ represents the instantaneous probability that the event will happen at $x$, given that it has not occurred until time $x$. Since the event may be the failure of some component, e.g., a lightbulb, it is sometimes also called the "failure rate".

Solving for $F$, we have

$$
\begin{equation*}
F(x)=1-\exp \left(-\int_{a}^{x} \lambda(t) d t\right) . \tag{2.11.64}
\end{equation*}
$$

This shows that any arbitrary function $\lambda:[a, b) \rightarrow \mathcal{R}_{+}$, such that for all $x<b$,

$$
\int_{a}^{x} \lambda(t) d t<\infty, \quad \lim _{x \rightarrow b} \int_{a}^{x} \lambda(t) d t=\infty
$$

## 244CHAPTER 2. PRELIMINARY KNOWLEDGE AND METHODS OF MATHEMATICS

is the hazard rate of some distribution that is given by (2.11.64).
Definition 2.11.3 (Hazard Rate Dominance) For any two distributions $F$ and $G$ with hazard rates $\lambda_{F}$ and $\lambda_{G}$, respectively, we say that $F$ dominates $G$ in terms of the hazard rate if $\lambda_{F}(x) \leqq \lambda_{G}(x)$ for all $x$. This order is also referred to in shortened from as hazard rate dominance.

If $F$ dominates $G$ in terms of the hazard rate, then

$$
F(x)=1-\exp \left(-\int_{a}^{x} \lambda_{F}(t) d t\right) \leqq 1-\exp \left(-\int_{a}^{x} \lambda_{G}(t) d t\right)=G(x),
$$

and thus $F$ first-order stochastically dominates $G$. Therefore, hazard rate dominance implies first-order stochastic dominance.

### 2.11.3 Reverse Hazard Rate Dominance

A closely related concept to the hazard rate is the reverse hazard rate $\sigma$ : $(a, b] \rightarrow \mathcal{R}_{+}$given by

$$
\sigma(x) \equiv \frac{f(x)}{F(x)},
$$

and is sometimes referred to as the inverse of the Mills' ratio. Similarly, solving for $F$ gives

$$
\begin{equation*}
F(x)=\exp \left(-\int_{x}^{b} \sigma(t) d t\right) \tag{2.11.65}
\end{equation*}
$$

This shows that any arbitrary function $\sigma:(a, b] \rightarrow \mathcal{R}_{+}$, such that for all $x>a$,

$$
\int_{x}^{b} \sigma(t) d t<\infty \text { and } \lim _{x \rightarrow 0} \int_{x}^{b} \sigma(t) d t=\infty
$$

is the "reverse hazard rate" of some distribution that is given by (2.11.65).
Definition 2.11.4 (Reverse Hazard Rate Dominance) For two distributions $F$ and $G$ with reverse hazard rates $\sigma_{F}$ and $\sigma_{G}$, we say that $F$ dominates Gin terms of the reverse hazard rate if $\sigma_{F}(x) \geqq \sigma_{G}(x)$ for all $x$. This order is also referred to in shortened form as reverse hazard rate dominance.

If $F$ dominates $G$ in terms of the reverse hazard rate, then

$$
F(x)=\exp \left(-\int_{x}^{b} \sigma_{F}(t) d t\right) \leqq \exp \left(-\int_{x}^{b} \sigma_{G}(t) d t\right)=G(x),
$$

and thus, again, $F$ first-order stochastically dominates $G$. Therefore, reverse hazard rate dominance also implies first-order stochastic dominance.

### 2.11.4 Likelihood Ratio Dominance

Definition 2.11.5 (Likelihood Ratio Dominance) We say that the distribution function $F$ dominates $G$ in terms of the likelihood ratio if for all $x<y$,

$$
\begin{equation*}
\frac{f(x)}{g(x)} \leqq \frac{f(y)}{g(y)}, \tag{2.11.66}
\end{equation*}
$$

which means that $\frac{f}{g}$ is a nondecreasing function. As such, we refer to this order as likelihood ratio dominance.

Rewriting (2.11.66) gives

$$
\frac{f(y)}{f(x)} \leqq \frac{g(y)}{g(x)}
$$

and then for all $x$, we have

$$
\int_{x}^{b} \frac{f(y)}{f(x)} d y \leqq \int_{x}^{b} \frac{g(y)}{g(x)} d y
$$

which, in turn, implies that

$$
\frac{1-F(x)}{f(y)} \leqq \frac{1-G(x)}{g(y)} .
$$

Therefore, likelihood ratio dominance implies hazard rate dominance.
Similarly, rewriting (2.11.66) gives

$$
\frac{f(x)}{f(y)} \leqq \frac{g(x)}{g(y)},
$$

and then for all $x$, we have

$$
\int_{a}^{y} \frac{f(x)}{f(y)} d x \leqq \int_{a}^{y} \frac{g(x)}{g(y)} d x
$$

which implies that

$$
\frac{F(y)}{f(y)} \leqq \frac{G(y)}{g(y)} .
$$

Therefore, likelihood ratio dominance implies reverse hazard rate dominance.

Summarizing the above discussions, one can see that likelihood ratio dominance is the strongest, which implies both hazard rate dominance and reverse hazard rate dominance, both of which, in turn, imply first-order stochastic dominance that again implies second-order stochastic dominance.

### 2.11.5 Order Statistics

Let $X_{1}, X_{2}, \cdots, X_{n}$ be $n$ random variables independently and randomly drawn from a distribution $F$ with density $f$. Let $Y_{1}^{(n)}, Y_{2}^{(n)}, \cdots, Y_{n}^{(n)}$ be a rearrangement of these, and thus

$$
Y_{1}^{(n)} \geqq Y_{2}^{(n)} \geqq \cdots \geqq Y_{n}^{(n)},
$$

where $Y_{k}^{(n)}, k=1,2, \cdots, n$ are referred to as order statistics.
Let $F_{k}^{(n)}$ denote the distribution of $Y_{k}^{(n)}$, with corresponding probability density function $f_{k}^{(n)}$. If there is no confusion, we simply denote them as $Y_{k}$, $F_{k}$ and $f_{k}$. In auction theory, we will typically be interested in properties of the highest and second highest order statistics, i.e., $Y_{1}$ and $Y_{2}$, respectively.

## Highest Order Statistic

The distribution of the highest order statistic $Y_{1}$ can be obtained as follows. The event that $Y_{1} \leqq y$ is equivalent to the event: $X_{k} \leqq y$ for all $k$. Since $X_{k}$ is independently drawn from the same distribution $F$, we have that

$$
F_{1}(y)=F(y)^{n} .
$$

The density function is

$$
f_{1}(y)=n F(y)^{n-1} f(y) .
$$

Note that if $F$ stochastically dominates $G$, and $F_{1}$ and $G_{1}$ are distributions of the highest order statistics of $n$ draws from $F$ and $G$, respectively, then $F_{1}$ stochastically dominates $G_{1}$.

## Second-Highest Order Statistics

The distribution of the second-highest order statistic $Y_{2}$ can also be easily derived. The event that $Y_{2} \leqq y$ is the union of the following disjoint events: (1) all $X_{k}$ 's are less than or equal to $y$; and (2) $n-1$ of the $X_{k}$ 's are less than or equal to $y$, and one is greater than $y$. There are $n$ different ways in which (2) can occur. Therefore, we have

$$
\begin{aligned}
F_{2}(y) & =F(y)^{n}+n F(y)^{n-1}(1-F(y)) \\
& =n F(y)^{n-1}-(n-1) F(y)^{n} .
\end{aligned}
$$

The probability density function is then

$$
f_{2}(y)=n(n-1)(1-F(y)) F(y)^{n-2} f(y) .
$$

Again, one can verify that if $F$ stochastically dominates $G$ and also $F_{2}$ and $G_{2}$ are distributions of the second-highest order statistics of $n$ draws from $F$ and $G$, respectively, then $F_{2}$ stochastically dominates $G_{2}$.

### 2.11.6 Affiliation

Affiliation is a basic assumption employed to study auctions with interdependent values in which random variables are non-negatively correlated.

Definition 2.11.6 Suppose that random variables $X_{1}, X_{2}, \cdots, X_{n}$ are distributed on some product of intervals $D \subseteq \mathcal{R}^{n}$ according to the joint density function $f . X=\left(X_{1}, X_{2}, \cdots, X_{n}\right)$ are said to be affiliated if for all $\mathbf{x}^{\prime}, \mathbf{x}^{\prime \prime} \in \mathcal{X}$,

$$
\begin{equation*}
f\left(\mathbf{x}^{\prime} \vee \mathbf{x}^{\prime \prime}\right) f\left(\mathbf{x}^{\prime} \wedge \mathbf{x}^{\prime \prime}\right) \geqq f\left(\mathbf{x}^{\prime}\right) f(\mathbf{x}) \tag{2.11.67}
\end{equation*}
$$

in which

$$
\mathbf{x}^{\prime} \vee \mathbf{x}=\left(\max \left(x_{1}^{\prime}, x_{1}\right), \cdots, \max \left(x_{n}^{\prime}, x_{n}\right)\right)
$$

denotes the component-wise maximum of $\mathbf{x}^{\prime}$ and $\mathbf{x}^{\prime \prime}$, and

$$
\mathbf{x}^{\prime} \wedge \mathbf{x}^{\prime \prime}=\left(\min \left(x_{1}^{\prime}, x_{1}^{\prime \prime}\right), \cdots, \min \left(x_{n}^{\prime}, x_{n}^{\prime \prime}\right)\right)
$$

denotes the component-wise minimum of $\mathbf{x}^{\prime}$ and $\mathbf{x}^{\prime \prime}$. If (2.11.67) is satisfied, then we also say that $f$ is affiliated.

Suppose that the density function $f: D \rightarrow \mathcal{R}_{+}$is strictly positive in the interior of $D$ and twice continuously differentiable. One can verify that $f$ is affiliated if and only if, for all $i \neq j$,

$$
\frac{\partial^{2}}{\partial x_{i} \partial x_{j}} \ln f \geqq 0,
$$

which means that the off-diagonal elements of the Hessian of $\ln f$ are nonnegative.

Proposition 2.11.1 Let $X_{1}, X_{2}, \cdots, X_{n}$ be random variables, and $Y_{1}, Y_{2}, \cdots, Y_{n-1}$ be the largest, second largest, $\ldots$, smallest order statistics from among $X_{2}, X_{3}, \cdots, X_{n}$. If $X_{1}, X_{2}, \cdots, X_{n}$ are symmetrically distributed and affiliated, then we have
(1) variables in any subset of $X_{1}, X_{2}, \cdots, X_{n}$ are also affiliated;
(2) $X_{1}, Y_{1}, Y_{2}, \cdots, Y_{n-1}$ are affiliated.

## Monotone Likelihood Ratio Property

Suppose that the two random variables $X$ and $Y$ have a joint density $f$ : $[a, b]^{2} \rightarrow \mathcal{R}$. If $X$ and $Y$ are affiliated, then for all $x^{\prime} \geqq x$ and $y^{\prime} \geqq y$, we have

$$
\begin{equation*}
f\left(x^{\prime}, y\right) f\left(x, y^{\prime}\right) \leqq f(x, y) f\left(x^{\prime}, y^{\prime}\right) \Leftrightarrow \frac{f\left(x, y^{\prime}\right)}{f(x, y)} \leqq \frac{f\left(x^{\prime}, y^{\prime}\right)}{f\left(x^{\prime}, y\right)} \tag{2.11.68}
\end{equation*}
$$

and

$$
\frac{f\left(y^{\prime} \mid x\right)}{f(y \mid x)} \leqq \frac{f\left(y^{\prime} \mid x^{\prime}\right)}{f\left(y \mid x^{\prime}\right)}
$$

so the likelihood ratio

$$
\frac{f\left(\cdot \mid x^{\prime}\right)}{f(\cdot \mid x)}
$$

is increasing, and this is referred to as the monotone likelihood ratio property.

Using the same arguments as for order stochastic dominance in the previous subsection, it can be deduced that for all $x^{\prime} \geqq x, F_{Y}\left(\cdot \mid x^{\prime}\right)$ dominates
$F_{Y}(\cdot \mid x)$ in terms of the likelihood ratio, and the other dominance relationships then follow as usual. We have the following conclusions.

Proposition 2.11.2 If $X$ and $Y$ are affiliated, the following properties hold:
(1) For all $x^{\prime} \geqq x, F\left(\cdot \mid x^{\prime}\right)$ dominates $F(\cdot \mid x)$ in terms of hazard rate, i.e.,

$$
\lambda\left(y \mid x^{\prime}\right) \equiv \frac{f\left(y \mid x^{\prime}\right)}{1-F\left(y \mid x^{\prime}\right)} \leqq \frac{f(y \mid x)}{1-F(y \mid x)} \equiv \lambda(y \mid x) .
$$

Or equivalently, for all $y, \lambda(y \mid \cdot)$ is nonincreasing.
(2) For all $x^{\prime} \geqq x, F\left(\cdot \mid x^{\prime}\right)$ dominates $F(\cdot \mid x)$ in terms of the reverse hazard rate, i.e.,

$$
\sigma\left(y \mid x^{\prime}\right) \equiv \frac{f\left(y \mid x^{\prime}\right)}{F\left(y \mid x^{\prime}\right)} \leqq \frac{f(y \mid x)}{F(y \mid x)} \equiv \sigma(y \mid x),
$$

or equivalently, for all $y, \sigma(y \mid \cdot)$ is nondecreasing.
(3) For all $x^{\prime} \geqq x, F\left(\cdot \mid x^{\prime}\right)$ first-order stochastically dominates $F(\cdot \mid x)$, i.e.,

$$
F\left(y \mid x^{\prime}\right) \leqq F(y \mid x),
$$

or equivalently, for all $y, F(y \mid \cdot)$ is nonincreasing.
(4) For all $x^{\prime} \geqq x, F\left(\cdot \mid x^{\prime}\right)$ second-order stochastically dominates $F(\cdot \mid x)$, i.e., for all $y$

$$
\int_{a}^{y} F\left(r \mid x^{\prime}\right) d r \leqq \int_{a}^{y} F(r \mid x) d r
$$

or equivalently, for all $y, \int_{a}^{y} F(y \mid \cdot)$ is nonincreasing.

All of these results extend in a straightforward manner to the case in which the number of conditional variables is more than one. Suppose that $Y, X_{1}, X_{2}, \cdots, X_{n}$ are affiliated and let $F_{Y}(\cdot \mid \mathbf{x})$ denote the distribution of $Y$ conditional on $X=\mathbf{x}$. We can then also obtain the above dominance relations.

### 2.12 Biographies

### 2.12.1 Friedrich August Hayek

Friedrich August Hayek (1899-1992), one of the greatest economic thinkers of the 20th century and a representative of the Austrian school, won the 1974 Nobel Prize in Economics for his contributions to the theory of money and economic cycles, as well as his penetrating analysis of the interdependence of economic, political, and institutional phenomena. The Nobel Prize Committee believed that Hayek's in-depth analysis of the economic cycle made him one of the very few economists who had warned about a possible great economic depression prior to 1929. In fact, both academically and practically, the 20th century was characterized by competition between the market economic system and the planned economic system, and disputes concerning their respective advantages and disadvantages. Hayek's penetrating analysis of different economic systems led him to point out very early that the planned economy is not feasible from the perspective of information efficiency, incentive compatibility, and resource allocation efficiency. Indeed, pragmatic results proved Hayek's extraordinary judgment and insight. Finally, the planned economic system experienced its demise, which made him one of the most influential economists of the 20th century.

Hayek was born in an intellectual family in Vienna and received a doctorate from the University of Vienna (1921-1923). When Hayek was at the University of Vienna, he attended classes taught by Ludwig von Mises (1881-1973). It was Mises' thorough critique of socialism published in 1922 that eventually pulled Hayek out of the Fabian socialist ideological trend. The best way to understand Hayek's great contribution to economics and classical liberalism is to analyze it from the perspective of Mises' paradigm of social collaboration. Hayek taught at the London School of Economics and Political Science (1931-1950), the University of Chicago (1950-1962), and Freiburg University (1962-1968). At the University of Chicago, Hayek was a professor of social and ethical science in the "Committee on Social Thought" and did not obtain a teaching post in the Department of Economics. Professor Friedman, a friend of his in the economics department,
was also critical of Hayek's books on economics. When he first arrived at the University of Chicago, Hayek conducted political studies and did not engage in economics research, and he held a negative attitude towards some research methods that were being used at the Department of Economics. Even so, Hayek interacted frequently with some of the members of the Chicago School of Economics, and his political views were compatible with many of the Chicago School. Hayek made a remarkable contribution to the University of Chicago. He strongly supported Aaron Director, a Chicago School economist and the founder of law and economics, to carry out the "Law and Society" project at the University of Chicago Law School. Indeed, Professor Director persuaded the University of Chicago Press to publish Hayek's The Road to Serfdom, which later became popular globally. Hayek also collaborated with Friedman and others on the establishment of the International Forum of Liberal Economists.

Hayek had two profound debates in his life: one was the "socialist controversy" in the 1920s and 1930s, which was the debate between MisesHayek and Lange-Lerner on the theoretical feasibility of efficient allocations under socialism. He criticized the drawbacks of the planned economy from the perspective of information and incentives. He held that the planned economy was theoretically impracticable, and emphasized the importance of a spontaneous social order based on freedom, competition, and rules. This advanced internal logic judgment was verified prior to his death. The second was the theoretical debate with Keynes in the 1930s. He pointedly criticized Keynes's theoretical claims and academic viewpoints put forward in A Treatise on Money, and thought that Keynes's economic proposition of achieving full employment by lowering interest rates and increasing the money supply was fundamentally incorrect. In 1947, Hayek advocated for the establishment of the Pilgrimage Mountain Society, an important liberal academic organization. He advocated thorough economic freedom and opposed any form of state intervention, calling for "nonnationalization" of currency issuance.

Hayek's profound philosophy of revealing the importance of institutions will undoubtedly continue to influence and guide the world, especially the next step of reform in China.

### 2.12.2 Joseph Alois Schumpeter

Joseph Alois Schumpeter (1883-1950), an Austrian American political economist (but not a member of the Austrian School) was profoundly influential, and is hailed as the originator of the Innovation Theory. Known as one of the greatest economists in history, his name is closely associated with most of the concepts and knowledge about market economies and innovation. Indeed, he proposed the four most representative and wellknown economic terms, i.e., innovation, entrepreneurship, corporate strategy, and creative destruction. In addition, he believed that "creative destruction" is a double-edged sword which can engender economic growth, but can also impair some values that people have traditionally cherished. He expressed this by stating, "What poverty brings is a tragic life, while it is difficult for prosperity to maintain peace of mind."

In 1883, Schumpeter was born into the family of a weaving factory owner in Triesch, Habsburg Moravia (now part of Czech, and thus Schumpeter is sometimes considered to be a Czech-American), Austria-Hungary. He enrolled in an elite middle school in Vienna. He studied law and sociology at the University of Vienna from 1901 to 1906, and received his doctoral degree in law in 1906. In 1908, he became an associate professor at the University of Czernowitz through his instructor's recommendation just at the beginning of his journey as an economist. Czernowitz is a remote city, but a suitable place for learning with its tranquility outside of modern industrial civilization. Here, Schumpeter wrote his first masterpiece, The Theory of Economic Development published in 1912, which touches on "innovation" and its role in economic development, and had a great impact in the economics community. According to statistics, the concept of "creative destruction" proposed by Schumpeter was cited frequently, second only to the "invisible hand" of Adam Smith. The Theory of Economic Development has become one of the classical economic works of the 20th century. Later, Schumpeter emigrated to the United States, and taught at Harvard University until the end of his life.

In his famous book, History of Economic Analysis, Schumpeter argued that the difference between an economic scientist and an average economist
lies in the adoption of the following three elements in the process of economic analysis. The first one is economic theory with an inherent logical analysis. The second is history with analysis from historical perspectives. Finally, the third is statistics with data and empirical analysis. Schumpeter's five innovation concepts are also frequently quoted and mentioned, even to the extent that his name appears in almost every discussion about innovation. Moreover, as the founder of the Innovation Theory and the research of business history, Schumpeter's influence is also currently being "rediscovered".

Innovation refers to an economic process that recombines and integrates original production factors into new production methods in order to increase efficiency and reduce costs. In Schumpeter's economic model, those who can successfully innovate can survive the dilemmas of diminishing returns; whereas, those who fail to recombine production factors will be the first to be eliminated by the market. The creative destruction of capitalism means that when the economy cycles to the bottom, this is the time when some entrepreneurs have to consider exiting the market and others must innovate to survive. As long as excess competitors are excluded or some successful "innovations" are created, the economy will improve and production efficiency will increase. When an industry becomes profitable again, however, it will attract the investment of new competitors. Then, the process of diminishing returns begins again and returns to the previous state. Therefore, every depression implies the possibility of another technological innovation, or it can alternatively be stated that the result of technological innovation is another expected depression. In Schumpeter's view, the creativity and destructiveness of capitalism are homologous. However, Schumpeter did not believe that the superiority of capitalism is due to its own impetus which can promote its own development continually. Instead, he contended that the capitalist economy will eventually collapse because it cannot withstand the energy of its rapid expansion. The business cycle, also known as the economic cycle, is Schumpeter's most quoted economic term. Schumpeter's concept of creative destruction has had a great influence on the development of modern economics. The combination of the dynamic market mechanism and R\&D economics provides economists
with a crucial perspective of endogenous technological change. Schumpeter's technological innovation has become a core element of the theory of endogenous growth in macroeconomics.

In Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy, Schumpeter gave the following modern definition of democracy: "the democratic method is that institutional arrangement for arriving at political decisions in which individuals acquire the power to decide by means of a competitive struggle for the people's vote" . He held that democracy constitutes a process in which political elites compete for power, and that the people choose political leaders. The essence of democracy lies in a competitive election process. Political elites occupy political power and implement their rule, but their legitimacy comes from the choice of the people. Schumpeter also took the view that, in the political market with democracy, politicians provide political programs and policies according to the preferences of voters, and compete freely in elections to attract voters. Schumpeter's definition of democracy symbolizes the great transformation of democratic theory from classical democracy directly ruled by the people to the modern election democracy.

The economic development of any country needs to go through three stages: factor-driven, efficiency-driven, and innovation-driven. The ideas and theories of Hayek and Schumpeter play a crucial role in theoretically guiding and clarifying the way that the two transition stages occur.

Hayek's economic thought on the fundamental importance of the market and institutions deeply affected economic development in the 20th century; likewise, Schumpeter's economic thought on the critical importance of innovation will undoubtedly continue to exert remarkable influence, as we have already witnessed during the first 20 years of the 21st century.

### 2.13 Exercises

Exercise 2.1 Consider an economy with two sectors: the industrial sector and the monetary sector, characterized by the following equations:

$$
Y=C+I+G,
$$

$$
\begin{gathered}
C=a+b(1-t) Y, \\
I=d-e i, \\
G=G_{0},
\end{gathered}
$$

where $Y, C, I$ and $i\left(i\right.$ is the interest rate) are endogenous variables, $G_{0}$ is an exogenous variable, and $a, b, d, e$ and $t$ are all structure parameters.

In the newly introduced monetary market, we have:
the equilibrium conditions: $\quad M_{d}=M_{s}$,
the money demand: $\quad M_{d}=k Y-l i$,
and the money supply: $\quad M_{s}=M_{0}$,
where $M_{0}$ is the exogenous variable of money stock, and $k$ and $l$ are parameters. Given this economy, please solve the following problems: (using Cramer's rule)

1. Equilibrium income $Y^{*}$;
2. Money supply multiplier;
3. Government expenditure multiplier.

Exercise 2.2 $Q$ represents the set rational numbers, and as a metric space, its distance is defined by $d(p, q)=|p-q|$, where $p \in E=\{p \in Q$ : $2<p<40\} \subseteq Q p \in E=\{p \in Q: 2<p<40\} \subseteq Q$.

1. Prove that $E$ is closed and bounded in $Q$.
2. Prove that $E$ is not compact.
3. Is $E$ open in $Q$ ? If yes, why?

Exercise 2.3 Given a metric space $X$, consider a series of open sets $\left\{E_{n}\right\}_{n \in N}$ in X .

1. Prove that $\bigcup_{n \in N} E_{n}$ is an open set.
2. Prove that it may not be true that the intersection of a series of open sets is open (please provide an example of this).

Exercise 2.4 Prove the following theorems:

1. The difference of an open set and a closed set is also open, while the difference of a closed set and an open set is also closed.
2. Each closed set is the intersection of a countable number of open sets; each open set is the union of a countable number of closed sets.

Exercise 2.5 Let $S \subseteq \mathcal{R}^{L}$. Prove that the following propositions are equivalent:

1. S is compact.
2. $S$ is bounded and closed.
3. Every sequence in $S$ has a convergent subsequence with the limit point in $S$.
4. Every infinite subset of $S$ has a cluster point in $S$.
5. Each closed subset of the set $S$ with finite intersection property (i.e., the intersection over any finite subcollection is nonempty) is nonempty.

Exercise 2.6 Prove the following propositions:

1. Every closed subset of a compact set is compact.
2. If $f: X \rightarrow Y$ is continuous and $K$ is compact in $X$, then $f(K)$ is compact in $Y$.
3. $S_{i}$ is compact, $i \in I$, if and only if $\prod_{i \in I} S_{i}$ is compact.
4. $S_{i}$ is compact, $i=1,2, \cdots, m$, if and only if $\sum_{i}^{m} S_{i}$ is compact.

Exercise 2.7 (Shapley-Folkman Theorem) Prove the theorem: Let $S_{i},(i=$ $1, \cdots, n)$ be $n$ non-empty subsets of $R^{m}$ and $S=\sum_{i=1}^{n} S_{i}$. Then, each $x \in$ $C o(S)$ has a representation $x=\sum_{i=1}^{n} x_{i}$, such that $x_{i} \in C o\left(S_{i}\right)$ for all $i$, and $x_{i} \in S_{i}$ for at least $(n-m)$ indices $i$.

Exercise 2.8 Prove the following theorems:

1. If $f$ is a differentiable function defined on $\mathcal{R}^{1}$, then $f$ is concave if and only if the first-order condition $f^{\prime}(x)$ is non-increasing.
2. If $f$ is a twice differentiable function defined on $\mathcal{R}^{1}$, then $f$ is concave if and only if the second-order condition $f^{\prime \prime}(x)$ is non-positive.
3. If $f$ is a differentiable function defined on $\mathcal{R}^{1}$, then $f$ is concave if and only if $f(y) \leqq f(x)+f^{\prime}(x)(y-x)$ for any $x, y \in \mathcal{R}^{1}$.

Exercise 2.9 Suppose that $f(\mathbf{x})=\frac{1}{2} \mathbf{x}^{T} A \mathbf{x}+b^{T} \mathbf{x}+c$, where $\mathbf{x} \in \mathcal{R}^{n}, \mathbf{x}^{T}$ is the transpose of vector $\mathbf{x}, A$ is an $n \times n$ symmetric matrix , $\mathbf{b}$ is an $n$-dimensional vector, and $c$ is a constant.

1. Prove that if $A$ is a positive semi-definite matrix, then $f(\mathbf{x})$ is a convex function.
2. Prove that if $A$ is a positive definite matrix, then $f(\mathbf{x})$ is a strictly convex function.

Exercise 2.10 Determine whether Kuhn-Tucker conditions are applicable for the following optimization problems and solve them.

$$
\begin{gathered}
\max x_{1} \\
\text { s.t. } \\
x_{1}^{3}-x_{2} \leqq 0, \\
\\
x_{2} \leqq 0
\end{gathered}
$$

Exercise 2.11 Solve the following optimization problems using Kuhn-Tucker conditions.

$$
\begin{gathered}
\max x y z \\
\text { s.t. } \quad x^{2}+y^{2}+z^{2} \leqq 6, \\
x \geqslant 0, y \geqslant 0, z \geqslant 0 .
\end{gathered}
$$

Exercise 2.12 The maximization problem is as follows:

$$
\begin{array}{ll} 
& \max f(\boldsymbol{x}) \\
\text { s.t. } & g^{1}(\boldsymbol{x})=0, \cdots, g^{m}(\boldsymbol{x})=0,
\end{array}
$$

where $f: \mathcal{R}^{n} \longrightarrow \mathcal{R}$ and $g^{j}: \mathcal{R}^{n} \longrightarrow \mathcal{R}$ are increasing functions with respect to $\boldsymbol{x}$, and $m<n$. Prove that: If $f$ is quasi-concave and all $g^{j}$ are quasi-convex functions, then any local optimum is the global optimal solution.

Exercise 2.13 Let $u: \mathcal{R}^{n} \longrightarrow \mathcal{R}$ be a function, $\boldsymbol{p}, \boldsymbol{x} \in \mathcal{R}^{n}$, and $y \in \mathcal{R}$. Consider the following optimization problem:

$$
\begin{aligned}
& \max _{\boldsymbol{x}} u(\boldsymbol{x}) \\
\text { s.t. } & \boldsymbol{p} \boldsymbol{x}=y .
\end{aligned}
$$

Suppose that there is an optimum solution $x^{*}(\boldsymbol{p}, y)>0$, such that $v(\boldsymbol{x}, y)=$ $u\left(\boldsymbol{x}^{*}(\boldsymbol{p}, y)\right)$.

1. Prove that $v(\boldsymbol{p}, y)$ is homogeneous of degree zero.
2. Prove that $v(\boldsymbol{p}, y)$ is a quasi-concave function.

Exercise 2.14 Suppose that a Cobb-Douglas utility function $u: \mathcal{R}^{2} \longrightarrow \mathcal{R}$ is defined as:

$$
u\left(x_{1}, x_{2}\right)=x_{1}^{\alpha} x_{2}^{\beta}, \alpha, \beta>0 .
$$

Prove:

1. If $\alpha+\beta \leqq 1$, then $u$ is a concave function.
2. If $\alpha+\beta>1$, then $u$ is a quasi-concave function, but not concave.
3. For any $\alpha>0$ and $\beta>0, h\left(x_{1}, x_{2}\right)=\ln \left(u\left(x_{1}, x_{2}\right)\right)$ is a concave function.

Exercise 2.15 Suppose that $\bar{X}$ is a nonempty, closed, and convex set in $\mathcal{R}^{n}$, $x_{0} \notin \bar{X}$. Prove that the following propositions are true.

1. There is a point $a \in \bar{X}$, such that $d\left(x_{0}, a\right)<d\left(x_{0}, x\right)$ for all $x \in \bar{X}$, and $d\left(x_{0}, a\right)>0$.
2. There is a point $p \in \mathcal{R}^{n}, p \neq 0,\|p\| \equiv\left(\sum_{i=1}^{n} p_{i}^{2}\right)^{1 / 2}<\infty$ and $\alpha \in \mathcal{R}$, such that

$$
p \cdot x \geqq \alpha, \text { for all } x \in \bar{X} \text { and } p \cdot x_{0}<\alpha .
$$

Specifically, $\bar{X}$ and $x_{0}$ is separated by a hyperplane $H=\{x: p \cdot x=$ $\left.\alpha, x \in \mathcal{R}^{n}\right\}$.

Exercise 2.16 Consider following functions:
(1) $3 x^{5} y+2 x^{2} y^{4}-3 x^{3} y^{3}$.
(2) $3 x^{5} y+2 x^{2} y^{4}-3 x^{3} y^{4}$.
(3) $x^{3 / 4} y^{1 / 4}+6 x+4$.
(4) $\frac{x^{2}-y^{2}}{x^{2}+y^{2}}+3$.
(5) $x^{1 / 2} y^{-1 / 2}+3 x y^{-1}+7$.
(6) $x^{3 / 4} y^{1 / 4}+6 x$.

1. Find homogeneous functions among them and determine their orders of degree.
2. Test whether the above functions satisfy the Euler theorem.

Exercise 2.17 There is a simple application of upper (lower ) hemi-continuity of correspondences. Suppose that $f: X \times Y \longrightarrow \mathcal{R}$,

$$
G(x)=\left\{y \in \Gamma(x): f(x, y)=\max _{y \in \Gamma(x)} f(x, y)\right\} .
$$

1. Suppose that $X=\mathcal{R}, \Gamma(x)=Y=[-1,1]$. For all $x \in X, f(x, y)=x y^{2}$.

Draw the graph of $G(x)$ and prove that $G(x)$ is upper hemi-continuous at $x=0$, but not lower hemi-continuous.
2. Suppose that $x=\mathcal{R}$ and $\Gamma(x)=Y=[0,4]$ for all $x \in X$. Define that

$$
f(x, y)=\max \left\{2-(y-1)^{2}, x+1-(y-2)^{2}\right\} .
$$

Draw the graph of $G(x)$ and prove that: $G(x)$ is upper hemi-continuous but not lower hemi-continuous, and specify at which points it is not lower hemi-continuous.
3. Suppose that $X=\mathcal{R}_{+}, \Gamma(x)=Y=\{y \in \mathcal{R}:-x \leqq y \leqq x\}$. For all $x \in X$, define that $f(x, y)=\cos (y)$, then draw the graph of
$G(x)$ and prove that: $G(x)$ is upper hemi-continuous but not lower hemi-continuous, and specify at which points it is not lower hemicontinuous.

Exercise 2.18 Let $S=\left\{x \in \mathcal{R}^{2}:\|x\|=4\right\}$ be the boundary of a circle with a radius of 2 . The mapping $\psi: \mathcal{R}^{2} \rightarrow S$ is defined as:

$$
\psi(x)=\underset{x^{\prime} \in S}{\arg \min } d\left(x, x^{\prime}\right),
$$

specifically, $\psi(x)$ contains the closest point in $S$ to $x$. Discuss the upper and lower hemi-continuity of $\psi(x)$.

Exercise 2.19 Consider a correspondence $\Gamma: D \subseteq \mathcal{R}^{l} \longrightarrow \mathcal{R}^{k}$, of which the graph is defined as

$$
G(\Gamma)=\left\{(x, y) \in D \times \mathcal{R}^{k}: y \in \Gamma(x)\right\} .
$$

If $G(\Gamma)$ is a closed set, then we say $\Gamma$ has a closed graph; if $G(\Gamma)$ is a bounded and closed set, we call $\Gamma$ compact-valued. Suppose that $\Gamma$ is compactvalued. Prove:

1. If $\Gamma$ is upper hemi-continuous, then it has a closed graph.
2. If $\Gamma$ is locally bounded and its graph is closed, then $\Gamma$ is upper hemicontinuous. (Hint: The definition of locally bounded correspondence $\Gamma: G(\Gamma)=\left\{(x, y) \in D \times \mathcal{R}^{k}: y \in \Gamma(x)\right\}$ is locally bounded, if for each $x \in D$, there is an $\epsilon>0$ and a bounded set $Y(x) \subseteq \mathcal{R}^{k}$, such that for all $x^{\prime} \in N_{\epsilon}(x) \cap D, \Gamma\left(x^{\prime}\right) \subseteq Y(x)$.)

Exercise 2.20 Suppose that $X \subseteq \mathcal{R}_{+}$is a nonempty compact set. Prove that:

1. If $f: X \longrightarrow X$ is a continuous increasing function, then $f$ has a fixed point.
2. Specially, suppose that $X=[0,1]$. If $f: X \longrightarrow X$ is an increasing function (not necessarily continuous), does $f$ have another fixed point?

Exercise 2.21 Suppose that $X$ is a complete metric space, and $T$ is the mapping from $X$ to $X$. Denote

$$
a_{n}=\sup _{x \neq x^{\prime}} \frac{d\left(T^{n} x, T^{n} x^{\prime}\right)}{d\left(x, x^{\prime}\right)}, n=1,2, \cdots .
$$

Prove that: If $\sum_{n=1}^{\infty} a_{n}<\infty$, then the mapping $T$ has a unique fixed point.
Exercise 2.22 Consider $n \in N$ and an $n$th order square matrix $A=\left(a_{i j}\right)_{n \times n}$. For any $x \in \mathcal{R}^{n}$, we have

$$
A x=\left(\sum_{j=1}^{n} a_{1 j} x_{j}, \sum_{j=1}^{n} a_{2 j} x_{j}, \cdots, \sum_{j=1}^{n} a_{n j} x_{j}\right)^{T}
$$

Suppose that $f$ is a differentiable mapping from $\mathcal{R}$ to $\mathcal{R}$, such that

$$
s=\sup \left\{\left|f^{\prime}(t)\right|: t \in \mathcal{R}\right\}<\infty
$$

Define a mapping $F$ from $\mathcal{R}^{n}$ to $\mathcal{R}^{n}$, namely,

$$
F(x)=\left(f\left(x_{1}\right), \cdots, f\left(x_{n}\right)\right)^{T}
$$

For a given $n$-dimensional vector $w$, we can solve the following system of nonlinear equations:

$$
\begin{equation*}
z=A F(z)+w \tag{*}
\end{equation*}
$$

1. Prove that: if $\max \left\{\sum_{j=1}^{n}\left|a_{i j}\right|: i=1, \cdots, n\right\}<\frac{1}{s}$, then there is a unique $z \in \mathcal{R}^{n}$ satisfying the above system of equations $(*)$.
2. Prove that: if $\sum_{i=1}^{n} \sum_{j=1}^{n}\left|a_{i j}\right|<\frac{1}{s^{2}}$, then there is a unique $z \in \mathcal{R}^{n}$ satisfying the above system of equations. (*).

Exercise 2.23 Suppose that $h$ is a mapping from $\mathcal{R}_{+}$to $\mathcal{R}_{+}$, and $H: \mathcal{R}_{+} \times$ $\mathcal{R} \longrightarrow \mathcal{R}$ is a bounded function, such that there is a $K \in(0,1)$,

$$
|H(x, y)-H(x, z)|<K|y-z|, \text { for any } x \geqq 0, y, z \in \mathcal{R}
$$

Prove that there is a unique bounded function, $f: \mathcal{R}_{+} \longrightarrow \mathcal{R}$, such that

$$
f(x)=H(x, f(h(x))), \text { for any } x \geqq 0
$$

Exercise 2.24 Find the extremum curve of the following functional:

1. $V(y)=\int_{0}^{1}\left(t^{2}+y^{\prime 2}\right) d t, y(0)=0, y(1)=2$;
2. $V(y)=\int_{0}^{1}\left(y+y y^{\prime}+y^{\prime}+0.5 y^{\prime 2}\right) d t, y(0)=2, y(1)=5$;
3. $V(y)=\int_{0}^{T}\left(1+y^{\prime 2}\right)^{0.5} d t, y(0)=A, y(T)=Z$.

Exercise 2.25 Solve the following optimal control problem:

$$
\begin{gathered}
\max \int_{0}^{3}(x-2)^{2}\left(x^{\prime}(t)-1\right)^{2} d t \\
\text { s.t. } \quad x(0)=0, x(3)=2 .
\end{gathered}
$$

Exercise 2.26 Consider the following optimal control problem, write the Hamilton equation, and solve the optimal function.

$$
\begin{aligned}
& \quad \max \int_{0}^{1}(x+u) d t \\
& \text { s.t. } \\
& x^{\prime}(t)=1-u^{2}, x(0)=1 .
\end{aligned}
$$

Exercise 2.27 Consider the following optimization problem:

$$
v(q)=\max _{x \in \mathcal{R}^{+}} \ln (2 x+q)-6 x+2 q,
$$

where $q \in(0,2)$.

1. Solve $v(q)$ and its derivative $v^{\prime}(q)$.
2. Verify that the Envelope Theorem holds.

Exercise 2.28 Find the general solution to the extremum curve of the following functional:

$$
V(y, z)=\int_{a}^{b}\left(y^{\prime 2}+z^{\prime 2}+3 y^{\prime} z^{\prime}\right) d t
$$

Exercise 2.29 In the problem of functional $\int_{0}^{T} F\left(t, y, z, y^{\prime}, z^{\prime}\right) d t$, suppose that $y(0)=A, z(0)=B, y_{T}=C, z_{T}=D, T$ are free, and $A, B, C$, and $D$ are constants.

1. How many transversal conditions are required for the problem? Why?
2. Write these transversal conditions.

Exercise 2.30 The integrand function of the target functional is $F\left(t, y, y^{\prime}\right)=$ $4 y^{2}+4 y y^{\prime}+y^{\prime 2}$.

1. Write the Euler equation.
2. Is the above Euler equation sufficient for maximization or minimization problems? Why?

Exercise 2.31 Solve the paths of $y(t)$ and $z(t)$ of extremum curves of $V(y, z)=$ $\int_{0}^{T}\left(y^{\prime 2}+z^{\prime 2}\right) d t$ subject to $y-z^{\prime}=0$.

Exercise 2.32 Solve the optimal paths of control variables, state variables, and costate variables as follows:

1. $\max \int_{0}^{T}-\left(t^{2}+2 u^{2}\right) d t$ subject to $y^{\prime}=u, y(0)=2$, and $y(T)=3$, and $T$ is free.
2. $\max \int_{0}^{T}-\left(u^{2}+y^{2}+3 u y\right) d t$ subject to $y^{\prime}=u, y(0)=y_{0}$, and $y(t)$ is free.
3. $\max \int_{0}^{4} 2 y d t$ subject to $y^{\prime}=y+u, y(0)=3, y(4) \geqq 200$.

Exercise 2.33 Find the optimal consumption path of the following exhaustible resource problem:

$$
\begin{array}{ll} 
& \max \int_{0}^{T} \ln q e^{-\delta t} d t \\
\text { s.t. } & s^{\prime}=-q, s(0)=s_{0}, s(t) \geqq 0
\end{array}
$$

Exercise 2.34 Using the revised transversal conditions expressed by the present value Hamilton function, solve the problems

1. with the end curve $y_{T}=\phi(t)$.
2. with truncated vertical end line.
3. with truncated horizontal end line.

Exercise 2.35 In a maximization problem, there are two known state variables, $\left(y_{1}, y_{2}\right)$, two control variables $\left(u_{1}, u_{2}\right)$, an inequality constraint, and an inequality integral constraint. The initial state is fixed, but the final state is free at fixed $T$.

1. State the maximization problem.
2. Define the Hamilton's equation and the Lagrange function.
3. Suppose that there is an interior solution, and then write the conditions of the maximum principle.

Exercise 2.36 Consider the problem of "eating cake" as follows. The agent has $A_{0}>0$ units of the commodity for consumption in period 0 and can save the commodity to the next period without costs, and its utility function is $\sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \beta^{t} \ln c_{t}$.

1. Write the Bellman equations of the problem.
2. Define the state variable and control variable.
3. Find the value function.

Exercise 2.37 Consider the following problem of "tree cutting" : the growth of a tree can be represented by the function $h$, i.e., $k_{t+1}=h\left(k_{t}\right)$, where $k_{t}$ is the scale of the tree at time $t$.

There is no cost for cutting trees, and the timber price is $p=1$. Interest rate $r$ remains unchanged, $\beta=1 /(1+r)$.

1. Assuming that trees cannot be replanted, we write the maximization problem of present value as $v(k)=\max \{k, \beta v[h(k)]\}$. Under what conditions about $h$ is there a simple rule that can be used to describe when to cut trees?
2. Suppose that another tree can be planted where the original tree is cut down, and the replanting cost $c \geqq 0$ remains unchanged for a long period of time. Under what conditions about $h$ and $c$ is there a simple rule that can be used to characterize when to cut trees?

Exercise 2.38 Solve the following dynamic programming problems by three methods: value function iteration, guessing value function, and guessing policy function, respectively:

$$
\begin{array}{lc} 
& \max _{\left\{c_{t}, k_{t+1}\right\}_{t=0}^{\infty}} \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \beta^{t} \ln c_{t} \\
\text { s.t. } & c_{t}+k_{t+1}=A k_{t}^{\alpha},
\end{array}
$$

where $k_{0}$ is given.

Exercise 2.39 Solve the following differential equations:

1. $y^{\prime}=t^{2} y$.
2. $y^{\prime \prime}-4 y^{\prime}+5 y=0$.
3. $y^{\prime \prime}-2 y^{\prime}-3 y=9 t^{2}$.

Exercise 2.40 Consider the following two dimensional autonomous differential equations:

$$
\begin{gathered}
\frac{d x}{d t}=x(4-x-y), \\
\frac{d y}{d t}=y(6-y-3 x) .
\end{gathered}
$$

1. Solve the equilibrium of the power system.
2. Verify the stability of each equilibrium.

Exercise 2.41 Solve the following difference equations:

1. $y(t+1)-2 y(t)=4^{t}$.
2. $y(t+2)+3 y(t+1)+2 y(t)=0$.
3. $y(t+2)-y(t+1)-6 y(t)=t+2$.

Exercise 2.42 Suppose that $X_{1}, X_{2}, \cdots, X_{n}$ are n independent and identically distributed random variables. The distribution function is $F$, and the probability density function is $f$. Let $Y_{1}^{(n)}, Y_{2}^{(n)}, \cdots, Y_{n}^{(n)}$ be the corresponding order statistics satisfying $Y_{1}^{(n)} \geqq Y_{2}^{(n)} \geqq \cdots \geqq Y_{n}^{(n)}$.

1. Find the distribution function and probability density function of $Y_{n}^{(n)}$.
2. Find $E\left(Y_{n}^{(n)}\right)$ and $\operatorname{Var}\left(Y_{n}^{(n)}\right)$.
3. Find $\operatorname{Cov}\left(Y_{1}^{(n)}, Y_{n}^{(n)}\right)$.

Exercise 2.43 Let $X$ and $Y$ be two random variables in the range $[a, b]$. Prove:

1. If $X$ first-order stochastically dominates $Y$, then $X$ necessarily secondorder stochastically dominates $Y$.
2. If $X$ second-order stochastically dominates $Y$, then $E X \geqq E Y$.
3. If $X$ second-order stochastically dominates $Y$ and $E X=E Y$, then $E u(X) \geqq E u(Y)$ for all concave and twice differentiable functions (whether increasing or not).
4. If $X$ second-order stochastically dominates $Y$ and $E X=E Y$, then $\operatorname{Var}(X) \leqq \operatorname{Var}(Y)$.

Exercise 2.44 Suppose that $X$ is a non-negative random variable, and the distribution function and density function are $F$ and $f$, respectively. The risk rate of random variable $X$ is defined as

$$
\lambda_{X}: \mathcal{R}_{+} \longrightarrow \mathcal{R}_{+}, \quad \lambda_{X}(t)=\frac{f(t)}{1-F(t)}
$$

If $\lambda_{X}(\cdot) \leqq \lambda_{Y}(\cdot)$, we say that the random variable $X$ stochastically dominates random variable $Y$ in terms of risk rate. Suppose that $G$ and $g$ are, respectively, the distribution function and density function of random variable $Y$. If $f(\cdot) / g(\cdot)$ is a non-decreasing function, then we say that $X$ stochastically dominates $Y$ in terms of likelihood ratio. Prove the following statements:

1. $\lambda_{X}(\cdot) \leqq \lambda_{Y}(\cdot)$ if and only if $1-G(t) /[1-F(t)]$ is a non-increasing function.
2. If $X$ dominates $Y$ in terms of likelihood ratio, then $X$ must stochastically dominate $Y$ in terms of risk rate.

Exercise 2.45 Prove that: if $X_{1}, X_{2}, \cdots, X_{N}$ are correlated, and $\gamma(\cdot)$ is an increasing function, then for $x_{1}^{\prime}>x_{1}$, we have

$$
E\left[\gamma\left(Y_{1}\right) \mid X_{1}=x_{1}^{\prime}\right] \geqq E\left[\gamma\left(Y_{1}\right) \mid X_{1}=x_{1}\right] .
$$

### 2.14 References

## Books and Monographs:

Ahmad, Shair and Antonio Ambrosetti (2004). A Textbook on Ordinary Differential Equations, Springer.

Bellman, R. (1957). Dynamic Programming, Princeton University Press.
Border, K. C. (1985). Fixed Point Theorems with Applications to Economics and Game Theory, Cambridge University Press.

Debreu, G. (1959). Theory of Value, Wiley.
Hildenbrand, W. and A. P. Kirman (1988). Equilibrium Analysis: Variations on Themes by Edgeworth and Walras, North-Holland.

Jehle, G. A. and P. Reny (1998). Advanced Microeconomic Theory, AddisonWesley.

Krishna, K. (2002). Auction Theory, Academic Press.
Kamien, M. and N. L. Schwartz (1991). Dynamic Optimization: The Calculus of Variations and Optimal Control in Economics and Management, NorthHolland.

Kreps, D. M. (2013). Microeconomic Foundation I: Choice and Competitive Markets, Princeton University Press.

Luenberger, D. (1995). Microeconomic Theory, McGraw-Hill.
Mas-Colell, A. , M. D. Whinston, and J. Green (1995). Microeconomic Theory, Oxford University Press.

Royden, H. L. (1989). Real Analysis, Prentice Hall.
Rubinstein, Ariel (2009). Lecture Notes in Microeconomics (modeling the economic agent), Princeton Univeristy Press.

Rudin, Walter (1976). Principles of Mathematical Analysis, McGraw-Hill.

## 268CHAPTER 2. PRELIMINARY KNOWLEDGE AND METHODS OF MATHEMATICS

Stockey, N. , and R. Lucas (1989). Recursive Methods in Economic Dynamics, Harvard University Press.

Sydsaeter, Knut, Arne Strom and Peter Berck (2010). Economist's Mathematical Manual (4th Edition), Springer.

Takayama, A. (1985). Mathematical Economics(Second Edition), Cambridge University Press.

Tian, G. (2015). Mathematical Economics (Lecture Notes).
Varian, H. R. (1992). Microeconomic Analysis(Third Edition), W. W. Norton and Company.

Vinnogradov, V. (1999). A Cook-Book of Mathematics, CERGE-EI Lecture Notes.

## Papers:

Arrow, K and G. Debreu (1954). "Existence of an Equilibrium for a Competitive Economy", Econometrica, Vol. 22, No. 3, 265-290.

Browder, F. E. (1968). "The Fixed Point Theory of Multi-valued Mappings in Topological Vector Spaces" , Mathematische Annale, Vol. 177, 283-301.

Fan, K. (1984). "Some Properties of Convex Sets Related to Fixed Point Theorem" , Mathematics Annuls, Vol. 266, No. 4, 519-537.

Kakutani, S. (1941). "A Generalization of Brouwer's Fixed Point Theorem", Duke Mathematical Journal, No. 8, 457-459.

Michael, E. (1956). "Continuous Selections I" , Annals of Mathematics, Vol. 63, No. 2, 361-382.

Modigliani, F. and M. Miller (1958). "The Cost of Capital, Corporation Finance and the Theory of Investment" , American Economic Review, Vol. 48, No. 3, 261-297.

Nessah, R. and G. Tian (2013). "Existence of Solution of Minimax Inequalities, Equilibria in Games and Fixed Points without Convexity and Compactness Assumptions", Journal of Optimization Theory and Applications, Vol. 157, No. 1, 75-95.

Samuelson, P. (1958). "An Exact Consumption-Loan Model of Interest with or without the Social Contrivance of Money", Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 66, No. 6, 467-482.

Sonnenschein, H. (1971). "Demand Theory Without Transitive Preferences, with Application to the Theory of Competitive Equilibrium", in Preferences, Utility, and Demand, (ed.) by J. S. Chipman, L. Hurwicz, M. K. Richter, and H. Sonnenschein, New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich.

Shafer, W. and H. Sonnenschein (1975). "Equilibrium in Abstract Economies without Ordered Preferences", Journal of Mathematical Economics, Vol. 2, Iss. 3, 345-348.

Tarski, A. (1955). "A Lattice-theoretical Fixpoint Theorem and Its Applications" , Pacific Journal of Mathematics, Vol. 5, No. 2, 285-309.

Tian, G. (1991). "Fixed Points Theorems for Mappings with Non-Compact and Non-Convex Domains" , Journal of Mathematical Analysis and Applications, Vol. 158, No. 1, 161-167.

Tian, G. (1992). "Generalizations of the FKKM Theorem and Ky-Fan Minimax Inequality, with Applications to Maximal Elements, Price Equilibrium, and Complementarity" , Journal of Mathematical Analysis and Applications, Vol. 170, No. 2, 457-471.

Tian, G. (1993). "Necessary and Sufficient Conditions for Maximization of a Class of Preference Relations", Review of Economic Studies, Vol. 60, No. 4, 949-958.

Tian, G. (1994). "Generalized KKM Theorem and Minimax Inequalities and Their Applications" , Journal of Optimization Theory and Applications, Vol. 83, 375-389.

Tian, G. (2016). "Characterizations of Minimax-Inequality, Fixed-Point Theorem, Saddle Point, and KKM Theorem in-Arbitrary Topological Spaces", Journal of Fixed Point Theory and Applications, forthcoming.

Tian, G. and R. Nessah(2013). "Existence of Solution of Minimax Inequalities, Equilibria in Games and Fixed Points without Convexity and Compactness Assumptions", Journal of Optimization Theory and Applications, Vol. 157, No. 1, 75-95.

Tian, G. and R. Nessah(2014). "On the Existence of Strong Nash Equilibria" , Journal of Mathematical Analysis and Applications, Vol. 414, 871-885.

Tian, G. and J. Zhou(1992). "The Maximum Theorem and the Existence of Nash Equilibrium of (Generalized) Games without Lower Semicontinuities" , Journal of Mathematical Analysis and Applications, Vol. 166, No. 2, 351-364.

Tian, G. and J. Zhou (1995). "Transfer Continuities, Generalizations of the Weierstrass Theorem and Maximum Theorem-A Full Characterization", Journal of Mathematical Economics, Vol. 24, No. 3, 281-303.

Zhou and Tian (1992). "Transfer Method for Characterizing the Existence of Maximal Elements of Binary Relations on Compact or Noncompact Sets", SIAM Journal on Optimization, Vol. 2, No. 3, 360-375.

## Part III

## Game Theory and Market <br> Theory

This part discusses game theory and market theory. Game theory has become an extremely important subdiscipline in mainstream economics, a core field in microeconomic theory, and one of the most important analytical tools for investigating various economic issues with strategic interactions among individuals. Readers will find that the market theory introduced in this part involves abundant knowledge and results in game theory, and thus we will present them as applications of game theory. The mechanism design theory, auction theory and matching theory studied in the book also take game theory as a basic analytical tool, and use extensive knowledge and results in game theory.

Game theory studies the strategic interactions between individuals. In earlier chapters, we studied the optimal choice of an individual, such as a firm or a consumer - the simplest case, and we assumed how individuals make optimal decisions when they are not affected by other individuals' decisions. However, in many situations, this is certainly not realistic. In reality, individuals' decisions are frequently more complicated. One aspect is that their decisions tend to affect each other. The game theory introduced in this part examines how interactions among individuals affect their outcomes or payoffs. There are many aspects from which one can study interactions of decision-makers. For example, one could investigate behaviors from the perspectives of sociology, psychology, biology, etc. Each of these approaches is useful in certain contexts. Game theory emphasizes the study of strictly "rational" decision-making, since this may constitute the most appropriate approach for economic behaviors and activities in which "business is business" .

Game theory can assist us to understand the phenomenon of individuals' interaction and its underlying mechanism. In games, a stronger assumption is required concerning decision-makers' rationality. It not only requires that a decision-maker be rational, but also requires the decisionmaker to assume that other decision-makers are rational and that others also think that he or she is rational. In other words, it is common knowledge that all decision-makers are rational. Game theory studies the strategic interactions among individuals in this context.

Game theory has two branches: non-cooperative game and coopera-
tive game (sometimes called the coalition game). These two branches are not divided literally. The former studies non-cooperative relations of individuals, while the latter investigates cooperation among individuals. In numerous situations, we will find that non-cooperative game frequently studies the mechanism of cooperation of players, and cooperative game often studies non-cooperative behaviors of players. Taking cost-sharing as an example, all players hope that the other party will bear more of the cost. As a consequence, cooperative game and non-cooperative game are not reflected in research objects, but instead are reflected in assumptions.

Cooperative game assumes that individuals communicate prior to making their decisions, and that the decisions are reflected in the choice of contract. Once a contract is chosen, it will be followed by a coalition (i.e., the group of individuals who have signed the contract). In this way, the analysis is based on the collective unit, and thus cooperative games are sometimes called the coalition games. Corresponding to this, in non-cooperative games, players' communication, choice of contract, and compliance with contracts are all based on individual rational decision-making. Nevertheless, neither of the theories is superior or inferior to the other. Instead, they analyze different issues on different levels of analysis and in dissimilar contexts. Overall, they are complementary in our understanding of practical problems.

In the development history of game theory, John von Neumann (19031957, see his biography in Section 5.8.1) is recognized as the founder of game theory. His work with Morgenstern (1944) marked the occasion when game theory become a subdiscipline. In its early stages, game theory was considered more of a branch of mathematics, and especially a branch of operations research.

Game theory has a broad range of applications. It is an abstract description of how individuals make rational decisions in real life, and thus can be employed to study various aspects of the economy, society, and politics. Any phenomenon that involves strategic interactions, such as competition among firms in the market, voting in the political system, lobbying of interested groups, war and disarmament, and even the evolution of species in ecosystems, can be investigated using game theory. Due to its influence
and importance, John Nash, John Harsanyi, and Reinhard Selten in 1994, Robert J. Aumann and Thomas C. Schelling in 2006, and Lloyd S. Shapley in 2012 were awarded the Nobel Prize in Economics, respectively. Their biographies can be found in Section 6.8.1, Section 6.8.2, Section 8.5.2, Section 8.5.1, Section 20.6.2, and Section 22.5.1.

Game theory, to be discussed in this part, is somewhat technical and abstract. However, various game theoretical models and results are widely used in many fields of economics, including the discussion of market theory that will be also discussed in this part. The core issue of market theory is pricing (i.e., how to determine the market equilibrium price and quantity). We will discuss the basic structure of four major markets: perfect competition, monopoly, monopolistic competition, and oligopoly. Subsequently, we will examine how the actions of consumers and firms affect market efficiency when they interact in the market. Game theory is involved extensively in the study of oligopolistic behaviors.

This part consists of four chapters: Chapter 6 discusses non-cooperative games, Chapter 7 explores repeated games, Chapter 8 examines cooperative games, and Chapter 9 proceeds to market theory.

## Chapter 6

## Non-Cooperative Game Theory

### 6.1 Introduction

This chapter is organized as follows: Section 6.2 introduces basic concepts of non-cooperative games, including the components of a game, two form representations of a game, pure strategy, mixed strategies, and behavior strategies. Section 6.3 discusses static games of complete information and their solution concepts, including dominant strategy equilibrium, iterated elimination of strictly dominated strategy equilibrium (IESDSE), rationalizable strategies, Nash equilibrium, and refinements of Nash equilibrium. Section 6.4 discusses dynamic games of complete information and their solution concepts, including subgame perfect Nash equilibrium (SPNE) and backward induction. Section 6.5 explores static games of incomplete information and their solution concepts, including Bayesian game and Bayesian Nash equilibrium. Section 6.6 discusses dynamic games of incomplete information and their solution concepts, including (weak) perfect Bayesian equilibrium (weak PBE) and sequential equilibrium. Section 6.7 explores the existence of Nash equilibrium.

### 6.2 Basic Concepts

This section presents basic terminologies used in game theory and discusses the assumptions behind game theory. In game theory, there are usually
two ways of describing the interactions of players: the normal form (also called the strategic form) and the extensive form. These two forms possess distinct advantages in expressing different games and are normally interchangeable.

To describe a situation of strategic interaction, we need to know four things:
(1) Players: Who are involved in the game? It is assumed that players are rational, ie., the goal is to maximize their own utilities/payoffs.
(2) Rules: Who moves and when? What information do the players possess when taking actions? What actions can the players choose?
(3) Outcomes: What is the consequence of the game for each possible set of actions by players? A primary purpose of game theory is to determine the outcomes of games according to a solution concept, such as those outcomes of equilibrium strategy profile, or equilibrium action profile.
(4) Payoffs: What are the benefits or utilities over possible outcomes? A payoff profile is the utility levels of all players under a certain outcome.

A central concept of game theory is the notion of player's strategy. A strategy is a decision rule of actions or complete contingent action plan which depends not only on players' own actions but also on the actions of others.

It is worth noting that strategy and action are closely related but generally are two different concepts, because a strategy is the rule of actions but not the actions per se. However, for the normal form game of complete information, a pure strategy is identical with an action.

### 6.2.1 Strategic Form Representation of Games

The strategic/normal form game is frequently used to describe players' interactions when making choices simultaneously. Suppose that a player could choose the player's action only once. The strategic form of a game has the following three basic elements:
(1) A set of players $N=\{1,2, \ldots, n\}$.
(2) A strategy space $S=S_{1} \times S_{2} \times \cdots \times S_{n}$. Each player $i \in N$ has a set of strategies $S_{i}$, and the strategic choices of all players $s=\left(s_{i}\right)_{i \in N}$ constitute a strategy profile. The strategy space may be discrete or continuum.
(3) A payoff function or utility function $u_{i}: S \rightarrow \mathcal{R}, i \in N$. Payoffs are usually represented by a payoff matrix if strategies are finite and there are two players (more complicated nested payoff matrix forms may be used if there are more than two players).

A normal form game is then denoted as

$$
\Gamma_{N}=\left(N, S,\left\{u_{i}(\cdot)\right\}_{i \in N}\right)
$$

We describe below the strategic form representation of games through examples.

Example 6.2.1 (Rock-Paper-Scissors Game) Two brothers, $A$ and $B$, employ the usual Rock-Paper-Scissors game to determine ownership of the 10 dollars given to them by their parents.

The rules of the game: Each one's hand forms one of three shapes (rock, paper, or scissors) simultaneously to determine the winner. Rock beats scissors, scissors beats paper, and paper beats rock. The winner will obtain 10 dollars, and the loser will obtain 0 dollars. If the game is tied (i.e., they choose the same shape), then each A and B will obtain 5 dollars.


Table 6.1: Strategic Form Representation of Rock-Paper-Scissors Game.

From this game, we inspect the elements of a game. The set of players is $N=\{A, B\}$. The set of strategies for players $A$ and $B$ are the same: $\{$ rock,
paper, scissors\}, and there are 9 possible strategy profiles in this game (see Table 6.1). The corresponding payoff of each outcome is represented by the payoff matrix shown in the table. For example, the corresponding payoff profile of strategy profile (rock, scissors) is ( 10,0 ), where 10 represents the payoff profile obtained by player $A$ under this outcome, and 0 represents the payoff profile obtained by player $B$ under this outcome.

Note that here we assume that each player's utility function is $u_{i}(x(s))=$ $x, i=A, B$, where $x$ is the dollars obtained. If the utility function is $u_{i}(x(s))=x^{\frac{1}{2}}$ for $i=A, B$, then under the outcome of strategy profile (scissors, rock), the payoff profile profile is $\left(0,10^{\frac{1}{2}}\right)$.

The game in this example is a constant-sum game (i.e., the sum of players' payoff profiles is a constant); the higher payoff profile one player obtains means the lower payoff profile the other player will obtain; these players are in a confrontational relationship in the game. When the constant is zero, the game is called the zero-sum game, which is a specific case of a constant-sum game.

In fact, the non-cooperative game can be used to describe many cooperative relationships, such as the following example.

Example 6.2.2 (Meet at the Restaurant) Two individuals, Tom (T) and Schelling (S), decide to meet and have lunch together at noon. They have forgotten the exact place to meet, and only know that there are two possible places (i.e., Restaurant 1 and Restaurant 2). They left home so hurriedly that they forgot to take their mobile phones. They can only choose one place. If they happen to go to the same restaurant, they can eat together, and their utility levels in this situation are both 10; otherwise, they can only eat alone, and their utility levels in this situation are both 0 . (see Table 6.2)

The elements of this game are: the set of players is $N=\{T, S\}$; the sets of strategies for Tom (T) and Schelling (S) are both \{Restaurant 1, Restaurant 2\}; there are four possible outcomes. For example, in the outcome (Restaurant 1 , Restaurant 1), the payoff profile of each player is 10 .

In this example, the interaction between these two players is actually a situation of seeking cooperation.


Table 6.2: Strategic Form Representation of Meeting at the Restaurant.

In the above two examples, players' actions happen to be their strategies. However, in many situations, one player may make multiple decisions in one game so as a strategy is a complete contingent action plan for a player in all possible situations. Therefore, if there are multiple decisions, as well as a description of the decisions of different players in different time structures, a more effective representation is the tree-view extensive form.

### 6.2.2 Extensive Form Representation of Games

The extensive form representation of a game specifies players, decision rules, outcomes, and payoff profiles: the players of the game, when each player has the move, what each player can do at each of their moves, what each player knows for every move, and the payoff profile (or utility level) received by each player for every possible outcome.

An extensive form game, denoted as

$$
\Gamma_{E}=\left(N, \bar{N}, W, X, Z, p, H, \iota(\cdot),\left\{u_{i}(\cdot)\right\}_{i \in N}\right)
$$

like a tree, has the following basic elements:
(1) A set of players. In addition to the actual participants $N=\{1,2, \cdots, n\}$ involved in the interaction, there may be some external events that are uncertain, and we usually add an additional player "Nature" $(\bar{N})$ who determines the probability distribution of external events, in addition to the actual players. It can be understood that which event will occur is decided by throwing a dice.
(2) Order of moves. The order of moves in $\Gamma_{E}$ is represented by a game tree that consists of a finite set of ordered nodes and a precedence relation $\prec$ on the set. The precedence relation $\prec$ describes the order of
the nodes, and satisfies asymmetry and transitivity (i.e., it is a partial order). $P(y)=\left\{y^{\prime} \in \Gamma_{E}: y^{\prime} \gtrless y\right\}$ is the set of all nodes preceding $y \in \Gamma_{E}$, which we call the set of predecessors of $y$; $S(y)=\left\{y^{\prime} \in \Gamma_{E}\right.$ : $\left.y \prec y^{\prime}\right\}$ is the set of all nodes succeeding $y$, which we call the set of successors of $y ; W=\left\{y \in \Gamma_{E}: P(y)=\emptyset\right\}(\emptyset$ represents an empty set) is the initial node of the game tree; $Z=\left\{y \in \Gamma_{E}: S(y)=\emptyset\right\}$ is the set of terminal nodes of the game tree; $X=\left\{x \in \Gamma_{E}: x \notin Z\right\}$ represents the set of non-terminal nodes, which we call the set of decision/choice nodes. Assume that for each $x \in X \backslash W$, there is a unique immediate predecessor $p(x) \in P(x)$.
(3) A correspondences about moves. The set of decision nodes to the set of players (including Nature), $\iota: X \rightarrow\{\bar{N}, 1,2, \ldots, n\}$, indicates the player that makes a decision at each decision node.
(4) A set of action for each player. The set of a player's choices at a decision node $x$ is called the action set at that node, denoted by $A(x)$, which may be a finite, infinite, or even continuum set.
(5) The collection of information sets. An information set is a set of decision nodes among which a player cannot distinguish (i.e., for any $x \in X$, there is a corresponding non-empty set $h(x)$, such that if $x^{\prime} \in$ $h(x)$, then $\left.x \in h\left(x^{\prime}\right)\right)$. Different information sets contain different nodes. The decision nodes in the same information set are linked with a dashed line, indicating that the player does not know exactly which decision node to act on. The set of all information sets is denoted as $H$, which forms a partition of $X$ (i.e., for $h, h^{\prime} \in H$, either $h=h^{\prime}$ or $h \cap h^{\prime}=\emptyset$.) If all information sets in a game tree are singletons, then the game is called the perfect information game, otherwise called the imperfect information game.
(6) Outcomes. The actions chosen by all players in each information set determine the outcome of the game (i.e., a terminal node $z \in Z$ ). Each player (except Nature) is assigned a payoff profile at each outcome $u_{i}(\cdot): Z \rightarrow \mathcal{R}, \forall i \in N$.
(7) External events. At the initial node $W$, there is a probability distribution $\rho: W \rightarrow[0,1]$, which can be interpreted as "Nature" 's choices.

In an extensive form game, a strategy is player $i$ 's complete contingent action plan for making decisions on each possible information set (including information sets that cannot be achieved under the strategy), i.e., it is an element in the set of actions:

$$
S_{i}=\Pi_{h \in H: \iota(h)=i} A(h),
$$

where $A(h)$ is the set of actions at information set $h$. Then a strategy is a mapping from the collection of information sets to the set of actions. The total number of pure strategies a player can choose is equal to the multiplication of the numbers of pure strategies of all action sets, .i.e.,

$$
\left|S_{i}\right|=\Pi_{h \in H: \iota(h)=i}|A(h)| .
$$

For instance, if player $i$ has two information sets, among which one set has three actions and the other set has two actions to choose, then the number of pure strategies in the player' strategy set is 6 .

Below, we utilize an example to illustrate that the extensive form representation can describe interaction behaviors in more detail.

Example 6.2.3 The following Game 1 and Game 2 describe interactions in two different situations (See Figure 6.1).

Game 1. The set of players contains two elements: player 1 and player 2. The game has two action stages. In the first stage, player 1 makes a decision, and at this stage his action set is $L$ and $R$. Since player 1 only acts once, his strategy set is exactly the action set. Then, player 2 makes a decision. When making a decision, she can observe player 1's different actions, and thus player 2 has two perfect (single node) information sets. A strategy of player 2 is constituted by decisions made on each of her information sets. In each information set, player 2's action set is $\{l, r\}$. Therefore, there are
four possible outcomes of strategy profiles (i.e., $(l, l),(l, r)$, $(r, l)$, and $(r, r)$ ). For example, strategy profile $(r, l)$ indicates that player 2 selects $r$ on her left information set and $l$ on her right information set. Once players 1 and 2 have chosen their strategies, there will be an payoff profile profile. For each strategy profile outcome, the corresponding payoff profiles of players 1 and 2 are assigned. The four terminal nodes in Figure 6.1(a) are the payoff profile profiles (the upper number is player 1's payoff profile, and the lower number is player 2's payoff profile).

Game 2. The player set is the same as in Game 1. The game has two action stages. The first stage is the same as in Game 1. However, the second stage differs from that of Game 1. We link the two decision nodes of player 2 together with a dashed line, indicating that player 2 does not know the actual action of player 1 in the first stage when making a decision. Therefore, the information that player 2 has at these two decision nodes is indistinguishable (i.e., player 2 only has one information set). In other words, when player 2 makes a decision, she does not know whether she is at the left or the right decision node. For this reason, a strategy of player 2 is to choose an action in the unique information set, and thus player 2 only has two possible strategies $\{l, r\}$. Once players 1 and 2 have chosen their respective strategies, an outcome will be reached, along with their corresponding payoff profiles.

Tables (a) and (b) in Table 6.3 illustrate the strategic forms corresponding to Game 1 and Game 2 in Figure 6.1. Two form representations of a game are interchangeable.

From Table 6.3, we know that there are differences between Game 1 and Game 2, where the key difference arises from player 2's strategies, which is the outcome of the information status of player 2 when making her decision.


Figure 6.1: (a): Game 1 is a perfect information game. Player 2 knows player 1's choice; (b): Game 2 is a imperfect information game. Player 2's information set is not singleton (player 1's actual choice is unknown to her).

In an extensive form game, the game tree is common knowledge for each player. That is, all players know the game tree, all players know that all players know the game tree, etc. In an extensive form game, it is usually required to satisfy the requirement of perfect recall (i.e., players remember their own moves (decisions) that they have made and what they have observed). Perfect recall is a strong assumption in practice. For example, during a card game of bridge, most people can not remember the complete bidding sequence and the complete play of the cards.


Figure 6.2: Game without Perfect Recall.

Figure 6.2 depicts an imperfect recall situation. In Figure 6.2, player 2 cannot distinguish between the two decision nodes when making her second decision. This means that player 2 cannot recall whether her first decision was $R$ or $L$. If player 2 has perfect recall, however, she can distinguish

| player 2 player 1 | $a_{2}^{1}=(l, l)$ | $a_{2}^{2}=(r, r)$ | $a_{2}^{3}=(l, r)$ | $a_{2}^{4}=(r, l)$ |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| $a_{1}^{1}=L$ | 5, 0 | 5, -3 | 5, 0 | 5, -3 |
| $a_{1}^{2}=R$ | 3, 0 | 8, 3 | 8, 3 | 3, 0 |
| (a) Game 1 |  |  |  |  |
|  | player 2 player 1 | $a_{2}^{1}=l$ | $a_{2}^{2}=r$ |  |
|  | $a_{1}^{1}=L$ | 5, 0 | 5, -3 |  |
|  | $a_{1}^{2}=R$ | 3, 0 | 8, 3 |  |
| (b) Game 2 |  |  |  |  |

Table 6.3: Table (a): the strategic form representation of Game 1; Table (b): the strategic form representation of Game 2.
them.
In addition, in an extensive form game, there may be external uncertainties. Usually, we introduce "Nature" as the decision-maker to select external uncertain events.


Figure 6.3:"Nature" selects the order of the game.

Example 6.2.4 (Matching Pennies) There are two players 1 and 2 who play a matching pennies game (i.e., choosing heads or tails). If these two players have the same choice, then player 1 pays one dollar to player 2; otherwise, player 2 pays one dollar to player 1 . Suppose that the game is played as follows: first, by tossing a coin, if the head side is face-up, player 1 choos-
es first and then player 2 chooses; if the tail side is face-up, their selection order is reversed. The player selecting later knows the action of the previous player. In this game, there is an external uncertainty (i.e., who chooses first). We introduce a new player "Nature", and let it act as a decisionmaker for external events. Figure 6.3 describes this game.

### 6.2.3 Mixed Strategies and Behavior Strategies

In the above, a strategy of a player is defined as a decision rule of actions or a complete contingent plan for the player. In the Rock-Paper-Scissors normal game, players $A$ and $B$ both have 3 strategies. Obviously, player $i$ is reluctant to let the other player know her choice. In numerous interactive situations, player $i$ introduces random factors to prevent the other players from knowing her exact choice. Randomizing pure strategies with these factors generates mixed strategies.

Definition 6.2.1 (Mixed Strategy) For a game $\Gamma_{N}=\left[N,\left\{S_{i}\right\},\left\{u_{i}(\cdot)\right\}\right]$ with $S_{i}=\left\{s_{i}^{1}, \cdots, s_{i}^{n_{i}}\right\}$, a mixed strategy for player $i, \sigma_{i}: S_{i} \rightarrow[0,1]^{n_{i}}$, is a probability distribution on $S_{i}=\left\{s_{i}^{1}, \cdots, s_{i}^{n_{i}}\right\}$, where $\sigma_{i}\left(s_{i}^{k}\right) \geqq 0$ indicates the probability that player $i$ chooses strategy $s_{i}^{k}$, which satisfies $\sum_{k=1}^{n_{i}} \sigma_{i}\left(s_{i}^{k}\right)=1$.

Consequently, a pure strategy can be seen as the degeneration of a mixed strategy in which the probability of selecting the pure strategy is 1 . The mixed strategy for the infinite strategy space can be similarly defined, and then should be expressed in the form of integral.

If we use an extensive-form description of a game, there is another way that player $i$ could randomize. Rather than randomizing over the entailed set of pure strategies in $S_{i}$, the player could randomize separably over the possible actions at each of the player's information sets $H$. This way of randomizing actions at each information set is termed a behavior strategy. While the concepts of mixed strategy and behavior strategy are very closely related in the context of randomization, they have very different implications.

Formally, for each information set $h \in H$, define $\Lambda(A(h))$ as the probability distribution space on action set $A(h)$ on information set $h$. For each
player $i \in N$, the choices of probability distributions in all information sets constitute a behavior strategy, and the behavior strategies of all players constitute a behavior strategy profile $\boldsymbol{\sigma}=\left(\sigma_{h}\right)_{h \in H}$, where $\sigma_{h}$ represents the behavior strategy of $\iota(h)$ on information set $h$. Starting from a behavior strategy, we can define a mixed strategy for player $i$ (i.e., $\left.\sigma_{i}=\Pi_{h \in H: \iota(h)=i} \sigma_{h}\right)$. All action plans over information sets belonging to player $i$ constitute a mixed strategy for player $i$.

Thus, while a mixed strategy assigns a probability distribution over all pure strategies (actions), a behavior strategy assigns a probability distribution over actions at each information set $h$. However, for games of perfect recall which we only deal with in this chapter, the two types of randomization are equivalent (Kuhn, 1953; see Exercise 6.27).

If all players choose mixed strategies, the expected payoff profile (utility) of player $i$ is

$$
\begin{align*}
E_{\boldsymbol{\sigma}} u_{i}(s)= & \sum_{s \in S}\left[\sigma_{1}\left(s_{1}\right) \sigma_{2}\left(s_{2}\right) \ldots \sigma_{n}\left(s_{n}\right)\right] u_{i}(s)  \tag{6.2.1}\\
& \text { when } S \text { is finite } \\
= & \int u_{i}(\boldsymbol{\sigma}(s)) d \sigma(s)  \tag{6.2.2}\\
& \text { when } S \text { is not finite, }
\end{align*}
$$

that is, utility from strategy $s$, times the joint probability of the occurrence of $s$, summed (integrated) over all $s \in S$.

In order to have an intuitive understanding how to get the players' expected payoff profiles, consider $n=2$ and the strategy space is finite. Then the expected payoff profile of player 1 is given by

$$
\begin{gather*}
\left.E u_{1}(s)=\sum_{l=l}^{n_{1}} \sum_{k=1}^{n_{2}} \sigma_{1}\left(s_{1}^{l}\right) \sigma_{2}\left(s_{2}^{k}\right) u_{1}\left(s_{1}^{l}, s_{2}^{k}\right)\right)  \tag{6.2.3}\\
=\sigma_{1}\left(s_{1}\right)^{\prime} U_{1} \sigma_{2}\left(s_{2}\right),
\end{gather*}
$$

where the payoff profile matrix of player 1 is

$$
U_{1}=\left[\begin{array}{cccc}
u_{1}\left(s_{1}^{1}, s_{2}^{1}\right) & u_{1}\left(s_{1}^{1}, s_{2}^{2}\right) & \cdots & u_{1}\left(s_{1}^{1}, s_{2}^{n_{2}}\right) \\
u_{1}\left(s_{1}^{2}, s_{2}^{1}\right) & u_{1}\left(s_{1}^{2}, s_{2}^{2}\right) & \cdots & u_{1}\left(s_{1}^{2}, s_{2}^{n_{2}}\right) \\
\cdots & \cdots & \cdots & \cdots \\
u_{1}\left(s_{1}^{n_{1}}, s_{2}^{1}\right) & u_{1}\left(s_{1}^{n_{1}}, s_{2}^{2}\right) & \cdots & u_{1}\left(s_{1}^{n_{1}}, s_{2}^{n_{2}}\right)
\end{array}\right] .
$$

(6.2.3) can be conveniently used to compute the expected payoff profiles and solve equilibrium strategies of players.

Under different situations, non-cooperative games can be divided into four basic types based on static games and dynamic games of complete and incomplete information. In economics and game theory, complete information is an economic situation or game in which knowledge about other individuals is available to all others (i.e., the players' characteristics such as payoff profiles, strategy space and "types" of players are common knowledge). Inversely, in a game of incomplete information, players do not possess full information about their opponents. Also, if the strategy space of a game has a finite number of strategy profiles, it is called the finite game. The repeated game is a special type of dynamic game. As this type of game exhibits a special structure, we will discuss it separately in the next chapter.

### 6.3 Static Games with Complete Information

Static games of complete information are the simplest type of game, in which knowledge about other individuals is available to all others and each player only makes one decision. In this type of game, the action set and the strategic set of every player are the same.

### 6.3.1 Dominant and Dominated Strategies

Individuals are rational in playing a game, which implies that individuals will attempt to avoid unfavorable choices. Therefore, prior to discussing the interactions of players, we first introduce two concepts of strategiesdominant and dominated strategies, which indicate how a player can cir-
cumvent adverse consequences. The dominant strategy is the strongest solution concept of describing self-interested behavior, which means the strategy chosen by a player is optimal, regardless of the choices of others. An axiom in game theory is that players will use a dominant strategy as long as it exists.

Example 6.3.1 (Prisoner's Dilemma) Two prisoners have been accused of collaborating in a crime. They are in separate jail cells and cannot communicate with each other. Each has been asked to confess, and are subjected to a policy of being "lenient to those who confess their crimes and severe to those who refuse to". If both prisoners choose to deny, the prosecution's case will be difficult to make, and then they will be assigned a lesser charge in the insufficiency of evidence. In this case, both will receive 2 years in jail. If only one of them confesses, then the confessor receives lighter sentence and the other one will be punished severely. In this situation, the confessor will receive 1 year in jail, and the other one will go to jail for 8 years. If both confess about the crimes that they committed, and the criminal acts are conclusive, then both will be assigned heavier charges. In this case, both of them will receive 4 years in jail. The participant's utility levels for $t$ years of imprisonment is $-t$. According to the normal-form representation of games, Table 6.4 describes the interaction between the two suspects.

|  |  | Prisoner 2 |  |
| :---: | ---: | ---: | ---: |
| Prisoner 1 | Confess | Confess |  |
|  | Deny | Deny |  |
|  |  | $-4,-4$ | $-1,-8$ |
| $-8,-1$ | $-2,-2$ |  |  |

Table 6.4: The Prisoner's Dilemma.

At first glance, both players should choose to deny since collective rationality can make both players better. However, the individual rational assumption implies that one only pursues one's own utility maximization. It is not difficult to see that "Confess" is always better than "Deny" because if the other player chooses "Deny", your choice of "Confess" will result in a payoff profile of -1 , greater than -2 , which is the payoff profile if you alternatively choose "Deny" ; if the other player chooses "Confess", y-
our choice of "Confess" will result in a payoff profile of -4 , greater than -8 , which is the payoff profile if you alternatively choose "Deny". In this way, regardless of what the opponent chooses, choosing "Confess" is always in the best interest of a player. This type of strategy is called the dominant strategy. For these two prisoners, however, it is better for them to choose "Deny" together. This kind of collective irrationality resulting from individual rationality is known in economics as the Prisoner's Dilemma, and sometimes is also known as the Prisoner's Paradox.

Definition 6.3.1 (Strict Dominant Strategy) A strategy $s_{i} \in S_{i}$ is a strictly dominant strategy for player $i$ in game $\Gamma_{N}=\left[N,\left\{S_{i}\right\},\left\{u_{i}().\right\}\right]$ if for all $s_{i}{ }^{\prime} \neq$ $s_{i}$, we have

$$
u_{i}\left(s_{i}, s_{-i}\right)>u_{i}\left(s_{i}{ }^{\prime}, s_{-i}\right)
$$

for all $s_{-i} \in S_{-i} \triangleq S_{1} \times \cdots \times S_{i-1} \times S_{i+1} \times \cdots \times S_{n}$.
Another concept associated with this concept is termed the dominated strategy.

Definition 6.3.2 (Strict Dominated Strategy) A strategy $s_{i} \in S_{i}$ is a strictly dominated strategy for player $i$ in game $\Gamma_{N}=\left[N,\left\{S_{i}\right\},\left\{u_{i}().\right\}\right]$ if there is another strategy $s_{i}{ }^{\prime} \neq s_{i}$, such that for all $s_{-i} \in S_{-i}$,

$$
u_{i}\left(s_{i}^{\prime}, s_{-i}\right)>u_{i}\left(s_{i}, s_{-i}\right) .
$$

In this case, we say that strategy $s_{i}^{\prime}$ strictly dominates strategy $s_{i}$.
With this definition, a strategy $s_{i} \in S_{i}$ is a strictly dominant strategy for player $i$ in game $\Gamma_{N}=\left[N,\left\{S_{i}\right\},\left\{u_{i}().\right\}\right]$ if and only if it strictly dominates every other strategy in $S_{i}$.

The following is a weak version of a dominant strategy.
Definition 6.3.3 (Weak Dominant Strategy) A strategy $s_{i} \in S_{i}$ is a weakly dominant strategy in game $\Gamma_{N}=\left[N,\left\{S_{i}\right\},\left\{u_{i}().\right\}\right]$ if it weakly dominates every other strategy in $S_{i}$, i.e., for every $s_{i}{ }^{\prime} \neq s_{i}$,

$$
u_{i}\left(s_{i}, s_{-i}\right) \geqq u_{i}\left(s_{i}^{\prime}, s_{-i}\right)
$$

for all $s_{-i} \in S_{-i}$ with strict inequality for some $s_{-i}$.
Similarly, we have
Definition 6.3.4 (Weak Dominated Strategy) A strategy $s_{i} \in S_{i}$ is weakly dominated in game $\Gamma_{N}=\left[N,\left\{S_{i}\right\},\left\{u_{i}().\right\}\right]$ if there is another pure strategy $s_{i}{ }^{\prime} \neq s_{i}$, such that for all $s_{-i} \in S_{-i}$,

$$
u_{i}\left(s_{i}^{\prime}, s_{-i}\right) \geqq u_{i}\left(s_{i}, s_{-i}\right)
$$

with strict inequality for some $s_{-i}$. In this case, we say that strategy $s_{i}^{\prime}$ weakly dominates strategy $s_{i}$.

If every player has a strictly dominant strategy, then we call the profile of all players' strictly dominant strategies a strictly dominant strategy equilibrium. If every player has a weakly dominant strategy, then we call the profile of all players' weakly dominant strategies a dominant strategy equilibrium. Formally, we have

Definition 6.3.5 (Strict Dominant Strategy Equilibrium) A strategy profile $\left(s_{1}, s_{2}, \ldots, s_{n}\right)$ is a strictly dominant strategy equilibrium of $\Gamma_{N}=\left[N,\left\{S_{i}\right\},\left\{u_{i}().\right\}\right]$ if for all $i, s_{i} \in S_{i}$ is a strictly dominant strategy.

Definition 6.3.6 (Dominant Strategy Equilibrium) A strategy profile $\left(s_{1}, s_{2}, \ldots, s_{n}\right)$ is a dominant strategy equilibrium of $\Gamma_{N}=\left[N,\left\{S_{i}\right\},\left\{u_{i}().\right\}\right]$ if for all $i, s_{i} \in$ $S_{i}$ is a weakly dominant strategy.

Since the players are (individually) rational, whenever there is a strictly dominant strategy for player $i$ in a game, player $i$ will choose it. In the prisoner's dilemma example above, since "Confess" is a strictly dominant strategy for both players, these two prisoners will choose the "Confess" strategy in the rational interaction. Therefore, the strategy profile ("Confess", "Confess" ) is a strictly dominant strategy equilibrium.

If a player has a strictly dominant strategy in a game, she must have only one strictly dominant strategy, and all other strategies are strictly dominated strategies. As long as the player is rational, she will not choose strictly dominated strategies. Therefore, when considering players' optimal choice, we can narrow their action sets by the iterated elimination
of strictly dominated strategies (IESDS), which is exactly what its name suggests: we iteratively eliminate strictly dominated strategies, yielding at each stage a smaller subset of surviving strategies. IESDS is a common technique for solving games that involves iterated elimination of dominated strategies. We call a strategy profile $s=\left(s_{1}, s_{2}, \ldots, s_{n}\right)$ that survives the process of IESDS an iterated-elimination equilibrium.

Like the concept of strictly dominant strategy equilibrium, the iteratedelimination equilibrium starts with the premise of rationality. In addition to rationality, the process of IESDS builds on the assumption of common knowledge of rationality: The first step of iterated elimination is a consequence of the rationality of a player who has a dominated strategy; the second stage follows because players know that players are rational; the third stage follows because players know that players know that they are rational,and this ends in a unique prediction. An attractive feature of iteratedelimination equilibrium is that it always exists. This comes, however, at the cost of uniqueness, and in fact there may be too many strategy profiles that survive the process of IESDS (see Example6.3.6).

Example 6.3.2 Consider the game described at the top of Table 6.5. Player 1 has three strategies $\{T, M, B\}$, and player 2 also has three strategies $\{L, C, R\}$.

In the initial game, since $M$ is a strictly dominated strategy for player 1, it is impossible for player 1 to choose strategy $M$, and the game after eliminating the strictly dominated strategy is described in Table 6.5(b). In this game, $C$ is a strictly dominated strategy for player 2 , and the game after eliminating the strictly dominated strategy is described in Table 6.5(c). In this game, $T$ is a strictly dominated strategy for player 1 , and the game after eliminating the strictly dominated strategy is described in Table 6.5(d). In this game, $L$ is a strictly dominated strategy for player 2 . In the game after eliminating the strictly dominated strategy, as described in Table 6.5(e), only one strategy profile remains, which is the iterated-elimination equilibrium equilibrium of the game.

Example 6.3.3 (Father Objecting Daughter's Marriage Game) Imagine a girl in a rich family falling in love with a poor boy. The father does not think it

Player 2

|  |  | L | C | R |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | T |  | 1,1 | 2,0 |
| Player 1 | B | 1,1 |  |  |
| 2,1 | 1,0 | 2,2 |  |  |

Player 2

|  |  | L | R |
| :---: | :---: | :--- | :--- |
| Player 1 | T | 1,1 | 1,1 |
|  | B | 2,1 | 2,2 |

Player 2
Player


Player 2

| Player 1 | B | R |
| :--- | :--- | :--- |
| 2,2 |  |  |

Table 6.5: Elimination of Strictly Dominated Strategy.
is a good match. He threatens his daughter, and says, "If you marry the poor boy, I will sever family ties with you" . A normal-form game can be employed to describe the game between the father and the daughter. Here, the daughter has two strategies: "Give In" and "Don't Give In" ; the father also has two strategies: "Agree" and "Disagree". If the daughter chooses "Give In" and the father chooses "Agree", then the father gets the best of both worlds (neither losing his daughter nor accepting the marriage), and the daughter loses her boyfriend. If the daughter chooses "Give In" and the father chooses "Disagree", then the father loses his daughter and the daughter loses everything. If the daughter chooses "Don't Give In" and the father chooses "Agree", then the father has to accept the poor boy, and the daughter gets the best of both worlds (neither

| Father: | Daughter |  |
| :--- | :--- | :--- |
|  | Given In | Don't Give In |
| Agree | the best of both, losing boyfriend | enduring poor boy, the best of both |
| Disagree | losing daughter, losing everything | losing daughter, losing father |

Table 6.6: Father Objecting to Daughter's Marriage Game.
losing her boyfriend nor her father). If the daughter chooses "Don't Give In" and the father chooses "Disagree", then the father loses his daughter, and the daughter loses her father.

Therefore, the game matrix shown in Table 6.6 can be obtained. What is the equilibrium outcome? First, it can be seen that for the daughter, "Give In" is a strictly dominated strategy. Irrespective of what strategy the father chooses, "Don't Give In" is a strictly dominant strategy for the daughter. If the daughter chooses "Don't Give In", then the father's best response is to choose "Agree", because accepting the poor boy is always better than losing his daughter! Then, the unique iterated-elimination equilibrium is ("Agree", "Don't Give In").

This example illustrates why in reality most fathers' efforts to resist their daughters' marriage end in failure. The reason for this is that the father's threat of cutting off family ties is not credible. For the daughter, "Don't Give In" is a dominant strategy: losing her father is better than losing everything (losing her father and her boyfriend), and the best of both worlds is better than losing her boyfriend. Indeed, a large number of actual phenomena in reality show that once the daughter and the poor boy go home with a grandson, the father often forgives his daughter. This further shows that "Don't Give In" is the optimal strategy for the daughter whose father opposes her marriage. The ideas shown in this example can also be utilized to study whether the threat of a price war is credible. We will return to the discussion of credibility issues later.

Example 6.3.4 (Boxed Pigs Game) The Boxed Pigs Game is also called the Rational Pigs Game. Imagine that two clever pigs, one Big Pig and one Piglet, live together in a pigpen. There is a lever on one side of the pigpen and a device that can provide food to the pigs on the other side. The device
produces food only if the pigs press the lever. Pushing the lever by one pig yields 10 units of food, the other pig will get the chance to run to the food earlier. Pushing and coming back"costs" either pig 2 units of food. Because the Big Pig is bigger than the Piglet, it eats faster too. Each pig can choose "Push" or "Not Push". There are four possible outcomes:

Piglet

| Big Pig |  | Push | Not Push |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | Push | 5,1 | 3,5 |
|  | Not Push | 9,-1 | 0,0 |

Table 6.7: Boxed Pig Game.
(1) Both pigs choose to "Not Push" . Then, there is no food, and the payoff profile is 0 for each pig.
(2) The Big Pig chooses to "Push", and the Piglet chooses to "Not Push" . The Big Pig, delayed by the action of pushing, eats quickly and consumes five units of food. The Piglet, not delayed, eats slowly and also consumes five units of food. After deducting the energy cost, the Big Pig gains 3 units of food, and the Piglet who does not pay any physical cost gets 5 units of food as payoff profile.
(3) The Piglet chooses to "Push", and the Big Pig chooses to "Not Push" . When the Piglet arrives at the other end of the pigpen, the Big Pig has already eaten nine units of food. The Piglet can only eat 1 unit of food, but it has to pay 2 units of energy cost. Therefore, the payoff profile of the Piglet is -1 .
(4) Both pigs choose to "Push" . In this case, the two pigs come back to eat at the same time. The Big Pig consumes 7 units of food, while the Piglet can only eat 3 units of food. After deducting their costs, the Big Pig and the Piglet gain 5 units and 1 unit of food, respectively.

Therefore, we have the payoff profile matrix shown in Table 6.7 for this

Boxed Pigs Game.
In this example, for the Piglet,"Not Push" is a strictly dominant strategy, and "Push" is a strictly dominated strategy. In other words, whether or not the Big Pig pushes the lever, it is better for the Piglet not to push. On the other hand, the Piglet is known not to push the lever, and thus pushing the lever is better for the Big Pig, and thus the unique iterated-elimination equilibrium is ( "Push", "Not Push" ). The basis for the existence of the Boxed Pig's Game is that both sides cannot escape the coexistence situation, and that there must be a party that has to pay a cost in exchange for the interests of both parties.

The Boxed Pigs Game has wide implications. For example, if a new product has just entered the market and its performance and function are not well known, and if there are other firms with more production capacity and stronger marketing capability, then it is not necessary for small firms to invest too much in advertising for product promotion. In this case, small firms need simply to wait for large firms' advertising. As another example, if the internal incentive mechanism of an enterprise is not set properly, a situation will occur in which big pigs do everything while piglets do nothing. Indeed, this kind of situation is ubiquitous in reality: most common tasks or public services are completed by a few people and other people just enjoy the outcomes. There are also many examples of the Boxed Pigs Game in society. For example: the people are big pigs and the government is piglets; private enterprises are big pigs and state-owned enterprises are piglets; reformers are big pigs and status-quo advocates are piglets; and innovators are big pigs and followers are piglets.

The above Boxed Pigs Game shows that: whoever pushes the lever will benefit the whole society, but more work does not necessarily lead to more rewards. However, as a rational person, no one is willing to benefit others all the time. In the long run, no one wants to work hard. This phenomenon exactly happened before China's reform and opening up. In the era of planned economy with limited resources, everyone, no matter a "big pig" or a "piglet", did not push the lever but counted on others to create a better communist society for themselves. Therefore, we need to redesign or reform the existing institutions or the rules of the game.

The story of the Boxed Pigs Game informs the weak participant (Piglet) in a competition that waiting is the Piglet's best strategy. However, as far as the society is concerned, since piglets do not participate in competitions and are free riders, the allocation of social resources is not optimal. Such result is, in fact, due to the inappropriate design of the institution or the rules of the game. Whether free-rider problems occur or not depends on the design of the incentive mechanism, otherwise desired outcomes cannot be achieved. Different institutional arrangements and different rules can lead to very dissimilar behaviors of economic agents, and further different choices and outcomes. For instance, the following variations of the Boxed Pigs Game give us very different equilibrium outcomes.

Reduction plan: Feed only half (5 units) of the original quantity (shortage economy). In this situation, if the Piglet pushes the lever, the Big Pig will eat all 5 units of food. If the Big Pig pushes the lever, the Piglet eats 4 units of food, the Big Pig eats only one unit of food and then has the payoff profile -1 after deducting the energy cost. If both pigs choose to "Push" and come back together, the Big Pig eats 3 units of food and the Piglet eats 2 units of food; after deducting their costs, their payoff profiles are $(1,0)$. Then, we have the payoff profile matrix depicted by Table 6.8.

| Big Pig | Push <br> Not Push | Piglet |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  |  | Push | Not Push |
|  |  | 1,0 | -1, 4 |
|  |  | 5,-2 | 0, 0 |

Table 6.8: Food Reduction Plan for the Boxed Pigs Game.

Again, "Not Push" is a strictly dominant strategy for the Piglet. Given the Piglet's dominant strategy, the Big Pig's best response is "Not Push". Then the unique iterated-elimination equilibrium is ("Not Push", "Not Push"). Whoever pushes the lever obtains negative payoff profile when the other does not, and then no one has the incentive to do so. As a
result, no one pushes the lever.
Increment plan: Feed triple of the original quantity (abundant economy). Suppose that the satiation points of consuming food for the Big Pig and Piglet are 15 and 10 units, respectively. As a result, no one can eat all units of food, leaving enough food for the other. In this situation, we have the following payoff profile matrix: We will see that this game

|  |  | Piglet |  |
| :---: | ---: | :---: | :---: |
|  |  | Push |  |
| Big Pig | Push Push |  |  |
|  | Not Push | 15,10 | 15,10 |
| 15,10 | 0,0 |  |  |

Table 6.9: Food Increment Plan for the Boxed Pigs Game.
has three Nash equilibria: ( "Push", "Push");( "Push", "Not Push" ); ( "Not Push", "Push" ). Whoever wants to eat will push the lever, since the other cannot eat all the food. The pigs here are similar to people living in a plentiful commonwealth society with abundant resources or somewhat like some European countries with very high levels of social welfare, so that their competition pressure may not be very intense compared to their counterparts in the United States.

Reduction plus displacement plan: Feed only half of the original quantity, and move the lever next to the device. Suppose that a pig who pushes the lever first has a small first-mover advantage, denoted by $\epsilon>0$, so that the payoff profile matrix is depicted in Table 6.10.

The unique strictly dominant strategy equilibrium is ("Push", "Push"). As a result, both the Big Pig and the Piglet desperately rush to push the lever, as they expect that more work brings more returns. Regardless of whether they are entrepreneurs or workers, as long as there are limited returns and scarce food in competition, they have to adapt to


Table 6.10: Food Reduction Plus Displacement Plan for the Boxed Pigs Game.
the law of the jungle and get involved in the "vicious" competition. As such, one has to innovate to get rid of the situation. Without innovation, it is not possible to survive. As mentioned in Chapter 1, there is a repeated cycle of "competition $\rightarrow$ innovation $\rightarrow$ monopoly profit $\rightarrow$ competition", in which market competition tends to achieve an equilibrium, but innovation disrupts it. The market continually goes through such cycles to inspire enterprises to pursue innovation. Through this dynamic process, the market maintains its vitality, and greater economic development and social welfare are obtained.

The differences in the above plans illustrate the crucial importance of proper institutional design. Indeed, as China's reformer Deng Xiaoping pointed out, "a good institution can prevent bad people from acting arbitrarily, while a bad institution may make good people unable to do good enough, or even go to the opposite side."

Since human nature, especially the nature of self-interest, can hardly be altered, we can only adapt to human nature through institutional design, which requires the design of rules to be forward-looking, adaptable and effective. Therefore, we need to redesign or reform the rules of the game carefully. The Boxed Pigs Game profoundly reveals that if an institution is not well designed, it will damage individuals' incentives and incur freerider problems everywhere in economic and social life. We will return to the solution of free rider in Chapter 18 on the theory of mechanism design, in which game theory displays a critical role.

To generally and more rigorously define the strictly dominated strategy, we should also take mixed strategies into account.

Definition 6.3.7 A mixed strategy $\sigma_{i}$ is called the strictly dominated mixed strategy of player $i$ in game $\Gamma_{N}=\left[N,\left\{\Delta S_{i}\right\},\left\{u_{i}().\right\}\right]$, where $\Delta S_{i}$ is player $i$ 's mixed strategy space (i.e., all possible probability distributions in pure strategy space $S_{i}$ ), if there exists player $i$ 's another mixed strategy $\sigma_{i}{ }^{\prime} \neq \sigma_{i}$, such that for any $\sigma_{-i} \in \Delta S_{-i} \triangleq \Delta S_{1} \times \cdots \times \Delta S_{i-1} \times \Delta S_{i+1} \times \cdots \times \Delta S_{n}$,

$$
u_{i}\left(\sigma_{i}, \boldsymbol{\sigma}_{-i}\right)<u_{i}\left(\sigma_{i}^{\prime}, \boldsymbol{\sigma}_{-i}\right) .
$$

Can a pure strategy be strictly dominated by a mixed strategy, even if it is not strictly dominated by any pure strategy? Can a mixed strategy be strictly dominated, even if no player has a strictly dominated strategy? The answers are in the affirmative.

$$
\begin{aligned}
& \text { player } 2 \\
&
\end{aligned}
$$

Table 6.11: Mixed Dominated Strategies.

Example 6.3.5 Consider the two games described in Table 6.12. In these two games, player 1 has three strategies $\{T, M, B\}$, and player 2 has two strategies $\{L, R\}$. In Table (a), neither player has a strictly dominated pure strategy. However, consider a mixed strategy, such as $\sigma_{1}$, in which player 1 has the same probability $1 / 2$ of choosing $T$ and $B$. Then, $M$ is a strictly dominated strategy for player 1.

In Table (b), neither player has a strictly dominated strategy. However,
consider a mixed strategy, say $\sigma_{1}{ }^{\prime}$, in which player 1 has the same probability $1 / 2$ of choosing $T$ and $M$. Then, regardless of what player 2 chooses, the utility that $\sigma_{1}{ }^{\prime}$ brings to player 1 is always lower than that brought by pure strategy $B$. In this way, mixed strategy $\sigma_{1}{ }^{\prime}$ is a strictly dominated (mixed) strategy.

In fact, since

$$
u_{i}\left(\sigma_{i}, \boldsymbol{\sigma}_{-i}\right)-u_{i}\left(\sigma_{i}^{\prime}, \boldsymbol{\sigma}_{-i}\right)=\sum_{s_{-i} \in S_{-i}}\left[\prod_{j \neq i} \sigma_{j}\left(s_{j}\right)\right]\left[u_{i}\left(\sigma_{i}, \boldsymbol{s}_{-i}\right)-u_{i}\left(\sigma_{i}^{\prime}, \boldsymbol{s}_{-i}\right)\right]
$$

$\left[u_{i}\left(\sigma_{i}, \boldsymbol{\sigma}_{-i}\right)-u_{i}\left(\sigma_{i}^{\prime}, \boldsymbol{\sigma}_{-i}\right)\right]<0$ if and only if $\left[u_{i}\left(\sigma_{i}, \boldsymbol{s}_{-i}\right)-u_{i}\left(\sigma_{i}^{\prime}, \boldsymbol{s}_{-i}\right)\right]<0 . \mathrm{We}$ then have the following proposition.

Proposition 6.3.1 A pure strategy $s_{i}$ of player $i$ is strictly dominated in game $\Gamma_{N}=\left[N,\left\{\Delta S_{i}\right\},\left\{u_{i}().\right\}\right]$ if and only if there exists another strategy $\sigma_{i}{ }^{\prime}$, such that for all $s_{-i} \in S_{-i}$,

$$
\left.u_{i}\left(s_{i}, \boldsymbol{s}_{-i}\right)<u_{i}\left(\sigma_{i}^{\prime}, \boldsymbol{s}_{-i}\right)\right]
$$

### 6.3.2 Best Response and Rationalizability

We begin with the concept of best response.
Definition 6.3.8 (Best Response) Given a game $\Gamma_{N}=\left[N,\left\{\Delta S_{i}\right\},\left\{u_{i}(\cdot)\right\}\right]$, a mixed strategy $\sigma_{i}$ is a best response of player $i$ to other players' mixed strategy profile $\sigma_{-i}$, if for any $\sigma_{i}{ }^{\prime} \in \Delta\left(S_{i}\right)$, we have

$$
u_{i}\left(\sigma_{i}, \boldsymbol{\sigma}_{-i}\right) \geqq u_{i}\left(\sigma_{i}{ }^{\prime}, \boldsymbol{\sigma}_{-i}\right)
$$

A strategy $\sigma_{i}$ is player $i^{\prime}$ s best response to $\boldsymbol{\sigma}_{-i}$, if it is an optimal choice when the player conjectures that other players will play $\sigma_{-i}$.

To define rationalizable strategies, we first need define the notions of belief and never-best-response strategy. Eliminating strictly dominated strategies is actually a rational choice of a player. The rational choice of player $i$, however, is based on the player's belief in the choices of other players. In a static game, there is a logical consistency between rationalizability on
players' strategic choices and the elimination of strictly dominated strategies.

Definition 6.3.9 (Belief) Give a game $\Gamma_{N}=\left[N,\left\{\Delta S_{-i}\right\},\left\{u_{i}(\cdot)\right\}\right]$, a belief of player $i$ about the strategies of other players is a probability distribution $\mu_{i} \in \Delta\left(S_{-i}\right)$.

Definition 6.3.10 (Never-Best-Response) Give a game $\Gamma_{N}=\left[N,\left\{\Delta S_{i}\right\},\left\{u_{i}(\cdot)\right\}\right]$, a pure strategy $s_{i}^{\prime} \in S_{i}$ of player $i$ is said to be a never-best-response if there is no belief $\mu_{i} \in \Delta\left(S_{-i}\right)$ for which $s_{i}^{\prime}$ is a best response, i.e., for any $\mu_{i} \in \Delta\left(S_{-i}\right)$, there exists $\sigma_{i} \in \Delta\left(S_{i}\right)$ such that

$$
\sum_{s_{-i} \in S_{-i}} \mu_{i}\left(s_{-i}\right) u_{i}\left(s_{i}^{\prime}, s_{-i}\right)<\sum_{s_{-i} \in S_{-i}} \mu_{i}\left(s_{-i}\right) u_{i}\left(\sigma_{i}, s_{-i}\right) .
$$

In other words, $s_{i}^{\prime}$ is not optimal against any belief $\mu_{i}\left(s_{-i}\right)$ about other players' strategies.

Obviously, if a pure strategy $s_{i}^{\prime} \in S_{i}$ is a strictly dominated strategy, then the strategy is a never-best-response. Conversely, for a finite game in which its strategy space has a finite number of strategy profiles, if a pure strategy is a never-best-response of player $i$, then this strategy must also be a strictly dominated strategy (cf. Osborne and Rubinstein (1994)). Thus in finite games, iterated elimination of never-best-response strategies yields the same outcomes as iterated elimination of strictly dominated strategies

Now we are able to define the rationalizability of strategy.
Definition 6.3.11 For game $\Gamma_{N}=\left[N,\left\{\Delta S_{i}\right\},\left\{u_{i}(\cdot)\right\}\right]$, a pure strategy $s_{i} \in$ $S_{i}$ is rationalizable, if it survives the iterated elimination of those strategies that are never-best-response.

The following facts are clear: (1) A never-best-response strategy is not rationalizable by definition. Thus, if player $i$ 's strategy $s_{i}$ is a strictly dominated strategy, it is not rationalizable. (2) Although strategy $s_{i}$ is a best response for player $i$ under beliefs $\mu_{i}$, but as long as the support of all such beliefs contains strictly dominated strategies of other players (i.e., for all beliefs $\mu_{i}(\cdot)>0$ under which $s_{i}$ is a best response, there is some $j \in N \backslash\{i\}$
such that $s_{j}$ is player $j^{\prime}$ s strictly dominated strategy), then $s_{i}$ is not rationalizable. (3) If strategy $s_{i}$ is the best response for player $i$ under beliefs $\mu_{i}$, but the support of all such beliefs contains strategies that are not rationalizable for other players, then strategy $a_{i}$ is not rationalizable.

As indicated above, for a finite game, the set of strategy profiles that survive the process of iterated elimination of never-best-response strategies coincides with the set of strategy profiles that survive the process of IESDS. Then, we have the following proposition.

Proposition 6.3.2 For a finite game $\Gamma_{N}=\left[N,\left\{\Delta S_{i}\right\},\left\{u_{i}(\cdot)\right\}\right]$, if $S^{I E}=\times_{j \in N} S_{j}^{I E}$ is the set of strategy profiles that survive the process of IESDS, then for each player $i \in N, S_{i}^{I E}$ is a set of rationalizable strategies for player $i$.

Example 6.3.6 (Continuation of Example 6.3.5) For the game depicted in Table 6.12 (a) in Example 6.3.5, we know that $M$ is a strictly dominated strategy for player 1 . Eliminating strategy $M$ from the game, we have the following payoff profile matrix:

\[

\]

Table 6.12: The rationalizable strategies for two players.

There are no remaining strictly dominated strategies in the payoff profile matrix. Then the set of rationalizable strategies for player 1 is $S_{1}^{I E}=$ $\{T, B\}$, and the set of rationalizable strategies for player 2 is $S_{2}^{I E}=\{L, R\}$.

Besides rationalizability of strategies, one can use the notion of best response to identify the Nash equilibria of a game, as discussed below.

### 6.3.3 Nash Equilibrium

Rationalizability can assist us to restrict individuals' choices in interactions. However, it is a weaker solution concept of equilibrium. In many games, there are too many rationalizable strategies such as those in Example 6.3.6.

We then need to refine the set of rationalizable strategies, and make a stronger assumption: The players are not only rational but also their expectations on others are mutually known. Here, we impose an additional restriction on players' beliefs - the rational expectation constraint, and the associated equilibrium is called Nash equilibrium. Then at a Nash equilibrium, each player will no longer adjust the player's own strategy given the player's rational expectation on the opponents's strategy profile. Thus, an important feature of Nash equilibrium is the consistency between belief and choice. In other words, the choice based on belief is rational (optimal), and the belief supporting this choice is correct (perfect foresight on the equilibrium strategy profile of the opponents). Thus, Nash equilibrium has the characteristics of predictive self enforcement. If everyone thinks this result will happen, it will really happen.

Now, we formally define the notion of Nash equilibrium.
Definition 6.3.12 (Nash Equilibrium) Given a game $\Gamma_{N}=\left[N,\left\{\Delta S_{i}\right\},\left\{u_{i}(\cdot)\right\}\right]$, strategy profile $\left(\sigma_{i}^{*}, \sigma_{-i}^{*}\right)_{i \in N}$ is a Nash equilibrium if for every $i \in N$, we have

$$
u_{i}\left(\sigma_{i}^{*}, \boldsymbol{\sigma}_{-i}^{*}\right) \geqq u_{i}\left(\sigma_{i}^{\prime}, \boldsymbol{\sigma}_{-i}^{*}\right)
$$

for all $\sigma_{i}^{\prime} \in \Delta S_{i}$.
That is, once a Nash equilibrium is reached, no participant has an incentive to deviate from the Nash equilibrium unilaterally (self enforcement).

If strategic choices are limited to pure strategies, there will be a corresponding definition for pure strategy Nash equilibrium.

Definition 6.3.13 For game $\Gamma_{N}=\left[N,\left\{S_{i}\right\},\left\{u_{i}(\cdot)\right\}\right]$, strategy profile $\left(s_{i}^{*}, s_{-i}^{*}\right)_{i \in N}$ is a pure strategy Nash equilibrium if for every $i \in N$, we have

$$
u_{i}\left(s_{i}^{*}, s_{-i}^{*}\right) \geqq u_{i}\left(s_{i}^{\prime}, s_{-i}^{*}\right)
$$

for all $s_{i}^{\prime} \in S_{i}$.
So far, we have introduced the solution concepts of strictly dominan$t$ strategy equilibrium, dominant strategy equilibrium, Nash equilibrium,
iterated-elimination equilibrium, and rationalizable strategy profile. It is clear that a (strictly) dominant strategy equilibrium is a Nash equilibrium that in turn implies that it is an iterated-elimination equilibrium and a rationalizable strategy profile, but the converse may not be true. Their relationship is in turn extended, i.e., the concept of strictly dominant strategy equilibrium is the strongest, and the concept of rationalizable strategy is the weakest. Of course, for a finite game, iterated-elimination equilibrium and rationalizable strategy profile are the same. Moreover, if the set of rationalizable strategy profiles or the set of iterated-elimination equilibria is singleton, it must be a Nash equilibrium.

Next we discuss the relationship between best response and Nash equilibrium. It is clear that, for the game $\Gamma_{N}=\left[N,\left\{\Delta S_{i}\right\},\left\{u_{i}(\cdot)\right\}\right]$, a strategy profile $\left(\sigma_{i}^{*}, \boldsymbol{\sigma}_{-i}^{*}\right)$ is a Nash equilibrium if and only if for every $i \in N, \sigma_{i}^{*}$ is a best response of player $i$ to other players' strategy profile $\boldsymbol{\sigma}_{-i}^{*}$. Indeed, Nash equilibrium means that given opponents' strategic choices, no one will choose to unilaterally deviate from the equilibrium choice and thus it is a best response strategy profile of all players. Conversely, if $\sigma^{*}$ is a best response strategy profile, it is clearly a Nash equilibrium. Thus, when a strategy profile is a Nash equilibrium, it is an element in the intersection of the sets of all players' best responses.

Thus, we have the following proposition.
Proposition 6.3.3 Given a game $\Gamma_{N}=\left[N,\left\{\Delta S_{i}\right\},\left\{u_{i}(\cdot)\right\}\right]$, the set of Nash equilibria coincides with the intersections of the sets of all players' best responses.

Although this proposition simple, it is very useful. It can be used not only to prove the existence of Nash equilibrium (as we will do it in the last section of this chapter), but also to find Nash equilibria through finding the intersections of the sets of best responses of all players. It also provides a simple method to find Nash equilibrium for two-person game.

Example 6.3.7 There are two players 1 and 2, and their game matrix is shown in Table 6.13.

We can find the Nash equilibrium of this game conveniently and quickly by using the conclusion that the set of Nash equilibria coincides with the set of intersections of all players' best response sets. Consider the strategy

| player 1 | player 2 |  |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  |  | L | C | R |
|  | T | [5, 3 | 0,4 | 3, $\underline{5}$ |
|  | M | 4,0 | 5, 5 | 4,0 |
|  | B | 3, $\underline{5}$ | 0,4 | 5, 3 |

Table 6.13: Example of Nash Equilibrium.
of player 1, and for each strategy of player 2, find out the best responses of player 1. Draw a horizontal line under its corresponding payoff profile. Similarly, find out the best responses of player 2. The strategy profile with both horizontal lines is $(M, C)$, and such a strategy profile is unique. Therefore, the strategy profile $(M, C)$ is the unique pure strategy Nash equilibrium, and its corresponding Nash equilibrium payoff profile is $(5,5)$.

Example 6.3.8 (Chicken Game) Consider the following Chicken Game. There are two equal-strength chickens. Each chicken has two strategies: "Continue to Fight" and "Retreat" . If both chickens choose "Continue to Fight", the outcome is a lose-lose, and the payoff profile of each player is -1 . If both chickens choose "Retreat", however, there is neither victory nor failure, and the payoff profile of each player is 0 . If one chicken chooses "Continue to Fight" and the other chicken chooses "Retreat", the payoff profile of the winning chicken is 1 and the payoff profile of the retreating chicken is 0 . In this way, the payoff profile matrix is:

Chicken B

|  |  | Continue To Fight |  |
| ---: | ---: | ---: | :---: |
| Chicken A | Retreat |  |  |
|  | Continue To Fight |  |  |
| Retreat |  |  |  | | $-1,-1$ | $\underline{0}$ |
| :---: | :---: |
| ,$\underline{1}$ | 0,0 |

Table 6.14: Chicken Game.
It can be seen that both (A Retreats, B Continues to Fight) and (A Continues to Fight, B Retreats) are pure strategy Nash equilibria.

When two chickens are fighting, it is a dilemma to make a choice between advancing and retreating, as the Nash equilibrium has given a best strategy of one winning and the other failing. In many contests, exerting
the utmost strength does not ensure success. This is also the logic of the famous guerrilla tactic of Mao Zedong's "The enemy advances, we retreat; the enemy retreats, we pursue" . General Matthew Bunker Ridgway also used the same strategy when he found out that each Chinese soldier could only carry food for seven days at most without logistics during the Korean War.

This example offers some pertinent implications for two equally powerful firms to get along and compete with each other. Two powerful firms already in the market are likely to consciously follow the Nash equilibrium. When one side takes the offensive, the other side temporarily retreats. Although one side may be temporarily loss, this is far superior to a loselose outcome. However, to maintain this situation such as the Battle of the Sexes game to be discussed below, it should be ensured that the next time the earlier damaged party takes the offensive, and the other side will also retreat.

The following equivalent definition of Nash equilibrium is based on the optimal decision-making of subjective beliefs:

Definition 6.3.14 For game $\Gamma_{N}=\left[N,\left\{\Delta S_{i}\right\},\left\{u_{i}(\cdot)\right\}\right]$, a Nash equilibrium consists of a pair of subjective belief system (assessment) $\mu^{*}=\left(\mu_{1}^{*}, \mu_{2}^{*}, \ldots, \mu_{n}^{*}\right)$ with $\mu_{i}^{*}$ defined on $S_{j}, j \neq i$, and strategy profile $\left(\sigma_{i}^{*}, \sigma_{-i}^{*}\right)_{i \in N}$, such that for any $\sigma_{i}{ }^{\prime} \in \Delta\left(S_{i}\right)$, we have

$$
\begin{aligned}
E u_{i}\left(\sigma_{i}^{*} \mid \mu_{i}^{*}\right) & \geqq E u_{i}\left(\sigma_{i}^{\prime} \mid \mu_{i}^{*}\right) ; \\
\sigma_{j}^{*} & =\mu_{i}^{*} \mid S_{j},
\end{aligned}
$$

where $E u_{i}\left(\sigma_{i}^{*} \mid \mu_{i}^{*}\right)=\int_{s_{i} \in S_{i}, s_{-i} \in S_{-i}} u\left(s_{i}, s_{-i}\right) d\left(\sigma_{i}\left(s_{i}\right)\right) d\left(\mu_{i}\left(s_{-i}\right)\right)$ denotes the expected utility of player $i$ choosing $\sigma_{i}$ under belief $\mu_{i}$, and $\left.\mu_{i}^{*}\right|_{S_{j}}$ represents the (marginal) probability distribution of belief $\mu_{i}^{*}$ on $S_{j}$. Note that if every player's mixed strategy is independent, then $\mu_{i}^{*}=\times\left._{j \in N \backslash\{i\}} \mu_{i}^{*}\right|_{S_{j}}$.

This definition on Nash equilibrium exactly describes the consistency between belief and choice mentioned above. The choice based on belief is rational (payoff profile maximization), and the belief supporting this choice is correct (perfect foresight on the equilibrium strategy profile of the oppo-
nents).
For some games, such as the Rock-Paper-Scissors game, there is no pure strategy Nash equilibrium, but there may exist a mixed strategy Nash equilibrium. Then, can we have a more convenient way to solve the mixed strategy Nash equilibrium? Of course, it can be always obtained by the standard method of maximizing the expected payoff profile (say, using the first-order condition), but this method is a little bit involved. In fact, there is a more straightforward way.

The following proposition shows that the indifference among strategies played with a positive probability is a general feature of a mixed strategy Nash equilibrium.

Proposition 6.3.4 Let $S_{i}{ }^{+} \subseteq S_{i}$ be the set of pure strategies that player $i$ plays with a positive probability under the mixed strategy profile $\boldsymbol{\sigma}=\left(\sigma_{1}, \sigma_{2}, \cdots, \sigma_{n}\right)$. Then the strategy profile $\boldsymbol{\sigma}=\left(\sigma_{1}, \sigma_{2}, \cdots, \sigma_{n}\right)$ is a mixed strategy Nash equilibrium of game $\Gamma_{N}=\left[N,\left\{\Delta S_{i}\right\},\left\{u_{i}(\cdot)\right\}\right]$ if and only if, for every $i \in N$, we have:
(1) $u_{i}\left(s_{i}, \boldsymbol{\sigma}_{-i}\right)=u_{i}\left(s_{i}{ }^{\prime}, \boldsymbol{\sigma}_{-i}\right)$ for all $s_{i}, s_{i}{ }^{\prime} \in S_{i}{ }^{+}$;
(2) $u_{i}\left(s_{i}, \boldsymbol{\sigma}_{-i}\right) \geqq u_{i}\left(s_{i}{ }^{\prime}, \boldsymbol{\sigma}_{-i}\right)$ for all $s_{i} \in S_{i}{ }^{+}, s_{i}{ }^{\prime} \notin S_{i}{ }^{+}$.

Proof. Necessity: Suppose by way of contradiction that one of the conditions (1) and (2) above is not satisfied. Then there exists $s_{i} \in S_{i}{ }^{+}, s_{i}{ }^{\prime} \in S_{i}$, such that $u_{i}\left(s_{i}{ }^{\prime}, \boldsymbol{\sigma}_{-i}\right)>u_{i}\left(s_{i}, \boldsymbol{\sigma}_{-i}\right)$. If player $i$ changes the chosen strategy from $s_{i}$ to $s_{i}{ }^{\prime}$, the expected payoff profile of player $i$ can be strictly increased, which means that $\sigma_{i}$ is not the best response of $\boldsymbol{\sigma}_{-i}$.

Sufficiency: Suppose that both conditions (1) and (2) above are satisfied, but $\boldsymbol{\sigma}=\left(\sigma_{1}, \sigma_{2}, \cdots, \sigma_{n}\right)$ is not a Nash equilibrium. Then, there exists at least one player $i$ and another strategy $\sigma_{i}{ }^{\prime}$, such that $u_{i}\left(\sigma_{i}{ }^{\prime}, \boldsymbol{\sigma}_{-i}\right)>$ $u_{i}\left(\sigma_{i}, \sigma_{-i}\right)$. This means that at $\sigma_{i}{ }^{\prime}$, there is at least one pure strategy $\hat{s}_{i}$ chosen by player $i$ with positive probability, and thus $u_{i}\left(\hat{s}_{i}, \boldsymbol{\sigma}_{-i}\right)>u_{i}\left(\sigma_{i}, \boldsymbol{\sigma}_{-i}\right)$ is established. Since $u_{i}\left(\sigma_{i}, \boldsymbol{\sigma}_{-i}\right)=u_{i}\left(s_{i}, \boldsymbol{\sigma}_{-i}\right)$ for all $s_{i} \in S_{i}{ }^{+}$by condition (1), we have $u_{i}\left(\hat{s}_{i}, \boldsymbol{\sigma}_{-i}\right)>u_{i}\left(s_{i}, \boldsymbol{\sigma}_{-i}\right)$. However, this contradicts at least one of the conditions (1) and (2).

Thus, given the mixed strategy Nash equilibrium profile of the opponent, the expected utility of any strategy for a player is the same, and therefore players have no incentive to change the probabilities of choosing these strategies (i.e., no players will unilaterally change their mixed strategies at equilibrium). This proposition is very helpful in finding mixed strategy equilibria, and thus it provides a simple method to solve for mixed strategy Nash equilibrium.

Player B

| Player A | Rock <br> Paper Scissors | Rock | Paper | Scissors |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  |  | 5,5 | 0,10 | 10, 0 |
|  |  | 10, 0 | 5,5 | 0,10 |
|  |  | 0, 10 | 10, 0 | 5,5 |

Table 6.15: Rock-Paper-Scissors Game.

Example 6.3.9 (Rock-Paper-Scissors Game continued) Consider Rock-PaperScissors Game once again. Its payoff profile matrix is given by Table 6.15

Suppose that column's mixed strategy assigns probability weight $\sigma_{r}$ to Rock, $\sigma_{p}$ to Paper and $\left(1-\sigma_{r}-\sigma_{p}\right)$ to Scissors. Then, using (6.2.3) leads to

$$
\left[\begin{array}{ccc}
5 & 0 & 10 \\
10 & 5 & 0 \\
0 & 10 & 5
\end{array}\right]\left[\begin{array}{c}
\sigma_{r} \\
\sigma_{p} \\
1-\sigma_{r}-\sigma_{p}
\end{array}\right]
$$

Then, row's expected payoff profile from Rock against ( $\sigma_{r}, \sigma_{p}, 1-\sigma_{r}-\sigma_{p}$ ) is

$$
5 \sigma_{r}+0 \sigma_{p}+10\left(1-\sigma_{r}-\sigma_{p}\right)
$$

row's expected payoff profile from Paper against $\left(\sigma_{r}, \sigma_{p}, 1-\sigma_{r}-\sigma_{p}\right)$ is

$$
10 \sigma_{r}+5 \sigma_{p}+0\left(1-\sigma_{r}-\sigma_{p}\right)
$$

row's expected payoff profile from Scissors against $\left(\sigma_{r}, \sigma_{p}, 1-\sigma_{r}-\sigma_{p}\right)$ is

$$
0 \sigma_{r}+10 \sigma_{p}+5\left(1-\sigma_{r}-\sigma_{p}\right)
$$

Setting these three expected payoff profiles equal to one another leads to $\sigma_{r}=\sigma_{p}=\left(1-\sigma_{r}-\sigma_{p}\right)=1 / 3$. By symmetry, this is also the column's optimal mixed strategy. Thus, the mixed strategy Nash equilibrium is (\{Rock with probability $1 / 3$, Paper with probability $1 / 3$, Scissors with probability $1 / 3\}$ ) for both players.

In this example, for the mixed strategy Nash equilibrium, $S_{i}^{+}=S_{i}$ is established for all players.

Some games have both pure strategy Nash equilibrium and mixed strategy Nash equilibrium.

Example 6.3.10 (Battle of the Sexes) The Battle of the Sexes is also a classical example analyzed in game theory. A man and a woman want a date over the weekend, but they cannot agree over what to do. The man prefers to watch a basketball game, whereas the woman wants to watch an opera. The payoff profile matrix is given by Table 6.16.


Table 6.16: Battle of the Sexes.
In this game, there are two pure strategy Nash equilibria: (Opera, Opera) and (Basketball, Basketball). Using the above method, we now show that there is also a mixed strategy Nash equilibrium : (\{Opera with probability $2 / 3$, Basketball with probability $1 / 3\}$, \{Opera with probability $1 / 3$, Basketball with probability $2 / 3$ ).

Given the man's choice of the mixed strategy $\left(\sigma_{1}, 1-\sigma_{1}\right)$, the expected payoff profile of the woman's choice of opera is $2 \sigma_{1}+0\left(1-\sigma_{1}\right)$ and the expected payoff profile of choosing basketball is $0 \sigma_{1}+1\left(1-\sigma_{1}\right)$. Equalizing them leads to $\sigma_{1}=1 / 3$. Similarly, given the woman's choice of the mixed strategy $\left(\sigma_{2}, 1-\sigma_{2}\right)$, the expected payoff profile of the man's choice of opera is $1 \sigma_{1}+0\left(1-\sigma_{1}\right)$ and the expected payoff profile of choosing basketball is $0 \sigma_{2}+2\left(1-\sigma_{2}\right)$. Equalizing them leads to $\sigma_{2}=2 / 3$. Thus, the man chooses the mixed strategy \{Opera with probability $1 / 3$, Basketball
with probability $2 / 3\}$ and the woman chooses the mixed strategy \{Opera with probability $2 / 3$, Basketball with probability $1 / 3\}$ constitute a mixed strategy Nash equilibrium.

In the above game and also the Chicken Game, there are two pure strategy Nash equilibria and one mixed Nash equilibrium. A natural question is: How many Nash equilibria are there? A partial answer is given by the Oddness Theorem (Wilson 1971), which shows that the pattern holds not just for $2 \times 2$ games, but for almost all $n \times n$ normal form games.

Theorem 6.3.1 (Oddness Theorem) Nearly all finite normal form games have an odd number of Nash equilibria.

Thus, as a corollary, provided a game has an even number of pure strategy Nash equilibria, then there must exist an odd number of mixed Nash equilibria.

Does there necessarily exist a Nash equilibrium in a game? As we will show in Section 6.7, the answer turns out to be"yes" under broad circumstances. Especially, for a normal-form game $\Gamma_{N}=\left[N,\left\{S_{i}\right\},\left\{u_{i}(\cdot)\right\}\right]$, if for each player $i \in N, S_{i}$ is a nonempty compact convex subset in Euclidean space, $u_{i}$ is continuous on $S=\prod_{i \in N} S_{i}$ and quasiconcave on $S_{i}$, then there exists a pure strategy Nash equilibrium in the game. Since each player's payoff profile function is linear in probability distributions on mixed strategy space $\Delta S_{i}$, it is quasiconcave, and thus any game with compact strategy space and continuous payoff profile functions has a mixed strategy Nash equilibrium. As a corollary, we have the following proposition whose proof will be given in Section 6.7.

Proposition 6.3.5 Every finite normal-form game $\Gamma_{N}=\left[N,\left\{S_{i}\right\},\left\{u_{i}(\cdot)\right\}\right]$ has a mixed strategy Nash equilibrium.

### 6.3.4 Refinements of Nash Equilibrium

Although the solution concept of Nash equilibrium has significantly reduced the number of rationalizable strategies, there may still be multiple or even finitely many Nash equilibria in a game. The non-uniqueness of

Nash equilibrium makes it hard to accurately predict the outcome of an interaction or in some sense, some of them result in undesirable Nash equilibrium outcomes that should be eliminated. As such, numerous approaches to refining Nash equilibria are proposed.

Thomas Schelling (1960) put forward the concept of focal point, which is a solution that people tend to choose by default in the absence of communication (i.e., a tacit understanding is formed). The context in which the players are located, such as culture, tradition, and practice, will constrain individuals' strategic choice in the interaction process. Indeed, as Schelling point out, "people can often concert their intentions or expectations with others if each knows that the other is trying to do the same" in a cooperative situation, and then their actions will approach a focal point which has some kind of prominence compared with the environment.

For example, in the Battle of the Sexes game, in order to woo the woman (man), the man (woman) usually pays more attention to the woman (man)'s feelings in their interactions. As such, their strategy profile is more likely to be the Nash equilibrium (Opera, Opera). If the background of their decisions is that they have watched the opera last time and they pay attention to equity, then this time they will choose the Nash equilibrium (Basketball, Basketball). In addition, in real life, people usually communicate in advance. In the case of the Battle of the Sexes, it is far-fetched to construe the mixed strategy equilibrium as a strategic choice in interactions, because under the mixed strategy equilibrium, both players' expected payoff profiles are $2 / 3$, which are less than the payoff profiles under pure strategy equilibrium. If the players can negotiate in advance in the process of interaction and there is a strategy profile which is the consensus of both parties after the negotiation and is also a Nash equilibrium, then individuals will not unilaterally deviate from this outcome. If the previously negotiated strategy profile is not a Nash equilibrium, then this ex ante agreement may not be followed.

Many technical standards to eliminate undesirable Nash equilibria have been introduced. One of them is the concept of trembling-hand perfec$t$ (Nash) equilibrium proposed by Selten (1975), which is a refinement of Nash equilibrium. The main idea of this concept is that a Nash equilibrium
is stable if it is preserved against small perturbations that may have originated from individuals' minor error in action. The trembling-hand perfect equilibrium means that if the sequence of probability with which individuals make mistakes approaches zero, then the trembling-hand perfect equilibrium is the limit of the equilibrium sequence in this process.

We can fully comprehend the trembling-hand perfect Nash equilibrium through the concept of subjective beliefs. When a player's subjective beliefs in the judgment of other players' actions have a minor error and this error becomes infinitely small, the player's strategy is still the best response to rational expectations (or correct beliefs).

Given a game $\Gamma_{N}=\left[N,\left\{\Delta S_{i}\right\},\left\{u_{i}(\cdot)\right\}\right]$, we define a perturbed game $\Gamma_{\varepsilon}=\left[N,\left\{\Delta_{\varepsilon}\left(S_{i}\right)\right\},\left\{u_{i}(\cdot)\right\}\right]$ by choosing for each player $i$ and strategy $s_{i} \in$ $S_{i}$ a disturbance number $\varepsilon_{i}\left(s_{i}\right) \in(0,1)$ with $\sum_{s_{i} \in S_{i}} \varepsilon_{i}\left(s_{i}\right)<1$, and then defining the (mixed) strategy space of player $i$ to be

$$
\Delta_{\varepsilon}\left(S_{i}\right)=\left\{\sigma_{i}: \sigma_{i}\left(s_{i}\right) \geqq \varepsilon_{i}\left(s_{i}\right), \sum_{s_{i} \in S_{i}} \sigma_{i}\left(s_{i}\right)=1\right\} .
$$

That is, a perturbed game $\Gamma_{\varepsilon}$ is derived from the original game $\Gamma_{N}$ by requiring that each player $i$ play only completely (or totally) mixed strategies in which every pure strategy receives positive probability not less than $\varepsilon_{i}\left(s_{i}\right)$.

Definition 6.3.15 (Trembling-Hand Perfect Nash Equilibrium) A Nash equilibrium $\sigma=\left(\sigma_{1}, \sigma_{2}, \cdots, \sigma_{n}\right)$ for a game $\Gamma_{N}=\left[N,\left\{\Delta S_{i}\right\},\left\{u_{i}(\cdot)\right\}\right]$ is a trembling-hand perfect Nash equilibrium, if there is a sequence of perturbed games $\left\{\Gamma_{\varepsilon^{k}}\right\}_{k=1}^{\infty}$ that converges to $\Gamma_{N}=\left[N,\left\{\Delta S_{i}\right\},\left\{u_{i}(\cdot)\right\}\right]$, and some associated sequence of Nash equilibria $\left\{\sigma^{k}\right\}_{k=1}^{\infty}$ that converges to $\sigma$. Here, convergence means that for each player $i$ and the player's strategy $s_{i} \in S_{i}$, we have $\lim _{k \rightarrow \infty} \varepsilon_{i}^{k}\left(s_{i}\right)=0$.

With the concept of the trembling-hand perfect Nash equilibrium, we can eliminate certain strategic choices of some players. In general, the criterion by the definition of trembling-hand perfect Nash equilibrium may be difficult to work with because it requires that we compute the equilibria of many possible perturbed games. The following characterization of the
trembling-hand perfect Nash equilibrium by Selten (1975) provides a formulation that makes checking whether a Nash equilibrium is tremblinghand perfect Nash equilibrium much easier.

Proposition 6.3.6 A Nash equilibrium $\boldsymbol{\sigma}=\left(\sigma_{1}, \sigma_{2}, \ldots, \sigma_{n}\right)$ of game $\Gamma_{N}=$ $\left[N,\left\{\Delta S_{i}\right\},\left\{u_{i}(\cdot)\right\}\right]$ is a trembling-hand perfect Nash equilibrium if and only if there is a sequence of completely mixed strategy profile $\left\{\sigma^{k}\right\}_{k=1}^{\infty}$, such that $\lim _{k \rightarrow \infty} \sigma^{k}=$ $\sigma$, and for every $k$ and every player $i \in N, \sigma^{k}{ }_{i}$ is the best response to the opponents' strategy profile $\boldsymbol{\sigma}_{-i}^{k}$.

The proof of the proposition can be found in Selten (1975). By the definition of trembling-hand perfect Nash equilibrium and Proposition 6.3.6, we immediately know that a trembling-hand perfect Nash equilibrium cannot be a weakly dominated strategy.

\[

\]

Table 6.17: Trembling-Hand Perfect Equilibrium.
Example 6.3.11 The game with two players 1 and 2 is described by Table 6.17.

In this game, there are two pure strategy Nash equilibria, $(U, L)$ and $(D, R)$. Strategy $D$ is a weakly dominated strategy for player 1 , and strategy $R$ is a weakly dominated strategy for player 2 . Although $(D, R)$ is a Nash equilibrium, it is not a trembling-hand perfect Nash equilibrium. This is because if each player has a choice deviation, no matter how small the probability of this deviation is, as long as this probability is positive, choosing a weakly dominated strategy is not a player's best response. As such, in a perturbed game, there is only one Nash equilibrium, i.e., $(U, L)$, and $(D, R)$ is not the limit of the sequence of Nash equilibria of perturbed games.

Selten (1975) also proved that every finite normal-form game $\Gamma_{N}=$ [ $\left.N,\left\{\Delta S_{i}\right\},\left\{u_{i}(\cdot)\right\}\right]$ has a trembling-hand perfect Nash equilibrium.

Trembling-hand perfect Nash equilibrium is not a unique standard to refine Nash equilibria, but there are many other standards to refine Nash equilibria. For instance, subgame perfect Nash equilibrium (SPNE) to be discussed below is another typical standard to refine Nash equilibrium in context of dynamic games.

### 6.4 Dynamic Games of Complete Information

The previous section studied games of complete information where all players make choices simultaneously. In many games, players make choices sequentially, one player observes the other players' decisions and then makes actions. The classic example is the game of Chess. The classic economic example is the Stackelberg Oligopoly in which the leader firm moves first and then the follower firm moves sequentially. This section discusses dynamic games of complete information. For a dynamic game, we may convert such an extensive-form game to a normal-form game, and then solve for the equilibrium of the normal-form game with an equilibrium concept (such as Nash equilibrium). However, such an approach likely result in many equilibria and some of them may be undesirable. We then need some criterion to refine Nash equilibria of dynamic games.

In a dynamic game, since there is an order of decisions, there may be a problem of credibility of "commitment" . A reasonable dynamic equilibrium then needs to satisfy the requirement of "credible commitment " ( "credible threat"), and thus we can refine equilibria. The "credible commitment" has new requirements for a player's rationality. It requires that players are rational in every possible decision-making environment (more precisely, every information set). This rationality is also called the sequential rationality. In the study of dynamic games, in many situations, we need to take a certain way to solve an equilibrium, usually using backward induction.

We first consider the issue of commitment through an example.
Example 6.4.1 (Market Entry Game) Suppose that there are two firms in a market, the Incumbent and the Potential Entrant. The Potential Entrant
moves first to choose whether to enter the market, and then the Incumbent decides whether or not to launch a price war. The payoff profiles of their actions are shown in Figure 6.4. Table 6.18 is the normal-form representation of the game. The game has two pure strategy Nash equilibria, i.e., (Enter, Accommodate if Enter occurs) and (Stay out, Fight if Enter occurs).


Figure 6.4: Extensive-Form of Market Entry Game.

| Potential Entrant | Enter <br> Stay Out | Incumbent |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  |  | Accommodate if Enter occurs | Fight if Enter occurs |
|  |  | $\underline{8}, \underline{5}$ | 0, 0 |
|  |  | 5, 8 | $\underline{5}, \underline{8}$ |

Table 6.18: Strategic-Form of Market Entry Game.

It is not difficult to see that the Incumbent' strategy"Fight if Enter occurs" is an incredible threat at Nash equilibrium (Stay Out, Fight if Enter occurs). The reason is that the Potential Entrant would evaluate the gain or loss of entering the market: if the Potential Entrant chooses to enter, he knows that the rational Incumbent will choose to accommodate so that the Incumbent's payoff profile is 5 ; otherwise, it is 0 , and then the Potential Entrant's payoff profile is 8 . If the Potential Entrant chooses to stay out, his payoff profile is only 5 . Thus, the rational choice of the Potential Entrant is to enter. Therefore, only Nash equilibrium (Enter, Accommodate if Enter occurs) is sequentially rational while Nash equilibrium (Stay Out,

Fight if Enter occurs) violates the principle of sequential rationality (i.e., in any possible environment, the decision-maker should make a rational decision).

In order to eliminate Nash equilibria that violate sequential rationality, backward induction is frequently used to solve for equilibrium of a dynamic game with perfect information. The equilibrium obtained through this method is the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium (SPNE) or simply termed as the subgame perfect equilibrium (SPE). We then need to know what a subgame is.

### 6.4.1 Subgame

A subgame is a subset of an entire game, but not all subsets can be a subgame. If an entire game begins with a singleton information set, then the game as a whole is also a subgame.

Definition 6.4.1 (Subgame) A subgame of an extensive-form game $\Gamma_{E}$ is a subset of the game if it satisfies the following two properties:
(1) It begins with a singleton information set. Let $x_{0}$ be the initial decision node of the subgame. The subgame contains and only contains all successors starting from this decision node. If $x$ belongs to the subgame starting from $x_{0}$, and $x \neq$ $x_{0}$, then $x \notin h\left(x_{0}\right)$, and there is a sequence $y_{1}, \cdots, y_{n}$, such that $y_{1}=x, y_{2}=p\left(y_{1}\right), \cdots, y_{n}=x_{0}=p\left(y_{n-1}\right)$, i.e., there is a sequence of immediate connected nodes connecting from $x_{0}$ to $x$.
(2) The subgame does not divide any information set. If decision node $x$ is in the subgame, then every decision node $x^{\prime} \in h(x)$ is also in the subgame.

Example 6.4.2 (Continuation of Example 6.4.1) In the above Market Entry Game, there are two subgames. The original game as a whole is a subgame. In addition, the game described in Figure 6.5 is also a subgame of the game.


Figure 6.5: A Subgame of the Market Entry Game.


None of the subsets of the game described in Figure 6.6 are subgames.
Example 6.4.3 (Non-Subgame) In the game described in Figure 6.6, the game's three subsets surrounded by the dashed lines are not subgames. In Figure 6.6(a), the initial node of the subset is not a singleton information set for firm $I$; in Figure 6.6(b), the subset divides the information set of firm $I$; in Figure 6.6(c), the initial node of the subset is not a singleton information set, and the subset divides the information set.

### 6.4.2 Backward Induction and Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibrium

As mentioned in the beginning of this section, since there is a sequence of players' decisions in an extensive-form dynamic game, an issue of the
credibility of threats arises in their interaction process.


Figure 6.7: Incumbent's Non-credible Threat.

Example 6.4.4 (Market Entry Game continued) Suppose that there are two firms $I$ and $E$, in which firm $I$ is the incumbent, and firm $E$ is the potential entrant. Firm $E$ decides whether to enter the market. If firm $I$ observes that firm $E$ has decided to enter the market, then firm $I$ may either fight or accommodate. Their payoff profiles are shown in Figure 6.7. (Stay out, Fight if firm $E$ enters) is a Nash equilibrium. However, there is a problem with this equilibrium. Once firm $E$ has chosen to enter the market, it is irrational for firm $I$ to choose to fight. In other words, firm $I$ 's threat, "If firm $E$ enters, I will choose to fight" , is not credible.

The following example suggests how we identify Nash equilibrium that satisfies the sequential rationality in more general games of imperfect information (i.e., an information set may contain more than one node).

Example 6.4.5 As shown in Figure 6.8, firm $E$ is the potential market entrant, and firm $I$ is the incumbent. Firm $E$ first chooses whether or not to enter (In) or stay out (Out). Once firm $E$ enters, firm $E$ and firm $I$ choose whether to accommodate (A) or fight (F) simultaneously. The normal form representation and the simultaneous-move game are depicted in (a) and (b) of Table 6.4.2, respectively.

From the normal form, we see that there are three Nash equilibria $\left(\sigma_{E}, \sigma_{I}\right)$ :
(1) ((Stay out, Accommodate if entering), Fight if Enter occurs);


Figure 6.8: Sequential Rationality in Game with Imperfect Information.
(2) ((Stay out, Fight if entering), Fight if Enter occurs);
(3) ((Enter, Accommodate if entering), Accommodate if Enter occurs).

However, in the simultaneous-move game, the unique Nash equilibrium is (Accommodate, Accommodate) after entry. Indeed, once firm $E$ has chosen to enter the market, "Accommodate" is a strictly dominant strategy and then it is rational for firm I to choose "Accommodate" too. Therefore, the two firms should expect that they will both play "Accommodate" after Firm E enters. Thus the logic of sequential rationality suggests that among three Nash equilibria, only ((Enter, Accommodate if entering), Accommodate if Enter occurs) strategy profile is a reasonable Nash equilibrium.

These examples reveal that a reasonable equilibrium concept of an extensiveform game is more demanding than Nash equilibrium. The equilibrium concept related to extensive-form games is subgame perfect Nash equilibrium. We then have the following formal definition.

Definition 6.4.2 (Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibrium) In an extensive-form game with $n$ players, a strategy profile is a subgame perfect (Nash) equilibrium (SPNE), if it is a Nash equilibrium in every subgame.

From the definition of SPNE, it is clear that every SPNE is a Nash equilibrium since the game as a whole is a subgame, but not every Nash equilibrium is subgame perfect. In a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium,
Firm I

| Firm E |  | A if Enter occurs | F if Enter occurs |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | Out, A if entering | 0, $\underline{3}$ | $\underline{0}, \underline{3}$ |
|  | Out, F if entering | 0, $\underline{3}$ | $\underline{0}, \underline{3}$ |
|  | In, A if entering | $\underline{5}, \underline{2}$ | $-3,-2$ |
|  | In, F if entering | $2,-3$ | -4, -2 |

(a): The Normal Form Representation
Firm I

|  | Accommodate | Fight |  |
| ---: | ---: | :---: | :---: |
| Firm E | Accommodate | $\underline{y}, \underline{2}$ | $\underline{-3},-2$ |
| Fight | $2,-3$ | $-4, \underline{-2}$ |  |

(b): The Simultaneous-Move Game

Table 6.19: The normal form representation and the simultaneous-move game.
each player's strategy is rationalizable on every possible information set, and each player's choice on each information set is based on the subjective beliefs about the information set that meet the rational expectation assumption (i.e., on each information set, the choice based on belief is rational, and the belief supporting this choice is correct).

The claim that a subgame perfect equilibrium is a Nash equilibrium in every subgame implies that for a dynamic game of complete information, players' decisions are rational on each information set (i.e., they satisfy the requirements of sequential rationality). If an extensive-form game is a perfect information game (i.e., each information set is a singleton), then backward induction can be used to solve for the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium of this game.

Backward induction: Start from the decision node at the bottom level, reducing the subgames at the bottom level to equilibrium payoff profiles of these subgames, and then advances recursively to the subgames at the upper level, reducing the subgames at this level to equilibrium payoff profiles of these subgames. This process continues until the very beginning of the game is reached.

Example 6.4.6 (Continuation of Example 6.4.4) Consider the previous mar-


Figure 6.9: Market Entry Game (continuation).
ket entry game. Diagram (a) in Figure 6.9 is the entire game. In the market entry game, there are two subgames: the original game (Diagram (a)), and the subgame starting from the incumbent's decision node (Diagram (b)). Backward induction starts from the subgame at the lowest level (i.e., from the game in Diagram (b)). The Nash equilibrium of the game in Diagram (b) is the incumbent choosing to accommodate, and thus the equilibrium payoff profile of this subgame is $(8,5)$, and then the entire game is reduced to the game in Diagram (c). At this time, the game has advanced to the topmost level (i.e., the subgame is replaced by its equilibrium payoff profile). The Nash equilibrium of the game in Diagram (c) is the Potential Entrant choosing to enter. Therefore, (Enter, Accommodate if Enter occurs) is the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium of the entire market entry game.

For a finite extensive form game of perfect information, there is always a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium stated in the following proposition.

Proposition 6.4.1 Every finite normal-form game of perfect information $\Gamma_{E}$ has a pure strategy subgame perfect Nash equilibrium. Moreover, if no player has the same payoff profiles at any two terminal notes, then there is a unique subgame perfect Nash equilibrium.

The proof for the existence of a pure strategy subgame perfect Nash equilibrium of a finite extensive form game is straightforward from the defini-
tion of subgame perfect Nash equilibrium since every finite subgame has a Nash equilibrium. Solving the dynamic game via backward induction, the solution obtained is a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium. The proof for the uniqueness of a pure strategy subgame perfect Nash equilibrium is more involved and is referred to Mas-Colell, Whinston, and Green (1995).

In the following, we study the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium of a dynamic game in which players make decisions alternately. As the shape of this dynamic game's extensive-form representation is similar to that of a centipede, it is called the Centipede Game. This game reveals that, although the total payoff profile increases after each cooperation, unfortunately, this happy ending is hard to achieve (i.e., no cooperation from the very beginning is a rational choice). Thus, like the Prisoner's Dilemma, the Centipede Game presents a conflict between self-interest and mutual benefit.


Figure 6.10: Centipede Game.

Example 6.4.7 (Centipede Game) The classic Centipede Game is a dynamic game problem proposed by Rosenthal (1981), and has many others in different modified forms. The original version of the game consisted of a sequence of a hundred moves with linearly increasing payoff profiles.

The "Centipede Game" considered here is an extensive-form game in which two players alternately get a chance to either take the larger portion (stop cooperation, denoted as S ) of a continually increasing pile of coins or pass to the opponent (continue cooperation, denoted as C ). As soon as a player takes, the game ends with that player getting the larger portion of the pile while the other player gets the smaller portion. Passing strictly decreases a player's payoff profile if the opponent takes on the next move.

The interactions are described by Figure 6.10.
The extensive form representation of a six-stage centipede game ends after six rounds. Passing the pile across the table is represented by a move of $C$ (going across the row of the lattice) and taking a larger portion of an increasing pile is a move of $S$ (down the lattice). The numbers 1 and 2 at a black circle ("decision node") denotes a decision opportunity for player 1 and player 2. The top number at the end of each vertical line is a payoff profile for player 1 and the bottom number is a payoff profile for player 2. Player 1 moves first: If player 1 chooses $S$, player 1 gets 1 and player 2 gets 0 ; if player 1 chooses $C$, the opportunity to make a decision passes to player 2. Player 2 has the second move: If player 2 chooses $S$, player 1 gets payoff profile of 0 and player 2 gets 2 ; if player 2 chooses $C$, the opportunity to make a decision passes to player 1 . And so on to the end of the game tree after six rounds, and the income is + distributed.

What does game theory predict will happen? Game Theory predicts that player 1 will choose $S$ in his first move. We use the backward induction procedure to solve for the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium. For the lowest subgame in which player 2 makes her third decision, the Nash equilibrium is that player 2 chooses strategy $S$. Then, we advance recursively to the upper level subgame. The Nash equilibrium of this subgame is that player 1 chooses $S$, and player 2 chooses $S$. This process continues until the topmost level of the game is reached. The subgame perfect Nash equilibrium of the entire game is ( $S, S, S ; S, S, S$ ) (i.e., players 1 and 2 choose $S$ in each period). Therefore, no cooperation from the very beginning is a rational choice.

This conclusion is very counter-intuitive. In practice, although cooperation is difficult to last long, the willingness to cooperate is actually common in the short run. Because of this, the Centipede Game is considered the best example of what is known as the "backward induction paradox." Indeed, typical experimental results in studying actual behaviour in different versions ( a four move, six move, and high payoff profile versions) of the centipede game by McKelvey and Palfrey (1992) found that subjects rarely followed the theoretical predictions. In fact, in only $7 \%$ of the four-move games, $1 \%$ of the six-move games, and $15 \%$ of the high payoff profile games
did the first player choose to take on the first move. Similar results were reported by Nagel and Tang (1998). There are some types of explanation to account for the divergence. One is that not all individuals are fully (sequentially) rational but bounded rational. The second one is that a player's self-interest or players' distrust interferes the cooperation and creates a situation where both do worse than if they had blindly cooperated. The third explanation may be simply because of the possibility of action errors such as pressing the wrong key.

If some enforcement or incentive mechanism could be imposed, both players would prefer that they both cooperate throughout the entire game as we will discuss next chapter.

The extensive-form games for solving perfect Nash equilibrium in the above examples are all perfect information games in which every information set is singleton. In a game with complete but imperfect information, we can use a more general backward induction procedure to get all possible subgame perfect Nash equilibria.

General Backward Induction: Start from the bottom level, at each level of game tree, identify the Nash equilibria for each of subgames, and then applies the backward induction procedure to each Nash equilibrium to get subgame perfect Nash equilibria. If multiple equilibria are never encountered during the process, the strategy profile is a unique subgame perfect Nash equilibrium. Otherwise, the set of subgame perfect Nash equilibria is identified by repeating the procedure for each possible equilibrium that could occur for the subgames in question.

Below, we discuss by example how to employ the general backward induction procedure to solve a dynamic game of complete but imperfect information.

Example 6.4.8 (Market Entry and Site Selection) There are two firms $E$ and $I$. Firm $E$ chooses whether to enter the market first. If firm $E$ does not enter, the game ends; if firm $E$ enters, in the second stage, firms $E$ and $I$ select their sites simultaneously. In this game, there is a non-singleton information set, so that it is not a perfect information game. There are $t$ wo subgames in this game. In addition to the original game, after firm $E$


Figure 6.11: Market Entry and Site Selection.
chooses to enter, the game in which two firms move simultaneously is also a subgame.

The subgame in which two firms move simultaneously can be described by Diagram (a) in Figure 6.11. This subgame has two Nash equilibria: (Large, Small) and (Small, Large), and the equilibrium payoff profiles are $(1,-1)$ and $(-1,1)$, respectively, which can be used to reduce this simultaneous move game. Therefore, the backward induction of this step produces two possibilities, which are given in Diagrams (b) and (c), respectively. In the game in Diagram (b), the Nash equilibrium is firm $E$ choosing to enter; whereas, in the game in Diagram (c), the Nash equilibrium is firm $E$ choosing to stay out. As such, the entire game has two subgame perfect Nash equilibria ((Enter, Large if entering), Small if Enter occurs) and ((Stay Out, Small if entering), Large if Enter occurs).

For a finite extensive form game of complete information but not necessarily perfect information, we have the following proposition.

Proposition 6.4.2 Every finite normal-form game of complete information $\Gamma_{E}$ has a mixed strategy subgame perfect Nash equilibrium.

Now, we use the concept of subgame perfect Nash equilibrium to discuss a classic example of economics (which is also a common situation in practice) - the bargaining game. There are many versions of the bargaining game, including the Nash bargaining game, the Rubinstein bargaining game, and bargaining games with finite or infinite periods.

Example 6.4.9 (Rubinstein Bargaining Game, 1982) Suppose that there are two players who conduct a bargaining on how to split a total of 1 unit of an infinitely divisible property. Obviously, in this game, any $\left(x_{1}, x_{2}\right) \in$ $[0,1] \times[0,1]$ with $x_{1}+x_{2}=1$ is a Nash equilibrium, and thus there are infinitely uncountable Nash equilibria, but the subgame perfect equilibrium is unique. Since backward induction is more suitable for bargaining games with finite periods, we first discuss the bargaining game with $T \geqq 1$ periods.

The bargaining process is as follows: In the $2 k+1$ period, $k=0,1, \ldots$, player 1 proposes a distribution plan (in which the payoff profile received by any player is not allowed to be negative), and player 2 chooses whether to accept it; in the $2 k$ period $(k \neq 0)$, player 2 proposes a distribution plan, and player 1 chooses whether to accept it. Once an agreement is reached in a certain period, at which player 1 (or player 2) chooses to accept the distribution plan proposed by the opponent, the game ends, and the distribution of the property is determined by the distribution plan. If the two players still have not reached an agreement in the $T$ period, then the property is confiscated and the two players will receive nothing. Suppose that the time discount rate for both players is $\delta$. Let $\left(x_{t}, 1-x_{t}\right)$ be a distribution plan proposed by the player who has the right to make a proposal during the $t$ period, where $x_{t}$ is the amount of property distributed to player 1 and $1-x_{t}$ is the amount of property distributed to player 2.

When $T=1$, player 1 has the right of proposal, and player 2 chooses whether or not to accept it. Obviously, as long as $x_{2}=1-x_{1} \geqq 0$, player 2 will not choose to reject the proposal. Therefore, the Nash equilibrium of the game is that player 1 proposes a distribution plan of $(1,0)$, and player 2 accepts it.

When $T=2$, in the last period, player 2 has the proposal right. Similar
to the logic in the previous case, in this period, player 2's proposal is $(0,1)$, and player 1 will also choose to accept $i t$. In this plan, the present value of the payoff profile profile of these two players is $(0, \delta)$. Returning to the first period, player 1 has the right of proposal. As long as $x_{2}=1-x_{1} \geqq \delta$, player 2 will accept player's 1 proposal, because if player 2 does not accept player 1's proposal, player 2's final payoff profile is still $\delta$ in the subgame in the last period. Therefore, in the equilibrium path of the game, player 1 proposes a distribution plan $(1-\delta, \delta)$ and player 2 accepts it in the first period, and the game ends.

When $T=3$, in the last period, player 1 has the proposal right. Similar to the logic in the previous cases, in this period, player 1's proposal is ( 1,0 ), and player 2 will also choose to accept it. Returning to the second period, player 2 has the right of proposal, and as long as $x_{1}=1-x_{2} \geqq \delta$, player 1 will accept player 2's proposal. Returning to the first period, player 1 has the right of proposal, and as long as $x_{2}=1-x_{1} \geqq \delta(1-\delta)$, player 2 will accept player 1's proposal. Therefore, in the equilibrium path of the game, player 1 proposes a distribution plan $\left(1-\delta+\delta^{2}, \delta-\delta^{2}\right)$ and player 2 accepts it in the first period, and the game ends.

We find that in the case of $T=1,2,3$, player 1 proposes a distribution plan $\left(\frac{1-(-\delta)^{T}}{1+\delta}, 1-\frac{1-(-\delta)^{T}}{1+\delta}\right)$ and player 2 accepts this plan in the first period, and then the game ends. As a consequence, we conjecture that for all $T$, we have: player 1 proposes a distribution plan $\left(\frac{1-(-\delta)^{T}}{1+\delta}, 1-\frac{1-(-\delta)^{T}}{1+\delta}\right)$ and player 2 accepts this plan in the first period, and then the game ends. This can be proven by mathematical induction.

Let $\left(x_{t}(T), y_{t}(T)\right)$ denote the distribution plan of the $t$ period of the bargaining game with the deadline of $T$ period(s), which satisfies $x_{t}(T)+$ $y_{t}(T)=1$. First of all, when $T=1$, the above conclusion holds. Assume that when $T=K$, the above conclusion is also true. That is, the distribution plan $\left(x_{1}(K)=\frac{1-(-\delta)^{K}}{1+\delta}, y_{1}(K)=1-x_{1}(K)\right)$ proposed by player 1 in the first period will be accepted by player 2 .

Suppose now that $T=K+1$. Consider the distribution plan in the second period $\left(x_{2}(K+1), y_{2}(K+1)\right)$. The subgame starting from the second period is the same as the bargaining game with the deadline of $K$ period(s) in which player 2 proposes a distribution plan first, and thus $y_{2}(K+1)=$
$x_{1}(K)=\frac{1-(-\delta)^{K}}{1+\delta}$ and $\left(x_{2}(K+1)=1-x_{1}(K), y_{2}(K+1)=x_{1}(K)\right)$ will be accepted by player 1 . Returning to the first period, $\left(x_{1}(K+1)=1-\delta y_{2}(K+\right.$ 1), $\left.y_{1}(K+1)=\delta y_{2}(K+1)\right)$ will be accepted by player 2 . Therefore, the distribution plan:
$\left(x_{1}(K+1)=1-\delta\left(\frac{1-(-\delta)^{K}}{1+\delta}\right)=\frac{1-(-\delta)^{K+1}}{1+\delta}, y_{1}(K+1)=1-x_{1}(K+1)\right)$
proposed by player 1 in the first period will be accepted by player 2 .
In this way, in the equilibrium path of the bargaining game with the deadline of $T$ period(s), player 1 proposes a distribution plan:

$$
\left(\frac{1-(-\delta)^{T}}{1+\delta}, 1-\frac{1-(-\delta)^{T}}{1+\delta}\right)
$$

and player 2 accepts this plan in the first period, and then the game ends.
When $\delta<1$ and $T \rightarrow \infty$, the subgame perfect equilibrium becomes

$$
\left(x_{1}, x_{2}\right)=\left(\frac{1}{1+\delta}, \frac{\delta}{1+\delta}\right)
$$

in which player 1 gets the first-mover advantage. In particular, if $\delta=0$, player 1 gets the whole property. Only when the friction disappears (i.e., $\delta \rightarrow 1)$, the shares become the same since $\left(x_{1}, x_{2}\right) \rightarrow(1 / 2,1 / 2)$.

If the time discount rates for both players are different, denoted by $\left(\delta_{1}, \delta_{2}\right) \in(0,1) \times(0,1)$, as $T \rightarrow \infty$, the subgame perfect equilibrium is given by

$$
\left(x_{1}, x_{2}\right)=\left(\frac{1-\delta_{2}}{1-\delta_{1} \delta_{2}}, \frac{\delta_{2}\left(1-\delta_{1}\right)}{1-\delta_{1} \delta_{2}}\right)
$$

Since the proof is somewhat complicated, it is referred to Fudenberg and Tirole (1991). As $\delta_{1} \rightarrow 1$ for fixed $\delta_{2}, x_{1} \rightarrow 1$ and player 1 gets the whole property, whereas player 2 gets the whole property if $\delta_{2} \rightarrow 1$ for fixed $\delta_{1}$. Player 1 also gets the whole property if $\delta_{2}=0$. However, even if $\delta_{1}=0$, player 2 does not get the whole property if $\delta_{2}<1$. Again, player 1 has the first-mover advantage.

In a two-person Nash bargaining game, the Nash bargaining solution $\left(x_{1}, x_{2}\right)$ is defined as the solution that maximizes the Nash product $\left(x_{1}-\right.$
$\left.v_{1}\right)\left(x_{2}-v_{2}\right)$, where $v_{i}$ represents the reservation utility of player $i$ or called $\left(v_{1}, v_{2}\right)$ the disagreement payoff profile profile since it is the payoff profile profile if the parties fail to agree.

Now suppose that $v_{1}=v_{2}=0$. Then the solution of the Nash bargaining game is given by $\left(x_{1}, x_{2}\right)=(1 / 2,1 / 2)$, which is the same as the solution of the Rubinstein bargaining game when $\delta_{1}=\delta_{2}=\delta \rightarrow 1$.

### 6.5 Static Games of Incomplete Information

Incomplete information is enormously important in game theory. In many interactions, information is asymmetric. Individuals do not know information about other individuals' types or payoff profile/untility functions. Incomplete information introduces additional strategic interactions and also raises questions related to "learning" . Examples are: a bidder does not know other bidders' values of the auction item; a sell often does not know the type of consumers, a firm often does not know how the exac$t$ cost of their competitors in a market competition; how you should infer the information of others from the signals they send; how much the other party is willing to pay is generally unknown to you in bargaining situation. However, all such incomplete information in these examples will affect the interaction process and outcomes. In addition, even when player 1 knows player 2's information, player 2 may not know that player 1 knows player 2 's information (e.g., when some of the related information is not common knowledge), and thus the Nash equilibrium concept cannot be applied to the analysis of strategic interactions with incomplete information.

Another development milestone in game theory is then the analytical framework proposed by Harsanyi $(1967,1968)$ to investigate games under incomplete information. Harsanyi converted games of incomplete information into games of complete (but imperfect) information. The key to this is to convert a player's subjective judgment about all other players' private information into random variables which describe other player$\mathrm{s}^{\prime}$ types. The type variables of players are exogenous random variables, which can be described by "natural" actions, while Nature's actions are based on type variables' prior probability distribution, which is common
knowledge of all players of the game. Different players may have different signals for these type variables. These signals can also be utilized to revise posterior beliefs. In this way, incomplete information can be converted into complete but imperfect information by describing all unknown information and beliefs by type variables. The complete information defined here refers to a situation in which a player's information state can be defined by an information set, and this information state is common knowledge. Nature assigns a random variable to each player, which could take values of types for each player.

At the beginning of the game, players' types are exogenously-given random variables whose values are decided by Nature. A player knows her own type, and does not know other players' types, but knows their prior distributions. The game after transforming from incomplete information to complete but imperfect information is called the Bayesian game. In the Bayesian game, belief is an essential concept, especially for dynamic games of incomplete information, which is a player's subjective judgment of other players' types distribution. If a player obtains some new information, the player will update beliefs about other players' types using Bayes' rule. We will use the concept of Bayesian-Nash equilibrium to analyze the equilibrium of strategic interactions in static games.

### 6.5.1 Bayesian Game

The Bayesian game of incomplete information is now formally defined.
Definition 6.5.1 (Bayesian Game) A Bayesian game, denoted by

$$
\Gamma_{B}=\left(\tilde{N},\left(A_{i}\right)_{i \in N},\left(T_{i}\right)_{i \in N}, p,\left(u_{i}(\cdot)\right)_{i \in N}\right),
$$

is characterized by the following five components:
(1) A set of players: $\tilde{N}=\left\{N, N_{0}\right\}$ is the set of players, where $N_{0}$ is Nature.
(2) A set of actions for each player: $A_{i}$ is the set of player $i^{\prime}$ s actions, and $A \equiv \prod_{i \in N} A_{i}$ is the set of action profiles of all players.
(3) A set of types for each player: $t_{i}$ is the type of player $i$, $\boldsymbol{t}=\left(t_{i}\right)_{i \in N}$ is a profile of all players' types, $T_{i}$ is the set of player $i$ 's types and $T \equiv \prod_{i} T_{i}$ is the set of all profiles of players' types. Nature randomly selects all players' types, and players know their own types.
(4) A joint probability distribution: The joint probability distribution of types is $p$, a common prior distribution for all players, and is denoted by $p(\boldsymbol{t})$. Nature randomly selects the profile of types $\boldsymbol{t}$ with the probability of $p(\boldsymbol{t})$. After player $i$ knows her own type $t_{i}$, the player's posterior belief in the distribution of other players' types is determined by the Bayes rule:

$$
p\left(\boldsymbol{t}_{-i} \mid t_{i}\right)=\frac{p\left(t_{i}, \boldsymbol{t}_{-i}\right)}{p\left(t_{i}\right)}
$$

where $p\left(t_{i}\right) \equiv \sum_{t_{-i}} p\left(t_{i}, \boldsymbol{t}_{-i}\right)$ is the (marginal) probability of player $i^{\prime}$ s type and $t_{-i} \equiv\left(t_{1}, \cdots, t_{i-1}, t_{i+1}, \cdots, t_{n}\right)$. In a Bayesian game, the type of player $i$ is the private information that is not known to others. More generally, we could also allow for a signal for each player, so that the signal is correlated with the underlying type vector.
(5) A payoff profile for each player: player $i$ 's utility function is $u_{i}(\cdot): A \times T \rightarrow \mathcal{R}$.

Note that the Bayes' Rule is not well-defined if there is a zero probability event that appears in the denominator of the formula for a conditional probability. This matters little for now, but matters a lot when requiring sequential rationality in dynamic games of incomplete information. Also, when players' probability distributions are independent each other, we have

$$
p\left(\mathbf{t}_{-i} \mid t_{i}\right)=p\left(\mathbf{t}_{-i}\right) .
$$

Now we are ready to define an important concept of a Bayesian game.
Definition 6.5.2 A pure strategy for player $i$ is a map $s_{i}: T_{i} \rightarrow A_{i}$, assigning an action for each type of player $i$, i.e., $s_{i}=s_{i}\left(t_{i}\right)_{t_{i} \in T_{i}}$ is a complete plan
of player $i$ for all possible types, where $s_{i}\left(t_{i}\right)$ is an action plan of player $i$ when the player's own type is $t_{i}$.

The set of all possible strategies player $i$ for type $t_{i}$ is denoted by $S_{i}\left(t_{i}\right)$. Player $i^{\prime}$ s strategy space $S_{i} \equiv \prod_{t_{i} \in T_{i}} S_{i}\left(t_{i}\right): T_{i} \rightarrow A_{i}$ is then a correspondence (set-valued map). The corresponding mixed strategy space is denoted as $\Delta S_{i} \equiv \prod_{t_{i} \in T_{i}} \Delta S_{i}\left(t_{i}\right)$.

Definition 6.5.3 A mixed strategy for player $i$ is a map $\sigma_{i}: T_{i} \rightarrow \Delta S_{i}$, assigning a probability distribution on $\Delta S_{i}$.

Since the payoff profile functions, possible types, and the prior probability distribution are common knowledge, the (interim) expected payoff profiles of player $i$ of type $t_{i}$ is given by

$$
\begin{align*}
& E_{\boldsymbol{t}_{-i}} u_{i}\left(s_{i}^{\prime}, \boldsymbol{s}_{-i}, t_{i}\right)= \sum_{\boldsymbol{t}_{-i}} p\left(\boldsymbol{t}_{-i} \mid t_{i}\right) u_{i}\left(s_{i}^{\prime}\left(t_{i}\right), \boldsymbol{s}_{-i}\left(\boldsymbol{t}_{-i}\right), \boldsymbol{t}\right)  \tag{6.5.4}\\
& \text { when types are finite } \\
&=\int u_{i}\left(s_{i}^{\prime}\left(t_{i}\right), \boldsymbol{s}_{-i}\left(\boldsymbol{t}_{-i}\right), \boldsymbol{t}\right) d p\left(\boldsymbol{t}_{-i}\right)  \tag{6.5.5}\\
& \text { when types are not finite. }
\end{align*}
$$

Here, "the interim expected utility" means that it is taken when the player knows her own type but does not known others'types (i..e, information is asymmetric). When a strategy is a mixed strategy, the expected payoff profiles of player $i$ of type $t_{i}$ is given by $U_{i}\left(\sigma_{i}^{\prime}, \sigma_{-i}, t_{i}\right)$.

In the following, we describe the Bayesian game with two examples.
Example 6.5.1 (Incomplete Information Prisoner's Dilemma) Consider a variant of the Prisoner's Dilemma depicted by Table 6.20. In this Bayesian game, the set of players is $N=\{1,2\}$. Each player's action set is \{Deny, Confess\}. Player 1 only has one type. Player 2 has two types, and the set of player 2's types is $T_{2}=\{I, I I\}$.

The common prior probability of player 2 's type distribution is $p(I)=$ $p(I I)=0.5$. If Prisoner 2 is of type $I$, the payoff profiles of Prisoner 1 and Prisoner 2's interaction are represented by the first matrix in Table 6.20. If

|  |  | Prisoner 2: Type $I$ |  |
| :---: | ---: | :---: | :---: |
| Prisoner 1 | Deny | Deny | Confess |
|  |  | Confess |  |
|  |  | $-2,-2$ | $-10,-1$ |
|  |  |  |  |


| Prisoner 1 |  | Prisoner 2: Type II |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  |  | Deny | Confess |
|  | Deny | -2, -2 | $-10,-7$ |
|  | Confess | -1, -10 | -5, -11 |

Table 6.20: Prisoner's Dilemma with Incomplete Information.

Prisoner 2 is of type $I I$, the payoff profiles of Prisoner 1 and Prisoner 2's interaction are represented by the second matrix in Table 6.20.

Formally, the Bayesian game for this incomplete information prisoner's dilemma can be decried as

$$
\Gamma_{B}=\left(N,\left(A_{1}, A_{2}\right),\left(T_{1}, T_{2}\right), p,\left(u_{1}, u_{2}\right)\right)
$$

which has the following characteristics:
(1) the set of players: $N=\{1,2\}$;
(2) the set of actions: $A_{1}=\{$ Deny, Confess $\}$ and $A_{2}=\{$ Deny, Confess);
(3) the set of types: $T_{1}=\left\{t_{1}\right\}$ and $T_{2}=\{I, I I\}$;
(4) the prior probability distribution is given by $p(t=I)=p(t=$ $I I)=1 / 2$.
(5) the utility functions $u_{i}\left(a_{1}, a_{2} ; t_{1}, t_{2}\right), i=1,2$, are given by in the payoff profile matrixes in Table 6.20.

An auction example is discussed below. In an auction, each bidder has incomplete information about other bidders. Auctions come in numerous forms. Assume that the auction format employed here is the Second-Price Sealed-Bid Auction.

Example 6.5.2 (Second-Price Sealed-Bid Auction) Suppose that there are $n$ bidders $\{1,2, \cdots, n\}$ participating in an antique auction. Bidder $i$ 's value of the antique is $v_{i}$. Each bidder only knows her own value, but does not know other bidders' values. Each bidder's value is independent. A bidder's value of the antique is then the type of the bidder and obeys the same probability distribution $q_{i}(\cdot): V \rightarrow(0,1)$, where $V$ is a set of all possible values. Therefore, each bidder's type set is $V$. Let $b_{i}$ be the bid chosen by bidder $i$. The bidder with the highest bid gets the antique, but pays the second-highest bidding price. If there are multiple bidders at the highest price, they will get the antique with the same probability and pay their bid price once they win.

In this Bayesian game, the set of bidders is $\tilde{N}=\left\{N, N_{0}\right\}$, where $N_{0}$ is Nature who determines bidders' types based on the prior probability distribution of other bidders' types. Bidder $i$ 's action set is $A_{i}=\mathcal{R}_{+}$. The set of signals received by bidder $i$ is $T_{i}=V$ (i.e., all bidders know their own types). All bidders have a common prior probability $p(\boldsymbol{t})=\prod_{i \in N} q\left(t_{i}\right)$, where $\boldsymbol{t}=\left(t_{i}\right)_{i \in N}$.

A profile of bidders' bids is $\left(b_{1}, \cdots, b_{n}\right)$. If $b_{i}>b_{j}$ for all $j \in N \backslash i$, bidder $i$ 's payoff profile is

$$
\Pi_{i}\left(b_{i}, \boldsymbol{b}_{-i}\right)=\left\{\begin{array}{cl}
v_{i}-\max _{j \neq i} b_{j} & \text { if } b_{i}>\max _{j \neq i} b_{j}  \tag{6.5.6}\\
0 & \text { if } b_{i}<\max _{j \neq i} b_{j}
\end{array}\right.
$$

If $b_{i}=\max _{j \neq i} b_{j}$, the types shall be decided by lot (i.e., the object is randomly assigned by the same probability).

We will come back to discuss their equilibrium solutions of these two examples.

### 6.5.2 Bayesian-Nash Equilibrium

The basic equilibrium concept corresponding to the game of incomplete information is Bayesian-Nash equilibrium at which every player's interim expected payoff profile is maximized given the strategies of others.

Definition 6.5.4 (Pure-Strategy Bayesian-Nash Equilibrium) A strategy profile $s=\left(s_{i}\left(t_{i}\right)_{t_{i} \in T_{i}}\right)_{i \in N}$ is said to be a pure-strategy Bayesian-Nash equilibrium of game $\Gamma_{B}$ if for all $i \in N$ and all $t_{i} \in T_{i}$, we have

$$
s_{i}\left(t_{i}\right) \in \arg \max _{s_{i}^{\prime}\left(t_{i}\right) \in S\left(t_{i}\right)} \sum_{t_{-i}} p\left(\boldsymbol{t}_{-i} \mid t_{i}\right) u_{i}\left(s_{i}^{\prime}{ }^{\prime}\left(t_{i}\right), \boldsymbol{s}_{-i}\left(\boldsymbol{t}_{-i}\right), \boldsymbol{t}\right),
$$

or in the non-finite case,

$$
s_{i}\left(t_{i}\right) \in \arg \max _{s_{i}^{\prime}\left(t_{i}\right) \in S\left(t_{i}\right)} \int u_{i}\left(s_{i}^{\prime}\left(t_{i}\right), s_{-i}\left(\boldsymbol{t}_{-i}\right), \boldsymbol{t}\right) d p\left(\boldsymbol{t}_{-i}\right) .
$$

It is clear that every dominant strategy equilibrium is a Bayesian-Nash equilibrium, and the converse may not be true.

Definition 6.5.5 (Mixed-Strategy Bayesian-Nash Equilibrium) A strategy profile $\sigma=\left(\sigma_{i}\left(t_{i}\right)_{t_{i} \in T_{i}}\right)_{i \in N}$ is a mixed-strategy Bayesian-Nash equilibrium of game $\Gamma_{B}$ if for all $i \in N$ and all $t_{i} \in T_{i}$, we have

$$
\sigma_{i}\left(t_{i}\right) \in \arg \max _{\sigma_{i}^{\prime}\left(t_{i}\right) \in \Delta S\left(t_{i}\right)} \sum_{t_{-i}} p\left(\boldsymbol{t}_{-i} \mid t_{i}\right) u_{i}\left(\sigma_{i}^{\prime}{ }^{\prime}\left(t_{i}\right), \boldsymbol{\sigma}_{-i}\left(\boldsymbol{t}_{-i}\right), \boldsymbol{t}\right),
$$

or in the non-finite case,

$$
\sigma_{i}\left(t_{i}\right) \in \arg \max _{\sigma_{i}^{\prime}\left(t_{i}\right) \in \Delta S\left(t_{i}\right)} \int u_{i}\left(\sigma_{i}^{\prime}\left(t_{i}\right), \boldsymbol{\sigma}_{-i}\left(\boldsymbol{t}_{-i}\right), \boldsymbol{t}\right) d p\left(\boldsymbol{t}_{-i}\right)
$$

## Example 6.5.3 (Incomplete Information Prisoner's Dilemma (continued))

We now find a (pure-strategy) Bayesian-Nash equilibrium of the Prisoner's Dilemma with incomplete information in Eexample 6.5.1. For player 1, regardless of the type of his opponent, choosing "Confess" is his dominant strategy. For player 2, if her type is $I$, choosing "Confess" is her dominant strategy, and if her type is $I I$, choosing "Deny" is her dominant strategy. Since any dominant strategy equilibrium is a Bayesian-Nash equilibrium, the Bayesian-Nash equilibrium of this game is $\left(s_{1}\left(t_{1}\right)=\right.$ Confess; $\mathrm{s}_{2}(I)=$ Confess, $\mathrm{s}_{2}(I I)=$ Deny).

Example 6.5.4 (Second-Price Sealed-Bid Auction (continued)) For the SecondPrice Sealed-Bid Auction, for player $i$, truth-telling $s_{i}\left(v_{i}\right)=v_{i}$ is the player's weakly dominant strategy. To see this, consider two cases:

Case 1. When $v_{i}>\max _{j \neq i} b_{j}$, bidding $b_{i}>\max _{j \neq i} b_{j}$ and the true value $v_{i}$ bring the same payoff profilef $v_{i}-\max _{j \neq i} b_{j}>0$, but when $b_{i}<\max _{j \neq i} b_{j}$, the opportunity to win is lost, so that the payoff profile is less than that brought by bidding the true value $v_{i}$. Thus, when $v_{i}>\max _{j \neq i} b_{j}, s_{i}\left(v_{i}\right)=v_{i}$ is a weakly dominant strategy.

Case 2. When $v_{i} \leqq \max _{j \neq i} b_{j}$, bidding $b_{i} \leqq \max _{j \neq i} b_{j}$ and the true value $v_{i}$ bring the same payoff profile 0 , but when the bidding price $b_{i}>$ $\max _{j \neq i} b_{j}$, the payoff profile $v_{i}-\max _{j \neq i} b_{j}<0$ is smaller than the payoff profile of bidding $v_{i}$. Thus, when $v_{i} \leqq \max _{j \neq i} b_{j}, s_{i}\left(v_{i}\right)=v_{i}$ is also a weakly dominant strategy.

Therefore, truth-telling $\left(s_{i}\left(t_{i}=v_{i}\right)=v_{i}\right)_{i \in N, t_{i} \in T_{i}}$ is a Bayesian-Nash equilibrium.

In the above examples, there is a (weakly) dominant strategy for each type of player. In many interaction situations, there is no dominant strategy equilibrium. The following examples illustrates how we can find BayesianNash equilibria that are not dominant strategy equilibria.

$$
\text { Player 2: } t_{2}=1
$$

| Player 1 |  | L | R |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | U | 2, -2 | -2, 2 |
|  | D | -2,2 | 2,-2 |

$$
\begin{aligned}
& \text { Player 2: } t_{2}=2
\end{aligned}
$$

Table 6.21: Bayesian Game

Example 6.5.5 Consider a two-player Bayesian game in which the payoff profiles depend on $t_{2}$ and actions are as in Table 6.21. Only player 2 knows whether $t_{2}=1$ or $t_{2}=2$.

The Bayesian game can be written as

$$
\Gamma_{B}=\left(N,\left(A_{1}, A_{2}\right),\left(T_{1}, T_{2}\right), p,\left(u_{1}, u_{2}\right)\right)
$$

which has the following characteristics:
(1) the set of players: $N=\{1,2\}$;
(2) the set of actions: $A_{1}=\{U, D\}$ and $A_{2}=\{L, R\}$;
(3) the set of types: $T_{1}=\left\{t_{1}\right\}$ and $T_{2}=\{1,2\}$;
(4) the probability distribution is given by $p\left(t_{2}=1\right)=p\left(t_{2}=\right.$ $2)=1 / 2$.
(5) the utility functions $u_{i}\left(a_{1}, a_{2} ; t_{1}, t_{2}\right), i=1,2$, are given by in the payoff profile matrixes in Table 6.21.

This game has no dominant strategy equilibrium. We now show there is a pure strategy Bayesian-Nash equilibrium. Note that a pure strategy for player 1 is an action $s_{1}\left(t_{1}\right) \in A_{1}$, and a pure strategy for player 2 is a pair $\left(s_{2}\left(t_{2}=1\right), s_{2}\left(t_{2}=2\right)\right) \in A_{2} \times A_{2}$, assigning an action for each type of player 2.

To find a pure strategy Bayesian-Nash equilibrium, suppose that player 1 chooses $s_{1}\left(t_{1}\right)=U$. Then, player 2's best response to this strategy is $s_{2}\left(t_{2}=1\right)=R$ and $s_{2}\left(t_{2}=2\right)=L$. Now we need to verify that $s_{1}\left(t_{1}\right)=U$ is also a best response to player 2's strategy $\left(s_{2}\left(t_{2}=1\right)=R, s_{2}\left(t_{2}=2\right)=\right.$ $L)$. Indeed, the expected payoff profile of player 1 from $U$ is

$$
\begin{aligned}
E_{t_{2}} u_{1}(U) & =u_{1}\left(U, s_{2}(1), t_{2}=1\right) p\left(t_{2}=1\right)+u_{1}\left(U, s_{2}(2), t_{2}=2\right) p\left(t_{2}=2\right) \\
& =u_{1}\left(U, R, t_{2}=1\right) \times \frac{1}{2}+u_{1}\left(U, L, t_{2}=2\right) \times \frac{1}{2} \\
& =-2 \times \frac{1}{2}+3 \times \frac{1}{2}=\frac{1}{2}
\end{aligned}
$$

and the expected payoff profile of player 1 from $D$ is

$$
\begin{aligned}
E_{t_{2}} u_{1}(D) & =u_{1}\left(D, s_{2}(1), t_{2}=1\right) p\left(t_{2}=1\right)+u_{1}\left(D, s_{2}(2), t_{2}=2\right) p\left(t_{2}=2\right) \\
& =u_{1}\left(D, R, t_{2}=1\right) \times \frac{1}{2}+u_{1}\left(D, L, t_{2}=2\right) \times \frac{1}{2} \\
& =2 \times \frac{1}{2}-2 \times \frac{1}{2}=0 .
\end{aligned}
$$

Hence, $E_{t_{2}} u_{1}(U)>E_{t_{2}} u_{1}(D)$ and thus $U$ is player 1's best response to the strategy of player 2. Therefore, the strategy profile $\left(s_{1}\left(t_{1}\right)=U ; s_{2}\left(t_{2}=\right.\right.$ $\left.1)=R, s_{2}\left(t_{2}=2\right)=L\right)$ is a Bayesian-Nash equilibrium.

Example 6.5.6 (Incomplete Information Cournot) Consider a Cournot model in which two firms both produce at constant marginal cost. The market demand is given by $P(Q)$. Firm 1 has marginal cost equal to $C$ which is common knowledge. Firm 2's marginal cost is private information. It is equal to $C_{L}$ with probability $\beta$ and to $C_{H}$ with probability $(1-\beta)$, where $C_{L}<C_{H}$.

Then this Cournot game has 2 players, and the set of actions of each player are $q_{i} \in[0, \infty)$, but firm 2 has two types $T_{2}=\{L, H\}$.

The payoff profile functions of the players, after output choices are made, are given by

$$
\begin{aligned}
& u_{1}\left(\left(q_{1}, q_{2}\right), t\right)=q_{1}\left(P\left(q_{1}+q_{2}\right)-C\right) \\
& u_{2}\left(\left(q_{1}, q_{2}\right), t\right)=q_{2}\left(P\left(q_{1}+q_{2}\right)-C_{t}\right)
\end{aligned}
$$

where $t \in\{L, H\}$ is the type of player 2 .
A strategy profile can be represented as $\left(q_{1}^{*}, q_{L}^{*}, q_{H}^{*}\right)$, where $q_{L}^{*}$ and $q_{H}^{*}$ denote the actions of player 2 as a function of its types. We can find the Bayesian-Nash equilibria of this game by computing the best response function and finding their intersection.

There are three best response functions and they are are given by

$$
\begin{aligned}
B_{1}\left(q_{L}, q_{H}\right)= & \arg \max _{q_{1} \geqq 0}\left\{\beta\left(P\left(q_{1}+q_{L}\right)-C\right) q_{1}\right. \\
& \left.+(1-\beta)\left(P\left(q_{1}+q_{H}\right)-C\right) q_{1}\right\} \\
B_{L}\left(q_{1}\right)= & \arg \max _{q_{L} \geqq 0}\left\{\left(P\left(q_{1}+q_{L}\right)-C_{L}\right) q_{L}\right\} \\
B_{H}\left(q_{1}\right)= & \arg \max _{q_{H} \geqq 0}\left\{\left(\left(P\left(q_{1}+q_{H}\right)-C_{H}\right) q_{H}\right\} .\right.
\end{aligned}
$$

The Bayesian-Nash equilibria of this game are vectors $\left(q_{1}^{*}, q_{L}^{*}, q_{H}^{*}\right)$ satisfying the best responses of all players:

$$
B_{1}\left(q_{L}^{*}, q_{H}^{*}\right)=q_{1}^{*}, \quad B_{L}\left(q_{1}^{*}\right)=q_{L}^{*}, \quad B_{H}\left(q_{1}^{*}\right)=q_{H}^{*}
$$

To simplify the algebra, suppose that $P(Q)=\bar{Q}-Q$ with $Q \leqq \bar{Q}$. Then we
have

$$
\begin{aligned}
q_{1}^{*} & =\frac{1}{3}\left(\bar{Q}-2 C+\beta C_{L}+(1-\beta) C_{H}\right) \\
q_{L}^{*} & =\frac{1}{3}\left(\bar{Q}-2 C_{L}+C\right)-\frac{1}{6}(1-\beta)\left(C_{H}-C_{L}\right), \\
q_{H}^{*} & =\frac{1}{3}\left(\bar{Q}-2 C_{H}+C\right)+\frac{1}{6} \beta\left(C_{H}-C_{L}\right) .
\end{aligned}
$$

Note that $q_{L}^{*}>q_{H}^{*}$. This reflects the fact that with lower marginal cost, the firm will produce more.

Example 6.5.7 (First-Price Sealed-Bid Auction) There are bidders whose valuations are independent and follow uniform distribution $G$ on $[0,1]$. The bidder with the higher bid wins the auction item at the bidding price. If they submit the same biding price, each player obtains the item with equal probability and pays the bidding price. Let $v_{1}$ and $v_{2}$ be the types of bidders 1 and 2 whose strategies are $b_{1}\left(v_{1}\right)$ and $b_{2}\left(v_{2}\right)$, respectively.

We want to solve the symmetric Bayesian-Nash equilibrium (i.e., $b_{1}\left(v_{1}\right)=$ $b\left(v_{1}\right)$ and $\left.b_{2}\left(v_{2}\right)=b\left(v_{2}\right)\right)$. Suppose that $b(v)$ is an increasing function, as we will verify later. The expected utility of bidder $i$ with type $v_{i}$ when she bids $b_{i}$ is

$$
E_{v_{j}} u_{i}\left(b_{i}, v_{i}\right)=\left(v_{i}-b_{i}\right) \operatorname{prob}\left(b\left(v_{j}\right)<b_{i}\right)+\frac{1}{2}\left(v_{i}-b_{i}\right) \operatorname{prob}\left(b\left(v_{j}\right)=b_{i}\right) .
$$

Since player $j$ has a continuous distribution and the bid is a strictly increasing function of the type, we have $\operatorname{prob}\left(b\left(v_{j}\right)=b_{i}\right)=0$ and

$$
\operatorname{prob}\left(b\left(v_{j}\right)<b_{i}\right)=\operatorname{prob}\left(v_{j}<b^{-1}\left(b_{i}\right)=G\left(b^{-1}\left(b_{i}\right)\right) \equiv \Phi\left(b_{i}\right) .\right.
$$

Hence,

$$
E_{v_{j}} u_{i}\left(b_{i}, v_{i}\right)=\left(v_{i}-b_{i}\right) \Phi\left(b_{i}\right) .
$$

The first-order condition of maximization is

$$
-\Phi\left(b\left(v_{i}\right)\right)+\left(v_{i}-b\left(v_{i}\right)\right) \Phi^{\prime}\left(b\left(v_{i}\right)\right)=0 .
$$

Since $\Phi\left(b\left(v_{i}\right)\right)=G\left(b^{-1}\left(b_{i}\right)\right)=G\left(v_{i}\right), \Phi^{\prime}\left(b\left(v_{i}\right)\right)=\frac{G^{\prime}}{b^{\prime}\left(v_{i}\right)}$, and $G^{\prime}\left(v_{i}\right)=1$,
we have

$$
\left.G\left(v_{i}\right) b^{\prime}\left(v_{i}\right)+b\left(v_{i}\right)\right)=v_{i}
$$

or

$$
\frac{d}{d v_{i}}\left[G\left(v_{i}\right) b\left(v_{i}\right)\right]=v_{i} .
$$

Thus, taking the integral from 0 to $v_{i}$ on the both sides and noting $G\left(v_{i}\right)=$ $v_{i}$, we have

$$
b\left(v_{i}\right)=\frac{v_{i}}{2} .
$$

Obviously, $b\left(v_{i}\right)$ is a strictly increasing function. Therefore, the BayesianNash equilibrium of this First-Price Sealed-Bid Auction is $b\left(v_{i}\right)=\frac{v_{i}}{2}, i \in N$.

It is sometimes difficult to understand mixed strategies, such as the previous Battle of the Sexes game under which both players' expected payoff profiles are less than the payoff profiles under pure strategy equilibrium. If so, why do they play mixed strategies? The Bayesian game can provide a rationalized explanation for the mixed strategy. It is because of incomplete information.

A mixed strategy equilibrium in a game of complete information can be constructed by the limit of a sequence of pure strategy Bayesian-Nash equilibria for games of incomplete information. This kind of interpretation of a mixed strategy equilibrium was first proposed by Harsanyi (1974).


Table 6.22: The Bayesian-Nash Equilibrium Interpretation of Mixed Strategy in the Battle of the Sexes.

Example 6.5.8 (Mixed Strategy and Bayesian-Nash Equilibrium) Consider the Battle of the Sexes game with a mixed strategy in which the woman will choose opera with probability $2 / 3$ and the man will choose basketball with probability $2 / 3$. In real life, however, it is an extreme situation in which players know exactly all the information of other players. For more general and practical interactions, there will always be more or less incomplete
information. Suppose that a sufficiently small incomplete information is introduced to the Battle of the Sexes game, as shown in Table 6.22. What will occur when the degree of incomplete information goes to zero (i.e., complete information)?

Let $x_{1}$ and $x_{2}$ be the types of the woman and the man, respectively, and they both obey the uniform distribution on $[0, x]$. When $x \rightarrow 0$, the limit of this incomplete information game is a complete information game, which returns to the previous example of Battle of the Sexes. We can use pure strategy Bayesian-Nash equilibrium of the incomplete information game to explain mixed strategy Nash equilibrium of the complete information game.

Suppose that the Bayesian-Nash equilibrium of this incomplete information game has the following properties: for the woman, as long as $x_{1}$ does not exceed a certain threshold $c<x$, she will still choose opera; otherwise, she will choose basketball, because the size of $x_{1}$ represents the woman's love for basketball. Similarly, for the man, as long as $x_{2}$ does not exceed a certain threshold $d<x$, he will still choose basketball; otherwise, he will choose opera.

In this way, the woman expects that the man will choose basketball with a probability of $\frac{d}{x}$ and choose opera with a probability of $1-\frac{d}{x}$. Similarly, the man expects that the woman will choose opera with a probability of $\frac{c}{x}$ and choose basketball with a probability of $1-\frac{c}{x}$. For women of type $x_{1}$, the expected utility for choosing opera is $2 \frac{x-d}{x}$, and the expected utility for choosing basketball is $\left(1+x_{1}\right) \frac{d}{x}$. When $x_{1}=c$, choosing opera or basketball makes no difference for the woman. Therefore, an equilibrium requires $(1+c) \frac{d}{x}=2 \frac{x-d}{x}$ or $(1+c) d=2(x-d)$. In the same way, we can obtain $(1+d) c=2(x-c)$. Solving the two equations, we obtain $c=d$ and $\frac{c}{x}=$ $\frac{4}{\sqrt{9+8 x}+3}$. Since $\lim _{x \rightarrow 0} \frac{4}{\sqrt{9+8 x}+3}=\frac{2}{3}$, when $x \rightarrow 0$, the woman chooses opera and basketball with probabilities $2 / 3$ and $1 / 3$, respectively. Similarly, we can also get: when $x \rightarrow 0$, the man chooses basketball and opera with probabilities $2 / 3$ and $1 / 3$, respectively.

Thus, the above example explains why individuals choose mixed strategies by introducing incomplete information. In other words, a player's
judgment of other players' mixed strategies may stem from a lack of understanding them.

Similarly, we can have the existence theorems on Bayesian-Nash equilibrium. For a Bayesian game with continuous strategy space and continuous types, if strategy sets and type sets are compact subsets in Euclidean space, payoff profile functions are continuous on the strategy spaces and concave in own strategies, then there exists a pure strategy Bayesian-Nash equilibrium.

For an incomplete information Bayesian game with finite strategy space and finite types, we have the following proposition.

Proposition 6.5.1 Every finite incomplete information Bayesian game has a mixed strategy Bayesian-Nash equilibrium.

### 6.6 Dynamic Games of Incomplete Information

So far, we have discussed static and dynamic games of complete information and static games of incomplete information. Now, we discuss dynamic games of incomplete information. This type of game is much more realistic. As this type of game exhibits features of both dynamic and incomplete information, it has more subtle factors that affect individuals' strategic interactions.

First of all, there is a new type of incomplete/asymmetric information. When the players have several moves in sequence, their earlier moves may reveal private information that is relevant to the decisions of players moving later on. In such a situation, the only subgame may be just the whole game and thus the solution of subgame perfect Nash equilibrium cannot be used to refine Nash equilibria. In addition, like a static game of incomplete information, the players may not know the others' types decided by Nature.

Then, an important factor to be considered is that players' beliefs should be specified and updated. Since a player can obtain information on the opponents' decision nodes through their previous actions (i.e., the previous actions of the opponents may contain some signal about the opponents'
information on moves and types), players can use both the knowledge of the entire game as well as the actions that have previously occurred in the game to update their beliefs about which node in the information set they are at through Bayes' rules.

Combining the insights of SPNE under dynamic situation and BayesianNash equilibrium in static game of incomplete information with the revision of the beliefs using Bayesian rule "whenever possible", a natural solution concept is the weak perfect Bayesian equilibrium (weak PBE) ${ }^{1}$, or called the weak sequent equilibrium by Myerson (1991), which needs to satisfy three requirements. The first requirement is that beliefs must be specified. When a player has multiple decision nodes within an information set, the player must specify a belief about which node in the information set he is at. This is a new requirement.

The second requirement is that the strategy choices must be sequentially rational. Each player must be acting optimally at each information set given the player's beliefs and the opponents' subsequent strategies that follow the information set (i.e., strategies must be best responses both to beliefs and to other players' strategies). The third requirement is that the beliefs must be updated by Bayes' rule at the equilibrium path (which mean$s$ the information set is reached when the equilibrium strategy is played). These three requirements together define a weak PBE.

However, the weak PBE does not impose any restriction off the equilibrium path. It is loosely defined by stating that players should be sequentially rational given beliefs in which Bayes' rule is applied" whenever possible." Consequently, there may exist undesirable weak perfect Bayesian equilibria. This is why the modifier "weak" was added here. So it is necessary to make further refinements.

Then a fourth requirement is the full consistence in the sense that the off-equilibrium-path beliefs are also determined by Bayes' rule and the players' equilibrium strategies where possible through the means of "tremblinghand" , i.e., playing completely mixed strategy so that the probability of

[^9]reaching any information set is positive and then beliefs on any information set can be updated according to Bayes' rule. These four requirements together define the solution concept of sequential equilibrium proposed by Kreps and Wilson (1982a) or called the strong PBE. Thus, the sequential equilibrium refines the Bayes-Nash equilibrium concept by eliminating "noncredible threats," and also eliminates some of the SPNE that exist "noncredible threats" when there is imperfect information.
When the types of players are the asymmetry of information, we will define the perfect Bayesian equilibrium and discuss the signaling game. All these solution concepts can be further refined by imposing various restrictions.

In the following, we will discuss these equilibrium solution concepts. We will first consider the situation where earlier moves of players are private information or the initial mover (state or type) of a player is determined by Nature. We then consider signaling games where types of players are private information.

### 6.6.1 Beliefs, Sequential Rationality and Bayes' Rule

## Specification of Belief:

Below, we first introduce the concept of belief system/assessment.

Definition 6.6.1 (A System of Belief) A system of beliefs in an extensive-form game $\Gamma_{E}$ is a function $\mu: X \rightarrow[0,1]$ that maps all actions in each information set to a probability distribution, i.e., for each information set $h \in H$, we have

$$
\sum_{x \in h} \mu(x)=1 .
$$

That is, a belief system means that for any information set $h$, the player who moves at point $h$ believes that she is at node $x \in h$ with probability $\mu(x \mid h)$. A player's belief system on an information set is actually a subjective judgment on the types of the opponents and the player's previous actions.

## Sequential Rationality:

In a dynamic game of incomplete information, just like in a dynamic game of complete information, the desirability for players' rationality is sequential rationality. Sequential rationality requires that at any point in the game, a player will choose the optimal actions from that point on given the opponents' strategies and her beliefs about what happened so far in the game. Then, a behavior strategy that assigns a probability distribution over actions at each information set $h$ should be used. Since we only deal with games of perfect recall, as indicated before, we may simply call a behavior strategy as a (mixed) strategy.

Definition 6.6.2 (Assessment) An assessment is a pair $(\boldsymbol{\sigma}, \boldsymbol{\mu})$ consisting of a strategy profile $\boldsymbol{\sigma}$ and a system $\boldsymbol{\mu}$.

Definition 6.6.3 (Sequential Rationality) A (behavior) strategy profile $\boldsymbol{\sigma}=$ $\left(\sigma_{h}\right)_{h \in H}$ with $\sigma_{h} \in \Delta A(h)$ in an extensive-form game $\Gamma_{E}$ is sequentially rational at information set $h \in H$ given a system of belief $\boldsymbol{\mu}$, if

$$
E_{\iota(h)}\left[u_{\iota(h)}\left(\sigma_{h}, \boldsymbol{\sigma}_{-h}\right) \mid h, \mu\right] \geqq E_{\iota(h)}\left[u_{\iota(h)}\left(\sigma^{\prime}{ }_{h}, \boldsymbol{\sigma}_{-h}\right) \mid h, \boldsymbol{\mu}\right], \forall \sigma_{h}^{\prime} \in \Delta A(h)
$$

where $\boldsymbol{\sigma}_{-h}=\left(\sigma_{h^{\prime}}\right)_{h^{\prime} \in H / h}$.
A strategy profile $\boldsymbol{\sigma}$ is sequentially rational given belief system $\boldsymbol{\mu}$ if strategy profile $\boldsymbol{\sigma}$ is sequentially rational at every information set $h \in H$ given belief system $\mu$.

We say that an assessment $(\boldsymbol{\sigma}, \boldsymbol{\mu})$ is sequentially rational if the strategy profile $\boldsymbol{\sigma}$ is sequentially rational given belief system $\boldsymbol{\mu}$.

The sequential rationality implies that, in order to have an equilibrium $\sigma, \mu$ must also be consistent with $\sigma$, which requires that players know which (mixed) strategies are played by the other players.

Although subgame perfect often very useful in capturing the principle of sequential rationality, sometimes it is not enough. The following example shows that SPNE cannot give us a direct help to eliminate those Nash equilibria with incredible threat strategies.

Example 6.6.1 (Non-Sequential Rationality of a SPNE) Figure 6.12 depicts a market entry game with two firms where firm $E$ can have two strategies to enter, Enter 1 and Enter 2, but firm I cannot distinguish which strategy firm E has used if entry occurs. Then firm I's information set contain two nodes. Firms' profile of strategies can be discussed in the dynamic game of incomplete information.


Figure 6.12: Market Entry Game.

|  |  | Firm I |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Firm E | Stay out |  |  |  |
|  | Accommodate if entry occurs | Fight if entry occurs |  |  |
|  | Enter 1 | $0, \underline{3}$ | $\underline{0}, \underline{3}$ |  |
|  | Enter 2 | $\underline{0}$ | $-2,-2$ |  |
|  |  | $3, \underline{1}$ | $-2,-2$ |  |

Table 6.23: The Normal Form Representation of Market Entry Game.
There is only one subgame that is the whole game and thus all Nash equilibria are SPNE. From the normal form representation depicted in Table 6.23, this game has two Nsh equilibria: One is (Stay Out, Fight if entry occurs) and the other is (Enter 1, Accommodate if entry occurs). However, strategy profile (Stay Out, Fight if entry occurs) does not satisfy sequential rationality since the sequential rationality for incomplete information game requires that the actions on any information set (not merely on a subgame, here it is the whole game) should be rational. On firm I's information set, regardless of what firm $I^{\prime}$ belief is (i.e., regardless of what entry strategy
firm $E$ has occurred), "Accommodate if entry occurs" is always more favorable than"Fight if entry occurs" .

Therefore, the solution concept of subgame perfect can not be directly applied to argue the sequential rationality in a dynamic game of incomplete information. However, the logic of SPNE is applicable. Sub-game perfect requires that an equilibrium strategy not only constitutes Nash equilibrium in the whole game, but also constitutes Nash equilibrium in every subgame. Following this logic, we require the sequential rationality for every continuation game which may begin with an information set with multiple decision nodes and also assigns beliefs (probabilities) about at which decision node the player is. Although continuation game is kind of like a subgame, but it is different from a subgame since a subgame begins with the single decision node and does not divide any information set.

A reasonable equilibrium then should meet the following requirements: given each player's beliefs about other players' moves (decision nodes), the player updates the beliefs using Bayes' rule, and the resulting strategy profile constitutes a Bayesian-Nash equilibrium in each continuation game.

## Bayes' Rule:

Understanding Bayes' rule is very important to understand the concept of (weak) Bayesian perfect equilibrium. Before giving a formal definition of weak Bayesian perfect equilibrium, we first explain Bayes' rule with the following intuitive example.

Example 6.6.2 (An Intuitive Explanation of Bayes' Rule) Suppose that two events $S$ (Smoke) and $F$ (Fire) can occur exclusively or together according to some prior probability distribution $P(\cdot) . P(S)$ denotes the prior probability of smoke (how often we can see smoke), $P(F)$ the prior probability of fire (i.e., how often there is fire), and $P(S \cap F)$ the prior probability that it will be smoke with fire. When you see smoke; what can you infer about (update) the probability of fire (without seeing the fire)?

Since the joint probability distribution $P(S \cap F)$ can be expressed as

$$
\begin{aligned}
P(S \cap F) & =P(F) \times P(S \mid F) \\
& =P(S) \times P(F \mid S)
\end{aligned}
$$

conditional on event $S$ occurring, the probability that event $F$ occurs is

$$
\begin{aligned}
P(F \mid S) & =\frac{P(S \cap F)}{P(S)} \\
& =\frac{P(F) \times P(S \mid F)}{P(S)}
\end{aligned}
$$

which tells us:
When we know how often smoke happens given that fire happens (i.e., $P(S \mid F)$ ), how likely fire is on its own (i.e., $P(F)$ ), and how likely smoke is on its own (i.e., $P(S)$ ), then we can know how often fire happens given that smoke happens (i.e., $P(F \mid S)$ ).
$P(F \mid S)$ is then called the posterior which is what we are trying to estimate, and $P(S \mid F)$ the likelihood which is the probability of observing the new evidence, given the initial hypothesis. So the formula kind of tells us "forwards" $P(F \mid S)$ when we know "backwards" $P(S \mid F)$.

For instance, dangerous fires are rare $(P(F)=1 \%)$, but smoke is fairly common $(P(S)=10 \%$ ) due to barbecues, and $P(S \mid F)=95 \%$ of dangerous fires make smoke. We can then discover the probability of dangerous Fire when there is Smoke:

$$
P(F \mid S)=\frac{P(F) \times P(S \mid F)}{P(S)}=\frac{1 \% \times 95 \%}{10 \%}=9.5 \% .
$$

Thus, given the probability of $S$, using Bayes' rule, we can significantly update the probability of fire from the prior $1 \%$ to the posterior $9.5 \%$.

Now if we interpret $S$ and $F$ as the sets of actions and players's decision nodes, respectively, since players' previous actions reveal the information on their moves, one can update one's belief system on opponents' moves using Bayes' rule.

To illustrate the consistency requirement on belief to be made in the definition of a weak perfect Bayesian equilibrium, consider a situation in which each player plays a completely mixed strategy profile $\sigma$ (i.e., each player's equilibrium strategy assigns a strictly positive probability to each possible action at every information set $h \in H$ ). In this case, every information set in the game can be reached with positive probability. In particular, if an information set contains only one decision node, it is clear that the belief on this information set is giving probability 1 to this decision node. Then the player should sign a conditional probabilities of being at each $x$ of nodes in every information set $h$ using Bayes' rule:

$$
\begin{align*}
\operatorname{prob}(x \mid h, \boldsymbol{\sigma}) & =\frac{\operatorname{prob}(x \mid \boldsymbol{\sigma})}{\sum_{x^{\prime} \in h}^{\operatorname{prob}\left(x^{\prime} \mid \boldsymbol{\sigma}\right)}} \\
& =\frac{\operatorname{prob}(x \mid \boldsymbol{\sigma})}{\operatorname{prob}(h \mid \boldsymbol{\sigma})} \tag{6.6.7}
\end{align*}
$$

The more serious issue arises when players are not using completely mixed strategies. In this situation, not all information sets can be reached with a positive probability, Bayes' rule is not well defined at which the denominator in the above formula is zero. Then Bayes' rule cannot be used to compute conditional probabilities for the nodes in these information sets. We refer to the information set which is not reached with positive probability as an information set off the equilibrium path.

In the dynamic game of incomplete information, there are different equilibrium concepts corresponding to different requirements for the information sets off the equilibrium path. The solution concept of weak perfect Bayesian equilibrium given below does not impose any restrictions on the beliefs on information sets off the equilibrium path, but rather imposes restrictions only on the information sets on an equilibrium path, requiring that beliefs are consistent with the equilibrium strategy's sequential rationality.

### 6.6.2 Weak Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium

Now we formally define the concept of weak perfect Bayesian equilibrium for a dynamic game of incomplete information.

Definition 6.6.4 (Weak Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium) An assessment ( $\boldsymbol{\sigma}, \boldsymbol{\mu}$ ) of (behavior) strategy profile and belief system constitutes a weak perfect Bayesian equilibrium (weak PBE) of an extensive-form game $\Gamma_{E}$ if the following conditions are met:
(1) (Sequential rationality) Given belief system $\mu$, the strategy profile $\sigma$ is sequentially rational (i.e., the choice based on belief system is sequentially optimal);
(2) (Consistence) Belief system $\boldsymbol{\mu}$ is derived from strategy profile $\sigma$ and initial beliefs (if they exist) through Bayes' rule whenever possible (i.e., the belief system supporting this choice is correct). In other words, for any information set $h \in H$, as long as the probability of reaching information set $h$ is positive under the strategy profile $\boldsymbol{\sigma}$, i.e., $\operatorname{prob}(h \mid \boldsymbol{\sigma})>0$, then for all $x \in h$, the belief on information set $h$ is

$$
\mu(x)=\frac{\operatorname{prob}(x \mid \boldsymbol{\sigma})}{\operatorname{prob}(h \mid \boldsymbol{\sigma})} .
$$

If $\operatorname{prob}(h \mid \boldsymbol{\sigma})=0$, the concept of weak perfect Bayesian equilibrium imposes no s on the belief of information set $h$.

Note that a weak PBE is a pair but not just a strategy profile.
We illustrate the application of the weak PBE concept using the previous game depicted by Figure 6.12.

Example 6.6.3 (Solving Weak Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium) This is a continuation of Example 6.6.1. In this Market Entry Game with firm $E$ and firm $I$, we already know that Nash equilibrium (Stay Out, Fight if Enter occurs) is not a weak PBE since it does not satisfy sequential rationality. We now show that Nash equilibrium (Enter 1, Accommodate if Enter occurs) is a weak PBE strategy profile.

To show this, we need to supplement these strategies with a belief system that satisfies two conditions of the weak PBE. It is clear that probability on firm $E$ 's decision node is 1 since firm $E$ 's information set contains only one decision node. Also, given the strategy profile (Enter 1, Accommodate
if Enter occurs), firm $i$ 's information is reached with positive probability, and further firm $I$ 's beliefs must assign probability 1 to the left decision node and 0 to the right decision node in the information set. This is because "Accommodate if entry occurs" is a dominant strategy on firm $I^{\prime}$ 's information set (i.e., irrespective of what strategy of firm $E$ is), sequential rationality requires that firm $I$ chooses "Accommodate if Enter occurs" . If firm $I$ chooses "Accommodate if Enter occurs", the optimal choice for firm $E$ is "Enter 1 ", which is also an equilibrium strategy under the requirement of sequential rationality. Thus, this strategy profile (Enter 1, Accommodate if Enter occurs) is the unique weak PBE strategy profile.

However, sometimes there may exist some unreasonable weak perfect Bayesian equilibria because it does not impose any restrictions on beliefs off the equilibrium path. In some cases, a weak PBE may not even be a subgame perfect equilibrium. Let us reconsider Example 6.4.5.

Example 6.6.4 (A Weak PBE may not be a Subgame Perfect Equcilibrium) This is the continuation of Example 6.4.5. As shown in Figure 6.13, firm $E$ is the potential market entrant, and firm $I$ is the incumbent. Firm $E$ first chooses whether or not to enter. Once firm $E$ enters, firm $E$ and firm $I$ choose whether to accommodate or fight simultaneously.


Figure 6.13: Weak perfect Bayesian equilibrium is not a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium.

We know that the game has three Nash equilibria:
(1) ((Stay out, Accommodate if entering), Fight if Enter occurs);
(2) ((Stay out, Fight if entering), Fight if Enter occurs);
(3) ((Enter, Accommodate if entering), Accommodate if Enter occurs).

A weak PBE of this game is the strategy profile $\left(\sigma_{E}, \sigma_{I}\right)=(($ Stay out, Accommodate if entering), Fight if Enter occurs) combined with beliefs for firm $I$ that assigns probability 1 to firm $E$ having played "Fight if entering", which is shown in Figure 6.13.

However, this weak PBE is not a subgame perfect equilibrium, because in the subgame after firm $E$ enters, the only Nash equilibrium is that both firm $E$ and firm $I$ choose "Accommodate if Enter occurs". Then, the only subgame perfect equilibrium of this game is that firm $E$ chooses to enter, and once it enters, it chooses "Accommodate" and firm $I$ also chooses
"Accommodate" after firm $E$ enters.
The problem is that after firm E enters, firm I's belief about firm E's play is unrestricted by the weak perfect Bayesian equilibrium because firm I's information set is off the equilibrium path.

This example shows that since there are no restrictions on beliefs off the equilibrium path, a weak perfect Bayesian equilibrium may not be a subgame perfect equilibrium. Firm $I$ 's beliefs off the equilibrium path do not match firm $E^{\prime}$ s strategy in the subgame.

The following example further illustrates that due to the lack of restrictions on beliefs off the equilibrium path, these beliefs become unsensible.

Example 6.6.5 In the game depicted in Figure 6.14, "Nature" randomly selects decision node on player 1's information set, and the probability with which any decision node on this information set is selected is 0.5 . Player 1 does not know "Nature" 's choice; player 2 on her information set does not know "Nature" 's choice either, but her belief is that player 1's choice is " $y$ ".

A weak PBE of this game is given by the strategies indicated by arrows on the chosen branches at each information set, and beliefs are indicated by numbers in brackets at the nodes in the information sets in Figure 6.14,


Figure 6.14: Beliefs off the equilibrium path.
i.e., player 1 chooses " $x$ " and player 2 chooses " $l$ " given her belief that player 1's choice is " $y$. Moreover, player 1's beliefs on his information set are 0.5 for the left decision node and 0.5 for the right decision node, and player 2's beliefs on her information set are 0.9 for the left decision node and 0.1 for the right decision node.

Obviously, given the beliefs of players 1 and 2 , their strategies meet the requirement of sequential rationality since player 2's expected payoff profile 3 of choosing the left node is greater than the expected payoff profile 1.4 of choosing the right node, and player 1's expected payoff profile 1.5 of choosing $x$ is greater than the expected payoff profile 0 of choosing $y$. However, while player 1's beliefs coincide with"Nature's" selection probabilities, player 2's information set is off the equilibrium path, and there are no restrictions on her beliefs on player 1's information set. Moreover, these beliefs are not sensible. Player 2's beliefs are unsensible since it is not consistent with "Nature" 's choices. Player 1 has the same probability on his two decision nodes, once player 1 has chosen $y$, player 2's beliefs on player's 1 information set should be 0.5 for both of her decision nodes, instead of 0.9 for the left decision node and 0.1 for the right decision node. Here we see that it is desirable to require that beliefs at lease be structurally consistent off the equilibrium path.

The above two examples show that the concept of the weak PBE needs to be strengthened and it is necessary to impose extra consistence restric-
tions on beliefs off the equilibrium path; otherwise, a weak perfect Bayesian equilibrium may contain unreasonable beliefs and strategy profiles. Below, we will discuss some strengthened equilibrium concepts which impose certain consistence restrictions on beliefs off the equilibrium path. We first consider the concept of sequential equilibrium.

### 6.6.3 Sequential Equilibrium

Due to the problem of weak perfect Bayesian equilibrium, a more reasonable equilibrium concept needs to impose suitable restrictions on belief system on information sets off the equilibrium path. Kreps and Wilson (1982a) proposed the solution concept of sequential equilibrium that strengths both the SPNE and the weak PBE through restricting beliefs off the equilibrium path. In a Bayesian game, if an information set is reached with probability 0 when an equilibrium strategy is played, Bayes' rule cannot be used to assess the beliefs on this information set.

In the spirit of the trembling-hand perfect Nash equilibrium in complete information, the concept of sequential equilibrium is then introduced by requiring the full consistence, i.e., taking the possibility of off the equilibrium path into account by playing completely mixed strategy so that the probability of reaching any information set is positive and thus beliefs on any information set can be updated according to Bayes' rule.

Definition 6.6.5 (Sequential Equilibrium) An assessment ( $\boldsymbol{\sigma}, \boldsymbol{\mu}$ ) of (behavior) strategy profile and a belief system constitutes a sequential equilibrium of an extensive-form game $\Gamma_{E}$ if the following conditions are satisfied:
(1) (Sequential rationality) Given belief system $\boldsymbol{\mu}$, the (behavior) strategy profile $\sigma$ is sequentially rational.
(2) (Full Consistence) There is a completely mixed strategy sequence $\left\{\boldsymbol{\sigma}^{k}\right\}_{k=1}^{\infty}$, such that $\lim _{k \rightarrow \infty} \boldsymbol{\sigma}^{k}=\boldsymbol{\sigma}$ and $\lim _{k \rightarrow \infty} \boldsymbol{\mu}^{k}=$ $\boldsymbol{\mu}$, where $\boldsymbol{\mu}^{k}$ are the beliefs derived from strategy $\sigma^{k}$ using Bayes' rule.

Thus, in order to identify a sequential equilibrium, one must check sequential rationality and full consistence of an assessment ( $\boldsymbol{\sigma}, \boldsymbol{\mu}$ ), i.e., one
must check if a strategy profile $\boldsymbol{\sigma}$ is a best response to belief $\mu(\cdot \mid h)$ at every information set $h$, and if the belief system $\mu$ is fully consistent with the strategy profile $\sigma$ so that each player knows which (possibly mixed) strategies are played by the other players.

Therefore, to verify whether or not an assessment $(\boldsymbol{\sigma}, \boldsymbol{\mu})$ of strategy profile and belief system constitutes a sequential equilibrium, we need to find a sequence of completely mixed disturbances which approaches the strategy profile, and determine if the belief assessment sequence based on the completely mixed strategy sequence and Bayes' rule converges to the belief assessment.

The following example from Myerson (1991) illustrates how to find such completely mixed strategies and the calculation of belief system.


Figure 6.15: Completely Mixed Strategy and Its Beliefs.

Example 6.6.6 (Beliefs of Completely Mixed Strategies) The extensive game is depicted by Figure 6.15. Consider the strategy profile $\left(z_{1}, y_{2}, y_{3}\right)$, which is a Nash equilibrium of this game. If it is disturbed into a completely mixed strategy. Player 1 chooses strategies $z_{1}$ with probability $1-\varepsilon_{0}-\varepsilon_{1}, y_{1}$ with probability $\varepsilon_{1}$ and $x_{1}$ with probability $\varepsilon_{0}$. When $\varepsilon_{0} \rightarrow 0, \varepsilon_{1} \rightarrow 0$, player 1's strategies converge to pure strategy $z_{1}$. Similarly, player 2 chooses strategies $y_{2}$ with probability $1-\varepsilon_{2}$ and $x_{2}$ with probability $\varepsilon_{2}$; and player 3 chooses strategies $y_{3}$ with probability $1-\varepsilon_{3}$ and $x_{3}$ with probability $\varepsilon_{3}$.

Under this completely mixed strategy profile, players' belief assessments are as follows:

Since player 1's information set has only one decision node, the belief probability on this decision node is 1 . Player 2's information set has two decision nodes. According to player 1's completely mixed strategy and by Bayes' rule, player 2's belief probabilities on the top decision node and bottom decision node must satisfy

$$
\alpha=\frac{\varepsilon_{0}}{\varepsilon_{0}+\varepsilon_{1}}
$$

and

$$
1-\alpha=\frac{\varepsilon_{1}}{\varepsilon_{0}+\varepsilon_{1}} .
$$

Similarly, player 3's belief probabilities of the decision nodes from the top to the bottom are

$$
\begin{aligned}
\beta & =\frac{\varepsilon_{0} \varepsilon_{2}}{\varepsilon_{0}+\varepsilon_{1}}=\alpha \varepsilon_{2} \\
\gamma & =\frac{\varepsilon_{0}\left(1-\varepsilon_{2}\right)}{\varepsilon_{0}+\varepsilon_{1}}=\alpha\left(1-\varepsilon_{2}\right), \\
\delta & =\frac{\varepsilon_{1} \varepsilon_{2}}{\varepsilon_{0}+\varepsilon_{1}}=(1-\alpha) \varepsilon_{2}, \\
\zeta & =\frac{\varepsilon_{1}\left(1-\varepsilon_{2}\right)}{\varepsilon_{0}+\varepsilon_{1}}=(1-\alpha)\left(1-\varepsilon_{2}\right),
\end{aligned}
$$

respectively.
When $\varepsilon_{0}, \varepsilon_{1}, \varepsilon_{2}$ and $\varepsilon_{3}$ approach to 0 , these consistent beliefs must satisfy:

$$
\beta=0, \quad \delta=0, \quad \gamma=\alpha, \quad \zeta=1-\alpha,
$$

where $\alpha$ may be any number in the interval $[0,1]$. So there is a one-parameter family of beliefs vectors that are fully consistent with the strategy profile $\left(z_{1}, y_{2}, y_{3}\right)$.

However, it is not a sequential equilibrium since with these beliefs, $\left(z_{1}, y_{2}, y_{3}\right)$ is not sequently rational. This is because when $\varepsilon_{0}, \varepsilon_{1}, \varepsilon_{2}$ and $\varepsilon_{3}$ al1 approach to 0 , completely mixed strategy profiles converge to $\left(z_{1}, y_{2}, y_{3}\right)$. The fact that player 3's choice of $y_{3}$ is sequentially rational requires that the expected payoff profile from choosing strategy $x_{3}$ is lower than that from
choosing strategy $y_{3}$ when $\gamma=\alpha, \zeta=1-\alpha, \beta=0, \delta=0$ so that the belief system satisfies $3 \alpha<1$ so that $\alpha<1 / 3$. The fact that player 2's choice of $y_{2}$ is sequentially rational requires that the belief system satisfies $3(1-\alpha)<1$ so that $\alpha>2 / 3$. Obviously, the above two inequalities cannot be satisfied at the same time.

To find a sequential equilibrium of this example, we consider $\varepsilon_{0}, \varepsilon_{1}, \varepsilon_{2}$ and $\varepsilon_{3}$ to be real numbers that belong to $[0,1]$, and $\varepsilon_{0}+\varepsilon_{1} \leqq 1$ is satisfied. In the belief system described above, a sequential equilibrium requires that player 3 satisfies sequential rationality.

Player 3's sequential rationality means:
If $\varepsilon_{3}=0$, i.e., for player 3, the expected payoff profile from choosing strategy $x_{3}$ is lower than that from choosing strategy $y_{3}$. Then $\gamma+\zeta>2 \beta+3 \gamma+2 \delta$, or $\zeta>2(\beta+\gamma+\delta)=2(1-\zeta)$, i.e., $(1-\alpha)\left(1-\varepsilon_{2}\right)>\frac{2}{3}$ is required;

If $\varepsilon_{3}=1,(1-\alpha)\left(1-\varepsilon_{2}\right)<\frac{2}{3}$ is required;
If $\varepsilon_{3} \in(0,1),(1-\alpha)\left(1-\varepsilon_{2}\right)=\frac{2}{3}$ is required.
Player 2's sequential rationality means the following:

$$
\begin{aligned}
& \text { If } \varepsilon_{2}=0,2 \varepsilon_{3}+3(1-\alpha)\left(1-\varepsilon_{3}\right)<1-\varepsilon_{3} \text { is required; } \\
& \text { If } \varepsilon_{2}=1,2 \varepsilon_{3}+3(1-\alpha)\left(1-\varepsilon_{3}\right)>1-\varepsilon_{3} \text { is required; } \\
& \text { If } \varepsilon_{2} \in(0,1), 2 \varepsilon_{3}+3(1-\alpha)\left(1-\varepsilon_{3}\right)=1-\varepsilon_{3} \text { is required. }
\end{aligned}
$$

Beliefs need to be consistent. Suppose that $\varepsilon_{3}=0$ is player 3 's belief assessment in a sequential equilibrium. Then, there is $(1-\alpha)\left(1-\varepsilon_{2}\right)>\frac{2}{3}$. However, $2 \varepsilon_{3}+3(1-\alpha)\left(1-\varepsilon_{3}\right)=3(1-\alpha)>2>1-\varepsilon_{3}=1$ implies that $\varepsilon_{2}=1$, which contradicts $(1-\alpha)\left(1-\varepsilon_{2}\right)>\frac{2}{3}$. As such, $\varepsilon_{3}=0$ cannot be player 3's belief assessment in a sequential equilibrium. Suppose that $\varepsilon_{3} \in(0,1)$, i.e., choosing a completely mixed strategy, is player 3's belief assessment in a sequential equilibrium. Then, there is $(1-\alpha)\left(1-\varepsilon_{2}\right)=$ $\frac{2}{3}$, which further requires $(1-\alpha) \geqq \frac{2}{3}$. $(1-\alpha) \geqq \frac{2}{3}$ means $2 \varepsilon_{3}+3(1-$ $\alpha)\left(1-\varepsilon_{3}\right)>1-\varepsilon_{3}$, which further requires $\varepsilon_{2}=1$, contradicting ( $1-$ $\alpha)\left(1-\varepsilon_{2}\right)=\frac{2}{3}$. Therefore, if a sequential equilibrium exists, player 3's belief assessment must inevitably satisfy $\varepsilon_{3}=1$, and thus $(1-\alpha)\left(1-\varepsilon_{2}\right)<\frac{2}{3}$
must be satisfied. $\varepsilon_{2}=1$ means $2 \varepsilon_{3}+3(1-\alpha)\left(1-\varepsilon_{3}\right)>1-\varepsilon_{3}$, and $\varepsilon_{2}=1$ is also compatible with $(1-\alpha)\left(1-\varepsilon_{2}\right)<\frac{2}{3}$. The above discussion implies that a sequential equilibrium requires $\varepsilon_{3}=1$ and $\varepsilon_{2}=1$. Further, player 1's sequential rationality requires that player 1 chooses strategy $x_{1}$, i.e., $\varepsilon_{0}=1$. Therefore, the game has a unique sequential equilibrium, i.e., strategy profile ( $x_{1}, x_{2}, x_{3}$ ), and the belief system satisfies $\alpha=1, \beta=1$ and $\gamma=\delta=\zeta=0$.

For a second example, we consider the following game given by Rosenthal (1981) and adopted from Myerson (1991).

Example 6.6.7 (Sequential Equilibrium with Nature) The game is depicted by Figure 6.16, which is interpreted as follows. After "Nature" chooses the upper chance event with probability 0.95 , two players alternate choosing between generous ( $g_{k}, k=1,2,3,4$ ) and selfish ( $f_{k}, k=1,2,3,4$ ) actions until someone is selfish or until both have been generous twice. Each player loses $\$ 1$ each time she is generous, but gains $\$ 5$ each time the other player in generous. Everything is the same after the lower chance event, which occurs with probability 0.05 , except that player 2 is then incapable of being selfish. Player 1 does not directly observe the chance outcome. The numbers in the angled brackets on decision nodes indicate the belief probabilities of the decision nodes, and the numbers in the parentheses below branches indicate the move probabilities with which the corresponding players choose pure strategies.

A sequential equilibrium of this game necessitates that the beliefs on player 1's information set satisfy $\alpha=0.95$. Information set 2.4 is the second information set for player 2 , and according to the requirement of sequential rationality, player 2 chooses $f_{4}$ or $\zeta=0$. Information set 1.3 , which contains two decision nodes, is player 1's information set, which is the outcome of player 1 choosing $g_{1}$. Player 1 cannot distinguish between these two decision nodes on information set 1.3. Since the probability with which player 2 chooses $g_{2}$ is $\gamma$, by Bayes' rule, player 1's beliefs on information set 1.3 satisfy $\delta=\frac{0.95 \beta \gamma}{0.95 \beta \gamma+0.05 \beta}=\frac{19 \gamma}{19 \gamma+1}$.

Under this belief system, player 1's sequential rationality requires the following:


Figure 6.16: Computing Mixed Strategy Sequential Equilibrium.

If player 1 's behavior strategy on information set 1.3 is $\varepsilon=0$, then $4>3 \delta+8(1-\delta)$;

If player 1 's behavior strategy on information set 1.3 is $\varepsilon=1$, $4<3 \delta+8(1-\delta) ;$

If player 1's behavior strategy on information set 1.3 is $\varepsilon \in(0,1)$, then $4=3 \delta+8(1-\delta)$.

On information set 2.2 , player 2's sequential rationality requires:
If player 2's behavior strategy on information set 2.2 is $\gamma=1$, then $9 \varepsilon+4(1-\varepsilon)>5 ;$

If $\gamma=0$, then $9 \varepsilon+4(1-\varepsilon)<5$;
If $\gamma \in[0,1]$, then $9 \varepsilon+4(1-\varepsilon)=5$.

On information set 1.1, player 1's sequential rationality requires the following:

If player 1 's behavior strategy on information set 1.1 is $\beta=1$, then $0.95[3 \gamma \varepsilon+4 \gamma(1-\varepsilon)-(1-\gamma)]+0.05[8 \varepsilon+4(1-\varepsilon)]>0$;
If $\beta=0$, then $0.95[3 \gamma \varepsilon+4 \gamma(1-\varepsilon)-(1-\gamma)]+0.05[8 \varepsilon+4(1-\varepsilon)]<0$;
If $\beta \in[0,1]$, then $0.95[3 \gamma \varepsilon+4 \gamma(1-\varepsilon)-(1-\gamma)]+0.05[8 \varepsilon+4(1-$ $\varepsilon)]=0$.

Below, we describe the solution process of sequential equilibrium.
Suppose that $\varepsilon=1$ holds in a sequential equilibrium. $\varepsilon=1$ implies that $4<3 \delta+8(1-\delta)$, i.e., $\delta<0.8$, or $\frac{19 \gamma}{19 \gamma+1}<0.8$, or $\gamma<4 / 19$. However, $\varepsilon=1$ also means that $9 \varepsilon+4(1-\varepsilon)=$ $9>5$, and $\gamma=1$, which contradicts $\gamma<4 / 19$.

Suppose that $\varepsilon=0$ holds in a sequential equilibrium. $\varepsilon=0$ means $4>3 \delta+8(1-\delta)$, and $\gamma>4 / 19$. However, $\varepsilon=0$ also means that $9 \varepsilon+4(1-\varepsilon)=4<5$, and $\gamma=0$, which contradicts $\gamma>4 / 19$.

As a result, in a sequential equilibrium, there must be $\varepsilon \in(0,1)$, which requires $4=3 \delta+8(1-\delta)$ or $\gamma=4 / 19 . \gamma=4 / 19$ means $9 \varepsilon+4(1-\varepsilon)=5$, and $\varepsilon=0.2$.

When $\varepsilon=0.2$ and $\gamma=4 / 19,0.95[3 \gamma \varepsilon+4 \gamma(1-\varepsilon)-(1-\gamma)]+$ $0.05[8 \varepsilon+4(1-\varepsilon)]=0.25>0$, which means that $\beta=1$.

Therefore, the only sequential equilibrium of the entire game is: the behavior strategy profile is $\beta=1, \gamma=4 / 19, \varepsilon=0.2, \zeta=0$; and the belief system is $\alpha=0.95$, and $\delta=0.8$.

In a finite extensive-form game, a sequential equilibrium always exists.
Proposition 6.6.1 Every finite incomplete information extensive-form game has a sequential equilibrium.

Readers who are interested in the proof of this proposition can refer to the classical literature of Kreps and Wilson (1982).

### 6.6.4 Forward Induction

Sequential rationality and subgame perfectness are backward induction principles. The forward induction principle may also be used in the analysis of extensive-form game with incomplete information. In some games, the rationalization of beliefs not only requires rational backward induction, but also rational forward induction. In this subsection, we consider two examples that are adopted from Myerson (1991).

The first example reflects a forward induction principle would assert that the behavior of rational players in a subgame may depend on the options that were available to them in the earlier part of the game, before the subgame.


Figure 6.17: Forward Induction.

Example 6.6.8 In the game depicted in Figure 6.17, there are two (pure strategy) sequential equilibria. One is strategy profile $\left(a_{1}, y_{1} ; y_{2}\right)$, and the belief probability of the lower decision node on player 2's information set 2.2 is 1 . The other is strategy $\left(b_{1}, x_{1} ; x_{2}\right)$, and the belief probability of the upper decision node on player 2's information set 2.2 is 1 . However, the first sequential equilibrium does not satisfy the forward induction criterion. If player 2 enters information set 2.2, player 1 has not chosen strategy $a_{1}$ on information set 1.0. If player 1 chooses $a_{1}$, his payoff profile is 4 . If player 1 is rational, the goal of having not chosen strategy $a_{1}$ on information set 1.0 is to obtain a higher payoff profile in the continuation subgame equilibrium. In consequence, the Nash equilibrium of the subgame starting from information set 1.1 is $\left(x_{1}, x_{2}\right)$.

If the Nash equilibrium of this subgame is $\left(y_{1}, y_{2}\right)$, player 1 only obtains a payoff profile of 3 , which is not as good as choosing strategy $a_{1}$ on information set 1.0. In other words, the strategy ( $b_{1}, y_{1}$ ) is player 1's strictly dominated strategy (relative to strategy $a_{1}$ ). If player 1 knows that player 2 will reason in this way, then once the subgame starting from information set 1.1 is entered, the Nash equilibrium will be $\left(x_{1}, x_{2}\right)$. This reasoning pro-
cess is called the forward induction. In the game shown in this example, only the sequential equilibrium ( $b_{1}, x_{1}, x_{2}$ ) satisfies the forward induction criterion. In this sequential equilibrium, the belief probability of the upper decision node on player 2 's information set 2.2 is 1 .

However, the forward induction criterion may conflict with the backward induction criterion. The following example (see Figure 6.18) shows the possibility of such a conflict.

Example 6.6.9 In this example, by backward induction, there are two Nash equilibria ( $x_{1}, x_{2}$ ) and ( $y_{1}, y_{2}$ ) in the subgame that starts from information set 1.3 , and their equilibrium payoff profiles are $(9,0)$ and $(1,8)$, respectively. On information set 2.2, if player 2 chooses $a_{2}$, her payoff profile is only 7 , and if player 2 chooses $b_{2}$, she wants to obtain an equilibrium payoff profile of 8 in the subgame starting from the information set 1.3 (otherwise, she has chosen $a_{2}$ ). Therefore, the Nash equilibrium is $\left(y_{1}, y_{2}\right)$.

However, reaching information set 1.3 indicates that player 1 has cho$\operatorname{sen} b_{1}$ on information set 1.1. If player 1 chooses $a_{1}$ on information set 1.1, his payoff profile is only 2 . As a consequence, for player 1 , the purpose of choosing $b_{1}$ is to ultimately obtain a payoff profile that is no less than 2. However, when the backward induction is combined with the previous forward induction, player 1's final equilibrium payoff profile is 1 if she chooses $b_{1}$, which contradicts the forward induction here.


Figure 6.18: Conflict between Forward Induction and Backward Induction.

Another objection to forward induction is that some irrational strategy disturbances may be misunderstood as purposefully rational actions. As in the previous example, player 1 originally intends to choose $a_{1}$, but may
accidentally choose $b_{1}$. Therefore, player 2 may think that player 1 will choose $x_{1}$ in the subsequent subgame.

The extensive-form dynamic games we considered so far are assumed that types of players are complete information. In dynamic games of incomplete information, an important type of game is the so-called signaling game, in which players' types can be inferred through their actions. In this kind of game, there are many sequential equilibria which call for further refinements.

### 6.6.5 Signaling Game

Spence (1973) proposed a new idea when discussing the value of education. He found that an important function of education was to deliver signals on individuals' productivity. In the labor market, different workers have heterogeneous productivities. However, individual productivity is private information so that employers usually do not know or is costly to obtain. A simple and convenient way of judging individual productivity is through years of education or diplomas. Different levels of education may reflec$t$ different intrinsic productivity. From years of education and diplomas, employers can speculate on potential employees' types.

Consider a signaling game that is described by a two-stage extensiveform game. Assume that there are two players 1 and 2 , and player 1's type $\theta$ is his private information. The set of all possible types is denoted as $\Theta$. The prior distribution of types is $p(\cdot): \Theta \rightarrow[0,1]$, which is common knowledge. Player 1's action in the first stage is represented by $a_{1}$, and the set of all possible actions is denoted as $A_{1}$. In the second stage, after observing player 1's action $a_{1}$, player 2 chooses action $a_{2}$. The set of all possible actions of player 2 is denoted as $A_{2}$. When player 1's type $\theta$ becomes public information, these two players' payoff profiles are $u^{1}\left(a_{1}, a_{2}, \theta\right)$ and $u^{2}\left(a_{1}, a_{2}, \theta\right)$, respectively. Let $\alpha_{1} \in \Delta A_{1}$ and $\alpha_{2} \in \Delta A_{2}$ represent the mixed actions of players 1 and 2 , respectively

Player 1's strategy $\sigma_{1}(\cdot \mid \theta)$ describes the probability distribution on his action set $A_{1}$ when his type is $\theta$; player 2's strategy $\sigma_{2}\left(\cdot \mid a_{1}\right)$ describes the probability distribution on her action set $A_{2}$ after she observes player 1's
action $a_{1}$. Prior to taking her action, player 2 speculates that the probability with which player 1's type is $\theta$ is $\mu\left(\theta \mid a_{1}\right)$. The formation of this posterior belief depends on player 1's strategy $a_{1}$ and Bayes' rule.

The equilibrium concept adopted here is that of perfect Bayesian equilibrium (PBE).

Definition 6.6.6 (Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium of Signaling Games) A perfect Bayesian equilibrium of a signaling game consists of a strategy profile $\left(\sigma_{1}{ }^{*}(\cdot \mid \theta), \sigma_{2}{ }^{*}\left(\cdot \mid a_{1}\right)\right)$ and posterior beliefs $\mu\left(\cdot \mid a_{1}\right)$, satisfying:
(1) Given $a_{1}, \sigma_{2}{ }^{*}\left(\cdot \mid a_{1}\right) \in \arg \max _{\alpha_{2}} \sum_{\theta \in \Theta} \mu\left(\theta \mid a_{1}\right) u^{2}\left(a_{1}, \alpha_{2}, \theta\right)$;
(2) Given $\theta \in \Theta, \sigma_{1}{ }^{*}(\cdot \mid \theta) \in \arg \max _{\alpha_{1}} u^{1}\left(\alpha_{1}, \sigma_{2}{ }^{*}\left(\cdot \mid a_{1}\right), \theta\right)$;
(3) $\mu\left(\theta \mid a_{1}\right)=\frac{p(\theta) \sigma_{1}^{*}\left(a_{1} \mid \theta\right)}{\sum_{\theta^{\prime}} p\left(\theta^{\prime}\right) \sigma_{1}^{*}\left(a_{1} \mid \theta^{\prime}\right)}$, if $\sum_{\theta^{\prime}} p\left(\theta^{\prime}\right) \sigma_{1}^{*}\left(a_{1} \mid \theta^{\prime}\right)>0$; otherwise $\mu\left(\cdot \mid a_{1}\right)$ is an arbitrary probability distribution on $\Theta$, if $\sum_{\theta^{\prime}} p\left(\theta^{\prime}\right) \sigma_{1}{ }^{*}\left(a_{1} \mid \theta^{\prime}\right)=0$, i.e., Bayes' rule should be used to update beliefs about players' types whenever players' previous actions have positive probabilities conditional on the history of previous play.

Although the definition of perfect Bayesian equilibrium is consistent with the previous weak perfect Bayesian equilibrium, in the signaling game, a great correlation exists between the perfect Bayesian equilibrium and sequential equilibrium. Indeed, Fudenberg and Tirole (1991) proved that in a two-stage or two-type signaling game, they are equivalent. In the following, we will discuss the signaling game's equilibrium concept through an example.

Example 6.6.10 (Education Game) Suppose that there are two different types of individuals whose intrinsic productivities are $\theta_{h}$ and $\theta_{l}$, respectively, where $\theta_{h}>\theta_{l}$. Productivity can be viewed as unit labor's output value, and the proportion of high-productivity individuals is $\lambda$ (priori distribution).

The costs of education level $e$ for different types of individuals are $C(e, \theta)$, which satisfy $C(0, \theta)=0, C_{e}(e, \theta)>0, C_{e e}(e, \theta)>0, C\left(e, \theta_{h}\right)<C\left(e, \theta_{l}\right)$,
and $C_{e}\left(e, \theta_{h}\right)<C_{e}\left(e, \theta_{l}\right)$ (i.e., $C_{e \theta}(e, \theta)>0$, which is called the singlecrossing property).

Assume that in the labor market, due to competition, the wage paid by an employer equals to the expected labor productivity of the worker. In the first stage, a job seeker chooses his education level $e$. In the second stage, after observing the job seeker's education level $e$, an employer's posterior belief on the job seeker's type $\theta_{h}$ is $\mu\left(\theta_{h} \mid e\right)$, and thereby the employer pays wage:

$$
w=\mu\left(\theta_{h} \mid e\right) \theta_{h}+\left(1-\mu\left(\theta_{h} \mid e\right)\right) \theta_{l} .
$$

The employer chooses to provide a labor contract with wage $w$, and the job seeker chooses whether or not to accept it. If the labor contract is accepted, the payoff profile of the job seeker whose type is $\theta$ is given by

$$
u(w, e \mid \theta)=w-C(e, \theta) .
$$

If the labor contract is not accepted, it is assumed that the payoff profile of each type of job seeker is zero. Then, the labor contract should satisfy participation constraint:

$$
u(w, e \mid \theta)=w-C(e, \theta) \geqq 0 \text { for } \theta \in\left\{\theta_{h}, \theta_{l}\right\} .
$$

The equilibrium of such a signaling game is usually divided into two types. One is separating equilibrium, in which different types of individuals choose different actions in the first stage; the other is pooling equilibrium, in which all types of individuals choose the same action in the first stage.

Separating equilibrium: Let $e_{h}$ and $e_{l}$ be the education levels chosen by job seekers of type $\theta_{h}$ and $\theta_{l}$, respectively, in the first stage and $e_{h} \neq e_{l}$. After observing the education level $e$, the employer provides the labor contract $w(e)$, which satisfies $w_{h}=w\left(e_{h}\right)$ and $w_{l}=w\left(e_{l}\right)$ in the separating equilibrium. Since $e_{h} \neq e_{l}$, the employer's beliefs in the separating equilibrium are $\mu\left(e_{h}\right)=1$ and $\mu\left(e_{l}\right)=0$. Thus, the wages provided by the employer after observing different education levels satisfy $w_{h}=\theta_{h}$ and $w_{l}=\theta_{l}$. At the same time, for job seekers of type $\theta_{l}$, since their type will be
known to the employer in the separating equilibrium, the rational choices satisfy $e_{l}=0$. Since it is a separating equilibrium, $e_{h} \neq 0$. However, arbitrary $e_{h}>0$ does not necessarily constitute a separating equilibrium.

First, under $e_{h}$ and wage $w\left(e_{h}\right)=\theta_{h}$, job seekers of type $\theta_{l}$ have no incentive to imitate the action of job seekers of type $\theta_{h}$; otherwise, $\mu\left(e_{h}\right) \neq 1$, which contradicts separating equilibrium. As a consequence, a separating equilibrium requires the following incentive compatible constraint be satisfied for $\theta_{l}$ :

$$
u\left(\theta_{h}, e_{h} \mid \theta_{l}\right)<u\left(\theta_{l}, e_{l} \mid \theta_{l}\right),
$$

i.e., $\theta_{h}-C\left(e_{h}, \theta_{l}\right)<\theta_{l}$. Let $\tilde{e}$ satisfy $\theta_{h}-C\left(\tilde{e}, \theta_{l}\right)=\theta_{l}$. Then, a separating equilibrium requires $e_{h} \geqq \tilde{e}$.

Secondly, under $e_{l}=0$ and wage $w\left(e_{l}\right)=\theta_{l}$, job seekers of type $\theta_{h}$ have no incentive to imitate the action of job seekers of type $\theta_{l}$; otherwise, $\mu\left(e_{l}\right) \neq 0$, which contradicts separating equilibrium. As such, a separating equilibrium requires the following incentive compatibility be satisfied for $\theta_{h}$ :

$$
u\left(\theta_{l}, e_{l} \mid \theta_{h}\right)<u\left(\theta_{h}, e_{h} \mid \theta_{h}\right)
$$

i.e., $\theta_{l}<\theta_{h}-C\left(e_{h}, \theta_{h}\right)$. Let $\bar{e}$ satisfy $\theta_{l}=\theta_{h}-C\left(\bar{e}, \theta_{h}\right)$. Obviously, $\bar{e}>\tilde{e}$. So, when $\bar{e} \geqq e_{h} \geqq \tilde{e}$, each type of job seeker has no incentive to imitate the action of the other type of job seeker.

Therefore, the separating equilibria of this game are: $e_{l}=0, e_{h} \in[\tilde{e}, \bar{e}]$, the beliefs of the employer are $\mu\left(e_{h}\right)=1$ and $\mu(0)=0$, and the strategies of the employer are $w\left(e_{h}\right)=\theta_{h}, w(0)=\theta_{l}$. In all of the above separating equilibria, $e_{l}=0, e_{h}=\tilde{e}, \mu(\tilde{e})=1, \mu(0)=0, w\left(e_{h}\right)=\theta_{h}$ and $w(0)=\theta_{l}$ is a Pareto optimal equilibrium, in the sense that no one can be better off without harming the other (a general definition of Pareto optimality will be given in Chapter 11).

Pooling equilibrium: In this type of equilibrium, different types of job seekers choose the same level of education (i.e., $e\left(\theta_{h}\right)=e\left(\theta_{l}\right)=e^{*}$ ). Since employers observe only one level of education in the equilibrium, the beliefs of employers are the same as the initial beliefs (i.e., $\mu\left(\theta_{h} \mid e^{*}\right)=\lambda$ ). The beliefs off the equilibrium path are $\mu\left(\theta_{h} \mid e \neq e^{*}\right)=0$. At this point, employers pay $w_{p}=\lambda \theta_{h}+(1-\lambda) \theta_{l}$. In order to form a pooling equilibrium, $e^{*}$ is
also faced with the incentive compatible constraint that no type of job seeker deviates from this choice. The fact that job seekers of type $\theta_{l}$ are willing to accept employers' labor contracts means that the participation constraint holds:

$$
u\left(w_{p}, e^{*} \mid \theta_{l}\right)=w_{p}-C\left(e^{*}, \theta_{l}\right) \geqq 0
$$

Let $\hat{e}$ satisfy $w_{p}-C\left(\hat{e}, \theta_{l}\right)=0$. When $e^{*}>\hat{e}$, job seekers of type $\theta_{l}$ will reject employers' contracts by the participation constraint. Consequently, this game's pooling equilibrium requires $e^{*} \leqq \hat{e}$.

### 6.6.6 Reasonable-Beliefs Refinements in Signaling Games

In the signaling games above, we obtain many (continuum) equilibria. These equilibria are all sequential equilibrium or perfect Bayesian equilibrium. Therefore, these equilibrium concepts need to be further refined. This subsection discusses several commonly used reasonable-beliefs refinements of perfect Bayesian equilibrium and sequential equilibrium in Signaling Games. These methods are similar to the idea of eliminating strictly dominated strategies.

Consider a more general signaling game. There are $N$ players and one "Nature" player. First, "Nature" selects player 1's type, $\theta \in \Theta$, and only player 1 knows his own type. Other players only know a priori probability distribution $p(\theta)$ about player 1's type, which is a common knowledge among players. Then, player 1 chooses his action $a_{1} \in A_{1}$. After observing player 1's action, other players $i \in\{2, \cdots, N\}$ choose their strategies $s_{i} \in S_{i}$ simultaneously. Define $S_{-1}=S_{2} \times \cdots \times S_{N}$. After observing player 1 's action $a_{1}$, the posterior beliefs of other players $i \neq 1$ are $\mu\left(\theta \mid a_{1}\right)$. If player 1 chooses action $a_{1}$ and other players choose strategy $s_{-1}=\left(s_{2}, \cdots, s_{N}\right)$, player 1's utility is $u_{1}\left(a_{1}, s_{-1}, \theta\right)$, and player $i \neq 1$ 's utility is $u_{i}\left(a_{1}, s_{-1}, \theta\right)$.

## Domination-Based Refinements of Beliefs

Below, we examine the refinement of beliefs. A reasonable belief of the PBE should not assign a positive probability to a strictly dominated strategy for a type. If a strategy is a strictly dominated strategy for a certain type of
player, after observing this strategy, assigning a positive probability to this type is clearly not a reasonable belief. The formal definition is as follows.

Definition 6.6.7 (Type Strictly Dominated Strategy) We say that an action $a_{1}$ is a strictly dominated strategy for type $\theta$, if there is an action $a_{1}^{\prime} \in A_{1}$, such that:

$$
\begin{equation*}
\min _{s_{-1}^{\prime} \in S_{-1}} u_{1}\left(a_{1}^{\prime}, s_{-1}^{\prime}, \theta\right)>\max _{s_{-1} \in S_{-1}} u_{1}\left(a_{1}, s_{-1}, \theta\right) \tag{6.6.8}
\end{equation*}
$$

and the updating of beliefs $\mu\left(\theta \mid a_{1}\right)=0$.

Define
$\Theta\left(a_{1}\right)=\left\{\theta: \nexists a_{1}^{\prime} \in A_{1}\right.$ makes the above strict inequality (6.6.8) true $\}$,
i.e., $\Theta\left(a_{1}\right)$ presents that under types $\theta \in \Theta\left(a_{1}\right), a_{1}$ is not a strictly dominated strategy.

In a perfect Bayesian game, reasonable beliefs need to satisfy: if $\mu\left(\theta \mid a_{1}\right)>$ 0 , then $\theta \in \Theta\left(a_{1}\right)$.

Since we must also take into account all players' strategies in equilibrium, we need an equilibrium related belief system for eliminating dominated strategies. Let $S_{-1}{ }^{*}\left(\Theta, a_{1}\right) \equiv S_{2}{ }^{*}\left(\Theta, a_{1}\right) \times \cdots \times S_{N}{ }^{*}\left(\Theta, a_{1}\right) \subseteq S_{-1}$ be all possible equilibrium responses of other players $i \neq 1$ to a given belief $\mu\left(\theta \mid a_{1}\right)$ after observing player 1's action $a_{1}$ (i.e., if $s_{i}{ }^{*} \in S_{i}{ }^{*}\left(\Theta, a_{1}\right)$, then $s_{i}{ }^{*} \in \arg \max _{s_{i}} u_{i}{ }^{*}\left(a_{1}, s_{i}, \theta\right)$ ).

Applying the above criterion, we have the following definition.
Definition 6.6.8 (Belief System after Eliminating Dominated Strategy) Let action $a_{1}^{\prime} \in A_{1}$ be a strictly dominated strategy for type $\theta$ under $\boldsymbol{S}_{-1}{ }^{*}\left(\Theta, a_{1}\right)$, i.e.,

$$
\begin{equation*}
\min _{s_{-1}^{\prime} \in S_{-1}^{*}\left(\Theta, a_{1}^{\prime}\right)} u_{1}\left(a_{1}^{\prime}, s_{-1}^{\prime}, \theta\right)>\max _{s_{-1} \in S_{-1}^{*}\left(\Theta, a_{1}\right)} u_{1}\left(a_{1}, s_{-1}, \theta\right) \tag{6.6.9}
\end{equation*}
$$

The belief system after eliminating dominated strategy $\Theta^{*}\left(a_{1}\right)$ is defined as: for any $a_{1} \in A_{1}$,

$$
\Theta^{*}\left(a_{1}\right)=\left\{\theta: \nexists a_{1}^{\prime} \in A_{1} \text { makes the above strict inequality (6.6.9) true }\right\} .
$$

Using the restrictions imposed on beliefs above, we can further refine the education game's separating equilibria. When $e>\tilde{e}, \theta_{h}-C\left(\tilde{e}, \theta_{l}\right)<\theta_{l}$. We have $\theta_{h}-C\left(\tilde{e}, \theta_{l}\right) \geqq w(\tilde{e})-C\left(\tilde{e}, \theta_{l}\right)$, where $w(\tilde{e})=\mu(\tilde{e}) \theta_{h}+(1-\mu(\tilde{e})) \theta_{l}$ is the employer's equilibrium response under given belief $\mu(\tilde{e})$. We also have $\theta_{l} \leqq w\left(e_{l}=0\right)-C\left(0, \theta_{l}\right)$, where $w(0)=\mu(0) \theta_{h}+(1-\mu(0)) \theta_{l}$ is the employer's equilibrium response under given belief $\mu(0)$. Therefore, when $e>\tilde{e}, \mu(e)=1$. Based on these beliefs, separating equilibria, including $e_{h}>\tilde{e}$, can be refined. In this way, only $e_{l}=0, e_{h}=\tilde{e}, \mu(\tilde{e})=1, \mu(0)=0$, $w\left(e_{h}\right)=\theta_{h}, w(0)=\theta_{l}$ satisfies the above belief restriction in all separating equilibria.

In addition, in the pooling equilibrium, if $u\left(w_{p}, e^{*} \mid \theta_{h}\right)=w_{p}-C\left(e^{*}, \theta_{h}\right)<$ $\theta_{h}-C\left(\tilde{e}, \theta_{h}\right)$ is established, such pooling equilibria can also be similarly refined.

In the following, we introduce two additional criteria to further strengthen the restrictions imposed on beliefs.

## Equilibrium Domination

We now consider a further strengthening of the notion of domination, known as equilibrium domination.

Suppose at a perfect Bayesian equilibrium $\left(\left(a_{1}{ }^{*}(\theta)\right)_{\theta \in \Theta}, s_{-1}{ }^{*}\left(a_{1}\right), \mu\left(\theta \mid a_{1}\right)\right)$, the utility of the type $\theta$ player is $u_{1}{ }^{*}(\theta) \equiv u_{1}\left(a_{1}{ }^{*}(\theta), s_{-1}{ }^{*}\left(a_{1}{ }^{*}\right), \theta\right)$.

Definition 6.6.9 (Equilibrium Dominated Strategy) Action $a_{1}$ is said to be equilibrium dominated or dominated strategy in equilibrium for the player of type $\theta$ if

$$
\begin{equation*}
u_{1}{ }^{*}(\theta)>\max _{s_{-1} \in S_{-1}^{*}\left(\Theta, a_{1}\right)} u_{1}\left(a_{1}, s_{-1}, \theta\right) . \tag{6.6.10}
\end{equation*}
$$

If the above inequality holds, then $\mu\left(\theta \mid a_{1}\right)=0$.

Using this notion of dominance, define
$\Theta^{* *}\left(a_{1}\right)=\left\{\theta: \nexists a_{1} \in A_{1}\right.$ makes the above strict inequality (6.6.10) true $\}$.

A perfect Bayesian equilibrium needs to have reasonable beliefs, and
thus when $\mu\left(\theta \mid a_{1}\right)>0$, we must have $\theta \in \Theta^{* *}\left(a_{1}\right)$. Since

$$
u_{1}(\theta) \equiv u_{1}\left(a_{1}{ }^{*}(\theta), s_{-1}{ }^{*}\left(a_{1}{ }^{*}\right), \theta\right)>\min _{s_{-1}^{\prime} \in S_{-1}^{*}\left(\Theta, a_{1}^{\prime}\right)} u_{1}\left(a_{1}^{*}(\theta), s_{-1}^{\prime}, \theta\right),
$$

the dominated strategy in equilibrium imposes stronger restrictions on beliefs than previous belief restrictions based on eliminating dominated strategies.

Applying this equilibrium dominance-based procedure to eliminate irrational beliefs, we can eliminate all pooling equilibria of the education game.
$\left(e\left(\theta_{h}\right)=e\left(\theta_{l}\right)=e^{*}<\hat{e}, w\left(e^{*}\right)=w_{p}=\lambda \theta_{h}+(1-\lambda) \theta_{l}, \mu\left(\theta_{h} \mid e^{*}\right)=\lambda, \mu\left(\theta_{h} \mid e^{*}\right)=0\right)$
is a pooling equilibrium.
Let $e^{\prime}$ satisfy $\theta_{h}-C\left(e^{\prime}, \theta_{l}\right)=w_{p}-C\left(e^{*}, \theta_{l}\right)$ and $e^{\prime \prime}$ satisfy $\theta_{h}-C\left(e^{\prime \prime}, \theta_{h}\right)=$ $w_{p}-C\left(e^{*}, \theta_{h}\right)$. Obviously, we have $e^{\prime \prime}>e^{\prime}$. When $e \in\left(e^{\prime}, e^{\prime \prime}\right), \theta_{h}-C\left(e, \theta_{l}\right)<$ $w_{p}-C\left(e^{*}, \theta_{l}\right)$ and $\theta_{h}-C\left(e, \theta_{h}\right)>w_{p}-C\left(e^{*}, \theta_{h}\right)$. In other words, when the employer observes $e \in\left(e^{\prime}, e^{\prime \prime}\right)$, job seekers of type $\theta_{l}$ prefer the payoff profile of pooling equilibrium instead of choosing $e$ to obtain the maximum possible payoff profile, while job seekers of type $\theta_{h}$ are just the opposite. According to the restrictions of the dominated strategy in equilibrium on beliefs, when $e \in\left(e^{\prime}, e^{\prime \prime}\right)$, the employer's posterior belief is $\mu(e)=1$. Therefore, job seekers of type $\theta_{h}$ have an incentive to choose $e$, and the pooling equilibrium does not satisfy the belief restrictions imposed by the dominated strategy in equilibrium.

## Intuitive Criterion

Based on the above restrictions on beliefs, Cho and Kreps (1987) proposed another refinement criterion for reducing the set of equilibria, which is intuitive criterion.

Definition 6.6.10 (Intuitive Criterion) A perfect Bayesian equilibrium $\left(\left(a_{1}{ }^{*}(\theta)\right)_{\theta \in \Theta}, s_{-1}{ }^{*}\left(a_{1}\right), \mu\left(\theta \mid a_{1}\right)\right)$ violates the intuitive criterion if there is a
type $\theta \in \Theta$ and an action $a_{1} \in A_{1}$, such that

$$
u_{1}^{*}(\theta)<\sum_{s_{-1} \in S_{-1}^{*}\left(\Theta^{* *}\left(a_{1}\right), a_{1}\right)} u_{1}\left(a_{1}, s_{-1}, \theta\right) .
$$

According to the above discussion of the education game, only the Pareto optimal separating equilibrium can pass the intuitive criterion among all perfect Bayesian equilibria.

In the following, we refer to the example in Cho and Kreps (1987) (see Figure 6.19) to explore how to employ the intuitive criterion to refine perfect Bayesian equilibria.


Figure 6.19: An Example of Intuitive Criterion.

Example 6.6.11 In the game depicted in Figure 6.19, "Nature" chooses the type of player 1. $\theta_{w}$ denotes the type of "weak", and $\theta_{s}$ denotes the type of "strong" . The initial probability of the "weak" type is 0.1 . Player 1 chooses breakfast between "Beer" and "Quiche" . After player 2 observes player 1's choice, she chooses an action from "Fight" $(F)$ and "Not Fight" $(N F)$. If the "weak" type is encountered, for player 2, the payoff profile of choosing $F$ is greater than that of choosing $N F$; if the "strong" type is encountered, for player 2, the payoff profile of choosing $N F$ is greater than that of choosing $F$. Regardless of the type, player 1 does not hope that player 2 chooses $F$.

First, we can verify that there is no "separating equilibrium" in this game. This game has the following two classes of perfect Bayesian equilibrium or sequential equilibrium.

The first class: both types of player 1 choose "Beer", and player 2
chooses $N F$ if she observes that player 1 has chosen "Beer" and chooses $F$ if she observes that player 1 has chosen "Quiche", and $\mu\left(\theta_{w} \mid\right.$ Beer $)=$ 0.9 .

The second class: both types of player 1 choose "Quiche", and player 2 chooses $F$ if she observes that player 1 has chosen "Beer" and chooses $N F$ if she observes that player 1 has chosen"Quiche", and $\mu\left(\theta_{w} \mid\right.$ Quiche $)=$ 0.9 .

We find that the second class of perfect Bayesian equilibrium does not satisfy the "intuitive criterion". If player 2 observes that player 1 has chosen "Beer", she should be able to infer that player 1 is "strong". This is due to the fact that if player 1 is "weak", his payoff profile is 3 in Bayesian equilibrium, which is the highest payoff profile of all possible outcomes in the game, and thus the "weak" type has no incentive to choose "Beer". However, for the "strong" type, choosing "Beer" can make player 2 choose $N F$ because she believes that "Beer" reveals that player 1 is "strong". In this case, the "strong" type has a higher payoff profile.

In a more rigorous way, since $u_{1}{ }^{*}\left(\theta_{w}\right)>\max _{s_{2}} u_{1}\left(\right.$ Beer, $\left.s_{2}, \theta_{w}\right)$ and $\mu\left(\theta_{w} \mid\right.$ Beer $)=$ $0, \Theta^{* *}=\theta_{s}$. When $\theta=\theta_{s}$, we have

$$
u_{1}{ }^{*}\left(\theta_{s}\right)=2<3=\min _{s_{2} \in S_{2}^{*}\left(\Theta^{* *}(\text { Beer,Beer })\right)} u_{1}\left(\text { Beer, NF, } \theta_{s}\right) .
$$

It can be verified that the first class of perfect Bayesian equilibrium does not violate the"intuitive criterion".

There are other criteria for refining the equilibrium of dynamic games of incomplete information, such as the "divinity" and the "universal divinity" proposed by Banks and Sobel (1987), and the concept of "stable equilibrium" proposed by Kohlberg and Mertens (1986).

Above, we have discussed various equilibrium concepts. In the following, we discuss the existence of equilibrium.

### 6.7 Existence of Nash Equilibrium

In using game theory to examine an interaction process, the most basic and important premise is that the game has an equilibrium solution. In the non-cooperative game, Nash equilibrium is a crucial concept. Nash (1951) proved the existence theorem of Nash equilibrium.

Below, we discuss some existence theorems of game equilibrium.

### 6.7.1 Existence of Nash Equilibrium in Continuous Games

Theorem 6.7.1 (Existence Theorem of Pure Strategy Nash Equilibrium) For a normal-form game $\Gamma_{N}=\left[N,\left\{S_{i}\right\},\left\{u_{i}(\cdot)\right\}\right]$, if for each player $i \in N, S_{i}$ is a nonempty compact convex subset in Euclidean space, $u_{i}$ is continuous on $S \equiv$ $\prod_{i \in N} S_{i}$ and quasiconcave on $S_{i}$, then there is a pure strategy Nash equilibrium in the game.

Proof. For any $\boldsymbol{x}_{-i}=\left(x_{1}, \cdots, x_{i-1}, x_{i+1}, \cdots, x_{N}\right)$, define

$$
B R_{i}\left(\boldsymbol{x}_{-i}\right)=\left\{x_{i} \in S_{i}: u_{i}\left(x_{i}, \boldsymbol{x}_{-i}\right) \geqq u_{i}\left(x_{i}^{\prime}, \boldsymbol{x}_{-i}\right), \quad \forall x_{i}^{\prime} \in S_{i}\right\},
$$

i.e., $B R_{i}\left(\boldsymbol{x}_{-i}\right)$ is the set of best responses to other players' strategy $\boldsymbol{x}_{-i}$. Define $B R(x)=\times_{i \in N} B R_{i}\left(\boldsymbol{x}_{-i}\right)$. Then, $B R: S \rightarrow 2^{S}$ is a correspondence (multi-valued mapping). Since for any $i \in N, u_{i}$ is continuous and quasiconcave on $S_{i}, B R_{i}\left(x_{-i}\right)$ is non-empty, compact and convex for all $s_{-i} \in S_{-i}$. Also, by the Maximum Theorem (Theorem 2.6.14), the correspondence $B R_{i}$ is an upper hemi-continuous correspondence on $S .^{2}$ Applying the Kakutani fixed point theorem (see Theorem 2.6.20), there is an $\boldsymbol{x}^{*}$, such that $\boldsymbol{x}^{*} \in B R\left(\boldsymbol{x}^{*}\right) . \boldsymbol{x}^{*}$ is the pure strategy Nash equilibrium of the game.

Since the utility function is linear on mixed strategy space $\Delta A_{i}$, it is quasiconcave. We immediately have the following corollary.

## Corollary 6.7.1 (Existence Theorem of Mixed Strategy Nash Equilibrium)

For a normal-form game $\Gamma_{N}=\left[N,\left\{S_{i}\right\},\left\{u_{i}(\cdot)\right\}\right]$, if for each player $i \in N$, mixed

[^10]strategy space $\Delta A_{i}$ is a nonempty compact convex subset in Euclidean space, $u_{i}$ is continuous, then there is a mixed strategy Nash equilibrium in the game.

Since a finite game $\Gamma_{N}=\left[N,\left\{S_{i}\right\},\left\{u_{i}(\cdot)\right\}\right]$ that can be viewed as a game with strategy sets $\left(\Delta S_{i}\right)_{i \in N}$ and $u_{i}\left(\sigma_{1}, \sigma_{2}, \ldots, \sigma_{n}\right)=\sum_{a_{i} \in S i}\left[\prod_{j=1}^{n} \sigma_{j}\left(a_{j}\right)\right] u_{i}\left(a_{i}\right)$ satisfies all the assumptions of Corollary 6.7.1, there exists a mixed strategy Nash equilibrium. Thus Proposition 6.3.5 is proved.

However, in reality, many games do not satisfy some of the above assumptions. For example, in the first-price sealed-bid auction, if two bidders bid the highest price at the same time, these two bidders obtain the auction item with the same probability. If one of these two bidders increases the bid slightly, the bidder's utility level will experience a large leap. As a consequence, the utility function is not continuous at this point. The classical Bertrand (1883) price war game also has discontinuous payoff profile functions.

If some of the above conditions are not satisfied, does it mean that no equilibrium exists? In the literature, there are intensive discussions on the existence of Nash equilibrium after appropriate relaxation of continuity and quasiconcavity, such as Dasgupta and Maskin (1986), Baye, Tian, and Zhou (1993), Reny (1999), and Tian (2015). Below, we introduce some characterization results on the existence of Nash equilibrium given by Baye, Tian and Zhou (1993) and Tian (2015).

### 6.7.2 Existence of Nash Equilibrium in Discontinuous Games

Consider a normal-form game $\left(\Gamma=\left(N,\left(X_{i}\right)_{i \in N},\left(u_{i}\right)_{i \in N}\right)\right), X=\prod_{i} X_{i}$. We first define upsetting a binary relation $\succ$.

Definition 6.7.1 For any $\boldsymbol{x}, \boldsymbol{y} \in X$, define upsetting the binary relation $\succ$ as: $\boldsymbol{y} \succ \boldsymbol{x}$ if and only if there is $i \in N$, such that $u_{i}\left(y_{i}, \boldsymbol{x}_{-i}\right)>u_{i}\left(x_{i}, \boldsymbol{x}_{-i}\right)$.

Obviously, if a strategy profile is a Nash equilibrium, no one will upset one's strategy.

Define $U(\boldsymbol{y}, \boldsymbol{x})=\sum_{i \in N} u_{i}\left(y_{i}, \boldsymbol{x}_{-i}\right)$, which represents the sum of utilities that each player uses strategy $y_{i}$ to upset strategy profile $\boldsymbol{x}$. For any $(\boldsymbol{x}, \boldsymbol{y}) \in X \times X$, based on the summation of all individual utilities, we
define a similar upsetting binary relation $\succ$, i.e., $\boldsymbol{y} \succ \boldsymbol{x}$ if and only if $U(\boldsymbol{y}, \boldsymbol{x})>U(\boldsymbol{x}, \boldsymbol{x})$. Obviously, if $\boldsymbol{x}$ is a Nash equilibrium, then there is no $\boldsymbol{y} \in X$, such that $\boldsymbol{y} \succ \boldsymbol{x}$.

We introduced the diagonal transfer continuity of function $U: X \times X \rightarrow$ $\mathcal{R}$ with respect to $\boldsymbol{y}$ in Chapter 2, and we now define the diagonal transfer continuity with respect to $\Gamma=\left(N,\left(X_{i}\right)_{i \in N},\left(u_{i}\right)_{i \in N}\right)$.

Definition 6.7.2 A game $\Gamma=\left(N,\left(X_{i}\right)_{i \in N},\left(u_{i}\right)_{i \in N}\right)$ is diagonally transfer continuous, if the function $U: X \times X \rightarrow \mathcal{R}$ is diagonally transfer continuous with respect to $\boldsymbol{y}$, i.e., for any $\boldsymbol{x}, \boldsymbol{y} \in X$, once $U(\boldsymbol{y}, \boldsymbol{x})>U(\boldsymbol{x}, \boldsymbol{x})$, then there is another strategy profile $\boldsymbol{z} \in X$ and a neighborhood of $\boldsymbol{x}, V_{x} \subseteq X$, such that $U\left(\boldsymbol{z}, V_{x}\right)>U\left(V_{x}, V_{x}\right)$, i.e., for any $\boldsymbol{x}^{\prime} \in V_{x}$, we have $U\left(\boldsymbol{z}, \boldsymbol{x}^{\prime}\right)>$ $\left.U\left(\boldsymbol{x}^{\prime}, \boldsymbol{x}^{\prime}\right)\right)$.

Definition 6.7.3 (Diagonally Transfer Quasiconcavity) A function $U(\boldsymbol{x}, \boldsymbol{y})$ $X \times X \rightarrow \mathcal{R}$ is diagonally transfer quasiconcave with respect to $\boldsymbol{x}$, if for any finite subset $X^{m}=\left\{\boldsymbol{x}^{1}, \cdots, \boldsymbol{x}^{m}\right\} \subseteq A$, there is a corresponding finite subset $Y^{m}=\left\{\boldsymbol{y}^{1}, \cdots, \boldsymbol{y}^{m}\right\} \subseteq C$, such that for any subset $\left\{\boldsymbol{y}^{k^{1}}, \boldsymbol{y}^{k^{2}}, \cdots, \boldsymbol{y}^{k^{s}}\right\} \subseteq$ $Y^{m}$, where $1 \leqq s \leqq m$, and any $y^{k 0} \in c o\left\{\boldsymbol{y}^{k^{1}}, \boldsymbol{y}^{k^{2}}, \cdots, \boldsymbol{y}^{k^{s}}\right\}$, we have

$$
\begin{equation*}
\min _{1 \leqq l \leqq s} U\left(\boldsymbol{x}^{k^{l}}, \boldsymbol{y}^{k 0}\right) \leqq U\left(\boldsymbol{y}^{k 0}, \boldsymbol{y}^{k 0}\right) . \tag{6.7.11}
\end{equation*}
$$

Similarly, a game $\Gamma=\left(N,\left(X_{i}\right)_{i \in N},\left(u_{i}\right)_{i \in N}\right)$ is diagonally transfer quasiconcave, if the function $U: X \times X \rightarrow \mathcal{R}$ is diagonally transfer quasiconcave with respect to $\boldsymbol{x}$.

Remark 6.7.1 Diagonal transfer quasiconcavity of $U$ is a weak version of quasiconcavity. For example, if $U$ is quasiconcave or diagonally quasiconcave with respect to $x$, then it is diagonally transfer quasiconcave with respect to $\boldsymbol{x}$ (Let $\boldsymbol{y}^{k}=\boldsymbol{x}^{k}$ ). ${ }^{3}$

Remark 6.7.2 Let $G(\boldsymbol{x})=\{\boldsymbol{y} \in C: U(\boldsymbol{x}, \boldsymbol{y}) \leqq U(\boldsymbol{y}, \boldsymbol{y})\}$. It is easy to verify that $U$ is diagonally transfer quasiconcave with respect to $x$ if and only if the corresponding $G: A \rightarrow 2^{C}$ is transfer FS-convex (see Definition 3.4.4).

[^11]In fact, the following theorem proves that diagonal transfer quasi-concavity is a necessary condition for the existence of Nash equilibrium, and it is also a sufficient condition under diagonal transfer continuity.

Theorem 6.7.2 (Baye, Tian, and Zhou (1993)) Suppose that a normal form game $\Gamma=\left(N,\left(X_{i}\right)_{i \in N},\left(u_{i}\right)_{i \in N}\right)$ satisfies diagonal transfer continuity. Г has a pure strategy Nash equilibrium if and only if it is diagonally transfer quasiconcave.

Proof. Necessity: Suppose that game $\Gamma$ has a pure strategy Nash equilibrium $\boldsymbol{y}^{*} \in X$. We need to prove that $U$ is diagonally transfer quasiconcave with respect to $\boldsymbol{x}$. For any finite subset $X^{m}=\left\{\boldsymbol{x}^{1}, \cdots, \boldsymbol{x}^{m}\right\} \subseteq X$, let the corresponding finite subset be $Y^{m}=\left\{\boldsymbol{y}^{1}, \cdots, \boldsymbol{y}^{m}\right\}=\left\{\boldsymbol{y}^{*}\right\}$. So, for any $\left\{\boldsymbol{y}^{k^{1}}, \boldsymbol{y}^{k^{2}}, \cdots, \boldsymbol{y}^{k^{s}}\right\} \subseteq Y^{m}=\left\{\boldsymbol{y}^{*}\right\}$, where $1 \leqq s \leqq m$ and any $\boldsymbol{y}^{k 0} \in \operatorname{co}\left\{\boldsymbol{y}^{k^{1}}, \boldsymbol{y}^{k^{2}}, \cdots, \boldsymbol{y}^{k^{s}}\right\}=\left\{\boldsymbol{y}^{*}\right\}$, we have
$\min _{1 \leqq l \leq s}\left[U\left(\boldsymbol{x}^{k^{l}}, \boldsymbol{y}^{k 0}\right) U\left(\boldsymbol{y}^{k 0}, \boldsymbol{y}^{k 0}\right)\right] \leqq\left[U\left(\boldsymbol{x}^{k^{l}}, \boldsymbol{y}^{*}\right) U\left(\boldsymbol{y}^{*}, \boldsymbol{y}^{*}\right)\right]=\sum_{i \in I}\left[u_{i}\left(\boldsymbol{x}_{i}^{k^{l}}, \boldsymbol{y}_{i}^{*}\right) u_{i}\left(\boldsymbol{y}^{*}\right)\right] \leqq 0$.
Therefore, $U$ is diagonally transfer quasiconcave with respect to $x$.
Sufficiency: For each $\boldsymbol{x} \in Z$, let $G(\boldsymbol{x})=\{\boldsymbol{y} \in X: U(\boldsymbol{x}, \boldsymbol{y}) \leqq U(\boldsymbol{y}, \boldsymbol{y})\}$. It is easy to verify that $U$ is diagonally transfer continuous with respect to $x$ if and only if $G: X \rightarrow 2^{X}$ is transfer closed-valued (see Chapter 2 for its definition). Moreover, $U$ is diagonally transfer quasiconcave with respect to $\boldsymbol{x}$ if and only if the corresponding $G: A \rightarrow 2^{C}$ is transfer FS-convex. From Lemma 3.4.2, we thus know that $\bigcap_{\boldsymbol{x} \in Z} G(\boldsymbol{x})=\bigcap_{\boldsymbol{x} \in Z} c l_{Z} G(\boldsymbol{x}) \neq \emptyset$. Therefore, there is $\boldsymbol{y}^{*} \in X$, such that $U\left(\boldsymbol{x}, \boldsymbol{y}^{*}\right) \leqq U\left(\boldsymbol{y}^{*}, \boldsymbol{y}^{*}\right)$ holds for all $\boldsymbol{x} \in X$. Let $\boldsymbol{x}=\left(\boldsymbol{x}_{i}, \boldsymbol{y}_{-i}^{*}\right)$, then

$$
\begin{equation*}
U\left(\boldsymbol{x}, \boldsymbol{y}^{*}\right)-U\left(\boldsymbol{y}^{*}, \boldsymbol{y}^{*}\right)=\left[u_{i}\left(\boldsymbol{x}_{i}, \boldsymbol{y}_{-i}^{*}\right)-u_{i}\left(\boldsymbol{y}^{*}\right)\right] \leqq 0 \tag{6.7.12}
\end{equation*}
$$

holds for all $\boldsymbol{x}_{i} \in X_{i}$. Therefore, $\boldsymbol{y}^{*}$ is a pure strategy Nash equilibrium of $\Gamma$.

Tian (2015) further provided the sufficient and necessary topological conditions for the existence of pure strategy Nash equilibrium in any normalform game. In a general game, the number of players can be finite or infinite; strategy spaces are arbitrary, which can be discrete or continuous and
can be non-compact or non-convex; and players' utility functions can be discontinuous or non-quasiconcave on strategy spaces. The way of proof shown in Tian (2015) does not use any form of a fixed point theorem as usual, but is based on a more basic mathematical result (Borel-Lebesgue covering theorem). The following only discusses situations in which utility functions exist. For general situations, please refer to Tian (2015).

Definition 6.7.4 A game $\Gamma=\left(N,\left(X_{i}\right)_{i \in N},\left(u_{i}\right)_{i \in N}\right)$ is said to be recursively diagonal transfer continuous if, for any $\boldsymbol{x}, \boldsymbol{y} \in X$ satisfying $\boldsymbol{y} \succ \boldsymbol{x}$, there exists a strategy profile $\boldsymbol{y}^{0} \in X$ (possibly $\boldsymbol{y}^{0}=\boldsymbol{x}$ ) and a neighborhood $V_{x} \subseteq X$, such that for any $\boldsymbol{z} \in X$ that recursively upsets $\boldsymbol{y}^{0},^{4}$ there exists $U\left(\boldsymbol{z}, V_{\boldsymbol{x}}\right)>U\left(V_{\boldsymbol{x}}, V_{\boldsymbol{x}}\right)$.

We can similarly define $m$-recursively diagonal transfer continuity. A game $G=\left(X_{i}, u_{i}\right)_{i \in I}$ is said to be $m$-recursively diagonal transfer continuous if and only if "recursively upsets $\boldsymbol{y}^{0}$ " in the above definition is replaced by " $m$-recursively upsets $\boldsymbol{y}^{0}$ " .

Based on the introduction of these concepts, Tian (2015) gave the necessary and sufficient conditions for the existence of pure strategy Nash equilibrium.

Theorem 6.7.3 (Necessary Conditions for the Existence of Nash Equilibrium) If a game $\Gamma=\left(N,\left(X_{i}\right)_{i \in N},\left(u_{i}\right)_{i \in N}\right)$ has a pure strategy Nash equilibrium, then the game must satisfy recursive diagonal transfer continuity.

Proof. First, note that, if $\boldsymbol{x}^{*} \in X$ is a pure strategy Nash equilibrium of a game $G$, we must have $U\left(\boldsymbol{y}, \boldsymbol{x}^{*}\right) \leq U\left(\boldsymbol{x}^{*}, \boldsymbol{x}^{*}\right)$ for all $\boldsymbol{y} \in X$, which is obtained by summing up $u_{i}\left(\boldsymbol{y}_{i}, \boldsymbol{x}_{-i}^{*}\right) \leq u_{i}\left(\boldsymbol{x}^{*}\right) \quad \forall \boldsymbol{y}_{i} \in X_{i}$ for all players.

If for any $\boldsymbol{x}, \boldsymbol{y} \in X$, there is $U(\boldsymbol{y}, \boldsymbol{x})>U(\boldsymbol{x}, \boldsymbol{x})$. Let $\boldsymbol{y}^{0}=\boldsymbol{x}^{*}$ and $V_{\boldsymbol{x}}$ be a neighbourhood of strategy profile $\boldsymbol{x}$. Since $U\left(\boldsymbol{y}, \boldsymbol{x}^{*}\right) \leqq U\left(\boldsymbol{x}^{*}, \boldsymbol{x}^{*}\right)$, it is impossible to find a strategy profile $\boldsymbol{y}^{1}$, such that $U\left(\boldsymbol{y}^{1}, \boldsymbol{y}^{0}\right)>U\left(\boldsymbol{y}^{0}, \boldsymbol{y}^{0}\right)$, and of course, it is impossible to find a finite strategy profile chain, $\left\{\boldsymbol{y}^{1}, \boldsymbol{y}^{2}, \cdots, \boldsymbol{y}^{m}\right\}$, such that $U\left(\boldsymbol{y}^{i+1}, \boldsymbol{y}^{i}\right)>U\left(\boldsymbol{y}^{i}, \boldsymbol{y}^{i}\right), i=1, \cdots, m-1$. This means that the game satisfies recursive diagonal transfer continuity.

[^12]
## Theorem 6.7.4 (Sufficient Conditions for the Existence of Nash Equilibrium)

Suppose that the strategy profile space $X$ of game $\Gamma=\left(N,\left(X_{i}\right)_{i \in N},\left(u_{i}\right)_{i \in N}\right)$ is compact. If the game satisfies recursive diagonal transfer continuity on $X$, then there is a pure strategy Nash equilibrium.

Proof. First, note that if there is $U\left(\boldsymbol{y}, \boldsymbol{x}^{*}\right) \leqq U\left(\boldsymbol{x}^{*}, \boldsymbol{x}^{*}\right)$ for all $\boldsymbol{y} \in X$, then $\boldsymbol{x}^{*} \in X$ must be a Nash equilibrium of the game. We can let $\boldsymbol{y}=$ $\left(\boldsymbol{y}_{i}, \boldsymbol{x}_{-i}^{*}\right), U\left(\boldsymbol{y}, \boldsymbol{x}^{*}\right) \leqq U\left(\boldsymbol{x}^{*}, \boldsymbol{x}^{*}\right)$ means $u_{i}\left(\boldsymbol{y}_{i}, \boldsymbol{x}_{-i}^{*}\right) \leqq u_{i}\left(\boldsymbol{x}^{*}\right)$.

Suppose, by way of contradiction, that there is no pure strategy Nash equilibrium. Then, for each $\boldsymbol{x} \in X$, there exists $\boldsymbol{y} \in X$, such that $U(\boldsymbol{y}, \boldsymbol{x})>$ $U(\boldsymbol{x}, \boldsymbol{x})$, and thus by recursive diagonal transfer continuity, for each $\boldsymbol{x} \in X$, there is $\boldsymbol{y}^{0}$ and a neighborhood of $\boldsymbol{x}, V_{x}$, such that for any $\boldsymbol{z}$ that recursively upsets $\boldsymbol{y}^{0}$, we have $U\left(\boldsymbol{z}, V_{\boldsymbol{x}}\right)>U\left(V_{\boldsymbol{x}}, V_{\boldsymbol{x}}\right)$. Since there is no equilibrium by the contrapositive hypothesis, $\boldsymbol{y}^{0}$ is not an equilibrium and thus, by recursive diagonal transfer continuity, such a sequence of recursive securing strategy profiles $\left\{\boldsymbol{y}^{0}, \cdots, \boldsymbol{y}^{m-1}, \boldsymbol{y}^{m}=\boldsymbol{z}\right\}$ exist for some $m \geq 1$, such that $U\left(\boldsymbol{y}^{i+1}, \boldsymbol{y}^{i}\right)>U\left(\boldsymbol{y}^{i}, \boldsymbol{y}^{i}\right), i=0, \cdots, m-1$.

Since $X$ is compact and $X \subseteq \bigcup_{x \in X} \mathcal{V}_{x}$, there are finite strategies $\left\{\boldsymbol{x}^{1}, \cdots, \boldsymbol{x}^{L}\right\}$, such that $X \subseteq \bigcup_{i=1}^{L} V_{x^{i}}$. For each such $\boldsymbol{x}^{i}$, there is a corresponding $\boldsymbol{y}^{0 i}$, so that $U\left(\boldsymbol{z}^{i}, V_{\boldsymbol{x}^{i}}\right)>u\left(\boldsymbol{x}^{i}, V_{\boldsymbol{x}^{i}}\right)$ whenever $\boldsymbol{y}^{0 i}$ is recursively upset by $\boldsymbol{z}^{i}$.

Since there is no equilibrium, then for each such $\boldsymbol{y}^{0 i}$, there must be $\boldsymbol{z}^{i} \in X$, such that $U\left(\boldsymbol{z}^{i}, \boldsymbol{y}^{0 i}\right)>u\left(\boldsymbol{y}^{0 i}, \boldsymbol{y}^{0 i}\right)$, and then, by 1 -recursive diagonal transfer continuity, we have $U\left(\boldsymbol{z}^{i}, \mathcal{V}_{x^{i}}\right)>U\left(\mathcal{V}_{x^{i}}, \mathcal{V}_{x^{i}}\right)$. For strategy profile $\left\{\boldsymbol{z}^{1}, \ldots, \boldsymbol{z}^{L}\right\}$, we must have $\boldsymbol{z}^{i} \notin \mathcal{V}_{\boldsymbol{x}^{i}}$; otherwise, by $U\left(\boldsymbol{z}^{i}, \mathcal{V}_{x^{i}}\right)>$ $U\left(\mathcal{V}_{\boldsymbol{x}^{i}}, \mathcal{V}_{\boldsymbol{x}^{i}}\right)$, we have $U\left(\boldsymbol{z}^{i}, \boldsymbol{z}^{i}\right)>U\left(\boldsymbol{z}^{i}, \boldsymbol{z}^{i}\right)$, which is a contradiction. As such, we must have $\boldsymbol{z}^{1} \notin \mathcal{V}_{\boldsymbol{x}^{1}}$. We assume that $\boldsymbol{z}^{1} \in V_{\boldsymbol{x}^{2}}$, which does not lose generality.

Since $U\left(\boldsymbol{z}^{2}, \boldsymbol{z}^{1}\right)>u\left(\boldsymbol{z}^{1}, \boldsymbol{z}^{1}\right)$ and $U\left(\boldsymbol{z}^{1}, \boldsymbol{y}^{01}\right)>u\left(\boldsymbol{y}^{01}, \boldsymbol{y}^{01}\right)$, by 2-recursive diagonal continuity, we have $U\left(z^{2}, V_{x^{1}}\right)>U\left(V_{x^{1}}, V_{\boldsymbol{x}^{1}}\right)$. Similarly, since $U\left(\boldsymbol{z}^{2}, V_{\boldsymbol{x}^{2}}\right)>U\left(V_{\boldsymbol{x}^{2}}, V_{\boldsymbol{x}^{2}}\right), U\left(\boldsymbol{z}^{2}, V_{\boldsymbol{x}^{1}} \cup V_{\boldsymbol{x}^{2}}\right)>U\left(V_{\boldsymbol{x}^{1}} \cup V_{\boldsymbol{x}^{2}}\right)$, from which $z^{2} \notin\left(V_{x^{1}} \cup V_{x^{2}}\right)$ is obtained. With this recursive process, for $k=3, \ldots, L$, we can show that $\boldsymbol{z}^{k} \notin V_{\boldsymbol{x}^{1}} \cup V_{\boldsymbol{x}^{2}} \cup \cdots \cup V_{\boldsymbol{x}^{k}}$. When $k=L$, we can obtain that $\boldsymbol{z}^{L} \notin V_{\boldsymbol{x}^{1}} \cup V_{\boldsymbol{x}^{2}} \cdots \cup V_{\boldsymbol{x}^{L}}$, which contradicts $X \subseteq \bigcup_{i=1}^{L} V_{\boldsymbol{x}^{i}}$ and $\boldsymbol{z}^{L} \in X$. Therefore, the game must have a pure strategy Nash equilibrium.

In the following, we define a relatively stronger concept based on recursive diagonal transfer continuity, and thus that we can identify the necessary and sufficient conditions for the existence of (pure strategy) Nash equilibrium in any game.

Definition 6.7.5 Let $B \subseteq X$. A game $\Gamma=\left(N,\left(X_{i}\right)_{i \in N},\left(u_{i}\right)_{i \in N}\right)$ is said to satisfy recursive diagonal transfer continuity relative to $B$ on $X$, if $\boldsymbol{x}$ is not a Nash equilibrium, and then there exists a strategy profile $\boldsymbol{y}^{0} \in B$ (possibly $\boldsymbol{y}^{0}=\boldsymbol{x}$ ) and a neighborhood of strategy profile $\boldsymbol{x}, V_{\boldsymbol{x}}$, such that: (1) $\boldsymbol{y}^{0}$ is upset by a strategy on $B$. (2) If for any finite strategy profile chain $\left\{\boldsymbol{y}^{1}, \cdots, \boldsymbol{y}^{m}=\boldsymbol{z}\right\}$ with $U\left(\boldsymbol{y}^{i+1}, \boldsymbol{y}^{i}\right)>U\left(\boldsymbol{y}^{i}, \boldsymbol{y}^{i}\right), i=0, \cdots, m-1$, we have $U\left(\boldsymbol{z}, V_{\boldsymbol{x}}\right)>U\left(V_{\boldsymbol{x}}, V_{\boldsymbol{x}}\right)$.

## Theorem 6.7.5 (Full Characterization for the Existence of Nash Equilibrium)

A game $\Gamma=\left(N,\left(X_{i}\right)_{i \in N},\left(u_{i}\right)_{i \in N}\right)$ has a pure strategy Nash equilibrium if and only if there is a compact set $B \subseteq X$, such that the game satisfies recursive diagonal transfer continuity relative to $B$ on $X$.

Proof. Since the sufficiency proof of the theorem is similar to the above, it is approximately given here. We first prove that the game has a Nash equilibrium $\boldsymbol{x}^{*}$ in strategy space $B$. Suppose that this is not the case. Since game $G$ satisfies recursive diagonal transfer continuity with respect to $B$ on $X$, for every $\boldsymbol{x} \in B$, there exists $\boldsymbol{y}^{0} \in B$ and neighborhood $\mathcal{V}_{\boldsymbol{x}}$, such that for any finite subsequence $\left\{\boldsymbol{y}^{1}, \cdots, \boldsymbol{y}^{m}\right\} \subseteq B$ satisfying $\boldsymbol{y}^{m}=\boldsymbol{z}$ and $U\left(\boldsymbol{z}, \boldsymbol{y}^{m-1}\right)>U\left(\boldsymbol{y}^{m-1}, \boldsymbol{y}^{m-1}\right), U\left(\boldsymbol{y}^{m-1}, \boldsymbol{y}^{m-2}\right)>U\left(\boldsymbol{y}^{m-2}, \boldsymbol{y}^{m-2}\right), \cdots$, $U\left(\boldsymbol{y}^{1}, \boldsymbol{y}^{0}\right)>U\left(\boldsymbol{y}^{0}, \boldsymbol{y}^{0}\right)$, we have $U\left(\boldsymbol{z}, \mathcal{V}_{x}\right)>U\left(\mathcal{V}_{x}, \mathcal{V}_{x}\right)$. By the assumption, since there is no equilibrium in $B, \boldsymbol{y}^{0}$ is not an equilibrium in $B$. Therefore, by recursive diagonal transition continuity with respect to $B$ on $X$, for some $m \geqq 1$, there exists such a recursive sequence $\left\{\boldsymbol{y}^{1}, \cdots, \boldsymbol{y}^{m-1}, \boldsymbol{z}\right\}$.

Since $B$ is compact and $B \subseteq \bigcup_{x \in X} \mathcal{V}_{\boldsymbol{x}}$, there is a finite set $\left\{\boldsymbol{x}^{1}, \cdots, \boldsymbol{x}^{L}\right\} \subseteq$ $B$, such that $B \subseteq \bigcup_{i=1}^{L} \mathcal{V}_{\boldsymbol{x}^{i}}$. For each such $\boldsymbol{x}^{i}$, there is a corresponding initial deviation $\boldsymbol{y}^{0 i}$, such that as long as $\boldsymbol{y}^{0 i}$ is recursively upset by $\boldsymbol{z}^{i}$ through finite strategies $\left\{\boldsymbol{y}^{1 i}, \cdots, \boldsymbol{y}^{m i}\right\} \subseteq B$ and $\boldsymbol{y}^{m i}=\boldsymbol{z}^{i}$, we have $U\left(\boldsymbol{z}^{i}, \mathcal{V}_{\boldsymbol{x}^{i}}\right)>$ $U\left(\mathcal{V}_{x^{i}}, \mathcal{V}_{x^{i}}\right)$. By the same reasoning as in the previous theorem's proof, for all $k=1,2, \cdots, L, z^{k}$ is not in the union of $\mathcal{V}_{\boldsymbol{x}^{1}}, \mathcal{V}_{\boldsymbol{x}^{2}}, \cdots, \mathcal{V}_{\boldsymbol{x}^{k}}$. Especially for
$k=L$, we have $\boldsymbol{z}^{L} \notin \mathcal{V}_{x^{1}} \cup \mathcal{V}_{x^{2}} \cdots \cup \mathcal{V}_{x^{L}}$ and thus $\boldsymbol{z}^{L} \notin B \subseteq \bigcup_{i=1}^{L} \mathcal{V}_{x^{i}}$, which is a contradiction. As a consequence, the game has a pure strategy Nash equilibrium $\boldsymbol{x}^{*}$ on $B$.

We now prove that $x^{*}$ must also be a pure strategy Nash equilibrium on $X$. Suppose that $\boldsymbol{x}^{*}$ was not a pure strategy Nash equilibrium on $X$. Then, $x^{*}$ will be upset by a strategy in $X \backslash B$, and thus it is upset by a strategy in $B$, which means that $\boldsymbol{x}^{*}$ is not a Nash equilibrium on B, which is a contradiction.

The proof of necessity is the same, since its proof does not rely on the compactness of the set.

In Tian (2015), the sufficient and necessary conditions for the existence of mixed strategy equilibrium and for the existence of equilibrium under general preferences are also discussed.

### 6.8 Biographies

### 6.8.1 John Forbes Nash Jr.

John Forbes Nash Jr. (1928-2015) was an American mathematician who made fundamental contributions to game theory. He was once a C. L. E. Moore instructor at MIT, and later became a professor of mathematics at Princeton University. He mainly studied game theory, differential geometry, and partial differential equations. He won the 1994 Nobel Memorial Prize in Economic Sciences for his pioneering analysis of equilibria in the theory of non-cooperative games, and the concept of Nash equilibrium proposed at the age of 22 that has had a profound influence on game theory and economics.

He received his Ph.D. from Princeton University in 1950. His doctoral dissertation, entitled "Non-Cooperative Games" , comprised only 27 pages. In 1950 and 1951, his two important papers on non-cooperative games theory completely transformed people's views on competition and the market. He defined the non-cooperative game and its equilibrium solution, and proved the existence of equilibrium solution (i.e., the well-known Nash equilibrium). His research shows that making decisions based on
maximizing individual interests does not necessarily maximize collective interests. In other words, the maximization of individual interests and the maximization of collective interests may conflict, thus revealing the intrinsic link between game equilibrium and economic equilibrium. Nash's research laid the foundation for the modern non-cooperative game theory, and later game theory research was basically carried out along this main line. However, Nash's genius discovery was flatly denied by von Neumann , and he had previously received an indifferent reception from Einstein. Nash's instinct of challenging authority made him adhere to his own ideas, and led to his great accomplishments. He had a serious mental illness for more than 30 years, and the Oscar-winning film A Beautiful Mind adapted from the biography of the same name in 2001 is about his life experience.

The minimax theorem proposed by von Neumann in 1928 and the equilibrium theorem proposed by Nash in 1950 formed the cornerstone of game theory. The former primarily considers the zero-sum game, while the latter considers the more general non-zero-sum game. By extending this theory to games involving various cooperation and competition, Nash successfully opened the door to application of game theory in economics, political science, sociology, and even evolutionary biology. In 1958, Nash was identified by Fortune (magazine) as the most outstanding figure among genius mathematicians of the modern generation for his excellent work in mathematics. In 1994, he and John C. Harsanyi and Reinhard Selten jointly won the Nobel Memorial Prize in Economic Sciences. In 1999, he was awarded the Leroy P. Steele Prize by the Mathematical Association of America.

Although the Nobel Memorial Prize in Economic Sciences, the highest prize in economics, brought a new life to Nash, and his physical and mental condition seemed to be improving in the 21 years since winning the prize, his life ended tragically. Nash won the Abel Prize in 2015, which is awarded by the Norwegian Royal Family and rewards scientists who have made outstanding contributions in the field of mathematics. On their way back to the United States after attending the Norwegian Royal Family Award Ceremony, Nash and his wife Alicia died in an automobile accident on the New Jersey Turnpike on May 23, 2015.

### 6.8.2 John C. Harsanyi

John C. Harsanyi (1920-2000) was one of the pioneers in developing game theory as a tool of economic analysis. He made fundamental contributions to games of incomplete information, i.e., Bayesian games. Other important contributions included the application of game theory, and economic reasoning in political and moral philosophy (specifically utilitarian ethics). His contributions made him a co-recipient of the 1994 Nobel Memorial Prize in Economic Sciences, together with John Nash and Reinhard Selten.

Harsanyi was born into a Jewish family in Budapest, Hungary. He followed his parents' wishes and studied pharmacology at the University of Budapest. In early 1944, he received a master's degree in pharmacy. In March 1944, German troops occupied Hungary. Harsanyi was compelled to join a forced labor unit from May to November. In November of the same year, the Nazi authorities decided to deport his unit at Budapest to a concentration camp in Austria. Harsanyi was fortunate enough to escape from the Budapest railway station, just before the train left for Austria. After the end of the war, in 1946, Harsanyi returned to the University of Budapest to obtain his Ph.D. in philosophy with minors in sociology and psychology. As he had credit for his previous studies in pharmacy, Harsanyi received a Ph.D. in philosophy in June 1947, after only one more year of course work and after writing a dissertation in philosophy. From September 1947 to June 1948, Harsanyi was an assistant professor at the University Institute of Sociology, where he met Anne Klauber, his future wife. In June 1948, he was forced to resign from the Institute because of openly expressing his anti-Marxist opinions. In April 1950, Harsanyi and Anne decided to leave Hungary. They crossed the Hungarian border over a marshy terrain, which was less guarded, and fled to Austria before they reached Sydney, Australia.

While working in a factory during the day in Sydney, Harsanyi took economics courses at the University of Sydney in the evening and obtained a master's degree in economics in 1953. During his study in Sydney, he began publishing papers in economic journals (including the Journal of Political Economy and the Review of Economic Studies). The degree allowed him
to secure a teaching position in 1954 at the University of Queensland in Brisbane. Harsanyi wrote a paper on game theory under the guidance of Kenneth J. Arrow (1921-2017) at Stanford University in 1958 and received his second doctoral degree (Ph.D. in economics) in 1959. He was appointed Professor of Economics at Wayne State University in Michigan between 1961 and 1963. In 1964, he moved to the University of California at Berkeley and remained there until his retirement in 1990.

The second half of the 1960s witnessed the most important achievements in Harsanyi's academic career. In 1967 and 1968, Harsanyi published a three-part paper, entitled "Games with Incomplete Information Played by 'Bayesian' Players" . The paper studied games with incomplete information that game theory at that time could not effectively discuss. He proposed a method to convert a game with incomplete information into one with complete but imperfect information, in order to make it accessible to game-theoretic analysis. Currently, this method is called the "Harsanyi Transformation" and is the standard method of analysing games with incomplete information. Due to Harsanyi's paper, the difficulty in analysing the incomplete information was solved, and the incomplete information game was incorporated into the analytical framework of game theory, which markedly expanded the analysis and application scope of game theory, and thus constituted a milestone achievement in the development of game theory. It was because of this contribution that Harsanyi received the Nobel Memorial Prize in Economic Sciences. In addition to his outstanding achievements in the study of game theory, Harsanyi also obtained important results in welfare economics and economic philosophy. From the early 1950s to the 1990s, Harsanyi published a series of articles in these two fields, which further established his position in the economics profession. John Harsanyi passed away on August 9, 2000, from a heart attack, in Berkeley, California.

### 6.9 Exercises

Exercise 6.1 Consider a normal-form game. Prove that if only one strategy profile survives the iterated elimination of non-best response strategies, then it is the unique Nash equilibrium.

Exercise 6.2 Consider the following game: There are 20 students in a class. Each of them chooses an integer between 1 and 100. Students who choose the number closest to $1 / 2$ of the class average will equally divide 100 dollars.

1. Find strictly dominated strategies for each student.
2. Find the Nash equilibrium of the game by iterated elimination of strictly dominated strategies.
3. Suppose that the winning rule is changed to that students who choose the number closest to 2 times the class average will equally divide 100 dollars. Find all Nash equilibria of the game.

Exercise 6.3 There are $n$ herdsmen in a public grassland. Herdsman $i$ can choose to herd $g_{i}$ sheep on the public grassland. The cost per head is $c>0$. One year later, each herdsman can sell his sheep at the market price $v(G)$, where $G=\sum_{i=1}^{n} g_{i}$. Assume that $v(G)$ is twice continuously differentiable, and that its second derivative is less than zero.

1. Solve for the socially optimal amount of sheep.
2. Solve for the amount of sheep held by each herdsman in the Nash equilibrium.

Exercise 6.4 Consider a normal-form game $\left.\left(N,\left(S_{i}\right)_{i \in N}\right),\left(u_{i}\right)_{i \in N}\right)$, where $N=\{1,2, \cdots, n\}$. We say that the game is symmetric if it satisfies the following conditions: (1) For any players $i$ and $j, S_{i}=S_{j}$; (2) if $s_{-i}=s_{-j}$ and $s_{i}=s_{j}$, then $u\left(s_{i}, s_{-i}\right)=u\left(s_{j}, s_{-j}\right)$. Suppose that for any player $i$ and $j, \sigma_{i}=\sigma_{j}$, strategy $\sigma=\left(\sigma_{1}, \cdots, \sigma_{n}\right)$ is symmetric. The symmetric Nash equilibrium refers to the Nash equilibrium whose strategy is symmetric.

1. Determine whether any finite symmetric game has a symmetric Nash equilibrium.
2. Prove that not all Nash equilibrium strategies are symmetric.

Exercise 6.5 Find all Nash equilibria of the following game (including purestrategy Nash equilibrium and mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium):

Player 2


Exercise 6.6 Two individuals have to decide how to allocate 100 thousand dollars. They use the following allocation rule: Each decision-maker reports a positive integer less than 100 thousand. If the sum of the numbers reported by these two individuals does not exceed 100 thousand, then the amount of money a decision-maker receives is the person's own number (the extra money is discarded). If the sum of the numbers reported by these two individuals is greater than 100 thousand and their numbers are different, then the decision-maker who reports the smaller number receives the amount of money that she reports, and the other decision-maker gets what remains of the 100 thousand dollars. If the sum of the two numbers is greater than 100 thousand and the two numbers are the same, then each decision-maker receives 50 thousand dollars.

1. Find all pure strategy Nash equilibria of the game.
2. Find all mixed strategy Nash equilibria of the game.

Exercise 6.7 Consider the following strategic-form game:

Player 2

|  |  |  |  |  |
| ---: | ---: | :--- | :---: | :---: |
| Player 1 | L | C | R |  |
|  | M | $\begin{array}{l}\text { L }\end{array}$ |  |  |
| $1,-3$ | $-3,1$ | 0,0 |  |  |
| $-3,1$ | $1,-3$ | 0,0 |  |  |
| 0,0 | 0,0 | 2,2 |  |  |

1. What is the set of rationalizable strategies for each player?
2. Find the pure strategy Nash equilibrium in this game.
3. Prove that there is no additional mixed strategy Nash equilibrium in this game.

Exercise 6.8 Consider the following simultaneous-move game:

\[

\]

1. Under what conditions is there a Nash equilibrium such that both of the two players choose completely mixed strategies?
2. Under what conditions is the Nash equilibrium in question (1) the unique Nash equilibrium of the game?
3. Find the Nash equilibrium in question (2) (where all players' payoff profiles are constant).

Exercise 6.9 Two players compete for one item, and each player simultaneously chooses a time node of giving up. If one of the two players first gives up, the other player will receive the item; if both players give up at the same time, then both players get the item with the same probability. Let time be a continuous variable that starts at 0 and tends to infinity. Assume that if player $i$ receives the item, the player's payoff profile is $v_{i}$. For each unit of time passed, each player needs to pay one unit cost. Let $t_{1}$ and $t_{2}$ represent the time node of giving up chosen by these two players.

1. Write down the normal-form representation of the above game.
2. Write down player $i$ 's best response function (or correspondence).
3. Suppose $v_{1}>v_{2}$. Find the best response curves for these two players.
4. Find the Nash equilibrium.

Exercise 6.10 Prove that in game $G=\left(I ;\left\{S_{i}, u_{i}\right\}_{i=1}^{n}\right)$, if $s^{*}=\left(s_{1}^{*}, \cdots, s_{n}^{*}\right)$ is the only strategy profile that survives the iterated elimination of strictly dominated strategies, then $s^{*}$ is the unique Nash equilibrium of the game.

Exercise 6.11 In the second-price sealed-bid auction with complete information (i.e., each player knows other players' true valuations, and the highest bidder obtains the auction item at the second-highest bid price), the true valuations of players $i=1,2, \cdots, n$ are $v_{1}>v_{2}>\cdots>v_{n}$, respectively. Find a Nash equilibrium in which the player with the highest valuation does not obtain the auction item.

Exercise 6.12 A game in which the sum of two players' payoff profiles is zero is called a zero-sum game. When player 1 chooses strategy $a_{1} \in A_{1}$ and player 2 chooses strategy $a_{2} \in A_{2}$, player 1's payoff profile is $u\left(a_{1}, a_{2}\right)$. In a zero-sum game, player 2 's payoff profile is $-u\left(a_{1}, a_{2}\right) . A_{1}$ and $A_{2}$ are strategy spaces for players 1 and 2 , respectively.

1. Prove the minimax theorem, i.e., prove that the following formula holds:

$$
\max _{x} \min _{y} u(x, y)=u\left(x^{*}, y^{*}\right)=\min _{y} \max _{x} u(x, y) .
$$

2. Prove that if $\left(m_{1}, m_{2}\right)$ and $\left(m_{1}^{*}, m_{2}^{*}\right)$ are Nash equilibria, then $\left(m_{1}, m_{2}^{*}\right)$ and $\left(m_{1}^{*}, m_{2}\right)$ also are Nash equilibria.
3. Prove that player 1's payoff profile is always zero in Nash equilibrium in a symmetric zero-sum game.

Exercise 6.13 Consider the following simultaneous-move game:

|  | Player $B$ |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | $L$ |  | $R$ |
| Player $A$ | $T$ | $x, x$ | 0,0 |
|  | $B$ | 0,0 | $x, x$ |
|  |  |  |  |
|  |  |  |  |

Player $A$ knows the exact value of $x$, and player $B$ only knows that the probability of $x$ being 5 or 10 is 0.5 .

1. Describe the above game of incomplete information.
2. Find all pure strategy and mixed strategy Bayesian-Nash equilibria of the above game.
3. Now, suppose that, after observing the value of $x$, player $A$ can choose to play a simultaneous-move game with player $B$, or pay a cost of 2 to play a sequential-move game and move first. For certain values of $x$, player $A$ will choose to pay a cost of 2 and move first. Find a Bayesian-Nash equilibrium for this dynamic game. Is this BayesianNash equilibrium a sequential equilibrium? If yes, why?

## Exercise 6.14 Consider the following game with two players. There are

 21 coins on the table. Player 1 and Player 2 take turns to take away 1 to 3 coins. The last player to take away the coin on the table loses the game. Specifically, player 1 can choose to take away 1,2 or 3 coins, and then player 2 chooses the number of coins to take away, and they will take turns until the last player to take away the coin on the table loses.1. Use backward induction to solve this game.
2. What is the number of coins on the table that can make player 2 always be the loser in equilibrium?

Exercise 6.15 Two players play the following game: In the first stage, player 1 makes a choice between actions $A$ and $B$; in the second stage, player 2 makes a choice between actions $C$ and $D$ after observing player 1's choice; in the third stage, player 1 makes a choice between actions $a$ and $b$ after not observing player 2's choice.

1. Give the extensive-form representation of the game.
2. Is the game of perfect information or imperfect information? Why?
3. Give the strategy set for each player.

Exercise 6.16 Consider the extensive-form game shown in Figure 6.20.


Figure 6.20:

1. What are the subgames?
2. For the simultaneous subgame, what are the (mixed) Nash equilibria?
3. What are the subgame perfect Nash equilibria?

Exercise 6.17 Consider the extensive-form game shown in Figure 6.21.


Figure 6.21:

1. How many subgames?
2. What are the Nash equilibria of the right subtree.
3. What are all the pure and mixed strategy Nash equilibrium of the left subtree.
4. What are all the subgame perfect Nash equilibria?

Exercise 6.18 Consider the extensive-form game shown in Figure 6.22.


Figure 6.22:

1. State the rationality/knowledge assumptions necessary for each step in the backward induction process.
2. Write the game in normal form.
3. Find all the rationalizable strategies in this game using the normal form of the game. State the rationality/knowledge assumptions necessary for each elimination.
4. Find all the Nash equilibria in this game.
5. Find the pure strategy subgame perfect Nash equilibrium in this game.

Exercise 6.19 Consider the extensive-form game shown in Figure 6.23.

1. State the rationality/knowledge assumptions necessary for each step in the backward induction process.
2. Write the game in normal form.
3. Find all the rationalizable strategies in this game using the normal form of the game. State the rationality/knowledge assumptions necessary for each elimination.


Figure 6.23:
4. Find all the Nash equilibria in this game.
5. Find the pure strategy subgame perfect Nash equilibrium in this game.

Exercise 6.20 Consider the extensive-form game shown in Figure 6.24.


Figure 6.24:

1. State the rationality/knowledge assumptions necessary for each step in the backward induction process.
2. Write the game in normal form.
3. Find all the rationalizable strategies in this game using the normal form of the game. State the rationality/knowledge assumptions necessary for each elimination.
4. Find all the Nash equilibria in this game.
5. Find the pure strategy subgame perfect Nash equilibrium in this game.

Exercise 6.21 In a wild grassland, there are $n$ hungry lions that have not eaten food for a long period of time. One of the lions has fallen into a coma and is defenseless due to an illness. These lions have a strict hierarchy. Only the highest-ranked lion can eat the sick lion. However, the highestranked lion may become sick and slip into a coma once he has eaten the sick lion, and may subsequently be eaten by the second highest-ranked lion. The preferences of these lions are as follows: "eat a sick lion and not be eaten" $\succ$, "not be eaten" $\succ$, and "eaten by another lion (they don't care whether or not they are sick)" . Use backward induction to find the subgame perfect equilibrium of this game.

Exercise 6.22 There is a duel among three musketeers, each with a pistol. In each round, they aim at the target and fire at the same time, and the entire process continues until at most one person survives. It is known that the hit rate of $A$ is 1 , the hit rate of $B$ is 0.8 , and the hit rate of $C$ is 0.6 .

1. In the first round of the duel, who should be the shooting target of $A$, $B$, and $C$, respectively?
2. What are the survival rates of $A, B$, and $C$ ?
3. The dueling rules are now amended to the following: In each round, $C$ fires first, then $B$ fires, and $A$ fires last. In the first round of the duel, who should be the shooting target for $A, B$, and $C$, respectively? What is the final survival rate of each of the three musketeers?

Exercise 6.23 Consider the following pirate game: 10 pirates consider how to allocate 100 gems, and they alternately propose a distribution plan in order of 1 to 10 , and the order is determined by a lottery. The rules of the game are as follows: Gems can only be allocated in integer quantities. Pirate 1 first proposes an allocation plan. If half or more of the pirates vote to accept the plan, the plan will be implemented, and the game ends; otherwise, pirate 1 must leave the game, and the other 9 pirates continue the game. Next, pirate 2 proposes an allocation plan. The rules of the game are the same as previously. Suppose that all pirates must choose to reject an allocation plan when they are indifferent between accepting and rejecting
this allocation plan. Solve for the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium of this game.

Exercise 6.24 Two players $A$ and $B$ consider how to allocate two cakes $X$ and $Y$. Each cake is 1 unit in size. The utility function of player $A$ is $u(x, y)=x+\lambda y$, where $(x, y)$ is his share (i.e., $x$ is obtained from cake $X$ and $y$ is obtained from cake $Y$ ); the utility function of player $B$ is $v(x, y)=$ $x+\delta y$, where $(x, y)$ is Player $B^{\prime}$ s share. Suppose that $\delta>\lambda>0$. The mechanism for allocating cakes is as follows: First, each cake is divided into two pieces by $A$ (i.e., $X$ is divided into $x$ and $1-x$ and $Y$ is divided into $y$ and $1-y$ ), and the divided cakes are merged into two groups: $(x, y)$ and $(1-x, 1-y)$. Then, $B$ chooses one group first, and $A$ gets the other group.

1. Solve for the subgame perfect Nash Equilibrium of this game with backward induction.
2. If the roles of $A$ and $B$ are reversed (i.e., the cakes are divided and grouped by $B$, and $A$ chooses one group first). What is the outcome?
3. Can this "distributor chooses last" allocation mechanism result in a fair distribution?
4. The distribution mechanism is now changed to: First, $A$ divides the cake $X$ into two pieces, $B$ chooses one piece, and $A$ receives the other piece; then, $B$ cuts the cake $Y$ into two pieces, $A$ chooses one of them and $B$ gets the other one. Find the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium under this mechanism. Compared with the original mechanism, which is more efficient?

Exercise 6.25 Consider the following dynamic game (arms race) with two players (two countries that are competing with each other). In each period $t=0,1,2, \cdots$, each player can choose to participate in or withdraw from the competition. The cost of participating in the competition in each period is 1 . If both players choose to participate in the competition in a certain period, then the returns of both players are 0 for the current period, and they enter the game in the next period; if one player chooses to participate
in the competition and the other player chooses to withdraw from the competition in a certain period, then the player who chooses to participate will receive $v$ for the current period and the player who chooses to withdraw will receive 0 for the current period, and the game will end (i.e., there will be no game in the subsequent period).

1. Prove that (always participate, always withdraw) is a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium.
2. Find a $p$, such that (always participate with probability $p$, always withdraw with probability $p$ ) is a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium.

Exercise 6.26 Consider a bargaining game with three players. During periods $t=1,4,7, \cdots$, the first player can propose an allocation plan $\left(x_{1}, x_{2}, x_{3}\right)$, where $x_{i} \geqq 0$ and $x_{1}+x_{2}+x_{3} \leqq 1$, and other players can choose whether or not to accept the allocation plan. During periods $t=2,5,8, \cdots$, the second player can propose an allocation plan. During periods $t=3,6,9, \cdots$, the third player can propose an allocation plan. If all players during a certain period accept the allocation plan, the allocation plan will be implemented; if there is one player in a certain period who rejects the allocation plan, these three players will perform the next round of distribution. The discount rate of each player per period is $\delta$.

1. Prove that $\left(1 /\left(1+\delta+\delta^{2}\right), \delta /\left(1+\delta+\delta^{2}\right), \delta^{2} /\left(1+\delta+\delta^{2}\right)\right)$ is a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium.
2. Prove that the above equilibrium is unique.

Exercise 6.27 Prove Huhn theorem on mixed strategies and behavior strategies.

1. In a finite extensive-form game that satisfies perfect recall, any mixed strategy has an outcome-equivalent behavior strategy.
2. Show by an example: in a situation in which perfect recall fails, a mixed strategy and a behavior strategy are not necessarily outcomeequivalent.

Exercise 6.28 Consider the incomplete information two-player game depicted by the following table, where $\alpha \in\{-2,2\}$ is known by Player 1 , but not known by player 2 who only knows the probability distribution is $\operatorname{Pr}(\alpha=-2)=0.6$ and $\operatorname{Pr}(\alpha=2)=0.4$.

Player 2

\[

\]

1. Write this formally as a Bayesian game.
2. Find a Bayesian-Nash equilibrium.

Exercise 6.29 Consider a two-player game depicted by the following table, where $\theta_{1}$ and $\theta_{2}$ are the private information of players 1 and 2 , respectively, and are identically and independently distributed with uniform distribution on $[-1 / 3,2 / 3]$.

Player 2

|  |  |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Player 1 | L | R |  |
| $2+\theta_{1}, 1$ | $\theta_{1}, \theta_{2}$ |  |  |
| 0,0 | $1,2+\theta_{2}$ |  |  |

1. Write this formally as a Bayesian game.
2. Find a Bayesian-Nash equilibrium.

Exercise 6.30 Suppose that two investors decide whether to invest in a certain firm, and their returns on investment can be represented in the following payoff profile matrix, where $\theta$ is the firm's operating cost.

Investor 2

Investor 1


1. If the investors know the operating $\operatorname{cost} \theta$. Find all Nash equilibria.
2. If the investors do not know the operating $\operatorname{cost} \theta$, investor $i$ can observe a signal $x_{i}=\theta+\varepsilon_{i}$ on the operating cost, where $\varepsilon_{i} \sim N\left(0, \sigma^{2}\right)$. Assume that the belief of investor $i$ prior to observing the cost signal is that $\theta$ obeys a uniform distribution in $\mathcal{R}$. The belief of investor $i$ after observing the cost signal becomes $\theta \mid x \sim N\left(x, \sigma^{2}\right)$. Find the unique Bayesian-Nash equilibrium of this game.

Exercise 6.31 Two households decide whether to maintain a shared facility simultaneously. If one of these two households maintains, then each household will get 1 unit gain; if there is no maintenance, then there is no gain for the two households. The maintenance costs for these two households are $c_{1}$ and $c_{2}$, respectively.

1. Suppose that $c_{1}$ and $c_{2}$ are 0.1 and 0.5 , respectively. What is the Nash equilibrium of this game? What will be the outcome of this game?
2. Suppose that $c_{1}$ and $c_{2}$ are random variables that independently obey a uniform distribution on $[0,1]$, and the true cost of each household is only known to itself. What is the Bayesian-Nash equilibrium of this game?

Exercise 6.32 Two hostile armies want to occupy an island. Each army can decide whether or not to attack. The probability that the army is strong or weak is one-half (the strength of each army is independent of each other). Each army knows its own strength. If the island is occupied by an army, this army gains $M$. If one army attacks the island and the other army does not attack the island, the attacker will occupy the island. If two armies choose to attack at the same time, then the stronger army will occupy the island; if the two armies have the same strength, then no army will occupy the island. Each attacker needs to pay a certain cost: the cost for a strong army is $s$, and the cost for a weak army is $w$. The army that does not attack the island will not suffer any cost. Assume $M>w>s$ and $w>M / 2>s$. Find the pure strategy Bayesian-Nash equilibrium of this game.

Exercise 6.33 Consider the following bilateral auction. Both the buyer and the seller quote a price simultaneously. If the seller's price $p_{s}$ is less than or equal to the buyer's price $p_{b}$, they trade at the price of $p=\left(p_{s}+p_{b}\right) / 2$; however, if $p_{s}$ is greater than $p_{b}$, no transaction occurs. The value of the auction item for the buyer is $v_{b}$, and for the seller it is $v_{s}$. The value is private information for each party, and independently obeys a uniform distribution on $[0,1]$. If the buyer gets the item at a price of $p$, then the buyer's payoff profile is $v_{b}-p$; if no transaction occurs, the buyer's utility is zero. If the seller sells the item at a price of $p$, the seller's payoff profile is $p-v_{s}$; if no transaction occurs, the seller's utility is zero.

1. Find out the objective functions for the buyer and the seller.
2. Suppose that the Bayesian-Nash equilibrium strategy of the buyer or the seller is a linear function of the value of the item. Find the Bayesian-Nash equilibrium.

Exercise 6.34 Consider a game with two players. Player 1 chooses from three strategies: $U, V$, and $W$. Player 2 chooses from two strategies: $L$ and $R$. Player 2 only knows whether player 1 has chosen $U$ while making her decision and does not know any other information. In the case in which player 1 has chosen $U$, if player 2 then chooses $L$, and their payoff profiles will be $(0,2)$, where 0 is player 1's payoff profile and 2 is player 2's payoff profile. If player 2 then chooses $R$, their payoff profiles will be $(2,0)$. Similarly, if these two players choose $V$ and $L$ one after another, their payoff profiles will be $(-1,-1)$; if these two players choose $V$ and $R$ one after another, their payoff profiles will be $(3,0)$. If these two players choose $W$ and $L$ one after another, their payoff profiles will be $(-1,-1)$; if these t wo players choose $W$ and $R$ one after another, their payoff profiles will be $(2,1)$.

1. Represent this game in extensive-form.
2. Find all pure strategy weak perfect Bayesian equilibria of this game.
3. Find out all pure strategy sequential equilibria of this game and compare them with the results in question 2.

Exercise 6.35 Prove the following theorem on the trembling hand perfect Nash equilibrium:

1. In a two-player finite strategy game, a strategy profile is a trembling hand perfect Nash equilibrium if and only if it is a Nash equilibrium, and no strategy is weakly dominated.
2. There is a trembling hand perfect Nash equilibrium in any finite strategy game.
3. In a finite extensive-form game that satisfies perfect recall, there is a belief system $\mu$ for each trembling hand perfect Nash equilibrium $\sigma$, such that $(\sigma, \mu)$ is a sequential equilibrium of this game.

Exercise 6.36 Consider the extensive-form game shown in Figure 6.25. Find all the sequential equilibria of this game.


Figure 6.25:

Exercise 6.37 Consider the extensive-form game shown in Figure 6.26. Find the sequential equilibria/equilibrium of this game.

Exercise 6.38 Consider the extensive-form game and scenario shown in Figure 6.27.

1. Find belief probabilities that are consistent with this scenario.
2. For each player, at each of his information sets, find the sequential value of each of his possible moves, relative to this scenario with these consistent beliefs.


Figure 6.26:


Figure 6.27:
3. Identify all irrational moves in this scenario with these consistent beliefs. In other words, for every information set of each player, identify each move that has a positive move probability in this scenario but does not maximize the sequential value for this player at this information set.
4. Find the sequential equilibrium of this game.

Exercise 6.39 For a firm recruiting a worker, the probability of recruiting a high-ability worker is 0.8 , while the probability of recruiting a low-ability worker is 0.2 . Workers can choose whether or not to attend training. The firm does not know workers' abilities, but can observe whether they have been trained. The firm can appoint the recruited worker as either a manager or an employee. If a trained high-ability worker is hired as a manager, the payoff profiles of the worker and the firm are (4,2), and if a trained
high-ability worker is hired as an employee, the corresponding payoff profiles are $(2,1)$. If an untrained high-ability worker is hired as a manager, the payoff profiles of the worker and the firm are (3,2), and if an untrained high-ability worker is hired as an employee, the corresponding payoff profiles are ( 1,1 ). If a trained low-ability worker is hired as a manager, the payoff profiles of the worker and the firm are $(3,1)$, and if a trained low-ability worker is hired as an employee, the corresponding payoff profiles are $(1,2)$. If an untrained low-ability worker is hired as a manager, the payoff profiles of the worker and the firm are $(4,1)$, and if an untrained low-ability worker is hired as an employee, the corresponding payoff profiles are $(2,2)$.

1. Represent this game with extensive-form.
2. Find out all pure-strategy sequential equilibria of this game.
3. In this game, are all pure-strategy sequential equilibria reasonable? Provide an explanation for your answer.

Exercise 6.40 An investor needs to decide how much to invest in an electronics manufacturer, but she does not know this manufacturer's true profitability $\theta$. The investor can consult an audit company. Suppose that the audit company knows this manufacturer's true profitability $\theta$ and can send the investor a report $m$ on the profitability $\theta$. However, the objectives of the audit company and the investor are not consistent, and the audit company does not necessarily report its true assessment result. Suppose that the investor knows in advance that this manufacturer's true profitability $\theta \in[0,1]$ and that its probability density function is $f$. The investor's investment is $a \in[0,1]$. The payoff profile functions of the audit company and the investor are $u^{S}(a, \theta, b)$ and $u^{R}(a, \theta)$, respectively, where $b$ represents the difference in preferences between the audit company and the investor. Assume that each player's payoff profile function is continuous and twice differentiable, and $\frac{\partial^{2} u^{i}}{\partial a^{2}}<0$ and $\frac{\partial^{2} u^{i}}{\partial a \partial \theta}>0$, where $i=R, S$. Therefore, there is a unique optimal investment amount $y^{R}(\theta)\left(y^{S}(\theta)\right)$ that maximizes the payoff profile of the investor (the audit company).

1. Prove that there is a pooling equilibrium, in which regardless of what
$m$ the audit company reports, the investment amount of the investor remains consistent.
2. Prove that if for any $\theta, y^{R}(\theta) \neq y^{S}(\theta, b)$, then the number of equilibrium actions is finite. Hint: It can be proven that for any two different equilibrium actions $a^{1}<a^{2}$, there is $\varepsilon>0$, such that $a^{1}-a^{2} \geqq \varepsilon$.
3. Prove that the state space is divided into finite intervals in each equilibrium, and in the same interval, the audit company will adopt the same strategy that leads to the same amount of investment.
4. Prove that for any $\theta$, such that $y^{R}(\theta) \neq y^{S}(\theta, b)$, there is a positive integer $N(b)$, such that for any positive integer $k$ between 1 and $N(b)$, there is a corresponding equilibrium which divides the state space into $k$ intervals.

Exercise 6.41 Consider the following dynamic game of incomplete information: Nature chooses Game 1 or Game 2 first, and the probability of choosing Game 1 is 0.6 , and the probability of choosing Game 2 is 0.4 .

Game 1 is as follows:
Player 2

Player 1

|  | C | D |
| :---: | :---: | :---: |
| C | 1,2 | 2,1 |
| D | 2,0 | 0,2 |

Game 2 is as follows:
Player 2

Player 1

|  | $C$ | $D$ |
| :---: | :--- | :--- |
|  | 2,1 | 1,2 |
|  | 2 |  |
|  | 0,2 | 4,0 |
|  |  |  |

After observing which game Nature has chosen, player 1 chooses between actions $C$ and $D$. Player 2 cannot observe Nature's choice, and after observing player 1's action, she chooses between actions $C$ or $D$.

1. Prove that there is no separating equilibrium in this game.
2. Solve for the pooling equilibrium of this game.
3. If player 1 cannot observe Nature's choice, can he receive a higher payoff profile?

Exercise 6.42 Consider the following conspicuous consumption model: player $A$ 's wealth level is either $H$ or $L$, where $H>L>0$. Suppose that $A$ knows his own wealth level precisely, while nobody else knows it, and $A$ wants others to think that his wealth level is high because it will make him more satisfied. If other players think that the probability of $A^{\prime}$ 's wealth level being $H$ is $q$, then the payoff profile of $A$ is $q$.

Assume that at the beginning of a period, other players think that the prior probability of $A$ 's wealth level being $H$ is $p$. Now, $A$ can choose to purchase some expensive-looking goods as a signal of being richer. Let $c$ be the conspicuous consumption on the expensive-looking goods, which does not in itself bring any benefit to $A$. Assume that the $\operatorname{cost}$ of $c$ units of conspicuous consumption is $c / w$, where $w$ is the actual wealth level of $A$ (i.e., $w$ is equal to $H$ or $L$ ).

Assume that other players can observe $c$ and update their posterior probability of $A$ having a wealth level of $H$ based on $c$ and that the total payoff profile function of $A$ is $q-c / w$, where $q$ is the posterior probability of $A$ having a wealth level of $H$ and $w$ is the actual wealth level of $A$.

1. Under what conditions does the game have a separating equilibrium?
2. Under what conditions does the game have a pooling equilibrium?
3. Which equilibria above satisfy the intuitive criterion?

Exercise 6.43 Consider the following education investment signaling model: Each employee has two possible types: $\theta \in\left\{\theta_{H}, \theta_{L}\right\}$, where $\theta_{H}>\theta_{L}$. Given $i \in\{H, L\}$, the prior probability of this employee being type $\theta_{i}$ is $\beta_{i}$. The reservation utility for each employee is $\bar{u}=0$. Employees of type $\theta$ can produce $\theta$ for a firm. The firm is willing to hire an employee at a wage of $w$ if and only if the employee's expected productivity can at
least offset the wage. Employees of type $\theta$ can receive $e$ years of education at $\operatorname{cost} c(e, \theta)=\frac{e}{\theta}$. The education investment cost function $c(e, \theta)$ satisfies the single-crossing property with respect to $(e, \theta)$ (i.e., if $e>e^{\prime}$, then $\left.c\left(e, \theta_{L}\right)-c\left(e^{\prime}, \theta_{L}\right)>c\left(e, \theta_{H}\right)-c\left(e^{\prime}, \theta_{H}\right)\right)$. Given wage $w$ and education level $e$, each type $\theta$ employee has a payoff profile function $u(w, e \mid \theta)=w-c(e, \theta)$. Consider the following sequential actions:

- An employee observes his own type, which is his private information;
- The employee chooses his education investment level;
- The firm observes the education level of the employee, but cannot observe the employee type;
- The employee requests a raise in wage from the firm;
- The firm either rejects the request or accepts the request and employs the employee at the wage level.

It is assumed that educational investment can promote a low-type employee to a high-type employee. Specifically, suppose that the probability that a type $\theta_{L}$ employee becomes type $\theta_{H}$ after investing in $e$ years' education is $p(e)$, which satisfies the following properties: $p(0)=0, \lim _{e \rightarrow \infty} p(e)=$ $1, p^{\prime}>0, p^{\prime}(0)=\infty, \lim _{e \rightarrow \infty} p^{\prime}(e)=0$ and $p^{\prime \prime}<0$. Once an employee of type $\theta_{L}$ has invested in education and converts to type $\theta_{H}$, he can observe his own type conversion prior to entering the labor market. First, assume that there is no asymmetric information between the firm and its employees. Answer the following questions:

1. Write down the optimization problem that can solve for the first best (the information is complete) wage and the first best education investment level.
2. Solve this problem. Prove that the type $\theta_{H}$ employee's investment level in education is 0 , and the type $\theta_{L}$ employee's investment level in education is strictly positive.
3. Suppose that education investment now becomes more effective (i.e., the probability that a type $\theta_{L}$ employee will become type $\theta_{H}$ after
investing in $e$ years' education is $q(e)$, where $q(e)>p(e)$ for any $e>$ $0)$. What is the first best investment level in education at this time? What is the payoff profile of type $\theta_{L}$ employee at this time? Provide an intuitive explanation for your answers.

Exercise 6.44 Based on the previous exercise, suppose that there is asymmetric information between the firm and its employees and that the solution concept of pure strategy perfect Bayesian equilibrium is adopted. Consider separating equilibrium that satisfies $e_{H} \neq e_{L}$. Answer the following questions:

1. In any separating equilibrium, type $\theta_{L}$ employees choose education level $e_{L}=e_{F B}$, where $F B$ represents first best.
2. Characterize the investment level in education of type $\theta_{H}$ employees, which satisfies $e_{H} \neq e_{F B}$.
3. Explain whether or not separating equilibrium always exists.
4. Suppose that education investment now becomes more efficient (i.e., the probability that a type $\theta_{L}$ employee will become type $\theta_{H}$ after investing in $e$ years' education is $q(e)$, where $q(e)>p(e)$ for any $e>$ $0)$. Will type $\theta_{H}$ employees change the education investment level in the above separating equilibrium? Explain your conclusion.

Next, consider pooling equilibrium which satisfies $e_{H}=e_{L}=e^{*}$. Answer the following questions:

1. Given the investment level in education $e^{*}$ under a pooling equilibrium, what is an employee's wage?
2. Characterize the pooling equilibrium $e^{*}$.
3. Does the pooling equilibrium $e^{*}=0$ always exist? Does the pooling equilibrium $e^{*}=e_{F B}$ always exist?
4. Suppose that educational investment now becomes more efficient (i.e., the probability that a type $\theta_{L}$ employee will become type $\theta_{H}$ after investing in $e$ years' education is $q(e)$, where $q(e)>p(e)$ for any $e>0$ ).

Characterize the impact of this change on the pooling equilibrium $e^{*}$ and provide your explanation.
5. Given the efficient educational investment, is there a pooling equilibrium that satisfies the intuitive criterion?

### 6.10 References

## Books and Monographs:

Fudenberg, D. and J. Tirole (1991). Game Theory, MIT Press.
Gibbons, R. (1992). Game Theory for Applied Economists, Princeton University Press.

Kreps, D. (1990). A Course in Microeconomic Theory, Princeton University Press.

Kreps, D. (1990). Game Theory and Economic Modeling, Oxford: Clarendon Press.

Mas-colell, A., M. D. Whinston, and J. Green (1995). Microeconomic Theory, Oxford University Press.

Myerson, R. (1991). Game Theory, Harvard University Press.
Osborne, M. J. and A. Rubinstein (1994). A Course in Game Theory, MIT Press.

Osborne, M. J. (2004). An Introduction to Game Theory, Oxford University Press.

Rubinstein, A. (1990). Game Theory in Economics, Edward Elgar Publishing Company.

Tirole, J. (1988). Theory of Industrial Organization, MIT Press.
Varian (1992). Microeconomic Analysis, New York: Norton.
Von Neumann, J. and O. Morgenstein (1944). Theory of Games and Economic Behavior, John Wiley and Sons.

Schelling, T. C. (1960). The strategy of conflict (First ed.). Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

## Papers:

Banks, J., and J. Sobel (1987). "Equilibrium Selection in Signaling Games", Econometrica, Vol. 55, No. 3, 647-661.

Cho, I., and D. Kreps (1987). "Signaling Games and Stable Equilibria", Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 102, No. 2, 179-221.

Baye, M. R., G. Tian and J. Zhou (1993). "Characterizations of the Existence of Equilibria in Games with Discontinuous and Non-Quasiconcave Payoffs", The Review of Economic Studies, Vol. 60, No. 4, 935-948.

Dasgupta, P. and E. Maskin (1986). "The Existence of Equilibrium in Discontinuous Economic Games, I: Theory", The Review of Economic Studies, Vol. 53, No. 1, 1-26.

Harsanyi, J. C. (1967). "Games with Incomplete Information Played by Bayesian Players, Part I" , Management Science, Vol. 14, No. 3, 159182.

Harsanyi, J. C. (1973). "Games with Randomly Disturbed Payoffs: A New Rationale for Mixed-Strategy Equilibrium Points", International Journal of Game Theory, Vol. 2, No. 1, 1-23.

Kreps, D. and R. Wilson (1982). "Sequential Equilibrium", Econometrica, Vol. 50, No. 4, 863-894.

Kohlberg, E. and J. F. Mertens (1986)."On the Strategic Stability of Equilibria", Econometrica, Vol. 54, No. 5, 1003-1037.

Kuhn, H. W. (1953). "Extensive games and the problem of information", in: Kuhn, H. W. andA.W. Tucker (eds.), Contributions to the Theory of Games, Vol. II, Annals of MathematicalStudies No. 28, Princeton University Press, Chapter 3, 193-216.

McKelvey, R. and T.Palfrey (1992) "An experimental study of the centipede game," Econometrica, Vol. 60, 803-836.

Milgrom, P. and J. Roberts (1982). "Predation, Reputation and Entry Deterrence" ,Journal of Economic Theory, Vol. 27, No. 2, 280-312.

Nagel, R. and F. Tang (1998). "Experimental results on the centipede game in normal form: an investigation on learning," Journal of Mathematical psychology, 42, 356-384.

Nash, J. F. (1951). "Non-cooperative Games" , Annals of Mathematics, Vol. 54, No. 2, 286-295.

Nessah, R. and G. Tian (2013). "Existence of Solution of Minimax Inequalities, Equilibria in Games and Fixed Points without Convexity and Compactness Assumptions", Journal of Optimization Theory and Applications, Vol. 157, No. 1, 75-95.

Nessah, R. and G. Tian (2014). "On the Existence of Strong Nash Equilibria", Journal of Mathematical Analysis and Applications, Vol. 414, 871-885.

Nessah, R. and G. Tian (2016). "Existence of Nash Equilibrium in Discontinuous Games" , Economic Theory, Vol. 61, 515-540.

Reny, P. J. (1999). "On the Existence of Pure and Mixed Strategy Nash Equilibria in Discontinuous Games," Econometrica, 67, 1029-1056.

Rosenthal, R. (1981). "Games of Perfect Information, Predatory Pricing, and the Chain Store" . Journal of Economic Theory. 25 (1): 92-100.

Rubinstein, A. (1982). "Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model," Econometrica. 50m 97-109.

Selten, R. (1975). "Reexamination of the Perfectness Concept for Equilibrium Points in Extensive Games" , International Journal of Game Theo$r y$, Vol. 4, No. 1, 25-55.

Selten, R. (1978). "The Chain Store Paradox", Theory and Decision, Vol. 9, No. 2, 127-159.

Spence, A. M. (1973). "Job Market Signaling", Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 87, No. 3, 355-374.

Tian, G. (1992a). "Generalizations of the KKM Theorem and Ky Fan Minimax Inequality, with Applications to Maximal Elements, Price Equilibrium, and Comp lementarity," Journal of Mathematical Analysis and Applications, 170, 457-471.

Tian, G. (1992b). "Existence of Equilibrium in Abstract Economies with Discontinuous Payoffs and Non-Compact Choice Spaces," Journal of Mathematical Economics, 21, 379-388.

Tian, G. (1992c). "On the Existence of Equilibria in Generalized Games," International Journal of Game Theory, 20, 247-254.

Tian, G. (1994). "Generalized KKM Theorem and Minimax Inequalities and Their Applications, Journal of Optimization Theory and Applications, 83, 375-389.

Tian, G. (2014). "On the Existence of Strong Nash Equilibria," (with Rabia Nessah), Journal of Mathematical Analysis and Applications, 414 (2014) 871-885.

Tian, G. (2015). "Existence of Equilibria in Games with Arbitrary Strategy Spaces and Payoffs: A Full Characterization" , Journal of Mathematical Economics, Vol. 60, 9-16.

Tian, G. (2016). "On the Existence of Price Equilibrium in Economies with Excess Demand Functions," Economic Theory Bulletin, 4 (2016), 5-16.

Tian, G. and Zhou, J. (1992). "The Maximum Theorem and the Existence of Nash Equilibrium of (Generalized) Games Without Lower Semicontinuities," Journal of Mathematical Analysis and Applications, 166, 351-364.

Wilson, R. (1971). "Computing Equilibria of N-Person Games," Author(s): SIAM Journal on Applied Mathematics, Vol. 21, 80-87.

## Chapter 7

## Repeated Games

### 7.1 Introduction

In game theory, the dynamic game refers to a game in which players move either sequentially or repeatedly. The previous chapter mainly discusses the sequential game, in which one chooses one's action before the others choose theirs. Importantly, the later players must have some information about the former player's choice; otherwise, the difference in time would have no strategic effect. Sequential games are thus governed by the time axis, and represented in the form of decision trees, but the structure of different sub decision trees (subgames) may be different.

Although the repeated game also exhibits a dynamic structure, the difference is that the structure of its sub-decision tree is the same,, it is an extensive form game that consists of a number of repetitions of some base game, called the stage game (i.e., it refers to a strategic situation in which all or some of the participants interact repeatedly). The theory of repeated games provides a central underpinning for understanding social, political, and economic institutions, both formal and informal. A key factor in understanding institutions and other long-term relationships is the role of shared expectations of behavioral norms such as cultural beliefs, as well as the role of sanctions in ensuring compliance with the "rules" . The repeated game theory can be used to study these roles.

Repeated games capture the idea that one will have to take into account
the impact of the one's current action on the future actions of others; this impact is sometimes called the person's reputation. We can find many examples of repeated games: neighbours in the countryside often interact repeatedly in certain activities, such as sowing and harvesting, social events (weddings, funerals, etc.), and borrowing. When making policies, including fiscal and monetary policies, governments may face similar environments repeatedly; furthermore, policy choices of governments may be constrained by possible future interactions. In addition, firms within the same industry may face repeated games of competition and cooperation.

Compared with one-shot interaction, these repeated interactions have quite dissimilar impacts on individuals' behaviors and incentives. For instance, discussions about increased urban crime rates after the opening-up of China often focus on the reason of migration. Some people behave appropriately in places where they have been living for a long period of time, while they may misbehave when visiting a location for a short period of time. This is not due to a change of preferences, but rather attributable to changed constraints and environments that face them. In a relatively stable environment, information is sufficient that punishment or encouragemen$t$ is relatively direct and effective. However, for a temporary stay, neither punishment nor encouragement works well. The common logic behind these phenomena is what the theory of repeated games is going to reveal.

The idea of the repeated game has been applied broadly in reality, with the reputation mechanism being one of the most important applications. Since individuals usually do not know much about the quality of goods that they consume, how do they make rational decisions about them? Since different companies have varied reputations (e.g., their product brands), these reputations will affect behavioral decisions regarding the quality of products. For example, individuals may encounter two kinds of restaurants. One is proximal to a railway station, and the other is near residential areas. In general, people only go to the former restaurant occasionally while visiting the latter frequently. Indeed, the quality of food of the former is likely to be inferior to that of the latter. With the idea of repeated games (e.g., Folk Theorem), repeated interactions will make the reputation mechanism more effective. It is not difficult to understand the above phenomenon.

The Folk Theorem actually concerns the fact that virtually any outcome of an infinitely repeated game becomes a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium. Expressed more simply, the theorem suggests that anything that is feasible and individually rational is possible. This result was termed the Folk Theorem because it was widely known among game theorists in the 1950s, even though no one had published it.

In this chapter, we will focus on how multiple interactions change individuals' incentives. The theoretical results show the reason why the modern market economy can better solve the problem of honesty. This is because honesty is not only a traditional virtue and a positive social climate, but also an incentive mechanism, and is the long-term outcome of the law and incentive mechanism such as market mechanism such that individuals who are dishonest will be punished. According to the Folk Theorem, any established social climate constitutes a social equilibrium. Indeed, once the social norm or convention is established, as long as the discount factor is sufficiently large (i.e., the future penalty after deviation is sufficiently large), no one has the incentive to deviate unilaterally. If the process of strategic choices can be divided into successive steps, rational behaviors would consider the influences of all individuals' initial behaviors on subsequent choices and final outcomes. The key issue here is credibility (i.e., once deviation occurs, whether or not the punishment is actually executed). In fact, this is precisely the key to establish credibility in a realistic society.

As will be revealed in this chapter (Section 7.5.3), in a society replete with deceit and dishonesty, even if the discount factor equals one, if a person chooses to be honest, the person's interest will be harmed. As a result, deceiving each other is a Nash equilibrium. However, in a society in which most people are honest, cheating is subject to legal sanctions and public condemnation (the discount factor is greater than some lower bound), and being honest would constitute a Nash equilibrium. If the discount factor in the society is not particularly large, the larger is the proportion of misbehavior individuals in the society, the lower is the effectiveness of social norms. This is because the lower bound of the discount factor that guarantees upholding the social norm is increasing with a lower proportion
of "misbehavior people" in a society. This is the profound concept contained in the Folk Theorem that tells us that if agents (usually referring to firms in markets) live long enough, they will be in an infinitely repeated game, rather than in a static one. When most of them are patient enough and far-sighted enough to be honest (discount factor is close to 1), keeping honest is a Nash equilibrium. As such, both dishonesty and honesty could be Nash equilibria. The determinant factors are the proportion of goodbehavior people and the degree of punishment (characterized by discount factor). As long as a mechanism is designed properly, such that the punishment of deviations is credible and the cost is sufficiently large to offset the extra benefit of deviating behaviors, no one has the incentive to deviate unilaterally.

Depending on the horizon, a repeated game can be either a finitely repeated game or an infinitely repeated game that is also called the supergame. In addition, based on the information distribution structure, it can also be a repeated game with perfect monitoring, a repeated game with imperfect public monitoring, or a repeated game with private monitoring, resulting in conclusions that may be quite different. We will mainly focus on the discussion of the first two kinds of repeated games.

### 7.2 Examples of Repeated Games

Repeated games can clearly describe not only the short-sighted incentives for which agents do not follow the rules, but also the incentive measures to prevent such opportunistic behaviors through appropriate norms, rewards and punishments for future behaviors.

Firstly, we illustrate this point through examples of long-term relationship and opportunistic behavior. These examples can assist us to understand the basic idea behind repeated games.

Example 7.2.1 Table 7.1 describes the incentive problem in a team. Consider a team with two members. If both members work hard (exert, denoted as "E" ), each receives a payoff profile of 3; if one is lazy (shirk, denoted as "S" ) and the other works diligently, the lazy worker receives
a payoff profile of 4 and the other receives a payoff profile of -1 ; if both are lazy, each receives a payoff profile of 1 . From the perspective of team welfare, both should choose to work hard; however, from the perspective of individual welfare, both will choose to be lazy because being lazy is a dominant strategy for both, and it is the unique equilibrium.

Now, suppose that they will interact infinitely often, with the payoff profile at the end of each period given by Table 7.1. At the beginning of each period, they can observe all previous choices. Let the discount factor be $0<\delta<1$. In such a repeated game, a player cares about the utility of all periods. As is standard, the (normalized/average discounted) utility of player $i$ in the repeated game is

$$
U_{i}=(1-\delta) \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \delta^{t} u_{i t},
$$

where $u_{i t}$ is the payoff profile obtained in period $t$. Note that if $u_{i t}=u_{i}$ for all $t$, then $U_{i}=u_{i}$.

\[

\]

Table 7.1: Dilemma of Work Incentives.
Is the collectively rational payoff profile (team welfare) a Nash equilibrium payoff profile of an infinitely repeated game? Since the history of previous actions can be observed, the choice of a player in a certain stage game depends on the past history of other players. Suppose that the players utilize "grim trigger strategy" (also called the "grim strategy" or "trigger strategy" : Play $E$ at $t=0$; thereafter play $E$ if the players have always played $(E, E)$ in the past, otherwise play $S$ forever (i.e., any participant's non-cooperation triggers the other party to never cooperate). In other words, each player chooses to work hard at the beginning, but as soon as one player defects, both defect forever. If we regard "work hard" and "be lazy" as "cooperation" and "punishment" ,respectively, "grim trigger strategy" means that once some player has de-
viated from"cooperation", both will choose to "punish the other". In other words, players do not forgive "treachery" .

We shall show that when $\delta \geqq \frac{1}{3}$, the strategy profile (Grim, Grim) is a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium, which is a Nash equilibrium that satisfies sequential rationality in any subgame (i.e., provided one player has chosen to "be lazy" in some previous round, the opponent will choose to "be lazy" in every future round; then, the optimal choice for the player who triggered the punishment is also to "be lazy" ). To see this, consider a stage game starting in period $t$ where both players chose to "work hard" in all previous periods. Under the "grim strategy" profile, player $i$ chooses to "work hard" and earns the utility

$$
(1-\delta)\left[\sum_{s=0}^{t-1} \delta^{s} 3+\delta^{t} 3+\sum_{s \geqq t+1} \delta^{s} 3\right]=3 .
$$

If player $i$ chooses to "be lazy" once and follow the "grim strategy" thereafter, the player's utility is

$$
(1-\delta)\left[\sum_{s=0}^{t-1} \delta^{s} 3+\delta^{t} 4+\sum_{s \geqq t+1} \delta^{s} 1\right]=3\left(1-\delta^{t}\right)+4(1-\delta) \delta^{t}+\delta^{t+1} .
$$

When $\delta \geqq \frac{1}{3}$, it can be shown that

$$
3\left(1-\delta^{t}\right)+4(1-\delta) \delta^{t}+\delta^{t+1} \leqq 3=3\left(1-\delta^{t}\right)+3(1-\delta) \delta^{t}+3 \delta^{t+1}
$$

Therefore, given that the opponent chooses the grim strategy, in any subgame player $i$ will choose to follow the grim strategy, as well.

In this infinitely repeated game, why are players willing to give up the best choice in the short run, "be lazy", and instead "work hard" ? The above reasoning process of "grim strategy" shows that each player will weigh the short-run benefits of choosing to "be lazy" and the long-run returns of choosing to "work hard" . When each player's extra return, $2 \delta$, from cooperation is greater than the short-run extra return, $(1-\delta)$, from non-cooperation, they both resist opportunistic behavior (i.e., not to "be lazy" ). As the discount factor $\delta$ increases, players place more weight on
long-run returns.
In this infinitely repeated game, there are multiple subgame-perfect Nash equilibria. One such equilibrium involves each player choosing to "be lazy" in every period; this gives $(1,1)$ as the equilibrium payoff profile. In fact, $(t+3(1-t), t+3(1-t))$, for all $t \in[0,1]$, are all payoff profiles of some Nash equilibria in this infinitely repeated game. This conclusion is called the "Folk Theorem" .

Now, instead of infinitely many periods, we allow the players to interact for a finite horizon $T<\infty$. Then, under grim strategies, for any $\delta \leqq 1$, the unique subgame perfect Nash equilibrium is: "be lazy" in each period. This is because, in the last period $T$, players choose to "be lazy" as there are no future returns; in period $T-1$, as the choices in this period will not influence their choices in the next period, both players will choose to "be lazy", as well. By backward induction, since the choices in any period have no effect on their behavior in future periods, they always choose their short-run optimum (i.e., to "be lazy").

However, this conclusion also depends on the uniqueness of Nash equilibrium in the one-stage game. When there are multiple equilibria in a stage game, the finiteness of the horizon does not fully determine players' behavior in a repeated interaction. The key determinant is how behavior in the current period affects future interaction. This is the case when a stage game has more than one equilibrium. We now explain this idea with a two-stage game.

Example 7.2.2 Suppose that there are two players, denoted $\{1,2\}$. Each has three choices: $\{L, M, R\}$. The payoff profiles are shown in Table 7.2. The game is repeated twice, using the discount factor 1 for simplicity (analysis of the general situation with $\delta \leqq 1$ is similar).

The single-stage game has two Nash equilibria, $\left(L_{1}, L_{2}\right)$ and $\left(R_{1}, R_{2}\right)$, with payoff profiles $(1,1)$ and $(3,3)$, respectively. However, compared with the two Nash equilibria, the action profile $\left(M_{1}, M_{2}\right)$ is better off for bothe players in terms of team welfare. The two-stage game has more than one subgame perfect Nash equilibrium. For example, playing any of the above Nash equilibria in each stage forms a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium.


Table 7.2: Two-Stage Repeated Game.

In addition, there is another subgame perfect Nash equilibrium: in stage 1, players choose $\left(M_{1}, M_{2}\right)$; if the choice in stage 1 is $\left(M_{1}, M_{2}\right)$, in stage 2 the players choose ( $R_{1}, R_{2}$ ); otherwise, they choose ( $L_{1}, L_{2}$ ) in stage 2 .

We now show that the two stage strategy profile $\left\{\left(M_{1}, M_{2}\right),\left(R_{1}, R_{2}\right)\right\}$ constitutes a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium. First, in stage 2, ( $R_{1}, R_{2}$ ) constitutes a Nash equilibrium of the subgame. Next, we consider that in stage 1. Given that the opponent chooses $M_{j}$, if player $i$ chooses $M_{i}$, the total payoff profile of two periods for the player is $4+3=7$. If player $i$ chooses $L_{i}$, the player's total payoff profile is $5+1=6$; if the player chooses $R_{i}$, the total payoff profile is $0+1=1$. Thus, $M_{i}$ is the best response of player $i$ in stage 1 , as desired.

Why do players choose individually irrational, but collectively rational behavior in the first stage (relative to the single stage game)? The key reason is that the choice in stage 1 will influence payoff profiles thereafter. In other words, when players make decisions, they are weighing short-run and long-run returns. When the latter is larger, each player will choose cooperation as an optimal choice in the long run.

In the above repeated game, a "cooperation" mechanism is used to punish deviations. However, punishment or other mechanisms that encourage cooperative behavior have different levels of effectiveness in different situations. In the above example, players can observe all past choices. If they cannot, can the outcomes that they observe assist them to infer past behavior? If not, the punishment scheme may not effectively preven$t$ deviations. In addition, the punishment scheme itself needs to satisfy some conditions. Draconian punishment schemes may run counter to the rationality of those who carry them out; thus, it is important to construct
appropriate punishment schemes. Indeed, punishment schemes may also involve cooperation among players. To this end, it may be necessary to encourage the performers. Furthermore, cooperation during a punishment process may involve information issues, as well. The degree of punishment, or when the punishment ends, is also an important issue. There are different solutions for different types of interaction. These will all be discussed and answered in this chapter.

Next, we start with the simplest repeated game with perfect monitoring, in which players can observe previous actions. Subsequently, we will discuss repeated games with imperfect public monitoring, in which players can observe the outcome of a public behavior instead of previous actions. We then discuss the repeated game with private monitoring, in which different players observe different outcomes. Finally, we examine the economic logic of the reputation mechanism. The repeated game is an important branch in the development of game theory. This literature also proposes and solves new problems. The most comprehensive survey of this literature is given in Mailath and Samuelson (2006), to which many discussions in this chapter refer.

### 7.3 Repeated Games with Perfect Monitoring

This section first sets up the basic structure and concepts of the repeated game with perfect monitoring (i.e., observable previous actions), and then focuses on providing important techniques and tools for proving the Folk Theorem in the next section and its extensions in more general environments in the consequent sections.

A repeated game consists of repetitions of some base game (also called a stage game). Generally, in a repeated game, the stage game is a static game with simultaneous actions (in some repeated games, the stage game may also be in extensive form). Let $\Gamma^{t}$ be the stage game in period $t$. The set of players in period $t$ is $N^{t}$, the set of actions of player $i \in N^{t}$ is $\left(A_{i}^{t}\right)$, and the utility / payoff profile function is $\left(u_{i}\left(a^{t}\right)\right)_{i \in N^{t}}$, with $a^{t} \in A^{t} \equiv A_{1}^{t} \times \cdots \times A_{N^{t}}^{t}$ being the action profile in period $t$.

Let $h^{t}=\left(a^{0}, a^{1}, \cdots, a^{t-1}\right)$ be the history of previous actions at period $t$, indicating what have been played before $t$, where $a^{0} \in H^{0}$ is the initial action history. The set of action histories at period $t$ is denoted by $H^{t}$. All possible action histories are contained in $H \equiv \bigcup_{t=0}^{\infty} H^{t}$. With perfect information, a player can observe all previous actions of all players.

A strategy in the repeated game prescribes a strategy of the stage game for each history $h^{t}=\left(a^{0}, a^{1}, \cdots, a^{t-1}\right)$ at each date $t$. Then a (mixed) strategy of player $i$ at date $t$ is $\sigma_{i}^{t}: H^{t} \rightarrow \Delta A_{i}^{t}$, which is a probability distribution on the set of actions, and a strategy of player $i$ in the whole repeated game is denoted by $\sigma_{i}=\left(\sigma_{i}^{t}\right)_{t \in\{1,2, \cdots, \infty\}}$.

Denote the strategy profile for all players by $\boldsymbol{\sigma}=\left(\sigma_{i}\right)_{i \in N}=\left(\sigma^{t}\right)_{t=1}^{\infty}$, where $\boldsymbol{\sigma}^{t}=\left(\sigma_{i}^{t}\right)_{i \in N}$ is the strategy profile of all players in period $t$. Thus, a strategy in a repeated game determines a strategy in the stage game for each history and period $t$. The important point is that the strategy in the stage game at a given period can vary by histories.

If the repetition period is finite, the repeated game $\Gamma_{R}=\left(\Gamma^{t}\right)_{t \in T}$ is called the finitely repeated game; otherwise, it is called the infinitely repeated game. The simplest infinitely repeated game is that the game in each stage is the same (i.e., we have $N^{t}=N$ and $A_{i}^{t}=A_{i}$ ).

As the game has multiple periods, the utility of a player is, in general, defined as the sum of intertemporal discounted utilities, and the discount factor $\delta$ is the same for all players. Of course, in some cases, such as bargaining, different players may have different discount factors.

Given the strategy profile $\boldsymbol{\sigma}=\left(\sigma_{i}\right)_{i \in N}$, the payoff profile for player $i$ is

$$
U_{i}(\boldsymbol{\sigma})=(1-\delta) \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \delta^{t} u_{i}\left(\boldsymbol{\sigma}^{t}\right)
$$

When defined in this way, the domain of this utility is the same as that of utility in the stage game. It is worth noting that $U_{i}$ is the payoff profile of player $i$ in the whole repeated game, while $u_{i}$ is the payoff profile in the stage game.

Each action history starts a new proper subgame, we can define the continuation game for the repeated game. From the beginning of action history $h^{t}$ at period $t$, for any strategy profile $\boldsymbol{\sigma}$, the continuation strategy of player $i$ given $h^{t}$ is denoted as $\sigma_{i \mid h^{t}}$ with $\sigma_{i \mid h^{t}}\left(h^{\tau}\right)$ for each $h^{\tau} \in H$.

The continuation game generated from a given action history is then a subgame of the whole repeated game. Thus, for any strategy profile $\sigma$ and history $h^{t}$, we can compute the players' expected present values of payoff profiles from period $t$ onward. We shall call these the continuation payoff profiles, denoted by

$$
U_{i}^{t}\left(\boldsymbol{\sigma} \mid h^{t}\right)=(1-\delta) \sum_{\tau=t}^{\infty}=\delta^{\tau-t} u_{i}\left(\boldsymbol{\sigma} \mid h^{t}\right) .
$$

Under what conditions are there equilibria of the repeated game? What are their properties and range? These are questions that we will answer in the remainder of this chapter.

### 7.3.1 Feasible and Individually Rational Payoffs

We first give some basic concepts on the stage game and equilibrium solution concept of a repeated game.

Define $F \equiv\left\{\boldsymbol{v} \in \mathcal{R}^{n}: \exists \boldsymbol{a} \in A\right.$, s.t. $\left.\boldsymbol{v}=u(\boldsymbol{a})\right\}$ as the set of pure strategy payoff profiles of the stage game, and define $F^{+} \equiv c o F$ as the convex hull
of the set $F$, which is the smallest convex set containing $F$.
Definition 7.3.1 (Feasible Payoffs) A profile of payoffs is feasible in the stage game $\Gamma^{t}$ if $\boldsymbol{v} \in F^{+}$.

Unfeasible payoffs cannot be outcomes of the game. Towards finding a lower bound on the payoffs from pure-strategy Nash equilibria, we define the following concept.

Definition 7.3.2 (Minmax Payoffs) In the stage game $\Gamma^{t}$, player $i^{\prime}$ s pure strategy minmax payoff $\underline{v}_{i}^{p}$ is:

$$
\underline{v}_{i}^{p} \equiv \min _{a_{-i} \in A_{-i}} \max _{a_{i} \in A_{i}} u_{i}\left(a_{i}, \boldsymbol{a}_{-i}\right)
$$

i.e., it is the lowest payoff that the player can obtain regardless of all the other players' choices. In other words, it is the minimum of player $i$ 's best response over other players's strategies.

When other players can employ mixed strategies in the stage game, the mixed strategy minmax payoff is defined as

$$
\underline{v}_{i} \equiv \min _{\sigma_{-i} \in \times_{j \neq i} \Delta A_{j}} \max _{a_{i} \in A_{i}} u_{i}\left(a_{i}, \boldsymbol{\alpha}_{-i}\right)
$$

In the stage game, player $i$ will never receive a payoff lower than the minmax payoff. So we have the following concept of individual rationality on payoffs.

Definition 7.3.3 (Individually Rational Payoffs) A pure strategy profile is individually rational in the stage game $\Gamma^{t}$ if for all $i \in N$, we have

$$
v_{i} \geqq \underline{v}_{i}^{p}
$$

i.e., the pure strategy payoff of every player is not less than its pure strategy minmax payoff. Similarly, a mixed strategy profile is individually rational in the stage game $\Gamma^{t}$ if

$$
v_{i} \geqq \underline{v}_{i}
$$

for all $i \in N$.

Thus, a payoff profile is individually rational if it gives each player at least the player's guarantee.

The set of feasible and individually rational payoffs $\boldsymbol{v}=\left(v_{i}\right)_{i \in N}$ for pure-strategies is defined as

$$
F^{p} \equiv\left\{\boldsymbol{v}: v_{i} \geqq \underline{v}_{i}^{p} \mid \boldsymbol{v} \in F^{+}\right\} .
$$

Similarly, the set of feasible and individually rational payoff profiles for mixed strategies is defined as

$$
F^{*} \equiv\left\{\boldsymbol{v}: v_{i} \geqq \underline{v}_{i} \mid \boldsymbol{v} \in F^{+}\right\} .
$$

The feasibility and individual rationality of payoff profiles are very important requirements. In the next section, we will show that any feasible and individually rational payoff profile $\boldsymbol{v}$ is an equilibrium payoff profile of a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium.

The following is an example of calculating the minmax payoff of players.

$$
\begin{aligned}
& \text { player } 2 \\
& \begin{array}{rr|r|} 
& & \\
\text { player } 1 & \text { Head } & \\
& 1,-1 & -1,1 \\
\hline-1,1 & 1,-1 \\
\hline
\end{array}
\end{aligned}
$$

Table 7.3: The Minmax Payoff of Matching Pennies Game.

Example 7.3.1 Consider the following matching pennies game.
In the matching pennies game in Table 7.3, the minmax payoff of pure strategy for player 1 (or player 2) is $\underline{v}_{1}^{p}=\underline{v}_{2}^{p}=1$. The mixed strategy minmax payoff is $\underline{v}_{1}=\underline{v}_{2}=0$ since optimal mixed strategy of player 1 (or player 2 ) is to choose heads or tails with probability 0.5 .

Next, we identify the set of feasible and individually rational payoff profiles in the following example.

Example 7.3.2 Consider the game given by Table 7.4. It can be shown that this game does not have a pure strategy Nash equilibrium, but there is a
mixed strategy Nash equilibrium at which two players choose (Up, Middle) and (Left, Right) with probability 0.5 , respectively, and then the mixed strategy minmax payoff is 0 . Thus, the set of feasible and individually rational payoffs, $F^{*}$, is the intersection of the feasible set $F^{+} \equiv c o F$ shown by the area of triangle and the set of all nonnegative vectors $\left\{\boldsymbol{v}: v_{i} \geqq 0\right\}$, which is the shaded area in Figure 7.1.

> |  |  | player 2 |  |
| :---: | ---: | :---: | :---: |
| player 1 | Uiddle | Left |  |
|  | Right |  |  |
|  | Down |  |  |
| $-2,2$ | $1,-2$ |  |  |
| $1,-2$ | $-2,2$ |  |  |
| 0,1 | 0,1 |  |  |

Table 7.4: Example of Feasible Payoff.


Figure 7.1: Feasible individual rational payoffs.

In a repeated game, when information is imperfect, players may use some public correlation devices to coordinate behavior among players. For example, in the 1950s, in a collusion of bids for electrical equipment, bidders used the phase of the moon as hint to coordinate their bids. Let $W$ be the set of public correlation devices in which $w \in W$ is one of its states that can be observed by all players, and $p$ be a probability distribution over $W$. The strategy of each player can conditional on the state of the public correlation device (i.e., $\sigma_{i}(\cdot): W \rightarrow \Delta A_{i}$ ). With public correlation devices,
the payoff profiles can be increased.
Example 7.3.3 Consider the game in Table 7.5. Let $W=\left\{w_{1}, w_{2}\right\}$, and the probability of each state be 0.5 . When $w_{1}$ appears, the choices of players 1 and 2 are (Up, Right); when $w_{2}$ appears, the choices of players 1 and 2 are (Down, Left). Thus, the expected payoff profiles obtained under the public correlation device are $(3,3)$. However, without such a device, they cannot achieve these payoff profiles.

|  |  | player 2 |  |
| :---: | ---: | ---: | ---: |
| player 1 | Up | Left |  |
|  | Downt | Right |  |
| 2,2 | 1,5 |  |  |
| 5,1 | 0,0 |  |  |

Table 7.5: Example of public correlation devices.

Assuming that public correlation devices exist, the set of feasible payoff profiles in the repeated game is:

$$
V^{*}=F^{+} \equiv\left\{\sum_{\boldsymbol{a} \in A} \lambda(\boldsymbol{a}) u(\boldsymbol{a}) \mid \exists \lambda(\cdot), \lambda(\boldsymbol{a}) \in[0,1], \sum_{\boldsymbol{a} \in A} \lambda(\boldsymbol{a})=1\right\}
$$

which is the convex hull of $F$
After introducing public correlation devices, the set of feasible and individually rational payoff profiles can be defined as $F V^{*}=\left\{\boldsymbol{v} \mid \boldsymbol{v} \in V^{*}, v_{i} \geqq\right.$ $\left.\underline{v}_{i}\right\}$. If the weak inequality is replaced by a strict inequality, it becomes the set of feasible and strictly individually rational payoff profiles.

Similarly, for repeated games, we define Nash equilibrium.
Definition 7.3.4 (Nash Equilibrium of Repeated Games) A strategy profile $\boldsymbol{\sigma}$ is a Nash equilibrium of a repeated game, if for any $i \in N$ and any $\sigma_{i}^{\prime}$, we have $U_{i}(\boldsymbol{\sigma}) \geqq U_{i}\left(\sigma_{i}^{\prime}, \boldsymbol{\sigma}_{-i}\right)$.

Since a repeated game with perfect monitoring is a dynamic game with complete information, it is natural to use subgame perfect Nash equilibrium.

Definition 7.3.5 (Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibrium of Repeated Games) A strategy profile $\boldsymbol{\sigma}$ is a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium of a repeated game, if for any history $h^{t} \in H,\left.\boldsymbol{\sigma}\right|_{h^{t}}$ is the Nash equilibrium of the continuation game that starts from the history $h^{t}$.

An infinitely repeated game has infinitely many histories and subgames. As a consequence, it is difficult to verify whether a strategy profile is subgame perfect Nash equilibrium. As such, we will provide several key techniques and tools, which will be discussed in the rest of this section.

We will first introduce a criterion called the one-shot deviation principle, which can be used to identify whether a strategy profile is a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium.

### 7.3.2 One-Shot Deviation Principle

The one-shot deviation principle is fundamental to the theory of dynamic games. The difficulty for a finding subgame perfect Nash equilibrium is that there are many possible deviations after many different histories. However, since repeated games are recursive, one uses the single-deviation principle to check whether a strategy profile is a subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium. It was first proposed by Blackwell (1965) in the context of dynamic programming.

For player $i$, a one-shot deviation from $\sigma_{i}$ is any strategy $\hat{\sigma}_{i} \neq \sigma_{i}$ that agrees with $\sigma_{i}$ at all histories but one, i.e., there exists a unique history $\tilde{h} \in H$ with $\hat{\sigma}_{i}(\tilde{h}) \neq \sigma_{i}(\tilde{h})$ such that $\hat{\sigma}_{i}(h)=\sigma_{i}(h)$ for all other histories $h \neq \tilde{h}$.

Definition 7.3.6 (Profitable One-Shot Deviation) Given the strategy profile $\sigma_{-i}$ of other players, one-shot deviation $\hat{\sigma}_{i}$ of strategy $\sigma_{i}$ is profitable, if there exists some history $\tilde{h} \in H$ with $\hat{\sigma}_{i}(\tilde{h}) \neq \sigma_{i}(\tilde{h})$, such that

$$
U_{i}\left(\left.\hat{\sigma}_{i}\right|_{\tilde{h}},\left.\boldsymbol{\sigma}_{-i}\right|_{\tilde{h}}\right)>U_{i}\left(\left.\boldsymbol{\sigma}\right|_{\tilde{h}}\right)
$$

Nash equilibria have no profitable one-shot deviations on their paths, but may have profitable one-shot deviations off their paths. However, this
is not true for subgame perfect Nash equilibria, which is characterized by the so-called one-shot deviation principle.

The importance of the one-shot deviation principle below is that we do not need to consider all possible deviations when solving for the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium of a repeated game. For instance, to check if the strategy profile $\sigma_{i}$ is subgame perfect, we do not need to consider strategies of player $i$ that deviate in period $t$, again in $t^{\prime}>t$, etc.

Theorem 7.3.1 (One-Shot Deviation Principle) A strategy profile $\boldsymbol{\sigma}$ is a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium of a repeated game if and only if no player has any profitable one-shot deviation.

Proof. Here, we prove the one-shot deviation for the case of pure strategies with perfect information. When mixed strategies or public correlation devices are allowed, proofs are similar, but require more technical details. Obviously, if a strategy profile is a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium, for each player there are no better strategies, which includes one-shot deviation strategies. Thus, the necessary condition is immediate.

Now, we prove sufficiency by way of contradiction. If a strategy profile is not a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium, there must exist a profitable one-shot deviation strategy.

Suppose that the strategy profile $\sigma$ is not the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium of a repeated game. Then, there exists at least one history $\tilde{h}^{t}$ such that for player $i$, there exists a strategy $\tilde{\sigma}_{i} \neq \sigma_{i}$ leading to

$$
U_{i}\left(\left.\tilde{\sigma}_{i}\right|_{\tilde{h}^{t}},\left.\boldsymbol{\sigma}_{-i}\right|_{\tilde{h}^{t}}\right)>U_{i}\left(\left.\boldsymbol{\sigma}\right|_{\tilde{h}^{t}}\right) .
$$

If $\tilde{\sigma}_{i}$ were a one shot deviation, we would be done. Suppose not. We will first show that there must exist a profitable deviation in a finite number of histories, and then use that deviation to construct a profitable one shot deviation.

Define

$$
\varepsilon=U_{i}\left(\left.\tilde{\sigma}_{i}\right|_{\tilde{h}^{t}},\left.\boldsymbol{\sigma}_{-i}\right|_{\tilde{h}^{t}}\right)-U_{i}\left(\left.\boldsymbol{\sigma}\right|_{\tilde{h}^{t}}\right)>0 .
$$

Let $M=\max _{\boldsymbol{a}} u_{i}(\boldsymbol{a})$ and $m=\min _{\boldsymbol{a}} u_{i}(\boldsymbol{a})$ be the highest and the lowest payoffs that player $i$ can obtain in a stage game. As $\delta<1$, there exists a
sufficient large $T>t$, such that $\delta^{T}(M-m)<\frac{\varepsilon}{2}$.
Consider a strategy $\hat{\sigma}_{i}$ that is identical to $\tilde{\sigma}_{i}$ in the first $T$ periods and to $\left.\sigma_{i}\right|_{\tilde{h}^{t}}$ thereafter, i.e., for any $h^{\tau} \in H$,

$$
\hat{\sigma}_{i}\left(h^{\tau}\right)= \begin{cases}\tilde{\sigma}_{i}\left(h^{\tau}\right), & \text { if } \tau<T \\ \left.\sigma_{i}\right|_{\tilde{h}^{t}}\left(h^{\tau}\right), & \text { if } \tau \geqq T\end{cases}
$$

where $\left.\sigma_{i}\right|_{\tilde{h}^{t}}\left(h^{\tau}\right)$ is the strategy that conditions on $h^{\tau}$ that includes $\tilde{h}^{t}$.
Obviously, we have

$$
\begin{aligned}
U_{i}\left(\left.\tilde{\sigma}_{i}\right|_{\tilde{h}^{t}},\left.\boldsymbol{\sigma}_{-i}\right|_{\tilde{h}^{t}}\right)-U_{i}\left(\left.\hat{\sigma}_{i}\right|_{\tilde{h}^{t}},\left.\boldsymbol{\sigma}_{-i}\right|_{\tilde{h}^{t}}\right) & =U_{i}^{T}\left(\left.\tilde{\sigma}_{i}\right|_{\tilde{h}^{t}},\left.\boldsymbol{\sigma}_{-i}\right|_{\tilde{h}^{t}}\right)-U_{i}^{T}\left(\left.\hat{\sigma}_{i}\right|_{\tilde{h}^{t}},\left.\boldsymbol{\sigma}_{-i}\right|_{\tilde{h}^{t}}\right) \\
& \leqq \delta^{T}(M-m)<\varepsilon / 2
\end{aligned}
$$

where $U_{i}^{T}(\cdot)$ is player $i^{\prime}$ s continuation payoff function starting from $T$, and then

$$
U_{i}\left(\left.\hat{\sigma}_{i}\right|_{\tilde{h}^{t}},\left.\boldsymbol{\sigma}_{-i}\right|_{\tilde{h}^{t}}\right)-U_{i}\left(\left.\boldsymbol{\sigma}\right|_{\tilde{h}^{t}}\right)>\varepsilon / 2
$$

Thus, for $\sigma_{i}$, if a profitable deviation $\tilde{\sigma}_{i}$ exists, there must exist a profitable deviation $\hat{\sigma}_{i}$ that deviates at only a finite number of histories.

Now we use $\hat{\sigma}_{i}$ to construct a profitable one shot deviation.
Let $\hat{h}^{T-1}=\left(\hat{\boldsymbol{a}}^{0}, \cdots, \hat{\boldsymbol{a}}^{T-2}\right)$ be a history of $T-1$ periods induced by $\left(\hat{\sigma}_{i}, \boldsymbol{\sigma}_{-i}\right)$.

Consider the payoff difference of the one-shot deviation strategy $\left.\hat{\sigma}_{i}\right|_{\hat{h}^{T-1}}$ and the original strategy $\sigma_{i}$ at the history $\hat{h}^{T-1}$ :

$$
U_{i}\left(\left.\hat{\sigma}_{i}\right|_{\hat{h}^{T-1}},\left.\boldsymbol{\sigma}_{-i}\right|_{\hat{h}^{T-1}}\right)-U_{i}\left(\left.\boldsymbol{\sigma}\right|_{\hat{h}^{T-1}}\right)
$$

If this difference is strictly positive, then we have a profitable one-shot deviation for player $i$ which is at history $h^{T-1}$. If this difference is weakly negative, redefine $\hat{\sigma}_{i}$ to coincide with $\sigma_{i}$ at history $h^{T-1}$; consider the $T-2$ period history $h^{T-2}$ induced, and evaluate the difference above (replacing $h^{T-1}$ with $h^{T-2}$ ). If this difference is positive, we have a profitable oneshot deviation; otherwise, continue this process iteratively. Eventually, the difference is positive, otherwise, contradicting to the fact that there must exist a profitable deviation in a finite number of histories.

Thus, in order to show that a strategy profile $\sigma$ is a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium of a repeated game by the one-shot deviation principle, we must check that for all histories $h, \boldsymbol{\sigma}$ is a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium. Conversely, in order to show that a strategy profile $\sigma$ is not a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium of a repeated game, we only need to find one history and one date $t$ for which $\sigma$ is not a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium of the continuation game from $t$.

Example 7.3.4 (Prisoner's Dilemma continued) Consider the problem of cooperation during work, where each player wants to be a free-rider. The payoff matrix in a stage game for two players is represented in Table 7.6.

\[

\]

Table 7.6: Incentives in the Prisoner's Dilemma.
We first consider the strategy profile (Grim, Grim): Play $E$ at $t=0$; thereafter play $E$ if the players have always played $(E, E)$ in the past, otherwise, play $S$ forever.

There are two kinds of histories we need to consider separately for this strategy profile.
(1) Cooperation: Histories in which $S$ has never been played by any player.
(2) Non-Cooperation: Histories in which S has been played by some player in the past.

First consider a cooperation history for any $t$. We want to show that cooperation is best response to cooperation. If both players play $E$ at $t$ and from $t+1$ on, each player will play $E$ forever, then the continuation payoff of each of two players starting from $t$ is

$$
U_{i}^{t}(E, E)=3 .
$$

If player $i$ plays $S$ at $t$, according to (Grim, Grim), from $t+1$ on, all the
histories will be non-cooperation histories and the continuation payoff of player $i$ starting from $t$ is

$$
U_{i}^{t}(S, E)=4(1-\delta)+\delta
$$

The one-shot deviation principle requires that $(E, E)$ is a Nash equilibrium of the continuation game starting from any $t$, i.e.,

$$
U_{i}^{t}(E, E) \geqq U_{i}^{t}(S, E)
$$

Thus, when $\delta \geqq \frac{1}{3}$, there is no profitable one-shot deviation.
We also need to consider non-cooperation histories and want to show that non-cooperation is best response to non-cooperation. Consider a history in which $S$ has been played by some player before $t$. According to (Grim, Grim), from $t$ on, each player will play $S$ forever. The one-shot deviation principle for (Grim, Grim) requires that $(S, S)$ is a Nash equilibrium of this game, i.e., it requires

$$
U_{i}^{t}(S, S)=(1-\delta)+\delta \geqq-(1-\delta)+\delta=U_{i}^{t}(E, S),
$$

which is clearly true for any $\delta \in[0,1]$.
Thus, provided $\delta \geqq \frac{1}{3}$, (Grim, Grim) has no one-shot deviation at each history, it is a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium.

Now suppose that players choose the "Tit for tat" strategy: Play $E$ at $t=0$, and each $t>0$, play whatever the other player played at $t-1$. That is, players choose to work in the initial stage and thereafter copy the opponent's behavior in the previous period, and thus "Tit-for-tat" strategies at $t$ only depends on what is played at $t-1$ not any previous play.

According to the Tit for tat strategy, if both players choose $E$ at $t>0$, then starting at $t+1$ and we will have $(E, E)$ throughout. Then, the player $i^{\prime}$ s continuation payoff at $t$ is

$$
U_{i}^{t}(E, E)=3 .
$$

If $(S, E)$ is played at $t$, according to (Tit-for-tat, Tit-for-tat), the sequence of plays will be:

$$
(S, E),(E, S),(S, E),(E, S), \cdots
$$

and then the player 1 's continuation payoff at $t$ is

$$
\begin{aligned}
U_{i}^{t}(S, E) & =(1-\delta)\left[4-\delta+4 \delta^{2}-\delta^{3}+\ldots\right] \\
& =(1-\delta)\left[\sum_{s=0}^{\infty} 4 \delta^{2 s}-\delta \sum_{s=0}^{\infty} \delta^{2 s}\right] \\
& =\frac{4-\delta}{1+\delta}
\end{aligned}
$$

If $(E, S)$ is played at $t$, according to (Tit-for-tat, Tit-for-tat), the sequence of plays will be:

$$
(E, S),(S, E),(E, S),(S, E), \cdots
$$

and and the player 1 's continuation payoff at $t$ is

$$
\begin{aligned}
U_{i}^{t}(E, S) & =(1-\delta)\left[-1+4 \delta-\delta^{2}+4 \delta^{3}+\ldots\right] \\
& =\frac{4 \delta-1}{1+\delta}
\end{aligned}
$$

After $(S, S)$ at $t$, we will have $(S, S)$ throughout, and then $U_{1}^{t}(S, S)=1$.
We want to show that (Tit-for-tat, Tit-for-tat) is not a subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium. To do so, we consider three histories in which it fails the one-shot deviation principle:

1. Consider the history at $t=0$ in which (Tit-for-tat, Tit-for-tat) prescribes $(E, E)$ (i.e., both players play $E$ forever). The one-shot deviation principle requires that $(E, E)$ is a Nash equilibrium of the continuation game starting from any $t$, i.e., we must have

$$
U_{i}^{t}(E, E) \geqq U_{i}^{t}(S, E)
$$

or

$$
3 \geqq \frac{4-\delta}{1+\delta}
$$

which requires that $\delta \geqq \frac{1}{4}$.
2. Consider a history in which $(E, S)$ is played at $t-1$ with $t>1$.

According to (Tit-for-tat, Tit-for-tat), we must have $(S, E)$ at $t$. The oneshot deviation principle requires that $(S, E)$ is a Nash equilibrium of the continuation game starting from $t$, i.e.,

$$
U_{i}^{t}(S, E) \geqq U_{i}^{t}(E, E),
$$

which requires that $\delta \leqq \frac{1}{4}$, the opposite of the previous requirement.
3. Consider a history in which $(S, E)$ is played at $t-1$ with $t>1$. According to (Tit-for-tat, Tit-for-tat), we must have $(E, S)$ at $t$. The oneshot deviation principle requires that $(E, S)$ is a Nash equilibrium of the continuation game starting from $t$, i.e.,

$$
U_{i}^{t}(E, S) \geqq U_{i}^{t}(S, S),
$$

which requires that $\delta \geqq \frac{2}{3}$, contradicting to the requirement in 2 .
Therefore, (Tit-for-tat, Tit-for-tat) is not a subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium for any $\delta \in[0,1]$.

For a general situation, it is much complicated to show that a strategy profile $\sigma$ is a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium using the one-shot deviation principle since one must check there is no profitable one-shot deviation for all histories. By introducing the technique of automata, we can transform the repeated game into normal-form games, and then we only need to apply the one-shot deviation principle to the static games induced by the automata, which greatly reduces the number of histories to be examined and simplifies the tests of the existence of subgame perfect Nash equilibrium.

### 7.3.3 Automaton Representation of Strategic Behavior

Although the one-shot deviation principle greatly simplifies the test of subgame perfect Nash equilibrium, many histories need to be examined to check whether there is no profitable one-shot deviation. A further simplification is to divide histories into equivalence classes, such that all histories in an equivalence class produce the same continuation strategy. If we de-
scribe an equivalence class as a state, we can describe strategies in different equivalence classes using an automaton.

Automata theory is the study of the mathematical properties of abstract machines and automata, as well as the computational problems that can be solved using them. It is a theory in theoretical computer science, which has wide applications. An automaton is an abstract self-propelled computing device which follows a predetermined sequence of operations automatically. The use of automata in repeated games was pioneered by Aumann (1981). Rubinstein (1986), Abreu and Rubinstein (1988), and Osborne and Rubinstein (1994) describe the problem of strategic choice in repeated games using automata.

An automaton consists of a 4-tuple $\left(\Omega, \omega^{0}, f(\cdot), \tau(\cdot)\right)$, where $\Omega$ represents all possible states (all possible equivalence classes of histories), $\omega^{0} \in \Omega$ is the initial state, $f: \Omega \rightarrow \Pi_{i} \Delta\left(A_{i}\right)$ is output function (decision rule) that describes the mapping from states to action profiles ( $f^{\omega}(\boldsymbol{a})$ denotes the probability of choosing profile $\boldsymbol{a}$ at state $\omega$, which satisfies $\sum_{\boldsymbol{a} \in A} f^{\omega}(\boldsymbol{a})=$ 1), and $\tau: \Omega \times A \rightarrow \Omega$ is state transition function that characterizes how we transition from the current state and the current action to the next period's state. Any automaton $\left(\Omega, \omega^{0}, f(\cdot), \tau(\cdot)\right)$ induces a strategy profile $\sigma=f(\cdot)$.

If the output of $f(\cdot)$ is a pure strategy profile, the sequence of histories generated by the automaton $\left(\Omega, \omega^{0}, f(\cdot), \tau(\cdot)\right)$ is $\left(\boldsymbol{a}^{0}, \boldsymbol{a}^{1}, \cdots\right)$ with

$$
\boldsymbol{a}^{0}=f\left(\omega^{0}\right), \boldsymbol{a}^{1}=f\left(\tau\left(\omega^{0}, \boldsymbol{a}^{0}\right)\right), \boldsymbol{a}^{2}=f\left(\tau\left(\tau\left(\omega^{0}, \boldsymbol{a}^{0}\right), \boldsymbol{a}^{1}\right)\right), \cdots
$$

The transition function $\tau: \Omega \times H /\{\emptyset\} \rightarrow \Omega$ is then given by

$$
\tau\left(\omega, h^{t}\right):=\tau\left(\tau\left(\omega, h^{t-1}\right), \boldsymbol{a}^{t-1}\right)
$$

and the induced strategy $\sigma$ is given by $\sigma(\emptyset)=f\left(\omega^{0}\right)$ and

$$
\sigma\left(h^{t}\right):=f\left(\tau\left(\omega^{0}, h^{t}\right)\right), \forall h^{t} \in H \backslash\{\emptyset\} .
$$

Thus, every strategy profile can be represented by an automaton (set $\Omega=$ $H)$. Based on this, we can form a one-to-one correspondence between the strategy profile and the automaton: $\boldsymbol{\sigma}\left(h^{t}\right)=f\left(\tau\left(\omega^{0}, h^{t}\right)\right)$ with $f\left(h^{t}\right)=\boldsymbol{\sigma}\left(h^{t}\right)$ and $h^{t+1} \equiv\left(h^{t}, \boldsymbol{a}^{t}\right)=\tau\left(h^{t}, \boldsymbol{a}^{t}\right)$.

The automaton can divide the entire history $H$ into equivalence classes and each equivalence class produces the same continuation strategy. The set of states under automaton is usually a finite set. Under automaton representation, for the strategy $\left.\boldsymbol{\sigma}\right|_{h^{t}}$ after history $h^{t}$, each state forms a specific continuation strategy.

The automaton of a player can be defined as $\left(\Omega_{i}, \omega_{i}^{0}, f_{i}, \tau_{i}\right)$, and it is interchangeable with individual strategy $\sigma_{i}$.

Example 7.3.5 (Automaton Representation of Grim Strategy) Consider the previous example of grim strategy that implies that a player chooses to exert ( $E$ ) first. If players always choose to exert $(E)$ prior to period $t$, they choose to work hard in this period, as well. If some player has chosen to shirk ( $S$ ), she chooses to shirk from then on.

In the static (one-shot) play, if each player plays $S$, it will result in $S S$ outcome (action); if player 1 plays $S$ and player 2 plays $E$, it will result in $S E$ outcome; other outcomes can be similarly denoted. Also, since each equivalence class produces the same continuation strategy, the state set for the grim strategy only contains two element $\{E E, S S\}$.

Then the automaton to represent the grim strategy can be expressed as

$$
\Omega=\left\{w_{E E}, w_{S S}\right\}, f\left(w_{E E}\right)=E E, f\left(w_{S S}\right)=S S,
$$

and

$$
\tau(w, a)= \begin{cases}w_{E E}, & \text { if } w=w_{E E}, a=E E, \\ w_{S S}, & \text { otherwise }\end{cases}
$$

The state transition function is represented by Figure 7.2.
As will be shown below, combining the one-shot deviation principle with the automaton representation, when verifying whether or not a Nash equilibrium is subgame perfect, we only need to make sure that in each state $\omega \in \Omega$, the strategy profile generated by the automaton $\left(\Omega, \omega^{0}, f(\cdot), \tau(\cdot)\right)$ is a Nash equilibrium of the induced normal-form games. This simplifies the analysis substantially because one only needs to check whether a strategy profile is a Nash equilibrium of the induced normal-form game.

In the case of incentives in the Prisoner's Dilemma, it is easy to prove


Figure 7.2: Automaton Representation of Grim Strategy.
that when $\delta \geqq 1 / 3$, as we did before, the grim strategy profile is a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium.

### 7.3.4 Credible Continuation Promises

In order to analyse repeated games using automata, we need characterize the set of equivalence classes of states. At every stage, a player needs to consider not only the player's payoff in the current period, but also the impact of the payer's decision on future states. We know that the future is a powerful incentive mechanism, but it is difficult to understand what repeated games can achieve when the space of strategy profiles themselves are infinite-dimensional spaces, especially in the context of infinitely repeated games. We now discuss some powerful techniques for characterizing the set of subgame perfect Nash equilibria.

Abreu, Pearce, and Stacchetti $(1986,1990)$ proposed a method to describe the state. Specifically, they suggested using the continuation (expected) discounted value to describe the state; thus, the state determines not only a player's incentives in the stage game, but also the player's payoff from the continuation game. The idea of this approach comes from the dynamic programming method that transforms the dynamic optimization problem into Bellman equation, which breaks a dynamic optimization problem into a sequence of simpler subproblems. So is here: the decision problem of the dynamic game is transformed into a sequence of (correlated) static decision subproblems of stage games, i.e., establishing a recursive structure to analyze repeated interactions among players and check whether a strat-
egy profile is a Nash equilibrium of the reduced stage game using one-shot deviation principle. This approach together with automata method has become a standard approach to solving repeated games. The current and next subsections will discuss the logic behind this approach.

Given an automaton $\left(\Omega, \omega^{0}, f(\cdot), \tau(\cdot)\right)$, let $V_{i}(\omega)$ be player $i^{\prime}$ s value starting from state $\omega$. In other words, if players make strategic choices according to the automaton $\left(\Omega, \omega^{0}, f(\cdot), \tau(\cdot)\right)$, then starting from $\omega,\left(\Omega, \omega^{0}, f(\cdot), \tau(\cdot)\right)$ will generate a strategic sequence, and $V_{i}(\omega)$ is player $i$ 's value that is generated by the strategy sequence that comes from the automaton under state $\omega$.

When the output of $f(\cdot)$ is a pure strategy profile, $V_{i}(\omega)$ at each state $\omega \in \Omega$ is determined by

$$
\begin{equation*}
V_{i}(\omega)=(1-\delta) u_{i}(\boldsymbol{a})+\delta V_{i}(\tau(\omega, \boldsymbol{a})) \tag{7.3.1}
\end{equation*}
$$

where $V_{i}(\tau(\omega, \boldsymbol{a}))$ is player $i$ 's continuation present value of future payoffs $V_{i}(\tau(\omega, \boldsymbol{a}))$ at $\tau(\omega, \boldsymbol{a})$. The automaton $\left(\Omega, \omega^{0}, f(\cdot), \tau(\cdot)\right)$ then induces the sequences:

$$
\begin{array}{ll}
\omega^{0}:=\omega, & a^{0}:=f\left(\omega^{0}\right)=\boldsymbol{a} \\
\omega^{1}:=\tau\left(\omega^{0}, \boldsymbol{a}^{0}\right) & \boldsymbol{a}^{1}:=f\left(\omega^{1}\right) \\
\omega^{2}:=\tau\left(\omega^{1}, \boldsymbol{a}^{1}\right) & \boldsymbol{a}^{2}:=f\left(\omega^{2}\right)
\end{array}
$$

Thus, we have

$$
\begin{align*}
V_{i}(\omega) & =(1-\delta) u_{i}\left(f\left(\omega^{0}\right)\right)+\delta V_{i}\left(\tau\left(\omega, f\left(\omega^{0}\right)\right)\right), \\
& =(1-\delta) u_{i}\left(\boldsymbol{a}^{0}\right)+\delta\left\{(1-\delta) u_{i}\left(\boldsymbol{a}^{1}\right)+V_{i}\left(\omega^{2}\right)\right\} \\
& \vdots  \tag{7.3.2}\\
& =(1-\delta) \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \delta^{t} u_{i}\left(\boldsymbol{a}^{t}\right),
\end{align*}
$$

which shows that the optimization problems determined by equations (7.3.1) and (7.3.2) are equivalent. At any date, the set of possible actions depends
on the current state; we can write this as $a \in A(\omega)$. Thus, when $V_{i}(\omega)$ is maximized, we have the conventional Bellman equation:

$$
\begin{equation*}
V_{i}(\omega)=\max _{a \in A(\omega)}\left\{(1-\delta) u_{i}(\boldsymbol{a})+\delta V_{i}(\tau(\omega, \boldsymbol{a}))\right\} \tag{7.3.3}
\end{equation*}
$$

by noting that the stage utility function is $(1-\delta) u_{i}(\cdot)$.
More generally, if strategic choices are mixed strategies, the probability of choosing the action profile $\boldsymbol{a}$ in state $\omega$ is $f^{\omega}(\boldsymbol{a})$. Based on the action profile $\boldsymbol{a}$ and the current state $\omega$, the transition function selects the new state $\tau(\omega, \boldsymbol{a})$, from which results in a continuation (expected) present value of future payoff $V_{i}(\tau(\omega, \boldsymbol{a}))$. Then, $V_{i}(\omega)$ is determined by

$$
\begin{equation*}
V_{i}(\omega)=(1-\delta) \sum_{\boldsymbol{a} \in A} u_{i}(\boldsymbol{a}) f^{\omega}(\boldsymbol{a})+\delta \sum_{\boldsymbol{a} \in A} V_{i}(\tau(\omega, \boldsymbol{a})) f^{\omega}(\boldsymbol{a}) . \tag{7.3.4}
\end{equation*}
$$

Definition 7.3.7 The state $\omega \in \Omega$ of an automaton $\left(\Omega, \omega^{0}, f(\cdot), \tau(\cdot)\right)$ is reachable from $\omega^{0}$ if $\omega=\tau\left(\omega^{0}, h^{t}\right)$ for some history $h^{t} \in H$. Denote the set of states reachable from $\omega^{0}$ by $\Omega\left(\omega^{0}\right)$.

Definition 7.3.8 An induced strategy profile $\sigma$ with $\sigma\left(h^{t}\right)=f\left(\tau\left(\omega^{0}, h^{t}\right)\right)$ for all $h^{t} \in H$ or the automaton $\left(\Omega, \omega^{0}, f(\cdot), \tau(\cdot)\right)$ is a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium if for all states $\omega \in \Omega\left(\omega^{0}\right)$ and all $i, \sigma_{i}$ maximizes $V_{i}(\omega)$.

In other words, the claim that the strategy generated by $\left(\Omega, \omega^{0}, f(\cdot), \tau(\cdot)\right)$ is a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium means that, given that other players follow the automaton, $V_{i}(\omega)$ starting from any state is the highest for a player when the player follows the recommendations of the automaton. As such, no one will deviate unilaterally.

If $V_{i}(\omega)$ is an optimal value, it is credible in a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium since, given any $a_{i}^{\prime} \in \operatorname{supp}\left(f_{i}(\omega)\right) \equiv\left\{a_{i} \mid f^{\omega}(\boldsymbol{a})>0\right\}$, for any
$\hat{a}_{i} \in A_{i}$, we have

$$
\begin{aligned}
& V_{i}(\omega)=(1-\delta) \sum_{\boldsymbol{a}_{-i} \in A_{-i}} u_{i}\left(a_{i}^{\prime}, \boldsymbol{a}_{-i}\right) f^{\omega}\left(a_{i}^{\prime}, \boldsymbol{a}_{-i}\right) \\
&+\delta \sum_{a_{-i} \in A_{-i}} V_{i}\left(\tau\left(\omega,\left(a_{i}^{\prime}, \boldsymbol{a}_{-i}\right)\right)\right) f^{\omega}\left(a_{i}^{\prime}, \boldsymbol{a}_{-i}\right) \\
& \geqq(1-\delta) \sum_{\boldsymbol{a}_{-i} \in A_{-i}} u_{i}\left(\hat{a}_{i}, \boldsymbol{a}_{-i}\right) f^{\omega}\left(\hat{a}_{i}, \boldsymbol{a}_{-i}\right) \\
&+\delta \sum_{a_{-i} \in A_{-i}} V_{i}\left(\tau\left(\omega,\left(\hat{a}_{i}, \boldsymbol{a}_{-i}\right)\right)\right) f^{\omega}\left(\hat{a}_{i}, \boldsymbol{a}_{-i}\right) .
\end{aligned}
$$

We call the payoff $V_{i}(\omega)$ that satisfies the above inequality as credible continuation promises of player $i$. On the basis of credible continuation promises, we can have the one-shot deviation principle in the automaton representation, which re-characterize the subgame perfect Nash equilibria of repeated games.

Proposition 7.3.1 The strategy $\boldsymbol{\sigma}$ induced by automaton $\left(\Omega, \omega^{0}, f(\cdot), \tau(\cdot)\right)$ is a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium if and only if for all reachable $\omega \in \Omega\left(\omega^{0}\right)$ that can be reached from $\omega^{0}, f(\omega)$ is a Nash equilibrium of the normal-form game (state game) $G=\left(N, A_{i}, U_{i}(\cdot)=g_{i}^{\omega}(\cdot)\right)_{i \in N}$, where

$$
g_{i}^{\omega}(\boldsymbol{a})=(1-\delta) u_{i}(\boldsymbol{a})+\delta V_{i}(\tau(\omega, \boldsymbol{a}))
$$

Proof. We prove this conclusion only in the case of pure strategies.
Sufficiency: Let strategy $\boldsymbol{\sigma}$ be generated by an automaton $\left(\Omega, \omega^{0}, f(\cdot), \tau(\cdot)\right)$. By the one-shot deviation principle, if there is no profitable one-shot deviation, $\sigma$ is a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium. Suppose by way of contradiction that there exists a profitable one-shot deviation $\hat{\boldsymbol{\sigma}}$. In other words, there exists a history $\hat{h}^{t}$, such that $\hat{\sigma}_{i}$ is a profitable one-shot deviation for player $i$. Let $\hat{\omega}=\tau\left(\omega^{0}, \hat{h}^{t}\right), \hat{a}_{i}=\hat{\sigma}_{i}\left(\hat{h}^{t}\right) \neq \sigma_{i}\left(\hat{h}^{t}\right)=f(\hat{\omega})=a_{i}$. Since $\hat{\sigma}_{i}$ is a profitable one-shot deviation for player $i$, then

$$
\begin{aligned}
U_{i}\left(\left.\hat{\sigma}_{i}\right|_{\hat{h}^{t}},\left.\boldsymbol{\sigma}_{-i}\right|_{\hat{h}^{t}}\right) & =g_{i}^{\hat{\omega}}\left(\hat{a}_{i}, \boldsymbol{a}_{-i}\right)=(1-\delta) u_{i}\left(\hat{a}_{i}, \boldsymbol{a}_{-i}\right)+\delta V\left(\tau\left(\hat{\omega},\left(a_{i}, \boldsymbol{a}_{-i}\right)\right)\right) \\
& >(1-\delta) u_{i}\left(a_{i}, \boldsymbol{a}_{-i}\right)+\delta V\left(\hat{\omega},\left(a_{i}, \boldsymbol{a}_{-i}\right)\right) \\
& =g_{i}^{\hat{\omega}}\left(a_{i}, \boldsymbol{a}_{-i}\right)=U_{i}\left(\left.\sigma_{i}\right|_{\hat{h}^{t}},\left.\boldsymbol{\sigma}_{-i}\right|_{\hat{h}^{t}}\right)
\end{aligned}
$$

contradicting the fact that $f(\omega)$ is a Nash equilibrium of $G$. Therefore, there is no profitable one-shot deviation, and $\boldsymbol{\sigma}$ is a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium.

Necessity: If $\boldsymbol{\sigma}$ is a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium, then no player has a profitable one-shot deviation. Furthermore, there does not exist $\hat{h}^{t}$, such that $V_{i}(\hat{\omega})=U_{i}\left(\left.\sigma_{i}\right|_{\hat{h}^{t}},\left.\sigma_{-i}\right|_{\hat{h}^{t}}\right)<U_{i}\left(\left.\hat{\sigma}_{i}\right|_{\hat{h}^{t}},\left.\sigma_{-i}\right|_{\hat{h}^{t}}\right)$ for player $i$ and $\hat{\sigma}_{i}$, which means that for any $\hat{\sigma}_{i}$ and $\hat{a}_{i}=\hat{\sigma}_{i}\left(\hat{h}^{t}\right)=f(\hat{\omega})=a_{i}$, we always have $(1-\delta) u_{i}\left(\hat{a}_{i}, \boldsymbol{a}_{-i}\right)+\delta V\left(\tau\left(\hat{\omega},\left(\hat{a}_{i}, \boldsymbol{a}_{-i}\right)\right)\right) \leqq(1-\delta) u_{i}\left(a_{i}, \boldsymbol{a}_{-i}\right)+V\left(\tau\left(\hat{\omega},\left(a_{i}, \boldsymbol{a}_{-i}\right)\right)\right)$.

Therefore, $f(\omega)$ is a Nash equilibrium of $G$ for $g_{i}^{\omega}(\boldsymbol{a})=(1-\delta) u_{i}(\boldsymbol{a})+$ $\delta V_{i}(\tau(\omega, \boldsymbol{a}))$.

Example 7.3.6 (Incentives in the Prisoner's Dilemma (continued)) Consider the two automaton representations for playing the repeated game based on the stage game in Table 7.6. The first is the "tit for tat" strategy profile, and the second is the grim strategy profile.

The automaton representation of the "tit for tat" strategy profile is: $\Omega=\left\{w_{E E}, w_{S E}, w_{E S}, w_{S S}\right\}, w^{0}=w_{E E}, f\left(w_{a_{1} a_{2}}\right)=a_{1} a_{2}, \tau\left(w_{a_{1} a_{2}}, a_{1}^{\prime} a_{2}^{\prime}\right)=$ $w_{a_{2}^{\prime} a_{1}^{\prime}}$.

If the "tit for tat" strategy profile is a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium, it is a Nash equilibrium of the normal form game induced by the automaton and thus we have:

$$
\begin{align*}
& V_{1}\left(w_{E E}\right)=(1-\delta) 3+\delta V_{1}\left(w_{E E}\right) \geqq(1-\delta) 4+\delta V_{1}\left(w_{E S}\right)  \tag{7.3.5}\\
& V_{1}\left(w_{S E}\right)=(1-\delta) 4+\delta V_{1}\left(w_{E S}\right) \geqq(1-\delta) 3+\delta V_{1}\left(w_{E E}\right)  \tag{7.3.6}\\
& V_{1}\left(w_{E S}\right)=(1-\delta)(-1)+\delta V_{1}\left(w_{S E}\right) \geqq(1-\delta) 1+\delta V_{1}\left(w_{S S}\right)  \tag{7.3.7}\\
& V_{1}\left(w_{S S}\right)=(1-\delta) 1+\delta V_{1}\left(w_{S S}\right) \geqq(1-\delta)(-1)+\delta V_{1}\left(w_{S E}\right) . \tag{7.3.8}
\end{align*}
$$

Then,

$$
V_{1}\left(w_{E E}\right)=3, V_{1}\left(w_{S S}\right)=1, V_{1}\left(w_{S E}\right)=\frac{4-\delta}{1+\delta}, V_{1}\left(w_{E S}\right)=\frac{4 \delta-1}{1+\delta} .
$$

Inequality (7.3.5) implies that $\delta \geqq 1 / 4$; inequality (7.3.6) implies that $\delta \leqq 1 / 4$; inequality (7.3.7) implies that $\delta \geqq 2 / 3$; obviously, there does not
exist any $\delta \in[0,1]$ that simultaneously satisfies inequalities (7.3.5), (7.3.6) and (7.3.7). Therefore, the "tit for tat" strategy profile is not a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium.

For the grim strategy, the automaton has been described earlier. Now, we study when it will be a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium. As

$$
\begin{align*}
& V_{1}\left(w_{E E}\right)=(1-\delta) 3+\delta V_{1}\left(w_{E E}\right) \geqq(1-\delta) 4+\delta V_{1}\left(w_{S S}\right),  \tag{7.3.9}\\
& V_{1}\left(w_{S S}\right)=(1-\delta) 1+\delta V_{1}\left(w_{S S}\right) \geqq(1-\delta)(-1)+\delta V_{1}\left(w_{S S}\right), \tag{7.3.10}
\end{align*}
$$

we obtain $V_{1}\left(w_{E E}\right)=3$ and $V_{1}\left(w_{S S}\right)=1$. Therefore, inequality (7.3.10) holds naturally. Moreover, if inequality (7.3.9) holds, $\delta \geqq 1 / 3$. In other words, when $\delta \geqq 1 / 3$, the grim strategy is a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium. This result is consistent with the previous one.

To construct equilibria of repeated games, Abreu, Pearce, and Stacchetti $(1986,1990)$ proposed the concept of the self-generating set of payoffs. Again, for simplicity, we only discuss the case of pure strategies below.

### 7.3.5 Enforceability, Decomposability, and Self-Generation

In contrast to the previous analysis, we will think not in terms of strategies, but in terms of payoffs. We decompose repeated games into games in which behavior today is implemented with self-enforcing payoffs tomorrow, i.e., generated from equilibria in the repeated game (analogous to the incentive compatibility issues studied in mechanism design). The idea is that to "enforce" certain actions at time $t$, we will attach continuation payoffs from time $t+1$ on to each time $t$ outcome. This decomposition of subgame perfect Nash equilibrium payoffs into flow payoffs today and promised utility tomorrow further greatly simplifies the study of repeated interaction and solving for SPNE.

First, let $E^{p}$ be the set of payoff profiles of all subgame perfect Nash equilibria. For every $\boldsymbol{v} \in E^{p} \subseteq \mathcal{R}^{n}$, let $\boldsymbol{\sigma}^{v}$ be a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium that results in payoff profile $\boldsymbol{v}$. From the previous subsection, we know that this profile $\sigma^{v}$ generates a specification of continuation promised payoffs $\gamma: A \rightarrow E^{p}$, such that $v_{i}=(1-\delta) u_{i}\left(\boldsymbol{a}^{*}\right)+\delta \gamma_{i}\left(\boldsymbol{a}^{*}\right)$. Since $\boldsymbol{\sigma}^{v}$ is a
subgame perfect Nash equilibrium, it satisfies:

$$
v_{i}=(1-\delta) u_{i}\left(\boldsymbol{a}^{*}\right)+\delta \gamma_{i}\left(\boldsymbol{a}^{*}\right) \geqq(1-\delta) u_{i}\left(a_{i}, \boldsymbol{a}_{-i}^{*}\right)+\delta \gamma_{i}\left(a_{i}, \boldsymbol{a}_{-i}^{*}\right) .
$$

As $\gamma(\cdot) \in E^{p}$, it is the present value of future payoffs of the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium, as well. After generating the action $a^{*}, \sigma^{v}$ also generates a continuation subgame perfect Nash equilibrium strategy $\left.\boldsymbol{\sigma}^{\gamma\left(\boldsymbol{a}^{*}\right)} \equiv \boldsymbol{\sigma}^{v}\right|_{h^{0}, \boldsymbol{a}^{*}}$. The equilibrium present value generated by $\boldsymbol{\sigma}^{\gamma\left(\boldsymbol{a}^{*}\right)}$ is $\gamma\left(\boldsymbol{a}^{*}\right)$. Then, the process continues recursively. This approach ingeniously divides an optimization problem with infinitely many periods into a sequence of one-stage optimization problems. What connects these problems is a sequence of subgame perfect Nash equilibrium payoffs. The discounted value of each continuation subgame equilibrium payoff is called a state. The equilibrium strategy, which is generated by the state, transitions the previous state to the subsequent one.

More generally, consider a function $\gamma: A \rightarrow W \subseteq \mathcal{R}^{n}$. We may regard $\gamma_{i}(a)$ as the payoff that player $i$ obtains when the action profile is $a$. The payoffs do not happen immediately but in the future. Their values determines the strength of the incentives that they create.

Definition 7.3.9 (Enforceable Action Profiles) An action profile $\boldsymbol{a}^{*} \in A$ is enforceable on $W \subseteq \mathcal{R}^{n}$ if there is some specification of continuation promises $\gamma: A \rightarrow W$, such that $\boldsymbol{a}^{*}$ is a Nash equilibrium of the normal form game with payoff function $g_{i}^{\gamma}: A \rightarrow \mathcal{R}^{n}$, where

$$
g_{i}^{\gamma}(\boldsymbol{a})=(1-\delta) u_{i}\left(\boldsymbol{a}^{*}\right)+\delta \gamma_{i}\left(\boldsymbol{a}^{*}\right),
$$

i.e., for any player $i \in N$ and for any $a_{i} \in A_{i}$, we have

$$
(1-\delta) u_{i}\left(\boldsymbol{a}^{*}\right)+\delta \gamma_{i}\left(\boldsymbol{a}^{*}\right) \geqq(1-\delta) u_{i}\left(a_{i}, \boldsymbol{a}_{-i}^{*}\right)+\delta \gamma_{i}\left(a_{i}, \boldsymbol{a}_{-i}^{*}\right) .
$$

This definition depicts the incentive of continuation equilibrium discounted payoffs (or state) for a player to choose (equilibrium) strategy. Next, we will propose several related concepts of equilibrium payoff.

Definition 7.3.10 (Action Decomposable Payoffs) A feasible payoff $\boldsymbol{v} \in F^{*}$
is action decomposable on $W \subseteq F^{*}$, if there is an enforceable action profile $\boldsymbol{a}^{*}$ on $F^{*}$, i.e.:

$$
v_{i}=(1-\delta) u_{i}\left(\boldsymbol{a}^{*}\right)+\delta \gamma_{i}\left(\boldsymbol{a}^{*}\right) \geqq(1-\delta) u_{i}\left(a_{i}, \boldsymbol{a}_{-i}^{*}\right)+\delta \gamma_{i}\left(a_{i}, \boldsymbol{a}_{-i}^{*}\right)
$$

in which $\gamma\left(\boldsymbol{a}^{*}\right)$ is a credible continuation promise function of enforceable action profile $\boldsymbol{a}^{*}$. Here, the payoff profile $v$ is decomposed by $a^{*}$ on $F^{*}$.

Definition 7.3.11 (Self-Generating Set of Payoffs) A set $W \subseteq F^{*}$ is purestrategy self-generating if every $\boldsymbol{v} \in W$ is action decomposable.

The notion of a self-generating set of payoff profiles is closely related to the payoff set of subgame perfect Nash equilibria. The following proposition characterizes their relationship.

Proposition 7.3.2 The pure-strategy self-generating set of payoff profiles $W \subseteq$ $F^{*}$ is a subset of pure strategy SPNE payoff profiles, i.e., $W \subseteq E^{p}$.

Proof. Let payoff set $\Omega=W \subseteq F^{*}$ be the set of states of the automaton. $W$ is a pure-strategy self-generating set of payoff profiles, which implies that: for arbitrary $\boldsymbol{v} \in W$, there exists a corresponding pure action profile $\boldsymbol{a}(\boldsymbol{v})$ and continuation promises $\gamma^{v}: A \rightarrow W$. Consider the following automaton set $\{(W, \boldsymbol{v}, f, \tau): \boldsymbol{v} \in W\}$ that satisfies: for all $\boldsymbol{v} \in W, f\left(\boldsymbol{v}^{\prime}\right)=\boldsymbol{a}\left(\boldsymbol{v}^{\prime}\right)$; and for all $\boldsymbol{v} \in W, \boldsymbol{a} \in A, \tau\left(\boldsymbol{v}^{\prime}, \boldsymbol{a}\right)=\gamma^{\boldsymbol{v}^{\prime}}(\boldsymbol{a})$.

We show that for any $\boldsymbol{v} \in W$, the automaton $\left\{W, \omega^{0}=\boldsymbol{v}, f, \tau\right\}$ describes a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium with payoff profile $\boldsymbol{v}$. For every state $v_{i}=V_{i}(\boldsymbol{v}), V_{i}(\boldsymbol{v})$ is the equilibrium payoff of player $i$ under state $\boldsymbol{v}$. Since each $\boldsymbol{v} \in W$ is decomposable, let $\boldsymbol{v}^{0}=\boldsymbol{v}$, and thus a sequence of payoffaction profiles can be generated as follows:

$$
\boldsymbol{v}^{0}=\boldsymbol{v}, \boldsymbol{a}^{0}=f\left(\boldsymbol{v}^{0}\right), \boldsymbol{v}^{k}=\tau\left(\boldsymbol{v}^{k-1}, \boldsymbol{a}^{k-1}\right)=\gamma^{\boldsymbol{v}^{k-1}}\left(\boldsymbol{a}^{k-1}\right), \boldsymbol{a}^{k}=f\left(\boldsymbol{v}^{k}\right)
$$

Thus,

$$
\begin{aligned}
v_{i} & =(1-\delta) u_{i}\left(\boldsymbol{a}^{0}\right)+\delta v_{i}^{1}=(1-\delta) u_{i}\left(\boldsymbol{a}^{0}\right)+\delta\left((1-\delta) u_{i}\left(\boldsymbol{a}^{1}\right)+\delta v_{i}^{2}\right) \\
& =\cdots=(1-\delta) \sum_{s=0}^{t-1} \delta^{s} u_{i}\left(\boldsymbol{a}^{s}\right)+\delta^{t} v_{i}^{t}
\end{aligned}
$$

As $v_{i}^{t}$ is bounded, when $t \rightarrow \infty, v_{i}=(1-\delta) \sum_{s=0}^{\infty} \delta^{s} u_{i}\left(\boldsymbol{a}^{s}\right)$, we have $v_{i}=V_{i}(\boldsymbol{v})$.

The above proposition can be extended to a corollary: the set of payoff profiles of pure strategy subgame perfect Nash equilibria, $E^{p}$, is the largest pure-strategy self-generating set. Furthermore, Abreu, Pearce, and Stacchetti (1990) proved that $E^{p}$ is a compact set.

Example 7.3.7 (Incentives in the Prisoner's Dilemma (continued)) Returning to the Prisoner's Dilemma, we analyse under what conditions both players working hard in each period is a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium. Then, the problem becomes under which conditions a self-generating set of payoff profiles, $W$, contains the payoff profile $(3,3)$. Furthermore, if such a $W \subseteq F^{*}$ exists, action profile $(E, E)$ in $W$ is enforceable. This implies that:

$$
\begin{aligned}
& (1-\delta) 3+\delta \gamma_{1}(E, E) \geqq(1-\delta) 4+\delta \gamma_{1}(S, E), \\
& (1-\delta) 3+\delta \gamma_{2}(E, E) \geqq(1-\delta) 4+\delta \gamma_{2}(E, S) .
\end{aligned}
$$

Moreover, $\gamma(E, E) \geqq \underline{v}_{i}=1, \gamma_{1}(S, E) \geqq \underline{v}_{i}=1, \gamma_{2}(E, S) \geqq \underline{v}_{i}=1$. In addition, $(S, S)$ is a Nash equilibrium of the normal form game $G$, which enures $\gamma(S, S)=1$ belong to $E^{p}$. When $\gamma_{1}(S, E)=\gamma_{2}(E, S)=1$ and $\gamma_{1}(E, E)=\gamma_{2}(E, E)=3$, the above two inequality constraints are the weakest. Thus, the condition to guarantee the two inequalities is $\delta \geqq 1 / 3$, and $W=\{(1,1),(3,3)\}$ is a self-generating payoff set. In this situation, working hard in every period is a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium for both players.

Using the above method, we can solve for the equilibrium payoffs in repeated games. However, empirical research is more concerned with analysing interactive behavior in repeated games. Dynamic inconsistency (or time inconsistency) is a difficulty usually faced by governments in the process of policy-making. Much research focuses on this topic, such as the dynamic inconsistency of monetary policy by Kydland and Prescott (1977). For such a problem, people will think of the credibility of the government. For example, the government can fix such decisions in the form of a rule that cannot be changed at will, or give the relevant decision-making power to
certain people or groups with specific preferences. The idea of a repeated game can also deal with other problems conveniently. Consider the following example of public goods provision (see Samuelson, 2006).

Example 7.3.8 Consider an infinitely repeated game with two types of players: the first type of player is a government, while the second type of player comprises consumers (a continuum of measure 1). For simplicity, assume that consumers are homogeneous. Each consumer is negligible relative to society, which means that his behavior has little influence on the society, and he will choose an action to maximize his short-run benefit. Assume that in every period, a consumer has 1 unit of endowment that he can consume or invest. Suppose that the return on investment is $R>1$, and that the consumption amount is $c$; then, the benefit from investment is $R(1-c)$. The government's tax rate on investment is $t$, and then the consumer's revenue is $t R(1-c)$. Suppose that all of the revenue is used for provision of public goods. Each unit of revenue can provide $\gamma$ units of public goods, and let $R-1 \leqq \gamma \leqq R$. For simplicity, suppose that there is no savings across periods, and the problem of dynamic inconsistency occurs within each period.

The utility function of a consumer is:

$$
c+(1-t) R(1-c)+2 \sqrt{G}
$$

in which $G$ is the pubic good provided by the government.
Since everyone is negligible to society, everyone's contribution to the financing of the good is also trivial. If the amount of public good provided by the government is $G$, the optimal decision for a consumer is: if $t<\frac{R-1}{R}$, there is $c=0$; otherwise, $c=1$.

The goal of the government is to maximize social welfare, which in this case is the total utility of all consumers. Therefore, the government's decision is to choose the tax rate $t$ to maximize social welfare:

$$
c+(1-t) R(1-c)+2 \sqrt{\gamma t R(1-c)}
$$

Then, combining with consumers' decisions, the government's choice of
tax rate is: $t(c)=\frac{\gamma}{R(1-c)}$.
The best response functions for consumers and the government are shown in Figure 7.3. Since $R>1$, the most efficient consumption arrangement is $c=0$ (i.e., all endowments are utilized for investment). In this situation, tax revenue is $t=\frac{\gamma}{R}$, which is point $B$ in Figure 7.3. From Figure 7.3 , we can find that there is a unique equilibrium $c=1, t=1$ in this (stage) game, which is point $A$. This equilibrium does not optimize the goal of consumers or the government. This conclusion is somewhat surprising since, in this model, both the consumers and the government have identical goals. However, in equilibrium, they choose a strategy that is unfavourable for both of them.


Figure 7.3: The Best Reaction Functions for Consumers and the Government.

Since every individual has very little influence on society, the individual will not consider the consequences of her actions, and each will choose the strategy to optimize her short-run benefit. Considering the behavior constraints of consumers (i.e., consumers always make a best response to the government's decision), the optimal strategy profile in this economy is point $C$ in Figure 7.3. The highest tax rate which is compatible with the best consumption decision is $\frac{R-1}{R}$.

Let $\underline{v_{1}}$ be the utility of the government (this is also the consumers' $u$ tility) in this profile. If the government can make a prior commitment to the tax rate, it can obtain revenue $\underline{v_{1}}$. If the government cannot promise in advance, it will be faced with a problem of policy commitment. However, in a repeated game, the government can solve the problem of commitmen$t$ even if it cannot make a commitment to the tax rate in advance. If the government is sufficiently concerned about its future benefits, once the tax rate that is chosen by the government is not $\frac{R-1}{R}$, the future interaction will revert to the single-stage Nash equilibrium permanently (i.e., $c=1$ and $t=1$ ). This can ensure that the government chooses an efficient tax rate for society.

Therefore, using the idea of repeated games, we can conclude that there exists a lower bound of time discount factor $\delta$, such that when the time discount factor of the government satisfies $\delta \in[\underline{\delta}, 1]$, there is a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium in which the choices for the government and consumers are $t=\frac{R-1}{R}$ and $c=1$, respectively, which is given by point $C$ in Figure 7.3.

### 7.4 Folk Theorems with Perfect Monitoring

There are generally many equilibria in a repeated game. Intertemporal incentives allow for not only efficient outcomes, but also inefficient outcomes, as well as very unreasonable outcomes. In fact, repeated games allow virtually any payoff to be an equilibrium outcome. These results are referred to as "Folk Theorems" since they were believe to be true before they were formally proved.

There are different versions of Folk Theorems for repeated games, which can be clarified into two types of Folk Theorems. One type of Folk Theorems is the Folk Theorem for Nash equilibrium, which assesses that any feasible and strictly individually rational payoff profile can be supported in a Nash equilibrium of the repeated game provided players are sufficiently patient (i.e., with sufficiently large $\delta$ ). This is a weaker version of Folk Theorem since it is only for Nash equilibria.

Another type of Folk Theorems is Folk Theorems for SPE, which were first studied in Friedman (1971) using "Nash threats," which shows that
any feasible and strictly rational payoffs above the static Nash payoffs is a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium payoff profile of repeated game; and then comprehensively studied in Fudenberg and Maskin (1986), which assesses that for any feasible and individually rational payoff profile $v$, if players are sufficiently patient, then there is a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium with payoff $v$. Consequently, the theorems imply that efficient payoffs are consistent with equilibrium (then collective rationality can be consistent with individual rationality), so are many other payoffs and associated behaviors. Moreover, multiple equilibria may be consistent with the same payoff.

We first discuss the Folk Theorem for Nash equilibrium.

Theorem 7.4.1 (Nash Folk Theorem) Suppose that $\boldsymbol{v}$ is a feasible and strictly individually rational payoff profile. Then, there exists $\underline{\delta}<1$ such that for any $\delta \in[\underline{\delta}, 1)$, there is a Nash equilibrium of repeated game with payoff profile $\boldsymbol{v}$.

Proof. Suppose that there is a pure action profile $\boldsymbol{a}$ such that $u_{i}(\boldsymbol{a})=v_{i}$. Consider the following strategy for each player $i$ :

1. Cooperation Phase: Play $a_{i}$ in period 0 and continue to play $a_{i}$ as long as (i) the realized action profile in the previous period was $\boldsymbol{a}$, or (ii) the realized action in the previous period differed from $\boldsymbol{a}$ in two or more components.
2. Punishment Phase: If in some previous period player $i$ was the only one not to follow profile $a$, then in each period, each player $j$ plays her component of a mixed strategy that makes player $i$ attain his minmax payoff $\underline{v}_{i}$.

Only behavior in the Cooperation Phase that corresponds to $t=0$ and (i) need to satisfy incentives; the other histories are off the equilibrium. We now show that incentives are indeed satisfied.

In the period in which player $i$ deviates, the player receives at most $\max _{a_{i}^{\prime}} u_{i}\left(a_{i}^{\prime}, \boldsymbol{a}_{-i}\right)$ and since his opponents will minimax him forever after, he will obtain $\underline{v}_{i}$ in all periods thereafter. Thus, if player $i$ deviates in period
$t$, the continuation payoff he can obtain is at most

$$
(1-\delta) \max _{a_{i}^{\prime}} u_{i}\left(a_{i}^{\prime}, \boldsymbol{a}_{-i}\right)+\delta \underline{v}_{i}
$$

Then, when $\delta \rightarrow 1$, this strategy profile a is a Nash equilibrium since

$$
(1-\delta) \max _{a_{i}^{\prime}} u_{i}\left(a_{i}^{\prime}, \boldsymbol{a}_{-i}\right)+\delta \underline{v}_{i}<v_{i}
$$

Thus, there exists a $\underline{\delta}$ such that for any $\delta \in[\underline{\delta}, 1)$, this strategy profile is a Nash equilibrium.

If there is no such pure strategy profile $\boldsymbol{a}$, such that $u_{i}(\boldsymbol{a})=v_{i}$, a public correlation device can be introduced. Let $W$ be the set of public states (i.e., everyone observes it). Let $p$ be a probability distribution on $W$, such that $\sum_{w \in W} u_{i}\left(a_{i}(w)\right) p(w)=v_{i}$. Then, the pure action profile above, $\boldsymbol{a}$, can be replaced by the action profile $\boldsymbol{a}(w)_{w \in W}$ using the public correlation device that yields expected payoff profile $\boldsymbol{v}$. The punishment phase incentives are unaffected.

When $\delta \rightarrow 1$, we have

$$
(1-\delta) \max _{a_{i}^{\prime} \in A_{i}} u_{i}\left(a_{i}^{\prime}, \boldsymbol{a}_{-i}(w)\right)+\delta \underline{v}_{i}<v_{i}
$$

which shows that this strategy profile $\mathbf{a}(\cdot)$ is a Nash equilibrium.
Thus, Nash Folk Theorem states that essentially any payoff profile can be supposed as a Nash Equilibrium when players are patient enough. However, the corresponding strategies involve this non-forgiving punishments, which may be very costly for the punisher to carry out (i.e., they represen$t$ non-credible threats). This implies that the strategies used may not be subgame perfect.

Now we discuss the Folk Theorems for SPE. The simplest Folk Theorem for SPE was attributable to Friedman (1971).

Theorem 7.4.2 (Nash Threats Folk Theorem for SPE (Friedman, 1971)) Let $a^{*}$ be the Nash equilibrium of a stage game, and its equilibrium payoff profile be e. Let $F^{p}$ be the set of all feasible and individually rational profiles. Then, for any $\boldsymbol{v}^{\prime} \in\left\{\boldsymbol{v} \mid v_{i}>e_{i}, \boldsymbol{v} \in F^{p}\right\}$, there is $\underline{\delta}$, such that for all $\delta \in[\underline{\delta}, 1)$, there exists a
subgame perfect Nash equilibrium of the repeated game with payoff profile $\boldsymbol{v}^{\prime}$.
Proof. Suppose that there is a pure action profile $\boldsymbol{a}$, such that $u_{i}(\boldsymbol{a})=$ $v_{i}^{\prime}$. Consider the following strategy for each player $i$ :

1. Cooperation Phase: If $t=0$ or $t \geqq 1$ and $\boldsymbol{a}$ was played in every prior period, then player $i \in N$ still chooses $a_{i}$.
2. Punishment Phase: If any other action profile is played in any prior period, player $i$ plays $a_{i}^{*}$ for every subsequent period.

We show that this is a SPE. When $\delta \rightarrow 1$, this strategy profile a is a Nash equilibrium since

$$
(1-\delta) \max _{a_{i}^{\prime}} u_{i}\left(a_{i}^{\prime}, \boldsymbol{a}_{-i}\right)+\delta e_{i}<v_{i}^{\prime} .
$$

Thus, there exists a $\underline{\delta}$, such that for $\delta \in[\underline{\delta}, 1)$, this strategy profile is a Nash equilibrium. As for any subgame off the equilibrium path, $\boldsymbol{a}$ is always a Nash equilibrium, and this equilibrium is naturally a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium. The case in which there is no action profile such that $u_{i}(\boldsymbol{a})=v_{i}^{\prime}$ is tackled as in the previous theorem.

The set of payoffs supportable in SPE by Nash threats is generally less than the set of feasible and strictly individually rational payoffs that are supportable in Nash equilibrium. Consequently, some payoff profiles that can be realized in Nash equilibrium of the repeated game cannot be supported by Nash threats. Excises in the chapter give such examples.

For a more general Folk Theorem, it is only required that each player's payoff is greater than the minmax payoff, and is not necessarily greater than the equilibrium payoff of the stage game. Next, we prove this Folk Theorem for two players first, and then prove it in a more general situation.

Theorem 7.4.3 (Subgame Perfect Folk Theorem for Two Players) Suppose that $n=2$. For any feasible and individually rational payoff profile $v \in F^{p}$, there always exists $\underline{\delta}$, such that for any $\delta \in[\underline{\delta}, 1)$, there is a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium of repeated game with payoff profile $\boldsymbol{v}$.

Proof. Suppose that there is a pure action profile $\tilde{\boldsymbol{a}}$, such that $u_{i}(\tilde{\boldsymbol{a}})=$ $v$. Let $M=\max _{\boldsymbol{a} \in A} u_{i}(\boldsymbol{a})<\infty$. Define a mutually punishing strategy $\hat{\boldsymbol{a}}=\left(a_{i}^{j}, a_{j}^{i}\right), i \neq j$ by

$$
u_{i}\left(\hat{a}_{i}^{i}, \hat{\boldsymbol{a}}_{-i}^{i}\right)=\min _{\boldsymbol{a}_{-i}} \max _{a_{i}} u_{i}\left(a_{i}, \boldsymbol{a}_{-i}\right)=\underline{v}_{i}^{p}
$$

which is the minmax strategy for both players. Note that $u_{i}(\hat{\boldsymbol{a}}) \leqq \underline{v}_{i}^{p}$. Consider the following strategy: players choose $\boldsymbol{a}(0)=\tilde{\boldsymbol{a}}$. If in previous stages both players choose $\boldsymbol{a}(0)$, they choose $\boldsymbol{a}(0)$ in this stage, as well; however, if in the last stage a player has deviated from $\boldsymbol{a}(0)$, a punishment process that lasts $L$ periods begins at this stage. During the punishment process, players choose $\hat{\boldsymbol{a}}$.

Meanwhile, if some player deviates from $\hat{\boldsymbol{a}}$, from the next stage onwards a new punishment process that lasts $L$ periods starts again. If during the punishment process both players choose $\hat{\boldsymbol{a}}$, it returns to the initial choice $\boldsymbol{a}(0)$ when the punishment process is over. This strategy can be expressed as the following automaton.

The state set of the automaton is $\Omega=\{w(l): l=0, \cdots, L\}$, and the initial state is $\omega^{0}=w(0)$. The strategy action function is

$$
f(w(l))= \begin{cases}\tilde{\boldsymbol{a}}, & \text { if } l=0 \\ \hat{\boldsymbol{a}}, & \text { if } l=1,2, \cdots, L\end{cases}
$$

The state transition function is

$$
\tau(w(l), \boldsymbol{a})= \begin{cases}w(0), & \text { if } l=0, \boldsymbol{a}=\tilde{\boldsymbol{a}} \text { or } l=L, \boldsymbol{a}=\hat{\boldsymbol{a}} \\ w(l+1), & \text { if } 0<l<L, \boldsymbol{a}=\hat{\boldsymbol{a}} \\ w(1), & \text { otherwise }\end{cases}
$$

where $\hat{\boldsymbol{a}}=\left({\hat{a_{1}}}^{2},{\hat{a_{2}}}^{1}\right)$.

Let $L$ such that

$$
\begin{equation*}
L \min _{i}\left(u_{i}(\tilde{\boldsymbol{a}})-u_{i}(\hat{\boldsymbol{a}})\right)>M-\min _{i} u_{i}(\tilde{\boldsymbol{a}}) \tag{7.4.11}
\end{equation*}
$$

When $\delta$ is sufficiently large (i.e., $\delta \rightarrow 1$ ), we have

$$
\begin{equation*}
u_{i}(\tilde{\boldsymbol{a}}) \geqq(1-\delta) M+\delta v_{i}^{*} \tag{7.4.12}
\end{equation*}
$$

where $v_{i}^{*}=\left(1-\delta^{L}\right) u_{i}(\hat{\boldsymbol{a}})+\delta^{L} u_{i}(\tilde{\boldsymbol{a}})$. Substituting $v_{i}^{*}$ into inequality (7.4.12), we have:

$$
\left(1-\delta^{L+1}\right) u_{i}(\tilde{\boldsymbol{a}}) \geqq(1-\delta) M+\delta\left(1-\delta^{L}\right) u_{i}(\hat{\boldsymbol{a}})
$$

Dividing both sides of the inequality by $(1-\delta)$, we have

$$
\begin{equation*}
\sum_{t=0}^{L} \delta^{t} u_{i}(\tilde{\boldsymbol{a}}) \geqq M+\sum_{t=0}^{L-1} \delta^{t} u_{i}(\hat{\boldsymbol{a}}) \tag{7.4.13}
\end{equation*}
$$

Obviously, when (7.4.12) holds, (7.4.13) holds, as well. In other words, there exists a $\underline{\delta}$, such that for $\delta \in[\underline{\delta}, 1)$, (7.4.13) holds. Consequently, the strategy generated by this automaton is a Nash equilibrium. If the deviation is profitable during the punishment stage off the equilibrium path, it will also be profitable under $w(1)$. This is because in the punishment stage, deviation from the first stage is more profitable than deviation in later stages. If there is no deviation under $w(1)$, the payoff is $v_{i}^{*}$; if there is a deviation, the player obtains a payoff in the current stage which is no more than $\underline{v}_{i}^{p}<v_{i}^{*}$ (since the other player chooses the minmax action) and a continuation payoff $v_{i}^{*}$. Consequently, deviation cannot increase the player's payoff. Therefore, the above strategy is a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium.

If there does not exist such a pure action profile $\tilde{\boldsymbol{a}}$, such that $u_{i}(\tilde{\boldsymbol{a}})=v$, by the payoff structure, there exists a mixed action $\alpha$ that assigns probability $\boldsymbol{\alpha}(\boldsymbol{a})$ to the pure action profile $\boldsymbol{a}$, such that $\sum_{a \in A} u_{i}(\boldsymbol{a}) \boldsymbol{\alpha}(\boldsymbol{a})=v_{i}$ for all $i$. Then, we can use a public correlation device to describe the strategy using an automaton $\left(\Omega, \mu^{0}, f, \tau\right)$, where $\Omega=\left\{w^{a}\right\}_{\boldsymbol{a} \in A} \cup\{w(l), l=1, \cdots, L\}, \mu^{0}$ is the probability distribution induced by $\boldsymbol{\alpha}$ on $\left\{w^{a}: \boldsymbol{a} \in A\right\}$,

$$
f(w)= \begin{cases}\boldsymbol{a}, & \text { if } w=w^{a} \\ \hat{\boldsymbol{a}}, & \text { if } w=w(l) \text { for } l=1, \cdots, L\end{cases}
$$

and

$$
\tau\left(w, \boldsymbol{a}^{\prime}\right)= \begin{cases}\boldsymbol{\alpha}, & \text { if } w=w^{\boldsymbol{a}}, \boldsymbol{a}^{\prime}=\boldsymbol{a} \text { or } w=w(L), \boldsymbol{a}^{\prime}=\hat{\boldsymbol{a}} \\ w(l+1), & \text { if } w=w(l) \text { for } 0<l<L, \boldsymbol{a}^{\prime}=\hat{\boldsymbol{a}} \\ w(1), & \text { otherwise. }\end{cases}
$$

After replacing $w(0)$ by $\left\{w^{a}\right\}_{\boldsymbol{a} \in A}$, and the initial state $w^{0}$ by $\mu^{0}$, the remainder of the proof is similar to the previous one and is thus omitted.

The intuitive meaning of the Folk Theorem is that if a player is sufficiently patient, the increase in payoff from a one-shot deviation in any stage game will be offset by the loss in payoff from the punishment stage in the future. In other words, the penalty concerning future payoff exceeds what a player can currently obtain by a deviation. Therefore, players have no incentive to deviate from the equilibrium.

In the previous proof, the punishment that is employed to guarantee no deviation from the equilibrium path applies to all players. However, in repeated games with more than two players, the punishment is aimed at the player who deviated most recently.

To describe this idea, we now state a more general Folk Theorem based on the classic paper by Fudenberg and Maskin (1986). In the proof, three stages were introduced. The first stage is equilibrium path; the second is the punishment stage, in which the player who deviated most recently is punished; and the last stage is the one in which players who carried out the punishments required by the equilibrium are rewarded.

Theorem 7.4.4 (Fudenberg-Maskin Subgame Perfect Folk Theorem) Suppose that the dimension of feasible and individually rational payoff set $F V^{*}$ equals the number of players (which is also called the full dimensionality). Then, for any $\boldsymbol{v} \in F V^{*}$, there exists a $\underline{\delta}$, such that for arbitrary $\delta \in[\underline{\delta}, 1)$, there is a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium with payoff profile $\boldsymbol{v}$.

Proof. Here, we only consider the case of pure strategies both on and off the equilibrium path. In particular, we assume that there exists $\boldsymbol{a}$, such that the payoff $u(\boldsymbol{a})=\boldsymbol{v}$ holds. The case of mixed strategies and the case in
which a public correlation device exists can be analyzed similarly; we refer the reader to Fudenberg and Maskin (1986) for details.

Their proof imposes a condition about feasible and individually rational payoffs, i.e., a full dimensionality requirement is imposed on the feasible and individually rational payoff set. This means that for arbitrary $\boldsymbol{v} \in F V^{*}$, when $\underline{v}_{i}<v_{i}^{\prime}<v_{i}$ for any $i \in N$, we can find $\varepsilon>0$, such that the payoff $\boldsymbol{v}^{\prime}(i)=\left(v_{1}^{\prime}+\varepsilon, \cdots, v_{i-1}^{\prime}+\varepsilon, v_{i}^{\prime}, v_{i+1}^{\prime}+\varepsilon, \cdots, v_{n}^{\prime}+\varepsilon\right)$ is in $F V^{*}$ for each $i$. Note that if $v$ is on the lower boundary of the feasible and individually rational set, we can construct the points differently following Abreu, Dutta and Smith (1994).

To avoid introducing a public correlation device, we assume that for any $i \in N$, there is a pure action profile $\boldsymbol{a}(i)$, such that $u(\boldsymbol{a}(i))=v_{i}^{\prime}$. Let $w_{i}^{j}=u_{i}\left(m^{j}\right)$, where $m^{j}$ is a minmax strategy profile for player $j$ : it gives $j$ the minmax payoff when $j$ is making a best response:

$$
\max _{a_{j}} u_{j}\left(m_{-j}^{j}, a_{j}\right)=u_{j}\left(m^{j}\right)=\underline{v}_{j} .
$$

Furthermore, assume that for each $j$, the action profile $m^{j}$ is pure. Finally, pick a natural number $k$ satisfying

$$
k>\frac{\max _{\boldsymbol{a} \in A} u_{i}(\boldsymbol{a})-v_{i}^{\prime}}{v_{i}^{\prime}-\underline{v}_{i}} \forall i .
$$

Such a number $k$ exists because, by construction, both the numerator and denominator of the fraction above are strictly positive.

Consider the following strategy profile. Interaction starts at stage I : in stage I, players choose $\boldsymbol{a}$, such that $u(\boldsymbol{a})=v$. If only player $j$ deviates from the strategy profile, the interaction enters stage $\mathrm{II}_{j}$; whereas, in other situations (e.g., more than one player deviates, or no player deviates) the interaction remains in stage I.

Stage $\mathrm{II}_{j}$ : players choose $m^{j}$. If no one deviates or more than one player deviates from $m^{j}$, stage $\mathrm{II}_{j}$ lasts for $k$ periods, followed by stage $\mathrm{III}_{j}$. In stage $\mathrm{II}_{j}$, if only one player $i \in N$ deviates from $m^{j}$, the interaction enters $\mathrm{II}_{i}$. Note that the construction of stage $\mathrm{II}_{j}$ makes sense only if $m^{j}$ is a pure strategy. We will discuss the case of a mixed strategy below. Stage $\mathrm{II}_{j}$ can
be regarded as the punishing stage for player $j$.
Stage $\mathrm{III}_{j}$ : players choose strategy profile $\boldsymbol{a}(j)$ all the time unless some player deviates from $\boldsymbol{a}(j)$ unilaterally. If there is some player $i \in N$ that deviates from this strategy, it enters stage $\mathrm{II}_{i}$ starting from the next period.

Next, we prove that this strategy profile is a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium. We only need to prove that in each subgame, no one deviates unilaterally.

In stage I, if player $i$ deviates, the payoff that the player can obtain is no more than

$$
(1-\delta) \max _{\boldsymbol{a} \in A} u_{i}(\boldsymbol{a})+\delta\left(1-\delta^{k}\right) \underline{v}_{i}+\delta^{k+1} v_{i}^{\prime}
$$

Obviously, when $\delta \rightarrow 1$, the best deviation payoff above converges to $v_{i}^{\prime}$, which is strictly less than the payoff $v_{i}$ of following the equilibrium path. Therefore, no player $i$ has a profitable one-shot deviation in this stage.

In stage $\mathrm{III}_{j}$, by following the strategy constructed above, player $i \neq j$ receives a payoff $v_{i}^{\prime}+\varepsilon$. If the player deviates from it, the payoff is at most

$$
(1-\delta) \max _{\boldsymbol{a} \in A} u_{i}(\boldsymbol{a})+\delta\left(1-\delta^{k}\right) \underline{v}_{i}+\delta^{k+1} v_{i}^{\prime}
$$

Obviously, when $\delta \rightarrow 1$, this converges to $v_{i}^{\prime}$, which is strictly less than the payoff $v_{i}^{\prime}+\varepsilon$. Thus, player $i$ does not have a profitable one-shot deviation in this stage. In stage $\mathrm{III}_{i}$, to ensure that there is no profitable one-shot deviation for player $i$, it suffices to show that

$$
(1-\delta) \max _{\boldsymbol{a} \in A} u_{i}(\boldsymbol{a})+\delta\left(1-\delta^{k}\right) \underline{v}_{i}+\delta^{k+1} v_{i}^{\prime}<v_{i}^{\prime}
$$

Rearranging and dividing by the factor $(1-\delta)$, this inequality becomes

$$
\max _{\boldsymbol{a} \in A} u_{i}(\boldsymbol{a})+\delta\left(\sum_{\tau=0}^{k-1} \delta^{\tau}\right) \underline{v}_{i}<\left(\sum_{\tau=0}^{k-1} \delta^{\tau}\right) v_{i}^{\prime}
$$

As $\delta \rightarrow 1$, this last inequality clearly reduces to the same inequality that was used to choose $k$.

In stage $\mathrm{II}_{j}$, consider player $i \neq j$. When $k^{t} \leqq k$ periods of this stage are
left, the payoff is

$$
\left(1-\delta^{k^{t}}\right) w_{i}^{j}+\delta^{k^{t}}\left(v_{i}^{\prime}+\varepsilon\right)
$$

If deviating unilaterally, the player receives the minmax payoff for the next $k$ periods, and then the game enters stage $\mathrm{III}_{i}$; thus, the payoff from deviation is no more than

$$
(1-\delta) \max _{a \in A} u_{i}(\boldsymbol{a})+\delta\left(1-\delta^{k}\right) \underline{v}_{i}+\delta^{k+1} v_{i}^{\prime} .
$$

When $\delta \rightarrow 1$, this payoff converges to $v_{i}^{\prime}$, while the payoff from not deviating converges to the strictly higher value $v_{i}^{\prime}+\varepsilon$. In stage $\mathrm{I}_{i}$, consider player $i$. When $k^{t} \leqq k$ periods are still left, if the player follows the equilibrium strategy, the payoff is

$$
q_{i}\left(k^{t}\right)=\left(1-\delta^{k^{t}}\right) \underline{v}_{i}+\delta^{k^{t}} v_{i}^{\prime} ;
$$

otherwise, the payoff is

$$
q_{i}(k)=\left(1-\delta^{k}\right) \underline{v}_{i}+\delta^{k} v_{i}^{\prime} .
$$

Obviously, $v_{i}^{\prime}>\underline{v}_{i}$ and $k^{t} \leqq k$ imply that $q_{i}\left(k^{t}\right) \geqq q_{i}(k)$ (i.e., it is not profitable to restart one's own punishment).

As a consequence, no player $i$ has a profitable one-shot deviation from the constructed three-phase strategy profile, which is therefore a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium.

For mixed strategies, the discussion is more complex, and details can be found in Fudenberg and Maskin (1986).

A popular explanation of the Folk Theorem is that as long as individuals are sufficiently patient, an arbitrary outcome in which the utility of each player exceeds the individually rational level can be obtained in a Nash equilibrium. This result with an infinite number of equilibria is considered as being negative for repeated games because if a theorem contains all possible outcomes. However, this constitutes a misunderstanding. Folk Theorems provide a highly profound explanation for the crucial importance of
a long-term institutional environment, such as culture and social norms, so that different (good or bad) environments will lead to different (good or bad) outcomes.

Firstly, research on long-run relationships can assist us to understand opportunistic behavior among individuals' and how institutions respond to them. In different institutional environments, including different cultures, habits, social norms, etc., individuals behave differently in long-run relationships. If a theory can ignore the institutional environment and obtain an explicit and a unique result, it is not necessarily a good theory since different institutional details tend to determine different equilibrium outcomes of long-run interactions. Secondly, regarding the Folk Theorem as a reference system, many theorists focus on conditions that invalidate this theorem. If individuals are not patient enough, or the identification of opportunism is not very accurate, or some players only interact in the short run, how would these changed conditions affect individuals' behavior in the long run? We discuss these factors in the following section.

### 7.5 Some Variations of Repeated Games

In the above discussion of repeated games, we assumed that players and action sets are the same in every period. Now, we introduce three examples to examine three variations-the case with short-run players, the case with entry and exit of players, and the case of social norms that constrain the behaviour of players.

### 7.5.1 Long-Run Players and Short-Run Players

In some multi-period interactions, players in different stage games may be different. For example, a seller meets different customers in different periods. In such a game, players can be divided into two categories: long-run players and short-run players. A short-run player only takes part in one round of play, and thus his goal is to maximize short-run payoff. However, a long-run player's goal is the aggregate payoff over periods, and thus she aims at long-run payoff maximization.

Let $i \in\{1,2, \cdots, L\}$ be a long-run player, and $j \in\{L+1, L+2, \cdots, n\}$ be a short-run player.

Let $B: \prod_{i=1}^{L} \Delta A_{i} \rightarrow \prod_{j=L+1}^{n} \Delta A_{j}$ be the best response of short-run players to the (mixed) strategy of long-run players. Based on this, the minmax payoff $\underline{v_{i}}$ of long-run player $i$ needs to be redefined as:

$$
\underline{v}_{i}=\min _{\boldsymbol{\alpha} \in \operatorname{graph}(B)} \max _{a_{i}} u_{i}\left(a_{i}, \boldsymbol{\alpha}_{-i}\right),
$$

where $\operatorname{graph}(B) \subseteq \prod_{i=1}^{n} \Delta A_{i}$ is the corresponding graph of $B$, which satisfies the following: for $j>L, \alpha_{j}\left(\boldsymbol{\alpha}_{-j}\right)=\operatorname{argmax}_{a_{j}} u_{j}\left(a_{j}, \boldsymbol{\alpha}_{-j}\right)$. However, in the situation with short-run players, there exists an upper bound in the repeated game that constrains the feasible and individually rational payoffs of long-run players. Define

$$
\bar{v}_{i}=\max _{\alpha \in \operatorname{graph}(B)} \min _{a_{i} \in \operatorname{support}\left(\alpha_{i}\right)} u_{i}\left(a_{i}, \boldsymbol{\alpha}_{-i}\right),
$$

in which support $\left(\alpha_{i}\right)$ denotes that those pure actions $a_{i}$ have strictly positive probability in the mixed action $\alpha_{i}$ of player $i$.

Example 7.5.1 (Short-Run Players and Long-Run Players) Consider a repeated game with short-run players. Player 1 (row) comprises a single long-run player, and player 2 (column) comprises a sequence of short-run players, each of whom interacts with the long-run player in only one period. In other words, the discount factor of player 2 is 0 . The two-player stage game is represented in Table 7.7.

$$
\begin{array}{r}
\operatorname{graph}(B)=\left\{\left(\alpha_{1}^{T}, L\right): \alpha_{1}^{T} \geqq 2 / 3\right\} \cup\left\{\left(\alpha_{1}^{T}, R\right): 1 / 3 \leqq \alpha_{1}^{T} \leqq 2 / 3\right\} \\
\cup\left\{\left(\alpha_{1}^{T}, C\right): \alpha_{1}^{T} \leqq 1 / 3\right\},
\end{array}
$$

in which $\alpha_{1}^{T}$ is the probability with which the long-run player 1 chooses $T$. We obtain $\underline{v}_{1}=1$ and $\bar{v}_{1}=6$.

In this game, the minmax payoff of the long-run player is 1 , which equals the player's payoff from the Nash equilibrium $(T, L)$ of the stage game; meanwhile, the upper bound of payoff 6 is equal to the payoff of player 1 when the (mixed) Nash equilibrium $(0.5, R)$ is played in the stage

|  | Player 2 |  |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  |  | $L$ |  |  |
| Player 1 | $B$ | $C$ | $R$ |  |
| 1,3 | 0,0 | 6,2 |  |  |
| 0,0 | 2,3 | 6,2 |  |  |

Table 7.7: Interaction between long-run player and short-run player.
game. Therefore, in this example, for player 1 the payoff is $v_{1} \in(1,6)$, and we can construct a public correlation device. For example, let the space $W$ be $\left\{w_{1}, w_{2}\right\}$, and let $p=\operatorname{prob}\left(w=w_{1}\right)$ and $1-p=\operatorname{prob}\left(w=w_{2}\right)$, such that $p+6(1-p)=v_{1}$. We construct the following strategy profile: under $w_{1}$, players choose $(T, L)$; under $w_{2}$, they choose $(0.5, R)$. If player 2 observed that player 1 deviated from this strategy in previous stages (by not choosing $T$ after $w_{1}$ ), they play ( $T, L$ ) henceforth. For player 1, there is a lower bound of time discount factor $\underline{\delta}$, such that when $\delta \in[\underline{\delta}, 1$ ), the above strategy is a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium where the payoff of player 1 is $v_{1}$.

In a more general situation, Fudenberg, Kreps and Maskin (1990) and Fudenberg and Levine (1994) proved the Folk Theorem for games with short-run and long-run players.

Theorem 7.5.1 (Folk Theorem on Long-Run and Short-Run Players) Let the dimension of the payoff space for the long-run players equal the number of longrun players L. If payoff profile $\boldsymbol{v}=\left(v_{1}, \cdots, v_{L}\right)$ of the long-run players satisfies $\underline{v_{i}}<v_{i}<\overline{v_{i}}, i \in\{1,2, \cdots, L\}$, then there exists a lower bound of the time discount factor, $\underline{\delta}$, such that for any $\delta \in[\underline{\delta}, 1)$, there is a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium of the repeated game in which the payoff profile of the long-run players is $\boldsymbol{v}$.

### 7.5.2 Overlapping Generations Games

Some interaction involves players entering or exiting the game, and there is some time limit for everyone to interact with others. In this situation, no player interacts with others forever, and different types of players face different periods of interaction. In reality, such examples are very common, especially in organizations. In fact, most members in an organization
will face retirement, and new ones will join. For different members, the time that they stay in the organization is different, and their career expectations are also dissimilar. This situation is called a repeated game with overlapping generations of finite-lived players. Next, we use an example (Cremer, 1986) to explore interactions and incentives of such individuals.

Consider an organization in which every one stays for $T$ years (which can be regarded as age at retirement). For simplicity, assume that in this organization, the measure of individuals with different ages is 1 . In every period, there is 1 member (length of service is $T$ ) retiring and a new member joining (length of service is 1 ). Every member who stays in the organization for the next period increases the member's length of service by 1 . Consider the cooperative interactions between members. Everyone can choose to work hard or to be lazy, and the individual cost of working hard is 1 . The output of the organization is determined by the number of members who choose to work hard. At the same time, each member gets the same proportion of output (i.e., there is a possibility of free-riding).

Assume that, except player $i$, the number of the players who choose to work hard is $k$. Let $s$ be the output efficiency of working hard and assume $1<s<T$. If player $i$ chooses to work hard, the player's utility is $\frac{s(k+1)}{T}-1$; otherwise, it is $\frac{s k}{T}$. Obviously, if the interaction lasts for only one period, all rational players choose to be lazy. However, the outcome is completely different in a repeated game. For simplicity, assume that the discount factor is $\delta=1$. Next, we consider the incentives of members in the organization.

Obviously, the player who has length of service $T$ stays in the organization only for the last period. Therefore, she has no incentive to work hard. Consider the following strategy profile for organization (players): the players that have length of service $T$ choose to be lazy; if no one whose length of service is not $T$ has ever chosen to be lazy, then these players choose to work hard; if someone whose length of service is not $T$ has ever chosen to be lazy, then all players choose to be lazy. In the following, we prove that this strategy is a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium.

Firstly, for players whose length of service is $T$, to be lazy is a dominant strategy. Then, consider the incentive of players who have length of service $T-1$. Assume that all other players follow the above strategy profile.

If only one player chooses to be lazy, the player's payoff is $\frac{s(T-2)}{T}$ in the current period and 0 in the next period. The total payoff is $\frac{s(T-2)}{T}$; if the player chooses to work hard, the player's payoff is $\frac{s(T-1)}{T}-1$ in this period and $\frac{s(T-1)}{T}$ in the next period. The total payoff $2 \frac{s(T-1)}{T}-1>\frac{s(T-2)}{T}$ since $s>1$. As a consequence, for a player with length of service $T-1$, there is no incentive to deviate unilaterally.

We consider the player whose length of service is $T-k$, in which $k \in$ $1,2, \cdots, T-1$. If the player deviates from this strategy, the player's payoff is $\frac{s(T-2)}{T}$ in current period and 0 for the next period. Her total payoff is $\frac{s(T-2)}{T}$. If this player follows the strategy, the player's payoff is $k \frac{s(T-1)}{T}-$ $(k-1)>\frac{s(T-2)}{T}$. Thus, the player with length of service $T-k$ does not deviate from the strategy profile, as well. In addition, off the equilibrium path where some players whose length of service is not $T$ choose to be lazy, the strategy profile is that everyone chooses to be lazy forever afterwards. This is exactly a Nash equilibrium in the stage game from which no player will deviate unilaterally. Therefore, the above strategy profile is a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium.

Of course, it is not necessary to restrict attention to $\delta=1$. In the above inference, we can find a lower bound $\underline{\delta}$ for time discount factor, such that when $\delta \in(\underline{\delta}, 1]$, the above strategy profile is still a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium.

### 7.5.3 Community Constraints and Social Norms

In many repeated games, players interact randomly. For example, people encounter different opponents at different times when they purchase something. As a result, punishment cannot be implemented by the participant who loses from a deviation, but by other participants. Also, punishment in many situations is costly. Then, other mechanisms are needed to constrain the punishment process. Here, we focus on discussing the constraining mechanism of social norms.

Assume that society consists of an even number $M$ of players. In each period, each player randomly interacts with one of the other players by choosing "cooperation" or "non-cooperation", and the payoff of the
stage game is given in Table 7.8. If $M$ is sufficiently large, the probability that anyone encounters the previous opponent is quite small. How can we stimulate individuals to cooperate with others in such a situation? Social norms are a general way to achieve this. Social norms consist of two elements: a renewal function of individual social labels, and strategies dependent on the label. A renewal function of individual social labels is a transition function for labels. When the labels of player $i$ and the opponent are $x$ and $z$, respectively, and player $i$ chooses $a_{i}$, the (updated) social label in the next period is $\tau_{i}\left(x, z, a_{i}\right)$. A social label dependent strategy $\sigma_{i}(x, z)$ denotes the strategy of player $i$ when the social labels of player $i$ and the opponent are $x, z$, respectively.

> |  | player 2 |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  |  | $\begin{array}{c}\text { player 1 } \\ \end{array}$ |  |
|  | $C$ | 4,4 | 0,5 |
|  | $D$ | 5,0 | 1,1 |

Table 7.8: Social Norm.
Consider the social norm below, with the set of social labels being $\{G, B\}$ :

$$
\begin{gathered}
\tau_{i}\left(x, z, a_{i}\right)= \begin{cases}G, & \text { if }\left(x, z, a_{i}\right)=(G, G, C) \text { or }(G, B, D), \\
B, & \text { otherwise. }\end{cases} \\
\sigma_{i}(x, z)= \begin{cases}C, & \text { if } x=z=G, \\
D, & \text { otherwise } .\end{cases}
\end{gathered}
$$

In the above, the definitions of social label and social label dependent strategy are quite intuitive: we can regard individuals who have social label $G$ as a "good person" and those who have $B$ as a "bad person". If a person with the label "good person" faces another one with the label "good person", choosing cooperation ( $C$ ) maintains the person's social label as a "good person" ; if his rival is a "bad person", choosing noncooperation ( $D$ ) keeps the person a "good person" ; in any other case, his social label becomes a "bad person". In other words, the social norm requires that to be a good person one should cooperate if one encounters another good person, but not if one encounters a bad one; otherwise, under
social norms, the social label for this person is a "bad person" . For a bad person, the social norm always regards him as a bad person, which is similar to the grim strategy in that there is no forgiveness. We shall show that when $\delta \rightarrow 1$, no matter how large $M$ is, the social norm described above is a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium.

Suppose that at the initial state the social label of every one is $G$. First, we prove that on the equilibrium path, no player deviates unilaterally. If a player deviates, the discounted payoff is $5(1-\delta)+\delta$; if the player follows the equilibrium path, the player's discounted payoff is 4 . As long as $\delta>1 / 4$, no player deviates unilaterally.

Next, consider a situation off the equilibrium path. Assume that the proportion of individuals with social labels $G$ and $B$ are $\alpha>0$ and $1-\alpha$, respectively. Let $V(G)$ and $V(B)$ denote the equilibrium utilities of players with social label $G$ and $B$, respectively, prior to knowing the type of the current opponent.

For the individual with social label $B$, since $(D, D)$ is the Nash equilibrium in a stage game, his optimal choice is $D$ given that all others follow the above social norms.

For the individual with social label $G$, when encountering an opponent with social label $B$, following the social norm gives the expected payoff ( $1-$ $\delta)+\delta V(G)$; if the individual does not follow the social norm, his expected payoff is $0+\delta V(B)$. When encountering an opponent with social label $G$, if the individual follows the social norm, the expected payoff is $4(1-\delta)+$ $\delta V(G)$; whereas, the expected payoff is $5(1-\delta)+\delta V(B)$ if she deviates from the norm. Clearly, $V(B)=1$. Therefore, we have $V(G)=(1-\delta)[\alpha 4+$ $(1-\alpha)]+\delta V(G)$, which yields $V(G)=1+3 \alpha>V(B)$.

Therefore, off the equilibrium path, an individual with label $G$ will follow social norms when the individual meets an opponent with label $B$, since $(1-\delta)+\delta V(G)>0+\delta V(B)$. When the individual's opponent has social label $G$, she strictly prefers to follow the social norm if

$$
4(1-\delta)+\delta V(G)=4(1-\delta)+\delta(1+3 \alpha)>5(1-\delta)+\delta V(B)=5-4 \delta,
$$

which is equivalent to $\delta>\underline{\delta}=\frac{1}{1+3 \alpha}$. Thus, as long as $\alpha>0$, no matter
what the distribution of good persons and bad persons is initially, the above norm is always a subgame Nash equilibrium as $\delta \rightarrow 1$.

In the above proof, we find that when the discount factor $\delta$ of a player is not very large, the greater is the proportion of "bad people" in society, the lower will be the effectiveness of social norms; especially, in a society replete with deceit and dishonesty, even if the discount factor is close to one, if a person chooses to be honest, his interest will be harmed. This is because the lower bound of the discount factor that guarantees upholding the social norm is $\underline{\delta} \equiv \frac{1}{1+3 \alpha}$, and this is increasing with a smaller $\alpha$. When $\alpha<\frac{1-\delta}{3 \delta}$, the above social norm is no longer a Nash equilibrium (i.e., the social norm will collapse. As such, both dishonesty and honesty can be Nash equilibria). The determinant factor is which equilibrium is in the majority. In the development of a society, there are various kinds of traps. In addition to resource endowment, social culture, which takes trust as a key element, has become a crucial constraining factor.

The long-run interaction of players discussed in this section is based on the extreme assumption that the previous behaviors of players will be accurately identified by themselves and their opponents. Correspondingly, in order to maintain cooperation among players, an important mechanism is punishment. In general, we can obtain the following conclusion: the more severe is the punishment for deviating from cooperative behavior, the easier it is for players to maintain cooperation. Some extreme punishment approaches, such as the grim strategy, play an important role in this kind of repeated game.

However, once we relax the perfect observation of players' behavior histories, many conclusions may need to be revised. For example, in the presence of observation errors, extreme punishment often destroys cooperation, and if minor disturbances occur, long-run cooperation between players will vanish. The example of imperfect public monitoring to be discussed in the next section illustrates this point. Under the punishment mode of grim strategy, all individuals choose to be lazy, while under the relatively loose punishment mode, they choose to work hard. Therefore, when maintaining long-term cooperative relations, it is critical that
the mechanism offers forgiveness (to some extent) in addition to punishing opportunistic behavior. In many experiments, researchers also found that "tit for tat" is usually a more effective way to maintain cooperation than strategies such as the grim strategy.

### 7.6 Repeated Games with Imperfect Public Monitoring

The study of repeated games above assumes that players can observe all previous actions, which is a very strong assumption in real life. For many repeated interactions, individuals are unable to observe previous actions, but can only observe certain outcomes, the distribution of which depends on individuals' actions. In order to support the cooperation outcome, players can punish actions highly related to noncooperation outcomes, and thus indirectly punish opportunistic behavior, although they cannot directly impose punishments on players who deviate.

Repeated interactions that cannot be accurately observed can be further divided into two categories, according to the outcomes that players observe. One is that the outcomes observed by the players are public. For example, when firms cannot directly observe their opponents' previous pricing behaviors, it is possible to observe the aggregate demand in the market (e.g., industry reports issued by trade associations), and the size of aggregate demand depends on the pricing behaviors. The other is that the outcomes observed by players are private. For example, firms cannot observe the overall market demand, but can observe their own demands. This section focuses on the situation of publicly observable outcomes.

### 7.6.1 Basics of Repeated Games with Imperfect Public Monitoring

Compared to the model with perfect public monitoring discussed above, the model of repeated games with imperfect public monitoring differs primarily in the players' knowledge of histories.

### 7.6. REPEATED GAMES WITH IMPERFECT PUBLIC MONITORING 467

First, we discuss the structure of repeated games with imperfect public monitoring, in which the outcomes are publicly observable.

In the stage game, each player $i \in N \equiv\{1,2, \cdots, n\}$ chooses $a_{i}$ from action set $A_{i}$ simultaneously. Each action $a \in A \equiv \prod_{i} A_{i}$ generates a probability distribution on the outcome set $Y, \pi_{y}(a), y \in Y$, which represents the probability of outcome $y$ conditional on the action $a$. The realized payoff of player $i$ is $r_{i}\left(a_{i}, y\right)$, which means that the payoff does not directly depend on the actions of other players. Under action $a$, the expected utility of player $i$ in the stage game is $u_{i}(a)=\sum_{y} \pi_{y}(a) r_{i}\left(a_{i}, y\right)$.

In repeated games, the common information at the beginning of stage $t$ is $h^{t}=\left(y^{0}, y^{1}, \cdots, y^{t-1}\right)$, because no player's action is known to others, and each player has different information; specifically, player $i$ knows $z_{i}^{t}=$ $\left(a_{i}^{0}, a_{i}^{1}, \cdots, a_{i}^{t-1}\right)$, all previous own actions, at the stage $t$. In the stage $t$, the information of the player $i$ is $h_{i}^{t}=\left(h^{t}, z_{i}^{t}\right)$, the set of all possible information is $H_{i}^{t}$, and the strategy of players in the stage $t$ is $\sigma_{i}^{t}(\cdot): H_{i}^{t} \rightarrow \Delta A_{i}$.

A repeated game with perfect monitoring is a special case of repeated game with imperfect monitoring, in which the common information set is $h^{t}=\left(a^{0}, a^{1}, \cdots, a^{t-1}\right)$ (i.e., the publicly observable outcomes of previous actions of all players).

In repeated games with perfect monitoring, we employ the idea of dynamic programming, which means that the whole dynamic game is transformed into a sequence of normal form games (i.e., establishing a recursive structure to analyze repeated interactions among players). Similar recursive structures can be established in repeated games under imperfect monitoring. However, one of the important factors in the recursive structure is the existence of some factors that can coordinate the interaction of players. Therefore, the equilibrium solution of repeated games with imperfect monitoring is concentrated in public strategy equilibrium (i.e., the player's strategies rely only on public outcomes). Through public outcomes, the whole game can be converted into a sequence of (correlated) static decisions. In terms of private strategy, we will utilize examples to illustrate the differences between them.

Definition 7.6.1 (Public Strategy) Strategy $\sigma_{i}$ is a public strategy, if at any
stage $t$, for any common history $h^{t}$, and any two different private histories $z_{i}^{t}$ and $\tilde{z}_{i}^{t}$, we have $\sigma_{i}\left(h^{t}, z_{i}^{t}\right)=\sigma_{i}\left(h^{t}, \tilde{z}_{i}^{t}\right)$.

For public strategy, we have the following conclusion: if all players other than $i$ choose a public strategy, player $i$ can best respond with a public strategy. The logic behind this conclusion is simple: the rational behaviour of player $i$ depends on his belief of the behavior of other players, while the behavior of other players depends only on public outcomes; thus, player $i$ 's belief in the behavior of other players is independent of the private information of other players (i.e., their previous actions). Therefore, the player has a best response on the basis of public outcomes only.

Although not all pure strategies are public strategies, the choice of public strategies has a certain degree of universality. This is because for any pure strategy equilibrium $\sigma$, there is an equivalent public strategy equilibrium $\hat{\sigma}$. Two strategies $\sigma_{i}$ and $\hat{\sigma}_{i}$ are (outcome) equivalent for player $i$ means that for the strategies of other players $\sigma_{-i}$, the distributions of common outcomes induced by action profiles ( $\sigma_{i}, \sigma_{-i}$ ) and ( $\hat{\sigma}_{i}, \sigma_{-i}$ ) are the same. The following lemma reveals this idea.

Lemma 7.6.1 In the game with imperfect public monitoring, each pure strategy has an (outcome) equivalent pure public strategy.

Proof. Let $\sigma_{i}$ be the pure strategy of player $i$, and $a_{i}^{0}=\sigma_{i}(\varnothing)$ be the action in the first stage, where $\varnothing$ is the empty set. In the second stage, given the public outcome $y^{0}$, player $i$ chooses $a_{i}^{1}\left(y^{0}\right)=\sigma_{i}\left(y^{0}, a_{i}^{0}\right)=\sigma_{i}\left(y^{0}, \sigma_{i}(\varnothing)\right)$. The rest can be done in the same manner. In stage $t$, public history is $h^{t}=$ $\left(y^{0}, y^{1}, \cdots, y^{t-1}\right)$, and the history of player $i$ is

$$
a_{i}^{t}\left(h^{t}\right) \equiv \sigma_{i}\left(h^{t}, a_{i}^{0}, a_{i}^{1}\left(y^{0}\right), \cdots, a_{i}^{t-1}\left(h^{t-1}\right)\right) .
$$

Therefore, for any public outcome $h$, the pure strategy gives a probability of 1 to $\left(a^{0}, a^{1}\left(y^{0}\right), \cdots, a^{t}\left(h^{t}\right), \cdots\right)$. Therefore, pure strategy $\sigma_{i}$ is outcome equivalent to a public strategy of player $i$ (choosing $a_{i}^{t}\left(h^{t}\right)$ in stage $t$ ).

The logic behind this lemma is as follows: in a pure strategy equilibrium, each player perfectly anticipates the actions of other players. Player
$i$ chooses $a_{i}^{0}$ in stage 1 , and chooses $\sigma_{i}^{1}\left(a_{i}^{0}, y^{0}\right)$ in stage 2 . Since the action $a_{i}^{0}$ in stage 1 was previously determined, the dependence of the strategy in stage 2 on $a_{i}^{0}$ becomes redundant. We can replace the strategy $\sigma_{i}^{1}$ of player $i$ with the public strategy $\hat{\sigma}_{i}{ }^{1}\left(y^{0}\right)=\sigma_{i}^{1}\left(a_{i}^{0}, y^{0}\right)$, and then the public strategy of the other stage is constructed in a similar way.

On the basis of public outcomes, we can give concepts and tools similar to those in repeated games with perfect monitoring. First, under imperfect public monitoring, an automaton consists of the following elements: state set $\Omega$, initial state $\omega^{0}$, output function $f: \Omega \rightarrow \prod_{i} \Delta\left(A_{i}\right)$, and state transition function $\tau: \Omega \times Y \rightarrow \Omega$.

The second is the concept of equilibrium. When all individuals adopt public strategies, given public history $h^{t}$, they agree on the distribution of future actions and outcomes (common knowledge). Similar to repeated games with perfect monitoring, we can define the continuation payoffs of a given public history, the public strategy associated with the continuation payoffs, and discuss what kind of public strategy profile is a Nash Equilibrium after stage $t$. Since there is such a structure at every possible stage, the equilibrium discussed here is perfect public equilibrium.

Definition 7.6.2 (Perfect Public Equilibrium) A strategy $\boldsymbol{\sigma}=\left(\sigma_{i}\right)_{i \in N}$ or the automaton $\left(\Omega, \omega^{0}, f, \tau\right)$ is a perfect public equilibrium, if it satisfies the following two conditions:
(1) Each $\sigma_{i}$ is a public strategy.
(2) The strategy profile is a Nash equilibrium of the continuation game starting at any public history $h^{t}$.

Under imperfect public monitoring, subgame perfect equilibrium would not be restrictive. Starting from stage 2 of the game, the information set has no singleton information sets, and there is only one subgame in the repeated game. When players only adopt public strategies, the private information of the player's own actions will not have a direct impact on the strategy. Consequently, the perfect public strategy is an extension of subgame perfect equilibrium for repeated games with imperfect public monitoring.

There is also a similar profitable one-shot deviation principle for perfect public equilibrium. The one-shot deviation strategy means that for player $i$ 's public strategy $\sigma_{i}$ and another strategy $\hat{\sigma}_{i} \neq \sigma_{i}$, we have a unique public history $\tilde{h}^{t} \in Y^{t}$ with $\hat{\sigma}_{i}\left(\tilde{h}^{t}\right) \neq \sigma_{i}\left(\tilde{h}^{t}\right)$, and for other history $\tilde{h}^{\tau} \neq \tilde{h}^{t}$, we have $\hat{\sigma}_{i}\left(\tilde{h}^{\tau}\right)=\sigma_{i}\left(\tilde{h}^{\tau}\right)$. A profitable one-shot deviation refers to the fact that under such a deviation, the discounted payoff of player $i$ is higher. The following proposition shows the relationship between perfect public equilibrium with imperfect public monitoring and profitable one-shot deviation.

Proposition 7.6.1 A public strategy $\boldsymbol{\sigma}$ or the automaton $\left(\Omega, \omega^{0}, f, \tau\right)$ is a perfect public equilibrium if and only if there is no profitable one-shot deviation, i.e., for all public histories $h^{t} \in Y^{t}, \boldsymbol{\sigma}\left(h^{t}\right)$ is a Nash equilibrium of the normal-form game with the payoff:

$$
g_{i}(\boldsymbol{a})=(1-\delta) u_{i}(\boldsymbol{a})+\delta \sum_{y \in Y} U_{i}\left(\left.\boldsymbol{\sigma}\right|_{h^{t}, y}\right) \pi_{y}(\boldsymbol{a})
$$

where $U_{i}\left(\left.\boldsymbol{\sigma}\right|_{h^{t}, y}\right)$ is the (expected) continuation value of player $i$ under public history $h^{t}$ and public strategy $\sigma$ with outcome $y$.

The proof of this proposition is similar to the previous one, and thus omitted. By adopting the automaton representation for repeated games, the following equivalent formulation of a perfect public equilibrium can be obtained (the proof is similar to the previous one with perfect monitoring, and thus omitted).

Proposition 7.6.2 For the automaton $\left(\Omega, \omega^{0}, f, \tau\right)$, let $V_{i}(w)$ is the discounted payoff of player $i$ from state $w$. A public strategy $\boldsymbol{\sigma}$ is a perfect public equilibrium if and only if for any state $w \in \Omega$ that can be reached from the initial state $\omega^{0}$, $f(w)$ is an equilibrium of the following normal-form game with payoff:

$$
g_{i}(\boldsymbol{a})=(1-\delta) u_{i}(\boldsymbol{a})+\delta \sum_{y \in Y} V_{i}(\tau(w, y)) \pi_{y}(\boldsymbol{a})
$$

### 7.6.2 Decomposability and Self-Generation in Imperfect Monitoring

Public strategies can be analysed with dynamic programming techniques developed under perfect public monitoring, i.e., the concepts of enforcement and self-generation can be used to construct a recursive structure for repeated games with imperfect monitoring. A major conceptual breakthrough of the techniques is to focus on continuation values in the description of equilibrium, rather than focusing on behavior directly. This yields a more transparent description of incentives, and an informative characterization of equilibrium payoffs.

First, we introduce enforceable actions and payoffs with imperfect monitoring.

Definition 7.6.3 (Enforcement under Public Outcomes) A profile of (mixed) actions and payoffs $\left(\boldsymbol{\alpha}^{*}, \boldsymbol{v}\right)$ is enforceable under a discount factor of $\delta$ and on a feasible payoff set $W \in \mathcal{R}^{n}$, where $\boldsymbol{\alpha}^{*} \in \prod_{i} \Delta\left(A_{i}\right)$, if there are continuation promises established on the public outcomes $\gamma: Y \rightarrow W$, such that $\left(\boldsymbol{\alpha}^{*}, \boldsymbol{v}\right)$ is a Nash equilibrium of the normal form game with payoff function $v: A \rightarrow \mathcal{R}^{n}$, where

$$
v_{i}=(1-\delta) u_{i}(\boldsymbol{\alpha})+\delta \sum_{y} \pi_{y}(\boldsymbol{\alpha}) \gamma_{i}(y),
$$

i.e., for any player $i \in N$ and any $\alpha_{i} \in \Delta\left(A_{i}\right)$, we have
$(1-\delta) u_{i}\left(\boldsymbol{\alpha}^{*}\right)+\delta \sum_{y} \pi_{y}\left(\boldsymbol{\alpha}^{*}\right) \gamma_{i}(y) \geqq(1-\delta) u_{i}\left(\alpha_{i}, \boldsymbol{\alpha}_{-i}^{*}\right)+\delta \sum_{y} \pi_{y}\left(\alpha_{i}, \boldsymbol{\alpha}_{-i}^{*}\right) \gamma_{i}(y)$.
We call the $\boldsymbol{\alpha}^{*}$ that satisfies the above conditions as enforceable on payoff set $W$, and $\boldsymbol{v}$ as decomposable on $W$ and being self-generated from $(W, \delta)$. All payoff profiles that can be generated from $(W, \delta)$ are denoted by $B(W, \delta)$.

The following defines the self-generating set of payoff profiles.
Definition 7.6.4 (Self-Generating Set of Payoffs) A set $W \subseteq \mathcal{R}^{n}$ is selfgenerating at discount factor $\delta$ if $W \subseteq B(W, \delta)$.

Let $E^{P P E}(\delta)$ be the set of all perfect public equilibrium payoff profiles at the discount factor $\delta$. Abreu, Pearce, and Stachetti $(1986,1990)$ proved the following theorem.

Theorem 7.6.1 If $W$ is a bounded and self-generating set, then $W \subseteq B(W, \delta) \subseteq$ $E^{P P E}(\delta)$.

The theorem is similar to the one under perfect monitoring. More generally, for the case of mixed strategy, see the proof of Proposition 7.3.1. in Mailath and Samuelson (2006).

Proof. Let $W$ be self-generating, and fix $v \in B(W, \delta)$. By definition of $B(W, \delta)$, we can find an action profile $\boldsymbol{\alpha}$ and the continuation promises $\gamma: Y \rightarrow W$ that leads to payoff profile $v$. Suppose that the strategy in period 0 is $\sigma^{0}=\boldsymbol{\alpha}^{0}(v)$, and for each outcome $y^{0}$ in stage $0, v^{1}=\gamma^{0}\left(y^{0}\right) \in W$. Then, we have $v=(1-\delta) u\left(\boldsymbol{\alpha}^{0}\right)+\delta \sum_{y \in Y} \pi_{y}\left(\boldsymbol{\alpha}^{0}\right) \gamma^{0}(y)$. In addition, since $v^{1} \in W$ and $W$ is a self-generating set, we have $v^{1} \in B(W, \delta)$; thus, $v^{1}$ is also decomposable by an action profile $\boldsymbol{\alpha}\left(v^{1}\right)$ and a continuation promise $\gamma^{1}\left(y^{1}\right)$. Let the strategy be the following in period 1: $\boldsymbol{\sigma}^{1}\left(y^{0}\right)=\boldsymbol{a}^{1}\left(\gamma^{0}\left(y^{0}\right)\right)$. Furthermore, for any sequence $y^{0}, y^{1}$, let $v^{2}=\gamma^{1}\left(\gamma^{0}\left(y^{0}\right)\right)\left(y^{1}\right)$. Continuing the above construction, we can obtain a public strategy profile. For any $t$, the payoff of this public strategy profile can be written as the discounted sum of $t$ action profiles and a continuation payoff profile; since this continuation payoff profile is discounted and in a bounded set $W$, the discounted sum of the actions converges to $v$.

Finally, it is necessary to check that there is no incentive to unilaterally deviate from any stage of this public strategy profile. In essence, this follows from the incentive compatibility conditions imposed by the notion of enforcement (and thus by self-generation) and the one-shot deviation principle mentioned earlier. Therefore, the constructed strategy profile is a perfect public equilibrium.

Abreu, Pearce, and Stacchetti (1990) also proved that the set of all perfect public equilibrium payoffs is self-generating:

$$
E^{P P E, \delta}=B\left(E^{P P E}, \delta\right) ;
$$

they also showed that it is the largest set with this property.

### 7.6. REPEATED GAMES WITH IMPERFECT PUBLIC MONITORING 473

We now present some examples to explore incentives and punishments in repeated games with imperfect public monitoring.

Example 7.6.1 (Prisoners's Dilemma with Noisy Monitoring) There are two players who choose to work hard (also known as the cooperation, $E$ ) or noncooperation (shirk, $S$ ). Their actions are not observed by the other player, but their actions affect the distribution of the observed public outcomes. Suppose that there are two public outcomes $\bar{y}$ and $\underline{y}$ representing high or low output, respectively. The relationship between actions and public outcomes is as follows:

$$
\pi_{\bar{y}}(a)= \begin{cases}p, & \text { if } a=E E \\ q, & \text { if } a=S E \text { or } a=E S \\ r, & \text { if } a=S S\end{cases}
$$

where $1>p>q>0,1>p>r>0$. Obviously, high outcome $\bar{y}$ is more likely under cooperation between both parties, while low outcome $\underline{y}$ is more likely to be the outcome of one or both parties being lazy.

We can show that the parameters of the game can be specified to yield ex-ante payoffs given by Table 7.9.

\[

\]

Table 7.9: The Stage Game of the Prisoner's Dilemma.
Here, we consider different types of punishment: one is the grim strategy, in which the occurrence of low output $\underline{y}$ triggers a permanent punishment stage for both players; the other is a relatively tolerant punishment mode, in which the two sides return to cooperation if the outcome of the previous period was the high output.

First, consider the grim punishment mode: Choosing cooperation at the beginning (i.e., $E$ ). Once there is a state of low output, all players will not choose to cooperate (i.e., $S$ ). The strategies of the two players can be described by an automaton with two states (see Figure 7.4).


Figure 7.4: Automaton Representation of the Grim Strategy.

The state space is $\Omega=\left\{w_{E E}, w_{S S}\right\}$, the initial state is $w_{E E}$, the automaton action function is $f\left(w_{E E}\right)=E E, f\left(w_{S S}\right)=S S$, and the state transition function is

$$
\tau(w, y)= \begin{cases}w_{E E}, & \text { if } w=w_{E E}, y=\bar{y} \\ w_{S S}, & \text { otherwise }\end{cases}
$$

A value function is assigned to the sum of expected discounted payoffs of players in different states:

$$
\begin{aligned}
& V_{i}\left(w_{E E}\right)=(1-\delta) 2+\delta\left\{p V_{i}\left(w_{E E}\right)+(1-p) V_{i}\left(w_{S S}\right)\right\}, \\
& V_{i}\left(w_{S S}\right)=(1-\delta) 0+\delta V_{i}\left(w_{S S}\right) .
\end{aligned}
$$

We then obtain $V_{i}\left(w_{E E}\right)=\frac{2(1-\delta)}{1-\delta p}, V_{i}\left(w_{S S}\right)=0$ from the above two equations. If the above grim strategy is a Nash equilibrium, the incentive compatibility conditions (i.e., players have incentives to follow the automaton) need to hold:

$$
\begin{aligned}
& V_{i}\left(w_{E E}\right) \geqq(1-\delta) 3+\delta\left\{q V_{i}\left(w_{E E}\right)+(1-q) V_{i}\left(w_{S S}\right)\right\}, \\
& V_{i}\left(w_{S S}\right) \geqq(1-\delta)(-1)+\delta V_{i}\left(w_{S S}\right) .
\end{aligned}
$$

To make the above two inequalities be satisfied, it is necessary to satisfy the condition $3 p-2 q \geqq \frac{1}{\delta}$. If $3 p-2 q \geqq \frac{1}{\delta}$, then $\left\{\left(\frac{2(1-\delta)}{1-\delta p}, \frac{2(1-\delta)}{1-\delta p}\right),(0,0)\right\}$ is a self-generating set of payoff profiles. Since the state $w_{S S}$ is an attractor (i.e., once we enter this state, there is no way to leave), the state $w_{E E}$ will eventually be attracted to $w_{S S}$. In the grim strategy, everyone will choose to be lazy eventually. In this way, we find that when players are sufficiently patient (i.e., $\delta \rightarrow 1$ ), we have $V_{i}\left(w_{E E}\right)=\frac{2(1-\delta)}{1-\delta p} \rightarrow V_{i}\left(w_{S S}\right)=0$. In oth-

### 7.6. REPEATED GAMES WITH IMPERFECT PUBLIC MONITORING 475

er words, under the grim strategy, the player's payoff profile of $(2,2)$ per period cannot be the payoff profile of this repeated game.

The following considers another mode of interaction, i.e., the relatively tolerant punishment mode (also known as the punishment mode under one-term memory). If the previous state has a high outcome, then this period returns to the cooperation state; otherwise, it enters the punishment period.

The above strategy is described by an automaton (see Figure 7.5).


Figure 7.5: Automaton with One-term Memory Punishment.

The state space is $\Omega=\left\{w_{E E}, w_{S S}\right\}$, the initial state is $w_{E E}$, and the payoff function is:

$$
f\left(w_{E E}\right)=E E, f\left(w_{S S}\right)=S S .
$$

The state transition function is:

$$
\tau(w, y)= \begin{cases}w_{E E}, & \text { if } y=\bar{y} \\ w_{S S}, & \text { if } y=\underline{y} .\end{cases}
$$

Similarly, if $\left\{\left(V_{1}\left(w_{E E}\right), V_{2}\left(w_{E E}\right)\right),\left(V_{1}\left(w_{S S}\right), V_{2}\left(w_{S S}\right)\right)\right\}$ is the self-generating set of payoffs from the above tolerant strategy, then it satisfies:

$$
\begin{align*}
V_{i}\left(w_{E E}\right) & =(1-\delta) 2+\delta\left[p V_{i}\left(w_{E E}\right)+(1-p) V_{i}\left(w_{S S}\right)\right]  \tag{7.6.14}\\
& \geqq(1-\delta) 3+\delta\left[q V_{i}\left(w_{E E}\right)+(1-q) V_{i}\left(w_{S S}\right)\right], \\
V_{i}\left(w_{S S}\right) & =(1-\delta) 0+\delta\left[r V_{i}\left(w_{E E}\right)+(1-r) V_{i}\left(w_{S S}\right)\right]  \tag{7.6.15}\\
& \geq(1-\delta)(-1)+\delta\left[q V_{i}\left(w_{E E}\right)+(1-q) V_{i}\left(w_{S S}\right)\right] .
\end{align*}
$$

we then have

$$
V_{i}\left(w_{E E}\right)=\frac{2(1-\delta(1-r))}{1-\delta(p-r)}, V_{i}\left(w_{S S}\right)=\frac{2 \delta r}{1-\delta(p-r)}
$$

Meanwhile, inequality (7.6.14) means $\delta \geqq \frac{1}{3 p-2 q-r}$, and inequality (7.6.15) means $\delta \leqq \frac{1}{p+2 q-3 r}$. To make the above two inequalities hold simultaneously, we need $p-q \geqq q-r$. In addition, the above two inequalities have some mutual restriction, satisfying the incentive compatibility of state $w_{E E}$, requiring the players to have enough patience (high discount factor); however, the incentive compatibility of state $w_{E E}$ requires that the patience cannot exceed a certain degree. Moreover, $p-q \geqq q-r$ means that the signal (payoff) requires a higher degree of accuracy in reflecting effort.

In the tolerant punishment, unlike the grim punishment pattern, the player will not eventually enter the mutual punishment state, and the value of maintaining the cooperation exceeds that of the grim mode, namely

$$
\frac{2(1-\delta(1-r))}{1-\delta(p-r)}>\frac{2(1-\delta)}{1-\delta p}
$$

Then, the conclusion in this example is different from the one in repeated games with perfect monitoring: under the grim strategy punishment mode, all individuals choose to shirk; whereas, under the relatively loose punishment mode, they choose to work hard.

Through the above discussion, we find that under the above two punishment modes, the highest possible ex-ante expected payoff of the prefect public equilibrium is less than the ex-ante expected payoff of the cooperation between two parties. Under the punishment model of one-term memory (i.e., $\frac{2(1-\delta(1-r))}{1-\delta(p-r)}<2$ ), which means that in repeated games with imperfect monitoring, the Folk Theorem may fail in many cases.

### 7.6.3 Potential Efficiency Loss in Repeated Games with Imperfect Monitoring

The following example reveals the potential inefficiency in repeated games.

Example 7.6.2 The following is a discussion of incentive issues among players in Example 7.6.1. Here, we focus on the strongly symmetric pure strategy equilibrium (i.e., in each possible history, all players choose the same action), and discuss the maximum possible discounted payoff that can be supported by the player's interaction in a symmetric case (or the most efficient symmetric pure strategy equilibrium payoff). Suppose that a public correlation device can be used, and thus we can consider automata of the sort shown in Figure 7.6.


Figure 7.6: Automaton Representation in Symmetric Strategies.

This can be represented as an automaton: $\Omega=\left\{w_{E E}, w_{S S}\right\}, f\left(w_{E E}\right)=$ $E E, f\left(w_{S S}\right)=S S, \tau: \Omega \times Y \rightarrow \Omega:$

$$
\tau_{w_{E E}}(w, y)= \begin{cases}1, & \text { if } w=w_{E E}, y=\bar{y} \\ \phi, & \text { if } w=w_{E E}, y=\underline{y} \\ 0, & \text { if } w=w_{S S}\end{cases}
$$

where $\tau_{w_{E E}}(w, y)$ is the probability of state $w_{E E}$ in the next stage. In the above state transition function, increasing $\phi$ reduces the difference between the observable signal and the payoff function; however, if $\phi$ is too high, it will impede players' incentive to work hard. The following discusses how automaton should be chosen to obtain the maximum possible payoff. If $\phi=0$, it corresponds to the previous grim strategy.

The following focuses on the value $V\left(w_{E E}\right)$ for players' cooperation. From

$$
\begin{aligned}
V\left(w_{E E}\right) & =(1-\delta) 2+\delta\left[p V\left(w_{E E}\right)+(1-p)\left(\phi V\left(w_{E E}\right)+(1-\phi) V\left(w_{S S}\right)\right)\right] \\
& \geqq(1-\delta) 3+\delta\left[q V\left(w_{E E}\right)+(1-q)\left(\phi V\left(w_{E E}\right)+(1-\phi) V\left(w_{S S}\right)\right)\right],
\end{aligned}
$$

and

$$
\begin{aligned}
V\left(w_{S S}\right) & =(1-\delta) 0+\delta V\left(w_{S S}\right) \\
& \geqq(1-\delta)(-1)+\delta V\left(w_{S S}\right),
\end{aligned}
$$

we have that $V\left(w_{S S}\right)=0, V\left(w_{E E}\right)=\frac{2(1-\delta)}{1-\delta(p+(1-p) \phi)}$, the incentive compatibility conditions are satisfied, and the larger is the $\phi$, the greater is the $V\left(w_{E E}\right)$.

To achieve the above automaton, it is necessary to have:

$$
\delta(1-\phi)(p-q) V\left(w_{E E}\right) \geqq 1-\delta .
$$

The maximum possible $\phi$ to satisfy the above inequality is $\phi=\frac{\delta(3 p-2 q)-1}{\delta(3 p-2 q-1)}$. Substituting the above solution into $V\left(w_{E E}\right)$, we obtain the maximum possible payoff: $V\left(w_{E E}\right)=2-\frac{1-p}{p-q}<2$. The maximum possible symmetric equilibrium payoffs are not dependent on the discount factor $\delta$, and it is strictly less than the most efficient symmetric equilibrium payoff under perfect monitoring (i.e., $(2,2)$ ).

The efficiency losses in a repeated game are due to the fact that some strategies need to be implemented by mutual punishment under certain conditions (observed public outcomes), which reduces the players' expected discounted payoffs. This conclusion is analogous to the one in the principletheory we will systematically discuss in the part of mechanism design: there is a tradeoff between allocative efficiency and the extraction of information rent. To avoid the decrease in payoffs due to punishment for all players, there is a need for more accurate signals that allow speculation on individual behavior, thus linking the state (observed public outcomes) more directly to individual behavior. In other words, sufficient information is needed to identify and punish opportunistic players, while avoiding accidental injury to "innocent" players.

Fudenberg, Levine and Maskin (1994) systematically discussed the conditions for Folk Theorem in repeated games with imperfect monitoring (i.e., infer players' actions probabilistically from public outcomes). For different public outcomes, the appropriate punishments or rewards are applied to

### 7.6. REPEATED GAMES WITH IMPERFECT PUBLIC MONITORING 479

different players to support some of the interactive patterns to a greater extent. As the proofs of such theorems are relatively complex, the discussion is omitted here, and readers are referred to their original work.

### 7.6.4 Private Strategies in Games with Perfect Public Equilibria

The cases discussed above are based on public strategies of players. This implies that any pure strategy has an (outcome) equivalent public strategy. Does this then mean that the private strategy (i.e., the strategic choices of players are based not only on the history of the public outcomes, but also on the history of one's own actions) irrelevant? The answer is negative. The following is an example from Mailath and Samuelson (2006) that discusses the difference between private strategies and public strategies. It shows that perfect public equilibrium payoffs do not cover the full set of equilibrium payoffs, even when signals are public, as some equilibria may rely on players using private strategies.

Example 7.6.3 Consider a two-stage repeated game. Based on the decomposition of repeated game payoffs, an infinitely repeated game can be reduced to a two-stage game in which the second stage payoff can be viewed as a continuation discounted payoff on the basis of public outcomes (see Table 7.10).


Table 7.10: Left table: payoff in the first stage; Right table: payoff in the second stage.

In the second stage, $R$ can be understood as a reward behavior, while $P$ is a punishment behavior. Let the discount factors of both players be $\delta=\frac{25}{27}$. The set of public outcomes is $Y=\{\underline{y}, \bar{y}\}$. Actions affect the distribution of public outcomes according to the following:

$$
\pi_{\bar{y}}(a)= \begin{cases}p=\frac{9}{10}, & \text { if } a=E E ; \\ q=\frac{4}{5}, & \text { if } a=S E \text { or } a=E S ; \\ r=\frac{1}{5}, & \text { if } a=S S .\end{cases}
$$

The following considers the choices of different strategies by players.
First, consider the case of pure strategies without public correlation device. Without loss of generality, we consider public strategy under pure strategy, and we focus on pure public strategy equilibrium. Symmetric equilibrium payoffs are: in the first and second stages, the stage payoffs of two players are $(2,2)$ and $\left(\frac{8}{5}, \frac{8}{5}\right)$. If two players choose strategy $(E, E)$ in the first stage, and the public outcome in the second stage is $\bar{y}$, then they choose the strategy $(R, R)$; otherwise, they choose $(P, P)$. Since in the second stage, the strategic choice given above under all possible public outcomes is a Nash equilibrium, we only need to consider the first stage. Given each other's strategy, if player $i$ chooses the above strategy, the payoff is:

$$
2(1-\delta)+\delta p \frac{8}{5}=\frac{40}{27},
$$

and if she changes the strategy, the payoff is:

$$
3(1-\delta)+\delta q \frac{8}{5}=\frac{38}{27}
$$

Obviously, the strategic choice above is an equilibrium.
Second, consider the pure strategy with public correlation devices. Similar to the examples discussed earlier, a good symmetric equilibrium is: choosing $(E, E)$ in the first stage. If the public outcome of the first stage is $\bar{y}$, then choose strategy $(R, R)$ in the second stage. If the public outcome of the first stage is $\underline{y}$, then choose strategy $(R, R)$ with probability $\phi$, and choose strategy $(P, P)$ with probability $1-\phi$ in the second stage. While satisfying the incentive compatibility (i.e., players have incentives to choose $E$ in the first stage), it is possible to improve $\phi$. The conditions for the first stage of incentive compatibility are:

$$
2(1-\delta)+\delta \frac{8}{5}[p+(1-p) \phi] \geqq 3(1-\delta)+\delta \frac{8}{5}[q+(1-q) \phi],
$$

The highest $\phi$ that satisfies the above inequality is seen to be $\phi=\frac{1}{2}$. As a consequence, with a public correlation device, the best symmetric equilibrium payoff is

$$
2(1-\delta)+\delta \frac{8}{5}\left[p+(1-p) \frac{1}{2}\right]=\frac{42}{27}
$$

Again, consider a mixed public strategy (with public correlation devices). In this example, comparing with the situation in which player $i$ chooses to "work hard", if the player is "lazy" $(S)$, public action outcomes better reflect player $j$ 's action. This is because when player $i$ is "lazy", if player $j$ is also "lazy," then the probability of $r=\frac{1}{5}$ in the public outcome distribution is $\bar{y}$; if player $j$ chooses to "work hard", the probability of $q=\frac{4}{5}$ is $\bar{y}$, and the difference is $q-r=\frac{3}{5}$. When player $i$ chooses to work hard, if player $j$ is "lazy", the probability of $\bar{y}$ is $q=\frac{4}{5}$; if player $j$ chooses to "work hard", the probability of $\bar{y}$ is $p=\frac{9}{10}$. Furthermore, the difference is only $p-q=\frac{1}{10}$. Therefore, choosing a mixed strategy in the first stage will make it easier to solve incentive compatibility issues.

Consider a symmetric mixed strategy: in the first stage, the probability of choosing $E$ is $\alpha$; if the public outcome of the first stage is $\bar{y}$, choose strategy $(R, R)$ in the second stage. If the public outcome of the first stage is $\underline{y}$, in the second stage choose strategy $(R, R)$ with probability $\phi$, and strategy $(P, P)$ with probability $1-\phi$. The condition for the above strategies to be an equilibrium is:

$$
\begin{aligned}
& \alpha\left\{2(1-\delta)+\delta \frac{8}{5}[p+(1-p) \phi]\right\}+(1-\alpha)\left\{(-1)(1-\delta)+\delta \frac{8}{5}[q+(1-q) \phi]\right\} \\
\geqq & \alpha\left\{3(1-\delta)+\delta \frac{8}{5}[q+(1-q) \phi]\right\}+(1-\alpha)\left\{(0)(1-\delta)+\delta \frac{8}{5}[r+(1-r) \phi]\right\} .
\end{aligned}
$$

The highest outcome is $\phi(\alpha)=\frac{11-10 \alpha}{12-10 \alpha}>\frac{1}{2}$. When $\alpha \in(0,1)$, it will decrease as $\alpha$ increases. Substituting this into the above equation, the expected payoff is $\frac{224-152 \alpha-30 \alpha^{2}}{27(6-5 \alpha)}$, which is maximum at $\alpha \approx 0.969$. This maximum payoff approximately equals to $1.5566>\frac{42}{27}$.

Finally, consider private (mixed) strategies. The public outcome better reflects the action of player $j$ when player $i$ is "lazy" $(S)$. Therefore, it is a natural consideration to punish player $j$ under the outcome $\underline{y}$ (which
makes it more likely that player $j$ chose to be "lazy") when player $i$ is "lazy". This strategy obviously takes advantage of the private strategy of player $i$ to solve the incentive problem for $j$. Due to symmetry, similar considerations apply when $i$ and $j$ are swapped.

Consider the following symmetric private strategy. Suppose that player $i$ chooses a mixed strategy in the first stage. If the outcome is $\bar{y}$ in the first stage, then the player chooses $R$ in the second stage; if the outcome is $\underline{y}$ and the player chose to be "lazy" in the first stage, she will choose $P$ with a strict positive probability in the second stage; if the player chooses to "work hard" in the first stage but the outcome is $\underline{y}$, she will still choose $R$ in the second stage.

Let $\alpha$ be the probability that player $i$ chooses $E$ in the first stage, and $\xi$ be the probability that player $i$ chooses $R$ in the second stage if she observes the outcome $\underline{y}$ and chose to be "lazy" in the first stage. Figure 7.7 describes the private strategy of each player by the automaton below.


Figure 7.7: An Automaton Representation of Private Strategies.

Getting player $i$ to mix $(\alpha \in(0,1))$ in the first stage requires that the player is indifferent regarding the two actions:

$$
\begin{aligned}
& \alpha\left\{2(1-\delta)+\delta \frac{8}{5}\right\}+(1-\alpha)\left\{(-1)(1-\delta)+\delta \frac{8}{5}[q+(1-q) \xi]\right\} \\
= & \alpha\left\{3(1-\delta)+\delta \frac{8}{5}\right\}+(1-\alpha)\left\{(0)(1-\delta)+\delta \frac{8}{5}[r+(1-r) \xi]\right\} .
\end{aligned}
$$

Substituting $\delta=\frac{25}{27}, q=\frac{4}{5}, r=\frac{1}{5}$ into the above equality, we obtain $\xi(\alpha)=\frac{11-12 \alpha}{12-12 \alpha}$. Substituting this, it can be checked that a player's expected payoff is $\frac{2}{9}\left(\alpha+\frac{56}{9}\right)$. To maximize this, we maximize $\alpha$ subject to $\xi(\alpha) \in[0,1)$; this requires $\alpha=\frac{11}{12}, \xi=0$, which gives a maximum expected utility of
approximately 1.5864 .
Since $1.5864>1.5566>\frac{42}{27}>\frac{40}{27}$, in the above four symmetric equilibrium cases, the private strategy can support a higher degree of cooperation than a mixed strategy with a public correlation device. The pure strategy with a public correlation device, when compared to the pure strategy, can support a higher degree of cooperation.

There are other types of repeated games, such as repeated games with private monitoring (i.e., players can only observe their own signals, and there is no public signal). It is more difficult to establish the previous recursive structure under this type of repeated game. However, for repeated games with private monitoring, Ely, Horner, and Olszewski (2005) proposed a new concept of equilibrium with stronger constraints - " "belieffree equilibrium" - to reconstruct a recursive structure. Mailath and Samuelson (2006) systematically discuss this type of repeated games, and their monograph is considered to constitute an encyclopedia of repeated games and reputation mechanisms to be discussed below.

### 7.7 Reputation Mechanism

Below is a practical application related to repeated games, i.e., how players develop a reputation for a particular behavior pattern in multiple-period interactions. In contrast to the previous repeated games, the reputation mechanism has privately-informed players in long-term interactions. Some players will use specific actions to influence their opponents' beliefs. The intuition behind it is that if a player always takes the same action, the opponents would expect the player to take similar actions in the future. An important question is under what conditions can the players develop and maintain the reputation that they want to achieve. For example, companies attempt to build a reputation for product quality; and policy-makers hope to build a credible reputation for a policy. In this section, the basic principle of reputation mechanism is discussed mainly through an example.

## The Chain Store Paradox

A long-lived company has chain stores in multiple markets that are independent. There is a sequence of short-lived players, each of whom is a potential entrant in a different market. Each short-run player observes all previous actions. Each potential entrant decides whether or not to enter the market. If he does not enter, then the incumbent in the market is a monopolist with payoff $a>0$. If the potential entrant enters, the incumbent decides whether to fight or accommodate to the entry. If the incumbent fights, the incumbent's payoff is -1 ; if not, the incumber's payoff is 0 . The incumbent's goal is to maximize the sum of expected discounted payoffs with $\delta<1$ as the discount factor.

Suppose that there are two types of potential entrants: with probability $q \in(0,1)$ the short-run player is tough and will enter in any case, while with the remaining probability the short-run player is weak and receives a payoff of 0 if the player does not enter (so this type will perform a costbenefit analysis when deciding whether or not to enter). If the potential entrant enters and the incumbent fights back, then the entrant's payoff is -1 ; if the incumbent accommodates and accepts the entry, then the entran$\mathrm{t}^{\prime}$ s payoff is $b>0$. The type of the potential entrants is private information, while the types of different potential entrants are independent. Assume that this is a finitely repeated game, in which the number of repetitions equals the number of markets. In each stage game, there is a unique equilibrium: potential entrants will enter, while the incumbent will choose to accommodate.

Selten (1978) noted that from a theoretical point of view, there exists a unique sequential equilibrium in this finitely repeated game, in which potential entrants enter in each period, and the incumbent chooses to accommodate to each entry. However, this equilibrium seems counter-intuitive given that there are multiple markets, and the incumbent can fight entrants in certain markets and create a tough image that discourages entry into other markets. Selten referred to this contrast between the theoretical prediction and the intuitive view as the chain store paradox.

Market entry is a key issue in industrial organizations because it influ-
ences the competition and efficiency of a market. Much work has been carried out to solve the Chain Store Paradox. Kreps and Wilson (1982b), Milgrom and Roberts (1982), and Kreps, Wilson, Milgrom and Roberts (1982) solved this paradox by introducing incomplete information.

Now, suppose that the incumbent also has private information. Specifically, the long-lived incumbent has a probability $p^{0}$ of being an irrational or hard type who will always fight an entrant; the incumbent has a probability of $1-p^{0}$ to be rational, when the incumbent's payoff equals that of the incumbent described earlier. The following argument demonstrates that even if $p^{0}$ is small, as long as the duration of the repetition is sufficiently long, the incumbent will always maintain a hard-line attitude toward entry (i.e., the incumbent will establish a reputation for being irrational when it comes to responding to entry).

We now discuss the mechanism of reputation. If there is only one period, as long as the potential entrant enters, the rational type incumbent will choose to accommodate, and the tough type incumbent will choose to fight. If $\left(1-p^{0}\right) b-p^{0}<0$, or $p^{0}>\bar{p} \equiv \frac{b}{b+1}$, a weak potential entrant will choose to not enter; otherwise, the entrant will choose to enter.

Consider two periods of interaction now. Potential entrants 1 and 2 make decisions for markets 1 and 2 , respectively. Player 1 firstly faces the entry choice, then player 2 chooses after seeing the outcome of market 1. The following focuses on the behaviour of the rational type incumbent and the weak type of potential entrants.

In period 1, if the incumbent chooses to accommodate when faced with market entry, the incumbent is revealed as the rational type. Therefore, in period 2 , the potential entrant will definitely choose to enter market 2. The following focuses on the consideration of the rational type incumbent . If faced with entry in the first period, the cost of choosing to fight is 1 . However, the benefit is to build the reputation of the hard type to discourage potential weak entrants. At this time, her revenue is at most $\delta(1-q) a$ so that her total expected revenue is $-1+\delta(1-q) a$. In this case, when $q>\bar{q} \equiv \frac{a \delta-1}{a \delta}$, the incumbent will not choose to fight.

When $q \leqq \bar{q}$, if the fight in market 1 can make weak potential entrant 2 quit, then reputation can produce value. However, player 2's decision-
making depends on his belief in the type incumbent.

Consider the case of $p^{0}>\bar{p}$. Since the tough type incumbent always chooses to fight, the probability of the rational type incumbent choosing to fight is not more than that of the tough type. After observing the fight in market 1, the potential entrants in market 2 believe that the probability of the tough type will not be lower than $p^{0}$. At this time, the weak type player 2 will not choose to enter; this, in turn, means that the rational type incumbent will establish reputation through fighting in market 1. In this way, potential weak entrants will choose to not enter market 1.

Consider the case of $p^{0} \leqq \bar{p}$. We prove that the incumbent will not choose a pure strategy. First, consider the pooling equilibrium and show that the rational type incumbent will not choose to fight entry into market 1. Under pooling, if there is a fight in market 1 , the posterior belief of the potential entrant of market 2 is the same as the initial belief. Therefore, the weak entrant 2 will also choose to enter, which means that the rational type incumbent should definitely not choose to fight in market 1. Second, consider the separating equilibrium, in which the rational type incumbent will certainly choose to accommodate in market 1 . If instead the incumbent deviates from this strategy and fights in market 1, the potential entrant in market 2 will think that the incumbent is tough and the potential entrant will choose to not enter. The rational type incumbent then has an incentive to fight entry in the market.

Therefore, the only possible equilibrium is the semi-separation (also called the partial-pooling) equilibrium (i.e., one type of a player may play a pure strategy while the other plays a mixed strategy). We assume that the rational type incumbent chooses a mixed strategy to fight in market 1. Let $\beta<1$ be the probability that rational type incumbent chooses to fight. Because the rational type incumbent adopts a strictly mixed strategy, choosing to fight and choosing to accommodate must bring the same benefits, which means that weak entrants must also choose mixed strategies. After observing the fight in the market, the posterior belief of the potential
entrant in market 2 satisfies

$$
\operatorname{prob}(\text { tough } \mid \text { fight })=\frac{p^{0}}{p^{0}+\left(1-p^{0}\right) \beta}=\bar{p}=\frac{b}{b+1},
$$

and thus it follows that $\beta=\frac{p^{0}}{\left(1-p^{0}\right) b}$. In market 1, the probability of the potential entrant facing a fight with the incumbent is

$$
p^{0}+\left(1-p^{0}\right) \frac{p^{0}}{\left(1-p^{0}\right) b}=\frac{p^{0}(1+b)}{b}
$$

If $p^{0}>\left(\frac{b}{b+1}\right)^{2}=\bar{p}^{2}$, weak potential entrants in market 1 will not choose to enter, the ex-ante expected payoff of the rational type incumbent is greater than zero; if $p^{0}<\bar{p}^{2}$, weak potential entrants in market 1 will inevitably enter.

The following continues to discuss the presence of chain stores in three markets. If $p^{0}>\bar{p}^{2}$, the rational type incumbent facing an entrant in market 1 will definitely choose to fight, while the weak potential entrants of market 1 will not choose to enter. If $p^{0} \in\left(\bar{p}^{3}, \bar{p}^{2}\right)$, the rational type incumbent chooses a mixed strategy when facing entry in market 1 , while the weak potential entrants in market 1 will not choose to enter. If $p^{0}<\bar{p}^{3}$, the weak potential entrants in market 1 will definitely enter.

More generally, the incumbent has $N$ chain stores. If $p^{0}>\bar{p}^{k}, k<N$, then the weak potential entrants from market 1 to market $N-k$ will not enter, and the incumbent will certainly build strong reputation in these markets by choosing to fight should there be entry. In addition, note that as $N \rightarrow \infty$, we obtain that $\bar{p}^{N} \rightarrow 0$, and thus $p^{0}>\bar{p}^{N}$ holds for sufficiently large $N$. This means that the first potential entrant will not enter, and if there is entry the rational type incumbent has a strong motivation to fight it to build a strong reputation. Therefore, as long as there is incomplete information, even if the degree of incomplete information is small, long-run players can build their reputations through certain behavior.

In different contexts, reputation operates differently and performs dissimilar roles. Fudenberg and Tirole (1991) and Mailath and Samuelson (2006) provide systematic introductions to the rich literature in this field; the latter also reviews some recent literature on the reputation mechanism.

### 7.8 Biographies

### 7.8.1 John Richard Hicks

John Richard Hicks (1904-1989), one of the founders of the general equilibrium theory, made great contributions to microeconomics, macroeconomics, economic methodology and economic history, and shared the Nobel Memorial Prize in Economic Sciences with Kenneth Joseph Arrow in 1972.

He was educated at Clifton College (1917-1922), and later obtained a scholarship to study mathematics at Balliol College, Oxford (1922-1926). In 1923, he moved to Philosophy, Politics and Economics, the "new school" that was just being started at Oxford, and graduated with second-class honors. During 1925 and 1926, he studied labor economics under Cole's guidance. From 1926 to 1935, Hicks worked as an assistant and later as a lecturer at the London School of Economics, during which time he received a Ph.D. degree from the University of London in 1932. In the same year, he published The Theory of Wages. During the time in the London School of Economics and Political Science, Hicks learned a great deal about economics, and gradually developed from a beginner to an accomplished economist who published a series of important academic papers, including $A$ Reconsideration of the Theory of Value (1934) with Roy Allen and A Suggestion for Simplifying the Theory of Money (1935). In the summer of 1935, Hicks left the London School of Economics, and became a researcher and lecturer at Gonville and Caius College of the University of Cambridge until 1938. During this period, his main achievement at the University of Cambridge was the book entitled Value and Capital. In addition, he wrote two influential book reviews of Keynes's The General Theory of Employment, Interest, and Money, in which the article Mr. Keynes and the "Classics" £oA Suggested Interpretation had far-reaching effects.

Hicks is one of the founders of the general equilibrium theory in microeconomics. The general equilibrium theory was originally characterized by normative analysis, but in his most famous work, Value and Capital published in 1939, he abandoned this tradition and gave a powerful empirical
implication to this theory. He put forward a complete economic equilibrium model with markets for commodities, factors of production, credit, and money. There are many innovations in the model, including perfecting the original consumption and production theory, clarifying the conditions of the stability of the market, extending the application scope of the static analysis, considering the dynamic analysis, and adopting the capital theory based on the assumption of profit maximization. The well-known Hicksian demand in microeconomics describes the minimum consumption expenditure under a given level of utility, which, together with the traditional Marshallian demand, is one of the two optimal solutions to a dual problem. Deeply rooted in consumer theory and producer theory, the Hicks model provides much greater possibilities for performing comparative static analyses than previous models in this field, and thus many important economic theorems were established using this model. His model is also an important link between the general equilibrium theory and the prevailing business cycle theory.

The most notable contributions of Hicks to welfare economics were the standard analysis of comparing different economic conditions and the revision of the concept of consumer surplus. He proposed the Kaldor-Hicks efficiency test, which is another well-known criterion for comparing different public policies and economic states besides the efficiency criterion of Pareto improvement. He also perfected the theory of marginal utility explained by the ordinal utility theory and indifference curve, and developed the general equilibrium theory. He systematically studied and clarified the general equilibrium theory based on the theories of Walrasian, Pareto, etc. In his theoretical system, general equilibrium was divided into static and dynamic general equilibrium, and its contribution was primarily to establish the dynamic general equilibrium theory, based on previous theory. He proposed the $I S-L M$ model and used it to analyze the simultaneous equilibrium of goods market and money market, the simultaneous determination of national income and interest rate, as well as the interrelationships between them. This model combines the general equilibrium analysis of neoclassical economics with the Keynesian theory of national income determination, and becomes the theoretical hallmark model of modern Key-
nesian macroeconomics.
Hicks used the accelerator multiplier interaction for building up a new theory of business cycle. The theory holds that the increase of output and income will lead to acceleration of investment through the acceleration effect. Moreover, due to the multiplier effect, the growth of investment causes output and income to increase accordingly by a magnified amount, and thus production capacity expands rapidly. When expansion reaches the limit of the cycle, it shifts to economic contraction. During the contraction, due to the role of acceleration, the decline in investment will lead to output and income decline in a certain proportion, and this decline is limited by the lower bound of the cycle. The economy starts to rebound again when it reaches the bottom of the cycle. Hicks discovered a regular cyclical fluctuation of 7-10 years, based on a study of the economic history of the past one and a half century.

### 7.8.2 Thomas Schelling

Thomas C. Schelling (1921-2016) was an American economist, an expert on foreign affairs, national security, nuclear strategy and arms control, and one of the founders of the theory of limited war. He was born in California in April 14, 1921 and received a Ph.D. degree in economics from Harvard University in 1948. He won the Frank E. Seidman Distinguished Award in Political Economy in 1977 and the Nobel Prize in Economics for "having enhanced our understanding of conflict and cooperation through gametheory analysis" in 2005.

Unlike conventional game theory, which has traditionally used mathematics extensively, Schelling's main research field is called the "nonmathematical game theory" . Schelling and Aumann further developed the non-cooperative game theory and began to deal with some major problems in the field of sociology. They came from different perspectivesAumann mainly from the perspective of mathematics while Schelling primarily from the perspective of economics-and both thought that it was possible to reconstruct the analytical paradigm of human interaction using game theory. More importantly, Schelling pointed out that many social
interactions with which people are familiar can be understood from the perspective of non-cooperative games; Aumann also found that some longterm social interactions can be analyzed deeply with formal non-cooperative game theory.

Schelling's game theory was based on the breakthrough of the analytical method of neoclassical economic theory, different from the mainstream game theory in research method and focus, thereby improving, enriching and developing the modern game theory. In his classic book, The Strategy of Conflict, Schelling first defined and clarified concepts, such as deterrence, credible commitment, strategic mobility, etc., began to study social science issues using a unified analytical framework of game theory, and made a detailed analysis of the bargaining and conflict management theory. Bargaining theory is the primary contribution of Schelling's early-period research. Although he did not deliberately set out to establish a formal model, many of his views were later shaped by the new development of game theory. The concepts that he defined are also the most basic in game theory, e.g., the non-credible threat of perfect equilibrium.

His fruitful work contributed to the new development of game theory and accelerated the application of game theory in the field of social science. In particular, his research on strategic commitments explains many phenomena (e.g., the firm's competitive strategy, and the mandate of political decision-making). In 1988, the American Economic Association gave him the "Distinguished Fellow Award", and stated "Schelling's theory about social relations and his application of the theory are derived from his fruitful integration of theory with practice. He has an unusual talent, which enabled him to capture the nature of the social and economic situations in which the participants share the same or different interests, and to vividly describe the nature." The Nobel committee evaluated him as follows, " Schelling, a self-described 'errant economist', has been proven to be a very distinguished and pioneering explorer."

### 7.9 Exercises

Exercise 7.1 Consider a three-player symmetric infinitely repeated game: the discount factor is $\delta$, and the stage game is $\left(1,2,3, A_{i}, u_{i}\right)$, where $A_{i}=$ $[0,1]$. For any $\left(a_{1}, a_{2}, a_{3}\right) \in A_{1} \times A_{2} \times A_{3}$, we have

$$
u_{i}\left(a_{1}, a_{2}, a_{3}\right)=a_{1} a_{2} a_{3}+\left(1-a_{1}\right)\left(1-a_{2}\right)\left(1-a_{3}\right) .
$$

1. Find the set of feasible payoff profiles of the stage game.
2. Prove: for any discount factor $\delta \in(0,1)$, the payoff of any player in a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium (SPNE) in the repeated game is at least $1 / 4$.

Exercise 7.2 Consider the following game:


The seller can choose to work hard $(H)$ or to be lazy $(L)$, and the buyer can choose to purchase ( $B$ ) or not ( $D$ ).

1. Find the set of feasible payoff profiles and the set of individually rational payoff profiles.
2. Suppose that the game is repeated infinitely, and the discount factor for both players is $\delta$. Find a SPNE such that, for some range of $\delta$, the path of the repeated game is $(H, B)^{\infty}$. Solve for the range of $\delta$.
3. Now, suppose that in the stage game, the buyer could observe the effort of the seller prior to making a purchasing decision. Then, solve question 2.

Exercise 7.3 There is a static game with complete information between player 1 and player 2 , and the strategy space for both is $\{A, B\}$. If both choose $A$, then each obtains $\alpha$; if both choose $B$, then each obtains $\beta$; if they choose $A$ and $B$, respectively, then the player with action $A$ receives $\gamma$, and the player with action $B$ receives $\lambda$.

1. Give the normal form of the above game.
2. If it is a Prisoner's Dilemma game, give the range of parameter.
3. With the answer from question 2 , suppose that the game is repeated infinitely, and the discount factor is $\delta$. Prove that if $\delta \geqq \bar{\delta}$, then the grim strategy can resolve the Prisoner's Dilemma. Solve for $\bar{\delta}$.

Exercise 7.4 Consider a two-player, two-stage repeated game, and the stage game is the following: Prior to stage two, both players could ob-

| player 1 | player 2 |  |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  |  | $d$ | $e$ | $f$ |
|  | $a$ | 3,1 | 0, 0 | 5, 0 |
|  | $b$ | 2, 1 | 1,2 | 3,1 |
|  | $c$ | 1,2 | 0,1 | 4,4 |

serve the outcomes of stage one, and there is no discount factor. Is there an SPNE, such that the payoff profile in stage one is $(4,4)$ ? If yes, give the corresponding strategy. If no, explain why.

Exercise 7.5 Consider the following infinitely repeated game with the stage game:


Solve for the range of discount factor $\delta$, such that the following strategy is an SPNE.

State 1: first choose ( $B, R$ ); if no one deviates, then continue to choose $(B, R)$; otherwise, change to state 2 ;

State 2: choose $(T, L)$; if no one deviates, then continue to choose $(T, L)$; otherwise, change to state 1 .

Exercise 7.6 Consider the infinitely repeated Prisoner's Dilemma game with the stage game:
player 2
player 1

|  | candor $(C)$ | disavow $(D)$ |
| ---: | :---: | :---: |
| candor $(C)$ | 1,1 | $-1,2$ |
| disavow $(D)$ | $2,-1$ | 0,0 |

Let the discount factor be $\delta$.

1. Prove: if $\delta \geqq 0.5$, then there is an SPNE, such that the strategy profile in every stage is $(C, C)$. Find the complete strategies of the two players in this equilibrium.
2. Prove the following Folk Theorem: if $\delta$ is sufficiently close to 1 , then any feasible and individually rational payoff profile is subgame perfect Nash equilibrium payoff profile.

Exercise 7.7 Consider the following infinitely repeated Prisoner's Dilemma with the discount factor $\delta$ and the stage game:


1. Solve for the minimum SPNE payoff profile for players, and prove that there is no lower equilibrium payoff.
2. Solve for the minimum discount factor $\delta^{*}$ in SPNE where cooperation can be realized.
3. If the discount factor is lower than $\delta^{*}$, is there an SPNE such that the payoff profile is bigger than $(0,0)$ ?

Exercise 7.8 Consider the following infinitely repeated Prisoner's Dilemma game with the stage game:
player 2
player 1

|  | candor $(C)$ | disavow $(D)$ |
| :---: | :---: | :---: |
| candor $(C)$ | 1,2 | $-1,3$ |
| disavow $(D)$ | $2,-4$ | 0,0 |

Let the discount factor be $\delta$.

1. Prove: if $\delta<0.5$, in pure strategy SPNE, the maximum payoff profile of players is 0 ; if $\delta=0.5$, then there is a pure strategy SPNE, such that the payoff profile of players is 1 .
2. Now suppose that a player plays the above game with $N$ players, and the payoff in one period is the sum of payoff in all $N$ games. Then, will the result in question 1 change? Explain your answer.

Exercise 7.9 Consider the following infinitely repeated Prisoner's Dilemma, where $2 a>b+c$, and the discount factor is $\delta$ :

| player 1 | candor(C) | player 2 |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  |  | candor | avow |
|  |  | a, a | b, c |
|  | disavow(D) | c, b | 0,0 |

1. If the grim strategy is an SPNE, then what is the range of discount factor?
2. Prove that if $\delta=1$, then the "tit-for-tat" strategy is not an SPNE.

Exercise 7.10 In the Cournot model of $n$ firms, the inverse demand function is $p=1-2 q$, and the marginal cost and fixed cost of all firms are zero. Consider the infinitely repeated game of this stage game:

1. Solve for the minimum $\delta$ such that a firm can maintain monopoly output through the grim strategy in SPNE.
2. If $\delta$ is too small to maintain monopoly output through the grim strategy, then solve for the SPNE in which the grim strategy leads to profit maximization.

Exercise 7.11 Consider a game between a firm and a labor union. The union determines the wage level, and the firm decides the number of employees. The union's utility function is $u(w, l)$, where $w$ is wage, $l$ is employment, and $u(w, l)$ is an increasing function of $w$ and $l$. The firm's profit function is $\pi(w, l)=R(l)-w l$, where $R(l)$ is the enterprise's revenue,
which is an increasing and concave function. The time sequence of the game is: the union first gives the salary level; the firm observes and accepts the salary level, and then chooses the number of employees. $u^{*}$ and $\pi^{*}$ represent the union's utility and the firm's profit, respectively, by backward induction of a one-shot game. Consider another wage-employment combination $(w, l)$ and the corresponding utility-profit combination $(u, \pi)$, where the discount factor for both is $\delta$. Solve for the condition that $(w, l)$ satisfy: $(u, \pi)$ is Pareto superior to $\left(u^{*}, \pi^{*}\right)$; and $(u, \pi)$ is the outcome of a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium for an infinitely repeated game, where as long as any deviation occurs, it permanently shifts to $\left(u^{*}, \pi^{*}\right)$.

Exercise 7.12 (Shapiro and Stiglitz, 1984) Consider the following stage game: in the first stage, the firm sets wage level $w$ for a worker; in the second stage, the worker chooses to accept or reject the wage. If rejected, the worker chooses a self-employment salary of $w_{0}$; if accepted, the worker chooses to work hard or to be lazy. Hard work will result in a negative utility of $f$, while laziness does not have a negative effect. The firm cannot observe the worker's effort, but the firm and the worker can observe the level of the worker's output, with a low output of 0 and a high output of $y>0$. The worker who works hard can inevitably achieve high output, while the lazy worker gets high output with probability $p$ and low output with probability $1-p$.

Suppose $y-f>w_{0}>p y$, and consider the following combination of strategies in an infinitely repeated game: the firm's strategy is to set the wage level $w^{*}$ for the first stage, and if at each subsequent stage, the outcome of the game is $\left(w^{*}, y\right)$, then continue the wage level $w^{*}$; otherwise, change the wage level to be $w=0$; the worker's strategy is if $w \geqq 0$, then accept the firm's wage (or choose self-employment), and if the outcome in each stage of the game is $\left(w^{*}, y\right)$, then work hard (otherwise choose to be lazy). Solve for the conditions under which the above strategies form a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium.

Exercise 7.13 Consider the following infinitely repeated game of two players with the discount factor $\delta$ and the stage game:

|  | player 2 |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | candor $(C)$ | disavow $(D)$ |
| er 1 candor $(C)$ | 2, 3 | 1,6 |
| disavow $(D)$ | 0,1 | 0,1 |

Prove that if $\delta$ satisfies a certain condition, then $(C, C),(C, C), \cdots$ is not the equilibrium path of an SPNE, and solve for the range of $\delta$ in this case.

Exercise 7.14 Prove that in a repeated game, if there is an SPNE for each player where the equilibrium payoff is the player's minmax payoff, then every Nash equilibrium payoff is an SPNE payoff.

Exercise 7.15 Prove that if $\left(w^{k}\right)_{k=1}^{\infty}$ is a sequence of the SPNE payoff profile of an infinitely repeated game with discount factor $\delta$, and it converges to $w^{*}$, then $w^{*}$ is an SPNE payoff profile for this repeated game.

Exercise 7.16 In a symmetric finitely repeated game, suppose that there is a symmetric minmax strategy profile $m^{*}$, where the pure strategy $m$ satisfies $\max _{a_{i}} g\left(a_{i}, m_{-i}^{*}\right) \leqq \underline{v}$. Prove that if public randomization is possible, then for sufficiently large discount factors, the minimum strongly symmetric equilibrium payoff $e$ can be obtained by the following strategy: in state $A$, players choose $m^{*}$; if players do not deviate in state $A$, then change to state $B$; if players deviate, then remain in state $A$ with probability 1 . In state $B$, the game is played by strategies with maximum equilibrium payoff.

Exercise 7.17 Consider a repeated game between a long-term player 1 and other players in an infinite sequence. Each player in the sequence only exists for one period and knows the previous actions of player 1. Player 1 evaluates the payoff sequence by limit of time-average, and any of other players only considers the payoff for the period in which she is present.

1. If two players in each period perform the Prisoner's Dilemma game as follows, solve for the set of subgame perfect Nash equilibria of the game.

$$
\left\lvert\,\right.
$$

2. If the payoff of $(C, D)$ is changed to 0 for each player in each period, prove that for each $x \in[1,3]$, there is a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium, in which the average (normalized) discounted payoff for player 1 is $x$.

Exercise 7.18 Consider the following game:

\[

\]

1. Suppose that the game proceeds in two periods, and the discount factor is $\delta$. Find a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium, such that for a range of $\delta$, the first stage can achieve the payoff profile of $(a, a)$. Solve for the range of $\delta$.
2. Suppose that the game repeats $T>2$ periods, and the discount factor is $\delta$. Find a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium, such that for some range of $\delta$, the payoff profile of $(a, a)$ can be achieved in the previous $T-1$ stage. Find the range of $\delta$ and equilibrium payoffs for each player.
3. Suppose that the game repeats infinite periods, and the discount factor is $\delta$. Is there a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium where for some $\delta$, every $T-1$ stage can achieve the payoff profile of $(a, a)$ ? If it exists, find the range of $\delta$ and the equilibrium payoff for each player; if it does not exist, provide the corresponding proof.

Exercise 7.19 Workers will face off season and peak seasons each year. In the off season, they will receive wage $w_{*}$. During the peak season, they will
receive wage $w^{*}$, and $w^{*}>w_{*}$. Workers cannot save, and their utility function $u$ is a strictly concave function defined in each period of consumption. The discount factor between different periods is $\delta$. Each season is a period.

1. Suppose that the wage cannot be used for saving or borrowing. Write the worker's lifelong utility.
2. Suppose that an employer provides a contract $\left(x_{*}, x^{*}\right)$ to the worker, where $x_{*}$ and $x^{*}$ are the worker's wage levels in the off season and the peak season, respectively. Set the utility of the employer as a linear function and assume that the employer keeps its promise to perform the contract, while the worker can choose to break the contract. Once the worker defaults, the employer can continue or cease providing the contract. As a result, the wages of the worker are still determined by $w_{*}$ and $w^{*}$.
(a) The relationship between workers and employers is represented by a repeated game. Is the payoff function of each period continuous? Explain your answer.
(b) Suppose that the employer provides the contract in the off season. What are the two constraints that need to be met, such that the workers accept and perform the contract?
(c) Prove that $\delta^{2} u^{\prime}\left(w_{*}\right)>u^{\prime}\left(w^{*}\right)$ is the sufficient and necessary condition for the existence of an incentive compatible contract in which both parties can make a profit.

Exercise 7.20 Consider the following stage game:

|  | player 2 |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | $C$ |  | $D$ |
| player 1 | $C$ | 5,5 | 3,6 |
|  | $D$ | 6,3 | 4,4 |

This stage game is repeated infinitely, and two players in each period fully know the history of the previous stages. Both have a discount factor $0<\delta<1$. Answer the following questions:

1. Consider the following trigger strategy: both parties choose $C$ in stage 0 . In any subsequent stage game, if the outcome of each previous stage is $(C, C)$, then both parties continue to choose $C$; otherwise, they choose $D$. Find the range of $\delta$, where the trigger strategy is the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium.
2. Consider another trigger strategy: in the 0 -stage game, player 1 chooses $C$, and player 2 chooses $D$. In any subsequent game, if the history of outcomes is the following sequence: $(C, D),(D, C),(C, D),(D, C)$, $(C, D),(D, C), \cdots$, then they continue to follow the sequence (i.e., player 1 chooses $C$ in even periods, and chooses $D$ in odd periods; player 2 chooses $C$ in odd periods, and $D$ in even periods); otherwise, they choose $D$. Find the range of $\delta$, where this trigger strategy is a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium.
3. According to the Subgame Perfect Folk Theorem, as long as $\delta$ is sufficiently close to 1 , the range of payoff profiles can be achieved by reasonably choosing trigger strategies in an infinitely repeated game. Illustrate this using figures.

Exercise 7.21 Consider the two-player game:

\[

\]

1. Find the Nash equilibrium of the game.
2. Suppose that this game repeats infinitely. According to the Nash Threats Folk Theorem, what are the payoff profiles that can be achieved in subgame perfect Nash equilibrium? Does it depend on the choice of the common discount factor $\delta$ ?
3. Suppose that this game repeats infinitely. According to the Nash Folk Theorem, what are the payoff profiles that can be realized in Nash equilibrium?

Exercise 7.22 Consider the two-player game:

|  | player 2 |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | $L$ |  | $R$ |
| player 1 | $T$ | 2,1 | 0,0 |
|  | $B$ | 0,0 | 1,2 |

1. Suppose that this game repeats infinitely. According to the Nash Threats Folk Theorem, what are the payoff profiles that can be achieved in subgame perfect Nash equilibrium?
2. Give a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium that can achieve the payoff profile $\left(\frac{3}{2}, \frac{3}{2}\right)$, and give the requirement for common discount factor $\delta$.
3. Suppose that this game repeats infinitely. According to the Nash Folk Theorem, what are the payoff profiles that can be realized in Nash equilibrium?

Exercise 7.23 Consider the two-player game:

|  | player 2 |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | $c$ <br> player 1 |  |
|  | $C$ | $D$ |
|  | $D, 3$ | $k, 1$ |
|  | $1, k$ | 2,2 |

Suppose that the new round of probability that the stage game continues is $p$, and this probability is independent of the number of repetitions of the stage game.

1. If $k=4$, under what conditions does a "tit-for-tat" strategy form a Nash equilibrium?
2. Consider the definition of a "tit-for-tat" strategy. They choose cooperation in the first round. After that, they adopt the action of the opponent in the previous round (betrayal or cooperation). Prove that if $k$ is sufficiently large, the alternate strategy defined below is better than the "tit-for-tat" strategy. At this time, does the alternate
strategy constitute Nash equilibrium? If not, what strategy is a Nash equilibrium?
The alternate strategy is defined as follows. Cooperation in the first round. Since then,
if both cooperated with each other last time, then you will defect this time;
if you defected the last time but the other party chose cooperation, then you will cooperate this time;
if you cooperated last time but the other side defected, then you will defect this time;
if both sides defected last time, then you will cooperate this time.
Exercise 7.24 Consider the two-player game:

$$
\text { player } 2
$$

player 1

|  | C $\quad$ D |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: |
| C | 3,3 | 1,4 |
| D | 4,1 | 2,2 |

1. Suppose that the two players know in advance that the stage game will only repeat for 3 rounds. What is the SPNE of this repeated game?
2. Let this game repeat infinitely. According to the Subgame Perfect Folk Theorem, what are the payoff profiles that can be achieved in SPNE?

Exercise 7.25 Consider the two-player game:


Describe the following strategies using the automaton representation of strategies, and use Proposition 7.3.1 to verify whether it is a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium.

1. Trigger strategy: both parties first choose to cooperate $(C)$. At period $t$, if the previous participants all chose to work hard $(C)$, then they choose to work hard; if anyone had chosen to defect $(D)$, then they choose to defect from this time forward.
2. "Tit-for-tat" strategy: both sides choose to cooperate $(C)$ in the first round. At period $t$, both choose the opponent's action in the previous round (defect or cooperation).
3. Alternate strategy (defined in Exercise 7.23).

Exercise 7.26 (Product Choice Game) Player 1 is the manufacturer, and player 2 is the consumer. The manufacturer can choose either high effort $(H)$ or low effort $(L)$. The consumer can choose from two products, high-end products ( $h$ ) or low-end products (l). The payoff matrix of the game is shown in the table:


1. If the game is played for a finite period, what is the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium?
2. If the game is played for 3 rounds, is there another Nash equilibrium besides the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium derived in question 1? If yes, give one.
3. Suppose that this game repeats infinitely. According to the Nash Threats Folk Theorem, what are the payoff profiles that can be achieved in subgame perfect equilibrium?
4. Suppose that this game repeats infinitely. According to the Nash Folk Theorem, what are the payoff profiles that can be realized in Nash equilibrium?
5. Suppose that this game repeats infinitely. According to the Subgame Perfect Folk Theorem, what are the payoff profiles that can be realized in Nash equilibrium?

Exercise 7.27 (Product Choice Game) There are two types of manufacturers. The probability of being effort type is $p$, who can only use strategy $H$; the other type of manufacturers is called the common type, and the probability of being such type is $1-p$. The discount factor for both types is $\delta$. The payoff matrixes are as follows:

Common type:

|  | player 2 |  |  |
| :---: | ---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | $h$ |  | $l$ |
| player 1 | $H$ | 2,3 | 0,2 |
|  | $L$ | 3,0 | 1,1 |

Effort type:

|  | player 2 |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | $h$ | $l$ |
| player 1 | $H$ | 2,3 |
|  |  | 0,2 |

1. For the common type of manufacturers, if the type is ex-ante public knowledge, what is the strategy of a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium in a finitely-repeated game?
2. Suppose that the type is private information, and the game repeats for 2 periods. Under what conditions can manufacturers of the common type benefit from the existence of effort type? What is the specific strategy? (Hint: the common type can maintain the confidentiality of their type by adopting strategy $H$ in the first period).
3. Suppose that the type is private information, and the game repeats for $n$ periods ( $n \geqq 3$ ). What is the equilibrium strategy?
4. If the game repeats infinitely, what is the equilibrium?

Exercise 7.28 (Reputation Mechanism) Consider the chain store model given in this chapter. Suppose that the incumbent has chain stores in 3 markets. Answer the following questions:

1. For market 2, suppose that the rational type incumbent has not revealed her own type in market 1 (fight when facing an entrant). Discuss her strategies for different ranges of $q$ and $p_{0}$. (Hint: it is the same as the case of 2 markets).
2. For market 2 , suppose that the rational type incumbent has already revealed her own type in market 1 (did not fight when faced with entry). Then, obviously her subsequent strategy is not to fight for any entry, while tough or weak type potential entrants will choose to enter. Based on this and the conclusion in question 1, use backward induction to discuss the strategy of the rational type incumbent for different ranges of $q$ and $p_{0}$ in the market 1 . Provide the reasoning process.
3. Give equilibrium strategies for this game, i.e., provide strategies for the rational type incumbent and weak potential entrants in these markets.

Exercise 7.29 (Reputation Mechanism) Consider the general case of the chain store model in this chapter. Suppose that the incumbent has chain stores in $N$ markets, and potential entrants are tough with probabilities $q_{1}, q_{2}, \cdots, q_{N}$, respectively. If the incumbent does not fight, then the benefits of entry are $b_{1}, b_{2}, \cdots, b_{N}$, respectively. The incumbent is rational with probability $1-p_{0}$.

1. First, suppose that $q_{i}=q$ and $b_{i}=b$ for any $i \in\{1,2, \cdots, N\}$. Use backward induction to find a market equilibrium strategy.
2. Is it true that no matter how small the $p_{0}$ is, as long as $N$ is sufficiently large, then the rational type incumbent will always choose to fight in the first few markets to establish a tough reputation? Is there such a conclusion when $q_{i}$ and $b_{i}$ are not exactly equal across these $N$ markets?

### 7.10 References

## Books:

Aumann, R. (1981). Survey of Repeated Games, in Essays in Game Theory and Mathematical Economics in Honor of Oskar Morgenstern, pp. 11-42, Zurich: Bibliographisches Inst.

Chan, Jimmy (2012). Lecture Notes, SHUFE.
Fudenberg, D. and J. Tirole (1991). Game Theory, MIT Press.
Gibbons, R. (1992). Game Theory for Applied Economists, Princeton University Press.

Hargreaves-Heap, Shaun P. and Yanis Varoufakis (2004). Game Theory: A Critical Introduction (2nd Edition), Routledge.

Kreps, D. (1990). A Course in Microeconomic Theory, Princeton University Press.

Kreps, D. (1990). Game Theory and Economic Modeling, Oxford: Clarendon Press.

Mas-Colell, A., M. D. Whinston, and J. Green (1995). Microeconomic Theory, Oxford University Press.

Mailath, J. M. and L. Samuelson (2006). Repeated Games and Reputations, Oxford University Press.

Mailath, J. M. and L. Samuelson (2013). Reputations in Repeated Games, in The Handbook of Game Theory, Vol 4.

Myerson, R. (1991). Game Theory, Harvard University Press.
Osborne, M. J. and A. Rubinstein (1994). A Course in Game Theory, MIT Press.

Osborne, M. J. (2004). An Introduction to Game Theory, Oxford University Press.

Ray, Debraj (2006). Lecture Notes, New York University.
Rubinstein, A. (1990). Game Theory in Economics, Edward Elgar Publishing Company.

Samuelson, Larry (2008). Lecture Notes, Yale University.
Vega-Redondo, Fernando (2003). Economics and Theory of Games, University of Cambridge.

Yildiz, M. (2012). Economic Applications of Game Theory, Lecture Notes.

## Papers:

Abreu, D., P.K. Dutta, and L. Smith (1994). "The Folk Theorem for Repeated Games: A NEU Condition" , Econometrica, Vol. 62, No. 4, 939-948.

Abreu, D., D. Pearce, and E. Stacchetti (1986). "Optimal Cartel Equilibria with Imperfect Monitoring" , Journal of Economic Theory, Vol. 39, No. 1, 251-569.

Abreu, D., D. Pearce, and E. Stacchetti (1990). "Toward a Theory of Discounted repeated game with imperfect Monitoring", Econometrica, Vol. 58, No. 5, 1041-1063.

Abreu, D. and A. Rubinstein (1988). "The Structure of Nash Equilibrium in Repeated Games with Finite Automata" Econometrica, Vol. 55, No. 6, 1259-1281.

Baye, M. R., G. Tian and J. Zhou (1993). "Characterizations of the Existence of Equilibria in Games with Discontinuous and Non-Quasiconcave Payoffs" , The Review of Economic Studies, Vol. 60, No. 4, 935-948.

Blackwell, D. (1965), "Discounted Dynamic Programming," Annals of Mathematical Statistics 36, 226-235.

Cremer, J. (1986). "Cooperation in Ongoing Organizations", Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 101, No. 1, 33-49.

Ely, J. C., J. Horner, and W. Olszewski (2005). "Belief-Free Equilibria in Repeated Games" , Econometrica, Vol. 73, No. 2, 377-416.

Friedman, J. (1971). "A Non-cooperative Equilibrium for Supergames" , Review of Economic Studies, Vol. 38, No. 1, 1-12.

Fudenberg, D., D. Kreps, and E. Maskin (1990). "Repeated Games with Long-run and Short-run Players" , Review of Economic Studies, Vol. 57, No. 4, 555-574.

Fudenberg, D., and D. Levine (1994). "Efficiency and Observability with Long-run and Short-run Players", Journal of Economic Theory, Vol. 62, No. 1, 103-135.

Fudenberg, D., D. Levine, and E. Maskin (1994). "The Folk Theorem with Imperfect Public Information", Econometrica, Vol. 62, No. 5, 997-1039.

Fuderberg, D., and E. Maskin (1986). "The Folk Theorem in Repeated Games with Discounting or with Imperfect Information", Econometrica, Vol. 54, No. 3, 533-554.

Green, E. J., and R. H. Porter (1984). "Noncooperative Collusion under Imperfect Price Formation" , Econometrica, Vol. 52, No. 1, 87-100.

Kandori, M. (1992). "Social Norms and Community Enforcement", Review of Economic Studies, Vol. 59, No. 1, 63-80.

Kandori, M. (1992). "Repeated Games Played by Overlapping Generations of Players" , Review of Economic Studies, Vol. 59, No. 1, 81-92.

Kreps, D. and R. Wilson (1982a). "Sequential Equilibrium", Econometrica, Vol. 50, No. 4, 863-894.

Kreps, D. and R. Wilson (1982b). "Reputation and Imperfect Information", Journal of Economic Theory, Vol. 27, No. 2, 253-279.

Kreps, D., P. Milgrom, J. Roberts, and R. Wilson (1982). "Rational Cooperation in the Finitely Repeated Prisoners' Dilemma", Journal of Economic Theory, Vol. 27, No. 2, 245-252.

Milgrom, P., and J. Roberts (1982). "Predation, Reputation and Entry Deterrence" , Journal of Economic Theory, Vol. 27, No. 2, 280-312.

Nessah, R. and G. Tian (2013). "Existence of Solution of Minimax Inequalities, Equilibria in Games and Fixed Points without Convexity and Compactness Assumptions", Journal of Optimization Theory and Applications, Vol. 157, No. 1, 75-95.

Nessah, R. and G. Tian (2014). "On the Existence of Strong Nash Equilibria", Journal of Mathematical Analysis and Applications, Vol. 414, 871-885.

Nessah, R. and G. Tian (2016). "Existence of Nash Equilibrium in Discontinuous Games" , Economic Theory, Vol. 61, 515-540.

Rubinstein, A. (1986). "Finite Automata Play the Repeated Prisoner's Dilemma" , Journal of Economic Theory, Vol. 39, No. 1, 83-96.

Samuelson, L. (2006). "The Economics of Relationship" . In Blundell, R., W. K. Newey, and T. Persson, Advances in Economics and Econometrics: Theory and Applications, Ninth World Congress (Cambridge University Press).

Selten, R. (1978). "The Chain-store Paradox", Theory and Decision, Vol. 9, No. 2, 127-159.

Shapiro, C. and J. Stiglize (1984). "Equilibrium Unemployment as a Work Discipline Device", American Economic Review, Vol. 74, No. 3, 433444.

Tian, G. (1992). "Generalizations of the FKKM Theorem and Ky-Fan Minimax Inequality, with Applications to Maximal Elements, Price Equilibrium, and Complementarity" , Journal of Mathematical Analysis and Applications, Vol. 170, No. 2, 457-471.

Tian, G. (1993). "Necessary and Sufficient Conditions for Maximization of a Class of Preference Relations", Review of Economic Studies, Vol. 60, No. 4, 949-958.

Tian, G. (1994). "Generalized KKM Theorem and Minimax Inequalities and Their Applications", Journal of Optimization Theory and Applications, Vol. 83, 375-389.

Tian, G. (2015). "Existence of Equilibria in Games with Arbitrary Strategy Spaces and Payoffs: A Full Characterization", Journal of Mathematical Economics, Vol. 60, 9-16.

Tian, G. (2016). "Characterizations of Minimax Inequality, Fixed-Point Theorem, Saddle Point, and KKM Theorem in Arbitrary Topological Spaces", Journal of Fixed Point Theory and Applications, forthcoming.

Tian, G. and J. Zhou (1992). "The Maximum Theorem and the Existence of Nash Equilibrium of (Generalized) Games without Lower Semicontinuities" , Journal of Mathematical Analysis and Applications, Vol. 166, No. 2, 351-364.

Tian, G. and J. Zhou, (1995). "Transfer Continuities, Generalizations of the Weierstrass Theorem and Maximum Theorem—A Full Characterization" , Journal of Mathematical Economics, Vol. 24, No. 3, 281-303.

Zhou, J. and G. Tian (1992). "Transfer Method for Characterizing the Existence of Maximal Elements of Binary Relations on Compact or Noncompact Sets" , SIAM Journal on Optimization, Vol. 2, No. 3, 360375.

## Chapter 8

## Cooperative Game Theory

### 8.1 Introduction

This chapter discusses cooperative games, also known as the coalitional games. The so-called coalition is a nonempty subset of players. The basic elements of the non-cooperative game discussed in the previous two chapters are based on each player's actions and preferences for possible outcomes. In cooperative games, the basic elements are coalitions consisting of players and the coalitional actions that they take. Although the actions are chosen by the coalition, it is also based on individual preferences. Similar to the equilibrium solution of the non-cooperative game, the equilibrium of a cooperative game must also satisfy stability (i.e., the stability of stable coalition and outcome).

Compared with non-cooperative games, cooperative games pay more attention to group choices rather than individual choices, and meanwhile ignore details of the interaction within a group. These two types of interactions reflect different strategic considerations. Game theory increasingly looks at the connection between the two, such as providing noncooperative game foundations for solutions to cooperative games.

### 8.2 The Core

The core is a basic solution concept to coalitional games. It reflects that there is no other coalition that can bring better outcomes to the players in the coalition, and thus such an outcome is stable. Judging by whether or not payoffs can be transferable among members of the coalition, coalitional games can be divided into coalitional games with transferable payoff and coalitional games without transferable payoff. Our discussion mainly focuses on the former in the current chapter. We will discuss coalitional games without transferable payoff somewhat in detail when examining the core property of competitive equilibrium in Chapter 12.

### 8.2.1 Coalitional Game with Transferable Payoff

The coalitional game with transferable payoff concerns the payoff obtained by a group of players, and the payoff is allocated among the members without restriction.

Definition 8.2.1 (Coalitional Game with Transferable Payoff) A coalitional game with transferable payoff or simply a coalitional game consists of the following two elements: a set of players $N$, and a value $v(S)$ assigned to each coalition (i.e., a non-empty subset of $N, S \subseteq N$ ). $v(S)$ that is called the characteristic function can be viewed as the total payoff of the coalition $S$ to be assigned among its members.

A coalitional game with transferable payoff is denoted by $\langle N, v\rangle$. The payoff that a coalition can obtain is usually dependent on the actions of other players, and thus $v(S)$ can be interpreted as the highest payoff that coalition $S$ receives independently of other coalitions $N \backslash S$. We can utilize the strategic form of a non-cooperative game $\Gamma=\left(N,\left(C_{i}\right)_{i \in N},\left(u_{i}\right)_{i \in N}\right)$ to discuss the payoff of a coalition in the coalitional game, where $C_{i}$ is the choice space of player $i$, and $u_{i}$ is the utility function of player $i$. Von Neumann and Morgenstern (1944) defined the characteristic function as:

$$
v(S)=\min _{\sigma_{N \backslash S} \in \Delta\left(C_{N \backslash S}\right)} \max _{\sigma_{S} \in \Delta\left(C_{S}\right)} \sum_{i \in S} u_{i}\left(\sigma_{S}, \boldsymbol{\sigma}_{N \backslash S}\right) .
$$

We usually assume $v(\emptyset)=0$, where $\emptyset$ denotes the empty set. The definition of coalitional payoff is based on a pessimistic judgment of actions of players outside of the coalition (i.e., they will choose the most unfavorable actions against coalition members). There are also other ways to define coalitional payoff. Different judgment criteria of players' actions outside of the coalition will lead to dissimilar definitions.

Myerson (1991) proposes using defensive-equilibrium representation to define the group's payoff in a coalitional game. The entire group is then divided into the coalition and its complement. Their respective values are equivalent to Nash equilibrium payoffs. Formally, define

$$
\begin{aligned}
\bar{\sigma}_{S} & =\operatorname{argmax}_{\sigma_{S} \in \Delta\left(C_{S}\right)} \sum_{i \in S} u_{i}\left(\sigma_{S}, \overline{\boldsymbol{\sigma}}_{N \backslash S}\right) ; \\
\overline{\boldsymbol{\sigma}}_{N \backslash S} & =\operatorname{argmax}_{\sigma_{N \backslash S} \in \Delta\left(C_{N \backslash S}\right)} \sum_{j \in N \backslash S} u_{j}\left(\bar{\sigma}_{S}, \boldsymbol{\sigma}_{N \backslash S}\right) ; \\
v(S) & =\sum_{i \in S} u_{i}\left(\bar{\sigma}_{S}, \overline{\boldsymbol{\sigma}}_{N \backslash S}\right) ; \\
v(N \backslash S) & =\sum_{j \in N \backslash S} u_{j}\left(\bar{\sigma}_{S}, \overline{\boldsymbol{\sigma}}_{N \backslash S}\right) .
\end{aligned}
$$

In addition, Harsanyi (1963) proposed to define characteristic functions by Nash's rational-threats criterion. Here, the payoff to the coalitional group is similar to the idea of coalitional group in Myerson (1991), except that the goal of each group is to maximize the difference between the payoffs of its own and its opponent. Formally, we define

$$
\begin{aligned}
\bar{\sigma}_{S} & =\operatorname{argmax}_{\sigma_{S} \in \Delta\left(C_{S}\right)}\left(\sum_{i \in S} u_{i}\left(\sigma_{S}, \overline{\boldsymbol{\sigma}}_{N \backslash S}\right)-\sum_{j \in N \backslash S} u_{j}\left(\sigma_{S}, \overline{\boldsymbol{\sigma}}_{N \backslash S}\right)\right) ; \\
\overline{\boldsymbol{\sigma}}_{N \backslash S} & =\operatorname{argmax}_{\boldsymbol{\sigma}_{N \backslash S} \in \Delta\left(C_{N \backslash S}\right)}\left(\sum_{j \in N \backslash S} u_{j}\left(\bar{\sigma}_{S}, \boldsymbol{\sigma}_{N \backslash S}\right)-\sum_{i \in S} u_{i}\left(\bar{\sigma}_{S}, \boldsymbol{\sigma}_{N \backslash S}\right)\right) ; \\
v(S) & =\sum_{i \in S} u_{i}\left(\bar{\sigma}_{S}, \overline{\boldsymbol{\sigma}}_{N \backslash S}\right) ; \\
v(N \backslash S) & =\sum_{j \in N \backslash S} u_{j}\left(\bar{\sigma}_{S}, \overline{\boldsymbol{\sigma}}_{N \backslash S}\right) .
\end{aligned}
$$

We employ an example to illustrate the characteristic function in different meanings.

Example 8.2.1 (Characteristic Function) Consider a three-person coalitional game with transferable payoff. Suppose that each player has two actions, $C_{i}=\left\{a_{i}, b_{i}\right\}, i \in\{1,2,3\}$, which represent "generosity" and "selfishness", respectively. The payoff matrix for their actions is shown in Figure 8.1.

|  |  | $C_{2} \times C_{3}$ |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| $C_{1}$ | $a_{2}, a_{3}$ | $b_{2}, a_{3}$ | $a_{2}, b_{3}$ |
| $a_{1}$ | $(4,4,4)$ | $(2,5,2)$ | $b_{2}, b_{3}$ |
| $b_{1}$ | $(5,2,2)$ | $(3,3,0)$ | $(3,0,3)$ |
| $(0,3,5)$ | $(1,1,1)$ |  |  |

Figure 8.1: Characteristic Function.

Under the definition of characteristic function by von Neumann and Morgenstern (1944), we will have:
$v(\{1,2,3\})=12, v(\{1,2\})=v(\{1,3\})=v(\{2,3\})=4, v(\{1\})=v(\{2\})=v(\{3\})=1$.

Under the definition of defensive-equilibrium by Myerson (1991), the characteristic function is then:
$v(\{1,2,3\})=12, v(\{1,2\})=v(\{1,3\})=v(\{2,3\})=4, v(\{1\})=v(\{2\})=v(\{3\})=5$.

In the sense of rational-threats of Harsanyi (1963), the characteristic
function is:
$v(\{1,2,3\})=12, v(\{1,2\})=v(\{1,3\})=v(\{2,3\})=2, v(\{1\})=v(\{2\})=v(\{3\})=1$.

Thrall and Lucas (1963) extended the characteristic function and proposed the concept of partition function, which can deal with the externality between coalitions in a more general framework. The coalitional games discussed later are based on the condition that each coalition has a corresponding characteristic function, thereby placing the focus on what kind of coalition the player will choose. We assume that the coalitional games satisfy the cohesive condition.

Definition 8.2.2 (Cohesive condition) A coalitional game with transferable payoff is said to be cohesive, if for each partition $S_{1}, \cdots, S_{K}$ of the set of all players $N$, we have $v(N) \geqq \sum_{k=1}^{K} v\left(S_{k}\right)$.

The cohesive condition means that the coalition consisting of all players is optimal.

A stronger condition is the superadditive condition.
Definition 8.2.3 (Superadditive Condition) We say that the characteristic function is superadditive, if for any two disjoint subsets $S$ and $T$ (i.e., $S \cap T=$ $\emptyset$ ) of the set of players $N$, we have $v(S \cup T) \geqq v(S)+v(T)$.

Superadditivity means that if coalitions $S$ and $T$ act together, they can do at least as good as when they act separately.

We next discuss the solution concept of the coalitional game with transferable payoff. The idea is similar to the Nash equilibrium of a non-cooperative game: for a certain outcome, if there is no deviation for improvement, then the outcome is stable. Core is a fundamental equilibrium concept in cooperative games. Core (payoff allocation for all players) means that no coalition can increase the payoffs of its members. In the coalition with transferable payoff, since free transfers can be made among members, a stable condition is that the sum of payoffs obtained by any member in the coalition cannot exceed the sum of payoffs corresponding to the core. Then, we have the concept of feasible payoff allocation below.

Definition 8.2.4 (Feasible Payoff Allocation) Let $\langle N, \boldsymbol{v}\rangle$ be a coalitional game with transferable payoff. For any payoff allocation $\left(x_{i}\right)_{i \in N}$ and any coalition $S$, define $x(S)=\sum_{i \in S} x_{i}$. We say that $\left(x_{i}\right)_{i \in S}$ is an $S$-feasible allocation if $x(S)=v(S)$. We say that $\left(x_{i}\right)_{i \in N}$ is a feasible (payoff) allocation when $S=N$.

Definition 8.2.5 (Core) We say that a feasible allocation $\left(x_{i}\right)_{i \in N}$ is in the core of a coalitional game with transferable payoff, if there exists no coalition $S$ and an $S$-feasible allocation $\left(y_{i}\right)_{i \in S}$, such that $y_{i}>x_{i}$ for any $i \in S$.

Thus, an payoff allocation $\left(x_{i}\right)_{i \in N}$ is in the core of $\langle N, v\rangle$ if and only if $\sum_{i \in S} x_{i}=v(N)$ and $x(S) \geqq v(S)$ for all $S \subseteq N$. We say a coalition $S$ can improve on an payoff allocation $\boldsymbol{x}$ if the participants in $S$ can obtain a $S$ feasible payoff allocation $\left(y_{i}\right)_{i \in S}$ such that $y_{i}>x_{i}, i \in S$. Then, if $x$ is in the core, there is no such an improvement.

Remark 8.2.1 In a strict sense, the core defined above should be a weak core. A strong core means that there exist no subset $S$ of $N$ and an $S$-feasible payoff allocation $\left(y_{i}\right)_{i \in S}$, such that $y_{i} \geqq x_{i}$ for any $i \in S$ and $y_{j}>x_{j}$ for at least one $j \in S$. This is similar to the difference between strong Pareto efficiency and weak Pareto efficiency (see Chapter 11). Obviously, a strong core implies a weak core, but the opposite may not be true. However, under continuous transfers, the concepts of weak core and strong core are equivalent. The transferable payoffs discussed in this chapter are mostly payoffs that can be transferred in a continuous manner, and thus a weak core implies a strong core.

The following example discusses the core of the coalitional game under different rules.

Example 8.2.2 (Coalitional game with collective allocation) There are three players, and a total of 300 units of resources that are available for allocation. Suppose that there are three different allocation rules. Rule 1: the allocation plan must win consent from all of the three players; otherwise, no one will receive any resource. Rule 2: the allocation plan can be passed with majority consent. Rule 3: if all players agree upon the allocation plan, then all of the resources can be allocated; if only two players agree upon the allocation
plan, the resources available for allocation are $2 / 3$ of the total resources; if only one player agrees upon the allocation plan, then no resource is available for allocation.

Under Rule 1, the coalitional game $\langle N, v\rangle_{1}$ can be described as $N=$ $\{1,2,3\}, v(N)=300$, and if $S \neq N$, then $v(S)=0$. By the definition of core, every feasible payoff allocation is in the core. This is because for any feasible payoff allocation $\left(x_{i}\right)_{i \in N}$, we have $x_{1}+x_{2}+x_{3}=0$, and there exists no other feasible payoff allocation $\left(y_{i}\right)_{i \in N}$, such that $y_{i}>x_{i}$ for any $i$.

Under Rule 2, the coalitional game $\langle N, v\rangle_{2}$ can be described as $N=$ $\{1,2,3\}$, and $v(N)=300$ when $S \subseteq N$ and $|S| \geqq 2$ (here the function $|\cdot|$ represents the number counting function); $v(S)=0$ when $S \subseteq N$ and $|S|=1$. If a feasible payoff allocation $\left(x_{i}\right)_{i \in N}$ is in the core, then there must exist $i$, such that $x_{i}>0$. However, at this time, there exists a coalition $S=N / i$ satisfying $|S|=2$ and $x(S)<300=v(S)$, and thus $\left(x_{i}\right)_{i \in N}$ cannot be in the core. Consequently, the core is an empty set in this coalitional game.

Under Rule 3, the coalitional game $\langle N, v\rangle_{3}$ can be described as: when $S=N=\{1,2,3\} ; v(N)=300$, and $v(S)=200$ when $S \subseteq N$ and $|S|=2$; $v(S)=0$ when $S \subseteq N$ and $|S|=1$. In this game, $\left(x_{i}\right)_{i \in N}=(100,100,100)$ is a unique allocation in the core. The reason for this is that if there exists an $i$, such that $x_{i}>100$, then there must exist a coalition $S=N / i$ satisfying $|S|=2$ and $x(S)<200=v(S)$.

## Example 8.2.3 (Transactions in a Market with Indivisible Commodities)

In a market with an indivisible commodity, the set of consumers is denoted by $B$, and the set of sellers is denoted by $L$. Each seller has one unit of indivisible commodity. Each consumer can purchase one unit of commodity at most. The reserve prices of the commodity for consumers and sellers are 1 and 0 , respectively. For a coalition $S \subseteq B \cup L$, its characteristic function is $v(S)=\min \{|S \cap B|,|S \cap L|\}$. In this game, the payoff allocations of consumers and sellers are denoted by $x_{b}$ and $x_{l}$, respectively. We can verify that: when $|B|>|L|$, only one allocation is in the core, which is given by $\left(x_{i}\right)_{i \in N}$, where $N=B \cup L$, satisfying $x_{i}=x_{b}=0, i \in B$; $x_{i}=x_{l}=1, i \in L$. When $|B|=|L|$, the set of allocations in the core features
$x_{i}=x_{b}=\alpha, i \in B ;$ and $x_{i}=x_{l}=1-\alpha, i \in L, \alpha \in[0,1]$.
In the examples above, the core is not always nonempty. Next, we discuss the conditions for the existence of nonempty cores.

### 8.2.2 The Existence Theorem on Nonempty Cores

According to the definition of core, if a feasible allocation is in a core, it needs to satisfy a series of inequalities. First, we introduce some related concepts.

The set of all coalitions is denoted by $C=\{S \mid S \neq \emptyset, S \subseteq N\} .1_{S} \in \mathcal{R}^{N}$ is called the characteristic vector of coalition $S$, satisfying

$$
\left(1_{S}\right)_{i}= \begin{cases}1, & i \in S \\ 0, & \text { otherwise }\end{cases}
$$

Definition 8.2.6 (Balanced Collection of Weights) $\left(\lambda_{S}\right)_{S \in C}, \lambda_{S} \in[0,1]$, is called a balanced collection of weights if $\sum_{S \in C} \lambda_{S} 1_{S}=1$.

Example 8.2.4 The set of players is $\{1,2,3,4\}$. If $|S|=3, \lambda_{S}=1 / 3$; if $|S| \neq 3, \lambda_{S}=0$. Then, $\left(\lambda_{S}\right)_{S \in C}$ is a balanced collection of weights. In addition, if $|S|=1, \lambda_{S}=1$; if $|S| \neq 1, \lambda_{S}=0$. Then, such defined $\left(\lambda_{S}\right)_{S \in C}$ is also a balanced collection of weights.

To interpret the balanced collection of weights, we can consider the players' time allocation. Suppose that the total time of player $i$ is 1 unit. Her time is allocated among all coalitions that include the player, and the total amount is feasible: $\sum_{S \in C}\left(1_{S}\right)_{i} \lambda_{S}=1$.

Definition 8.2.7 (Balanced Game) ) A game $\langle N, v\rangle$ is said to be balanced, if for each balanced collection of weights $\left(\lambda_{S}\right)_{S \in C}$, we have

$$
\sum_{S \in C} \lambda_{S} v(S) \leqq v(N)
$$

We can comprehend the balanced game as the allocation of all feasible time of the player, in which, taking time allocation as weights, the sum of payoffs received by the player in all coalitions is less than what she will
receive in the biggest coalition that includes all players. Bondereva (1963) and Shapley ${ }^{1}$ (1967) characterized the relationship between balanced game and nonempty core based on linear programming and duality theorem.

Theorem 8.2.1 (Bondereva-Shapley Theorem) A sufficient and necessary condition for the existence of nonempty core in a coalitional game with transferable payoff is that the game is balanced.

Proof. Necessity: Let $\left(x_{i}\right)_{i \in N}$ be a payoff allocation in the core, while $\left(\lambda_{S}\right)_{S \in C}$ is one of its balanced collections of weights. Then, $\sum_{S \in C} \lambda_{S} v(S) \leqq$ $\sum_{S \in C} \lambda_{S} x(S)=\sum_{i \in N} x_{i} \sum_{i \in S} \lambda_{S}=\sum_{i \in N} x_{i}=v(N)$.

The inequality is attributed to the definition of the core; the first equal sign is attributed to different orders of summation of the equivalence; the second equal sign comes from the definition of balanced weights; the last equal sign comes from the definition of feasible payoff allocation.

Sufficiency: $\langle N, v\rangle$ is balanced, and thus there exists no balanced weight$\mathrm{s}\left(\lambda_{S}\right)_{S \in C}$ satisfying $\sum_{S \in C} \lambda_{S} v(S)>v(N)$. Therefore, the convex set $\left\{\left(1_{N}, v(N)+\right.\right.$ $\varepsilon): \varepsilon>0\}$ and the convex cone $\left\{y \in \mathcal{R}^{N+1}: y=\sum_{S \in C} \lambda_{S}\left(v(S)+1_{S}\right)\right.$, $\left.\forall S \in C, \lambda_{S} \geqq 0\right\}$ are disjoint. Using the hyperplane separation theorem, there exists a non-zero vector $\left(a_{N}, a\right) \in \mathcal{R}^{N+1}$, such that for any $y, \varepsilon>0$, we have $\left(a_{N}, a\right) y \geqq 0>\left(a_{N}, a\right)\left(1_{N}, v_{N}+\varepsilon\right)$. Since $\left(1_{N}, v_{N}\right)$ is in the convex cone, this inequality implies that $a<0$. We construct $x=a_{N} /(-a)$. In addition, since for any $S \in C,\left(1_{S}, v(S)\right)$ belongs to the above convex cone, then from the above inequality, we have $\left(a_{N}, a\right)\left(1_{S}, v(S)\right)=a\left(-x 1_{S}+v(S)\right)=$ $a(-x(S)+v(S)) \geqq 0$, and thus $x(S) \geqq v(S)$. Since for any $\varepsilon>0$, we have $\left(a_{N}, a\right)\left(1_{N}, v(N)+\varepsilon\right)<0$ and $\left(a_{N}, a\right)\left(1_{N}, v(N)\right)=a\left(-x 1_{N}+v(N)\right)=$ $a(-x(N)+v(N)) \geqq 0$. Then, we have $x(N)=v(N)$, and thus the $x$ constructed above is a payoff allocation in the core.

In the following, we discuss why some cores exist and some cores may be empty in the previous coalitional game with collective allocation.

Example 8.2.5 (Coalitional Game with Collective Allocation) It is clear under rule 1 that the coalitional game described by $v(S)_{S \in C}$ is a balanced game, because when $S=N, v(S)=300$; when $S \neq N, v(S)=0$. Therefore, for any $i \in N, \sum_{i \in S} \lambda_{S} 1_{S}=1$, we have $\sum_{S \in C} \lambda_{S} v(S) \leqq v(N)$.

[^13]Under rule 2, consider the following balanced collection of weights. If $|S|=2$, then $\lambda_{S}=\frac{1}{2}$; otherwise, $\lambda_{S}=0$. However, $\sum_{S \in C} \lambda_{S} v(S)=450>$ $300=v(N)$, and thus the coalitional game under rule 2 is not a balanced game.

Under rule 3, when $|S|=2, v(S)=200, v(N)=300$; when $|S|=1$, $v(S)=0$. At this time, for any balanced collection of weights $\left(\lambda_{S}\right)_{S \in C}$, since it is a balanced collection of weights, it satisfies:

$$
\begin{aligned}
\lambda_{\{1,2\}}+\lambda_{\{1,3\}}+\lambda_{\{1,2,3\}} & \leqq 1, \\
\lambda_{\{1,2\}}+\lambda_{\{2,3\}}+\lambda_{\{1,2,3\}} & \leqq 1, \\
\lambda_{\{1,3\}}+\lambda_{\{2,3\}}+\lambda_{\{1,2,3\}} & \leqq 1,
\end{aligned}
$$

so we have $\lambda_{\{1,2\}}+\lambda_{\{2,3\}}+\lambda_{\{1,3\}} \leqq 3 \frac{1-\lambda_{\{1,2,3\}}}{2} . \sum_{S \in C} \lambda_{S} v(S)=\lambda_{\{1,2,3\}} 300+$ $\left(\lambda_{\{1,2\}}+\lambda_{\{2,3\}}+\lambda_{\{1,3\}}\right) 200 \leqq 300=v(N)$.

To further understand the existence theorem on the core, we now discuss the issue based on linear programming and duality theorem, as in Bondereva (1963) and Shapley (1967).

Consider the following problem: what is the minimum utility transfer required under the constraint that no coalition can improve its members' payoffs? This problem can be expressed as the following linear programming:

$$
\begin{array}{cc} 
& \min _{x \in \mathcal{R}^{N}} \sum_{i \in N} x_{i} \\
\text { s.t. } & \sum_{i \in S} x_{i} \geqq v(S), \forall S \subseteq N .
\end{array}
$$

The duality problem of the above linear programming is:

$$
\begin{array}{r}
\max _{\lambda \in \mathcal{R}_{+}^{C}} \sum_{S \in C} \lambda_{S} v_{S} \\
\text { s.t. } \quad \sum_{S \ni i} \lambda_{S}=1, \forall i \in N .
\end{array}
$$

According to the duality theorem of linear programming, if these two problems have solutions, then they are the same.

### 8.2.3 Coalitional Game without Transferable Payoff

For a coalitional game without transferable payoff, allocations among its members are not arbitrary. In other words, within each coalition, given its total payoff, not all possible allocations can be implemented in the coalition. As such, for the characteristic function of the coalition, instead of giving a certain value $v(S)$, it gives a set of allocations $v(S)$. We can consider the coalitional game with transferable payoff as one special case, in which $v(S) \equiv\left\{x \in \mathcal{R}^{N} \mid \sum_{i \in S} x_{i}=v(S), x_{j}=0, \forall j \in N \backslash S\right\}$.

A coalitional game without transferable payoff usually includes the following components: the set of players $N$; the set of allocations $X$; a set $v(S) \subseteq X$ given for any nonempty subset $S$ of $N$, which can be understood as possible allocations under coalition $S$; and the preference relation $\succ_{i}$ of each player on $X$.

Accordingly, the core of the coalitional game without transferable payoff $\left\langle N, X, v(\cdot), \succ_{i}\right\rangle$ can be defined as: for all $x \in V(N)$, there exists no coalition $S \subseteq N$ and a feasible allocation $y$, such that $y_{i} \succ_{i} x_{i}, \forall i \in S$. Scarf (1967) provided the condition for the existence of nonempty cores of the coalitional game without transferable payoff.

In the general equilibrium theory to be discussed in Part IV, the market exchange can be regarded to some extent as the formation of coalitions among players (i.e., the transactions among them in a coalition without transferable payoff). Relevant content will be discussed in depth in Chapter 12.

### 8.3 Application of the Core: Market Design

In the following, we consider the application of the concept of core and its importance, especially the application of matching theory that will be highlighted in the last part of the textbook. We first consider the exchange of goods (or resources), including the exchange of homogeneous goods and that of heterogeneous goods. The discussion here deals primarily with the transaction of a single indivisible commodity. The transaction of multiple types of (divisible) commodities are discussed in more detail in the general
equilibrium theory in Part IV. We then provide a brief introduction to the problem of matching. Matching theory has numerous applications, including matchings in the marriage market, labor market, etc. Relevant discussions largely concern the problem of equity and efficiency of educational opportunities, especially the application in the reform of the school admission approach. These examples are adopted from Osborne (2004) and Peter (2008). A detailed discussion of the basic results of matching theory and its applications will be presented in the last chapter of the textbook.

### 8.3.1 Transaction of Homogeneous Goods

Suppose that there are some homogeneous and indivisible goods, such as horses of the same type. Different individuals have different values or reserve prices or willingness to pay for the horses. In addition, in this economy, some individuals have horses, while others do not. We denote the group of individuals who own horses (owners) as $L,|L|=L$, and those without horses (non-owners) as $B,|B|=M$. To simplify the discussion, everyone has at most one horse. At the same time, each individual $i \in N \equiv L \cup B$ has a value $v_{i}$ for having the first horse and no extra value for having more horses, which means that the demand is at most the unit demand. We rank the values of non-owners for horses from the top to the lowest, $\beta_{1}, \cdots, \beta_{M}$, and the values of owners for horses from the lowest to the top, $\sigma_{1}, \cdots, \sigma_{L}$. We denote $k^{*}=\max \left\{k \mid \beta_{k}>\sigma_{k}\right\}$. When $k \leqq k^{*}$, $\beta_{k}>\sigma_{k}$, the top $k^{*}$ highest values of non-owners for horses are higher than the top $k^{*}$ lowest values by owners. During the transaction, the horses are transferred from the owners to the non-owners. In this way, both parties can benefit when the transaction occurs between high-value non-owners and low-value owners.

We denote the group of individuals who have sold horses (the seller group) as $L^{*} \subseteq L$, and the group of individuals who do not own horses initially but have purchased horses now as $B^{*} \subseteq B$. Assume that during the entire process of transaction, $r_{i}, i \in L$ is the income of the horse seller $i$, and $p_{j}, j \in B$ is the payment of the horse buyer $j$. The payoff allocation of
players corresponding to this transaction outcome is

$$
\mathbf{x}=\left(\max \left\{\beta_{j}-p_{j}, 0\right\}, \max \left\{\sigma_{i}, r_{i}\right\}\right)_{i \in L, j \in B}
$$

We now discuss below what conditions $\boldsymbol{x}$ should be satisfied to become the core of this transaction.

First, for $\boldsymbol{x}$, we must have $p_{j}=0$ for $j \in B \backslash B^{*}$. In other words, for the individual who does not participate in the transaction, the individual's payment or income is zero. Obviously, for $j \in B \backslash B^{*}$, if $p_{j}>0$, this means that even though agent $j$ does not participate in the transaction, he still needs to make extra payment $p_{j}$. Obviously, this outcome will be improved by the coalition of the economic agent $j$ alone because he does not need to make the extra payment in this way.

If $p_{j}<0$, this means that other economic agents need to give agent $j$ an extra positive payment $-p_{j}>0$. Obviously, this outcome will also be improved by the coalition of other players that excludes $j$, because the coalition of other players that excludes $j$ has the same amount of horses and positive revenue $-p_{j}>0$ relative to this outcome. They can evenly allocate this amount of money to each player in the coalition, so that the payoff of each member of the coalition can be improved. As a consequence, the only possible outcome is $p_{j}=0$. Similarly, we can also determine the income of the owner who is not involved in the transaction (i.e., $i \in L \backslash L^{*}$ ) to be $r_{i}=0$.

Secondly, for the owners or non-owners who participate in the transaction, the income of each seller and the payment of each buyer must be the same (i.e., $r_{i}=p_{j}$ for any $i \in L^{*}, j \in B^{*}$ ). Indeed, this is true. If there is a set $(i, j)$, such that $r_{i}<p_{j}$, then players $i$ and $j$ can form a coalition $\{i, j\}$, who can have the same amount of horses relative to outcome $\boldsymbol{x}$, but increased benefits of $p_{j}-r_{i}>0$. This additional increase can be evenly allocated among them, so that the coalition improves the outcome $\boldsymbol{x}$. As a result, we must have $r_{i} \geqq p_{j}$.

Because buyers and sellers of horses are equal in number, the total amount paid to purchase horses must be the same as the total amount of income from selling horses (because the buying and selling process consti-
tutes a closed system). In other words, $\sum_{i \in L^{*}} r_{i}=\sum_{j \in B^{*}} p_{j}$, and thus we must have $r_{i}=p_{j}=p^{*}$.

Next, we discuss the value range of $p^{*}$. We want to verify that $\boldsymbol{x}$, which satisfies $k^{*}=\left|L^{*}\right|=\left|B^{*}\right|$ and $p^{*} \in\left[\max \left\{\beta_{k^{*}+1}, \sigma_{k^{*}}\right\}, \min \left\{\beta_{k^{*}}, \sigma_{k^{*}+1}\right\}\right]$ is in the core (See Figure 8.2).


Figure 8.2: The Core of Market Transactions.

In a market transaction, for non-owners, if their valuation $\beta_{k} \geqq p^{*}$, they will participate in the transaction; and for owners, if their valuation $\sigma_{k} \leqq$ $p^{*}$, they will participate in the transaction. A transaction that maximizes the overall benefit will bring about all profitable transactions. In the previous setting, there are $k^{*}$ non-owners who have higher values than $k^{*}$ owners. Therefore, in all transactions of benefit maximization, there are $k^{*}$ buyers and $k^{*}$ sellers. In other words, the top $k^{*}$ non-owners who have the highest values constitute the buyer group, and the top $k^{*}$ owners who have the lowest values form the seller group. In order to prevent non-owners who have the $\left(k^{*}+1\right)$ th highest value or below from joining the buyer group, we have $p^{*} \geqq \beta_{k^{*}+1}$; at the same time, in order to prevent owners who have the $\left(k^{*}+1\right)$ th lowest value and above from joining the seller group, we have $p^{*} \leqq \sigma_{k^{*}+1}$. Consequently, the transaction price that maximizes the overall benefits must have $p^{*} \in\left[\max \left\{\beta_{k^{*}+1}, \sigma_{k^{*}}\right\}, \min \left\{\beta_{k^{*}}, \sigma_{k^{*}+1}\right\}\right]$. The
outcome of this transaction is:

$$
\begin{aligned}
& x_{i}=\max \left\{v_{i}, p^{*}\right\}, i \in L, \\
& x_{j}=\max \left\{v_{j}, p^{*}\right\}-p^{*} \geqq 0, j \in B .
\end{aligned}
$$

To verify that the outcome $\boldsymbol{x}$ satisfying the above conditions is in the core, it is necessary to show that there are no coalitions whose member$s^{\prime}$ benefits can be improved. For any coalition, the optimal arrangement for members is to allocate the horses to members with the highest valuations and transfer payoffs between the corresponding members, so that each member's payoff can be improved. For coalition $S$, we denote $l$ as the number of owners in $S$ and $b$ as the number of non-owners in $S$. Let $S^{*}$ be the top $l$ members who have the highest values for horses in $S$, and thus $\left|S^{*}\right|=l$ and $\left|S \backslash S^{*}\right|=b$. When the coalition optimally allocates the horses, the total benefit of the coalition $S$ is $v(S)=\sum_{i \in S^{*}} v_{i}$.

For the initial $x$,

$$
\begin{aligned}
\boldsymbol{x}(S) & =\sum_{i \in S} \max \left\{v_{i}, p^{*}\right\}-b p^{*} \\
& =\sum_{i \in S^{*}} \max \left\{v_{i}, p^{*}\right\}+\sum_{i \in S \backslash S^{*}} \max \left\{v_{i}, p^{*}\right\}-b p^{*} \\
& \geqq \sum_{i \in S^{*}} v_{i}=v(S) .
\end{aligned}
$$

Since the above coalition $S$ is arbitrary, $\boldsymbol{x}$ is in the core.

### 8.3.2 Matching of Heterogeneous Goods

In the following, we discuss the exchange of indivisible items, such as the allocation problems of houses and offices. These problems are called the housing market problem in matching theory. For a more formal and rigorous discussion, see Section 22.3.1.

Now, we consider a group of individuals, each of whom owns a house. The houses are different. The values of the houses are also different to different players. If we do not consider the monetary factor (i.e., there are no transfers), then what would be a stable allocation that can maximize
the welfare of the individuals? A stable allocation means that there is no coalition that can improve the situation of its members through exchanges within the coalition. If an allocation does not maximize individuals' welfare, it is possible to improve their welfare by forming coalitions to obtain new allocations. The concept of core happens to possess such property.

In the previous section, we already have the existence theorem of core. However, in reality, what we need more is to determine how to find the specific allocations in the core. In the exchange of indivisible heterogeneous items where money is not the medium of exchange, there is an algorithm that can be utilized to find a core allocation in finite steps. This method is called the top trading cycle mechanism. It first appeared in Shapley and Scarf (1974), ${ }^{2}$, but they gave credit for it to David Gale.

The top trading cycle mechanism can be described as follows. In step 1, everyone ranks all goods in order; everyone's most preferred good is owned by someone in this group, and everyone's most preferred good is different from others' (thus constituting strict orderings of goods). Let every one point to the owner's most preferred good. Since there are only finitely many participants, there will be cycle(s) which are called the top trading cycles. Note that a participant pointing to herself also constitutes a cycle. Let participants in cycles exchange and remove them. In step 2, with the remaining participants and goods, rank participants' preference for the goods and search for another top cycle. Subsequently, in each step, participants and goods in previous cycles are removed, until all of the participants and items have participated in top trading cycles (of different steps).

We now argue that there exist top trading cycles for all exchanges that involve a finite number of participants and goods. Let $N=\{1, \cdots, n\}$ denote the set of players; for player $i$, the initial endowment owned by the player is denoted by $h_{i}$; the set of all initial endowments is $H$. In order to simplify the discussion, it is assumed that participant $i$ 's preference for the set of goods is strict (i.e., player $i$ is not indifferent between any two items), and is denoted by $\succ_{i}$. In this way, we rule out the possibility of a tie. In the case of dealing with indifferent preference, more sophisticated techniques

[^14]are required. Participant $i$ can rank the items in set $H$ in order of preference from the highest to the lowest. If $\left|\left\{h^{\prime} \in H \mid h^{\prime} \succ_{i} h\right\}\right|=k-1$, which means for player $i$, only $k-1$ goods are preferred to $h$ in the set of goods, then participant $i$ is ranked $k$ in $h$, denoted by $h=R_{i}(k)$.

Definition 8.3.1 (Top Trading Cycle) We say that $\left\{i_{1}, \cdots, i_{K}\right\}$ constitutes a $K$-loop top trading cycle, if for any $k<K$, we have $h_{i_{k+1}}=R_{i_{k}}(1)$ and $h_{i_{1}}=R_{i_{K}}(1)$.

In the following, we show that if every agent has only one good, then there must be a top trading cycle.

First, consider $N=2$. If $i \in\{1,2\}$ and $h_{i}=R_{i}(1)$. Obviously, $\{i\}$ is a top trading cycle; otherwise, $h_{1}=R_{2}(1)$ and $h_{2}=R_{1}(1)$ must hold, and thus $\{1,2\}$ is a top cycle.

Next, consider $N=3$. If $i \in\{1,2\}$ and $h_{i}=R_{i}(1)$, obviously, $\{i\}$ is a top cycle; otherwise, for player 1 , we have $h_{2}=R_{1}(1)$ or $h_{3}=R_{1}(1)$. When $h_{2}=R_{1}(1)$, consider the preference list of player 2. If $h_{1}=R_{2}(1)$, then $\{1,2\}$ is a top cycle; if $h_{3}=R_{2}(1)$, consider the preference list of player 3. If $h_{2}=R_{3}(1)$, then $\{2,3\}$ is a top cycle; if $h_{1}=R_{3}(1)$, then $\{1,2,3\}$ is a top cycle. When $h_{3}=R_{1}(1)$, we will obtain similar results. Therefore, when $N=3$, a top cycle exists, as well.

Mathematical induction shows that within finitely many individuals, if each agent owns only one good, then there must be a top trading cycle. Of course, we can also relax the assumption of each agent having only one good and let agents have different numbers of items.

We next examine why the outcome of such a top trading cycle mechanism is a core allocation. As we know, if an outcome is a core allocation, then there exists no improvable coalition. During the operation of the top trading cycle mechanism, it is impossible for any individual in top trading cycles of the first step to improve the individual's welfare through any other allocation. As a consequence, coalitions that are likely to improve welfare must not include participants in top trading cycles of the first step. Second, for the participants in top trading cycles of the second step, no allocation can possibly improve their welfare by reallocation in the coalition without the participation of the individuals in top trading cycles of the first
step. Therefore, if all of the individuals in top trading cycles of the first step do not participate in a certain coalition, the individuals in top trading cycles of the second step will also not participate in the coalition. By analogy, if participants in top trading cycles of previous steps do not participate in a coalition, this coalition will not improve the welfare of participants in top trading cycles of the current step. As a result, there is no coalition that can improve the welfare of its members.

In the following, we discuss the top trading cycle mechanism through an example.

Example 8.3.1 (Exchange of Houses) Consider a group of four members. The house owned by player $i$ is denoted by $h_{i}$. The values of houses by each player are shown in Figure 8.3.

| Player 1 | Player 2 | Player 3 | Player 4 |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| $h_{2}$ | $h_{1}$ | $h_{1}$ | $h_{3}$ |
| - | - | $h_{2}$ | $h_{2}$ |
| - | - | $h_{4}$ | $h_{4}$ |
| - | - | $h_{3}$ | - |

Figure 8.3: The Top Trading Cycle of the First Step.

Each player's ordering of houses is from top to bottom, and the horizontal lines "-" appearing in the figure indicate that these parts of orderings can be arbitrary, which is not our concern here.

In the first step, $\{1,2\}$ constitutes a top trading cycle, while player 1 and player 2 make exchanges. In the second step, player 1 and player 2 have been removed, and player 3 and player 4 remain. Their preferences
are shown in Figure 8.4.

Player 3

| $h_{4}$ | $h_{3}$ |
| :---: | :---: |
| $h_{3}$ | $h_{4}$ |

Figure 8.4: The Top Trading Cycle of the Second Step.

In the second step, $\{3,4\}$ constitutes a top trading cycle, and thus player 3 and player 4 exchange. The outcome of the whole exchange is that player 1 owns the house of player 2, player 2 owns the house of player 1 , player 3 owns the house of player 4, player 4 owns the house of player 3, and there does not exist any improved coalition for this allocation outcome.

For a more detailed discussion of the top trading cycle, see one-sided matching in Chapter 22, where we present a systematic discussion of the matching mechanism of players and indivisible goods, as well as the efficiency and incentive characteristics of different mechanisms. In addition, the one-sided matching mechanism has a broad range of applications in school admissions (Abdulkadiroglu and Sonmez, 2003) and organ transplantation (Roth, Sonmez and Unver, 2004). These problems are discussed in depth in Chapter 22.

### 8.3.3 Two-sided Matching: Marriage Market

Gale and Shapley (1962) published a paper in The American Mathematical Monthly that discussed the matching problem in the marriage market, and opened up an entirely novel field of research, i.e., matching among different groups. This mechanism has a very wide range of applications, such as matching between companies and laborers in the labor market, matching
between hospitals and interns, matching between universities and scholars in the realm of education, matching between donees and donors in the field of organ donation, etc. Roth and Sotomayor (1992) and Abdulkadiroglu and Sonmez (2013) made comprehensive reviews of relevant literature in two different periods of time.

Here, we introduce one of the simplest matching problems (i.e., one-toone matching), such as the matching of men and women in the marriage market (e.g., "Blind Dating" shows frequently seen on television).

We assume that there are two groups that correspond to two sets of agents: $M=\left\{m_{1}, \cdots, m_{n}\right\}$ and $W=\left\{w_{1}, \cdots, w_{k}\right\}$, one for men and the other for women. The preference of member $i$ is defined on the opposite set of agents and herself. To simplify the discussion, assume that the preference is strict (i.e., there exist no agents that are indifferent and denoted by $\succ_{i}$ ).

Definition 8.3.2 (Matching) A mapping $\mu: M \cup W \rightarrow M \cup W$ is called a matching, if
(1) for all $i \in M, \mu(i) \in W \bigcup\{i\}$,
(2) for all $j \in W$, we $\mu(j) \in M \bigcup\{j\}$,
(3) $\mu(i)=j$ implies that $\mu(j)=i$.

We can understand that, in the matching of marriage, the matching of a man is either a woman, or himself (which can be understood as being single), and the matching of a woman is similar. We say that for a man $m \in M$, a woman $w$ is unacceptable if $m \succ_{m} w$. We discuss below what kind of matching $\mu$ is stable.

Definition 8.3.3 (Stable Matching) A matching $\mu$ is stable if it satisfies the following conditions:
(1) there exists no pair $(m, w)$ with $m \in M$ and $w \in W$, such that $w \succ_{m} \mu(m)$ and $m \succ_{w} \mu(w)$;
(2) for $i \in M \cup W$, if $\mu(i) \neq i$, then $\mu(i) \succ_{i} i$.

Stable matching means that if the mate of an agent is not the agent self, then the mate is surely acceptable to the agent; at the same time, there are
no two agents of the opposite groups who would both rather have each other than their current matching mates. The stability of matching is consistent with the concept of the core. First, if one's matching is unacceptable, then according to the definition of the core, the coalition of one's own can improve one's benefit. Second, for the matching problem, there are only two types of meaningful coalitions: one is a coalition of one agent, and the other is a coalition of a man and a woman.

In the matching, we rule out the possibility of polygamy, polyandry, or group marriages (shared husbands and wives), i.e., a coalition of multiple men and multiple women. Consequently, in a coalition formed by a man and a woman in the matching problem, stable matching is consistent with the core. However, the pertinent question is, how can we find the stable matching? Gale and Shapley (1962) proposed a deferred acceptance algorithm. The deferred acceptance algorithm introduced here is from Roth (2010).

There are two steps for each stage. We start with the first stage.
In the first step, each agent in the proposing group (e.g., a male agent) proposes to his most preferred choice (e.g., a female agent) in the proposed group (if there is anyone acceptable; otherwise, no proposal is made).

In the second step, each agent in the proposed group first removes the proposals of those unacceptable agents. If there are any remaining ones, choose the most preferred and reject the rest.

At stage $k$ : an agent in the proposing group who was rejected at stage $k-1$ can propose to the agent's most preferred agents among the acceptable ones who have not yet rejected the agent. If no acceptable choice remains, he or she makes no proposal. Each agent of the proposed group chooses the most preferred agent after comparison between the retained proposal in the last stage and the new proposals (if any) received at the current stage and reject the rest.

Stop stage: no new proposal occurs. In this stage, the agent in the proposed group is matched to the agent who he or she has retained. If an agent
of the proposing group does not receive any acceptance, or an agent of the proposed group does not receive any offer, the agent is matched with the agent self.

Gale and Shapley (1962) proved that there always exists a stable matching in the marriage market. We will discuss in detail the logic behind this in Chapter 22. Next, we use an example to understand the operation of the deferred acceptance algorithm.

Example 8.3.2 (Men Proposing Deferred Acceptance Algorithm) Consider marriage matching between three men and three women. Each agent's preference for agents in the opposite side is as follows (any unacceptable $\mathrm{man} /$ woman is removed from the ordered list of preference):

$$
\begin{array}{ll}
p\left(m_{1}\right)=w_{2}, w_{1}, w_{3} ; & p\left(w_{1}\right)=m_{1}, m_{2}, m_{3} ; \\
p\left(m_{2}\right)=w_{1}, w_{2}, w_{3} ; & p\left(w_{2}\right)=m_{3}, m_{1}, m_{2} ; \\
p\left(m_{3}\right)=w_{1}, w_{2}, w_{3} ; & p\left(w_{3}\right)=m_{1}, m_{2}, m_{3} .
\end{array}
$$

The procedure for the deferred acceptance algorithm is shown in the table below, in which the underlined proposals are being held without commitment.

| Stage | $w_{1}$ | $w_{2}$ | $w_{3}$ |
| :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- |
| 1 | $\underline{m_{2}}, m_{3}$ | $\underline{m_{1}}$ |  |
| 2 |  | $m_{1}, \underline{m_{3}}$ |  |
| 3 | $\underline{m_{1}}, m_{2}$ |  |  |
| 4 |  | $m_{2}, \underline{m_{3}}$ |  |
| 5 |  |  | $\underline{m_{2}}$ |

The marriage matching outcome between men and women is:

$$
\mu_{M}^{D A}=\left(\begin{array}{lll}
w_{1} & w_{2} & w_{3} \\
m_{1} & m_{3} & m_{2}
\end{array}\right)
$$

It is easy to verify that this matching outcome satisfies the stability condition.

Of course, with different groups as the proposing group, the matching outcome of the deferred acceptance algorithm may be dissimilar. For instance, the matching outcome with male (or female) as the proposing group is the best matching outcome for the male (or female) group in all possible stable matchings. Simultaneously, the set of stable matchings coincides with the set of cores. In addition, stable matching is not strategyproof (by manipulatively reporting preference information) (Roth, 1982). These conclusions are discussed in detail in Chapter 22.

Environmental changes or information asymmetry will cause the rupture of some initial stable matchings, and thus matching can also be highly dynamic. If employment is viewed as matching between firms and workers, while unemployment is regarded as the rupture of matching, then we can use the matching method to study employment and unemployment.

In many matching problems, there exists a medium of exchange, such as money. Moreover, the matching process may be accompanied by some contracts, such as labor contracts in the matching between workers and firms that provide terms, including wages, duties, etc. Kelso and Crawford (1982) introduced contracts in the analytical framework of matching, and this analytical framework is combined with the auction mechanism (Hatfield and Milgrom, 2005). For a more in-depth discussion of these issues, see Chapter 22.

We next discuss the concept of other stable allocations in the cooperative game.

### 8.4 Stable Set, Bargaining Set, and Shapley Value

The stability of the core comes from blocking any deviations. However, the deviation itself may be unstable, and the deviation can lead to new deviations. The initial deviation may also bring worse outcomes to the deviant. Therefore, the concept of stability needs a reasonable justification. In the following, we will further explore stability in the cooperative game by constraining the deviation. We will introduce some related concepts based on different constraints, including stable set, bargaining set, and the Shapley value. Here, we focus on the type of coalitional game with transferable
payoff. Furthermore, the bargaining mechanism plays an important role in the process of formation of coalition. Ray (2006) employed the method of (cooperative and non-cooperative) game theory to discuss in depth the mechanism of coalition formation.

### 8.4.1 Stable Set

Von Neumann and Morgenstein (1944) proposed the concept of the stable set. This concept is related to the negotiation process. Assume that a feasible allocation disappoints some players who, therefore, may propose a blocking that is favorable for them. If their blocking is inherently unstable, there will be subsequent reactions. If the final stable outcome is not as good as the previous allocation, then it is not a meaningful deviation to the coalition. In other words, what a coalition $S$ puts forward should be a credible blocking. The so-called credibility means that the blocking is stable (i.e., no new blocking or possibly chain of blockings will be triggered, such that eventually some members of the coalition are worse off than previously).

In this way, a set of stable outcomes need to satisfy two conditions: first, for each unstable outcome, there is a coalition that can present a credible blocking; second, for any stable outcome, there is no other credible blocking. Therefore, the solution concept is discussed in terms of sets. By the concept of stable set, we can divide the feasible outcomes into a stable set and an unstable set.

Definition 8.4.1 (Blocking of Coalition) An allocation $x$ is called a blocking of coalition $S$ against allocation $\boldsymbol{y}$ if for any $i \in S$, we have $x_{i} \succ_{i} y_{i}$ and $\boldsymbol{x}(S) \leqq v(S)$, denoted by $\boldsymbol{x} \succ_{S} \boldsymbol{y}$.

Definition 8.4.2 (Stable Set) We say that a subset $Y$ of the feasible allocation set $X$ of the coalitional game with transferable payoff $\langle N, \boldsymbol{v}\rangle$ is a stable set, if it satisfies the following two conditions:
(1) (Internal Stability) No allocation $\boldsymbol{y} \in Y$ is blocked by any allocation $z \in Y$.
(2) (External Instability) Every $\boldsymbol{z} \in X / Y$ is blocked by some allocation $\boldsymbol{y} \in Y$.

Von Neumann and Morgenstein explained that each stable set constitutes a behavior pattern, and the allocations of different stable sets correspond to different behavior patterns.

The following proposition summarizes the relationship between the core and the stable set, and the property of the stable set.

Proposition 8.4.1 The core is a subset of every stable set; no stable set is a proper subset of another stable set; if the core forms a stable set, then it is the only stable set.

In the following example, the core is empty, but there are multiple stable sets.

Example 8.4.1 (Continued from Example 8.2.2) There are three players, and a total of 300 units of resources that are available for allocation. The rule is: the allocation plan can be passed with majority consent. The expression of their coalition: for coalitional game $\langle N, v\rangle, N=\{1,2,3\}$, if $S \subseteq N$ and $|S| \geqq 2$, then we have $v(S)=300$ (here the function $|\cdot|$ represents the number counting function); if $S \subseteq N$ and $|S|=1$, then we have $v(S)=0$.
$Y_{1}=\{(150,150,0),(150,0,150),(0,150,150)\}$ is a stable set. For this stable set, its behavior pattern is that the coalition members allocate the coalition income evenly. Firstly, for each element of $Y_{1}$, there exists no deviation in $Y_{1}$. For any $\boldsymbol{z} \in X / Y_{1}$, where $X=\left\{\left(x_{1}, x_{2}, x_{3}\right) \mid x_{i} \geqq 0, x_{1}+x_{2}+x_{3}=300\right\}$, obviously there exists $i \neq j, z_{i}<150, z_{j}<150$ and a coalition $S=\{i, j\}$, such that in $Y_{1},\left(y_{i}=y_{j}=150, y_{k}=0\right)$ is a blocking in $Y_{1}$ to $\boldsymbol{z}$.
$Y_{k, c}=\left\{\left(y_{i}\right)_{i \in N} \mid y_{k}=c \in[0,300], \forall i \neq k, y_{i} \geqq 0, \sum_{i \in N} y_{i}=300\right\}$ is also a stable set. Its behavior pattern is that the player $k$ gets a fixed value $c$. Therefore, there are infinite stable sets in this coalitional game.

Next, we verify that $Y_{k, c}$ is a stable strategy. Firstly, the outcome $z_{k}>c$ will be improved with an outcome $\boldsymbol{y}$ in $Y_{k, c}$ by the coalition $\{i, j\}, i \neq k, j \neq$ $k$ formed by other players, for example, $\boldsymbol{y}=\left(y_{k}=c, y_{i}=z_{i}+\frac{z_{k}-c}{2}, y_{j}=\right.$ $\left.z_{j}+\frac{z_{k}-c}{2}\right)$. If $z_{k}<c$, then there always exists an $i \neq k$, such that $z_{i}>0$, and thus $\{k, j\}, j \neq k, j \neq i$ can be improved with any outcome $\boldsymbol{y}$ in $Y_{k, c}$, for example, $\boldsymbol{y}=\left(y_{k}=c, y_{i}=0, y_{j}=300-c\right)$. In addition, for any outcomes in the set $Y_{k, c}$, there does not possibly exist any coalition, such that the choice
of other outcomes within $Y_{k, c}$ will improve the situation of the coalition members.

### 8.4.2 Bargaining Set, Kernel, and Nucleolus

We can also utilize the bargaining method to restrict blocking in the negotiation process. Under this method, the deviation chain generated by each blocking is divided into two steps. The stability condition means that for each blocking, there is a counter-blocking constraint. The idea here is that, if a certain set is stable, then there exists no stable blocking. Stability here is reflected in the way that if a player raises a blocking against other players and the blocking increases the player's payoff, then players suffering a loss because of this blocking can always put forward a counter-blocking against the previous objector. Therefore, the previous blocking is not a stable blocking, because the previous objector's payoff will eventually become worse.

In the following, we discuss the two stages of three types of blocking and counter-blocking coalitions. Different types correspond to the solution concepts of different stable outcomes.

The first type of blocking and counter-blocking:

Blocking: We say that a 2-tuple $(\boldsymbol{y}, S)$ is a blocking to $\boldsymbol{x}$ that player $i$ proposes against player $j$, if: $i \in S, j \notin S, \boldsymbol{y}$ is a feasible payoff allocation for $S$ that improves the payoff of each coalition member (i.e., $\forall k \in S, y_{k}>x_{k}$ ).

Counter-blocking: We say that a 2-tuple $(\boldsymbol{z}, T)$ is a counterblocking that player $j$ proposes against player $i$ 's blocking $(\boldsymbol{y}, S)$, if $j \in T, i \notin T$, and $\boldsymbol{z}$ is a feasible payoff allocation for $T$, such that $\forall k \in T \backslash S, z_{k} \geqq x_{k}$, and $\forall l \in T \cap S, z_{l} \geqq y_{l}$. In other words, for members who are in the counter-blocking coalition $T$ but not in blocking coalition $S$, their payoffs under counter-blocking will not be worse than under the initial allocation. For members who are in both blocking and counter-blocking coalitions, their payoffs will not be worse
than the allocation under blocking. These are the necessary conditions for the members of $T$ to join the coalition.

The second type of blocking and counter-blocking:
Let $e(S, \boldsymbol{x})=v(S)-\boldsymbol{x}(S)$, which we call the excess of coalition $S$ relative to allocation $\boldsymbol{x}$. When $e(S, \boldsymbol{x})<0$, it reflects the gain of coalition $S$, and when $e(S, \boldsymbol{x})>0$, it reflects the sacrifice made by the coalition.

Blocking: We say that a coalition $S$ is a blocking to $\boldsymbol{x}$ that player $i$ proposes against player $j$, if $i \in S, j \notin S$, and $x_{j}>v(j)$. This condition reflects the fact that the player $j$ gets more resources $x_{j}>v(j)$ in allocation $\boldsymbol{x}$ than in the player's own coalition, and the coalition $S$ excludes $j$ to reduce the plaer's benefit.

Counter-blocking: We say that a coalition $T$ is a counter-blocking that player $j$ proposes against player $i^{\prime}$ s blocking $S$, if $i \notin$ $T, j \in T$, and $e(T, \boldsymbol{x})>e(S, \boldsymbol{x})$. This condition reflects that player $j$ can find a counter-blocking coalition $T$ that includes the agent self but does not include player $i$, such that the counter-blocking coalition which supports the allocation $\boldsymbol{x}$ can get less or sacrifice more.

The third type of blocking and counter-blocking:

Blocking: We say that a 2-tuple $(\boldsymbol{y}, S)$ is a blocking against feasible allocation $\boldsymbol{x}$, if $e(S, \boldsymbol{x})>e(S, \boldsymbol{y})$ (i.e., $\boldsymbol{y}(S)>\boldsymbol{x}(S)$ ). This means that the blocking coalition $S$ obtains more in the blocking allocation $\boldsymbol{y}$ than in the initial allocation $\boldsymbol{x}$.

Counter-blocking: We say that a coalition $T$ is a counter-blocking against blocking $(\boldsymbol{y}, S)$, if $e(T, \boldsymbol{y})>e(T, \boldsymbol{x})$ (i.e., $x(T)>$ $\boldsymbol{y}(T))$ and $e(T, \boldsymbol{y})>e(S, \boldsymbol{x})$. This means that the counterblocking coalition $T$ can get more in allocation $\boldsymbol{x}$ than the initial allocation $\boldsymbol{y}$, while the counter-blocking coalition $T$ sacrifices more to support the blocking allocation $\boldsymbol{y}$ than the blocking coalition $S$ does in the initial allocation $\boldsymbol{x}$.

The above two conditions are for the blocking coalition that deviates from the stable allocation, but not for any specific member of it.

These three types of different blocking and counter-blocking coalitions can form three associated stable solution concepts.

Definition 8.4.3 (Bargaining Set) We say that a set of coalitional game with transferable payoff is a bargaining set, if: (1) its element $\boldsymbol{x}$ is a feasible allocation; and (2) under the first type of blocking and counter-blocking, for a blocking $(\boldsymbol{y}, S)$ of any player $i$ to $\boldsymbol{x}$ against another player $j$, there always exists a counter-blocking of player $j$ against player $i^{\prime}$ blocking $(\boldsymbol{y}, S)$.

Definition 8.4.4 (Kernel) We say that a coalitional game with transferable payoff is a kernel, if: (1) its element $x$ is a feasible allocation; and (2) under the second type of blocking and counter-blocking, for a blocking $S$ of any player $i$ to $x$ against another player $j$, there always exists a counterblocking of player $j$ against player $i$ 's blocking $(\boldsymbol{y}, S)$.

For any two players $i$ and $j$ and any allocation $\boldsymbol{x}$, define $s_{i, j}(\boldsymbol{x})=$ $\max _{S \in C}\{e(S, \boldsymbol{x}): i \in S, j \notin S\}$, where $C=\{S: S \neq \emptyset, S \subseteq N\}$, which is the maximum surplus of coalition $S$ including $i$, but not including $j$. The following definition of the kernel is in accordance with the above. If $x$ is a feasible kernel element of $N$, then for any pair of players $i$ and $j$, either $s_{j, i}(\boldsymbol{x}) \geqq S_{i, j}(\boldsymbol{x})$, or it satisfies $x_{j}=v(\{j\})$ for all $j \in N$.

The kernel models a stable arrangement of the group, making each member have the following collective logic about the allocation $x$ in it: if player $i$ proposes a blocking to the allocation $\boldsymbol{x}$ and establishes a coalition $S$ including the player self, then the coalition excludes player $j$ who receives more benefits under the initial allocation than the payoff of the player self. The blocking was raised because player $i$ was dissatisfied with the payoff from the previous allocation $\boldsymbol{x}$. Player $j$ could raise a counter-blocking and create a coalition $T$ that includes the player self (player $j$ ), but does not include the blocker (player $i$ ). This coalition sacrifices more or gains less than the blocking coalition $S$ under the allocation $x$. In other words, if the
initial allocation $x$ is blocked, players can obtain more than in the previous blocking coalition by forming the counter-blocking coalition $T$.

Definition 8.4.5 (Nucleolus) We say that a coalitional game with transferable payoff is a nucleolus if: (1) its element $\boldsymbol{x}$ is a feasible allocation; and (2) under the third type of blocking and counter-blocking, for a blocking $(S, \boldsymbol{y})$ to $\boldsymbol{x}$, there always exists a counter-blocking to block $(S, \boldsymbol{y})$.

The idea of the nucleolus is closely related to the idea of the kernel. If the coalition $S$ is not satisfied with allocation $\boldsymbol{x}$, measured by $e(S, \boldsymbol{x})$, the coalition believes that it contributes too much. In the kernel, blocking is raised by one of the players; whereas, in the nucleolus, it is raised by the coalition. A blocking $(S, \boldsymbol{y})$ can be interpreted as such opinion of the coalition: "In allocation $\boldsymbol{x}$, our contribution is too big, and thus we propose a relatively less contributing allocation $\boldsymbol{y}$." The nucleolus depicts that one of the other coalitions, $T$, can raise such a counter-blocking: "Your opinion is not justified because we have contributed more in allocation $\boldsymbol{y}$ than in allocation $\boldsymbol{x}$, and our contribution in allocation $\boldsymbol{y}$ is more than what you (i.e., the coalition $S$ ) contribute in allocation $\boldsymbol{x}$." Therefore, the idea of the nucleolus reflects the concept of equity (i.e., how much contribution players should make in the group).

In the following, we discuss the allocations (sets) corresponding to these three concepts through some examples.

Example 8.4.2 (Continued from Example 8.2.2 (2)) There are three players , and a total of 300 units of resources that are available for allocation. For coalitional game $\langle N, v\rangle, N=\{1,2,3\}$, if $S \subseteq N$ and $|S| \geqq 2$, then we have $v(S)=300$; if $S \subseteq N$ and $|S|=1$, then we have $v(S)=0$.

First, we solve for the bargaining set of the coalitional game. In this example, the set is a singleton whose allocation is ( $x_{i}=100, \forall i \in N$ ). To see this, let feasible allocation $\boldsymbol{x}$ be in the bargaining set. If $(\boldsymbol{y}, S)$ is a blocking of player $i$ to $x$ against player $j$, then she will propose $S=\{i, h\}, i \neq h \neq j$, satisfying: $y_{h}>x_{h}, y_{i}>x_{i}$, and $y_{h} \leqq 300-y_{i}$, getting $y_{h} \leqq 300-x_{i}$, and thus player $i$ and player $h$ receive more benefits in the blocking coalition. Since $\boldsymbol{x}$ is in the bargaining set, player $j$ can always propose a counterblocking $(\boldsymbol{z}, T)$. Let $T=\{j, h\}$, and $\boldsymbol{z}$ satisfies: $z_{h} \geqq y_{h}, z_{j} \geqq x_{j}$, and
$z_{h} \leqq 300-z_{j}$. Therefore, we have: $z_{h} \leqq 300-x_{j}$. Thus, if $\boldsymbol{x}$ is a bargaining set, then as long as $y_{h}<300-x_{i}$, we will have $y_{h} \leqq 300-x_{j}$; otherwise, $z_{h} \geqq y_{h}>300-x_{j}$. Therefore, $300-x_{i} \leqq 300-x_{j}$ (i.e., $x_{j} \leqq x_{i}$ ). Since $i$ and $j$ are arbitrary, we have $x_{i}=x_{j}=x_{h}$ and $x_{i}+x_{j}+x_{h}=300$. Consequently, the only bargaining set is a singleton (i.e., the allocation $\left(x_{i}=100, \forall i \in N\right)$ ).

Suppose that the feasible allocation $\boldsymbol{x}$ is the kernel. Then, it can always be ranked as $x_{i} \geqq x_{j} \geqq x_{h}, i \geqq j \geqq h$. We now verify that if one of the above inequalities is a strict inequality, then the allocation is not possible in the kernel. If at least one of the above is a strict inequality, then $x_{i}>x_{j}$, and $x_{i}>100>0=v(i)$. For the blocking of player $j$ to $\boldsymbol{x}$ against player $i$, in coalition $S=\{h, j\}, h \neq i$, we have $s_{j i}(\boldsymbol{x})=e(S, \boldsymbol{x})=300-x_{j}-x_{h}$, and thus there exists no counter-blocking $T=\{i, h\}, h \neq j$ of $i$ to the blocking of $j$ because $s_{i j}(\boldsymbol{x})=e(T, \boldsymbol{x})=300-x_{i}-x_{h} \leqq S_{j i}(\boldsymbol{x})$. Therefore, the allocation in the kernel must satisfy $x_{i}=100, \forall i \in N$.

For nucleolus: consider feasible allocation $x_{i} \geqq x_{h} \geqq x_{j}$. If at least one is a strict inequality, then $x_{i}>x_{j}$ and $x_{i}>100$. Consider a blocking to $\boldsymbol{x}, S=\{j, h\}$, and $\boldsymbol{y}=(100,100,100)$. Since $e(S, \boldsymbol{y})=300-200=100<$ $300-x_{j}-x_{h}=x_{i}=e(S, \boldsymbol{x})$, there exists no counter-blocking coalition $T$, such that $e(T, \boldsymbol{y})>e(T, \boldsymbol{x})$ and $e(T, \boldsymbol{y})>e(S, \boldsymbol{x})$.
$|T| \neq 3$; otherwise, $e(T, \boldsymbol{y})=e(T, \boldsymbol{x})=0$. Meanwhile, $|T| \neq 1$; otherwise, $e(T, \boldsymbol{y}) \leqq 0$. If $|T|=2$, then $e(T, \boldsymbol{y})=300-200<e(S, \boldsymbol{x})$. Therefore, $x_{i}>x_{h}$ cannot be in the nucleolus. It is easy to verify that $\boldsymbol{y}=(100,100,100)$ is in the nucleolus.

Note that the sets of solutions for these three concepts are not necessarily identical. The following example shows that the kernel is a proper subset of the bargaining set.

Example 8.4.3 (Simple Game) A simple game refers to a coalitional game with transferable payoff whose characteristic value is either 1 or 0 . Consider the following simple game consisting of four players, $N=\{1,2,3,4\}$, if and only if $S=\{2,3,4\}$, or $\{1, i\} \subseteq S$, for any $i \in\{2,3,4\}$. In this game, we can verify that no core exists. Player 1 is in a stronger position relative to other players; other than the player, every other player is in equal position. Do the allocations under the three solution concepts (i.e., bargaining set,
kernel, and nucleolus) discussed above also reflect their positions?
Firstly, we discuss the bargaining set. If $\boldsymbol{x}$ is an element in it, we must have $x_{2}=x_{3}=x_{4}$; otherwise, for $i, j \in\{2,3,4\}$, we have $x_{i}<x_{j}$. Then, player $i$ can propose a blocking against $j$ (i.e., $(T=\{1, i\}, y)$ ), satisfying $y_{1}=1-y_{i}, y_{i}=x_{i}+\frac{x_{j}-x_{i}}{2}$, and player $j$ does not have a corresponding counter-blocking, and thus we must have $x_{2}=x_{3}=x_{4}=\alpha$. In addition, $\alpha$ also has upper and lower bounds. If $\alpha$ is high, player 1 will have a credible blocking. For example, the player may raise a blocking ( $\boldsymbol{y}, S=\{1,3\}$ ) against player 2, $y_{1}>1-3 \alpha, y_{3}=1-y_{1}<3 \alpha$, and $y_{j}>\alpha$. If player 2 cannot raise a counter-blocking $(\boldsymbol{z}, T=\{2,3,4\}), z_{2} \geqq \alpha, z_{3} \geqq y_{3}$, and $z_{4} \geqq \alpha$, then it must satisfy $\alpha+3 \alpha+\alpha>1$, or $\alpha>\frac{1}{5}$. Meanwhile, $\alpha$ cannot be too low; otherwise, player 2 can propose a blocking against player 1: $(\boldsymbol{y}, S=\{2,3,4\})$ and $y_{2}>\alpha$. As such, $j, k \in\{3,4\}$, and $y_{j} \leqq y_{k}$, and thus we must have $y_{j}<\frac{1-\alpha}{2}$. If player 1 cannot propose a counter-blocking $(\boldsymbol{z}, T=\{1, j\})$, then it satisfies $z_{1} \geqq 1-3 \alpha$ and $z_{j} \geqq y_{j}$, and we must have $1-3 \alpha+\frac{1-\alpha}{2}>1$, or $\alpha<\frac{1}{7}$. As a consequence, the bargaining set is $\left\{(1-3 \alpha, \alpha, \alpha, \alpha): \frac{1}{7} \leqq \alpha \leqq \frac{1}{5}\right\}$.

Now, we discuss the set of the kernel. Firstly, if allocation $x$ is in the kernel, we must have $x_{2}=x_{3}=x_{4}$; otherwise, without loss of generality, suppose that $x_{2} \geqq x_{3} \geqq x_{4}$ and $x_{2}>x_{4}$. Thus, $x_{2}>0=v(\{2\})$, player 4 can propose a blocking against player 2 (i.e., $s_{4,2}(\boldsymbol{x})=e(\{1,4\}$ and $\boldsymbol{x})=$ $\left.1-x_{4}\right)$ such that player 2 cannot propose a credible counter-blocking. This is because, for $s_{2,4}(\boldsymbol{x})=e(\{1,2\}, \boldsymbol{x})=1-x_{2}<s_{4,2}(\boldsymbol{x})$, we must have $x_{2}=x_{3}=x_{4}=\alpha$ and $x_{1}=1-3 \alpha$. Secondly, if allocation $x$ is in the kernel, then we have $x_{1}=\frac{2}{5}$ and $x_{2}=x_{3}=x_{4}=\frac{1}{5}$. This is because when allocation $\boldsymbol{x}$ is in the kernel, if $x_{2}>v(\{2\})=0$ (i.e., $\alpha>0$ ), for $s_{1,2}(\boldsymbol{x})=e(\{1,3\}, \boldsymbol{x})=2 \alpha$ and $s_{2,1}(\boldsymbol{x})=e(\{2,3,4\}, \boldsymbol{x})=1-3 \alpha$, we have $s_{2,1}(\boldsymbol{x}) \geqq s_{1,2}(\boldsymbol{x})$ or $\alpha \leqq \frac{1}{5}$; if $x_{1}>v(\{2\})=0$ or $\alpha<\frac{1}{3}$, then we have $s_{2,1}(\boldsymbol{x}) \leqq s_{1,2}(\boldsymbol{x})$ or $\alpha \geqq \frac{1}{5}$. Therefore, $\alpha=\frac{1}{5}$.

Osborne and Rubinstein (1994) depicted the relationship between the above three concepts in the following way: the kernel is a subset of the bargaining set, and the nucleolus is a subset of the kernel. They also demonstrated that in any cohesive coalitional game with transferable payoff, the
nucleolus is always nonempty, and it consists of a single point. For a more detailed discussion, one can refer to their book.

### 8.4.3 Shapley Value

The previous solution concepts are all based on a single game, while the Shapley value discussed below is based on a series of games. In all games, the marginal contributions of a player to the coalition and the payoff that its average value assigns to the player reflect some kind of equity, which means that one's revenue is associated with one's contribution. The Shapley value is widely adopted and has good properties.

Let $\langle N, v\rangle$ be a coalitional game with transferable payoff. We call the $\left\langle S, v^{S}\right\rangle$ a subgame of the coalitional game, where $S \subseteq N$, if for any $T \subseteq S$, we always have $v(T)=v^{S}(T)$. Let $\psi$ be a value that is a feasible payoff allocation to the coalitional game with transferable payoff. For $i \in S, \psi_{i}\left(S, v^{S}\right)$ characterizes the payoff of player $i$ in the subgame $\left\langle S, v^{S}\right\rangle$.

The blocking of player $i$ to $j$ is against the feasible payoff allocation $\boldsymbol{x}$ of the whole coalitional game $\langle N, v\rangle$.

There are two types of blocking:
The first type: player $i$ requests more benefits; otherwise, the player will leave the initial game, making player $j$ 's payoff decrease from $x_{j}$ to $\psi_{j}\left(N /\{i\}, v^{N\{i\}}\right)$.

The second type: player $i$ requests more benefits; otherwise, the player will join the others to exclude player $j$. During this process, player $i^{\prime}$ s payoff increases from $x_{i}$ to $\psi_{i}\left(N /\{j\}, v^{N /\{j\}}\right)$.

For the two types of blocking of player $i$, player $j$ has two corresponding types of counter-blocking:

The first type of counter-blocking: although the payoff of player $j$ decreases after blocker $i$ 's leaving, player $j$ 's leaving will lead to a greater decrease in the payoff of blocker $i$ (i.e., $x_{i}-$ $\left.\psi_{i}\left(N /\{j\}, v^{N /\{j\}}\right) \geqq x_{j}-\psi_{j}\left(N /\{i\}, v^{N /\{i\}}\right)\right)$.

The second type of counter-blocking: player $j$ proposes that if she joins other players to exclude player $i$, the increase in
the payoff is greater than that when $i$ excludes player $j$ (i.e., $\left.\psi_{j}\left(N /\{i\}, v^{N /\{i\}}\right)-x_{j} \geqq \psi_{i}\left(N /\{j\}, v^{N /\{j\}}\right)-x_{i}\right)$.

Under the solution concept of the previous coalitional game, a stable solution means that each blocking corresponds to a counter-blocking. Thus, if for any group of players, $i, j \in N, i \neq j$, we always have $\psi_{j}\left(N /\{i\}, v^{N /\{i\}}\right)-$ $x_{j}=\psi_{i}\left(N /\{j\}, v^{N /\{j\}}\right)-x_{i}$, then $\boldsymbol{x}$ is stable.

It is noted that in the Shapley value, blocking and counter-blocking involve the subgames of the entire coalitional game, and the previously discussed blocking and counter-blocking are limited only to the entire game. We first have the following definition.

Definition 8.4.6 (Balanced Contribution) We say that a solution $\psi$ satisfies the property of balanced contribution, if for $i, j \in N, i \neq j$,

$$
\psi_{j}(N, v)-\psi_{j}\left(N /\{i\}, v^{N /\{i\}}\right)=\psi_{i}(N, v)-\psi_{i}\left(N /\{j\}, v^{N /\{j\}}\right)
$$

Shapley (1953) proposed the concept of the Shapley value, which is based on individuals' marginal contributions. The marginal contribution of player $i$ to the coalition $S$ is defined as $\Delta_{i}(S)=v(S \cup i)-v(S)$.

The Shapley value is defined as $\psi_{j}(N, v)=\frac{1}{|N|!} \sum_{R \in \Re} \Delta_{i}(S(R))$, in which $R$ is a permutation of the set of players $N$, the number of all possible permutations is $|N|$ !, the set of all permutations is denoted by $\Re$, and $S(R)$ is all players before player $i$ in permutation $R$.

Therefore, the payoff that the Shapley value assigns to each player equals the average of the player's marginal contribution to all possible coalitions.

It can be shown that the Shapley value is the only solution that satisfies the property of balanced contribution and, in addition, satisfies the following three properties.
(1) Symmetry (SYM): for any $S \subseteq N, i \notin S, j \notin S, \Delta_{i}(S(R))=\Delta_{j}(S(R))$ implies $\varphi_{i}(N, n)=\varphi_{j}(N, n) ;$
(2) Dummy players (DUM): if $\Delta_{i}(S)=v(j)$ for any $S \subseteq N, i \notin S$, then $\varphi_{i}(N, n)=v(i) ;$
(3) Additivity (ADD): for any two games $\langle N, v\rangle$ and $\langle N, w\rangle$, and for any $i \in N$, we have

$$
\varphi_{i}(N, v+w)=\varphi_{i}(N, v)+\varphi_{i}(N, w)
$$

where $\langle N, v+w\rangle$ is defined as: for any $S \subseteq N,(v+w)(S)=v(S)+$ $w(S)$.

Now, we show how to solve for the Shapley value through some examples.

Example 8.4.4 (Continued from Example 8.2.2 (3)) There are three players, and a total of 300 units of resources that are available for allocation. For coalitional game $\langle N, v\rangle, N=\{1,2,3\}$, if $S \subseteq N$ and $|S| \geqq 2$, then $v(S)=300$; if $S \subseteq N$ and $|S|=1$, then $v(S)=0$.

By the definition of the Shapley value, there are six possible permutations of the set of players $N$ (i.e., there are only two possible permutations in which each player $i$ can have a positive marginal contribution of 300). Consequently, the Shapley value of this game is $\varphi(N, n)=(100,100,100)$. The Shapley value can also be obtained with symmetry. Because the contribution of each player in the coalition is symmetric, the payoffs that they receive are also the same.

Example 8.4.5 (Weighted Majority Game) A weighted majority game is a kind of simple game, in which the weight of player $i$ is defined as $w_{i}$, and the fixed amount $q$ represents the lower bound of weight required to become the winning coalition:

$$
v(S)= \begin{cases}1, & \sum_{i \in S} w(i) \geqq q \\ 0, & \text { otherwise }\end{cases}
$$

Assume that the set of players is $N=\{1,2,3,4\}$, and their weight is:

$$
\left(w_{i}\right)= \begin{cases}0.2, & i=1 \\ 0.4, & \text { otherwise }\end{cases}
$$

In the 24 possible permutations, calculate the average of the players'
marginal contribution, and we obtain the Shapley value of the entire game:

$$
\varphi\langle N, n\rangle=\left\{\frac{1}{2}, \frac{1}{6}, \frac{1}{6}, \frac{1}{6}\right\} .
$$

Example 8.4.6 Consider the previous simple game, $N=\{1,2,3,4\}$. It is a simple game if and only if $S=\{2,3,4\}$, or $\{1, i\} \subseteq S$, for any $i \in\{2,3,4\}$. We know that the game's kernel and nucleolus allocation outcome is $x_{1}=$ $\frac{2}{5}, x_{2}=x_{3}=x_{4}=\frac{1}{5}$. Next, we calculate the Shapley value of this game. In all 24 possible permutations, player 1's marginal contribution is 1 in 12 of them and 0 in the rest; the other players' marginal contribution is 1 in 4 of them and 0 in the rest. In this way, the Shapley value for the entire game is: $\varphi\langle N, n\rangle=\left\{\frac{1}{2}, \frac{1}{6}, \frac{1}{6}, \frac{1}{6}\right\}$.

It can be seen that the Shapley value is different from the allocation of the nucleolus discussed earlier. They establish blocking and counterblocking mechanisms based on different environments, and thus have different applicability under various environments. Moreover, the coalitional games discussed above are based on transfers. For coalitional games without transferable payoff, there are also corresponding solution concepts , which usually involve a more mathematical and technical background. Readers can refer to certain books, such as Myerson (1991) and Peleg and Sudholter (2007).

### 8.5 Biographies

### 8.5.1 Robert J. Aumann

Robert J. Aumann (1930- ), an Israeli-American economist, made fundamental contributions to decision theory and played an important, or even indispensable, role in the formation of game theory and many other economic theories. In 2005, he shared the Nobel Memorial Prize in Economic Sciences with Thomas C. Schelling (see his biography in section 20.6.2), a Professor at the School of Public Policy of the University of Maryland, College Park, for "having enhanced our understanding of conflict and cooperation through game-theory analysis" .

In June 1930, Robert Aumann was born in a traditional Jewish family in Frankfurt am Main, Germany. He moved to the United States in 1938, received a bachelor's degree from the City College of New York, and received a Ph.D. degree in mathematics from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology in 1955. He then served as a strategic advisor and did two years of post-doctoral research at Princeton University. After that, he moved to Israel. Aumann was elected as a Fellow of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences in 1974; received the Harvey Prize in Science and Technology from the Technion-Israel Institute of Technology in 1983; has been a Member of the U.S. National Academy of Sciences since 1985; has been a Member of the Israel Academy of Sciences and Humanities since 1989; and received the Israel Prize for Economics in 1994. He is currently a Professor at the Center for the Study of Rationality at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem in Israel.

Aumann is the first to define the concept of correlated equilibrium in game theory, which is a type of equilibrium in non-cooperative games and more flexible than the classical Nash equilibrium. He has also proposed a market model with a continuum of traders, the most natural mathematical model for a market with perfect competition, and demonstrated that the core of such a market coincides with the set of its equilibrium allocations. The introduction of "continuum" has a great influence on the development of economics. Aumann points out that continuum can be viewed as an approximation to the true situation where there is a great, but finite, number of particles (or economic agents, strategies, or possible prices). Using continuum as a rough approximation makes it possible to apply a powerful, precise method called the "mathematical analysis", while a discrete method would be more difficult or even useless.

Aumann has also made numerous important contributions in the field of set-valued functions (i.e., functions map to multiple points rather than a single point), such as the "Aumann Measurable Choice Theorem" and the theory of integration of set-valued functions. Most of the problems that he investigated arise from the study of different game theories and economic models, while the continuum of economic agents and mathematical theory constitute important tools for the evolution and analysis of these
models. The results obtained by Aumann regarding general equilibrium, optimal allocation, nonlinear programming, control theory, measure theory, fixed-point theory, etc., are fundamental, and they are applied to numerous fields, such as economics, mathematics, operations research, etc. In addition, Aumann has extended the equilibrium outcome of the Kuhn's theorem on optimal behavior strategies in finite games of perfect recall to an infinite situation, overcoming complex technical difficulties.

### 8.5.2 Reinhard Selten

Reinhard Selten (1930-2016) was the founder of the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium, the founder of experimental economics, and winner of the 1994 Nobel Memorial Prize in Economic Sciences.

Selten was born in Breslau, a German city that became part of Poland and was renamed Wroclaw after World War II. In 1951, Selten graduated from high school, and although he had considered studying economics or psychology in university, he finally decided to study mathematics. In 1951, Selten was admitted to the Department of Mathematics at Goethe University Frankfurt. He graduated in 1957 with a master's degree in mathematics, and was later engaged in academic research in game theory and its applications, experimental economics, etc. In 1961, Selten received a Ph.D. degree in mathematics from Goethe University Frankfurt. In the early 1960s, Selten conducted experiments on an oligopoly game; from 1967 to 1968, he was a visiting professor at the University of California, Berkeley. He transferred to work at the University of Bielefeld in Germany in 1972 and began working at the University of Bonn in Germany in 1984. In 1994, Selten received the Nobel Memorial Prize in Economic Sciences for his" pioneering analysis of equilibria in the theory of non-cooperative games".

Having obtained the master's degree in 1957, Selten was hired as an assistant by Professor Heinz Sauermann, an economist at Goethe University Frankfurt. Sauermann was among the first economists to advocate Keynesianism in Germany. At first, Selten was arranged to study the application of game theory to industrial organization, but he soon became fascinated with economic laboratory experimentation. His work received support
from Sauermann. Then, Selten and several colleagues started working on experimental research of economics. In 1959, Selten published his first academic paper together with Sauermann - "An Oligopoly Experiment" . At that time, the discipline of experimental economics did not yet exist.

In conducting experiments on an oligopoly game, Selten found there were many equilibria in this game. In order to solve the problem of multiple equilibria, Selten introduced the concept of subgame perfectness, and published his most famous paper of game theory in 1965 - "An Oligopoly Model with Demand Inertia" . Selten did not expect that his article would often be quoted, almost exclusively for the definition of subgame perfectness which laid the foundation for his winning the Nobel Prize in Economics. In 1964, Selten published the paper"Valuation of n-Person Games" . This is an important paper on game theory, and it is another major contribution to game theory. In 1975, Selten published another well-known paper,
"Reexamination of the Perfectness Concept for Equilibrium Points in Extensive Games" . In this paper, Selten proposed the concept of "trembling hand perfect equilibrium" . As the University of Bielefeld encouraged cross-disciplinary research, in exchange with biologists, Selten realized that game theory could be applied to the study of biology. Selten familiarized himself with the notion of evolutionary stability and developed a strong interest in biological game theory. He investigated evolutionary stability in extensive games and wrote a series of papers.

### 8.6 Exercises

Exercise 8.1 In a cooperative game with transferable payoff, use linear programming and the duality theorem to prove the Bondereva-Shapley Theorem: a sufficient and necessary condition for the existence of a nonempty core in a coalitional game with transferable payoff is that the game is balanced.

Exercise 8.2 In a two-person bargaining game, $x=\left(x_{1}, x_{2}\right)$ represents a payoff allocation, $F$ represents the feasible set of allocations, and $v$ represents the reservation utility profile or the disagreement payoff profile. The Nash bargaining solution $\left(x_{1}, x_{2}\right)$ is defined as the solution that maximizes the Nash product $\left(x_{1}-v_{1}\right)\left(x_{2}-v_{2}\right)$.

1. Verify whether the Nash bargaining solution satisfies individual rationality and Pareto efficiency.
2. Let $(F, v)$ be an allocation of 100 dollars between two players. If the t wo players cannot reach an agreement, then they will receive nothing; if an agreement can be reached, then player 1 receives $x$, and player 2 receives $100-x$. Assume $v_{1}(x)=x$ and $v_{2}(100-x)=\sqrt{100-x}$. Solve for the Nash bargaining solution of the problem.

Exercise 8.3 Suppose that two players perform a bargaining game on 1 u nit of divisible goods. The utility functions for player 1 and player 2 are $u_{1}(\alpha)=\alpha / 2$ and $u_{2}(\beta)=1-(1-\beta)^{2}$, respectively, where $\alpha, \beta \in[0,1]$.

1. Derive the set of feasible utilities and represent them with figures.
2. Derive Nash bargaining outcome, and provide the allocation plan of the goods and the utility of each player.
3. Suppose that the player's utility has a discount factor of $\delta \in[0,1)$. Derive Rubinstein bargaining outcome (i.e., the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium solution of the infinite alternating-proposal bargaining game).
4. Use the results of questions 2-3 to derive the solution to the Rubinstein bargaining problem when $\delta$ approaches 1 .

Exercise 8.4 Suppose that two players perform a bargaining game on 1 unit of divisible goods. The utility functions for player 1 and player 2 are $u_{1}(\alpha)=\alpha$ and $u_{2}(\beta)=\beta^{\frac{1}{2}}$, respectively, where $\alpha, \beta \in[0,2]$. Assume that they have a discount factor of $\delta \in[0,1)$.

1. Derive Rubinstein bargaining outcome.
2. According to the result of question 1, derive Nash bargaining outcome.
3. Suppose that player 2's utility function is unchanged, but player 1's utility function become:

$$
u_{1}(\alpha)= \begin{cases}\alpha, & \text { if } \alpha \in[0,1] \\ 1, & \text { if } \alpha \in[1,2]\end{cases}
$$

Derive Nash bargaining outcome, and provide the allocation plan of the goods and the utility of each player.

Exercise 8.5 (Weighted Majority Game) A weighted majority game is a simple game $\langle N, v\rangle$, such that for some $q \in \mathcal{R}$ and weights $w \in \mathcal{R}_{+}^{N}$,

$$
v(S)= \begin{cases}1, & \text { if } w(S) \geqq q \\ 0, & \text { if } w(S)<q\end{cases}
$$

where $w(S)=\sum_{i \in S} w_{i} . w_{i}$ can be interpreted as the number of votes that player $i$ owns, and $q$ is the number of votes needed to win. A weighted majority game is homogeneous if $w(S)=q$ for any minimum winning coalition; it is zero-sum if for each coalition, either $v(S)=1$ or $v(N)=1$, but the two cannot hold at the same time.

Consider a zero-sum homogeneous weighted majority game $\langle N, v\rangle$, where for each player $i$ who does not belong to any minimum winning coalition, $w_{i}=0$. Prove that the core of $\langle N, v\rangle$ includes all allocations that satisfy $x_{i}=w_{i} / w(N)$ for any $i \in N$.

Exercise 8.6 Given the following men and women (3 women and 5 men) marriage market preference structure:

Women's preferences are as follows:

|  | $A$ | $B$ | $C$ | $D$ | $E$ |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| $a$ | 1 | 1 | 2 | 3 | 3 |
| $b$ | 2 | 3 | 1 | 1 | 2 |
| $c$ | 3 | 2 | 3 | 2 | 1 |

Men's preferences are as follows:

|  | $A$ | $B$ | $C$ | $D$ | $E$ |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| $a$ | 2 | 1 | 3 | 4 | 5 |
| $b$ | 3 | 1 | 2 | 5 | 4 |
| $c$ | 3 | 1 | 4 | 2 | 5 |

1. Use women-proposing Gale-Shapley algorithm to find out a stable matching.
2. Which women do not have a spouse in this stable matching? Do these women get spouses in other stable matchings? Please explain.

Exercise 8.7 Consider the following leader-follower game:

$$
\left\langle I, J, X_{i}, Y_{j}, f_{i}, g_{j}\right\rangle
$$

where $I$ is the finite set of leaders $i, J$ is the finite set of followers $j, X_{i}$ is the action set of leader $i, Y_{j}$ is the action set of follower $j, f_{i}: X \times Y \longrightarrow \mathcal{R}$ is the payoff function of leader $i$, and $g_{j}: X \times Y \longrightarrow \mathcal{R}$ is the payoff function of follower $j$.

In the multi-leader-follower game, the leaders make decisions first, and then the followers play the game after obtaining information about the leaders' action. For the leaders' action $x \in X, \operatorname{let} \mathcal{C}(x)$ represent the cooperative equilibrium core of the followers' game. It becomes a correspondence relationship $\mathcal{C}: X \rightrightarrows Y$, i.e., $y \in \mathcal{C}(x)$ means that for any $B \subseteq J$, there exists no $u^{B} \in Y^{B}$ satisfying:

$$
g_{j}\left(x, u^{B}, v^{-B}\right)>g_{j}(x, y), \forall v^{-B} \in Y^{-B}, \forall j \in B .
$$

In the multi-leader-follower game, a coalition $B \subseteq I$ is considered to block $x \in X$, if there exists $u^{B} \in X^{B}$, such that:

$$
f_{i}\left(u^{B}, z^{-B}, y\right)>f_{i}(x, y), \forall y \in \mathcal{C}(x), \forall z^{-B} \in X^{-B}, \forall i \in B
$$

We say that action $x \in X$ is the cooperative equilibrium of the multi-leader-follower game, if there exists no coalition $B \subseteq I$ that can block $x$.

Prove the following theorem:
For the multi-leader-follower game

$$
\left\langle I, J, X_{i}, Y_{j}, f_{i}, g_{j}\right\rangle
$$

it satisfies the following conditions:
(1) For each $i \in I$ and each $j \in J$, both $X_{i}$ and $Y_{j}$ are nonempty compact convex subsets in normed linear spaces.
(2) For each $i \in I, f_{i}$ is continuous on $X \times Y$.
(3) For each $i \in I$ and each $y \in Y, f_{i}(\cdot, y)$ is quasi-concave on $X$.
(4) For each $j \in J, g_{j}$ is continuous on $X \times Y$.
(5) For each $j \in J$ and each $x \in X, g_{j}(x, \cdot)$ is quasi-concave on $Y$.

Then, the set of cooperative game equilibrium solutions of this multi-leaderfollower game is not empty.

Exercise 8.8 Determine if true or false for the following three propositions and provide corresponding explanations.

1. The core is a subset of each stable set.
2. A stable set may be a proper subset of another stable set.
3. If the core is a stable set, then there is no other stable set.

Exercise 8.9 An allocation set of a three-person game can be geometrically represented as an equilateral triangle with a height of $v(N)$. Each side represents a player, and each point in the triangle represents an allocation. The distance from a point to each side represents the payoff of everyone in
the allocation (for example, the vertex corresponds to the allocation that u niquely assigns $v(N)$ to the player who is represented by the opposite side of this vertex).

1. Use this figure to find the general form of stable set of the following three-person game: $v(1,2)=\beta<1, v(1,3)=v(1,2,3)=1$, and $v(S)=0$ for any other subset $S$.
2. We can interpret the game in question 1 as a market in which player 1 is the seller, while player 2 and 3 are buyers with reserve prices of $\beta$ and 1, respectively. Explain the stable set of this game in terms of this market.

Exercise 8.10 Three cities can establish connections with a new power source, $P$, to increase power supply. The utilities of increased power supply for the three cities $A, B$, and $C$ are $u_{A}=100, u_{B}=140$, and $u_{C}=130$, respectively. Suppose that any established connection has the transmission capacity to meet the requirement of simultaneous power supply for the three cities, and the costs of establishing a direct connection between two points are as follows:

| Connection | $A B$ | $B C$ | $C A$ | $A P$ | $B P$ | $C P$ |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Cost | 50 | 20 | 30 | 100 | 140 | 130 |

The net value of power transmission for each city equals $v_{i}=u_{i}-c_{i}$ for $i=A, B, C$.

1. Use a cooperative game to set up this problem.
2. Solve for the core, give the set, and draw figures to represent it.
3. Solve for the Shapley value. Is it in the core?
4. Solve for the nucleolus. Is it in the core?

Exercise 8.11 There are three players, each denoted by $Z, M$, and $H$. Each of them has a different skill: $Z$ is strong, $M$ moves fast, and $H$ has good stamina. They plan to work together to hunt antelopes. They need to decide how to share the work and allocate the reward with antelope as the unit of measurement. Antelopes can be used for transfers, and their coalitions and
payoffs are shown in the table below.

| Coalition | Payoff |
| :---: | :---: |
| $\{Z M H\}$ | $(6)$ |
| $\{Z M\}\{H\}$ | $(4)(1)$ |
| $\{Z H\}\{M\}$ | $(3)(1)$ |
| $\{M H\}\{Z\}$ | $(3)(2)$ |
| $\{Z\}\{M\}\{H\}$ | $(2)(1)(1)$ |

1. Write the characteristic function of the coalition, and verify that it is superadditive.
2. Write the core allocation of the game.
3. Derive the Shapley value, and check whether it is in the core.

Exercise 8.12 Three players, $A, B$, and $C$, consider establishing a company. $A$ is good at technology, $B$ is good at design, and $C$ is good at sales. The characteristic function of the coalitional game is shown in the following table.

| $A, B, C$ | 50 |
| :---: | :---: |
| $A, B$ | 25 |
| $B, C$ | 20 |
| $A, C$ | 30 |
| $A$ | 15 |
| $B$ | 10 |
| $C$ | 5 |

Use the core concept of cooperative game to answer the following questions:

1. Which coalitions may appear? Why?
2. Someone suggests that members of the coalition should divide their income equally. Is this a stable allocation?
3. Find the Shapley value, and show whether it is in the core.

Exercise 8.13 Three individuals, $A, B$, and $C$, make appointments for treatment at a clinic on Monday, Tuesday, and Wednesday, respectively. The utility of their treatment at each time is given in the following table:

|  | Monday | Tuesday | Wednesday |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| $A$ | 2 | 4 | 8 |
| $B$ | 10 | 5 | 2 |
| $C$ | 10 | 6 | 4 |

Everyone can benefit by exchanging their time for doctor visits. In this case, consider the following questions:

1. Use the cooperative game to model this problem.
2. Solve for the core and give the set.
3. Solve for the Shapley value. Is it in the core?
4. Solve for the nucleolus. Is it in the core?

Exercise 8.14 Consider a three-person coalitional game with transferable payoff. For each real number $a$ and $v_{a}$, given the following:

$$
\begin{aligned}
& v_{a}(i)=0, i=1,2,3 ; \\
& v_{a}(\{1,2\})=3, v_{a}(\{1,3\})=2, v_{a}(\{2,3\})=1 ; \\
& v_{a}(\{1,2,3\})=a .
\end{aligned}
$$

Answer the following questions:

1. What is the minimum value of $a$, such that the core of this cooperative game is nonempty?
2. Calculate the Shapley value for $a=6$.
3. What is the minimum value of $a$, such that the Shapley value is in the core?

Exercise 8.15 Consider a company with multiple shareholders, two of whom have $\frac{1}{3}$ shares each, and the other $n-2$ shareholders own the remaining shares evenly. First, model this situation as a weighted majority game. Then, answer the following questions:

1. When $n$ approaches infinity, what are the limits of the Shapley values for these two major shareholders?
2. According to the Shapley value, is it desirable for the $n-2$ small shareholders to form the only coalition?

### 8.7 References

## Books and Monographs:

Gura, Ein-Ya and Michael B. Maschler (2008). Insights into Game Theory, Cambridge University Press.

Hargreaves-Heap, Shaun P. and Yanis Varoufakis (2004). Game Theory: A Critical Introduction (2nd Edition), Routledge.

Mas-Colell, A., M. D. Whinston, and J. Green (1995). Microeconomic Theory, Oxford University Press.

McCain, Roger A. (2010). Game Theory: A Nontechnical Introduction to the Analysis of Strategy, World Scientific Publishing Company.

Myerson, R. (1991). Game Theory $£$ oAnalysis of Conflict, Harvard University Press.

Osborne, M. J. and A. Rubinstein (1994). A Course in Game Theory, MIT Press.

Osborne, M. J. (2004). An Introduction to Game Theory, Oxford University Press.

Peleg, B. and P. Sudholter (2007). Introduction to the Theory of Cooperative Games, Second Edition, Springer.

Peter, Hans (2008). Game Theory: A Multi-leveled Approach, Springer.
Ray, Debraj (2006). A Game-Theoretic Perspective on Coalition Formation, Oxford University Press.

Roth, A. E. and M. Sotomayor (1990). Two-Sided Matching: A Study in Game-Theoretic Modeling and Analysis, Econometric Society Monograph Series, Cambridge University Press.
von Neumann, J. and O. Morgenstein (1944). Theory of Games and Economic Behavior, John Wiley and Sons.

Game Theory and Information Economics, Shanghai: Shanghai People's Publishing House. )

## Papers:

Abdulkadiroglu, A. and T. Sonmez (2013). "Matching Markets: Theory and Practice" . In Acemoglu, Daron, et al., Advances in Economics and Econometrics.

Abdulkadiroglu, A. and T. Sonmez (2003). "School Choice: A Mechanism Design Approach", American Economic Review, Vol. 93, No. 3, 729-747.

Aumann, R. J. (1961). "The Core of a Cooperative Game without Side Payments" , Transactions of the American Mathematical Society, Vol. 98, No. 3, 539-552

Bondereva, O. N. (1963). "Some Applications of Linear Programming Methods to the Theory of Cooperative Games (in Russia)" , Problemy Kibernetiki, Vol. 10, 119-139.

Gale, D. and L. S. Shapley (1962). "College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage" , American Mathematics Monthly, Vol. 69, No. 1, 9-15.

Harsanyi, J. C. (1963). "A Simplified Bargaining Model for the $N$-Person Cooperative Game" , International Economic Review, Vol. 4, No. 2, 194-220.

Hatfield, John W., and Paul Milgrom (2005). "Auctions, Matching and the Law of Aggregate Demand" , American Economic Review, forthcoming.

Kelso, A. S. Jr. and V. P. Crawford (1982). "Job Matching, Coalition Formation, and Gross Substitutes" , Econometrica, Vol. 50, No. 6, 14831504.

Kojima, F. (2010). "Impossibility of Stable and Nonbossy Matching Mechanism" , Economic Letters, Vol. 107, No. 1, 69-70.

Ma, J. (1994). "Strategy-Proofness and the Strict Core in a Market with Indivisibilities" , International Journal of Game Theory, Vol. 23, No. 1, 75-83.

Matsubae, Taisuke (2010). "Impossibility of Stable and Non-damaging Bossy Matching Mechanism", Economics Bulletin, Vol. 30, No. 3, 2092-2096.

Nessah, R. and G. Tian (2013). "Existence of Solution of Minimax Inequalities, Equilibria in Games and Fixed Points without Convexity and Compactness Assumptions", Journal of Optimization Theory and Applications, Vol. 157, No.1, 75-95.

Nessah, R. and G. Tian (2014). "On the Existence of Strong Nash Equilibria", Journal of Mathematical Analysis and Applications, Vol. 414, 871-885.

Nessah, R. and G. Tian (2016). "Existence of Nash Equilibrium in Discontinuous Games" , Economic Theory, Vol. 61, 515-540.

Roth, A. E. (1982). "The Economics of Matching: Stability and Incentives" , Mathematics of Operations Research, Vol. 7, No. 4, 617-628.

Roth, A. E. (2010). "Deferred-Acceptance Algorithms: History, Theory, Practice" . In Siegfried, John J., Better Living through Economics (Harvard University Press).

Roth, A. E. , T. Sonmez, and M. U. Unver (2004). "Kidney Exchange", Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 119, No. 2, 457-488.

Scarf, H. E. (1967). "The Core of an $N$-person Game" , Econometrica, Vol. 35, No. 1, 50-69.

Shapley, L. S. (1953). "A Value for $N$-person Games" . In Rubinstein, A. (eds.), Game Theory in Economics.

Shapley, L. S. (1967). "On Balanced Set and Cores", Naval Research Logistics Quarterly, Vol. 14, No. 4, 453-460.

Shapley, L. S. and H. E. Scarf (1974). "On Cores and Indivisibiltiy", Journal of Mathematical Economics, Vol. 1, No. 1, 23-37.

Shapley, L. S. and M. Shubik (1971). "The Assignment Game I: The Core", International Journal of Game Theory, Vol. 1, No. 1, 111-130.

Thrall, R. and W. Lucas (1963). " $N$-Person Games in Partition Function Form" , Naval Research Logistics Quarterly, Vol. 10, No. 1, 281-298.

Tian, G. (1992). "Generalizations of the FKKM Theorem and Ky-Fan Minimax Inequality, with Applications to Maximal Elements, Price Equilibrium, and Complementarity" , Journal of Mathematical Analysis and Applications, Vol. 170, No. 2, 457-471.

Tian, G. (1993). "Necessary and Sufficient Conditions for Maximization of a Class of Preference Relations" , Review of Economic Studies, Vol. 60, 949-958.

Tian, G. (1994). "Generalized KKM Theorem and Minimax Inequalities and Their Applications", Journal of Optimization Theory and Applications, Vol. 83, 375-389.

Tian, G. (2015). "Existence of Equilibria in Games with Arbitrary Strategy Spaces and Payoffs: A Full Characterization", Journal of Mathematical Economics, Vol. 60, 9-16.

Tian, G. (2016). "Characterizations of Minimax Inequality, Fixed-Point Theorem, Saddle Point, and KKM Theorem in Arbitrary Topological Spaces", Journal of Fixed Point Theory and Applications, forthcoming.

Tian, G. and J. Zhou (1992). "The Maximum Theorem and the Existence of Nash Equilibrium of (Generalized) Games without Lower Semicontinuities" , Journal of Mathematical Analysis and Applications, Vol. 166, No. 2, 351-364.

Tian, G. and J. Zhou (1995). "Transfer Continuities, Generalizations of the Weierstrass Theorem and Maximum Theorem—A Full Characterization" , Journal of Mathematical Economics, Vol. 24, No. 3, 281-303.

Yu, J. and H. L. Wang (2008). "An Existence Theorem of Equilibrium Points for Multi-leader-follower Games" , Nonlinear Analysis, Vol. 69, No. 5-6, 1775-1777.

Zhou and Tian (1992). "Transfer Method for Characterizing the Existence of Maximal Elements of Binary Relations on Compact or Noncompact Sets" , SIAM Journal on Optimization, Vol. 2, No. 3, 360-375.

## Chapter 9

## Market Theory

### 9.1 Introduction

In Part II, we studied the rational behavior of individual consumers and firms when market prices are taken as given and beyond individuals' control. In this chapter, we explore the consequences of that behavior when consumers and firms come together in markets. We will also consider the determination of equilibrium price and quantity in a single market or a group of related markets under different market structures.

The key insight of Adam Smith's The Wealth of Nations is simple: if an exchange between two parties is voluntary, it will not take place unless both parties believe that they will benefit from it. How is this also true for any number of parties and for production cases? The price system is the mechanism that performs this task well without government intervention in many situations. In Chapter 1, we have already highlighted that price performs three functions in organizing economic activities in a free market economy: (1) it transmits information about production and consumption in an efficient manner; (2) it provides appropriate incentives. The subtlety of a free price system is that the price that transmits the information also provides incentives for individuals who receive the information to adjust demand and supply accordingly. (3) It determines the distribution of income. When price is utilized to transmit information and provide incentives, it will inevitably affect the distribution of income. If one's income
does not depend on prices, what incentive does she have to seek out price information or to respond to that information?

This chapter focuses on partial equilibrium analysis that involves a single market or a group of related markets, implicitly assuming that changes in the markets under consideration do not change the prices of commodities in other markets. We will treat all markets simultaneously in general equilibrium theory in the next part. Here, we mainly discuss the market behavior of firms, focusing on how they determine the price at which they will sell the output or at which they are willing to purchase the input. In fact, this is the main focus of microeconomics, which can be essentially characterized in one word - pricing. Price-taking behavior may be a reasonable approximation to some optimal behaviors, but there are numerous other cases in which we have to explore the price-setting process.

A firm has the power of free pricing only when the market competition is imperfect. In an imperfectly competitive market, firms can influence demand, and thus have the ability to determine prices and quantities of the products that they produce. Such ability is known as market power or the ability to influence the market, or as a competitive advantage. Such market power may come from unique resources, intellectual property, governments, product differentiation, or cost advantages from economies of scale.

The main feature of an imperfectly competitive market is that the demand curve faced by a single firm is downward, and its elasticity is related to the market structure (degree of competition). Imperfect competition includes monopoly (seller's and buyer's), oligopoly (seller's and buyer's), and monopolistic competition. We will first consider the situation of perfect competition as a benchmark and then, based on this benchmark market structure, turn to investigate situations in which individuals have the market power. These situations include several market structures (i.e., pure monopoly, monopsony, monopolistic competition, and oligopoly).

### 9.2 Perfect Competition

We begin by considering a perfectly competitive market, which constitutes an ideal and extreme market structure. Just like free fall in physics, although it basically does not exist in reality, it is crucial to fully comprehend and study a competitive market, as it serves as a benchmark for investigating more realistic market structures.

The basic feature of a perfectly competitive market is that many firms sell homogeneous products in the market, and each consumer or producer, irrespective of how much she consumes or produces, does not have an impact on the market price. From the perspective of maximizing social welfare, it is the most efficient market.

For perfectly competitive markets, we make the following assumptions:
(1) A large number of buyers and sellers that take prices as given.
(2) Unrestricted mobility of resources among industries: no barrier to entry into, or exit from, the market.
(3) Homogeneous product: the products of all of the firms in an industry are identical to consumers.
(4) All relevant information is common knowledge: firms and consumers have all of the information necessary to make optimal economic decisions.

### 9.2.1 The Competitive Firm

The above four assumptions portray the basic nature of firms in a perfectly competitive market (i.e., the firm's impact on the market is zero). Next, we discuss the characteristics of firms in a perfectly competitive industry.

A competitive firm is free to set whatever price that it wants and produce whatever quantity that it is able to produce. However, since all products are homogeneous, each firm that sells the product must sell it at the same price, and thus the inverse demand function is a horizontal line parallel to the consumption axis. If any firm attempted to set its price at a level
higher than the market price, it would immediately lose all of its customers ; if it sets its price at a level below the market price, all of the consumers would immediately come to it, but it can also sell its output at a higher price. Therefore, as a profit-maximizing firm, it must use the market price for its products. When making supply decisions, each firm must take the market price as given, and thus price is an exogenous variable.

Next, we analyze the behavior of perfectly competitive firms. The analysis of firms' market behavior is usually based on the short-run or long-run time frame, according to the scope and degree of firms' decision-making. Short-run analysis means that certain production factors of the firm, such as manufacturing plants and production lines, are constrained, and thus the scope of its decision-making is also constrained accordingly. In the shortrun, the structures of firms in the market are immutable. In the long-run, all production factors can be changed. For example, a firm can expand its factory buildings, set up new production lines, and establish new business outlets. It can also decide whether to enter or exit from a market. In the long-run, the structures of firms in the market are variable.

### 9.2.2 The Competitive Firm's Short-Run Supply Function

Assuming that a firm only produces one product, we want to know how its supply function and the market equilibrium price are determined. Since a perfectly competitive firm must take the market price as given, its profit maximization problem is simple. The firm only needs to choose an output level $y$ to solve:

$$
\max _{y} p y-c(y)
$$

where $p$ is the price of the product, and $c(y)$ is the cost function of production.

The first-order condition (FOC for short) for the interior solution of the above optimization problem gives:

$$
p=M C(y),
$$

i.e., the market price equals the marginal cost.

In the first-order condition of profit maximization, the marginal revenue equals the marginal cost. In a perfectly competitive market, the revenue is $R=p y$, and the marginal revenue is $M R=\frac{d R}{d y}=p$. Therefore, $M R=M C$ means $p=M C(y)$.

The second-order condition for the above optimization problem is $c^{\prime \prime}(y)>$ 0 , which means that the associated production function is concave.

The above two conditions determine the supply decision of the competitive firm. At any price $p$, the firm will supply an amount of output $y(p)$. According to the first-order condition, we have $p=c^{\prime}(y(p))$. Further derivation yields $1=c^{\prime \prime}(y) y^{\prime}(p)$. From the second-order condition, we know that $y^{\prime}(p)>0$, which means that the law of supply holds.

When the market price $p$ is sufficiently low, the firm may not produce. The firm's short-run cost function is $c(y)=c_{v}(y)+F$, where $F$ denotes the fixed cost. If $p y(p)-c_{v}(y)-F \geqq-F$, then the firm should choose to produce a positive amount of output. This means that $p \geqq \frac{c_{v}(y(p))}{y(p)} \equiv$ $A V C$. In other words, in the short-run, the necessary condition for the firm to produce is that the market price of the product is not less than the minimum average variable cost (see Figure 9.1).

In general, the supply curve for the competitive firm is given by:

$$
y= \begin{cases}\left(c^{\prime}\right)^{-1}(p), & \text { if } p \geqq \frac{c_{v}(y(p))}{y(p)}, \\ 0, & \text { otherwise }\end{cases}
$$

where $\left(c^{\prime}\right)^{-1}$ is the inverse function of $c^{\prime}$.
As long as the price is greater than the average variable cost, the firm's supply curve coincides with the upward sloping portion of the marginal cost curve. If the price is lower than the (smallest) average variable cost, the firm's supply is zero.

Suppose that there are $J$ firms in the market. The industry supply function is simply the sum of all firms' supply functions (i.e., $\hat{y}(p)=\sum_{j=1}^{J} y_{j}(p)$, where $y_{j}(p)$ is the supply function of firm $j$ ). Since each firm chooses a level of output at which price equals marginal cost, each firm that produces a positive amount of output must have the same marginal cost. The industry supply function measures the relationship between industry output and
the common marginal cost of producing this output.


Figure 9.1: Firm's supply curve, AC, AVC, and MC curves. The bold curve is the supply curve.

The industry aggregate demand function measures the total output demanded at any price, which is given by $\hat{x}(p)=\sum_{i=1}^{n} x_{i}(p)$, where $x_{i}(p)$ is the demand function of consumer $i$, and $n$ denotes the number of consumers.

### 9.2.3 Single-Commodity Market Equilibrium

The market price of a commodity is determined by the requirement that the total quantity of output that the firms wish to supply is equal to the total quantity of output that the consumers wish to consume. Formally, we have the following definition.

Definition 9.2.1 (Equilibrium Price) The market equilibrium price $p^{*}$ of a single product in a perfectly competitive market is a price at which the aggregate quantity demanded equals the aggregate quantity supplied, i.e., it is the solution of the following equation:

$$
\sum_{i=1}^{n} x_{i}(p)=\sum_{j=1}^{J} y_{j}(p) .
$$

Once this equilibrium price is determined, we can go back to look at the individual supply schedules of each firm and determine its output level, revenue, and profit. In Figure 9.2, we have depicted cost curves for three firms. The first has positive profit, the second has zero profit, and the third has negative profit. Even though the third firm has negative profit, it may
make sense for it to continue production as long as its revenues cover its variable costs (i.e., $p \geqq A V C$ ); otherwise, it will suffer even greater losses (which equals the fixed cost).


Figure 9.2: Positive, zero, and negative profits.

### 9.2.4 Competitive Market and Returns to Scale of Production Technology

From the producer theory, we know that the feature of returns to scale of technology can be inferred from the cost function. If the average cost decreases (increases or remains unchanged) as the output increases, then the technology exhibits increasing (decreasing or constant) returns to scale.

The following cost function exhibits the typical feature of increasing returns to scale:

$$
C(q)= \begin{cases}F+c q, & \text { if } q>0 \\ 0, & \text { if } q=0\end{cases}
$$

The corresponding average cost function is $A C(q)=\frac{F}{q}+c$. Figure 9.3 illustrates the average cost and the marginal cost of the technology: the average cost decreases with the increase in output; and when the output goes to infinity, the average cost converges to the marginal cost.

However, a technology with increasing returns to scale is not compatible with a perfectly competitive market. Let us use an example to demonstrate this statement.


Figure 9.3: Increasing returns to scale of production technology.

Let the market demand function be $P(Q)=a-b q$, where $b>0, a>c$.
Suppose that the equilibrium of the competitive market exists, and let the equilibrium price be $p^{e}$. Then, there are only two possibilities for the equilibrium price: either $p^{e} \leqq c$ or $p^{e}>c$.

When $p^{e}=p_{1}^{e} \leqq c$, for any positive amount of output $q$, $p^{e}=p_{1}^{e} \leqq$ $c<\frac{F}{q}+c$, the firm's profit and the producer surplus are both less than zero. For a firm that pursues profit maximization, its production can only be zero. However, if the firm's output is zero, the price $p_{1}^{e}$ cannot be the market equilibrium, because at $p_{1}^{e}$ the market demand is greater than zero, while the market supply is zero.

When $p^{e}=p_{2}^{e}>c$, when output $q$ exceeds a certain limit, we will have $p_{2}^{e}>\frac{F}{q}+c=A C(q)$, and $\frac{d\left(p_{2}^{e}-A C(q)\right)}{d q}>0$. Thus, at market price $p_{2}^{e}$, the competitive firm that pursues profit maximization will choose infinitely large output (because the producer surplus is greater than zero at any output). At this point, the market supply is infinitely large. However, at $p_{2}^{e}$, the market demand is limited. Therefore, $p_{2}^{e}$ can also not be the market equilibrium price.

In conclusion, if the firm's production technology displays increasing returns to scale, the market structure cannot be perfectly competitive. In the following chapter on general equilibrium theory, we will discuss the incompatibility between increasing returns to scale and perfectly competitive market equilibrium from a different perspective.

### 9.2.5 Long-Run Equilibrium

The long-run behavior of a competitive industry is determined by two effects. Consider that all firms can choose other firms' production technologies, or that production technologies are common knowledge. If production technology cannot be replicated, in the case of patents for example, then the market structure is not a perfectly competitive market in the typical sense. The first effect is free entry and exit that make the long-run profits of all firms zero. If a firm is making negative profits, it would eventually exit from the market. Conversely, if a firm is making positive profits, other firms would enter the industry. If we have an industry characterized by free entry and exit, all firms surely will make the same level of profits in the long-run. As a result, every firm makes zero profit at the long-run competitive equilibrium as illustrated in Figure 9.4.

The second effect on the long-run behavior of a competitive industry is that of technological adjustment. In the long-run, firms will attempt to adjust technologies and so their fixed factors in order to produce the equilibrium level of output in the least expensive way. If every firm attempts to do this, the equilibrium price will change.


Figure 9.4: Long-run competitive equilibrium where every firm makes zero profit.

In the case of free entry or exit, the equilibrium number of firms is determined by the following principle: at the equilibrium, the entry of new firms will make the profits of all firms less than zero. In other words, when free entry and exit makes the profits of firms approach zero at the equilibrium price, the number of firms is determined.

Example 9.2.1 $c(y)=y^{2}+1$. The equilibrium level of output is the solution of the following equation:

$$
A C(y)=M C(y)
$$

Therefore, at $y=1$, the average cost reaches its minimum, which is 2 . If the price is higher than 2 , the firm is making a positive profit. If the price is lower than 2, its profit is less than zero. The supply function satisfies $p=M C(y)=2$, and thus we have $y=\frac{p}{2}$.

Suppose that the demand is linear: $D(p)=a-b p$. Then, the equilibrium price will be the smallest $p^{*}$ that satisfies the condition: $p^{*}=\frac{a}{b+J / 2} \geqq 2$, and thus $J^{*}=[a-2 b]$, where $[\cdot]$ is a rounding function that takes a number to the nearest integer. If $j>J^{*}$, the entry of firms would make the market price less than 2, and firms' profits less than zero; if $j<J^{*}$, firms entering the market would make positive profits.

### 9.2.6 Social Welfare under Perfect Competition

In a single-commodity market, participants are consumers and producers, whose social welfare is made up of the net benefits of these participants. In consumer theory, as previously discussed, the concept for the net benefit of the consumer in market transactions is consumer surplus; in producer theory, the concept for the net benefit of the producer in market transactions is net profit (equal to producer surplus minus fixed cost). Given $J$ firms in a certain market, at market price $p$, we define social welfare as $W(p)=C S(p)+\sum_{j=1}^{J} P S(p)$. In the long-run, since the fixed cost is zero, the producer surplus equals the profit of the firm, so that $W(p)=C S(p)+\sum_{j=1}^{J} \pi_{j}(p)$.

In the perfectly competitive market, the market equilibrium is the result of market transactions with maximum social welfare. Therefore, it is frequently adopted as a benchmark to analyze the loss or change of social welfare in other market structures.

We employ a simple example to illustrate this. Let the unit cost (or marginal cost) of production be $c$ and the market demand be $P(Q)=a-b q$,
where $b>0, a>c$. Figure 9.5 depicts the market demand curve and the marginal cost curve. At market price $p=p_{0}$ and market transaction quantity $Q_{0}$, the consumer surplus is $\alpha$, the firm's producer surplus or profit is $\beta$, and social welfare is $\alpha+\beta$. We find that in the process when the price falls from $p_{0}$ to the marginal cost $c$, the consumer surplus increases, the firm's profit declines, and social welfare also increases. When the price equals $c$, the consumer surplus is $\alpha+\beta+\gamma$, the firm's profit is zero, and social welfare is $\alpha+\beta+\gamma$. When the price falls further, we find that the decrease of the firm's profit exceeds the increase of the consumer surplus, and thus social welfare decreases. As a consequence, when price equals marginal cost, social welfare reaches the maximum at the perfectly competitive equilibrium where the market price equals the marginal cost.


Figure 9.5: Social welfare in the perfectly competitive market.

The market price describes consumers' willingness to pay for extra product, while the marginal cost is the cost that a firm spends to produce extra product. As long as the social welfare generated by the production of an extra product (depicted by the consumer's willingness to pay) exceeds the social cost (depicted by the marginal cost if there is no externality) of it, trading this extra product will increase social welfare. When consumers' willingness to pay is lower than the marginal cost, trading this extra product in the market will reduce social welfare. When consumers' willingness to pay equals the marginal cost, the market transaction is optimal. The perfectly competitive market happens to be the place where the two are equal. In other market structures, firms have the ability to make the market price higher than the marginal cost, which means that firms possess the market
power to make consumers' willingness to pay higher than firms' marginal cost. As a result, social welfare is lower than that of the perfectly competitive market, and thus social welfare loss results. In the remainder of this chapter, we further discuss social welfare in imperfectly competitive markets.

### 9.3 Pure Monopoly

The other extreme of market structure that is the opposite of perfect competition is pure monopoly, referred to as monopoly. In the monopoly market, there is only one seller. If there is only one buyer in the factor market, it is called the monopsony market, which will be discussed later. The sources of monopoly are from: (1) economies of scale; (2) barriers to market entry; and (3) exclusive possession of rare factors of production. In this section, we classify monopoly into two categories: monopoly in the product market; and monopsony in the factor market. Monopolies in the two types of markets have different characteristics. We first discuss monopoly in the product market, and then discuss monopoly (i.e., monopsony) in the factor market.

### 9.3.1 Monopoly in the Product Market

A monopolistic firm of a single commodity faces two types of decisions (i.e., how much to produce and at what price it should sell this output). Of course, the two decisions of the monopolist are interrelated. Different from a competitive firm, who takes the market price as given and decides its output at the price, the monopolistic firm needs to choose the output and price of its product. The price is determined by the demand function $q(p)$ together with the marginal cost function of production. Sometimes, it is more convenient to consider the inverse demand function $p(q)$, which indicates the price that consumers are willing to pay for the output of the monopolist. We have already given conditions under which the inverse demand function exists in Chapter 3. The revenue that the firm receives can be expressed as a function of the output (i.e., $R(q)=p(q) q)$.

The production cost of the firm also depends on the quantity of output. We have studied in depth the characteristics of the cost function in producer theory. Here, we assume that the factor market is perfectly competitive, and thus the factor price can be set as constant (we will discuss below that in a monopoly market of factors, the factor prices are determined by the monopoly buyer), and so the conditional cost function can be written as a function of the level of output of the firm.

The profit maximization problem of the firm can then be written as:

$$
\max _{q} R(q)-C(q)=\max p(q) q-C(q) .
$$

The first-order condition for profit maximization is that marginal revenue equals marginal cost, or $p\left(q^{*}\right)+p^{\prime}\left(q^{*}\right) q^{*}=C^{\prime}\left(q^{*}\right)$, for positive production, the left side of which is the marginal revenue.

The economic implication of this condition is the following: if the monopolist considers producing one extra unit of output, then, on the one hand, the sale of more goods (when the price is greater than the marginal cost) will increase the monopolist's revenue; on the other hand, according to the law of demand, the increase of demand will force the price down, thereby reducing the monopolist's revenue. The sum of these two effects in opposite directions gives the marginal revenue. When the output is small, the former effect dominates, and revenue increases with output. When the output is large, the latter effect dominates, and revenue decreases with output. If the marginal revenue exceeds the marginal cost of production, the monopolist will expand production; otherwise, the output will be reduced until the marginal revenue and the marginal cost balance out.

The first-order condition for profit maximization can be reformulated through the use of the price elasticity of demand.

The price elasticity of demand is defined as $\varepsilon(q)=\frac{p}{q(p)} \frac{d q(p)}{d p}$, which is always a negative number since $\frac{d q(p)}{d p}<0$.

Simple algebra shows that the condition for marginal cost to equal marginal
revenue can be expressed as:

$$
p\left(q^{*}\right)\left[1+\frac{q^{*}}{p\left(q^{*}\right)} \frac{d p\left(q^{*}\right)}{d q}\right]=p\left(q^{*}\right)\left[1+\frac{1}{\varepsilon\left(q^{*}\right)}\right]=C^{\prime}\left(q^{*}\right),
$$

or

$$
p\left(q^{*}\right)=\frac{C^{\prime}\left(q^{*}\right)}{1+\frac{1}{\varepsilon\left(q^{*}\right)}} .
$$

Since $\varepsilon\left(q^{*}\right)<0$, in order to ensure that the price is non-negative, the firm needs to produce within the arrangement of the elastic demand (i.e., $\left.\varepsilon\left(q^{*}\right)<-1\right)$. Therefore, we have $\left[1+\left(1 / \varepsilon\left(q^{*}\right)\right)\right] \leqq 1$, which implies that the price is not less than the marginal cost at profit maximization.

This formula is very useful, and provides a basic pricing formula for any market. It shows that the equilibrium price of a product depends on its marginal cost and price elasticity of demand. It should be noted that the price is dependent on the price elasticity of demand. When the marginal cost remains unchanged, the optimal pricing of the product is inversely proportional to the price elasticity of demand, which means that the smaller is the elasticity, the bigger is the market power and thus the higher is the price. When the market is perfectly competitive, the price elasticity of demand is infinitely large, and thus the price equals the marginal cost.

For a monopoly market, the monopoly price equals the marginal cost multiplied by a markup. This markup is a decreasing function of the price elasticity of demand. Meanwhile, the smaller is the absolute value of the prive elasticity, the stronger is the monopoly power of the firm and the higher is the markup. Price elasticity measures the substitutability of a product. The smaller is the absolute value of price elasticity, the lower is the consumer's sensitivity to the price of the product, like in the case of salt. If such commodity as salt is subject to monopoly pricing, its price could be very high (e.g., salt monopolized by the government in China's feudal society). This is because there are no other substitutes, and firms are not concerned that price increases may bring about decline in sales.

A graphical illustration of the profit maximization condition is shown in Figure 9.6. Suppose for simplicity that the inverse demand function is linear (i.e., $p(q)=a-b q$ ). Therefore, the revenue function is $R(q)=q p(p)$,
and the marginal revenue function is $R^{\prime}(q)=a-2 b q$. The marginal revenue curve has the same vertical intercept as the demand function, but the former is twice as steep as the latter. Figure 9.6 illustrates the relationship between price elasticity and monopoly price. Figure (a) shows the case of low price elasticity of demand, in which the difference between monopoly price and marginal cost is large; Figure (b) shows the case of high price elasticity of demand, in which the difference between monopoly price and marginal cost is small.

(a) Low elasticity demand

(b) High elasticity demand

Figure 9.6: Low price elasticity of demand and high price elasticity of demand.

### 9.3.2 Monopoly in the Long Run

We have seen how the long-run and the short-run behavior of a competitive industry may differ due to changes in technology and entry. There are similar effects in a monopolistic industry. The technological effect is the simplest: the monopolist will choose the level of fixed factors in order to maximize the monopolist's own long-run profits. Therefore, she will operate where the marginal revenue equals the long-run marginal cost. The entry effect is slightly more subtle. Presumably, if the monopolist is earning positive profits, other firms would like to enter the industry. If the monopolist remains a monopolist, there must be some sort of barrier to entry for the industry, so that it still can make positive profits even in the long run.

These barriers to entry may be of a legal sort, but often they are due to the fact that the monopolist owns some unique factor of production. For
example, a firm might own a patent on a certain product, or might own a certain proprietary process or factor of production, such as in the case of South Africa having the largest diamond supply in the world. If the monopoly power of the firm is due to a unique factor, we must be especially careful when measuring the monopoly profit. Indeed, because this factor has an opportunity cost, we need to deduct all explicit or implicit costs when calculating the profit.

### 9.3.3 Disadvantage of Monopoly: Social Welfare Losses

We say that a situation is Pareto efficient if there is no way to make one agent better off without making the others worse off. Pareto efficiency is a major theme in the discussion of welfare economics. Here, we only provide a simple illustration of this concept. In partial markets, according to the social welfare function as previously defined, although social welfare maximization and Pareto efficiency are distinct, a link exists between the two. If an allocation maximizes social welfare, then it must be Pareto optimal when the social welfare function is strictly increasing in individuals' utilities. This means that the allocation in the competitive market is a Pareto optimal allocation, but the reverse may not necessarily be true.

Because the monopoly price of firms exceeds the marginal cost, from the previous discussion of social welfare in a competitive market, it can be inferred that monopoly markets suffer social welfare losses. According to the Pareto criterion, the monopoly allocation is a Pareto inefficient allocation, which means that there is a way to improve the situation of the monopolist without negatively affecting the situation of the consumers.

To illustrate this, we consider the production decision of a monopolist. At a monopoly price of $p^{m}$, its sales volume is $q^{m}$. Assume that the monopolist intends to produce a quantity of extra output $\Delta q$ and sell it to consumers. How much will consumers pay for this extra output? Clearly, they will pay a price $p\left(q^{m}+\Delta q\right)$. What is the additional cost of producing this extra output? The answer is the marginal cost $M C(q)$. Under such changes in production, the consumers are at least not worse off, while the monopolist is better off since she sells the extra output at a price that is
greater than the cost of production. Here, we allow the monopolist to discriminate in pricing (we will further discuss differential pricing later). She firstly sells an output of quantity $q^{m}$ at a certain price, and then sells more at some other (lower) price.

How long will this process continue? Once the output reaches the competitive level, the firm will not be able to improve its situation further. At this point, the competitive levels of price and output are Pareto efficient for this industry. The welfare losses of the monopolist relative to the competitive market are revealed by Figure 9.7. At the monopoly price $p^{m}$, the consumer surplus is the area of the triangle $D E C$, the monopoly profit is the area of the trapezoid $C E F A$, and the total social welfare is the area of the trapezoid $D E F A$. In a competitive market, the total social welfare is the area of the triangle $D G A$. Therefore, the loss of social welfare resultant from monopoly is the area of triangle $E G F$.


Figure 9.7: Social welfare losses of monopoly.

### 9.3.4 Advantage of Monopoly: Corporate Innovation

From the above discussion, we know that monopoly means that firms possess market power in setting prices. They can use their monopoly power to raise the price of their products above the competitive equilibrium price, and make their output lower than that of the perfectly competitive market. As such, this results in Pareto inefficient allocations, incurring certain social welfare loss. Government regulations may then be needed, such as anti-trust laws, to increase market competition. However, because some industries are naturally monopolistic due to economies of scale, technology
innovation, or other reasons, even if private firms are allowed to produce, the problem of monopoly pricing remains. In order to achieve economies of scale, some market entities frequently monopolize the market by means of alliances, mergers, and acquisitions, thereby distorting the market competition mechanism and preventing it from playing a spontaneous and efficient role in resource allocation. Nevertheless, the problem can be solved through government regulations to realize compatibility of firms' interest and social welfare.

However, monopoly is not without certain merit. In terms of resource allocation efficiency of the entire society, since monopoly generates efficiency loss, competition is clearly a superior choice. Nonetheless, in the view of firms, they hope to achieve a monopoly. Since their profits decrease as competition increases, due to the profit-seeking incentive of private firms, they often have a strong incentive to innovate continuously to conduct research and develop new products, and thus they can set the price of new products above the competitive equilibrium price to obtain great profits. Once doing so, other firms in the same industry will soon develop similar products to share the market and profits. Such market competition leads to the decline of firms' profits, and thus forces firms to engage in further innovation.

Corporate innovation then leads to monopoly profits, and considerable profits will attract other firms to enter and compete again. In this way, market competition leads to the decrease of profits and firms obtain monopoly profits through innovation, which forms a repeated cycle of competition-innovation-monopoly-competition. In this cycle, market competition produces market equilibrium, while innovation disrupts this equilibrium. This repeated game in the market motivates firms to constantly pursue innovation. Through this repeated game process, the market economy maintains long-term vitality, increases social welfare and promotes economic development, revealing the unique beauty and power of the market system. Of course, in order to encourage innovation, the government should enact intellectual property protection laws. At the same time, to encourage competition and form externalities of technology innovation, the protection given by anti-monopoly laws and intellectual property rights legislation should
not be permanent, but rather for a limited time, in case fixed or permanent oligopolies and monopolies may appear.

Overall, competition and monopoly are two sides of the same entity, like supply and demand, the two of which can become an awe-inspiring dialectical unity of opposites under market forces, showing the beauty and power of the market system. Without competition, just like state-owned enterprises with a government monopoly, they would not possibly have the incentive to innovate. Entrepreneurs' pursuit of reasonable profit constitutes the power source for market progress. Where does the pricing power come from? The monopoly of a product generates pricing power. On what does the ability of a monopoly rely? In addition to government protection, which can lead to monopolies and thus produce low efficiency and incentive distortions, innovation and unique products are needed to gain the preemptive advantage.

Schumpeter's (see his biography in section 2.12.2) "Innovation Theory" informs us that valuable competition is not a price war, but instead competition of new products, technologies, markets, sources of supply, and combination forms. The root of the long-term vitality of the market economy lies in innovation and creativity, which originates from entrepreneurship and entrepreneurs' constant "creative destruction" of market equilibria. Apple Inc., a thriving company today, was once on the verge of bankruptcy in the late 20th century. What did Steve Jobs rely on to turn the tide when he returned to Apple as its CEO? It was innovation that met and stimulated demand in the market. Its series of products that combined human aspects with science and technology profoundly affected people's consumption preferences and lifestyle. Innovation is the result of flashes of inspiration, yet it cannot be simply achieved from a single brainstorming session. Essentially, innovation comprises many existing ideas. Therefore, entrepreneurs are crucial, but "it is not part of his function to 'find' or 'create' new possibilities. They are always present, abundantly accumulated by all sorts of people". The function of an entrepreneur is to put those possibilities into practice before they disappear by conceiving and developing new combinations of factors.

It should also be pointed out that innovation mainly relies on private
firms. Because innovation means breaking with routines, it inevitably implies high risk. High-tech innovation, in particular, is a high-risk venture with a very low success rate. However, once it succeeds, there may be parabolic profits, which will then attract additional funds for investment. For state-owned enterprises (SOEs), however, due to the congenital lack of risk-taking incentive mechanisms, the SOE leaders are neither courageous nor able to assume such responsibility. Moreover, irrespective of how great the profit is, SOE leaders themselves do not profit from it, and thus they have no incentive to take such high risks, and it is unrealistic to look to SOEs for innovation.

The private economy, on the other hand, is the most willing to take risks because of the strong incentive to pursue self-interest, and thus the most innovation-driven. Therefore, as shown clearly from the situations in different countries, the main agents of innovation (non-basic scientific research) are all private firms. For instance, the most widely-recognized innovative companies even in China, such as Alibaba, Tencent and Huawei, are also private firms. The emergence of Internet finance, such as Yu'ebao, is the result of barring the private economy from entering the financial industry under the control of state-owned enterprises, and thus private firms have no choice but to resort to financial technology innovation for survival.

### 9.3.5 Price Discrimination of Monopolies

The pricing of firms discussed above is uniform price, but in reality, firms usually adopt differential pricing, known as price discrimination. Under differential pricing, the firm may charge varied prices to different customers or different purchase quantities, even though the production cost is the same. The premise of differential pricing is that the purchase of the demander will generate consumer surplus. In the analysis of monopoly pricing, the firm obtains monopoly profit by setting a uniform price, while different consumers also obtain consumer surplus to some extent. To further increase profits, a monopolist may obtain some, or even all, of the consumer surplus through price discrimination.

There are many ways that price discrimination appears in the real world.

For instance, magazines offer discounts to students; airlines charge different prices at different times of purchase; some associations, such as the American Economic Association, charge membership fees according to the category of their members; many stores offer discounts or coupons on holidays; some product packages offer coupons, which allow consumers to purchase the product at a lower price next time and enable sellers to charge first-time customers a higher price than repeat visitors; for telecommunications services, there are many kinds of packages and different charging standards in different time periods. These are all various forms of price discrimination.

However, as Dennis W. Carlton and Jeffrey M. Perloff (1998) pointed out, ${ }^{1}$ movies and television shows often portray, as great heroes, physicians who charge poorer patients lower rates. In very old movies, a country doctor may accept a chicken as payment, instead of insisting on cash. Are doctors selfless creatures or profit maximizers who engage in price discrimination? Certainly, some physicians see indigent patients at no cost or nominal fees as an act of altruism. Others, however, may be engaging in price discrimination.

There are many broadly adopted forms of price discrimination.
The first kind is two-part tariff. The firm first charges the consumer a fixed fee (the first charge); after paying the fee, the consumer then has the right to purchase the goods at a specified price, such as monthly charges by cell phone service providers in many countries. Some amusement parks, as another example, charge an admission fee first and then a surcharge for each event.

The second is quantity discount. In this case, different unit prices are set according to the quantity of purchase. For instance, the sales of numerous products discriminate between group purchasing and individual purchases.

The third is tie-in sale. In this case, a firm only sells the product to the customers they want to purchase when they also buys some other produc$\mathrm{t}(\mathrm{s})$ at the same time. For example, when a consumer wants to purchase a durable machine, the consumer must purchase the maintenance service

[^15]or maintenance parts together. When selling copiers, the firm may require that the customer purchase ink, copy paper, etc., at the same time. When the consumer buys a cell phone, she also needs to purchase a charger from the seller. Indeed, it is sometimes the case that consumers have no choice due to technological compatibility requirements, as in the case of chargers for Apple products.

The fourth is quality discrimination. Quality discrimination may occur when a firm offers commodities with different profiles of price and quality. For example, a firm can offer high-quality products at a high price to some customers who greatly value quality and low-quality products at a low price to the others, thus dividing the customers into two markets. As another example, airline tickets are divided into first class, business class, and economy class. A similar situation is found in the case of train and performance tickets. In the following, a real-world example in Dupuit's discussion of railroad tariffs is given:

It is not because of the few thousand francs which would have to be spent to put a roof over the third-class carriages or to upholster the third-class seats that some company or other has open carriages with wooden benches.... What the company is trying to do is prevent the passengers who can pay the second-class fare from traveling third-class; it hits the poor, not because it wants to hurt them, but to frighten the rich.... And it is again for the same reason that the companies, having proven almost cruel to third-class passengers and mean to second-class ones, become lavish in dealing with first-class passengers. Having refused the poor what is necessary, they give the rich what is superfluous. ${ }^{2}$

In addition, it should be noted that not every non-uniform pricing constitutes price discrimination. There are numerous other reasons that firms would charge different consumers varied prices. For example, when firms offer quantity discounts to consumers, it may be due to cost savings of large orders that firms would return to bulk buyers. Sometimes, even for the same price, price discrimination can also exist. For example, a firm may charge consumers at different locations the same price for a home delivery service, in which the price cannot fully reflect the cost difference, which

[^16]comprises the cost of production and transportation.

## Principle of Price Discrimination

As mentioned above, the increment of revenue of a monopolist generated by one extra unit of production is the summation of two effects. One is the incremental revenue $p$ generated by selling one extra unit of product at price $p$. The other is the reduction in the total revenue resulting from the lowered price, the amount of which is $Q \Delta p$. Consequently, when the total revenue is $p(Q) Q$, its marginal revenue is $p(Q)+Q \frac{d p(Q)}{d Q}$.

If a monopolist only needs to lower the price of the extra product, then the firm will constantly expand production as long as the price of the last unit of product is higher than the marginal cost. Until the price of the last unit is equal to the marginal cost, the monopolist will stop producing and turn to differential pricing for additional profits. In fact, all kinds of price discrimination can be viewed as a marketing design of the firm to reduce the negative impact of the second effect of expanding production on marginal revenue.

## Conditions of Price Discrimination

It is not unconditional for a firm to practice price discrimination because consumers can arbitrage between different prices to undermine the intention of the firm. The important conditions for price discrimination are as follows.

Firstly, the firm must possess certain power to manipulate the market (or the ability to obtain profit by setting the price above the marginal cost); otherwise, the firm cannot charge consumers a price that is higher than that in a competitive market.

Secondly, the firm needs to know or infer consumers' willingness to pay for each unit of product, which varies with consumers and sales volume. In other words, the firm should be able to determine which type of consumers can be charged a high price.

Thirdly, the firm should be able to prevent or restrict resale. Resale means that low-price buyers sell the commodities to customers who are
willing to pay a higher price. If it is easy to resale, then the firm's attempt to charge higher prices to one consumer group than the other will not succeed. Moreover, in the case of quantity discount, the firm has to prevent bulk buyers from reselling the commodities to small buyers.

Resale can be prevented or reduced in the following ways.
(1) Service. The vast majority of services cannot be resold.
(2) Guarantee. Taking after-sale service as an example, a firm may announce that only first-time buyers will be provided a guarantee or free after-sale service. For example, black market electronic products sold via unauthorized channels are apparently not guaranteed.
(3) Mixture. A firm may include certain other substances in a product, so that the product cannot be used for other purposes. For instance, medicinal alcohol cannot be converted into alcoholic beverages.
(4) Transaction costs. A large transaction cost can be charged for resale. Taking the resale of coupons (which allows consumers to purchase a product at a lower price) as an example, it costs too much to search for buyers without coupons.
(5) Contract remedy. The firm may ban resale as a condition of sale in the purchase contract. For example, if one uses a student sports game ticket, one needs to present one's student ID. In addition, in some universities, students and teachers can purchase computers below the market price, but resales are banned.
(6) Vertical integration. Upstream firms can integrate some downstream firms to charge higher prices than do other downstream firms.

## Three Typical Price Discriminations

Price discrimination can be divided into three types.
(1) First-degree price discrimination, also known as perfect price discrimination. By charging a different price for each unit of product, the producer can obtain the entire consumer surplus. Such price discrimination generally requires the producer to know the reserve price of each consumer, and to prevent resale or arbitrage between consumers.
(2) Second-degree price discrimination. The firm prices the same product differently based on the quantity of purchase. In reality, the two conditions above for perfect price discrimination are rarely fully satisfied. At this time, the producer can design different profiles of quantity and price from which the consumer can freely choose. The producer can still obtain the consumer surplus (more than that of uniform pricing).
(3) Third-degree price discrimination. The firm divides the market into two or more groups, and prices the product for each group. The producer can observe certain signals related to consumer preferences (e.g., age, occupation, location, etc.), and utilize these signals to divide customers into different markets for differential pricing.

The difference between second-degree and third-degree price discrimination is that in third-degree price discrimination, firms can take advantage of the signals of consumer types to divide the market into many independent markets for differential pricing; in second-degree price discrimination, because firms cannot observe the signals of consumer types, there is only one market, and thus firms implement price discrimination by setting different purchase contracts from which consumers can choose.

Besides, we also have the two-part tariff that is related to price discrimination and provides another means of extracting consumer surplus. A two-part tariff consists in charging consumers with a lump sum fee for the right to purchase the product and then a uniform price per unit consumed.

### 9.3.6 First-Degree (Perfect) Price Discrimination

First-Degree Price Discrimination means to price each unit of commodity differently. Let us consider a simple case. There is only one type of consumer in the market, and they all have unit demand (purchasing either nothing or 1 unit of product). Let their valuation of unit product be $V$. Then, the monopolist can obtain all of the consumer surplus by setting the price $p=V$.

Now, consider an extended case. There are $n$ types of consumers in the market, consumers of each type all have unit demand, and their valuation of the unit product is $V_{i}, i=1, \cdots, n$. Then, the monopolist can price, respectively, for the $n$ types of consumers. For consumers of type $i$, the price is set as $V_{i}$. Similarly, the monopolist can extract all the consumer surplus.

For the case of non-unit demand, suppose that there are $n$ consumers in the market. The market demand function is $D(p)$, and each consumer's demand function is $\frac{D(p)}{n}$. If only uniform price is allowed, the maximum profit obtained by the monopolist is $p^{m} D\left(p^{m}\right)-C\left(D\left(p^{m}\right)\right)$, where $p^{m}$ is the monopoly price. If a more flexible pricing strategy can be adopted, the monopolist will be able to make greater profits.


Figure 9.8: Perfect price discrimination.

Suppose that the monopolist adopts a two-part tariff which is quite the same as first-degree price discrimination, which charges a fixed fee and a same unit price (i.e., $T(q)=A+p q$ ). If the monopolist adopts competitive pricing, then $T(q)=p^{c} q$. At this point, the net surplus of all consumers is $S^{c}=\int_{0}^{q^{c}}\left[p(q)-p^{c}\right] d q$, where $q^{c}=p^{-1}\left(p^{c}\right)$, and the net surplus of each consumer is $\frac{S^{c}}{n}$. If $A=\frac{S^{c}}{n}, p=p^{c}$, the two-part tariff $T(q)=A+p q$ will be accepted by the consumer, at which the net surplus left for the consumer is 0 , and the monopoly profit equals the optimal social welfare. Setting aside the issue of allocation and equity, and only taking efficiency into consideration, perfect price discrimination increases social welfare, and the decrease of consumer surplus is offset by the increase of producers' profits. Figure
9.8 shows the change of consumer surplus and firm profit under perfect price discrimination.

We can extend the above analysis to the case of $n$ types of consumers. Each type of consumers' demand function is $Q^{i}(p)$. In this way, each type of consumer makes one separate market. Similar to the previous analysis, if different two-part tariffs are adopted for each type of consumer, then in each market, the unit price corresponds to the competitive market price, while the fixed fee is the surplus of consumers of each type corresponding to the competitive price.

A serious information problem exists in perfect price discrimination, as the firm does not know the consumers' type, and the consumers are also reluctant to disclose their type in most cases. In this situation, perfect price discrimination is impossible, and the firm cannot obtain all of the consumer surplus.

### 9.3.7 Second-Degree (Self-Selection) Price Discrimination

Second-Degree Price Discrimination means to price the same product differently based on the quantity of purchase. If the information of the consumer's type cannot be observed, the monopolist can also design various consumption bundles from which consumers can choose.

Suppose that there are two types of consumers in the market, whose valuations of the commodity are $\theta_{i} V(q), i=1,2$. Figure 9.9 describes the demands of the two types of consumers and their consumer surplus.


Figure 9.9: Demands of two types of consumers and their consumer surpluses.
$\theta_{i}$ is the preference parameter which characterizes type $i$ consumers' preferences for commodities. Assume that in the market, the proportion of consumers with preference $\theta_{1}$ is $\lambda$, and the rest are consumers with preference $\theta_{2}$. Let $\theta_{2}>\theta_{1}, V(q)=\frac{1-(1-q)^{2}}{2}$. The firm cannot identify the type of consumers, and the marginal cost is $c$.

We first look at the demands of different types of consumers.
First, for type $i$ of consumers, in the face of the market price $p$, their decision is to solve the following maximization problem

$$
\max \theta_{i} V(q)-p q .
$$

Its first-order condition is

$$
\theta_{i} V^{\prime}(q)=p,
$$

i.e.,

$$
\theta_{i}(1-q)=p .
$$

Therefore, the demand function of type $i$ consumers is

$$
D_{i}(p)=1-\frac{p}{\theta_{i}} .
$$

The consumer surplus of type $i$ consumers is

$$
S_{i}(p)=\theta_{i}\left[\frac{1-\left(1-D_{i}(p)\right)^{2}}{2}\right]-p D_{i}(p)=\frac{\left(\theta_{i}-p\right)^{2}}{2 \theta_{i}}
$$

The market demand function is

$$
D(p)=\lambda D_{1}(p)+(1-\lambda) D_{2}(p)=1-\frac{p}{\theta},
$$

where $\frac{1}{\theta} \equiv \frac{\lambda}{\theta_{1}}+\frac{1-\lambda}{\theta_{2}}$.
Now, we discuss how firms can implement second-degree price discrimination for consumers. Assume that a two-part tariff is adopted for differential pricing. In order to understand the difference between seconddegree price discrimination and other types of price discrimination, we use perfect price discrimination and uniform monopoly pricing as a bench-
mark.
In the previous discussion of perfect price discrimination, we know that the firm gains the revenue of perfect price discrimination by setting various types of two-part tariffs for different consumers. In perfect price discrimination, for type $i$ of consumers, the corresponding two-part tariff set by the monopolist is $T_{i}(q)=A_{i}+c q$, satisfying $p^{f d}=c$ and $A_{i}=S_{i}(c)$. The monopolist gains all consumer surplus, and the monopolist profit is

$$
\pi^{f d}=\lambda \frac{\left(\theta_{1}-p\right)^{2}}{2 \theta_{1}}+(1-\lambda) \frac{\left(\theta_{2}-p\right)^{2}}{2 \theta_{2}}
$$

If the monopolist adopts uniform monopoly pricing, then the monopoly price can only be a linear price (i.e., $T(q)=p q$ ). The monopolist's best choice of price is to solve the following maximization problem

$$
\max (p-c)\left(1-\frac{p}{\theta}\right) .
$$

The monopoly price and profit are $p^{m}=\frac{c+\theta}{2}$ and $\pi^{m}=\frac{(\theta-c)^{2}}{4 \theta}$, respectively.

When the monopolist does not know the type of the consumer, how should it implement second-degree price discrimination? We start with a simple way of using a single two-part tariff for second-degree price discrimination (i.e., $T(q)=A+p q$ ). Since the firm cannot distinguish the type of consumers, this pricing is for consumers of all types.

When the unit price is $p$, consumers with preference $\theta_{1}$ may still purchase, and the maximum fixed fee that they are willing to pay is $A=S_{1}(p)$. Then, the consumer surplus of consumers with preference $\theta_{1}$ is completely extracted, but consumers with preference $\theta_{2}$ still have positive consumer surplus. Since $S_{1}(p)>0$, given the price $p$, the optimal fixed fee is $A=$ $S_{1}(p)$. The subsequent question is how much the unit price $p$ should be.

For the monopolist, the most profitable two-part tariff is found by solving the following optimization problem,

$$
\max _{p} S_{1}(p)+(p-c) D(p)=\frac{\left(\theta_{1}-p\right)^{2}}{2 \theta_{1}}+(p-c)\left(1-\frac{p}{\theta}\right) .
$$

The first-order condition is,

$$
-\frac{\theta_{1}-p}{\theta_{1}}+\left(1-\frac{p}{\theta}\right)-\frac{p-c}{\theta}=0
$$

so the optimal unit price in second-degree price discrimination is,

$$
p^{s d}=\frac{c}{2-\theta / \theta_{1}}
$$

and the profit is denoted by $\pi^{s d}$.
Obviously, $c<p^{s d}<p^{m}$, and $\pi^{f d} \geqq \pi^{s d} \geqq \pi^{m}$ (i.e., the profit of perfec$t$ price discrimination is higher than that of second-degree price discrimination, the latter of which is higher than the monopoly profit under uniform pricing). Social welfare under perfect price discrimination is the highest. For second-degree price discrimination and uniform monopoly pricing, given any price $p$, social welfare is

$$
T W(p)=\lambda S_{1}(p)+(1-\lambda) S_{2}(p)+(p-c)\left[\lambda D_{1}(p)+(1-\lambda) D_{2}(p)\right]
$$

where

$$
T W^{\prime}(p)=(p-c)\left[\lambda D_{1}^{\prime}(p)+(1-\lambda) D_{2}^{\prime}(p)\right]
$$

When $p \geq c$, social welfare decreases as $p$ increases. Since $c<p^{s d}<p^{m}$, compared with uniform monopoly pricing, second-degree price discrimination improves social welfare.

In second-degree price discrimination, the monopolist can actually have more choices, meaning that she can adopt more complicated nonlinear pricing methods to obtain higher profits. In the following, we discuss the nonlinear pricing that maximizes the monopolist's profit. This constitutes a standard principal-agent problem. In Part VI, we discuss the principal-agent theory in detail.

Suppose that the commodity bundle designed by the firm for consumers with preference $\theta_{i}$ is $\left(q_{i}, T_{i}\right)$, where the purchase quantity is $q_{i}$ and the total payment is $T_{i}$, and meanwhile, $\left(q_{i}, T_{i}\right) \neq\left(q_{j}, T_{j}\right), i \neq j$. This design needs to meet two conditions: first, choosing $\left(q_{i}, T_{i}\right)$ over $\left(q_{j}, T_{j}\right)$ can bring more utility to consumers with preference $\theta_{i}$, which is called the incentive
compatibility (IC) constraint; second, the net consumer surplus cannot be less than zero when consumers with preference $\theta_{i}$ choose $\left(q_{i}, T_{i}\right)$, which is called the participation constraint.

The objective of the monopolist is,

$$
\begin{equation*}
\max _{\left(q_{i}, T_{i}\right)} \lambda\left(T_{1}-c q_{1}\right)+(1-\lambda)\left(T_{2}-c q_{2}\right), \tag{9.3.1}
\end{equation*}
$$

subject to

$$
\begin{align*}
& \theta_{1} V\left(q_{1}\right)-T_{1} \geqq 0 \quad \text { (Type } \theta_{1} \text { 's participation constraint), }  \tag{9.3.2}\\
& \theta_{2} V\left(q_{2}\right)-T_{2} \geqq 0 \quad \text { (Type } \theta_{2} \text { 's participation constraint), }  \tag{9.3.3}\\
& \theta_{1} V\left(q_{1}\right)-T_{1} \geqq \theta_{1} V\left(q_{2}\right)-T_{2} \quad \text { (Type } \theta_{1} \text { 's IC constraint), }  \tag{9.3.4}\\
& \theta_{2} V\left(q_{2}\right)-T_{2} \geqq \theta_{2} V\left(q_{1}\right)-T_{1} \quad \text { (Type } \theta_{2}^{\prime} \text { 's IC constraint). } \tag{9.3.5}
\end{align*}
$$

At the optimal point, at least one equality holds in inequalities (9.3.2) and (9.3.4); otherwise, we can increase the value of $T_{1}$ to increase the objective value. Similarly, at least one equality holds in the inequalities (9.3.3) and (9.3.5).

For inequality (9.3.5), since $\theta_{2} V\left(q_{2}\right)-T_{2} \geqq \theta_{2} V\left(q_{1}\right)-T_{1}>\theta_{1} V\left(q_{1}\right)-$ $T_{1} \geqq 0$, inequality (9.3.3) is strict, and thus we have $\theta_{2} V\left(q_{2}\right)-T_{2}>0$, which means that $\theta_{2} V\left(q_{2}\right)-T_{2}=\theta_{2} V\left(q_{1}\right)-T_{1}$ (i.e., (9.3.5) is binding). If the equality holds in inequality (9.3.4), add it to inequality (9.3.5) and we obtain $V\left(q_{1}\right)=V\left(q_{2}\right)$ (i.e., $q_{1}=q_{2}$ ), which implies that $T_{1}=T_{2}$, and thus contradicts the previous assumption. Therefore, inequality (9.3.4) is strict, which implies that (9.3.2) is binding.

To sum up the above discussion, only the inequalities (9.3.2) and (9.3.5) hold with equality, which implies that

$$
T_{1}=\theta_{1} V\left(q_{1}\right)
$$

and

$$
\theta_{2} V\left(q_{2}\right)-T_{2}=\theta_{2} V\left(q_{1}\right)-T_{1}=\left(\theta_{2}-\theta_{1}\right) V\left(q_{1}\right)
$$

Substituting them into the objective function,

$$
\max \left\{\lambda\left(\theta_{1} V\left(q_{1}\right)-c q_{1}\right)+(1-\lambda)\left(\theta_{2} V\left(q_{2}\right)-c q_{2}-\left(\theta_{2}-\theta_{1}\right) V\left(q_{1}\right)\right)\right\} .
$$

The first-order condition is then given by

$$
\begin{gathered}
\theta_{1} V^{\prime}\left(q_{1}\right)=\frac{c}{1-\frac{1-\lambda}{\lambda} \frac{\theta_{2}-\theta_{1}}{\theta_{1}}}, \\
\theta_{2} V^{\prime}\left(q_{2}\right)=c .
\end{gathered}
$$

Because of $V(q)=\frac{1-(1-q)^{2}}{2}$, we have

$$
\begin{gathered}
q_{1}=1-\frac{c}{\theta_{1}-\frac{1-\lambda}{\lambda}\left(\theta_{2}-\theta_{1}\right)}, \\
q_{2}=1-\frac{c}{\theta_{2}}
\end{gathered}
$$

Therefore, the consumption for high-demand type consumers is socially optimal (the marginal utility of commodities equals the marginal cost), but the consumption for low-demand type consumers is lower than the socially optimal level. Meanwhile, the high-demand type consumers receive positive consumer surplus.

Figure 9.10 depicts the above optimal nonlinear pricing. Point $B_{1}$ in the figure corresponds to the purchase profile $\left(q_{1}, T_{1}\right)$ of consumers with preference $\theta_{1}$, where the consumer surplus is zero; point $C_{2}$ corresponds to the purchase profile ( $q_{2}, T_{2}$ ) of consumers with preference $\theta_{2}$, whose consumer surplus is greater than zero. In the previous second-degree price discrimination with two-part tariffs, the purchase profile for consumers with preference $\theta_{1}$ is $B_{1}$ and for consumers with preference $\theta_{2}$ is $B_{2}$. Compared with the above single two-part tariff, consumers with preference $\theta_{2}$ purchase more commodities in nonlinear second-degree price discrimination, and the monopolist's profits are also higher. Since the second-degree price discrimination with two-part tariffs is a form of nonlinear pricing, the monopolist under the above optimal nonlinear pricing chooses a form of discrimination that is different from the two-part tariff, resulting in a higher
profit.


Figure 9.10: Second-degree price discrimination.

### 9.3.8 Third-Degree (Multi-Market) Price Discrimination

Third-degree Price Discrimination means to divide the market into two or more groups, for which the same product is priced differently. The monopolist can divide the aggregate demand into $m$ markets based on the information of consumers, and knows the demand curves of these markets. If all markets are independent and there is no arbitrage between any two markets, the monopolist can set different prices for different markets, but a unified price within each market. What the monopolist practices is termed the multi-market monopoly pricing.

Let $\left\{p_{1}, \cdots, p_{i}, \cdots, p_{m}\right\}$ be the prices of $m$ markets, and the corresponding demands of the $m$ markets be

$$
\left\{D_{1}\left(p_{1}\right), \cdots, D_{i}\left(p_{i}\right), \cdots, D_{m}\left(p_{m}\right)\right\} .
$$

The monopolist chooses $m$ monopoly prices for the $m$ markets.
The objective function of the monopolist is

$$
\max \sum_{i} p_{i} D_{i}\left(p_{i}\right)-C\left(\sum_{i} D_{i}\left(p_{i}\right)\right) .
$$

The first-order condition is:

$$
\frac{p_{i}-C^{\prime}(q)}{p_{i}}=\frac{1}{\varepsilon_{i}},
$$

where $\varepsilon_{i}=-\frac{p_{i} D_{i}^{\prime}\left(p_{i}\right)}{D_{i}\left(p_{i}\right)}$ is the absolute value of the elasticity of demand of market $i$.

From the above condition, we know that, compared with uniform pricing, consumers with higher elasticity of demand face lower prices under price discrimination. As a consequence, this kind of consumers prefer differential pricing. Less-elastic consumers will be charged higher prices due to price discrimination, resulting in reduced welfare. However, for the monopolist, differential pricing will certainly bring more profits; otherwise, there is no need for it. Because of the pair of opposite effects, the change of social welfare in third-degree price discrimination is uncertain.

Now, let us consider a more general case. Suppose that there are $m$ markets, the marginal cost is constant $c$, the demand of the $i$ th market is $q_{i}=D_{i}\left(p_{i}\right)$, the corresponding consumer surplus is $S_{i}\left(p_{i}\right)$, and the firm's profit is $\left(p_{i}-c\right) q_{i}$. If differential pricing is not allowed, the monopolist sets a uniform price $\bar{p}$ for all markets. Then, the corresponding demand of the $i$ th market is $\bar{q}_{i}=D_{i}(\bar{p})$, the consumer surplus is $S_{i}(\bar{p})$, and the profit is $(\bar{p}-c) \bar{q}_{i}$. After adopting differential pricing, the demand of the $i$ th market will become $\Delta q_{i} \equiv q_{i}-\bar{q}_{i}$.

The change of social welfare after adopting price discrimination is:

$$
\begin{equation*}
\Delta W=\left\{\sum_{i}\left(S_{i}\left(p_{i}\right)-\bar{S}_{i}(\bar{p})\right)\right\}+\left\{\sum_{i}\left(p_{i}-c\right) q_{i}-\sum_{i}(\bar{p}-c) \bar{q}_{i}\right\} . \tag{9.3.6}
\end{equation*}
$$

The (net) consumer surplus is $S(p)=\int_{p}^{\hat{p}} D(\xi) d \xi$, where $\hat{p}$ is the maximum price (i.e., $D(\hat{p})=0$ ). Since $S^{\prime}(p)=-D(p)<0$ and $S^{\prime \prime}(p)=-D^{\prime}(p)>$ $0, S(p)$ is a convex function. Thus, we have

$$
\begin{align*}
S_{i}\left(p_{i}\right)-S_{i}(\bar{p}) & \geqq S_{i}^{\prime}(\bar{p})\left(p_{i}-\bar{p}\right),  \tag{9.3.7}\\
S_{i}\left(p_{i}\right)-S_{i}(\bar{p}) & \leqq S_{i}^{\prime}\left(p_{i}\right)\left(p_{i}-\bar{p}\right) . \tag{9.3.8}
\end{align*}
$$

Substituting formulas (9.3.7) and (9.3.8) into (9.3.6), we obtain

$$
\Delta W \geqq \sum_{i}\left(p_{i}-c\right) \Delta q_{i}
$$

and

$$
\Delta W \leqq(\bar{p}-c) \sum_{i} \Delta q_{i}
$$

where $\Delta q_{i}=q_{i}\left(p_{i}\right)-q_{i}(\bar{p})$. If $\Delta q_{i} \geqq 0, \forall i$, then $\Delta W \geqq 0$. In other words, after adopting differential pricing, the demand of each type of consumers increases, and thus differential pricing increases social welfare.

If $\sum_{i} \Delta q_{i} \leqq 0$, then $\Delta W \leqq 0$, which means that the aggregate demand of consumers decreases, and thus price discrimination reduces social welfare.

Therefore, whether the effect of differential pricing on social welfare is positive or negative depends on its influence on sales volume.

Example 9.3.1 (Linear demand) Suppose that there are two markets, the demand functions are $q_{1}=a_{1}-b_{1} p$ and $q_{2}=a_{2}-b_{2} p$, respectively, and the marginal cost is 0 . In addition, suppose that $a_{1} \geqq a_{2}$ and $b_{1} \leqq b_{2}$, which means that market 1 is larger than market 2 .

Suppose that the monopolist can adopt price discrimination. In market $i$, the objective of the monopolist is

$$
\max p_{i}\left(a_{i}-b_{i} p_{i}\right)
$$

The first-order condition of profit maximization is

$$
\begin{aligned}
p_{i} & =\frac{a_{i}}{2 b_{i}} \\
q_{i} & =\frac{a_{i}}{2}
\end{aligned}
$$

Suppose that the monopolist can only set a uniform price instead of differential pricing. If the monopolist sets a uniform price $\bar{p}$ in all markets, and at the same time all markets have positive demands (of course, the demand of some markets can be zero at a certain price level, which will be discussed later), then the aggregate market demand is

$$
Q=\bar{q}_{1}+\bar{q}_{2}=\left(a_{1}+a_{2}\right)-\left(b_{1}+b_{2}\right) \bar{p} .
$$

As a result, the objective function of the monopolist is

$$
\max \bar{p}\left[\left(a_{1}+a_{2}\right)-\left(b_{1}+b_{2}\right) \bar{p}\right] .
$$

The first-order condition of profit maximization is

$$
\bar{p}=\frac{\left(a_{1}+a_{2}\right)}{2\left(b_{1}+b_{2}\right)} .
$$

Thus, the aggregate demand is

$$
Q=\bar{q}_{1}+\bar{q}_{2}=\frac{\left(a_{1}+a_{2}\right)}{2}=q_{1}+q_{2},
$$

and the profit is

$$
\bar{\pi}=\frac{\left(a_{1}+a_{2}\right)^{2}}{4\left(b_{1}+b_{2}\right)^{2}} .
$$

Since $\bar{q}_{1}+\bar{q}_{2}=q_{1}+q_{2}$ (i.e., $\Delta q_{1}+\Delta q_{2}=0$ ), price discrimination lowers social welfare.

At uniform pricing, if some markets no longer have positive demands, then it can be assumed that only market 1 is still open, while market 2 is closed. The monopoly price, output, and profit are $\tilde{p}=\frac{a_{1}}{2 b_{1}}, \tilde{q}=\frac{a_{1}}{2}$, and $\tilde{\pi}=\frac{a_{1}^{2}}{4 b_{1}}$, respectively. Then, we have $\tilde{\pi}=\frac{a_{1}^{2}}{4 b_{1}}>\frac{\left(a_{1}+a_{2}\right)^{2}}{4\left(b_{1}+b_{2}\right)}=\bar{\pi}$. For example, if $a_{1}=2, a_{2}=1, b_{1}=1$ and $b_{2}=2$, then $\tilde{\pi}=1>\frac{3}{4}=\bar{\pi}$. We have $\Delta q_{1}=0, \Delta q_{2}=q_{2}>0$. Consequently, price discrimination increases social welfare in this case.

Therefore, the effect of third-degree price discrimination on social welfare depends on the specific demand and characteristics of technology, and thus is indeterminate.

Different properties of commodities, such as those of durable goods and non-durable goods, will also affect the choice of the monopolist. In the next subsection, we discuss the monopolist's choice in the durable goods market.

### 9.3.9 Monopolist of Durable Goods

When the monopolist provides a durable good, intertemporal demand will change the interaction between the monopolist and consumers, because intertemporal demand will generate a dynamic game structure. In the pre-
vious discussion of game theory, we know that the commitment of players is usually an important factor in a dynamic game. When consumers have purchased a durable good, they may not purchase it again in the future, and thus the monopolist will face consumers that are different from the previous ones, who we call the remaining consumers.

Since the willingness to pay of the remaining consumers is lower than that of the previous consumers, as long as the marginal cost of the monopoly is sufficiently low, the monopolist will have the incentive to lower the price in order to obtain additional profits. When expecting intertemporal price discrimination from the monopolist, rational consumers will change their purchase decisions. In fact, concerning the issue of durable goods, the monopolist's pricing flexibility will harm the monopolist own profits. When the monopolist adjusts the price frequently, the monopoly profit approaches zero. This conclusion is called the Coase conjecture.

We will identify some means to restrict the flexibility of price adjustment in business, such as the most-favored-customer clause for price difference compensation. Sometimes, the firm will choose to rent instead of selling the goods, in order to enhance the credibility of price adjustment. In other situations, the firm will choose uneconomical durability, also called the planned abandonment, as in the case of the regular publication of new versions of textbooks with approximately identical contents.

To illustrate this issue, let us examine a simple example. Assume that there are seven consumers, their willingness to pay for a durable good is 1, $2, \ldots, 7$, respectively, and the production cost is 0 . Let time be discrete, and the time discount rate be $\delta$. Let us assume that there is only one period, and the monopolist charges a monopoly price 4 and sells the good to consumers with willingness to pay no less than 4 . At this point, the monopoly profit is 16 . Now, consider multiple periods. If the monopolist charges 4 in the first period and consumers with willingness to pay at least 4 accept this price, then in the second period, in the face of consumers whose willingness to pay is 1,2 , and 3 , the monopolist will choose the monopoly price 2, and thus consumers with willingness to pay no less than 2 will accept this price. However, the above outcome cannot be a stable equilibrium, because if expecting price reduction in the second period, consumers who
have willingness to pay at least 4 will not purchase in the first period, and the demand in the first period will decrease.

Such examples are ubiquitous in reality. For example, many electronic products are durable goods, such as the iPad. When the product is newly released, only consumers with a high willingness to pay will purchase it. As people expect that the firm will inevitably lower the price to attract medium- and low-end consumers in the future, consumers with a lower willingness to pay will wait for future price reductions.

## Sale and Rental of Durable Goods

Here, we use an example to explore how the monopolist's pricing commitment affects its profits.

Assume that the lifespan of a certain product is two periods, consumers also live for only two periods, and each consumer purchases one unit of product at most. The value of the product to consumers is $v$ per period, which is uniformly distributed over $[0,100]$. The time discount rate for consumers is 1 , and the marginal cost of production is zero. Here, we define the game structure of the sale of durable goods as follows:
(1) Players: the monopolist and consumers (who have different values $v$ of the product).
(2) A set of strategies: the producer chooses prices $p_{1}$ and $p_{2}$ for the first and second period, respectively, which indirectly determines the demands $q_{1}$ and $q_{2}$ in the two periods, meaning that $q_{1}$ consumers purchase in the first period and $q_{2}$ consumers purchase in the second period. Consumers choose whether and when to purchase.
(3) Payoffs: first, for consumers (whose valuation of product is $v$ in every period), $u(v, 1)=2 v-p_{1}$ if purchasing in the first period, $u(v, 2)=v-p_{2}$ if purchasing in the second period, and $u(v, \phi)=0$ if not purchasing at all. Then, the monopolist's payoff is made up of the profits in the two periods (i.e., $\pi=p_{1} q_{1}+p_{2} q_{2}$ ).

In the following, we use backward induction to solve the above game.
Assume that $\hat{v}$ is the value of the product for marginal buyers who are indifferent between purchasing in the first period and purchasing in the
second period, and thus $\hat{v}=p_{1}-p_{2}$. Consumers whose valuation of the durable good is $v>\hat{v}$ will choose to purchase in the first period, and consumers whose valuation of the durable good is $v>\hat{v}$ and $v \geqq p_{2}$ will choose to purchase in the second period.

In the second period, the inverse demand function is $p_{2}=100-q_{1}-q_{2}$, where $q_{1}=100-\hat{v}$ and $q_{2}=\hat{v}-p_{2}$. The optimization condition of the second period means that the marginal revenue equals the marginal cost (i.e., $M R=M C$ ), and thus we obtain $100-q_{1}-2 q_{2}=0$, i.e.,

$$
p_{2}=q_{2}=\frac{100-q_{1}}{2} .
$$

Now, consider demand $q_{1}$ or price $p_{1}$ in the first period of the game. Marginal consumers' valuation of the durable good is $\hat{v}$, satisfying $\hat{v}=$ $p_{1}-p_{2}$, and meanwhile, $q_{1}=100-\hat{v}$, and thus we obtain

$$
p_{1}=\frac{300-3 q_{1}}{2} .
$$

Therefore, the monopolist's total profit of two periods is

$$
\pi=\frac{300-3 q_{1}}{2} q_{1}+\left(\frac{100-q_{1}}{2}\right)^{2} .
$$

The choice of maximizing profits is $q_{1}=40, p_{1}=90$ and $q_{2}=30, p_{2}=30$ when the profits are $\pi=4,500$.

If the monopolist chooses to rent instead of selling, because renting does not involve the issue of product durability, the demands for each period are identical. From the above model setting, we know that the inverse demand function for each period is $p_{t}=100-q_{t}, t=1,2$. The total profits of the two periods of the monopolist are $\pi=p_{1} q_{1}+p_{2} q_{2}$. From the first-order condition, we obtain that $q_{1}=50, p_{1}=50 ; q_{2}=50, p_{2}=50 ; \pi=5,000$.

We find that, in this example, the profit from the rental of durable goods is higher than the profit from the sale. The reason for this phenomenon is that during the selling process, the dynamic commitment issue of the monopolist may affect the monopolist's profit from the first-period consumers, while renting avoids the issue of pricing commitment for durable goods.

### 9.3.10 Monopoly in an Input Market

A similar classification of market structures exists for input markets. If firms take the factor prices as given, then we have competitive factor markets. If instead there is only one firm which demands some factor of production, then we have a monopolistic factor market, and this kind of market structure is called the monopsony. In the monopolistic factor market, the behavior of a monopsonist determines the price of the purchased factor. Now, we discuss the rational decisions of the monopsonist.

Let us consider a simple example of a firm that is a competitor in its output market, but the sole purchaser of some input good. Let $w(x)$ be the (inverse) supply curve of this factor of production. Then, the profit maximization problem for the firm is:

$$
\max _{x} p f(x)-w(x) x,
$$

where $f(x)$ is a production function, and $p$ is the price of a competitive product. The first-order condition is:

$$
p f^{\prime}\left(x^{*}\right)-w\left(x^{*}\right)-w^{\prime}\left(x^{*}\right) x^{*}=0 .
$$

$p f^{\prime}\left(x^{*}\right)$ refers to the marginal value of product , or the marginal revenue of product , and $w\left(x^{*}\right)+w^{\prime}\left(x^{*}\right) x^{*}$ is the marginal purchase cost of the factor.

We can rewrite the above condition as

$$
p f^{\prime}\left(x^{*}\right)=w\left(x^{*}\right)\left(1+\frac{1}{\varepsilon(x)}\right),
$$

where $\varepsilon(x)=\frac{d x}{d w(x)} \frac{w(x)}{x}$ is the price elasticity of supply. As the elasticity goes to infinity, the monopsonist becomes perfectly competitive in the input market.

Recall that, in Chapter 4, we considered only the behavior of a firm in competitive factor markets. Similarly, it is possible to define the cost function for a monopsonistic firm. For example, suppose that $x_{i}(w)$ is the supply function for factor $i$. Then, we can define $C(y)=\min \sum w_{i} x_{i}(w)$,
such that $f(x(w))=y$. At this time, $C(y)$ is the minimum cost of producing $y$ in the monopolistic factor market.

### 9.4 Monopolistic Competition

The previous section assumes that the demand curve for a product depends only on the price set by the monopolist. However, this constitutes an extreme case. Most commodities have some substitutes, and the prices of those substitutes will affect the demand of a commodity. In this section, we consider what occurs when the prices and quantities of similar products produced by many firms affect one another, in what we term a monopolistically competitive market.

We assume that a group of $n$ "monopolists" sell similar, but not identical, products. The price that consumers are willing to pay for the output of firm $i$ depends on not only the level of output of firm $i$, but also the levels of output of the other firms: we write this inverse demand function as $p_{i}\left(q_{i}, \boldsymbol{q}_{-i}\right)$, where $\boldsymbol{q}_{-i}=\left(q_{1}, \ldots, q_{i-1}, q_{i+1}, \cdots, q_{n}\right)$.

Each firm $i$ chooses output level $q_{i}$ in order to maximize its profits,

$$
\max p_{i}\left(q_{i}, \boldsymbol{q}_{-i}\right) q_{i}-C_{i}\left(q_{i}\right)
$$

Since the demand facing firm $i$ also depends on what the other firms do, how is firm $i$ supposed to forecast the other firms' behavior? We will adopt a very simple behavior hypothesis that firm $i$ assumes that the other firms' behavior will be constant and thus we can use Nash equilibrium as solution concept. Then, each firm $i$ will take the output level of other firms as given and choose its level of output $q_{i}^{*}$. We then have the following first-order condition:

$$
p_{i}\left(q_{i}^{*}, \boldsymbol{q}_{-i}\right)+\frac{\partial p_{i}\left(q_{i}^{*}, \boldsymbol{q}_{-i}\right)}{\partial q_{i}} q_{i}^{*}-C_{i}^{\prime}\left(q_{i}^{*}\right) \leqq 0, \quad \text { with equality if } q_{i}^{*}>0
$$

The optimal output of all firms is denoted by $\boldsymbol{q}=\left(q_{1}, \ldots, q_{n}\right)$. For firm $i$, there will be some optimal output level, denoted by $Q_{i}\left(\boldsymbol{q}_{-i}\right)$.

In order for the market to be in equilibrium, each firm's forecast about
the behavior of the other firms must be compatible with what the other firms actually do. As a consequence, if $\boldsymbol{q}^{*}=\left(q_{1}^{*}, \ldots, q_{n}^{*}\right)$ is the vector of equilibrium output, it must satisfy:

$$
q_{i}^{*}=Q_{i}\left(\boldsymbol{q}_{-i}^{*}\right), i \in\{1,2, \ldots, n\},
$$

i.e., $q_{1}^{*}$ must be the best response of firm 1 if it assumes that other firms are going to produce $q_{2}^{*}, \cdots, q_{n}^{*}$.

For each firm, its marginal revenue equals the marginal cost given the actions of all of the other firms. This is illustrated in Figure 9.11. At the point of equilibrium under monopolistic competition depicted in Figure 9.11, firm $i$ is making positive profits. In a monopolistically competitive industry, if there is no barrier and firms can freely enter and exit, it is necessary to consider long-run equilibrium.


Figure 9.11: Short-run equilibrium under monopolistic competition.

### 9.4.1 Long-run Equilibrium under Monopolistic Competition

Since firms can freely enter and exit, the profits of the monopolistically competitive industry will be zero in the long run. This means that firm $i$ must set a price $p_{i}^{*}$ and choose an output level $q_{i}^{*}$, such that

$$
p_{i}^{*} q_{i}^{*}-C_{i}\left(q_{i}^{*}\right)=0,
$$

or

$$
p_{i}=\frac{C_{i}\left(q_{i}^{*}\right)}{q_{i}^{*}} .
$$

Therefore, in long-run equilibrium, the price must be equal to the average cost, but higher than the marginal cost. This means that there is excessive accumulation of production capacity, and the choice of the firm's output level is not efficient (i.e., it does not produce at the lowest point of its average cost). Figure 9.12 depicts the long-run equilibrium of such industry.


Figure 9.12: Long-run equilibrium under monopolistic competition.

### 9.4.2 Social Welfare in Monopolistic Competition

Since the price is higher than the marginal cost, there is a loss of social welfare in monopolistic competition compared with perfect competition. In addition, as their products are different, the product varieties may also lead to an efficiency loss. Since each firm cannot obtain all of the consumer surplus, the positive externality shows the possibility of insufficient entry. Moreover, the entry of a firm will reduce the profits of others, and thus the negative externality shows the possibility of excessive entry. As a result, a monopolistically competitive industry may have too many or too few product varieties. In the following, we discuss a classic monopolistic competition model.

### 9.4.3 Dixit-Stiglitz Model of Monopolistic Competition

Assume that there is a representative consumer who prefers diverse products. There are $L$ kinds of differentiated products, and $L$ is endogenously determined. Assume that each firm can only produce one product. Then, how many firms or types of products will the market have in the long run?

Here, we analyze this problem according to the Dixit-Stiglitz classic model. We assume that consumer preference is a CES (constant elasticity of substitution) utility function,

$$
U\left(q_{1}, \cdots, q_{L}\right)=\left(\sum_{l=1}^{L} q_{l}^{\rho}\right)^{1 / \rho}, \quad \rho \leqq 1
$$

where $q_{l}$ denotes the quantity of differentiated products. The consumer prefers diverse products (i.e., $\frac{\partial U\left(q_{1}, \cdots, q_{L}\right)}{\partial q_{l}} \rightarrow \infty$ when $q_{l} \rightarrow 0$ ).

The budget constraint of the consumer is $\sum_{l=1}^{L} p_{l} q_{l} \leqq I$, where $p_{l}$ is the price of differentiated product $l$, and $I$ is the exogenously-given income of the representative consumer. There are two parts of costs for firms to produce differentiated products: one is the fixed cost $F$; and the other is the marginal cost $c$. Assume that these costs are both cost of labor. Therefore, the cost function for producing $q_{l}$ differentiated products is

$$
T C_{l}\left(q_{l}\right)=F+c q_{l} .
$$

An equilibrium under monopolistic competition must satisfy the following conditions:
(1) given income and market price, the consumer chooses a consumption bundle that maximizes the consumer's utility;
(2) given the consumer's choice, firms of differentiated products (each of whom is a monopolist of its own product) chooses a monopoly price or output to maximize its profit;
(3) firms can enter and exit freely: the point at which the market profits are zero determines how many firms enter the market.

First, for consumer maximization,

$$
\begin{array}{lc} 
& \max _{q_{1}, \cdots, q_{L}}\left(\sum_{l=1}^{L} q_{l}^{\rho}\right)^{1 / \rho} \\
\text { s.t. } \quad & \sum_{l=1}^{L} p_{l} q_{l}=I . \tag{9.4.9}
\end{array}
$$

The Lagrangian function of the above optimization problem is

$$
L\left(q_{1}, \cdots, q_{L} ; \lambda\right)=\left(\sum_{l=1}^{L} q_{l}^{\rho}\right)^{1 / \rho}-\lambda\left(\sum_{l=1}^{L} p_{l} q_{l}-I\right)
$$

The first-order condition is:

$$
\begin{gathered}
\left(\sum_{l=1}^{L} q_{l}^{\rho}\right)^{\frac{1-\rho}{\rho}} q_{l}^{\rho-1}=\lambda p_{l}, \quad l=1, \cdots, L \\
\sum_{l=1}^{L} p_{l} q_{l}=I
\end{gathered}
$$

thus, we obtain that

$$
\lambda=\frac{\left(\sum_{l=1}^{L} q_{l}^{\rho}\right)^{\frac{1}{\rho}}}{I}
$$

and

$$
q_{l}=\left(\frac{p_{l}}{I}\right)^{\frac{1}{\rho-1}}\left(\sum_{l=1}^{L} q_{l}^{\rho}\right)^{\frac{1}{\rho-1}}
$$

From the demand function above, we can solve for the price elasticity of demand for products in monopolistic competition as

$$
\eta \equiv-\frac{\partial \ln q_{l}}{\partial \ln p_{l}}=\frac{1}{1-\rho} .
$$

Second, for each firm, its decision is to solve the following optimization problem,

$$
\max _{p_{l}} D_{l}\left(p_{l}\right) p_{l}-c D_{l}\left(p_{l}\right)-F .
$$

We then obtain that

$$
p_{l}=\frac{c}{1-\frac{1}{\eta}}=\frac{c}{\rho} .
$$

By symmetry, we have

$$
q_{l}=q=\frac{I}{L p_{l}}=\frac{I \rho}{L c} .
$$

At the equilibrium point, the profit of each monopolistic competitive
firm is 0 , and thus we obtain the equilibrium number of firms by

$$
\frac{I}{L}(1-\rho)=F
$$

Consequently,

$$
L^{*}=\frac{I(1-\rho)}{F}
$$

and

$$
q_{l}^{*}=\frac{F \rho}{(1-\rho) c}
$$

From the above analysis, we can conclude that the larger is the elasticity of substitution $\rho$, the lower is the price, the smaller is the number of firms, and the greater is the output of differentiated products; the higher is the fixed cost, the smaller is the number of firms, or the fewer is the product varieties, the greater is the output; and the rise of revenue will increase the number of firms, but it has no effect on the price and quantity of the products.

### 9.5 Oligopoly

In perfect competition, the interaction among firms is indirectly affected by the relationship between market price and profit. Now we discuss the direct interaction of a few firms that produces all or most of the output of some product. Such a market is called the oligopoly. The study of this issue is grounded almost entirely on the game theory. Many of the specifications of market interactions are clarified with the concepts of game theory. The purpose of this section is to elucidate how the market power of a firm is determined under different circumstances. The so-called market power refer$s$ to the extent to which the firm's pricing can deviate from the marginal cost. It will also affect the welfare level of the market. In the following, we will first discuss static oligopolistic competition, then dynamic oligopolistic competition, and finally oligopolistic competition under asymmetric information.

### 9.5.1 Price Competition: Bertrand Model

The simplest and most basic static price competition model of oligopoly was proposed by the French economist Joseph Bertrand in 1883, so is called the Bertrand model. When the market structure of a monopoly is broken, competition arises among firms. If their strategic means is price competition, what will the interactions among them be like? What is the market equilibrium?

We first assume that there are only two firms in the market which are symmetric to each other. They produce homogeneous products with the same marginal cost $c$, and the market demand function is $q=D(p)$. We will find that in such a symmetric price competition and interactive equilibrium, the equilibrium prices of the two firms are both the marginal cost, which is the same as the outcome of perfect competition. At this point, adding just one competitor will make the market power of the original monopolist completely reduce to zero. The enlightenment of this model is that when two rival firms compete, they should not immediately engage in a price war. The price war is the most direct form of competition, which often results in a lose-lose outcome.

When firm 1 and firm 2 are in price competition, the profit of firm $i$ is

$$
\pi^{i}\left(p_{i}, p_{j}\right)=\left(p_{i}-c\right) D_{i}\left(p_{i}, p_{j}\right),
$$

where $D_{i}\left(p_{i}, p_{j}\right)$ is the demand faced by firm $i$ given the prices of itself and its opponent (i.e., $p_{i}$ and $p_{j}$ ), respectively. Since the products of the two firms are homogeneous, the demand faced by firm $i$ is characterized as follows:

$$
D_{i}\left(p_{i}, p_{j}\right)= \begin{cases}D\left(p_{i}\right), & \text { if } p_{i}<p_{j}, \\ \frac{1}{2} D\left(p_{i}\right), & \text { if } p_{i}=p_{j}, \\ 0, & \text { if } p_{i}>p_{j} .\end{cases}
$$

The objective of firm $i$ is to choose $p_{i}$ to maximize $\pi^{i}\left(p_{i}, p_{j}\right)$.
The Bertrand equilibrium $\left(p_{i}^{*}, p_{j}^{*}\right)$ is a (pure strategy) Nash equilibrium,
i.e., when the opponent chooses $p_{j}^{*}$, the best response function of firm $i$ is

$$
p_{i}^{*}=\arg \max \pi^{i}\left(p_{i}, p_{j}^{*}\right)=\left(p_{i}-c\right) D_{i}\left(p_{i}, p_{j}^{*}\right) .
$$

Formally, the Bertrand price competition equilibrium is defined as:
Definition 9.5.1 (Bertrand Equilibrium) $\left(p_{1}^{b}, p_{2}^{b}\right)$ is a Bertrand equilibrium, if it satisfies the following conditions:
(i) given $p_{2}=p_{2}^{b}, p_{1}^{b}=\arg \max _{p_{1}} \pi_{1}\left(p_{1}, p_{2}^{b}\right)$;
(ii) given $p_{1}=p_{1}^{b}, p_{2}^{b}=\arg \max _{p_{2}} \pi_{2}\left(p_{1}^{b}, p_{2}\right)$.

We find that the Bertrand equilibrium outcome is unique (i.e., $\left(p_{1}^{*}, p_{2}^{*}\right)=$ $(c, c)$ ). To see this, we consider three cases.
(1) When $p_{i}^{*}>p_{j}^{*}>c$, the strategy profile is not a Nash equilibrium. This is because, in this case, the profit of firm $i$ is zero, and at least firm $i$ has the incentive to deviate from the choice. If the strategy of firm $j$ is unchanged while $p_{i}=$ $p_{j}^{*}-\varepsilon>c$, then the profit of firm $i$ is $\left(p_{j}^{*}-\varepsilon-c\right) D\left(p_{j}^{*}-\varepsilon\right)>0$.
(2) When $p_{i}^{*}=p_{j}^{*}>c$, the strategy profile is not a Nash equilibrium. Suppose that the strategy of firm $j$ is unchanged. Then, if the strategy of firm $i$ also remains unchanged, its profit is $\frac{1}{2}\left(p_{j}^{*}-c\right) D\left(p_{j}^{*}\right)$; if firm $i$ chooses a price $p_{i}^{*}=p_{j}^{*}-\varepsilon>$ $c$, its profit becomes $\left(p_{j}^{*}-\varepsilon-c\right) D\left(p_{j}^{*}-\varepsilon\right)>0$. As long as the positive number $\varepsilon$ is sufficiently small, we will have $\left(p_{j}^{*}-\varepsilon-c\right) D\left(p_{j}^{*}-\varepsilon\right)>\frac{1}{2}\left(p_{j}^{*}-c\right) D\left(p_{j}^{*}\right)$.
(3) When $p_{i}^{*}>p_{j}^{*}=c$, the strategy profile is not a Nash equilibrium. At this time, the profit of firm $j$ is zero. If the strategy of firm $i$ is unchanged, when firm $j$ chooses $p_{j}=c+\varepsilon<p_{i}^{*}$, where $\varepsilon>0$, its profit becomes $\varepsilon D(c+\varepsilon)>0$.

Therefore, the only possible pure strategy equilibrium is $p_{1}^{*}=p_{2}^{*}=c$, which is indeed a pure strategy Nash equilibrium, because no firm can obtain higher profit by unilaterally changing its pricing strategy.

The equilibrium outcome of Bertrand competition is that all symmetric firms set the price of the product at the marginal cost so that the profit of each firm is zero, which is the same as in the case of perfect competition. However, it is difficult to conceive that, in reality, firms do not have any market power and cannot obtain positive profits in an industry with only a few firms. As such, this is termed the "Bertrand Paradox". The problem is that the assumption of the Bertrand price competition model is far from reality in several ways, and the conclusion of zero profit is based on the pure strategy Nash equilibrium.

First, although the pure strategy Nash equilibrium is unique in a Bertrand competition, for a certain type of the market demand function, there is a continuum of mixed strategy Nash equilibrium with positive profit [see Exercise 9.12].

Second, the two firms may not be identical or have asymmetric production technology, which will affect the pattern of market competition. Suppose that we allow an asymmetric Bertrand competition, $c_{1}<c_{2}$. When the marginal cost of firm 1 is much lower than that of firm 2 so that $c_{2}>$ $p^{m}\left(c_{1}\right)$, firm 1 will obviously choose the monopoly price and firm 2 will exit from the market. Indeed, the market will evolve into a monopoly. When $c_{2} \leqq p^{m}\left(c_{1}\right)$, whereas no pure-strategy Nash equilibrium exists, there exists a mixed strategy Nash equilibrium where $p_{1}^{*}=c_{2}$, and $p_{2}^{*}$ randomizes on an interval above $c_{2}$. In this case, the profit of firm 1 is $\left(c_{2}-c_{1}\right) D\left(c_{2}\right)>0$, the profit of firm 2 is 0 , and the market price is the higher marginal cost of the two firms. This can be regarded as a variant of the symmetric outcome.

Third, in addition to the above symmetry assumption of production technology, it also relies on other implicit and explicit assumptions that will affect the Bertrand equilibrium outcome:

It is implicitly assumed that an oligopolistic firm can supply all of the demands that it faces at the same marginal cost (i.e., when the price is the marginal cost $c$, the oligopolistic firm can supply $D(c))$. However, in reality, firms are usually limited by their productivity. When the production capacity of firm 1 is less than $D(c), p_{1}^{*}=p_{2}^{*}=c$ is not an equilibrium. The reason for this is as follows: if the pricing decisions of both firms are unchanged, their profits are both zero; however, since firm 1's production capacity is
less than $D(c)$, the product at price $c$ is not available to some consumers who will turn to firm 2 instead even if firm 2 raises the price slightly. In this way, firm 2 can choose a price that is higher than the marginal cost, and it has an incentive to deviate from marginal-cost pricing. In practice, the production capacity needs to be accumulated through investment in advance. At the same time, in many industries, the marginal cost will rise when the output reaches a certain level. We often see the weakening of competition due to the limitation of production capacity.

It is also assumed that a firm only makes one price decision. In reality, however, firms usually can adjust prices. We learned in the previous repeated game that if the interaction between firms is repeated, two firms may choose to cooperate after all. For example, through price collusion, they can both obtain greater benefits.

In addition, it assumed that the products of firms are homogeneous. In reality, there will be differences between products produced by different firms. Some products have their own adherents, and thus even if their prices are higher than other similar products, consumers will not change the target of purchase. For example, suppose that there are two stores in different locations. A slight decrease in price will not assist one store to occupy the entire market, nor will a slight increase of price make the other store lose all of its customers. As a result, $p_{1}^{*}=p_{2}^{*}=c$ cannot be the price competition equilibrium of differentiated products. Under the extreme circumstance, the product difference is so great that every firm is a monopolist and each will choose a monopoly price, which is similar to the monopoly market structure, as previously discussed.

As a consequence, the outcome of oligopolistic competition depends on the intensity of competition, the latter of which further depends on various environmental factors. Next, we discuss strategic choices and equilibria when the above three assumptions are relaxed. Meanwhile, we retain the symmetry assumption for the sake of discussion.

### 9.5.2 Price Competition with Production Capacity Constraints

Suppose that the cost function $C(q)$ satisfies $C^{\prime}(q)>0$ and $C^{\prime \prime}(q)>0$. In this way, the production cost of the firm exhibits the property of decreasing returns to scale, and the extreme case of decreasing returns to scale is constrained production capacity. The production capacity $\bar{q}$ implies that the marginal cost will be infinitely large when the output exceeds $\bar{q}$. In the following, we examine price competition among firms under production capacity constraints through an example.

We investigate the residual demand functions of firms under production capacity constraints. If firm $i$ charges a low price $p_{i}$ and the supply of firm $i$ under this price is less than the market demand (i.e., $S_{i}(p)<D(p)$ ), then there are consumers who cannot purchase from firm $i$, and other firms will face positive residual demand.

Let $p_{1}<p_{2} . \bar{q}_{1} \equiv S_{1}\left(p_{1}\right)$ denote the supply of firm 1 or the production capacity constraint of firm 1 . When $\bar{q}_{1} \equiv S_{1}\left(p_{1}\right)<D\left(p_{1}\right)$, the residual demand function of firm 2 is

$$
\tilde{D}_{2}\left(p_{2}\right)= \begin{cases}D\left(p_{2}\right)-\bar{q}_{1}, & \text { if } D\left(p_{2}\right)>\bar{q}_{1}, \\ 0, & \text { if } D\left(p_{2}\right) \leqq \bar{q}_{1}\end{cases}
$$

This rationing rule for residual demand is called the efficient rationing rule, which means that consumers will first purchase products from lowpriced producers. Tirole (1988) also discussed some other rationing rules in his classic textbook about industrial organization.

Let the market demand function be $D(p)=1-p$, and the inverse demand function be $p=P\left(q_{1}+q_{2}\right)$. Assume that both firms are subject to production capacity constraints (i.e., the output of firm $i$ satisfies $q_{i} \leqq \bar{q}_{i}$ ). The production capacity $\bar{q}_{i}$ was obtained by firm $i$ prior to price competition at a unit cost $c_{0} \in[3 / 4,1]$. Once the production capacity is completed, the marginal cost is 0 at an output below $\bar{q}_{i}$ and becomes infinitely large at an output greater than $\bar{q}_{i}$. Because of the monopoly profit $\max _{p} p(1-p)=\frac{1}{4}$, the ex-ante profit of firm $i$ does not exceed $\frac{1}{4}$, and meanwhile $c_{0} \in[3 / 4,1]$, and thus $\bar{q}_{i} \leqq \frac{1}{3}$.

It can be shown that the Nash equilibrium caused by the price competition between the two firms is that both firms charge $p^{*}=1-\left(\bar{q}_{1}+\bar{q}_{2}\right)$. In other words, in the price competition, the two firms are doing their best to produce in the market, and all of the demand can be satisfied. This is because even if one firm lowers the price, it cannot sell more products, which means that lowering the price will only bring about less revenue, and thus no firm will choose to lower the price. Now, we discuss whether the firms have the incentive to raise the price.

There are two effects of raising the price. One effect is to obtain more revenue from consumers falling inside of the margin who have positive net consumer surplus. The other effect is to decrease the sales volume of the product, or to drive away cutoff consumers whose net consumer surplus is zero, and some other consumers falling inside of the margin. If the price set by firm $i$ satisfies $p \geqq p^{*}$, the residual demand of firm $i$ (here, we employ the efficient rationing rule) is $q=1-\bar{q}_{j}-p$, and thus its profit is $p\left(1-\bar{q}_{j}-p\right)=$ $\left(1-q-\bar{q}_{j}\right) q$ given $p \geqq p^{*}$ and $q \leqq \bar{q}_{i}$. In this way, the derivative of profit $\left(1-q-\bar{q}_{j}\right) q$ with respect to $q$ is $1-2 q-\bar{q}_{j} \geqq 0$, since $q \leqq \bar{q}_{i} \leqq \frac{1}{3}$ and $\bar{q}_{j} \leqq \frac{1}{3}$.

This means that increasing the sales volume will increase the profits of firms, or raising the price will have a negative impact on profits, and thus we conclude that $p^{*}=1-\left(\bar{q}_{1}+\bar{q}_{2}\right)$ is the Nash equilibrium of price competition for the two firms. Thus, under production capacity constraints, the price competition of firms will lead to a price that just clears the market. Meanwhile, the price is higher than the marginal cost and the firms obtain a certain degree of market power. This outcome is the same as the Cournot competition model, which will be discussed below. Under a more general assumption, Kreps and Scheinkman (1983) proved that the two-stage (production capacity accumulation and price competition) oligopolistic competition equilibrium outcome is consistent with that of Cournot competition. In the following, we discuss Cournot competition, which is an oligopolistic interaction model of quantity competition.

### 9.5.3 Quantity Competition: Cournot Model

Now, we discuss quantity competition. This model is a simple duopoly model introduced by the French economist Cournot in 1838, so known as the Cournot model. For simplicity, suppose that two firms, $i, j$, are in quantity competition, and their strategies are both to choose an output level so that the price just clears the market. We can regard the quantity competition of firms as a two-stage competition. In the first stage, the two firms choose their profit-maximizing production levels $q_{i}, q_{j}$. In the second stage, the two firms engage in price competition. According to the price competition with production constraints discussed above, we know that the equilibrium price can just clear the market at this moment. This two-stage explanation was proposed by Kreps and Scheinkman (1983).

The profit of firm $i$ can be written as

$$
\pi^{i}\left(q_{i}, q_{j}\right)=q_{i} P\left(q_{i}+q_{j}\right)-C_{i}\left(q_{i}\right) .
$$

Assume that the profit function $\pi^{i}$ is strictly concave and twice differentiable to $q_{i}$. Through the first-order condition for the output from the profit function, the reaction function of firm $i$ can be obtained, which is $q_{i}=q_{i}^{*}\left(q_{j}\right)$, such that $\frac{\partial \pi^{i}\left(q_{i}^{*}\left(q_{j}\right), q_{j}\right)}{\partial q_{i}}=0$ for $q_{i}^{*}>0$.

Deriving the first-order condition for $q_{i}$ from the above profit function, we have

$$
P\left(q_{i}+q_{j}\right)-C_{i}^{\prime}\left(q_{i}\right)+q_{i} P^{\prime}\left(q_{i}+q_{j}\right)=0 .
$$

We then obtain firm $i$ 's Lerner index, which measures the market power of the firm,

$$
L_{i} \equiv \frac{P-C_{i}^{\prime}}{P}=-\frac{q_{i} P^{\prime}}{P}=-\frac{P^{\prime} Q}{P} \frac{q_{i}}{Q}=\frac{d_{i}}{\varepsilon},
$$

where $d_{i}$ is the market share of firm $i$, and $\varepsilon$ is the absolute value of demand elasticity. Given the linear demand and cost, the equilibrium outcome can be easily deduced.

For discussion purposes, we set a specific market demand function, $P(Q)=1-Q$. The cost function of each firm is $C_{i}\left(q_{i}\right)=c_{i} q_{i}$, and the
first-order condition at this time is

$$
1-\left(q_{i}+q_{j}\right)-c_{i}-q_{i}=0,
$$

and thus we obtain that

$$
q_{i}=q_{i}^{*}\left(q_{j}\right)=\frac{1-q_{j}-c_{i}}{2}
$$

Solving the simultaneous reaction functions, we can derive

$$
q_{i}=\frac{1-2 c_{i}+c_{j}}{3}
$$

In the equilibrium of quantity competition, the equilibrium profit of each firm is

$$
\pi_{i}=\frac{\left(1-2 c_{i}+c_{j}\right)^{2}}{9}
$$

From the above equilibrium we find that $\frac{\partial q_{i}}{\partial c_{j}}>0$ and $\frac{\partial \pi_{i}}{\partial c_{j}}>0$ (i.e., the output and profit of firm $i$ increase with the increase of the cost of its opponent). When its opponent firm $j$ becomes weaker (i.e., its marginal cost increases), the output of firm $j$ will decrease, and thus firm $i$ faces more residual demand and higher production.

We can extend the competition between the two firms to $n$ firms' quantity competition. For convenience of discussion, assume that firms are symmetric, and thus $P(Q)=1-Q, C_{i}\left(q_{i}\right)=c q_{i}$ and $Q=\sum_{i=1}^{n} q_{i}$. Then, the first-order condition becomes $1-Q-c-q_{i}=0$. By symmetry, we obtain the equilibrium output as

$$
q_{i}^{c}=q=\frac{1-c}{n+1}
$$

the equilibrium profit as

$$
\pi_{i}^{c}=\frac{(1-c)^{2}}{(n+1)^{2}}
$$

the consumer surplus as

$$
C S=\frac{n^{2}\left(1-c^{2}\right)}{2(n+1)^{2}},
$$

and the market price as

$$
p=1-n q=c+\frac{1-c}{n+1} .
$$

Note that $p=c$ when $n \rightarrow \infty$, this is exactly the case of perfect competition.
We can also investigate the relationship between the number of firms and social welfare, defined as

$$
W(N) \equiv C S(N)+N \pi(N)=\frac{(1-c)^{2}}{2}\left(1-\frac{1}{\left(N+1^{2}\right)}\right) .
$$

Then, it is easy to show that $\frac{d}{d n} W(n)>0$ (i.e., the more are the oligopolistic firms, the higher is the social welfare).

## Dynamic Explanation of the Cournot Equilibrium

The Cournot equilibrium is a steady-state solution. Once the equilibrium is reached, no firm will unilaterally choose to deviate. However, can the Cournot equilibrium explain the actual output choices of firms in competition? Alternatively, if the output choices of firms are not at a Cournot equilibrium, will the two firms adjust their strategies? Below, we explain the equilibrium of static quantity competition with dynamic adjustment. In period 1, firm 1 chooses a certain output. In period 2, firm 2 adjusts its output to an optimal level according to the choice of firm 1. In period 3, firm 1 adjusts its output to a new level according to the choice of firm 2. Repeat this process infinitely, and we find that, regardless of what output level the initial firm chooses, the final outcome of dynamic adjustment is a Cournot equilibrium output. Figure 9.13 shows this dynamic adjustment process. We also find that the convergence outcome does not depend on the initial output choice.

If the two firms choose the output level not simultaneously, but sequentially, is the competition equilibrium still a Cournot equilibrium? Next, we discuss quantity competition equilibrium under sequential decisionmaking.


Figure 9.13: The convergence of the Cournot equilibrium.

### 9.5.4 Sequential Quantity Competition: Stackelberg Model

Stackelberg (1934) discussed sequential quantity competition, so known as the Stackelberg Model. In an industry, the dominant firm 1 takes the lead in choosing its output. After observing the output of firm 1, firm 2 chooses its own output, and then the market clears.

For convenience, we assume that the market demand is $Q(p)=1-p$, and the average cost of each firm is $c$. This is a standard dynamic game. So we use subgame perfect Nash equilibrium as solution concept and adopt the backward induction technique to find the equilibrium.

First, we analyze the action of firm 2. After observing the output of firm 1 , firm 2 makes the optimal output decision as follows:

$$
\max _{q_{2}}\left(1-q_{1}-q_{2}-c\right) q_{2},
$$

from which we can obtain the best response of firm 2,

$$
q_{2}=q_{2}^{*}\left(q_{1}\right)=\frac{1-c-q_{1}}{2} .
$$

Given the reaction function of firm 2, the optimal output choice of firm 1 is to solve the problem

$$
\max _{q_{1}}\left(1-q_{1}-q_{2}^{*}\left(q_{1}\right)-c\right) q_{1}
$$

from which we obtain that

$$
\begin{gathered}
q_{1}^{s}=\frac{1-c}{2}>q_{1}^{c}, \\
q_{2}^{s}=\frac{1-c}{4}<q_{2}^{c}, \\
p^{s}<p^{c},
\end{gathered}
$$

and the profits satisfy

$$
\begin{aligned}
& \pi_{1}^{s}>\pi_{1}^{c}, \\
& \pi_{2}^{s}<\pi_{2}^{c},
\end{aligned}
$$

where $q_{i}^{c}, p^{c}$ and $\pi_{i}^{c}$ are the output, price, and profit when the firms are in the situation of Cournot competition. From comparison of the above market equilibria, we find that there is a first-mover advantage in the quantity competition.

Having discussed the one-shot interaction of firms, we next explore the impact of multi-period interactions on market competition.

### 9.5.5 Dynamic Price Competition and Firm Collusion

When firms can conduct multiple pricing, an early price may affect subsequent ones. For instance, if a firm lowers its price, it may trigger a chain reaction of price cuts, which as a result poses an incentive that constrain$s$ the price cuts of firms. Chamberlin's oligopoly model pointed out that in the oligopoly of homogeneous products, when recognizing the strategic dependence between them, firms can maintain the monopoly price through tacit agreement without taking any specific measures so that each firm can obtain higher profits. The tacit collusion between them is based on revenge for unilateral deviations, such as in a ruthless price war.

The validity of collusion between firms depends on the effectiveness of the penalty mechanism for deviations. The so-called effectiveness refers to the intensity of punishment against deviant participants, such that no firm is willing to deviate from the collusive price. This depends on numerous factors, such as observability of information and coordination during the
punishment process. Here, we adopt a simple infinitely repeated game to describe the collusion mechanism between firms.

When interactions are repeated infinitely, a significant change occurs in comparison with the static interaction because there is no explicit final period at this time. Every firm, when making decisions at any period, needs to consider the impact of previous decisions on subsequent price competition. Of course, there is more than one equilibrium strategy at this time.

For example, the firm charges the marginal-cost pricing in each period (i.e., $p_{1 t}=p_{2 t}=\cdots=c, t=1,2, \cdots$ ), which is a Nash equilibrium of the infinite-period price competition. This is because if the opponent sets a price at the marginal cost in each period, then the firm will not obtain a higher profit by unilaterally changing the price. However, the above equilibrium is not the only equilibrium. When $\delta \geqq \frac{1}{2}$, the grim strategy discussed in Chapter 7 is also a Nash equilibrium (in fact it is a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium) in infinite-period price competition.

The grim strategy: in the first period, each firm chooses $p_{11}=p_{21}=p^{m}$, where $p^{m}$ is the monopoly price; in period $t \geqq 2$, for firm $i$, if the prices previously chosen by its opponent are the monopoly price (also known as the collusive price), i.e., $p_{j s}=p^{m}, \forall s<t$, then firm $i$ chooses $p_{i t}=p^{m}$; if the price previously chosen by its opponent deviates from the monopoly price, i.e., there exists $s<t$, such that $p_{j s} \neq p^{m}$, then firm $i$ chooses $p_{i t}=c$ in period $t$.

This price strategy is called the "grim strategy" because once the opponents have ever deviated from the collusion price, the firm will never forgive them, i.e., in each subsequent period, it will choose the marginalcost pricing to punish the opponents.

Let us now determine whether such a strategy can become a Nash equilibrium. If the firm decides to follow the collusive arrangement and chooses the monopoly price in each period, then the total discounted profit of firm $i$ is $\frac{\pi^{m}}{2}\left(1+\delta+\delta^{2}+\cdots\right)=\frac{\pi^{m}}{2(1-\delta)}$. If firm $i$ deviates from the collusive arrangement in period $t$, then the maximal profit that it can obtain in this period is $\pi^{m}$. In subsequent periods, because its opponent chooses to price the product at the marginal cost, its profit is zero. Then, the total
discounted profit of firm $i$ is

$$
\begin{aligned}
\frac{\pi^{m}}{2}\left(1+\delta+\delta^{2}+\cdots+\delta^{t-1}\right)+\delta^{t} \pi^{m} & \leqq \frac{\pi^{m}}{2}\left(1+\delta+\delta^{2}+\cdots+\delta^{t-1}\right) \\
& +\delta^{t}\left[\frac{\pi^{m}}{2}\left(1+\delta+\delta^{2}+\cdots\right)\right] \\
= & \frac{\pi^{m}}{2}\left(1+\delta+\delta^{2}+\cdots\right)
\end{aligned}
$$

$$
\text { If } \delta \geqq \frac{1}{2}
$$

$$
\frac{\pi^{m}}{2}\left(1+\delta+\delta^{2}+\cdots\right)=\frac{\pi^{m}}{2(1-\delta)} \geqq \pi^{m}
$$

then the grim strategy is a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium.
From the above analysis, it can be seen that there is a possibility of price collusion between oligopolists to make the market price the same as the monopoly price. In the collusion mechanism, some strict punishment mechanisms exist to restrict the deviation of firms.

Although the infinite-period assumption seems to be unrealistic, as long as there is no clear cut-off time in the market competition, assuming that there is a probability $\hat{p}$ that firm $i$ will coexist with its opponents in the market in the next period, we can write the discount rate as $\hat{\delta}=\delta \hat{p}$. Then, the total discounted profit of firm $i$ is $\sum_{t} \delta \hat{p}^{t} \pi_{t}^{i}\left(p_{i t}, p_{u t}\right)=\sum_{t} \hat{\delta}^{t} \pi_{t}^{i}\left(p_{i t}, p_{u t}\right)$. Therefore, as long as $\hat{\delta}=\delta \hat{p} \geqq \frac{1}{2}$, there will exist the same equilibrium of price collusion as in the above case.

By the Folk Theorem in Chapter 7, we know that repeated games usually have infinitely many equilibria. In the above context, we find that firms choosing the price $p_{1 t}=p_{2 t}=p \in\left[c, p^{m}\right]$ in each period also constitute a (subgame perfect) Nash equilibrium. A similar grim strategy exists, i.e., each firm chooses the price $p$ in the beginning, and if any opponent deviates in a period, then in each period afterwards, other firms choose marginalcost pricing as a punishment for the opponent.

From the above multi-period price competition model, we find that in the case of repeated games, firms have the incentive and ability to choose collusion, which further explains why in reality we do not see the same intense price competition as in the Bertrand equilibrium. Next, we will relax the assumption of the homogeneity of products. We will find that in
the market of heterogeneous products, price competition still brings market power to firms.

### 9.5.6 Price Competition under Horizontal Product Differentiation: Hotelling Model

The characterization of product differentiation is usually based on differences in consumer valuations. There are primarily two kinds of value differentiations. One is horizontal differentiation, i.e., the value of products is different for different consumers. The other is vertical differentiation, i.e., the value of a product is the same for all consumers, but is different from that of other products. For price competition of differentiated products, we mainly adopt the method of the spatial location model. First, we discuss the horizontal differentiation model.

For many commodities in real life, such as clothes with different colors and styles, different people have heterogeneous preferences, just as consumers in different locations have different preferences for stores in different locations. Harold Hotelling (1895-1973, see his biography in Section 9.6.1) developed a location model to characterize the price competition of differentiated products in a paper published in the Journal of Political Economy in 1929.

Assume that the city is a line of length 1 , and consumers are uniformly distributed in the city with a density of 1 . Two stores are located at both ends of the city. Store 1 is located at $x=0$, and store 2 is located at $x=1$. The marginal cost of each store is $c$. Assume that the traffic cost is a quadratic function of distance (i.e., for consumers located at $x$, the traffic cost of going to store 1 is $t x^{2}$ ), and the traffic cost of going to store 2 is $t(1-x)^{2}$. The product prices of the two stores are $p_{1}$ and $p_{2}$, respectively. Assume that the price difference is not large to the extent that one store faces no demand (i.e., $\left|p_{1}-p_{2}\right|<t$ ). This assumption can be verified at the Nash equilibrium point. If there is no demand for one store, as long as the price is not lower than the marginal cost, the store has an incentive to lower the price. The consumer has a unit demand for the product, and his valuation of the product $\bar{s}$ is sufficiently large. This assumption ensures that
all consumers will purchase at the equilibrium point. In addition, in the Hotelling model, the products of the two stores are homogeneous, except the location.

According to these assumptions, there always exists one consumer in the city who is indifferent between the two stores. This consumer is called the cutoff consumer, whose position depends on the prices of the two stores. Let the cutoff consumer's position be $x\left(p_{1}, p_{2}\right)$, satisfying

$$
p_{1}+t x^{2}\left(p_{1}, p_{2}\right)=p_{2}+t\left(1-x\left(p_{1}, p_{2}\right)\right)^{2} .
$$

The demand for store 1 is

$$
D_{1}\left(p_{1}, p_{2}\right)=x\left(p_{1}, p_{2}\right)=\frac{p_{2}-p_{1}+t}{2 t} .
$$

The demand for store 2 is

$$
D_{2}\left(p_{1}, p_{2}\right)=1-x\left(p_{1}, p_{2}\right)=\frac{p_{1}-p_{2}+t}{2 t} .
$$

The profit of store $i$ is

$$
\pi^{i}\left(p_{i}, p_{j}\right)=\left(p_{i}-c\right) \frac{p_{j}-p_{i}+t}{2 t} .
$$

Solving the first-order condition with respect to $p_{i}, p_{j}+c+t-2 p_{i}=0$. Then, the reaction function of store $i$ is

$$
R_{i}\left(p_{j}\right)=\frac{p_{j}+c+t}{2} .
$$

By symmetry, we can obtain the Nash equilibrium price as $p_{1}^{c}=p_{2}^{c}=$ $c+t$, and the profits as $\pi^{1}=\pi^{2}=\frac{t}{2}$.

Here, the value $t$ characterizes the degree of product differentiation. When $t=0$, the products supplied by the two stores are homogeneous, and the equilibrium price is equal to that of the Bertrand equilibrium. When $t>0$, both stores obtain positive profits under price competition, and the greater is the product differentiation, the greater is the market power of the stores.

### 9.5.7 Vertical Product Differentiation Model

Consumers usually have a preference ordering for the characteristics of products. A typical example of this is quality. Although consumers generally like high-quality products in pratice, the value of product quality possessed by each consumer is different. Use $x$ to describe different types of consumers. For convenience of discussion, assume that the consumer type $x$ is uniformly distributed in $[0,1]$, and the marginal cost of firms is zero. Here, we discuss not only price competition under product differentiation, but also under product positioning.

In price competition under vertical product differentiation, suppose that the product qualities of firm $A$ and $B$ are $a$ and $b$, respectively, where $a<b$, and the prices of the two firms are $p_{A}$ and $p_{B}$, respectively. Let the utilities of the two products for consumers of type $x$ be

$$
U_{x}(i) \equiv \begin{cases}a x-p_{A}, & i=A \\ b x-p_{B}, & i=B .\end{cases}
$$

Consider the competitive equilibrium when both firms have positive market shares. Let $\hat{x}$ be cutoff consumers, satisfying

$$
\hat{x}=\frac{p_{B}-p_{A}}{b-a} .
$$

Then, $\hat{x}$ is the market share of firm $A$, and $1-\hat{x}$ is that of firm $B$.
The competitive equilibrium prices of the two firms are

$$
p_{A}^{*}=\underset{p_{A}}{\arg \max } p_{A} \hat{x} ; \quad p_{B}^{*}=\underset{p_{B}}{\arg \max } p_{B}(1-\hat{x}) .
$$

Their reaction functions are

$$
p_{A}=R_{A}\left(p_{B}\right)=\frac{p_{B}}{2} ; \quad p_{B}=R_{B}\left(p_{A}\right)=\frac{b-a+p_{A}}{2} .
$$

As a consequence, we obtain that

$$
p_{A}^{*}=\frac{b-a}{3} ; \quad p_{B}^{*}=\frac{2(b-a)}{3} .
$$

Therefore, $\hat{x}=\frac{p_{B}^{*}-p_{A}^{*}}{b-a}=\frac{1}{3}$. At Nash equilibrium, the profits of the two firms are

$$
\pi_{A}(a, b)=\frac{b-a}{9} ; \quad \pi_{B}(a, b)=\frac{4(b-a)}{9} .
$$

We further discuss the choice of product positioning. Consider the following two-stage game and find the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium. In the first stage, the two firms choose product quality, and in the second stage, they engage in price competition.

If the two firms choose product quality $a$ and $b$, respectively, in the first stage where $a \leqq b$, then the equilibrium of the above price competition is the Nash equilibrium in the second stage of the game.

In the first stage, the profits of firm $A$ and $B$ are

$$
\pi_{A}(a, b)=\frac{b-a}{9} ; \quad \pi_{B}(a, b)=\frac{4(b-a)}{9} .
$$

Since

$$
\frac{\partial \pi_{A}(a, b)}{\partial a}=-\frac{1}{9}, \quad \frac{\partial \pi_{B}(a, b)}{\partial b}=\frac{4}{9},
$$

we have $a^{*}=0$ and $b^{*}=1$, which means that in price competition under vertical product differentiation, firms will maximize their product differences from others.

In the second stage, the prices of the two firms are $p_{A}^{*}=\frac{1}{3}$ and $p_{B}^{*}=\frac{2}{3}$, both larger than the marginal cost, which means that in the price competition under vertical product differentiation, firms will weaken the intensity of price competition.

The above oligopolistic competition models assume that the market structure is exogenous. However, in practice, entering or exiting the market is an important dimension of firms' strategy. In the following, we will consider competition in the dynamic market structure.

### 9.5.8 Market Entry Deterrence

Bain (1956) summarized four factors that affect the market structure, which also affect the ability of incumbent firms to maintain market power.

The first factor is economies of scale. The minimum efficient scale of a
firm (or the output at the lowest average cost) is a crucial factor to determine the consumer demand of the industry. For example, in a firm that exhibits increasing returns to scale, its minimum efficient scale may be infinitely large. If we have $C(q)=f+c q, A C(q)=\frac{f}{q}+c$ as the decreasing function of the output, then only a few firms can survive in the market. In an industry with increasing returns to scale, the cost is the least when all of the output is produced by one firm.

The second is the absolute advantage of cost. Incumbent firms may have more advanced technologies obtained through experience (the process of learning by doing) or $\mathrm{R} \& \mathrm{D}$ (patenting or innovation). Incumbent firms may accumulate capital to lower their production costs, or prevent entrants from acquiring important inputs by contracts with suppliers, or raise the cost of their competitors.

The third is the advantage of product differentiation. Incumbent firms obtaining patents for their products can prevent other firms from using or imitating their technologies. They can also use the first-mover advantage to gain brand loyalty of consumers.

The fourth is capital input requirement. Before a firm enters the market, it needs to finance the investment. When financing is difficult, for example, banks are unwilling to lend due to risk considerations, or if incumbent firms increase the intensity of potential competition in the product market and thus lower the potential entrant's expectation for profitability, the willingness of the potential entrant to enter the market will decrease.

Some barriers to entry are exogenous, such as those granted by law, and not controlled by incumbent firms; whereas, some others are endogenous, and caused by strategic choices of incumbent firms. When an incumbent faces the threat of entry, she may take the following three actions.
(1) Entry blockade: it is difficult for the entrant to obtain the resources needed to establish a business, and the incumbent faces little threat of entry.
(2) Entry deterrence: the incumbent has successfully thwarted the entry by adjusting her strategy to lower the entrant's expectation of profitability.
(3) Entry accommodation: the incumbent finds it more profitable to allow (a few) entrants to enter the market than setting barriers to entry.

Below, we investigate an example of endogenous barrier.
Consider an industry consisting of two firms. Firm 1 (the incumbent) chooses a capital level $k_{1}$ (or the previous "production capacity") and fixes on it. Firm 2 (the potential entrant) observes $k_{1}$ and chooses a capital level $k_{2}$. If $k_{2}=0$, this means that firm 2 has not entered the market. Under the dynamic market structure, the competition of the two firms is to choose their own capital levels successively. Let the output be the previous production capacity. The game between the two firms is a two-stage game and then we can use subgame perfect Nash equilibrium as solution concept.

The first stage: firm 1 chooses a capital level of $k_{1}$.
The second stage: having observed $k_{1}$, firm 2 chooses a capital level $k_{2}$. If firm 2 chooses to enter (i.e., $k_{2}>0$ ), it must bear a fixed entry cost $f$.

If not considering whether firm 2 enters, this model is the previously discussed Stackelberg model.

Let market demand be linear, and the market price be $p=1-k_{1}-k_{2}$. At this point, the profit of firm 1 is $\pi^{1}\left(k_{1}, k_{2}\right)=k_{1}\left(1-k_{1}-k_{2}\right)$; the profit of firm 2 is $\pi^{2}\left(k_{1}, k_{2}\right)=k_{2}\left(1-k_{1}-k_{2}\right)-f$ if it enters; otherwise, it is zero.

In the second stage, if firm 2 enters (i.e., $k_{2}>0$ ), its choice is the best response to firm 1's action, i.e.,

$$
k_{2}=R_{2}\left(k_{1}\right)=\frac{1-k_{1}}{2} .
$$

In the first stage, expecting the response of firm 2 , firm 1 chooses the optimal capital level from the problem:

$$
\max _{k_{1}} k_{1}\left(1-k_{1}-R_{2}\left(k_{1}\right)\right)
$$

or

$$
\max _{k_{1}} k_{1}\left(1-k_{1}-\frac{1-k_{1}}{2}\right) .
$$

We use the Stackelberg model to obtain the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium, $k_{1}^{*}=\frac{1}{2}, k_{2}^{*}=\frac{1}{4}, \pi^{1}=\frac{1}{8}, \pi^{2}=\frac{1}{16}-f$. When $f>\frac{1}{16}$, we know that firm 2 will not enter, or there is a market entry blockade. When $f<\frac{1}{16}$, if firm 1 allows firm 2 to enter, then it will choose the outcome of the Stackelberg equilibrium, i.e., $k_{1}^{*}=\frac{1}{2}$, and firm 2 will also choose $k_{2}^{*}=\frac{1}{4}$. The profit of firm 1 is then $\pi^{1}=\frac{1}{8}$, and the profit of firm 2 is $\frac{1}{16}-f>0$.

If firm 1 deters the entry of firm 2 , it will choose a capital level $k_{1}^{b}$, such that the best choice of firm 2 is $k_{2}^{*}=0 . k_{1}^{b}$ satisfies $\max _{k_{2}} k_{2}\left(1-k_{1}^{b}-k_{2}\right)-$ $f=0$, and thus we obtain $k_{1}^{b}=1-2 \sqrt{f}>1 / 2$. The profit of firm 1 is $\pi^{1}=(1-2 \sqrt{f})[1-(1-2 \sqrt{f})]$. When $f \rightarrow \frac{1}{16}, \pi^{1} \rightarrow \frac{1}{4}=\pi^{m}$, a deterrence strategy is a better choice for firm 1 . When $f \rightarrow 0$, an accommodation strategy is a better choice for firm 1.

We can verify that, when $f \leqq\left(\frac{1}{4}-\frac{\sqrt{2}}{8}\right)^{2}$, firm 1 will choose an accommodation strategy; otherwise, it will choose a deterrence strategy.

### 9.5.9 Price Competition with Asymmetric Information

The above discussion of oligopolistic competition is based on the assumption that the competition game is one of complete information. However, in practice, firms usually face some state variables that cannot be accurately observed when making decisions, such as the cost of an opponent, the market demand or market potential, because some information is privately owned, such as the case in which a firm knows its own production technology better than its opponents do. George J. Stigler (1911-1991, see his biography in Section 9.6.2) is one of the founders of information economics. He believed that it costs too much for consumers to obtain information about quality, price and purchase timing of goods, so that consumers are neither able nor willing to obtain sufficient information, resulting in different prices for the same commodity. According to Stigler, such result was inevitable and did not require human intervention. In this subsection, we discuss oligopolistic competition and dynamic market entry under asymmetric information. For a detailed discussion of such principal-agent issues under incomplete information, see the chapters on incentive mechanism
design theory in Part VI.
In real market competition, firms have information that their opponents do not possess. In game theory, we can characterize the types of firms according to the information that is not known to their competitors. Below, we discuss a simple price competition model with asymmetric information.

Suppose that there are two firms in the market, firm 1 and firm 2, which produce differentiated products and engage in price competition with each other. Firms' demand functions are public information in the form of linear function $D_{i}\left(p_{i}, p_{j}\right)=a-b p_{i}+d p_{j}, 0<d<b$. The information on the cost of firm 2 is public, but the cost information of firm 1, also called the type, is private. There are two possibilities for the marginal cost of firm 1 , $c_{1}^{l}<c_{1}^{h}$, with a prior distribution $\operatorname{prob}\left(c_{1}=c_{1}^{l}\right)=\beta$ and $\operatorname{prob}\left(c_{1}=\right.$ $\left.c_{1}^{h}\right)=1-\beta$. Therefore, firm 2's expectation for firm 1's marginal cost is $c_{1}^{e} \equiv \beta c_{1}^{l}+(1-\beta) c_{1}^{h}$. The marginal cost of firm 2 is $c_{2}$.

The ex-post profit of firm $i$ is

$$
\pi^{i}\left(p_{i}, p_{j}\right)=\left(p_{i}-c_{i}\right)\left(a-b p_{i}+d p_{j}\right) .
$$

The two firms choose the prices at the same time. To solve for the Bertrand price equilibrium under asymmetric information, we use Bayesian-Nash equilibrium as a solution concept. Let $p_{2}^{*}$ be the equilibrium price of firm 2, and $p_{1}^{l}$ and $p_{1}^{h}$ be the equilibrium price strategies of firm 1 at marginal costs $c_{1}^{l}$ and $c_{1}^{h}$, respectively.

Now, we solve for the best response functions of the two firms.
For firm 1, given marginal $\operatorname{cost} c_{1}$ and the pricing of firm 2, $p_{2}^{*}$, from profit maximization, we obtain

$$
a-2 b p_{1}+d p_{2}^{*}+b c_{1}=0,
$$

and then

$$
p_{1}=R_{1}\left(p_{2} ; c_{1}\right)=\frac{a+d p_{2}^{*}+b c_{1}}{2 b} .
$$

Therefore,

$$
p_{1}^{l}=\frac{a+d p_{2}^{*}+b c_{1}^{l}}{2 b} .
$$

Similarly, given marginal $\operatorname{cost} c_{2}$ and the pricing of firm $2, p_{2}^{*}$, we have

$$
p_{1}^{h}=\frac{a+d p_{2}^{*}+b c_{1}^{h}}{2 b} .
$$

The expectation of firm 2 for firm 1's pricing is then

$$
\begin{aligned}
p_{1}^{e} & =\beta p_{1}^{l}+(1-\beta) p_{1}^{h} \\
& =\frac{a+d p_{2}^{*}+b c_{1}^{e}}{2 b} .
\end{aligned}
$$

For firm 2, given firm 1's choice, its objective is to choose a price $p_{2}$ to maximize the expected profit

$$
\begin{aligned}
E \pi^{2} & =\beta\left(p_{2}-c_{2}\right)\left(a-b p_{2}+d p_{1}^{l}\right)+(1-\beta)\left(p_{2}-c_{2}\right)\left(a-b p_{2}+d p_{1}^{h}\right) \\
& =\left(p_{2}-c_{2}\right)\left(a-b p_{2}+d p_{1}^{e}\right) .
\end{aligned}
$$

From the first-order condition, we can obtain the reaction function of firm 2:

$$
p_{2}^{*}=R_{2}\left(p_{1}\right)=\frac{a+b p_{1}^{e}+b c_{2}}{2 b}
$$

and thus we obtain the Bayesian-Nash equilibrium:

$$
\begin{gathered}
p_{2}^{*}=\frac{2 a b+a d+2 b^{2} c_{2}+b d c_{1}^{e}}{4 b^{2}-d^{2}} ; \\
p_{1}^{l}=\frac{a+d p_{2}^{*}+b c_{1}^{l}}{2 b} ; \\
p_{1}^{h}=\frac{a+d p_{2}^{*}+b c_{1}^{h}}{2 b} .
\end{gathered}
$$

We compare the above case with the case of symmetric information. When information is symmetric, we can obtain that

$$
\begin{aligned}
& p_{2}^{*}\left(c_{1}=c_{1}^{l}\right)=\frac{2 a b+a d+2 b^{2} c_{2}+b d c_{1}^{l}}{4 b^{2}-d^{2}}<p_{2}^{*} ; \\
& p_{2}^{*}\left(c_{1}=c_{1}^{h}\right)=\frac{2 a b+a d+2 b^{2} c_{2}+b d c_{1}^{h}}{4 b^{2}-d^{2}}>p_{2}^{*} .
\end{aligned}
$$

We can verify that, in the case of symmetric information, the profit of
firm 2 is higher because the equilibrium profit of firm 2 is a convex function of firm 1's cost.

For firm 1, we have that $\frac{d \pi_{1}}{d p_{2}}=\frac{\partial \pi^{1}}{\partial p_{2}}=d\left(p_{1}-c_{i}\right)>0$. Consequently, when the cost of firm 1 is $c_{1}^{h}$, it will have an incentive to disclose its type information if there is an opportunity to disclose; when the cost of firm 1 is $c_{1}^{l}$, it will deliberately conceal its cost information. This is because a firm with high cost can avoid competitors from choosing more aggressive low-price strategies by disclosing information, since the reaction functions of firms are increasing functions in the costs of its opponents. If a firm experiences a stage of information disclosure prior to setting its price, the act of releasing (verifiable) information conveys that it is a high-cost type.

### 9.5.10 Limit Pricing with Asymmetric Information: Dynamic Market Structure

The traditional view is that an incumbent firm can block entry through low prices. Bain, in his 1949 article, proposed the concept of limit pricing, also known as entry preventing pricing. If there is a positive relationship between the price prior to entry and the degree of entry, the incumbent firm will have an incentive to lower the price. A pertinent question becomes: why can low prices prevent firms from entering? Bain asserted that the information delivered to potential entrants by low prices was poor market profitability, or high competition intensity, or that incumbent firms have low-cost advantages.

Consider the situation in which price acts as a signal mechanism proposed by Milgrom and Roberts (1982). Assume that, in order to convey her private information of competitiveness or cost level, the incumbent firm chooses a price to deliberately reveal its type information to form an entry barrier. This game constitutes a typical signaling game.

Assume that there are two periods. In the first period, there is a monopolistic incumbent firm 1 that chooses a price. In the second period, firm 2 decides whether or not to enter. If firm 2 enters, there is a duopoly market structure in the second period; if not, firm 1 remains a monopolist. The cost of the incumbent firm is private information, and it has two possible values.

Assume that the probability of low cost is $\beta$, and the probability of high cost is $1-\beta$. If firm 2 does not enter the market, it does not know the private information of firm 1 . If it enters, firm 2 will get the cost information of firm 1. Meanwhile, entry is irreversible. The significance of introducing private information here is that we can study how private information influences the market entry decision and no longer has an impact post-entry.

Let $M_{1}^{t}\left(p_{1}\right)$ be the profit of the incumbent firm when her type is $t \in$ $\{l, h\}$ and price is $p_{1}$. Let $p_{m}^{l}$ and $p_{m}^{h}$ be the monopolistic prices when the incumbent has low cost and high cost, respectively. From the monopoly pricing, we know that $p_{m}^{l}<p_{m}^{h}$. Let $M_{1}^{l}$ and $M_{1}^{h}$ be the monopoly profits at low cost and high cost, respectively, i.e., $M_{1}^{t} \equiv M_{1}^{t}\left(p_{m}^{t}\right), t \in\{l, h\}$.

If firm 2 enters, the cost information of firm 1 can be observed by firm 2 , and the two firms engage in price competition in the second period. Let $D_{1}^{t}$ and $D_{2}^{t}$ be the profits of the two firms after entry, where $t \in\{l, h\}$. To make the discussion meaningful, suppose $M_{1}^{t}>D_{1}^{t}, \forall t ; D_{2}^{h}>0>D_{2}^{l}$. In other words, for the incumbent, monopoly is superior to oligopolistic competition; if the incumbent is a high-cost type, the entrant possesses an advantage and can earn positive profits, while if the incumbent is a lowcost type, firm 2 will not wish to enter. The discount rate is $\delta$ for both firms.

Since the incumbent aims to obtain a monopoly profit, she hopes that her price choice in the first period can make the potential entrant believe that she is a low-cost type. The problem here is whether or not the incumbent has the ability to achieve the goal. Consider the following signaling mechanism. Firm 1 chooses a low price $p_{1}^{l}$ to send the low-cost signal. As a result, the profit of the incumbent may decrease in first period, but such a reduction can bring returns in the second period, i.e., the incumbent can obtain a monopoly profit, as the potential entrant believes that the incumbent is a low-cost type and thus abandons entering the market. Now, the issue becomes whether the potential entrant will believe that the incumbent is low-cost without observing $p_{1}^{l}$. The answer may not be readily apparent. This is because even a high-cost incumbent may be able to imitate the lowprice type, so that price signals may not reflect the type information. To analyze this problem, we usually use equilibrium concepts of the incomplete information dynamic game, such as "perfect Bayesian equilibrium" .

In Chapter 6, we discussed signaling games. The equilibria of a signaling game can be divided into three categories: separating equilibrium; pooling equilibrium; and semi-separating equilibrium (in which some types of signal senders will adopt mixed strategies). Here, we focus on the first two categories.

First, we analyze the separating strategy. The separating strategy means that different types of the incumbent will send different signals and satisfy incentive compatibility constraints. Since a separating equilibrium is a perfect Bayesian equilibrium, it is necessary to define the belief of the signal receiver off the equilibrium path. In separating equilibrium, a firm of high-cost type does not need to imitate a low-cost type through low prices. She will choose a high-cost monopoly price $p_{m}^{h}$ in the first period where her profit is $M_{1}^{h}$, while in the second period, her profit is the oligopoly profit $D_{1}^{h}$, and thus the total discounted profit is $M_{1}^{h}+\delta D_{1}^{h}$. Let $p_{1}^{l}$ be the price of the low-cost incumbent in the first period. Since it is a separating equilibrium, it should be ensured that the high-cost type does not choose $p_{1}^{l}$ to imitate the pricing strategy of the low-cost type.

Therefore, the incentive compatibility constraint for the high-cost type is

$$
M_{1}^{h}+\delta D_{1}^{h} \geqq M_{1}^{h}\left(p_{1}^{l}\right)+\delta M_{1}^{h},
$$

or

$$
\begin{equation*}
M_{1}^{h}-M_{1}^{h}\left(p_{1}^{l}\right) \geqq \delta\left(M_{1}^{h}-D_{1}^{h}\right), \tag{9.5.10}
\end{equation*}
$$

where $M_{1}^{h}\left(p_{1}^{l}\right)$ is the profit of the high-cost type in the first period when it chooses price $p_{1}^{l}$.

In the following, we consider the strategic choice of a low-cost type. Since the incumbent can at least set a monopoly price $p_{m}^{l}$ in the first period and the worst case in the second period is that there are entrants, the minimum profit that he or she can obtain is $M_{1}^{l}+\delta D_{1}^{l}$. If choosing $p_{1}^{l}$ in the first period, the total discounted profit of the low-cost type of the incumbent is $M_{1}^{l}\left(p_{1}^{l}\right)+\delta M_{1}^{l}$. As a consequence, the incentive compatibility constraint for the low-cost type to choose $p_{1}^{l}$ is

$$
M_{1}^{l}\left(p_{1}^{l}\right)+\delta M_{1}^{l} \geqq M_{1}^{l}+\delta D_{1}^{l},
$$

or

$$
\begin{equation*}
M_{1}^{l}-M_{1}^{l}\left(p_{1}^{l}\right) \leqq \delta\left(M_{1}^{l}-D_{1}^{l}\right) . \tag{9.5.11}
\end{equation*}
$$

Assume that the separating equilibrium under asymmetric information is different from the pricing of various types of the incumbent under symmetric information (when the high-cost and low-cost types choose $p_{m}^{h}$ and $p_{m}^{l}$, respectively). In other words, under asymmetric information, if the low-cost type chooses $p_{m}^{l}$, the high-cost type has an incentive to pool, i.e.,

$$
\begin{equation*}
M_{1}^{h}-M_{1}^{h}\left(p_{m}^{l}\right)<\delta\left(M_{1}^{h}-D_{1}^{h}\right) \tag{9.5.12}
\end{equation*}
$$

In (9.5.10) and (9.5.11), $p_{1}^{l}$ is in a range $\left[\tilde{\tilde{p}}_{1}, \tilde{p}_{1}\right]$, where $\tilde{p}_{1}<p_{m}^{l}$. Consequently, to achieve the separating equilibrium, the pricing of a low-cost type must be sufficiently lower than her monopoly price, which is the cost of preventing the high-cost firm from pooling, in order to prevent market entry in the second period.

The reason why a high-cost type does not mimic the pricing of a lowcost type is that imitation leads to more decrease of profit in the first period than the gain.

When $M_{1}^{l}-D_{1}^{l}>M_{1}^{h}-D_{1}^{h}$, i.e., the revenue obtained by the lowcost type through low prices to prevent entry (the increase in profit from oligopoly to monopoly) is more than that of a high-cost type, or

$$
\frac{d}{d c_{1}}\left[M_{1}\left(c_{1}\right)-D_{1}\left(c_{1}\right)\right]<0
$$

where

$$
\begin{aligned}
& M_{1}\left(c_{1}\right)=\max _{p_{1}}\left[\left(p_{1}-c_{1}\right) D_{1}^{m}\left(p_{1}\right)\right], \\
& D_{1}\left(c_{1}\right)=\max _{p_{1}}\left(p_{1}-c_{1}\right) D_{1}\left(p_{1}, p_{2}^{d}\right)
\end{aligned}
$$

According to the envelope theorem, we have

$$
\begin{gathered}
\frac{d M\left(c_{1}\right)}{d c_{1}}=-D_{1}^{m}\left(p_{1}^{m}\right) \\
\frac{d D_{1}\left(c_{1}\right)}{d c_{1}}=-D_{1}\left(p_{1}^{d}, p_{2}^{d}\right)+\left(p_{1}^{d}-c_{1}\right) \frac{\partial D_{1}\left(p_{1}^{d}, p_{2}^{d}\right)}{\partial p_{2}} \frac{\partial p_{2}^{d}}{\partial c_{1}} .
\end{gathered}
$$

Thus,
$\frac{d}{d c_{1}}\left[M_{1}\left(c_{1}\right)-D_{1}\left(c_{1}\right)\right]=-D_{1}^{m}\left(p_{1}^{m}\right)+D_{1}\left(p_{1}^{d}, p_{2}^{d}\right)-\left(p_{1}^{d}-c_{1}\right) \frac{\partial D_{1}\left(p_{1}^{d}, p_{2}^{d}\right)}{\partial p_{2}} \frac{\partial p_{2}^{d}}{\partial c_{1}}$.
If the monopoly demand of the incumbent is greater than the duopoly demand, and $\frac{\partial p_{2}^{d}}{c_{1}}>0$, which means that the increasing cost of the incumbent will make the opponent raise the price, then we have $\frac{d}{d c_{1}}\left[M_{1}\left(c_{1}\right)-\right.$ $\left.D_{1}\left(c_{1}\right)\right]<0$.

Figure 9.14 illustrates the separating equilibrium. In the separating interval, a low-cost type is most likely to choose $\tilde{p}_{1}$, because this is the separating price closest to the low-cost monopoly price in the interval, which is of the lowest (credible) signaling cost and also will not be mimicked by the high-cost type. Since the high-cost type's price choice will always reveal her own type, she will choose the monopoly price in the first period. Therefore, the most reasonable separating equilibrium in this equilibrium series (the continuum of separating equilibria) is that in the first period, the low-cost type chooses $\tilde{p}_{1}$, and the high-cost type chooses $p_{m}^{h}$.

We next examine whether the pooling equilibrium exists. One condition for the existence of pooling equilibrium is $\beta D_{2}^{l}+(1-\beta) D_{2}^{h}<0$, or $\beta>\frac{D_{2}^{h}}{D_{2}^{h}-D_{2}^{l}}$, i.e., the probability of the low-cost type is sufficiently large, which means that firm 2 will not choose to enter the market if there is no information. If both types choose the same price, the potential entrant cannot distinguish the types of the incumbent based on the price. In this case, the potential entrant in the second period has the same belief for both types as the initial belief. Another condition for pooling equilibrium to exist is that both types have the incentive to choose the same price. For the high-cost incumbent, the condition of choosing the same price $p_{1}$ is $M_{1}^{h}-M_{1}^{h}\left(p_{1}\right) \geqq \delta\left(M_{1}^{h}-D_{1}^{h}\right)$. For the low-cost type, it has no incentive to show the difference from the high-cost type, because firm 2 will not enter when firm 1's type cannot be distinguished.

One conclusion in Chapter 6 on game theory is that only separating equilibrium satisfies the intuitive criterion in the signaling game.

Here, we use a simple example to solve the above signaling game in


Figure 9.14: Separating equilibrium.
which the price transmits the cost information. Assume that the inverse demand function is $p=10-Q$, and the incumbent firm 1's marginal cost $c_{1}$ is private information. Assume that the prior distribution of the type of firm 1 is $\operatorname{prob}\left(c_{1}=0\right)=\operatorname{prob}\left(c_{1}=4\right)=0.5$. The cost of the potential entrant firm 2 is $c_{2}=1$, which is public knowledge. The market entry cost is 9 , and the time discount rate is $\delta=1$. Suppose that the oligopolistic market competition is quantity competition. The time structure of the game is as follows: in the first period, firm 1 is the market monopolist and chooses the price $p_{1}$; in the second period, firm 2 chooses whether to enter the market. If firm 2 enters, it will pay a fixed cost 9 , and the two oligopolists will engage in quantity competition; if not, firm 1 is still a monopolist and chooses the price $p_{2}$ in the second period.

We use simple formulas for equilibrium profits of quantity competition under linear demand, which are

$$
\begin{gathered}
\pi_{1}\left(c_{1}, c_{2}\right)=\frac{\left(a-2 c_{1}+c_{2}\right)^{2}}{9} \\
\pi_{2}\left(c_{1}, c_{2}\right)=\frac{\left(a-2 c_{2}+c_{1}\right)^{2}}{9}-f
\end{gathered}
$$

where $a=10$. Table 9.1 depicts the profits of the two firms.
If under price $p_{1}$ in the first period, firm 2 cannot distinguish the type of the firm 1 (which is the pooling equilibrium), the expected revenue of firm 2 to enter the market is $0.5 \times(-1.9)+0.5 \times 7>0$. As a result, firm 2 will

| Type of the incumbent: | The potential entrant |  |
| :--- | :--- | :--- |
|  | Enter | Not enter |
| Low $\operatorname{cost} c_{1}=0$ | $\pi_{1}^{c}(0) \approx 13, \pi_{2}^{c}(0) \approx-1.9$ | $\pi_{1}^{m}(0)=25, \pi_{2}(0)=0$ |
| High $\operatorname{cost} c_{1}=4$ | $\pi_{1}^{c}(4)=1, \pi_{2}^{c}(4)=7$ | $\pi_{1}^{m}(4)=9, \pi_{2}(4)=0$ |

Table 9.1: Firms' profits under limit pricing.
choose to enter.
We discuss $p_{1}\left(c_{1}\right)$ in the first period that satisfies the intuitive criterion. In other words, when $p_{1}=p_{1}\left(c_{1}=0\right)$, firm 2 believes that firm 1 is the low-cost type, or the high-cost type will not mimic the low-cost type, and meanwhile, $p_{1}\left(c_{1}=0\right)$ is the price that brings the highest profits to the lowcost type among all separating equilibria. We can verify that $p_{1}\left(c_{1}=0\right)=$ 4.17, because $9.99=\pi_{1}^{m}\left(p_{1}=4.17, c_{1}=4\right)+\pi_{1}^{m}(4)=(10-4.17)(4.17-$ 4) $+9<\pi_{1}^{m}(4)+\pi_{1}^{c}(4)=10$.

### 9.5.11 Concluding Remarks on the Oligopolistic Market

From the above all kinds of models in the oligopolistic market, we find that different market environments, including information distribution (symmetric or asymmetric), one-shot or repeated games, product properties (homogeneous or heterogeneous), sequence of actions, different strategy spaces (price decisions, quantity decisions, product decisions), etc., will all affect the final strategic choices of the firms, and impact the final market price and the profits of the firms. Because the firms possess market power (i.e., the pricing ability of deviating from the marginal cost), generally the more are the market transactions, the greater is the social welfare. Therefore, an in-depth analysis of the oligopolistic market may be beneficial to provide certain useful suggestions for government policies. For example, it can provide a logical basis for the design of competition policy to control and restrain the excessive market power of incumbents and control price collusion among firms.

We have a simple classification of market structure, but in pratice, an industry may experience different market structures in various periods. For instance, when a new product is just released, the market is likely to be a monopoly. With the imitation of other firms, the market structure slow-
ly becomes an oligopoly. In the mature period of the industry, firms will increasingly emerge and the market may be transformed into a monopolistically competitive market, or even close to a perfectly competitive market. In the evolution process, the welfare of consumers and producers will change, as well.

The models discussed above only describe a small part of firm interactions in the market. Indeed, many other interesting problems exist, such as corporate $\mathrm{R} \mathrm{\& D}$ and innovation incentives, related patent system design, compatibility of technical standards in the network economy, network externality, relationships between upstream and downstream firms, platform economy, etc., which constitute an extensive branch of microeconomics (i.e., industrial organization). Readers who are interested in these issues can refer to certain classic textbooks, including Tirole's seminal work The Theory of Industrial Organization published in 1988. Some of the examples in our discussion are based on this book.

### 9.6 Biographies

### 9.6.1 Harold Hotelling

Harold Hotelling (1895-1973) is a widely recognized figure in the fields of statistics, economics, and mathematics. Although his papers on economics were not many, he made a profound contribution to economic sciences. He is considered one of the leaders of the Pareto school.

Hotelling originally majored in journalism when studying at the University of Washington, but later turned to mathematics to carry out related research in the field of topology, and received his Ph.D. degree in 1924. He then received an appointment at Stanford University. His most important contribution to statistical theory was multivariate analysis and probability. His most influential paper is "The Generalization of Student's Ratio", which is now known as Hotelling's $T^{2}$. He also played a key role in the development of principal component analysis and canonical correlations. He was elected as a Fellow of the U.S. National Academy of Sciences in 1972 and a member of the Accademia Nazionale dei Lincei in Rome in 1973.

The Edgeworth model described the instability of the market with only two sellers, but in 1929, Hotelling challenged this view and proposed the Hotelling model. He believed that price or output instability was not the basic feature of oligopoly. The Hotelling model is obviously a criticism of Edgeworth and Bertrand. Hotelling disagreed with the idea that consumers' sudden change of choice from one seller to another constituted a feature of the market. He expected that the decrease in price would, in fact, not attract a great number of consumers. Therefore, he asserted that as long as consumers turned to other sellers gradually, the market would remain stable. At the same time, he proposed the theory of spatial competition, which divides product difference into different points in the line segment of space, and thus product difference has a testable empirical meaning. One wellknown example of this is the previously discussed Hotelling model that was published in the Journal of Political Economy in 1929. In 1931 he published "The Economics of Exhaustible Resources" , which is considered to be a hallmark of the birth of resource economics.

Hotelling taught Milton Friedman statistics and Kenneth J. Arrow mathematical economics. He also helped Arrow to transfer from the Department of Mathematics to the Department of Economics, and was an important influence in his change of research interest from mathematical statistics to economic theory.

### 9.6.2 George J. Stigler

George J. Stigler (1911-1991) was a prominent American economist, economic historian, and professor at the University of Chicago. He and Milton Friedman were known as the leaders of the Chicago School of Economics. He was the 1982 Laureate in the Nobel Memorial Prize in Economic Sciences. Stigler grew up in Seattle, in the U.S., where he received his education until he graduated from the University of Washington with a bachelor's degree in business administration, and later earned a master's degree in business administration from Northwestern University. After that, he stayed at the University of Washington for more than one year before he went to the University of Chicago to pursue his doctoral degree. In 1936-

1938, he served as an Assistant Professor at Iowa State University. In 19381946, he taught at the University of Minnesota, and was promoted to Full Professor in 1941. In 1946, Stigler learned that his alma mater, the University of Chicago, wanted him to attend an interview for the recruitment of professors, where he met another professor candidate, Friedman, who finally received the only professor vacancy. Stigler then came to Brown University and taught there until 1947. From 1947 to 1958, he taught at Columbia University, during which time his economic thought gradually matured. In 1958, when a professor vacancy came up at the University of Chicago, Stigler finally received the position of Full Professor there. He spent more than 20 years at the University of Chicago, during which time the Chicago School of Economics took the lead in academia.

Stigler believed that it was a pleasant and uniquely stimulating life to be a devoted intellectual and dedicate himself to "boring" economics research. Indeed, he intended to avoid all non-academic occupations and activities. He had endless enjoyment from teaching, research and academic exchanges, and left numerous invaluable works, including Production and Distribution Theories (1941), The Theory of Competitive Price (1942), The Theory of Price (1946, 1952, 1964), Domestic Servants in the United States, 1900-1940 (1947), Trends in Output and Employment (1947), Employment and Compensation in Education (1950), The Price Statistics of the Federal Government (1961), The Intellectual and the Marketplace (1962), A Dialogue on the Proper Economic Role of the State (coauthored work, 1963), Capital and Rates of Return in Manufacturing Industries (1963), Essays in the History of Economics (1965), The Organization of Industry (coauthored work, 1968), The Behavior of Industrial Prices (coauthored work, 1970), Modern Man and His Corporations (1971), The Citizen and the State: Essays on Regulation (1975), etc.

Stigler was a representative of the Chicago School of Economics in the area of microeconomics. He was one of the founders of information economics. He contended that it was too costly for consumers to obtain information on quality, price and timing of purchasing, so that consumers were neither able to nor willing to obtain sufficient information, thus resulting in different prices for the same commodity. According to him, this was inevitable and a normal market phenomenon that did not require human
intervention. Stigler's view renewed the assumption that there was only one price for a commodity in the market theory of microeconomics. In the research process, Stigler also extended this analysis to the labor market. These studies established a new research area called the information economics. Since his paper The Economics of Information was published in 1961, the study has become a prominent subject in today's economic discipline, producing many Laureates of the Nobel Memorial Prize in Economic Sciences. Another contribution of Stigler was his criticism of social regulation policies. His frequent comments on public policies were often cited by political figures. His most well-known contribution was to demonstrate that the free market mechanism remains the most efficient system in existence today. He utilized the latest research results of econometrics, and provided many examples in which government regulations that aimed to improve efficiency were actually ineffective or deleterious. He also advocated the free market system, and opposed monopoly and state intervention. He was the primary founder of a new and important research area called the regulatory economics. Friedman praised Stigler as a pioneer who used economic and analytical methods to study legal and political issues.

### 9.7 Exercises

Exercise 9.1 In an industry with unchanged technology, the long-run cost function of perfectly competitive firms is $L T C=q^{3}-10 q^{2}+175 q$, and the market demand function is $Q=1000-2 P$.

1. Find the long-run supply function of the industry.
2. Find the number of firms at the long-term equilibrium.
3. If a consumption tax of $\$ 50$ per unit is levied, find the number of firms at the new long-run equilibrium.
4. If the above consumption tax is replaced by a sales tax of $50 \%$ of the product price, find the number of firms at the new long-run equilibrium.

Exercise 9.2 The demand function of a perfectly competitive market is $q=$ $a-b p$, and the supply function is $q=c+d q$, where $a, b, c, d>0$.

1. If consumers are levied a specific duty $t$, how will social welfare change? Why?
2. If the above specific duty $t$ is now levied on producers instead, how will social welfare change? Why?
3. If consumers are given a specific subsidy $s$ instead, how will social welfare change? Why?

Exercise 9.3 The demand function of a perfectly competitive market is $q^{d}(p)$, and the supply function is $q^{s}(p)$, where $q^{d}(p)$ is a decreasing function of $p$, and $q^{s}(p)$ is an increasing function of $p$.

1. Consider the case of specific duty. Are the equilibrium quantity and price finally obtained by producers when taxing consumers the same as those when taxing producers? Justify your answer.
2. Consider the case of specific subsidy. Are the equilibrium quantity and price finally obtained by producers when subsidizing consumers the same as those when subsidizing producers? Justify your answer.
3. Consider the case of ad valorem duty. Are the equilibrium quantity and price finally obtained by producers when taxing consumers the same as those when taxing producers? Justify your answer.

Exercise 9.4 There is a unique monopolistic firm in the market, who can adopt first-degree price discrimination.

1. Will the firm choose the output level according to the decision principle $M R=M C$ ? Why?
2. Will the firm choose to produce where the market demand is inelastic? If it is possible, give an example; if not, justify your answer.

Exercise 9.5 A monopolist has two geographically separated markets with demand functions $q_{1}=30-2 p_{1}$ and $q_{2}=25-p_{2}$, respectively, its marginal cost is 3 , and the fixed cost is zero.

1. If the monopolist can implement third-degree price discrimination, what will its price, output, and profit be?
2. If price discrimination is prohibited by law, then what will its price, output, and profit be?
3. If the demand of market 2 increases and its demand function becomes $q_{2}=a-p_{2}$ for $a>25$, answer questions 1 and 2 again.

Exercise 9.6 There is only one firm in the market with a demand function $q=a-b p$ and a marginal cost $c$ satisfying $c<a / b$. The firm sells through a unique retailer. It first sets a wholesale price $w$, and then the retailer sets a retail price $p$ after observing the wholesale price. The retailer's cost is zero. Prove the following: The retail price in the market is higher than the price set by the vertically integrated monopolist.

Exercise 9.7 There is a unique monopolistic firm in the market, and its inverse demand function (in each period) is $p=a-b q$. The marginal cost
in period 1 is $c_{1}$; as the monopolist is "learning by doing", the marginal cost in period 2 is $c_{2}=c_{1}-m q_{1}$. Suppose that $a>c$ and $b>m$.

1. What is the output of the monopolist in each period?
2. If the output in each period is chosen by a social planner, will she choose the output on the principle that "the price equals the marginal cost" in period 1? Why?
3. If the output in period 2 is determined by the monopolist, will the social planner choose an output level in period 1 higher than the result obtained in question 1 ? Why?

Exercise 9.8 Suppose that the monopolist and consumers both live for infinite periods. The value $v$ by consumers is uniformly distributed over $[0,1 /(1-\delta)]$ (i.e., the valuation in each period is subject to a uniform distribution on $[0,1])$. If a consumer with value $v$ purchases at price $p_{t}$ at time $t$, his utility is $\delta^{t}\left(v-p_{t}\right)$. The monopolist's intertemporal profit is $\sum_{t=1}^{\infty} \delta^{t} p_{t} q_{t}$. Find the linear stable equilibrium: in a certain period, when the price is $p$, any consumer with a value higher than $w(p)=\lambda p$ will purchase, where $\lambda>1$, while consumers with lower valuations will not. Conversely, in a certain period, if consumers with value higher than $v$ purchase while others do not purchase, then the monopolist charges a price $p(v)=\mu v$, where $\mu<1$.

1. When only consumers with values lower than $v$ purchase, the monopolist charges $p_{t}, p_{t+1}, \cdots$, and consumers follow the above linear rule. Find the intertemporal profit of the monopolist starting from period $t$.
2. Prove the following: The optimization of $p_{t}$ by the monopolist leads to a linear rule, where $\lambda$ is determined by $1-2 \lambda \mu+\delta \lambda^{2} \mu^{2}=0$.
3. Write down the indifference equation of consumers with valuation $w(p)$.
4. Prove the following: When $\delta$ approaches 1 , the monopolist's profit approaches 0 .

Exercise 9.9 Consider an economy consisting of two consumers and two commodities. The utility function of type $A$ consumers is $u(x, y)=6 x-$ $x^{2}+y$, and the utility function of type $B$ consumers is $v(x, y)=8 x-x^{2}+2 y$. The price of commodity $y$ is 1 , the income of each consumer is 5,000 , and the numbers of the two types of consumers are both $n$.

1. Suppose that the monopolist's marginal cost of producing commodity $x$ is $c$, and it cannot implement any price discrimination. Find the optimal price and output. What range is $c$ in when the monopolist sells the commodity to both types of consumers?
2. Suppose that the monopolist adopts a "two-part tariff" under which consumers must first pay a lump-sum fee $k$, so that they can purchase at a unit price $p$. If $p<4$, what is the highest lump-sum fee $k$ for type $A$ consumers? If a type $A$ consumer pays $k$ and then purchases at a unit price $p$, how many units will he purchase?
3. If the economy only has $n$ type $A$ consumers and no type $B$ consumers, what will $p$ and $K$ be when the profit is maximized?
4. If $c<1$, and both types of consumers purchase, what will $p$ and $k$ be when the profit is maximized?

Exercise 9.10 A retailer purchases products from a wholesaler and sells the products to consumers. The retailer holds all sales channels, and thus it is a monopolist in the retail market. The market demand is $p=20-q$. Suppose that the retailer cannot implement price discrimination. The wholesaler is a monopolist in the wholesale market, and its production cost is $c(Q)=$ $3 Q^{2}+10$. The wholesaler charges the retailer a two-part tariff: in addition to the wholesale price $w$ per unit of product, there is a fixed entry fee $F$ (note that when the retailer does not purchase products from the wholesaler, i.e., when the retailer chooses to withdraw from the market, there is no need to pay the entry fee $F$ ). Because the wholesaler does not have retail channels, it cannot directly sell its products to consumers. The retailer's goal is to maximize her profit $p(q)=w q-F$ by choosing $q$ under the premise of given $(w, F)$. To facilitate the solution, we assume that the retailer will exit
from the market if and only if its profit is negative, and the wholesaler chooses a wholesale price $w<20$.

1. Express the retailer's profit as a function of $w, q$, and $F$.
2. If the retailer chooses to enter the market, find the output $q^{*}$ when the retailer's profit is maximized, where $q^{*}$ is a function of $w$.
3. After obtaining $q^{*}$, express the retailer's price $p$ and its profit as functions of $w$.
4. What conditions shall $F$ and $w$ satisfy so that the retailer will not exit from the market?

Exercise 9.11 Suppose that the product market is perfectly competitive, and that the production of this product requires two factors of production (i.e., labor and capital). A firm is a price-taker in the labor market, but it is the only buyer in the capital market, and thus can determine the price of capital.

1. Write the firm's profit maximization problem and give the first-order condition.
2. If the firm becomes a price-setter in both labor and capital factor markets, how will the first-order condition of its profit maximization problem change?
3. If the firm becomes a monopolist in the product market and a pricesetter in the capital factor market, how will the first-order condition of its profit maximization problem change?

Exercise 9.12 There are two oligopolists in the market who engage in a Bertrand competition. The market demand function $x(p)$ is continuous and strictly decreasing in $p$, and there exists a $\bar{p}<\infty$, such that $x(p)=0$ for all $p \geqq \bar{p}$. The marginal costs of the two firms are both $c>0$.

1. Prove that there is a pure strategy Nash equilibrium $p_{1}^{*}=p_{2}^{*}=c$.
2. Prove that the above pure strategy Nash equilibrium is also the $u$ nique Nash equilibrium.
3. If the market demand function becomes $x(p)=p^{-\eta}$, prove that there is a mixed strategy Nash equilibrium, such that both firms have positive profits. (Hint: Let the firms choose prices according to the distribution function $F(p)=1-\frac{m^{-\eta}(m-c)}{p^{-\eta}(p-c)}$ for $p \geqq m ; F(p)=0$ otherwise, and $m>c \mathrm{~m}$, and check that $F$ is a mixed strategy Nash equilibrium where prices announced always exceed marginal cost $c$.)

Exercise 9.13 Consider the following product differentiation model: $p_{1}=$ $a-b q_{1}-d q_{2}$ and $p_{2}=a-d q_{1}-b q_{2}$, where $a, d>0, b \geqq d$. Suppose that the marginal costs of the two firms are $c_{1}$ and $c_{2}$, respectively.

1. If the two firms engage in quantity competition, find the equilibrium outputs.
2. Derive the demand functions of the two firms.
3. If the two firms engage in price competition, find the equilibrium prices.

Exercise 9.14 Consider the following product differentiation model: $p_{1}=$ $a-b\left(q_{1}+\lambda q_{2}\right)$ and $p_{2}=a-b\left(\lambda q_{1}+q_{2}\right)$, where $a, b>0$ and $0 \leqq \lambda \leqq 1$. Suppose that the marginal costs of the two firms are both $c$, and the two firms make decisions simultaneously, where firm 1 sets the price and firm 2 sets the output. Find the equilibrium outputs and prices of the two firms.

Exercise 9.15 There exist two oligopolists in the market, and their cost functions are $c_{1}=2 q_{1}^{2}$ and $c_{2}=q_{2}^{2}$, respectively. The demand function is $q=10-2 p$.

1. If the two firms do not form a cartel, solve for the optimal outputs and profits of the two in a Cournot competition.
2. If the two firms form a cartel, solve for the profit-maximizing outputs. How will the two firms distribute the profits?
3. If the two firms' cost functions change to $c_{1}=2 q_{1}$ and $c_{2}=q_{2}$, answer questions 1 and 2 again.

Exercise 9.16 There are two oligopolists in the market who engage in a Cournot competition. The marginal costs of the two firms are both 2 . The market demand function is $q=14-3 q$. Before they decide on their outputs, firm 1 can choose whether to adopt a new technology with a fixed cost of 10 to reduce its marginal cost to 0 . Firm 2 can observe whether firm 1 has adopted the technology.

1. Write the strategy sets of the two firms in this game.
2. Will firm 1 use this technology? What are the equilibrium outputs of the two firms, respectively?

Exercise 9.17 There are $J$ oligopolists in the market who engage in a Cournot competition. The market demand function is $q=a-2 p$, and the marginal cost of firm $i(i=1,2, \cdots, J)$ is $c_{i}$.

1. Find the equilibrium outputs of the $J$ firms.
2. Suppose that an upcoming policy will increase the marginal costs of all firms by a constant $c_{0}$. Will they support the policy? Why?
3. Suppose that an upcoming policy will increase the marginal costs of all firms by a fixed percentage of $t$. Will they support the policy? Why?

Exercise 9.18 There are two oligopolists in the market. Their marginal costs are both $c$, and the inverse demand function is $p=a-b q$. The two firms compete in a Stackelberg game, where firm 1 is the leader, and firm 2 is the follower.

1. Solve for the output levels in the subgame perfect equilibrium (i.e., $\left.\left(q_{1}^{*}, q_{2}^{*}\right)\right)$.
2. Is $\left(q_{1}^{*}, q_{2}^{*}\right)$ a Nash equilibrium of this game? Why?
3. If these two firms now compete in a Cournot game, prove that the Nash equilibrium of the Cournot game is also the Nash equilibrium of the Stackelberg game.

Exercise 9.19 There are three oligopolists in the market. The demand function is $q=a-b p$, their marginal costs are all $c$, and the fixed costs are all zero. If the three firms make output decisions, respectively, in the following orders, solve for the optimal output level of each firm.

1. The three firms choose their outputs simultaneously.
2. Firm 1 first chooses its output, firm 2 chooses its output after observing firm 1's output, and firm 3 chooses its output after observing the outputs of firm 1 and firm 2.
3. Firm 1 first chooses its output, and after observing firm 1's output, firm 2 and firm 3 choose their outputs simultaneously.
4. Firm 1 and firm 2 first choose their outputs simultaneously, and firm 3 chooses its output after observing the outputs of firm 1 and firm 2.

Exercise 9.20 There are two oligopolists in the market. The market demand function is $q=500-4 p$. Firm 1 and firm 2 have constant marginal costs of 6 and 10, respectively.

1. If firm 1 sets the market price of the product and firm 2 is a price-taker, find the equilibrium outputs and profits of the two firms.
2. If firm 2 sets the market price of the product and firm 1 is a price-taker, find the equilibrium outputs and profits of the two firms.
3. Is firm 1 or firm 2 willing to become a price leader? Why?
4. If the two firms engage in a Cournot competition, find the equilibrium outputs and profits, and compare them with the results of questions 1 and 2. What do you find?

Exercise 9.21 There is a leader firm and a follower firm in the market. The market demand function is $q=10-2 p$. The leader firm 1 sets the market price of the product, and then the follower firm 2 takes the price as given. This is called the "price leadership model". The cost functions of the two firms are $T C_{1}=0$ and $T C_{2}=2 q_{2}^{2}$, respectively.

1. Explain the difference between the price leadership model and the Stackelberg model.
2. Solve for the outputs and profits of the leader firm and the follower firm.
3. If the follower firm's cost function becomes $T C_{2}=a q_{2}$, where $a$ is a constant, solve for the output and profit of the leader firm.

Exercise 9.22 Suppose that the cost for each firm to enter the market is $c>$ 0 , and the following conditions are satisfied: (1) the equilibrium output of a single firm decreases in the number of firms; (2) the total output increases in the number of firms; and (3) the equilibrium price is always above the marginal cost. Prove the following: From the perspective of social welfare, the symmetric Cournot model of free entry leads to excessive entry.

Exercise 9.23 Consumers are uniformly distributed on an axis of length 1, and each consumer only purchases one unit of goods. In the first stage, two firms choose their locations. Firm 1 is $a>0$ away from the left end of the axis, firm 2 is $b>0$ away from the right end, and $a+b \leqq 1$. In the second stage, the two firms choose their prices $p_{1}$ and $p_{2}$, respectively. The transportation cost is quadratic, i.e., the transportation cost for a consumer at $x$ to go purchase from firm 1 is $c x^{2}$, while that for a consumer at $y$ to go purchase from firm 2 is $c y^{2}$. The fixed costs and marginal costs of the two firms are all zero. Prove the following: $a=b=0$.

Exercise 9.24 (Rotemburg and Saloner, 1986) There are two oligopolists in the market who produce homogeneous products, and both have a constant marginal cost $c$. The two firms engage in infinitely repeated Bertrand competition with a discount factor $\delta$. The market demand function is $q=a-p$, and the intercept $a$ randomly fluctuates: in each period, the probability of $a=a_{h}$ is $\lambda$, and the probability of $a=a_{l}$ is $1-\lambda . a_{l}<a_{h}$ and the demands in different periods are independent. The monopoly prices at two demand levels are denoted by $p_{h}$ and $p_{l}$.

1. Solve for the $\delta^{*}$, such that for $\delta \geqq \delta^{*}$, the two firms can employ the trigger strategy to maintain the above-mentioned monopoly prices in the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium.
2. For $1 / 2<\delta<\delta^{*}$, find the highest price $p(\delta)$, such that in the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium, the two firms can use the trigger strategy to maintain the price $p(\delta)$ at the high demand level, and $p_{l}$ at the low demand level.

Exercise 9.25 There are two oligopolists in the market who produce homogeneous products and engage in the incomplete information Cournot competition. The market demand function is $q=a-b p$. The marginal cost of firm 1 is $c_{h}$ with a probability $\lambda$ and $c_{l}$ with a probability $1-\lambda$. The marginal cost of firm 2 is $c_{h}$ with a probability $\eta$ and $c_{l}$ with a probability $1-\eta$.

1. If both firms know exactly their own marginal costs and know only the probability distribution of the opponent's marginal cost, find the equilibrium outputs of the two firms.
2. If the two firms know only the probability distribution of the marginal costs of their own and their opponents, find the Bayesian-Nash equilibrium outputs of the two firms.

Exercise 9.26 Suppose that consumers and firms are uniformly distributed on a unit circle. A consumer chooses one firm to purchase one unit of its product, and his transportation cost is $t x$, where $x$ represents the distance between the consumer and the chosen firm. The market is free to enter, and the fixed entry cost for each firm is $f$.

1. Find the equilibrium number $J$ of firms.
2. Find the socially optimal number $m$ of firms. What is the numerical relation between $m$ and $J$ ? Provide an explanation for your answer.
3. If the consumer's transportation cost is changed to $t x^{2}$, answer questions 1 and 2 again.

Exercise 9.27 (Selten, 1973) There are $J$ firms in the market, and their marginal costs are all zero. The market demand function is $q=1-p$. The firms decide whether to join a cartel. The cartel members determine the output distribution standard and strictly enforce it, and they engage in a Cournot
competition with other firms. Prove the following: If $J \leqq 4$, then all firms will join the cartel; but if $J \geqq 6$, the cartel will only include some of the firms.

Exercise 9.28 There are $J$ firms in the market, their marginal costs are all $c$, and the market demand function is $q=a-p$.

1. Consider a merger of two firms. Prove the following: If $J=2$, they can profit from it; but if $J \geqq 3$, the merger is unprofitable.
2. Now, consider a merger of $k$ firms. Find the necessary and sufficient conditions for them to profit from the merger.

Exercise 9.29 In the limit pricing model in this chapter, it is assumed that the marginal cost of the potential entrant is public knowledge. Now, consider the following model, in which the marginal cost of the potential entrant is private information. Specifically, let the demand function be $p=$ $10-2 q$, the prior distribution of the incumbent firm 1's type be $p\left(c_{1}=0\right)=$ $\alpha$ and $p\left(c_{1}=4\right)=1-\alpha$, and the prior distribution of the potential entrant firm 2's type be $p\left(c_{2}=1\right)=\beta$ and $p\left(c_{2}=2\right)=1-\beta$. The market entry cost is $F$, and the time discount rate is $\delta=1$. Find possible pooling equilibria and separating equilibria, and verify whether they satisfy the intuitive criterion.

### 9.8 References

## Books and Monographs:

Dennis W. Carlton, and Jeffrey M. Perloff (1998). Modern Industrial Organization, Pearson Press.

Bain, J. (1956). Barriers to New Competition, Harvard University Press.
Belleflamme, Paul and Martin Peitz (2010). Industrial Organization: Markets and Strategies, Cambridge University Press.

Cabral, Luis M. B. (2000). Introduction to Industrial Organization, MIT Press.

Debreu, G. (1959). Theory of Value, Wiley.
Jehle, G. A. and P. Reny (1998). Advanced Microeconomic Theory, AddisonWesley.

Kreps, D. (1990). A Course in Microeconomic Theory, Princeton University Press.

Luenberger, D. (1995). Microeconomic Theory, McGraw-Hill.
Mas-Colell, A., M. D. Whinston, and J. Green (1995). Microeconomic Theory, Oxford University Press.

Shy, Oz (1995). Industrial Organization: Theory and Applications, MIT Press.

Tirole, J. (1988). The Theory of Industrial Organization, MIT Press.
Varian, H. R. (1992). Microeconomic Analysis (Third Edition), W. W. Norton and Company.

## Papers:

Dixit, A. and J. Stiglitz (1977). "Monopolistic Competition and Optimum Product Diversity" , American Economic Review, Vol. 67, No. 3, 297308.

Hotelling, H. (1929). "Stability in Competition", Economic Journal, Vol. 39, No. 153, 41-57.

Kreps, D. and J. Scheinkman (1983). "Quantity Precommitment and Bertrand Competition Yield Cournot Outcomes", Bell Journal of Economics, Vol. 14, No. 2, 326-337.

Milgrom, P. and J. Roberts (1982). "Information Asymmetries, Strategic Behavior and Industrial Organization", American Economic Review, Vol. 77, No. 2, 184-193.

Rotemberg, J. J. and G. Saloner (1986). "A Supergame-theoretic Model of Price Wars During Booms" , American Economic Review, Vol. 76, No. 3,390-407.

Selten, R. (1973). "A Simple Model of Imperfect Competition Where Four Are Few and Six Are Many", International Journal of Game Theory, Vol. 2, No. 1, 141-201.

Shakes, A. and J. Sutton (1982). "Relaxing Price Competition Through Product Differentiation", Review of Economic Studies, Vol. 49, No. 1, 3-13.

Shapiro, C. (1989). "Theories of Oligopoly Behavior" . In Schmalensee, R. and R. Willig (Eds.), Handbook of Industrial Organization, Volume 1 (Amsterdam: North-Holland).

Singh, N. and X. Vives (1984). "Price and Quantity Competition in a Differentiated Duopoly", Rand Journal of Economics, Vol.15, No. 4, 546-554.

Sonnenschein, H., (1968). "The Dual of Duopoly Is Complementary Monopoly:
Or, Two of Cournot's Theories Are One", Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 76, No. 2, 316-318.

Spence, M. (1976). "Product Selection, Fixed Costs and Monopolistic Competition" , Review of Economic Studies, Vol. 43, No. 2, 217-235.

## Part V

## Externalities and Public Goods

The rest of the textbook will examine the allocation of resources in more realistic economic environments. The main theme is how to solve the issue of "market failure". These will be the topics discussed in the remaining chapters of this textbook.

The market we have discussed so far is basically a frictionless ideal one. In addition, we directly or implicitly assume that markets are perfectly competitive except for monopolistic competition, oligopoly, and monopoly discussed in Chapter 9.

Chapters 3-10 and Chapter 13 are primarily positive analysis of the market economy, discussing how rational consumers and firms make optimal decisions, and how the market operates in various structures (perfect competition, monopolistic competition, oligopoly). Chapters 11-12 primarily conduct normative analysis on perfectly competitive markets, and discuss the free market's optimality, rationality, uniqueness, and universality from different aspects.

In Chapters 11 and 12, we have discussed the internal logic between competitive equilibrium (Walrasian equilibrium) and efficiency (Pareto optimality). The concept of competitive equilibrium provides us with an appropriate notion of market equilibrium for competitive market economies. The concept of Pareto optimality offers a minimal test that any socially optimal economic outcome should pass since it is a formulation of the idea that there is no further improvement under given social resources, and it conveniently separates the issue of economic efficiency from more controversial (and political) questions regarding the ideal distribution of wealth across individuals.

The important results and insights obtained in Chapters 11-12 are the First and Second Fundamental Theorems of Welfare Economics, the Competitive Equilibrium Core Property Theorem, the Core Equivalence Theorem, and the Fairness Theorem. These results demonstrate the optimality, rationality, and uniqueness of a perfectly competitive market from different perspectives. The First Fundamental Theorem of Welfare Economics reveals how a market economy results in Pareto optimal allocations under certain conditions, such as perfect competition, pursuit of personal interests (local non-satiation preferences), no externalities, no public goods, no
increasing returns to scale, no transaction cost, and complete information. When these conditions are not satisfied, the market often fails, resulting in inefficient allocations of resources. It is, in some sense, the formal expression of Adam Smith's claim about the "invisible hand" of the market.

The Second Fundamental Theorem of Welfare Economics goes even further. It states that under the same set of conditions plus convexity and continuity conditions, all Pareto optimal outcomes can in principle be implemented through the market by appropriate redistribution of initial endowments, and then "letting the market work" . The First and Second Fundamental Theorems of Welfare Economics show that Pareto optimal allocations and competitive market equilibrium allocations are equivalent in a certain sense, while the Economic Core Theorem reveals that a free competitive market system is also socially stable.

Equity of resource allocations is also an important criterion to an economy. The Fairness Theorem discussed in Chapter 12 gives specific suggestions on how to achieve efficiency and equity of resource allocations simultaneously. If all economic agents have an equal starting point for competition, even if this starting point is not Pareto efficient, it can achieve both Pareto efficient and equitable allocations through market competition. The Core Equivalence Theorem is profound, in that it shows that the market system is the unique institutional arrangement that results in efficient allocations in the presence of sufficient economic freedom and competition. In other words, it demonstrates that under the objective and realistic constraints of individuals pursuing their self-interests, as long as individuals choose to voluntarily cooperate and exchange freely under sufficient competition, even if no economic system has been established beforehand, the result approaches a competitive market equilibrium allocation.

All of these conclusions show the effective role of the free market in resolving problems associated with fairness and justice. Through the joint role of the government, the market and society, we can achieve resource allocations with both efficiency and equity. These results provide a theoretical support for inheritance tax, compulsory education, environmental protection, anti-monopoly legislation, and financial regulation, thus providing inspiration for solving the problem of the excessive gap between
the rich and the poor, as well as correcting market failures.
As mentioned, all of these theoretical conclusions are based on their preconditions, and the perfectly competitive market is just an ideal state without frictions, which basically does not exist in reality, and thus they belong to the category of benchmark theories. However, this research method, like that of natural science, is of critical importance. Like the ideal state without any friction in physics, it does not exist at all in practice, but it provides a benchmark or a reference system for the study of practical problems with various frictions. Similarly, the perfect competition situation analyzed by the general equilibrium theory is relevant for thinking about, studying, and testing a real market economy. It provides directions and strategies for the choice and reform of economic systems, establishes a benchmark or a reference system to study more realistic markets, and it is the starting point for people to think of and test the results of market economies. In particular, if a market economy fails to achieve efficiency of resource allocation, it will inevitably violate at least some of the conditions of the First Fundamental Theorem of Welfare Economics.

Of course, from micro- and incomplete information perspectives, the market still faces many problems that often lead to "market failure". It is important to analyze the circumstances under which a market may fail and how a government should act. Provided the governance boundary of the market mechanism is clarified, we do not unconditionally refute the role of the market, or go from one extreme to the other, but instead know the circumstances under which the market can play a decisive role in allocating resources, and how a government can play an effective and appropriate, but not unconstrained, role in cases of market failures. Of course, the basic premise remains that individuals are rational, and governments should not directly intervene in economic activities, but rather establish rules or systems to correct market failure. This is due to that, with incomplete information, direct intervention in economic activities (e.g., using a large number of state-owned enterprises, arbitrary restrictions on market access, and interference with commodity prices) often does not work well. In this regard, the last two parts of the textbook, which are devoted to the study of designing incentive compatible mechanisms, can play a significant role in making
the market more efficient and solving market failure problems.
Therefore, the contents of the remainder of the textbook can be viewed as a further expansion of these topics. From Chapter 14 to the last chapter of the textbook, the focus of our discussion will shift from the superiority of the frictionless and freely competitive market system to issues that may arise from market economies, with further exploration on how to remedy the failures. To this end, we will examine the various situations in which the actual market deviates from the ideal perfect competition situation, and the so-called "market failure" issues resulting in Pareto inefficient allocations, and we will provide corresponding solutions for market failure.

In the current part, we will study externalities and public goods in Chapter 14 and Chapter 15, respectively. In both cases, the actions of one agent directly affect the utility or production of other individuals in the economy. We will see that these nonmarketed "goods" or "bads" generally result in Pareto inefficiency. It turns out that private markets frequently do not work well in the presence of externalities and public goods. We will consider situations of incomplete information which also tend to result in Pareto inefficient outcomes in Parts ?? and ??.

## Chapter 14

## Externalities

### 14.1 Introduction

In this chapter we deal with economic environments with externalities. The so-called externality refers to situations in which economic activities (production or consumption activities) of some individuals affect the utility or production levels of other individuals, which further affects their own economic activities. The basic conclusion is that the presence of externality generally leads to Pareto inefficient outcomes, resulting in market failure. The fundamental reason for this is that some factors affecting economic activities are not properly considered. Even if the requirements of perfect competition and economic freedom are satisfied, allocation is often inefficient, and thus other institutional arrangements or mechanisms are needed to improve the allocation of resources.

Externality constitutes an objective and ubiquitous phenomenon. Specifically, externality consists of two categories: consumer externality and production externality, and they are the same in nature.

### 14.1.1 Consumption Externality

In the previous analysis, utility, satisfaction, and welfare of individuals are only related to their own consumption levels, but not to the consumption choices of others. In fact, however, in many situations, the utility level of an agent will also be affected by the consumptions of others, while the agent
cannot control the consumption of others, and thus the agent's utility level is passively affected. Externality can be either negative, which may hurt an agent, or positive, which may benefit the agent. Indeed, such examples in the real world are manifold.

Example 14.1.1 The following examples about consumption externalities are commonly seen in practice.
(i) One person's quiet environment is disturbed by another person's noise.
(ii) Mr. A dislikes Mr. D smoking next to him.
(iii) Mr. B's satisfaction decreases as Mr. C's consumption level increases, because Mr. B envies Mr. C's affluent life, which leads to the mentality of resenting the rich.
(iv) It does not matter if you are feeling well or not. You do not want others feeling well. If someone else is feeling well, you will not feel well. Seeing others feel well makes you unhappy.
(v) You watch the television purchased by your roommates.
(vi) You accept a free ride to work from your colleague.
(vii) Your clothes are influenced by the style of other people.
(viii) Your utility from using a phone, WhatsApp, and email depends on whether other people have a corresponding device.

Environmental impacts or pollution in cases (i) and (ii) are typical externalities, and individual behaviors that pollute the environment can have a negative impact on the health of others. In addition, there are always some people who are jealous of others around them. Benefiting oneself at the cost of others in case (iv) may be understandable, and harming others at the cost of oneself (all perish together) may also be understandable, but, as shown in case (iii), harming others without benefiting oneself is more commonplace. Although it is somewhat difficult to understand, it may be interpreted by negative consumption externalities. Cases (v) and (vi) are
examples of positive externalities, while cases (vii) and (viii) are examples of consumption network externalities.

These examples illustrate that externality is a ubiquitous phenomenon. Some may deny the existence of externality with the example of looking at beauty without cost. In fact, there are two misunderstandings in this assertion. First, whether the price is zero is not used in defining externality. Second, to see beauty more often, such as models in fashion shows or movie stars in films, it is actually necessary to pay for admission tickets.

Formally, we express the existence or absence of consumption externalities as follows:

$$
\begin{aligned}
& u_{i}\left(\boldsymbol{x}_{i}\right): \text { without preference externality; } \\
& u_{i}\left(\boldsymbol{x}_{1}, \ldots, \boldsymbol{x}_{n}\right) \text { : with preference externality, }
\end{aligned}
$$

in which other individuals' consumption choices affect individual $i$ 's utility.

### 14.1.2 Production Externality

Production externality means that the level of one firm's output is affected by the production activities of other economic agents. Production externality effects can be either negative or positive.

The following lists some examples for production externality:
Example 14.1.2 Here are some typical examples about production externalities in practice.
(i) Sewage discharge from chemical plants can affect the production of surrounding fishermen. In particular, downstream fishing can be adversely affected by pollutants emitted from an upstream chemical plant.
(ii) The machine noise of the factory near to you disturbs your equanimity.
(iii) Smog from factories could be equivalent to smoking one pack of cigarettes per day.
(iv) A problem with a bank has caused panic and a significant decline in currency liquidity. In the face of bank failures caused by the financial crisis, everyone is afraid to deposit, thus affecting the real economy.
(v) Beekeeping and farms have mutually positive production externalities. The flowers in the farm benefit the beekeepers, which in turn facilitates pollination of crops.
(vi) University brands can benefit all students, including those with a low GPA, making it relatively easier for them to find jobs.
(vii) The R\&D of an enterprise may increase the productivity and, in turn, the output levels of other firms. In the IT industry, the fixed cost of production is large, and the marginal cost is small, but the positive externality of the product is very large. As such, knowledge has a typical externality. In order to facilitate innovation, intellectual property protection is required; otherwise, an enterprise may not have incentives to conduct R\&D. A monopoly is not altogether an undesirable condition under a competition environment. One of its benefits is that it can stimulate firms to carry out R\&D and innovations (and thus obtain monopoly profits).
(viii) The output of a firm is influenced by the aggregate knowledge in the entire economy (production network externality).

In addition, the decisions of governments and their officials might have an enormous positive or negative externality to individuals, both in terms of production and consumption. This is the fundamental reason why a need exists for supervision of, or checks and balances on, governments and their officials.

This leads to an examination of various suggestions for alternative ways to allocate resources that may lead to more efficient outcomes. Achieving an efficient allocation in the presence of externalities essentially involves
ensuring that agents face the correct pricing for their activities. Ways of solving externality problems include taxation, regulation, property rights, merges, mechanism design, market design, etc.

### 14.2 Consumption Externality

When there are no consumption externalities, agent $i$ 's utility function is a function of only her own consumption:

$$
\begin{equation*}
u_{i}\left(\boldsymbol{x}_{i}\right) . \tag{14.2.1}
\end{equation*}
$$

In this case, for any $l=1,2, \ldots, L$ and $h=1,2, \ldots, L$, the first-order conditions (FOCs) for a competitive equilibrium are given by

$$
\begin{equation*}
M R S_{x_{1}^{l}, x_{1}^{h}}=M R S_{x_{2}^{l}, x_{2}^{h}}=\cdots=M R S_{x_{n}^{l}, x_{n}^{h}}=\frac{p^{l}}{p^{h}}, \tag{14.2.2}
\end{equation*}
$$

and from Chapter 11, we know that the FOCs for Pareto efficiency are also given by:

$$
\begin{equation*}
M R S_{x_{1}^{l}, x_{1}^{h}}=\cdots=M R S_{x_{n}^{l}, x_{n}^{h}}, \tag{14.2.3}
\end{equation*}
$$

As a result, because of the price-taking assumption, every competitive equilibrium results in Pareto efficiency when utility functions are locally non-satiated.

The main purpose of this section is to demonstrate that a competitive equilibrium allocation is not generally Pareto efficient when an consumption externality exists. We show this by examining that, in the presence of consumption externalities, the FOCs for a competitive equilibrium are not, in general, identical to the FOCs for Pareto efficient allocations. The following discussion is mainly drawn from Tian and Yang (2009).

Consider the following simple two-person and two-good exchange economy. The utility functions are given as follows:

$$
\begin{align*}
& u_{A}\left(x_{A}, x_{B}, y_{A}\right),  \tag{14.2.4}\\
& u_{B}\left(x_{A}, x_{B}, y_{B}\right), \tag{14.2.5}
\end{align*}
$$

which are assumed to be strictly increasing in their own consumption levels and quasi-concave in all arguments. To obtain interior solutions, we assume that $u_{i}$ satisfies the Inada condition $\frac{\partial u}{\partial x_{i}}(0)=+\infty$, and also $\lim _{x_{i} \rightarrow 0} \frac{\partial u}{\partial x_{i}} x_{i}=$ 0 . Note that only the consumption of good $x$ results in consumption externalities.

The FOCs for a competitive equilibrium are the same as previously:

$$
\begin{equation*}
M R S_{x y}^{A}=\frac{p_{x}}{p_{y}}=M R S_{x y}^{B} . \tag{14.2.6}
\end{equation*}
$$

We now provide the FOCs for Pareto efficient allocations, $x^{*}$, in exchange economies with consumption externalities by solving the following problem:

$$
\begin{array}{ll} 
& \max _{x \in \mathcal{R}_{+}^{4}+} u_{B}\left(x_{A}, x_{B}, y_{B}\right)  \tag{14.2.7}\\
\text { s.t. } & x_{A}+x_{B} \leqq w_{x}, \\
& y_{A}+y_{B} \leqq w_{y}, \\
& u_{A}\left(x_{A}, x_{B}, y_{A}\right) \geqq u_{A}\left(x_{A}^{*}, x_{B}^{*}, y_{A}^{*}\right) .
\end{array}
$$

The FOCs are given by

$$
\begin{align*}
x_{A} & : \frac{\partial u_{B}}{\partial x_{A}}-\lambda_{x}+\mu \frac{\partial u_{A}}{\partial x_{A}}=0,  \tag{14.2.8}\\
y_{A} & :-\lambda_{y}+\mu \frac{\partial u_{A}}{\partial y_{A}}=0,  \tag{14.2.9}\\
x_{B} & : \frac{\partial u_{B}}{\partial x_{B}}-\lambda_{x}+\mu \frac{\partial u_{A}}{\partial x_{B}}=0,  \tag{14.2.10}\\
y_{B} & : \frac{\partial u_{B}}{\partial y_{B}}-\lambda_{y}=0,  \tag{14.2.11}\\
\lambda_{x} & : w_{x}-x_{A}-x_{B} \geqq 0, \lambda_{x} \geqq 0, \lambda_{x}\left(w_{x}-x_{A}-x_{B}\right)=0,(14.2 .12) \\
\lambda_{y} & : w_{y}-y_{A}-y_{B} \geqq 0, \lambda_{y} \geqq 0, \lambda_{y}\left(w_{y}-y_{A}-y_{B}\right)=0,  \tag{14.2.13}\\
\mu & : u_{A}-u_{A}^{*} \geqq 0, \mu \geqq 0, \mu\left(u_{A}-u_{A}^{*}\right)=0 . \tag{14.2.14}
\end{align*}
$$

By (14.2.11), $\lambda_{y}=\frac{\partial u_{B}}{\partial y_{B}}>0$, and thus by (14.2.13),

$$
\begin{equation*}
y_{A}+y_{B}=w_{y}, \tag{14.2.15}
\end{equation*}
$$

which means that there is never disposal (or destruction) of the good that has no externality. Moreover, by (14.2.9) and (14.2.11), we have

$$
\begin{equation*}
\mu=\frac{\frac{\partial u_{B}}{\partial y_{B}}}{\frac{\partial u_{A}}{\partial y_{A}}} . \tag{14.2.16}
\end{equation*}
$$

Then, by (14.2.8) and (14.2.9), we obtain

$$
\begin{equation*}
\frac{\lambda_{x}}{\lambda_{y}}=\left[\frac{\frac{\partial u_{A}}{\partial x_{A}}}{\frac{\partial u_{A}}{\partial y_{A}}}+\frac{\frac{\partial u_{B}}{\partial x_{A}}}{\frac{\partial u_{B}}{\partial y_{B}}}\right], \tag{14.2.17}
\end{equation*}
$$

and by (14.2.10) and (14.2.11), we have

$$
\begin{equation*}
\frac{\lambda_{x}}{\lambda_{y}}=\left[\frac{\frac{\partial u_{B}}{\partial \partial_{B}}}{\frac{\partial u_{B}}{\partial y_{B}}}+\frac{\frac{\partial u_{A}}{\partial x_{B}}}{\frac{\partial u_{A}}{\partial y_{A}}}\right] . \tag{14.2.18}
\end{equation*}
$$

Thus, by (14.2.17) and (14.2.18), we get

$$
\begin{equation*}
\frac{\frac{\partial u_{A}}{\frac{\partial x_{A}}{}}}{\frac{\partial u_{A}}{\partial y_{A}}}+\frac{\frac{\partial u_{B}}{\partial x_{A}}}{\frac{\partial u_{B}}{\partial y_{B}}}=\frac{\frac{\partial u_{B}}{\frac{\partial x_{B}}{}}}{\frac{\partial u_{B}}{\partial y_{B}}}+\frac{\frac{\partial u_{A}}{\partial x_{B}}}{\frac{\partial u_{A}}{\partial y_{A}}}, \tag{14.2.19}
\end{equation*}
$$

which means that the social marginal rate of substitution of good $x$ for good $y$ for the two consumers is identical at Pareto efficient allocations. We call this the social marginal rate of substitution because the social welfare function can be written as the sum of individual utilities. From the above condition, in order to evaluate relevant marginal rates of substitution for optimality conditions, we must take into account both the direct and indirect effects of consumption activities in the presence of externalities. In other words, to achieve Pareto optimality, when one consumer increases the consumption of good $x$, not only does the consumer's consumption of good $y$ need to change, the other consumer's consumption of good $y$ also needs to change. Thus, the social marginal rate of substitution of good $x$ for good $y$ by consumer $i$ equals $\frac{\frac{\partial u_{i}}{\partial x_{i}}}{\frac{\partial u_{i}}{\partial y_{i}}}+\frac{\frac{\partial u_{j}}{\partial x_{i}}}{\frac{\partial u_{j}}{\partial y_{j}}}$. Since the FOCs for competitive equilibrium and Pareto optimal allocations are not the same, we immediately have the following conclusion:

Proposition 14.2.1 If there is consumption externality, competitive equilibrium allocations are, in general, not Pareto efficient.

Elaborating further, solving (14.2.8) and (14.2.10) for $\mu$ and $\lambda_{x}$, we have

$$
\begin{equation*}
\mu=\frac{\frac{\partial u_{B}}{\partial x_{B}}-\frac{\partial u_{B}}{\partial x_{A}}}{\frac{\partial u_{A}}{\partial x_{A}}-\frac{\partial u_{A}}{\partial x_{B}}}>0 \tag{14.2.20}
\end{equation*}
$$

and

$$
\begin{equation*}
\lambda_{x}=\frac{\frac{\partial u_{A}}{\partial x_{A}} \frac{\partial u_{B}}{\partial x_{B}}-\frac{\partial u_{A}}{\partial x_{B}} \frac{\partial u_{B}}{\partial x_{A}}}{\frac{\partial u_{A}}{\partial x_{A}}-\frac{\partial u_{A}}{\partial x_{B}}} . \tag{14.2.21}
\end{equation*}
$$

When the consumption externality is positive, from (14.2.17) or (14.2.18), we can easily see that $\lambda_{x}$ is always positive since $\lambda_{y}=\frac{\partial u_{B}}{\partial y_{B}}>0$. In addition, when no externality or a one-sided externality ${ }^{1}$ exists, by either (14.2.17) or (14.2.18), $\lambda_{x}$ is positive. Thus, the marginal equality condition (14.2.19) and the balanced budget conditions completely determine all Pareto efficient allocations for these cases. However, when there are negative externalities for both consumers, the Kuhn-Tucker multiplier $\lambda_{x}$, directly given by (14.2.21) or indirectly given by (14.2.17) or (14.2.18), is the sum of negative and positive terms, and thus the sign of $\lambda_{x}$ may be indeterminate. Therefore, using condition (14.2.19) and the balanced budget conditions alone may not guarantee finding Pareto efficient allocations correctly.

To guarantee that an allocation is Pareto efficient in the presence of negative externalities, we must require $\lambda_{x} \geqq 0$ at efficient points, which in turn requires that the social marginal rate of substitution of good $x$ for $\operatorname{good} y$ is nonnegative, i.e.,

$$
\begin{equation*}
\frac{\frac{\partial u_{A}}{\partial x_{A}}}{\frac{\partial u_{A}}{\partial y_{A}}}+\frac{\frac{\partial u_{B}}{\partial x_{A}}}{\frac{\partial u_{B}}{\partial y_{B}}}=\frac{\frac{\partial u_{B}}{\partial x_{B}}}{\frac{\partial u_{B}}{\partial y_{B}}}+\frac{\frac{\partial u_{A}}{\partial x_{B}}}{\frac{\partial u_{A}}{\partial y_{A}}} \geqq 0, \tag{14.2.22}
\end{equation*}
$$

or equivalently requires both (14.2.19) and

$$
\begin{equation*}
\underset{\text { (joint marginal benefit) }}{\frac{\partial u_{A}}{\partial x_{A}} \frac{\partial u_{B}}{\partial x_{B}}} \geqq \frac{\partial u_{A}}{\frac{\partial u_{B}}{\partial x_{B}} \frac{\partial x_{A}}{\partial x_{A}}} \tag{14.2.23}
\end{equation*}
$$

for all Pareto efficient points.

[^17]We can interpret the term in the left-hand side of (14.2.23), $\frac{\partial u_{A}}{\partial x_{A}} \frac{\partial u_{B}}{\partial x_{B}}$, as the joint marginal benefit of consuming good $x$, and the term in the righthand side, $\frac{\partial u_{A}}{\partial x_{B}} \frac{\partial u_{B}}{\partial x_{A}}$, as the joint marginal cost of consuming good $x$ because the negative externality harms the consumers. To consume the goods efficiently, a necessary condition is that the joint marginal benefit of consuming good $x$ should not be less than the joint cost of consuming good $x$.

Thus, the following conditions

$$
(\mathrm{PO})\left\{\begin{array}{c}
\frac{\frac{\partial u_{A}}{\partial x_{A}}}{\frac{\partial u_{A}}{\partial y_{A}}}+\frac{\frac{\partial u_{B}}{\partial x_{A}}}{\frac{\partial u_{B}}{\partial y_{B}}}=\frac{\frac{\partial u_{B}}{\partial x_{B}}}{\frac{\partial u_{B}}{\partial y_{B}}}+\frac{\frac{\partial u_{A}}{\partial x_{B}}}{\frac{\partial u_{A}}{\partial y_{A}}} \geqq 0, \\
y_{A}+y_{B}=w_{y} \\
x_{A}+x_{B} \leqq w_{x} \\
\left(\frac{\partial u_{A}}{\partial x_{A}} \frac{\partial u_{B}}{\partial x_{B}}-\frac{\partial u_{A}}{\partial x_{B}} \frac{\partial u_{B}}{\partial x_{A}}\right)\left(w_{x}-x_{A}-x_{B}\right)=0,
\end{array}\right.
$$

constitute a set of requirements that must be satisfied by Pareto efficient allocations. We can further analyze the solution for Pareto efficiency by considering three cases.

Case 1. When $\frac{\partial u_{A}}{\partial x_{A}} \frac{\partial u_{B}}{\partial x_{B}}>\frac{\partial u_{A}}{\partial x_{B}} \frac{\partial u_{B}}{\partial x_{A}}$, or equivalently $\frac{\frac{\partial u_{A}}{\partial x_{A}}}{\frac{\partial u_{A}}{\partial y_{A}}}+\frac{\frac{\partial u_{B}}{\partial x_{A}}}{\frac{\partial u_{B}}{\partial y_{B}}}=\frac{\frac{\partial u_{B}}{\partial x_{B}}}{\frac{\partial u_{B}}{\partial y_{B}}}+$ $\frac{\frac{\partial u_{A}}{\partial x_{B}}}{\frac{\partial u_{A}}{\partial y_{A}}}>0$, we have $\lambda_{x}>0$, and thus the last two conditions in the PO reduce to $x_{A}+x_{B}=w_{x}$. In this case, there is no destruction for good $x$. Substituting $x_{A}+x_{B}=w_{x}$ and $y_{A}+y_{B}=w_{y}$ into the marginal equality condition (14.2.19), a relationship is provided between $x_{A}$ and $y_{A}$, from which we can find Pareto efficient allocations.

Case 2. When the joint marginal benefit equals the joint marginal cost:

$$
\begin{equation*}
\frac{\partial u_{A}}{\partial x_{A}} \frac{\partial u_{B}}{\partial x_{B}}=\frac{\partial u_{A}}{\partial x_{B}} \frac{\partial u_{B}}{\partial x_{A}}, \tag{14.2.24}
\end{equation*}
$$

then

$$
\begin{equation*}
\frac{\frac{\partial u_{A}}{\partial x_{A}}}{\frac{\partial u_{A}}{\partial y_{A}}}+\frac{\frac{\partial u_{B}}{\partial x_{A}}}{\frac{\partial u_{B}}{\partial y_{B}}}=\frac{\frac{\partial u_{B}}{\partial x_{B}}}{\frac{\partial u_{B}}{\partial y_{B}}}+\frac{\frac{\partial u_{A}}{\partial x_{B}}}{\frac{\partial u_{A}}{\partial y_{A}}}=0 \tag{14.2.25}
\end{equation*}
$$

and thus $\lambda_{x}=0$. In this case, when $x_{A}+x_{B} \leqq w_{x}$, the necessity of destruction is indeterminant (Note that no destruction means that $x_{A}+x_{B}=w_{x}$.). However, even when destruction is necessary, we can still determine the
set of Pareto efficient allocations by using $y_{A}+y_{B}=w_{y}$ and the zero social marginal equality condition (14.2.25). Indeed, after substituting $y_{A}+y_{B}=$ $w_{y}$ into (14.2.25), we can solve for $x_{A}$ in terms of $y_{A}$.

Case 3. When $\frac{\partial u_{A}}{\partial x_{A}} \frac{\partial u_{B}}{\partial x_{B}}<\frac{\partial u_{A}}{\partial x_{B}} \frac{\partial u_{B}}{\partial x_{A}}$, for any allocation that satisfies $x_{A}+$ $x_{B}=w_{x}, y_{A}+y_{B}=w_{y}$, and the marginal equality condition (14.2.19), the social marginal rate of substitution is negative. The allocation will not be Pareto efficient. Thus, there must be a destruction (free disposal) for good $x$ for Pareto efficiency, and there exist Pareto efficient allocations that satisfy (14.2.25).

Summarizing the above three cases, we conclude that one can employ the following set of conditions

$$
\left\{\begin{array}{c}
\frac{\frac{\partial u_{A}}{\partial x_{A}}}{\frac{\partial u_{A}}{\partial y_{A}}}+\frac{\frac{\partial u_{B}}{\partial x_{A}}}{\frac{\partial u_{B}}{\partial y_{B}}}=\frac{\frac{\partial u_{B}}{\frac{\partial x_{B}}{\partial u_{B}}}+\frac{\frac{\partial u_{A}}{\partial x_{B}}}{\frac{\partial x_{B}}{\partial u_{A}}}}{x_{A}+x_{B}=w_{x}} \\
y_{A}+y_{B}=w_{y}
\end{array},\right.
$$

together with whether $\frac{\partial u_{A}}{\partial x_{A}} \frac{\partial u_{B}}{\partial x_{B}} \geqq \frac{\partial u_{A}}{\partial x_{B}} \frac{\partial u_{B}}{\partial x_{A}}$, to determine whether or not there is destruction (free disposal):

Indeed, if $\frac{\partial u_{A}}{\partial x_{A}} \frac{\partial u_{B}}{\partial x_{B}} \geqq \frac{\partial u_{A}}{\partial x_{B}} \frac{\partial u_{B}}{\partial x_{A}}$ is also satisfied, then there is no free disposal in achieving Pareto efficient allocations. If $\frac{\partial u_{A}}{\partial x_{A}} \frac{\partial u_{B}}{\frac{x_{B}}{B}}<\frac{\partial u_{A}}{\partial x_{B}} \frac{\partial u_{B}}{\partial x_{A}}$, although utility functions are strictly increasing in $x$, there must be the case of destruction of some amount of $x$ in achieving Pareto efficient allocations.

We then have the following proposition that characterizes whether or not there is destruction (free disposal) of endowments $w_{x}$ in achieving Pareto efficient allocations, although utility functions are strictly increasing in $x$.

Proposition 14.2.2 For $2 \times 2$ pure exchange economies, suppose that the utility function $u_{i}\left(x_{A}, x_{B}, y_{i}\right)$ is continuously differentiable, strictly quasi-concave, and $\frac{\partial u_{i}\left(x_{A}, x_{B}, y_{i}\right)}{\partial x_{i}}>0$ for $i=A, B$.
(1) If the social marginal rate of substitution of good $x$ for good $y$ is positive at a Pareto efficient allocation $x^{*},{ }^{2}$ then there is no free disposal for $w_{x}$ in achieving the Pareto efficient allocation $x^{*}$.

[^18](2) If the social marginal rate of substitution of good $x$ for good $y$ is negative for any allocation $\left(x_{A}, x_{B}\right)$ satisfying $x_{A}+x_{B}=w_{x}$, $y_{A}+y_{B}=w_{y}$, and the marginal equality condition (14.2.19), then there must be free disposal for $w_{x}$ in achieving any Pareto efficient allocation $x^{*}$. In other words, $x_{A}^{*}+x_{B}^{*}<w_{x}$ and $x^{*}$ is determined by $y_{A}+y_{B}=w_{y}$ and (14.2.25).

Example 14.2.1 Consider the following utility function:

$$
u_{i}\left(x_{A}, x_{B}, y_{i}\right)=\sqrt{x_{i} y_{i}}-x_{j}, \quad i \in\{A, B\}, j \in\{A, B\}, j \neq i
$$

By the marginal equality condition (14.2.19), we obtain

$$
\begin{equation*}
\left(\sqrt{\frac{y_{A}}{x_{A}}}+1\right)^{2}=\left(\sqrt{\frac{y_{B}}{x_{B}}}+1\right)^{2} \tag{14.2.26}
\end{equation*}
$$

and thus

$$
\begin{equation*}
\frac{y_{A}}{x_{A}}=\frac{y_{B}}{x_{B}} \tag{14.2.27}
\end{equation*}
$$

Let $x_{A}+x_{B} \equiv \bar{x}$. Substituting $x_{A}+x_{B}=\bar{x}$ and $y_{A}+y_{B}=w_{y}$ into (14.2.27), we have

$$
\begin{equation*}
\frac{y_{A}}{x_{A}}=\frac{w_{y}}{\bar{x}} . \tag{14.2.28}
\end{equation*}
$$

Then, by (14.2.27) and (14.2.28), we get

$$
\begin{equation*}
\frac{\partial u_{A}}{\partial x_{A}} \frac{\partial u_{B}}{\partial x_{B}}=\frac{1}{4} \sqrt{\frac{y_{A}}{x_{A}}} \sqrt{\frac{y_{B}}{x_{B}}}=\frac{y_{A}}{4 x_{A}}=\frac{w_{y}}{4 \bar{x}} \tag{14.2.29}
\end{equation*}
$$

and

$$
\begin{equation*}
\frac{\partial u_{A}}{\partial x_{B}} \frac{\partial u_{B}}{\partial x_{A}}=1 \tag{14.2.30}
\end{equation*}
$$

Thus, $\bar{x}=w_{y} / 4$ is the critical point that makes $\frac{\partial u_{A}}{\partial x_{A}} \frac{\partial u_{B}}{\partial x_{B}}-\frac{\partial u_{A}}{\partial x_{B}} \frac{\partial u_{B}}{\partial x_{A}}=0$, or equivalently $\frac{\frac{\partial u_{A}}{\partial A_{A}}}{\frac{\partial A_{A}}{\partial y_{A}}}+\frac{\frac{\partial u_{B}}{\partial x_{A}}}{\frac{\partial u_{B}}{\partial y_{B}}}=\frac{\frac{\partial u_{B}}{\partial \partial_{B}}}{\frac{\partial u_{B}}{\partial y_{B}}}+\frac{\frac{\partial u_{A}}{\partial x_{B}}}{\frac{\partial u_{A}}{\partial y_{A}}}=0$. Therefore, if $w_{x}>\frac{w_{y}}{4}$, then $\frac{\partial u_{A}}{\partial x_{A}} \frac{\partial u_{B}}{\partial x_{B}}-\frac{\partial u_{A}}{\partial x_{B}} \frac{\partial u_{B}}{\partial x_{A}}<0$, and thus there must be destruction in any Pareto efficient allocation. If $w_{x}<\frac{w_{y}}{4}$, then $\frac{\partial u_{A} \frac{\partial u_{B}}{\partial x_{A}} \frac{\partial u_{A}}{\partial x_{B}}-\frac{\partial u_{B}}{\partial x_{B}}>0 \text {, and thus }}{\partial x_{A}}>{ }^{2}$ Pareto optimal allocation requires no destruction. Finally, when $w_{x}=\frac{w_{y}}{4}$, any allocation that satisfies the marginal equality condition (14.2.19) and the balanced budget conditions, $x_{A}+x_{B}=w_{x}$ and $y_{A}+y_{B}=w_{y}$, also
satisfies (14.2.23) since $\frac{\partial u_{A}}{\partial x_{A}} \frac{\partial u_{B}}{\partial x_{B}}-\frac{\partial u_{A}}{\partial x_{B}} \frac{\partial u_{B}}{\partial x_{A}}=0$, and thus it is a Pareto efficient allocation with no free disposal.

Note that, since $\frac{\partial u_{A}}{\partial x_{A}}$ and $\frac{\partial u_{B}}{\partial x_{B}}$ represent marginal utilities, they are usually diminishing as consumption in good $x$ increases. Since $\frac{\partial u_{A}}{\partial x_{B}}$ and $\frac{\partial u_{B}}{\partial x_{A}}$ are in the form of marginal cost, their absolute values are typically increasing in good $x$. Therefore, when total endowment $w_{x}$ is small, the social marginal benefit would exceed the social marginal cost, so that there is no destruction of good $x$. As the total endowment of $w_{x}$ increases with the total endowment of $w_{y}$ fixed (i.e., $y$ becomes relatively scarce when $x$ becomes abundant), the social marginal cost will ultimately outweigh the social marginal benefit, which results in the destruction of the endowment $w_{x}$.

Alternatively, we can obtain the same result by using the social marginal rate of substitution. When utility functions are strictly quasi-concave, marginal rates of substitution are diminishing. Therefore, in the presence of negative consumption externalities, the social marginal rate of substitution of good $x$ for good $y$ may become negative when the consumption of good $x$ becomes sufficiently large. When this occurs, it is better to destroy some resources for good $x$. As the destruction of good $x$ increases which will, in turn, decrease the consumption of good $x$, the social marginal rate of substitution will increase. Eventually, it will become nonnegative.

When there is a negative externality, it seems strange that some commodities need to be destroyed in order to achieve Pareto efficient allocations. This phenomenon, however, is not only important in theory, but also related to practice. Tian and Yang (2012) used the above theoretical results to explain a well-known puzzle of the happiness-income relationship in the economics and psychology literature: people's happiness rises with income up to a point, but not beyond it. For example, mean life satisfaction in the United States has been declining in roughly past 60 years; whereas, that in the United Kingdom remained approximately flat across the same period. If we interpret income as a good, when the good becomes an inferior good or people envy each other's income level (e.g., low-income people envy high-income people), then according to the above results, when income
exceeds a certain threshold level, if all income is spent, people's happiness decreases as consumption increases, which leads to Pareto inefficient allocations. Consequently, when economic growth reaches a certain level, if other aspects (e.g., spiritual civilization and political civilization ) cannot achieve a corresponding level, increases in income do not increase people's satisfaction, which is the so-called happiness - income paradox.

To illustrate this point, return to Example 14.2.1 and interpret $x$ as the composite of material goods or GDP index, and $y$ as the composite of nonmaterial goods or non-GDP index. If we do not increase the level of nonmaterial goods $w_{y}$ in a comprehensive and balanced manner, and only focus on GDP growth, we will eventually have $w_{x}>\frac{w_{y}}{4}$. As a result, as we can see in practice, people's happiness continues to decline as income level constantly rises.

The above results have a strong policy implication, i.e., the government's pursuit of GDP growth does not always improve people's happiness, but rather may decrease people's satisfaction, resulting in Pareto inefficient allocations. This is the fundamental reason for that, in the past few decades, people's happiness in many countries has risen and then began to decline as income continued to rise. A similar phenomenon is also seen recently in China. According to the above discussions, an individual's happiness comes from both material and non-material (spiritual civilization and political civilization) levels. In fact, an individual's happiness level is determined by multiple factors: (1) material factors, such as income levels and differences; (2) mental factors, such as career achievement, work stress, unemployment, leisure time, friendships, and family harmony; (3) social and political factors, such as social equity, political stability, and democratic rights; and (4) ecological factors, such as control of environmental pollution and ecological damage, which are related to individual health and even survival. It can be seen that the factors listed in (1) are GDP products, and the factors listed in (2)-(4) are non-material goods or non-GDP products.

Therefore, happiness comes from material civilization, spiritual civilization, political civilization, and ecological civilization. When people's living standards are limited, people care more about pursuing material civ-
ilization. When their living standard reaches a certain threshold, people will tend to pursue spiritual civilization, political civilization, and ecological civilization. In other words, people first need to satisfy the need for food, clothing, shelter, and transportation, and then the superstructure of art, poetry, philosophy, life comfort and quality, physical health, democratic politics, and protection of one's own rights. Due to the negative externalities resulting from envying other people's living standards, the construction of spiritual civilization, political civilization, and ecological civilization is also crucial. Therefore, both material and non-material goods need to be balanced and fully developed; otherwise, social harmony and efficiency will not be achieved.

Happiness is the subject of psychology, ethics, and economics. Many economists believe that mainstream economics cannot solve the problem of human happiness. However, the above results show that "happiness economics" can also be incorporated into the framework of mainstream economics. It can still be assumed that individuals are self-interested in pursuing their personal interests, and Pareto optimality or social welfare maximization is still a necessary and basic criterion for judging whether the resource allocation is efficient. It just adds to the reasonable assumption that people's income generally has negative externalities. For a detailed discussion of this issue, see Tian and Yang $(2009,2012)$.

### 14.3 Production Externality

We now discuss the fact that, when production externalities exist, competitive markets may also result in inefficient allocations of resources. To illustrate this, consider a simple economy with two firms. Firm 1 produces output $x$ that will be sold in a competitive market. However, production of $x$ imposes an externality cost, denoted by $e(x)$, to firm 2 , which is assumed to be convex and strictly increasing.

Let $y$ be the output produced by firm 2 , which is sold in a competitive market. Let $c_{x}(x)$ and $c_{y}(y)$ be the cost functions of firms 1 and 2 , which are convex and strictly increasing.

The profits of the two firms amount to

$$
\begin{align*}
\pi_{1} & =p_{x} x-c_{x}(x),  \tag{14.3.31}\\
\pi_{2} & =p_{y} y-c_{y}(y)-e(x) \tag{14.3.32}
\end{align*}
$$

where $p_{x}$ and $p_{y}$ are the prices of $x$ and $y$, respectively. Then, by the FOCs, we have for positive amounts of outputs:

$$
\begin{align*}
& p_{x}=c_{x}^{\prime}(x),  \tag{14.3.33}\\
& p_{y}=c_{y}^{\prime}(y) . \tag{14.3.34}
\end{align*}
$$

However, the profit maximizing output $x_{c}$ is over-produced from a social perspective. The first firm only takes account of its own production cost, i.e., the cost that is imposed on itself, but it ignores the social cost, i.e., its private cost plus the cost that it imposes on the other firm.

What is the socially efficient output?

The social profit, $\pi_{1}+\pi_{2}$, is not maximized at $x_{c}$ and $y_{c}$, which satisfy (14.3.33) and (14.3.34). If the two firms merged in order to internalize the externality, then the problem becomes

$$
\begin{equation*}
\max _{x, y} p_{x} x+p_{y} y-c_{x}(x)-e(x)-c_{y}(y) \tag{14.3.35}
\end{equation*}
$$

which gives the FOCs:

$$
\begin{aligned}
& p_{x}=c_{x}^{\prime}\left(x^{*}\right)+e^{\prime}\left(x^{*}\right), \\
& p_{y}=c_{y}^{\prime}\left(y^{*}\right),
\end{aligned}
$$

where $x^{*}$ is an efficient amount of output, characterized by price being equal to the marginal social cost. Thus, $x^{*}$ is less than the competitive output $x_{c}$ by the convexity of $e(x)$ and $c_{x}(x)$.


Figure 14.1: The efficient output $x^{*}$ is less than the competitive output $x_{c}$.

### 14.4 Solutions to Externalities

From the above discussion, we know that a competitive market may not result in Pareto efficient outcomes in the presence of externalities. Consequently, one needs to seek some other alternative mechanisms to solve the market failure problem. Many remedies have been proposed to correct the market failure of externality, such as:

1. Pigovian taxes;
2. Voluntary negotiation (Coase's approach );
3. Compensatory taxes/subsidies;
4. Creating a missing market with property rights;
5. Direct intervention;
6. Mergers of firms;
7. Creating a market for the exchange of emission rights;
8. Incentive mechanism design.

Any of the above solutions may result in Pareto efficient outcomes, but may lead to different income distributions. It is also important to know what kinds of information are required to implement one of the above solutions.

Most of the above proposed solutions need to make the following assumptions:

1. The source and degree of the externality are identifiable.
2. The recipients of the externality are identifiable.
3. The causal relationship of the externality can be established objectively.
4. The cost of preventing (by different methods) an externality is perfectly known to everyone.
5. The cost of implementing taxes and subsides is negligible.
6. The cost of voluntary negotiation is negligible.

We will discuss the advantages and disadvantages of the above schemes below, and identify which are feasible and which are not. In addition, it is important to know what kind of information is needed to perform each of these solutions. Most of the above schemes require information symmetry, such as Pigovian tax, and Coase Theorem. There will be major problems in the implementation of these rules in the case of incomplete information. Therefore, incentive mechanism design is necessary to implement these solutions or to provide new solutions.

### 14.4.1 Pigovian Tax

The Pigovian tax was proposed by Arthur Cecil Pigou (1877-1959, see his biography in Section 14.6.1). For externality-producing firms, the government imposes a tax on the marginal cost of externality with the tax rate $t=e^{\prime}\left(x^{*}\right)$. In the case of complete information, both the externality and the tax rate $t$ can be determined, and the FOCs of the enterprise's problem are the same as the FOCs of the social optimum, thereby achieving the efficient allocation of resources.

To see this, set a tax rate, $t$, such that $t=e^{\prime}\left(x^{*}\right)$. This tax rate to firm 1 would internalize the externality. Indeed, the net profit of firm 1 is

$$
\begin{equation*}
\pi_{1}=p_{x} \cdot x-c_{x}(x)-t \cdot x, \tag{14.4.36}
\end{equation*}
$$

which leads to the FOC:

$$
\begin{equation*}
p_{x}=c_{x}^{\prime}(x)+t=c_{x}^{\prime}(x)+e^{\prime}\left(x^{*}\right), \tag{14.4.37}
\end{equation*}
$$

which is the same as the one for social optimality. In other words, when firm 1 faces the wrong pricing of its action, $\operatorname{atax} t=e^{\prime}\left(x^{*}\right)$ should be imposed for each unit of its production. This will lead to a socially optimal outcome that is less than the competitive equilibrium outcome. Such correction taxes are called Pigovian taxes.

This solution requires that the taxing authority knows the externality cost $e(x)$. How does the authority know the externality and estimate its value in real world? If the authority has such information, this solution would work well, such as imposing a Pigovian tax on gasoline, since automobile emissions are relatively easier to determine. However, in most cases, it does not work well, and it is only applicable to scenarios in which $e(x)$ is relatively easier to identify.

In addition, as pointed out by Ng (2004), if $e(x)$ is an assessment function of environmental disruption, this often involves many people (even globally) and the future generations, and thus it is difficult to estimate. However, if $e(x)$ is a cost function on abatement spending, it is often easier to estimate. Ng argues that in the case of serious pollution (and therefore there is an abatement investment), it is not necessary to estimate the damage of pollution, but rather to tax according to the marginal cost of abatement. However, when $e(x)$ is private information and is difficult to identify, it is difficult for the tax collector to accurately obtain information about the cost $e(x)$, and thus this solution cannot be directly adopted. In order to obtain information, some effective means are necessary, but they all involve a cost. If the cost is too high, it is difficult to adopt in practice.

### 14.4.2 Coase's Approach

A different approach to the externality problem relies on the parties involved to negotiate a solution themselves.

Nobel laureate Ronald Harry Coase (1910-2013, see his biography in Section 14.6.2) raised two problems of Pigou's tax: first, government intervention harms economic freedom; and second, taxpayers are unlikely to get informed about $e(x)$ in most situations.

The greatest novelty of Coase's contribution was the systematic treat-
ment of trade in property rights. To solve the externality problem, Coase emphasized in his famous 1960 article, "The Problem of Social Cost" , that whether externality problems can be effectively solved depends on whether property rights are clearly defined. For this reason, Coase put forward a clear definition of property rights, and methods of voluntary exchange and negotiation. The so-called Coase Theorem asserts that as long as property rights are clearly defined, the outcome of negotiations between the two parties will result in an efficient level of production in the presence of production externality.

The term "Coase Theorem" originated with George Stigler, who explained Coase's ideas in his textbook, "The Theory of Price" . Stigler asserted that the Coase Theorem actually contains two claims in the absence of transaction costs:

Claim 1 (Coase Efficiency Theorem): Voluntary negotiations over externalities will lead to a Pareto-optimal outcome.

Claim 2 (Coase Neutrality Theorem or Independence Theorem): The level of externality is the same, regardless of to whom the property rights are given and how they are allocated.

Stigler's Claim 2 would follow from Claim 1 if it were true that every Pareto optimal allocation has the same level of externality, irrespective of the way that private goods are distributed. Thus, the so-called Coase Theorem asserts that as long as property rights are clearly assigned and the transaction cost is zero, the two parties will negotiate in such a way that the optimal level of the externality-producing activity is implemented. As a policy implication, a government should simply rearrange property rights with appropriately designed property rights. The market could then internalize externalities without direct government intervention.

Coase illustrates his assertion through various examples of the twoperson economy with externalities. The following simple examples depict Coase's core ideas.

Example 14.4.1 Two firms: One is a chemical factory that discharges chemicals into a river, and the other is the fisherman. Suppose that the river can
produce a value of $\$ 100,000$. If the chemicals pollute the river, the fish cannot be consumed. How does one solve the externality problem? Coase's solution states that as long as the property right of the river is clearly assigned, efficient outcomes will emerge. In other words, to yield an efficient output, the government should give the river's ownership either to the chemical firm or to the fisherman. To see this, assume that:

The cost of a filter is denoted by $c_{f}$.
Case 1: The river is given to the factory.
i) $c_{f}<\$ 100,000$. The fisherman is willing to buy a filter for the factory. The fisherman will pay for the filter so that the chemical cannot pollute the river.
ii) $c_{f}>\$ 100,000$. The chemical is discharged into the river. The fisherman does not want to install a filter.

Case 2: The river is given to the fisherman, and the firm's net product revenue is greater than $\$ 100,000$.
i) $c_{f}<\$ 100,000$. The factory purchases the filter so that the chemical cannot pollute the river.
ii) $c_{f}>\$ 100,000$. The firm pays $\$ 100,000$ to the fisherman before the chemical is discharged into the river.

In this way, regardless of who owns the property, two cases lead to the same efficient result: as long as $c_{f}<\$ 100,000$, pollution will not occur; otherwise, it will take place. The only difference is that the income distribution effect is different.

Like the above example, Coase himself provided numerous examples supporting his claims concerning negotiations between firms, but rather negotiations between individuals. Because firms pursue profit maximization rather than utility maximization, their economic behavior seem to be fiduciary behavior. This difference is important because profit maximization has no income effect, whereas utility maximization generally has an income effect. Therefore, we need to make some restricted assumptions
on consumers' utility functions to establish the Coase Theorem for negotiations between utility-maximizing individuals.

Now, consider an economy with two consumers with $L$ goods. Furthermore, consumer $i$ has initial wealth $w_{i}$, and her utility function is given by

$$
u_{i}\left(x_{i}^{1}, \ldots, x_{i}^{L}, h\right)
$$

In other words, the utility of each consumer is related to the quantity of goods consumed, as well as the activity $h$ carried out by consumer 1 .

Activity $h$ has no direct monetary cost for person 1. For example, $h$ is the quantity of loud music played by person 1. In order to play the music, the consumer must purchase electricity, but electricity can be captured as one of the components of $\boldsymbol{x}_{1}$. From the point of view of consumer $2, h$ represents an external effect of consumer 1's action. In the model, we assume that

$$
\frac{\partial u_{2}}{\partial h} \neq 0 .
$$

Thus, the externality in this model lies in the fact that $h$ affects consumer 2's utility, but it is not priced by the market. Let $v_{i}\left(p, w_{i}, h\right)$ be consumer $i$ 's indirect utility function:

$$
\begin{aligned}
v_{i}\left(w_{i}, h\right)= & \max _{\boldsymbol{x}_{i}} u_{i}\left(\boldsymbol{x}_{i}, h\right) \\
\text { s.t. } & \boldsymbol{p} \boldsymbol{x}_{i} \leqq w_{i} .
\end{aligned}
$$

To rule out the income effect resultant from the assignment of property rights, we assume that utility functions are quasi-linear with respect to some numeraire commodity. Thus, the consumer's indirect utility function takes the following form:

$$
v_{i}\left(w_{i}, h\right)=\phi_{i}(h)+w_{i} .
$$

We further assume that utility is strictly concave in $h$ : $\phi_{i}^{0}(h)<0$. Again, the competitive equilibrium outcome in general is not Pareto optimal. In order to maximize utility, consumer 1 chooses $h$ in order to maximize $v_{1}$, so that the interior solution satisfies $\phi_{1}^{\prime}\left(h^{*}\right)=0$. Even though consumer 2's
utility depends on $h$, it cannot affect the choice of $h$.
On the other hand, the socially optimal level of $h$ will maximize the sum of the consumers' utilities:

$$
\max _{h} \phi_{1}(h)+\phi_{2}(h) .
$$

The FOC for an interior maximum is:

$$
\phi_{1}^{\prime}\left(h^{* *}\right)+\phi_{2}^{\prime}\left(h^{* *}\right)=0,
$$

where $h^{* *}$ is the Pareto optimal amount of $h$. Thus, the social optimum is where the sum of the marginal benefit of the two consumers equals zero. In the case of negative externality for consumer 2 (loud music), we have $h^{*}>h^{* *}$, namely, too much $h$ is produced. In the case of positive externality for consumer 2, we then have $h^{*}<h^{* *}$.

Now, we show that, as long as property rights are clearly determined, the two parties will negotiate in such a way that the optimal level of the externality-producing activity is implemented. We first consider the case in which consumer 2 has the right to prohibit consumer 1 from undertaking activity $h$. However, this right is contractible. Consumer 2 can sell consumer 1 the right to undertake $h_{2}$ units of activity $h$ in exchange for some transfers, $T_{2}$. The two consumers will bargain both over the size of the transfers, $T_{2}$, and over the number of units of the externality-producing good, $h_{2}$.

In order to determine the bargaining outcome, we first specify the bargaining mechanism as follows:

1. Consumer 2 offers consumer 1 a take-it-or-leave-it contract specifying a payment $T_{2}$ and an activity level $h_{2}$.
2. If consumer 1 accepts the offer, that outcome will be implemented. If consumer 1 does not accept the offer, consumer 1 cannot produce any amount of the externality-producing good, i.e., $h_{2}=0$.

In the absence of agreement, consumer 1 must have $h_{2}=0$ because the right is given to consumer 2 , and consumer 1 will accept $\left(h_{2}, T_{2}\right)$ if and only
if it satisfies the participation constraint, i.e.,

$$
\phi_{1}\left(h_{2}\right)-T_{2} \geqq \phi_{1}(0) .
$$

Given this constraint on the set of acceptable offers, consumer 2 will choose $\left(h_{2}, T_{2}\right)$ that is a solution to the following problem:

$$
\begin{aligned}
& \max _{h_{2}, T_{2}} \phi_{2}\left(h_{2}\right)+T_{2} \\
& \text { s.t. } \phi_{1}\left(h_{2}\right)-T_{2} \geqq \phi_{1}(0) .
\end{aligned}
$$

Since consumer 2 prefers higher $T_{2}$, the constraint must be binding at the optimum. Thus, the problem becomes:

$$
\max _{h_{2}} \phi_{1}\left(h_{2}\right)+\phi_{2}\left(h_{2}\right)-\phi_{1}(0) .
$$

The FOC for this problem is given by:

$$
\phi_{1}^{\prime}\left(h_{2}\right)+\phi_{2}^{\prime}\left(h_{2}\right)=0 .
$$

This is the same condition that results in the socially optimal level of $h_{2}$. Thus, consumer 2 chooses $h_{2}=h^{* *}$, and, using the constraint, we have $T_{2}=\phi_{1}\left(h^{* *}\right)-\phi_{1}(0)$. Moreover, the offer $\left(h_{2}, T_{2}\right)$ is accepted by consumer 1 , and the bargaining process implements the social optimum.

Now, we consider the case in which consumer 1 has the right to produce as much of the externality as she wants. We maintain the same bargaining mechanism. Consumer 2 can give consumer 1 a take-it-or-leave-it offer $\left(h_{1}, T_{1}\right)$, where the subscript indicates that consumer 1 has the property right in this situation. However, now, in the event that consumer 1 rejects the offer, she can choose to produce as much of the externality as she wants, which means that she will choose to produce $h^{*}$. Thus, the only change between this situation and the previous case occurs when no agreement is reached. In this case, consumer 2's problem is:

$$
\begin{aligned}
& \max _{h_{1}, T_{1}} \phi_{2}\left(h_{1}\right)-T_{1} \\
& \text { s.t. } \phi_{1}\left(h_{1}\right)+T_{1} \geqq \phi_{1}\left(h^{*}\right) .
\end{aligned}
$$

Again, the constraint must be binding, and thus consumer 2 chooses $h_{1}$ and $T_{1}$ to maximize

$$
\max \phi_{1}\left(h_{1}\right)+\phi_{2}\left(h_{1}\right)-\phi_{1}\left(h^{*}\right),
$$

which is also maximized at $h_{1}=h^{* *}$, since the FOC is the same. The only difference is in the transfer. Here, $T_{1}=\phi_{1}\left(h^{*}\right)-\phi_{1}\left(h^{* *}\right)$.

Though the outcomes of both property-rights arrangements implement $h^{* *}$, they have different distributional consequences. Specifically, the transfer payment is positive if consumer 2 has the property rights; whereas, it is negative when consumer 1 has the property rights. The reason for this is that consumer 2 has bargaining power in the sense that consumer 1 is forced to produce 0 units of the externality-producing good when no agreement is reached.

Note that in the quasi-linear framework, redistribution of the numeraire commodity has no effect on social welfare. Irrespective of how the property rights are assigned, this bilateral bargaining process provides an example of the Coase Theorem: If trade of the externality can occur, then bargaining will lead to an efficient outcome, regardless of how property rights are assigned (as long as they are clearly assigned). Note that well-defined, enforceable property rights are essential for bargaining to work. If there is a dispute over who has the right to pollute (or not pollute), then bargaining may not result in efficiency. An additional requirement for efficiency is that the bargaining process itself is costless. Note that the government does not need to know about individual consumers here, i.e., it only needs to define property rights clearly. Thus, the Coase Theorem provides an argument in favor of having clear laws and a well-developed judicial system.

However, we know that the quasi-linear function is a highly restrictive assumption, which means that there is no income effect. If the Coase Theorem is only valid for the quasilinear utility function, then it has great limitations to be applicable for solving consumption externality problems. Therefore, a natural question is, does the Coase Theorem hold for other types of utility functions? Hurwicz gave a surprising and disappointing answer . Hurwicz (Japan and the World Economy, 7, 1995, pp. 49-74) argued
that, even when the transaction cost is zero and property rights are clearly defined, the absence of income effects in the demand for the good with an externality is not only sufficient (which is well known) but also necessary for the Coase Neutrality Theorem to be true. In other words, when the transaction cost is negligible, the level of pollution will be independent of the assignments of property rights if and only if the preferences of the consumers are quasi-linear with respect to the externality-generating private good.

Unfortunately, as shown by Chipman and Tian (2012), the proof of Hurwicz's claim on the necessity of quasi-linear preferences for the Coase Theorem to be valid is incorrect. To see this, consider the following class of utility functions that have the functional form:

$$
\begin{equation*}
U_{i}\left(x_{i}, h\right)=x_{i} e^{-h}+\phi_{i}(h), \quad i=1,2 \tag{14.4.38}
\end{equation*}
$$

where

$$
\begin{equation*}
\phi_{i}(h)=\int e^{-h} b_{i}(h) d h \tag{14.4.39}
\end{equation*}
$$

$U_{i}\left(x_{i}, h\right)$ is clearly not quasi-linear in $x_{i}$. It is further assumed that for all $h \in(0, \eta], b_{1}(h)>\xi, b_{2}(h)<0, b_{i}^{\prime}(h)<0(i=1,2), b_{1}(0)+b_{2}(0) \geqq \xi$, and $b_{1}(\eta)+b_{2}(\eta) \leqq \xi$.

We then have

$$
\begin{aligned}
\partial U_{i} / \partial x_{i} & =e^{-h}>0, \quad i=1,2, \\
\partial U_{1} / \partial h & =-x_{1} e^{-h}+b_{1}(h) e^{-h}>e^{-h}\left[\xi-x_{1}\right] \geqq 0, \\
\partial U_{2} / \partial h & =-x_{2} e^{-h}+b_{2}(h) e^{-h}<0
\end{aligned}
$$

for $\left(x_{i}, h\right) \in(0, \xi) \times(0, \eta), i=1,2$. Thus, by the mutual tangency equality condition for Pareto efficiency, we have
$0=\frac{\partial U_{1}}{\partial h} / \frac{\partial U_{1}}{\partial x_{1}}+\frac{\partial U_{2}}{\partial h} / \frac{\partial U_{2}}{\partial x_{2}}=-x_{1}-x_{2}+b_{1}(h)+b_{2}(h)=b_{1}(h)+b_{2}(h)-\xi$,
which is independent of $x_{i}$. Therefore, if $\left(x_{1}, x_{2}, h\right)$ is Pareto optimal, and so is $\left(x_{1}^{\prime}, x_{2}^{\prime}, h\right)$ provided that $x_{1}+x_{2}=x_{1}^{\prime}+x_{2}^{\prime}=\xi$. In addition, note
that $b_{i}^{\prime}(h)<0(i=1,2), b_{1}(0)+b_{2}(0) \geqq \xi$, and $b_{1}(\eta)+b_{2}(\eta) \leqq \xi$. Then, $b_{1}(h)+b_{2}(h)$ is strongly monotone, and thus there is a unique $h \in[0, \eta]$, satisfying (14.4.40). Thus, the contract curve is horizontal, even though individuals' preferences need not be quasi-linear.

Example 14.4.2 Suppose that $b_{1}(h)=(1+h)^{\alpha} \eta^{\eta}+\xi$ with $\alpha<0$, and $b_{2}(h)=$ $-h^{\eta}$. Then, for all $h \in(0, \eta], b_{1}(h)>\xi, b_{2}(h)<0, b_{i}^{\prime}(h)<0(i=1,2)$, $b_{1}(0)+b_{2}(0)>\xi$, and $b_{1}(\eta)+b_{2}(\eta)<\xi$. Thus, $\phi_{i}(h)=\int e^{-h} b_{i}(h) d h$ is concave, and $U_{i}\left(x_{i}, h\right)=x_{i} e^{-h}+\int e^{-h} b_{i}(h) d h$ is quasi-concave, $\partial U_{i} / \partial x_{i}>0$ and $\partial U_{1} / \partial h>0$, and $\partial U_{2} / \partial h<0$ for $\left(x_{i}, h\right) \in(0, \xi) \times(0, \eta), i=1,2$, but it is not quasi-linear in $x_{i}$.

Chipman and Tian (2012) then investigate the necessity for the "Coase conjecture" that the level of pollution is independent of the assignments of property rights. This reduces to developing necessary and sufficient conditions that guarantee that the contract curve is horizontal, so that the set of Pareto optima for the utility functions is $h$-constant. This, in turn, reduces to finding the class of utility functions, such that the mutual tangency (firstorder) condition does not contain $x_{i}$ and, consequently, it is a function, denoted by $g(h)$, of $h$ only:

$$
\begin{equation*}
\frac{\partial U_{1}}{\partial h} / \frac{\partial U_{1}}{\partial x_{1}}+\frac{\partial U_{2}}{\partial h} / \frac{\partial U_{2}}{\partial x_{2}}=g(h)=0 . \tag{14.4.41}
\end{equation*}
$$

Let $F_{i}\left(x_{i}, h\right)=\frac{\partial U_{i}}{\partial h} / \frac{\partial U_{i}}{\partial x_{i}}(i=1,2)$, which can be generally expressed as

$$
F_{i}\left(x_{i}, h\right)=x_{i} \psi_{i}(h)+f_{i}\left(x_{i}, h\right)+b_{i}(h),
$$

where $f_{i}\left(x_{i}, h\right)$ are nonseparable and nonlinear in $x_{i} . \quad \psi_{i}(h), b_{i}(h)$, and $f_{i}\left(x_{i}, h\right)$ will be further specified below.

Let $F(x, h)=F_{1}(x, h)+F_{2}(\xi-x, h)$. Then, the mutual tangency equality condition can be rewritten as

$$
\begin{equation*}
F(x, h)=0 . \tag{14.4.42}
\end{equation*}
$$

Thus, the contract curve, i.e., the locus of Pareto-optimal allocations, can be expressed by a function $h=f(x)$ that is implicitly defined by (14.4.42).

Then, the Coase Neutrality Theorem, which is characterized by the condition that the set of Pareto optimal allocations (the contract curve) in the $(x, h)$ space for $x_{i}>0$ is a horizontal line $h=$ constant, implies that

$$
h=f(x)=\bar{h}
$$

with $\bar{h}$ constant, and thus we have

$$
\frac{d h}{d x}=-\frac{F_{x}}{F_{h}}=0
$$

for all $x \in[0, \xi]$ and $F_{h} \neq 0$, which means that the function $F(x, h)$ is independent of $x$. Then, for all $x \in[0, \xi]$,
$F(x, h)=x \psi_{1}(h)+(\xi-x) \psi_{2}(h)+f_{1}(x, h)+f_{2}(\xi-x, h)+b_{1}(h)+b_{2}(h) \equiv g(h)$.

Since the utility functions $U_{1}$ and $U_{2}$ are functionally independent, and $x$ disappears in (14.4.43), we must have $\psi_{1}(h)=\psi_{2}(h) \equiv \psi(h)$ and $f_{1}(x, h)=$ $-f_{2}(\xi-x, h)=0$ for all $x \in[0, \xi]$. Therefore,

$$
\begin{equation*}
F(x, h)=\xi \psi(h)+b_{1}(h)+b_{2}(h) \equiv g(h), \tag{14.4.44}
\end{equation*}
$$

and

$$
\begin{equation*}
\frac{\partial U_{i}}{\partial h} / \frac{\partial U_{i}}{\partial x_{i}}=F_{i}\left(x_{i}, h\right)=x_{i} \psi(h)+b_{i}(h), \tag{14.4.45}
\end{equation*}
$$

which is a first-order linear partial differential equation. It can be verified that the principal integral $U_{i}\left(x_{i}, h\right)$ of (14.4.45) is given by

$$
\begin{equation*}
U_{i}\left(x_{i}, h\right)=x_{i} e^{\int \psi(h) d h}+\phi_{i}(h), \quad i=1,2 \tag{14.4.46}
\end{equation*}
$$

with

$$
\begin{equation*}
\phi_{i}(h)=\int e^{\int \psi(h) d h} b_{i}(h) d h . \tag{14.4.47}
\end{equation*}
$$

The general solution of (14.4.45) is then given by $\bar{U}_{i}(x, y)=\psi\left(U_{i}\right)$, where $\psi$ is an arbitrary function. Since a monotonic transformation preserves orderings of preferences, we can regard the principal solution $U_{i}\left(x_{i}, h\right)$ as a general functional form of utility functions that is fully characterized
by (14.4.45).
Note that (14.4.46) is a general utility function that contains quasi-linear utility in $x_{i}$ and the utility function given in (14.4.38) as special cases. Indeed, it reduces to the quasi-linear utility function when $\psi(h) \equiv 0$ and to the utility function given by (14.4.38) when $\psi(h)=-1$.

To make the mutual tangency (first-order) condition (14.4.41) also be sufficient for the contract curve to be horizontal in a pollution economy, we assume that for all $h \in(0, \eta], x_{1} \psi(h)+b_{1}(h)>0, x_{2} \psi(h)+b_{2}(h)<0, \psi^{\prime}(h) \leqq$ $0, b_{i}^{\prime}(h)<0(i=1,2), \xi \psi(0)+b_{1}(0)+b_{2}(0) \geqq 0$, and $\xi \psi(\eta)+b_{1}(\eta)+b_{2}(\eta) \leqq 0$.

We then have for $\left(x_{i}, h\right) \in(0, \xi) \times(0, \eta), i=1,2$,

$$
\begin{aligned}
\partial U_{i} / \partial x_{i} & =e^{\int \psi(h)}>0, \quad i=1,2, \\
\partial U_{1} / \partial h & =e^{\int \psi(h)}\left[x_{1} \psi(h)+b_{1}(h)\right]>0, \\
\partial U_{2} / \partial h & =e^{\int \psi(h)}\left[x_{2} \psi(h)+b_{2}(h)\right]<0,
\end{aligned}
$$

and thus

$$
\begin{align*}
0 & =\frac{\partial U_{1}}{\partial h} / \frac{\partial U_{1}}{\partial x_{1}}+\frac{\partial U_{2}}{\partial h} / \frac{\partial U_{2}}{\partial x_{2}} \\
& =\left(x_{1}+x_{2}\right) \psi(h)+b_{1}(h)+b_{2}(h) \\
& =\xi \psi(h)+b_{1}(h)+b_{2}(h), \tag{14.4.48}
\end{align*}
$$

which does not contain $x_{i}$. Therefore, if $\left(x_{1}, x_{2}, h\right)$ is Pareto optimal, so is $\left(x_{1}^{\prime}, x_{2}^{\prime}, h\right)$ provided that $x_{1}+x_{2}=x_{1}^{\prime}+x_{2}^{\prime}=\xi$. Furthermore, note that $\psi^{\prime}(h) \leqq 0, b_{i}^{\prime}(h)<0(i=1,2), \xi \psi(0)+b_{1}(0)+b_{2}(0) \geqq 0$, and $\xi \psi(\eta)+$ $b_{1}(\eta)+b_{2}(\eta) \leqq 0$. Then, $\xi \psi(h)+b_{1}(h)+b_{2}(h)$ is strongly monotone, and there is a unique $h \in[0, \eta]$ that satisfies (14.4.48). Thus, the contract curve is horizontal, even though individuals' preferences need not be quasi-linear.

The formal statement of the Coase Neutrality Theorem obtained by Chipman and Tian (2012) can thus be set forth as follows:

Proposition 14.4.1 (Coase Neutrality Theorem) In a pollution economy considered in the chapter, suppose that the transaction cost equals zero, and that the utility functions $U_{i}\left(x_{i}, h\right)$ are differentiable and such that $\partial U_{i} / \partial x_{i}>0$, and $\partial U_{1} / \partial h>0$, but $\partial U_{2} / \partial h<0$ for $\left(x_{i}, h\right) \in(0, \xi) \times(0, \eta), i=1,2$. Then,
the level of pollution is independent of the assignments of property rights if and only if the utility functions $U_{i}(x, y)$, up to a monotonic transformation, have a functional form given by

$$
\begin{equation*}
U_{i}\left(x_{i}, h\right)=x_{i} e^{\int \psi(h)}+\int e^{\int \psi(h) d h} b_{i}(h) d h, \tag{14.4.49}
\end{equation*}
$$

where $h$ and $b_{i}$ are arbitrary functions, such that the $U_{i}\left(x_{i}, h\right)$ are differentiable, $\partial U_{i} / \partial x_{i}>0$, and $\partial U_{1} / \partial h>0$, but $\partial U_{2} / \partial h<0$ for $\left(x_{i}, h\right) \in(0, \xi) \times(0, \eta)$, $i=1,2$.

Although the above Coase Neutrality Theorem includes quasilinear utility function as a special case, Hurwicz's insight on the limitations of the Coase Theorem remains valid. The Coase Theorem is more applicable to production externalities rather than consumption externalities.

It is important to fully comprehend the limitations of the Coase Theorem. One might think that, with clear property rights, free exchange, and voluntary cooperation, the market can operate efficiently without considering the preconditions of the Coase Theorem, and especially the following two basic prerequisites: (1) zero transaction cost; and (2) no income effect. In practice, costs of negotiation and organization, in general, are not negligible, and the income effect may not be zero. Thus, privatization is optimal only in case of zero transaction cost, no income effect, and perfectly competitive economic environments. However, in the real world, these conditions are often not satisfied. For example, the privatization of state-owned enterprises tends to be expensive, and much debate exists about how to privatize and who should receive a share or benefit. Indeed, if there is no corresponding system as the basis and the transaction cost is too large, then radical privatization may not be desirable.

Do clearly defined private property rights necessarily lead to the optimal allocation of resources, and is it impossible for other ownership forms? Tian $(2000,2001)$ showed that private ownership (resp. state ownership and collective ownership) may be (resp. relatively or constrainedly) efficient, depending on the development level of the underlying institutional environment. If an institutional environment is markedly underdeveloped, state and collective ownership could be sub-optimal (relatively more
efficient) compared to private ownership. Only when the market system is mature, and has a good governance, the private property right system can be efficient, or the private property rights system is (globally) optimal. Therefore, all three property rights systems may be (sub-)optimal, depending on the regularity of institutional environments. Therefore, instead of rapid privatization of state-owned enterprises, it is better to continuously improve the institutional environment and allow private enterprises to flourish. China's economic reform and opening-up over the past 40 years has fully demonstrated this point.

The problem of the Coase Efficiency Theorem is more serious. First, as Arrow (1979, p. 24) pointed out, the basic postulate underlying Coase's theory appears to be that the process of negotiation over property rights can be modelled as a cooperative game, and this requires the assumption that each player knows the preferences or production functions of each of the other individuals. When information is not complete or asymmetric, in general, it results in Pareto inefficient outcomes. For instance, when there is one polluter and there are many pollutees, a "free-rider" problem arises, and there is an incentive for pollutees to misrepresent their preferences. Irrespective of whether or not the polluter is liable, the pollutees may be expected to overstate the amount that they require to compensate for the externality. Thus, we may need to design an incentive compatible mechanism to solve the free-rider problem.

Secondly, even if the information is complete, there are several circumstances that have led a number of economists to question the conclusion in the Coase Efficiency Theorem:
(1) The economic core may be empty, and thus no Pareto optimum exists. An example of this for a three-agent economy was presented by Aivazian and Callen (1981).
(2) There may be a fundamental non-convexity that prevents a Pareto optimum from being supported by a competitive equilibrium. Starrettt (1972) showed that externalities are characterized by "fundamental non-convexities" that may preclude the existence of competitive equilibrium.
(3) When an agent possesses the right to pollute, there is a builtin incentive for extortion. As Andel (1966) pointed out, anyone with the right to pollute has an incentive to extract payment from potential pollutees, e.g., by threating to disrupt the peace of the pollutees by making loud noises in the middle of the night.
(4) Arrow (1979) argued that the Coase Theorem relies on a bargaining process and finally forms a cooperative game, which depends on the assumption of complete information. Obviously, in practice, the information is not complete and may lead to free-rider problems.

Thus, the hypothesis that negotiations over externalities will mimic trades in a competitive equilibrium is, as Coase himself conceded, not one that can be logically derived from his assumptions, but must be regarded as an empirical conjecture that may or may not be confirmed by the data. Consequently, room for much theoretical work remains in order to provide Coasian economics with rigorous underpinnings .

### 14.4.3 Missing Market

We can regard externality as a lack of a market for an "externality". For the above example of Pigovian taxes, a missing market is a market for pollution. Adding a market for firm 2 to express its demand for pollution or for a reduction of pollution - will provide a mechanism for efficient allocations. By adding this market, firm 1 can decide how much pollution it wants to sell, and firm 2 can decide how much pollution it wants to purchase.

Let $r$ be the price of abatement of pollution.
$x_{1}=$ the units of pollution that firm 1 wants to produce;
$x_{2}=$ the units of pollution that firm 2 wants topurchase.
Normalize the output of firm 1 to $x_{1}$.

The profit maximization problems become:

$$
\begin{aligned}
& \pi_{1}=p_{x} x_{1}-r x_{1}-c_{1}\left(x_{1}\right), \\
& \pi_{2}=p_{y} y+r x_{2}-e_{2}\left(x_{2}\right)-c_{y}(y) .
\end{aligned}
$$

The FOCs are given by:

$$
\begin{aligned}
& p_{x}-r=c_{1}^{\prime}\left(x_{1}\right) \text { for Firm 1, } \\
& p_{y}=c_{y}^{\prime}(y) \quad \text { for Firm 2, } \\
& r=e^{\prime}\left(x_{2}\right) \quad \text { for Firm 2. }
\end{aligned}
$$

At market equilibrium, $x_{1}^{*}=x_{2}^{*}=x^{*}$, we have

$$
\begin{equation*}
p_{x}=c_{1}^{\prime}\left(x^{*}\right)+e^{\prime}\left(x^{*}\right) \tag{14.4.50}
\end{equation*}
$$

which results in a socially optimal outcome.
In this model, we assume that the price of abatement of pollution is taken as given for all firms. When the number of firms is small, this assumption is not necessarily true, and thus may still result in an inefficient pollution level. Then, in the real world, the method of auctioning pollution rights is used to greatly increase competition.

The basic idea of this model has been utilized to deal with a large number of externalities in practice, and has established a warrants market for the consumption and production of numerous externality-producing goods. In addition to establishing a market for pollution rights transactions, it is also widely applied in establishing license trading markets for many externality-producing goods such as radio frequency spectra. As an application, we will discuss this issue by considering emissions trading in the end of this chapter.

### 14.4.4 The Compensation Mechanism

In general, Pigovian taxes were not adequate to solve externality problems due to incomplete information: the tax authority cannot know the cost induced by the externality. How then can one solve this incomplete infor-
mation problem?
Varian (1994) proposed an incentive mechanism which encourages firm$s$ to correctly reveal the costs that they impose on others. Here, we discuss this mechanism. In brief, a mechanism consists of a message space and an outcome function (rules of game). We will introduce in detail mechanism design theory in Part VI. Varian's incentive mechanism allows firms to form a Pareto efficient tax rate through a game. The regulatory department does not know the individual's information, and thus it is necessary to induce individuals' information about their economic characteristics to implement efficient tax rates $t_{1}$ and $t_{2}$ through an incentive compatible mechanism.

Varian's mechanism is designed in a way that firms proposes a tax rate for each other. If the tax rates set by the two parties are different, they then will be punished. The mechanism proposed by Varian is divided into two stages. In the first stage, firms independently propose tax rates for each other, which captures the idea of competitive markets, and no firm can control the tax rate imposed on itself. If one can determine its tax rate, then rent-seeking occurs. In the second stage, the mechanism designer distributes interests according to the information of both parties. Finally, the individuals make the decision of production and output according to the rules determined by the mechanism, and the equilibrium outcome is Pareto efficient.

Strategy Space (Message Space): $M=M_{1} \times M_{2}$ with $M_{i}=\left\{\left(t_{i}, x_{i}\right)\right\}$, $i=1,2$, where $t_{1}$ is interpreted as a Pigovian tax proposed by firm 1 and $x_{1}$ is the proposed level of output by firm 1 , and $t_{2}$ is interpreted as a Pigovian tax proposed by firm 2 and $y_{2}$ is the proposed level of output by firm 2.

The mechanism has two stages:
Stage 1 (Announcement stage): Firms 1 and 2 name Pigovian tax rates respectively, $t_{i}, i=1,2$, which may or may not be the efficient level of such a tax rate.

Stage 2 (Choice stage): If firm 1 produces $x$ units of pollution, firm 1 must pay $t_{2} x$ to firm 2. Thus, each firm takes the tax rate as given. Firm 2 receives $t_{1} x$ units as compensation. Each firm pays a penalty, $\left(t_{1}-t_{2}\right)^{2}$, if they announce different tax rates.

Thus, the payoffs of the two firms are:

$$
\begin{aligned}
& \pi_{1}^{*}=\max _{x} p_{x} x-c_{x}(x)-t_{2} x-\left(t_{1}-t_{2}\right)^{2} \\
& \pi_{2}^{*}=\max _{y} p_{y} y-c_{y}(y)+t_{1} x-e(x)-\left(t_{1}-t_{2}\right)^{2}
\end{aligned}
$$

Since this is a two-stage game, we may use the subgame perfect equilibrium, i.e., an equilibrium in which each firm takes into account the repercussions of its first-stage choice on the outcomes in the second stage. As usual, we solve this game by looking at stage 2 first.

At stage 2, firm 1 will choose $x\left(t_{2}\right)$ to satisfy the FOC:

$$
\begin{equation*}
p_{x}-c_{x}^{\prime}(x)-t_{2}=0 . \tag{14.4.51}
\end{equation*}
$$

Note that, by the convexity of $c_{x}$, i.e., $c_{x} 0(x)>0$, we have

$$
\begin{equation*}
x^{\prime}\left(t_{2}\right)=-\frac{1}{c 0_{x}(x)}<0 . \tag{14.4.52}
\end{equation*}
$$

Firm 2 will choose $y$ to satisfy $p_{y}=c_{y}^{\prime}(y)$.
Stage 1: Each firm will choose the tax rates $t_{1}$ and $t_{2}$ to maximize their payoffs.

For Firm 1,

$$
\begin{equation*}
\max _{t_{1}} p_{x} x-c_{x}(x)-t_{2} x\left(t_{2}\right)-\left(t_{1}-t_{2}\right)^{2}, \tag{14.4.53}
\end{equation*}
$$

which leads to the following FOC:

$$
2\left(t_{1}-t_{2}\right)=0,
$$

and thus

$$
\begin{equation*}
t_{1}^{*}=t_{2} \tag{14.4.54}
\end{equation*}
$$

For Firm 2,

$$
\begin{equation*}
\max _{t_{2}} p_{y} y-c_{y}(y)+t_{1} x\left(t_{2}\right)-e\left(x\left(t_{2}\right)\right)-\left(t_{1}-t_{2}\right)^{2} \tag{14.4.55}
\end{equation*}
$$

so that the FOC is

$$
t_{1} x^{\prime}\left(t_{2}\right)-e^{\prime}\left(x\left(t_{2}\right)\right) x^{\prime}\left(t_{2}\right)+2\left(t_{1}-t_{2}\right)=0
$$

and then we have

$$
\begin{equation*}
\left[t_{1}-e^{\prime}\left(x\left(t_{2}\right)\right)\right] x^{\prime}\left(t_{2}\right)+2\left(t_{1}-t_{2}\right)=0 . \tag{14.4.56}
\end{equation*}
$$

By (14.4.52), (14.4.54) and (14.4.56), we get

$$
\begin{equation*}
t^{*}=e^{\prime}\left(x\left(t^{*}\right)\right) \text { with } \quad t^{*}=t_{1}^{*}=t_{2}^{*} \tag{14.4.57}
\end{equation*}
$$

Substituting the equilibrium tax rate, $t^{*}=e^{\prime}\left(x\left(t^{*}\right)\right)$, into (14.4.51), we obtain

$$
\begin{equation*}
p_{x}=c_{x}^{\prime}\left(x^{*}\right)+e^{\prime}\left(x^{*}\right), \tag{14.4.58}
\end{equation*}
$$

which is the condition for social efficiency of production.
Remark 14.4.1 This mechanism works by setting opposing incentives for two agents. Firm 1 always has an incentive to match the announcement of firm 2. However, consider firm 2's incentive. If firm 2 thinks that firm 1 will propose a large compensation rate $t_{1}$ for it, it wants firm 1 to be taxed as little as possible so that firm 1 will produce as much as possible. On the other hand, if firm 2 thinks that firm 1 will propose a small $t_{1}$, it wants firm 1 to be taxed as much as possible. Thus, the only point where firm 2 is indifferent about the level of production of firm 1 is where firm 2 is exactly compensated for the externality cost.

In general, individuals' personal goals are different from certain social goal. However, we may be able to design an incentive-compatible mechanism so that individuals' personal goals are consistent with the social goal. Tian (2003) also gave the solution to consumption externalities by providing the incentive mechanism that results in Pareto efficient allocations. Tian (2004) studied the informational efficiency problem of the mechanisms that result in Pareto efficient allocations in the presence of consumption externalities.

### 14.5 Emissions Trading and Efficient Allocation of Pollution Rights

This section deals with emissions trading. Emissions trading is also called cap and trade (CAT), which is a market-based approach to controlling pollution by providing economic incentives for achieving reductions in the emissions of pollutants. In contrast to command-and-control environmental regulations, such as best available technology (BAT) standards and government subsidies, emissions trading programs are a type of flexible environmental regulation that allows organizations to decide how best to meet policy targets.

We will discuss the governance of pollution and focus on how to achieve efficient allocations of pollution rights through markets, so that pollution can be efficiently controlled. In the 1990s, some European and American countries established emission permit markets for pollutants and achieved relative success. Their application has also been gradually extended to other countries. This section focuses on the intrinsic mechanism, efficiency, and possible limitations of the emissions trading market. The discussion in this section refers to the analysis of emissions trading markets by Leach (2004) and Newell and Stavins (2003).

An important issue regarding pollution charges and emission caps is information. Since the government does not have the information on technology of firms, discharge of pollutants usually do not reach the level of Pigovian tax, nor can it achieve the most efficient level of pollution abatement. In addition, in environmental pollution, the negotiations between firms and residents are faced with excessive transaction costs, such as free-rider problems, and thus cannot achieve efficient pollution control. However, cap-and-trade can usually reduce information requirements and transaction costs through market mechanisms.

Below is a simple example to discuss the efficiency of the emission rights market.

Consider an economy with two firms. There is no externality between the two firms, and they may discharge pollutants. Without control, firm $i$ will produce pollution of $\bar{e}$. Let $a_{i}$ denote the volume of emission abate-
ment. Assume that the cost of emission abatement is $C_{i}=c_{i} \frac{a_{i}^{2}}{2}$. The two firms have different costs of emission reduction. Suppose that $c_{1}<c_{2}$, the total social emission regulated by the government is $2 \hat{e}$, and the emission cap for every firm is $\hat{e}<\bar{e}$.

### 14.5.1 Emission Reduction without Trading Market

If the emission rights of two firms cannot be exchanged, then the mission abatement cost for firm $i$ is $C_{i}=c_{i} \frac{(\bar{e}-\hat{e})^{2}}{2}$, and the total cost of emission abatement is $\left(c_{1}+c_{2}\right) \frac{(\bar{e}-\hat{e})^{2}}{2}$. The marginal costs of emission abatements for firm 1 and firm 2 are $c_{1}(\bar{e}-\hat{e})$ and $c_{2}(\bar{e}-\hat{e})$, respectively. Since two firms' marginal costs of emission abatement are different, the total cost of social emission abatement is not minimized. If firm 2 transfers 1 unit of emission rights to firm 1, the social emission abatement cost is reduced by $\left(c_{2}-c_{1}\right)(\bar{e}-\hat{e})$. The establishment of an emission rights market will reduce the total cost of emission abatement without affecting total emissions.

### 14.5.2 Emissions Trading

Below, we discuss market equilibrium under emissions trading. Assume that the emissions trading market is competitive, and the number of firm $i$ is a continuum. The total number of firms in each category is standardized to 1 .

For firm $i$, the optimization problem is as follows:

$$
\begin{array}{ll} 
& \min _{a_{1}} c_{1} \frac{a_{1}^{2}}{2}+p\left(\bar{e}-\hat{e}-a_{1}\right) \\
\text { s.t. } & a_{1} \leqq \bar{e}, \tag{14.5.60}
\end{array}
$$

where $a_{1}$ is the actual emission abatement by firm 1 , and $p$ is the price of emission rights. The emission abatement needed for firm 1 is $\bar{e}-\hat{e}$. If the actual emission abatement is $a_{1}<\bar{e}-\hat{e}$, firm 1 needs to purchase $\bar{e}-\hat{e}-a_{1}$ of emission rights. If its actual emission abatement is $a_{1}>\bar{e}-\hat{e}$, firm 1 can supply $-\left(\bar{e}-\hat{e}-a_{1}\right)$ of emission rights. Therefore, the objective function for firm 1 is to minimize the pollution cost under emission cap $\hat{e}$.

Condition (14.5.60) represents that the highest possible abatement of emissions by firm 1 will not exceed the pollution that it produces.

So, the optimal decision of firm 1 is

$$
a_{1}= \begin{cases}\frac{p}{c_{1}}, & \text { if } p<c_{1} \bar{e},  \tag{14.5.61}\\ \bar{e}, & \text { otherwise }\end{cases}
$$

The demand of emission rights for firm 1 is denoted as $d_{1}(p)=\bar{e}-\hat{e}-a_{1}$. Here, we see supply as a negative demand. By (14.5.61), we obtain

$$
d_{1}(p)= \begin{cases}\bar{e}-\hat{e}-\frac{p}{c_{1}}, & \text { if } p<c_{1} \bar{e}  \tag{14.5.62}\\ -\hat{e}, & \text { otherwise }\end{cases}
$$

Similarly, we can get the demand of emission rights for firm $2, d_{2}(p)$.
When $d_{1}(p)+d_{2}(p)=0$, the emission rights market reaches an equilibrium, and there are two possible equilibria.
(1) Equilibrium 1: firm 1 reserves a part of emission rights. That is, $a_{1}<\bar{e}$.

The market clears and satisfies

$$
2(\bar{e}-\hat{e})-\left[\frac{p}{c_{1}}+\frac{p}{c_{2}}\right]=0
$$

the equilibrium price is

$$
\begin{equation*}
p=2(\bar{e}-\hat{e})\left[\frac{1}{c_{1}}+\frac{1}{c_{2}}\right]^{-1}, \tag{14.5.63}
\end{equation*}
$$

and satisfies

$$
p<c_{1} \bar{e}
$$

Substituting the equation (14.5.63) into the above equation yields

$$
\hat{e}>\bar{e} \frac{c_{2}-c_{1}}{2 c_{2}} .
$$

In other words, if firm 1's cap is sufficiently large, then the firm will retain

### 14.5. EMISSIONS TRADING AND EFFICIENT ALLOCATION OF POLLUTION RIGHTS697

part of the emission rights. In this equilibrium, emissions trading is

$$
\begin{equation*}
-d_{1}=d_{2}=(\bar{e}-\hat{e}) \frac{c_{2}-c_{1}}{c_{1}+c_{2}} . \tag{14.5.64}
\end{equation*}
$$

From the formula (14.5.64), we can see that the greater is the difference in the emissions technologies of the two firms, the greater is the scale of the emissions trading. Through emissions trading, the social emission abatement costs can be minimized. In equilibrium, the emission abatement cost of the society is

$$
C_{1}+C_{2}=2(\bar{e}-\hat{e})^{2}\left[\frac{1}{c_{1}}+\frac{1}{c_{2}}\right]^{-1}<(\bar{e}-\hat{e})^{2} \frac{c_{1}+c_{2}}{2} .
$$

(2) Equilibrium 2: firm 1 sells all emission rights.

The market clears and satisfies

$$
\bar{e}-2 \hat{e}-\frac{p}{c_{2}}=0
$$

the equilibrium price is

$$
p=c_{2}(\bar{e}-2 \hat{e}),
$$

and satisfies

$$
p>c_{1} \bar{e},
$$

obtaining

$$
\hat{e}<\bar{e} \frac{c_{2}-c_{1}}{2 c_{2}} .
$$

The volume of emissions trading is

$$
-d_{1}=d_{2}=\hat{e} .
$$

The total social emission abatement cost is

$$
\frac{c_{1}}{2}(\bar{e})^{2}+\frac{c_{2}}{2}(\bar{e}-2 \hat{e})^{2}<(\bar{e}-\hat{e})^{2} \frac{c_{1}+c_{2}}{2} .
$$

In the emissions trading market, when firms have different technologies in emission abatement, the transaction will allow them to remain the same regarding the marginal cost of emission abatement, resulting in efficient al-
location of pollution rights. In addition, in the case of an emission rights market, firms will also have greater incentives in the innovation of emission abatement technologies. This is because market transactions can make the benefits of emission abatement innovations greater, rather than merely lower their own emission abatement costs. Many studies have found that, through market transactions, emission abatement costs of the society can be markedly conserved. For example, a study on sulfur dioxide emissions trading among electric utilities by Carlson et al. (2000) demonstrated that emissions trading could lower abatement cost curves for the U.S. power industry by over $50 \%$ since 1985 , as opposed to the command-and-control approach (requiring a uniform emission rate standard), and the trading can reduce annual abatement costs by 700 million $\sim 800$ million dollars.

However, the operation of the emission rights market will also have its costs. For instance, what would be the optimal way to allocate emission rights among firms and for new participants? Of course, an established way to deal with the distribution of emission rights is by auction. However, setting up an auction market among different pollutants presents a major challenge because, in some industries, there may be intrinsic links among different pollutants. Joskow et al. (1998) studied transaction cost$s$ in the operation of an emission rights market, and discussed the impact of auctions on the price of emission rights in the sulfur dioxide emission rights market in the U.S. context.

In addition, the allocation of emission rights may lead to rent-seeking and social risks. Different firms may have dissimilar borrowing capabilities, and may suffer from efficiency losses in auctions and market trading. Moreover, for many developing countries, the supervision of emissions has long been problematic. If pollution discharge cannot be efficiently monitored, then the market for emission rights will inevitably lack clear property rights. Stavins (1995) discussed the impact of transaction costs of emission rights on pollution control efficiency. In addition, Tietenberg (1995) discussed the spatial allocation of emission rights. For more information on the emissions trading market, readers can refer to Gayer and Horowitz (2005). They discussed in detail some of the important theoretical and practical issues involved in the emissions trading market.

### 14.6 Biographies

### 14.6.1 Arthur Pigou

Arthur Cecil Pigou (1877-1959) was a British economist, and one of the leading representatives of the Cambridge School. Pigou was born into a military family in England and was admitted to the University of Cambridge, where he first studied history. Later, he changed his focus to economics under the influence of Marshall. In 1908, Pigou became a Professor of Political Economy at the University of Cambridge in succession to Alfred Marshall, and held the post until 1943. Pigou inherited Marshall's academic tradition and analytical framework to a large extent. In addition, he also served as a Fellow of the Royal Society, Honorary President of the International Economic Association, a member of the Cunliffe Committee on the Currency and Foreign Exchange, and a member of the Royal Commission on Income Tax. He proposed the concept of "economic welfare" in his representative works The Economics of Welfare, Industrial Fluctuations and $A$ Study in Public Finance. He advocated the equalization of national income and established the cardinal utility theory. Pigou was the first to systematically study externality from the perspective of welfare economics. Based on the concept of "external economy" put forward by Marshall, he expanded the concept and content of "external diseconomy". This expansion turned from the effect of external factors on business to the impact of business or residents on other businesses or residents.

The Economics of Welfare published in 1920 was Pigou's most famous representative work. This textbook systemized welfare economics, and marked the establishment of Pigou's complete theoretical system. Its interpretation of welfare economics has long been regarded as "classic", and therefore Pigou was also known as the "father of welfare economics". Pigou believed that the purpose of this textbook was to study the important factors that affect economic welfare in real life. The entire book was centered on how to increase social welfare. Pigou proposed the so-called Pigovian tax, which advocates subsidies for activities that have positive externalities.

Pigou contributed an important model of neoclassical thought. In fact , Keynes criticized Pigou as a representative of the full employment perspective in the neoclassical school. Pigou replied to this criticism by stating that Keynes' The General Theory of Employment, Interest, and Money was a mixture of incorrect ideas. In his response to Keynes, Pigou attempted to restore the position of neoclassical employment theory through a logically complete demonstration, under the classical assumption about wages and price elasticity.

### 14.6.2 Ronald Coase

Ronald Harry Coase (1910-2013) was the originator of the new institutional economics, founder of property rights theory, and a representative of the Chicago School of Economics. He was awarded the 1991 Nobel Memorial Prize in Economic Sciences for his discovery and analysis of the role of transaction costs and property rights in institutional structure and operation.

Coase was born on 29 December 1910 in a small town, named Willesden, outside of London. In his childhood, Coase had to wear leg-irons to help support his legs. Due to physical limitations, young Coase had to attend a school for the physically disabled. Through his own unremitting efforts, Coase successfully entered the London School of Economics and obtained a Bachelor of Commerce degree at the age of 22. After six years of teaching at this school, Coase received a doctoral degree from the University of London in 1951. He then came to the U.S. and taught at the University of Buffalo and the University of Virginia. Subsequently, he became a professor at the University of Chicago.

Coase only wrote a few papers in his life. The most famous of these were "The Nature of the Firm" published in 1937 and "The Problem of Social Cost" published in 1960. These two papers are probably the most widely cited works in all economics literature. Although he seldom used mathematics, his articles were logically clear. He introduced and adopted the concept of transaction costs and clarified property rights to investigate the boundaries and externalities of the firm. He introduced the institution
and the firm into mainstream economics, which had previously focused on interpreting how the market price system works. He demonstrated the relationship of the firm, property rights, contracts, and markets, as well as the important role of these factors in economic development. His economic ideas were profound, and had a far-reaching influence on the development of modern economics. Indeed, various subfields of economics, such as the economics of property rights, information economics, mechanism design theory, contract theory, and transition economics, have all been greatly influenced by Coase's ideas.

In his paper, entitled "The Nature of the Firm", he explained how the firm was formed from a distinctive perspective. This paper was later widely considered as having a paradigm-changing effect on economics. From the perspective of "transaction costs" , Coase provided reasons for how firms emerged. Coase believed that there were costs in market transactions. These costs include bargaining, costs of contracts formation and implementation, and time costs. Coase also asserted that when market transaction costs are higher than coordination costs within the firm, then the firm emerges. The existence of the firm occurs to save market transaction costs by replacing higher-cost market transactions with lower-cost intra-firm transactions. This distinctive research perspective is still heralded by the economics community.

Coase's research seldom involves mathematics. In his seminal 1960 paper "The Problem of Social Cost", he used a written discourse to deal with the economic problem of externalities, and to demonstrate the definition of property rights and the importance of property rights arrangement in economic transactions. George Joseph Stigler (1911-1991), winner of the 1982 Nobel Prize in Economics, further classified Coase's theory as " under perfect competition, private and social costs will be equal" , and eventually formed the well-known "Coase Theorem" . The importance of the Coase Theorem lies in the revelation that, apart from price, property rights arrangement and transaction costs have a major impact on institutional arrangements. The Coase Theorem is divided into two parts. As long as the transaction cost is zero and the property rights are clearly defined: (1) the level of the externality will be the same, regardless of the assignment
of property rights, known as the Coase Neutrality Theorem; and (2) with voluntary exchanges and voluntary negotiations, clearly defined property rights will lead to efficient allocation of resources. In other words, with market mechanisms, through voluntary trading and negotiations, contractual arrangements that achieve the best interests of all individuals can be determined. This conclusion is called the Coase Efficiency Theorem. Coase further argued that, even if there are transaction costs, the parties involved in the interaction will find a less costly institutional arrangement through the contract when the property rights are clearly defined.

Coase's economic theory and his insights have spread widely in China, which has always been in the process of economic reforms, making him one of the most cited contemporary economists among Chinese economists. Coase also enjoyed a remarkably long life, and passed away at the age of 102.

### 14.7 Exercises

Exercise 14.1 There is an orchard next to an apiary. The orchard produces fruit, and the apiary supplies honey. The flowers of the fruit tree provide honeybees with nectar, and the bees promote pollen transmission. Suppose that the price of fruit is $\$ 2$ per unit, and the price of honey is $\$ 8$ per unit. Let $H$ be the output of honey, and $A$ be the yield of fruit. The orchard's cost function is $C_{A}(A, H)=A^{2} / 2-6 H$, and the apiary's cost function is $C_{H}(A, H)=H^{2} / 2-3 A$.

1. If the orchard and the apiary make independent decisions, what is the output of fruit and honey, respectively?
2. If the orchard and the apiary merge, what is the output of fruit and honey, respectively?
3. Do the markets for fruit and honey result in Pareto efficient allocations? Why?

Exercise 14.2 Consider an economy with two goods and two consumers. The utility functions of the two consumers are

$$
\begin{gathered}
u_{1}(\boldsymbol{x})=0.5 \ln \left(x_{1}^{1}+x_{2}^{1}\right)+0.5 \ln x_{1}^{2}, \\
u_{2}(\boldsymbol{x})=0.5 \ln x_{2}^{1}+0.5 \ln x_{2}^{2} .
\end{gathered}
$$

Their consumption spaces $Z_{i}=\mathcal{R}_{+}^{2}, i=1,2$, and the initial endowments are $\boldsymbol{w}_{1}=(1,2)$ and $\boldsymbol{w}_{2}=(2,1)$.

1. Solve for Pareto efficient allocations and competitive equilibria.
2. Is a competitive equilibrium allocation Pareto efficient? Why?

Exercise 14.3 Consider a pure exchange economy with two goods and two consumers. The first good is "music", and the second good is "bread". The consumption space is $X_{i}=\mathcal{R}_{+}^{2}, i=1,2$. The aggregate initial endowment is ( $w_{m}, w_{b}$ ). The utility functions of the two consumers are

$$
\begin{aligned}
& u_{1}\left(m_{1}, b_{1}\right)=m_{1}^{3 / 5} b_{1}^{2 / 5}-k_{1}, \\
& u_{2}\left(m_{2}, b_{2}\right)=m_{2}^{3 / 5} b_{2}^{2 / 5}-k_{2},
\end{aligned}
$$

in which $m_{1}$ and $m_{2}$ are music consumptions, and $b_{1}$ and $b_{2}$ are bread consumptions of consumer 1 and 2 , respectively, and $k_{1}$ and $k_{2}$ are constant parameters.

1. What is the set of Pareto optimal allocations?
2. Suppose that the initial endowments of consumers 1 and 2 are $\boldsymbol{w}_{1}=$ $(3 / 2,1 / 2)$ and $\boldsymbol{w}_{2}=(1 / 2,3 / 2)$. Solve for the competitive equilibrium.
3. Verify whether the equilibrium allocation in question 2 is Pareto optimal.
4. Now, suppose that the consumers' utility functions change to

$$
\begin{aligned}
& \widehat{u}_{1}\left(m_{1}, m_{2}, b_{1}\right)=m_{1}^{3 / 5} b_{1}^{2 / 5}-m_{2}, \\
& \widehat{u}_{2}\left(m_{1}, m_{2}, b_{2}\right)=m_{2}^{3 / 5} b_{2}^{2 / 5}-m_{1} .
\end{aligned}
$$

One explanation to the above utility functions is that, while one person's consumption of music increases her own utility, it also interferes with the quiet environment of the other, thereby reducing the utility of the other.
(a) What is the critical value $\bar{w}^{m}$ of the aggregate initial endowment, such that exhaustion of resources beyond the critical value will result in Pareto inefficient allocation?
(b) What is the set of interior-point Pareto efficient allocations? (Discuss two situations: $w^{m} \leqq \bar{w}^{m}$ and $w^{m}>\bar{w}^{m}$ ). Compare the result with that in question 1 above.
(c) Suppose that $\boldsymbol{w}_{1}=(3 / 2,1 / 2)$ and $\boldsymbol{w}_{2}=(1 / 2,3 / 2)$. Solve for the competitive equilibrium. Is the competitive allocation Pareto optimal?

Exercise 14.4 Consider the pure exchange economy of two commodities and two consumers. The consumption space is $X_{i}=\mathcal{R}_{+}^{2}, i=1,2$, and the aggregate endowment is given by $\left(w_{x}, w_{y}\right)$, where $x$ and $y$ represent two commodities. The utility functions of the two consumers are

$$
\begin{aligned}
& u_{1}\left(x_{1}, y_{1}\right)=x_{1}^{0.3} y_{1}^{0.7}-x_{2}, \\
& u_{2}\left(x_{2}, y_{2}\right)=x_{2}^{0.3} y_{2}^{0.7}-x_{1} .
\end{aligned}
$$

1. Solve for $\bar{w}_{x}$, such that if $w_{x}>\bar{w}_{x}$, any attainable (balanced) allocation is not Pareto efficient.
2. Solve for interior-point Pareto efficient allocations.
3. Suppose that $\boldsymbol{w}_{1}=(2,1), \boldsymbol{w}_{2}=(1,2)$, and solve for competitive equilibrium. Is the competitive allocation Pareto efficient? Why?

Exercise 14.5 Consider the economy of two commodities and two consumers. The consumption space is $X_{i}=\mathcal{R}_{+}^{2}, i=1,2$. Commodity $m$ represents all commodities that can be purchased with money. Commodity $n$ characterizes all commodities that cannot be purchased with money, such as
freedom and family life. In other words, commodity $m$ represents the composite of all goods that can be included in GDP, while commodity $n$ cannot. The utility function of consumer $i$ is:

$$
u_{i}\left(m_{i}, n_{i}, m_{j}\right)=m_{i}^{\alpha} n_{i}^{1-\alpha}-\beta m_{j}, \quad 0<\alpha<1, \beta>0 .
$$

1. Prove that if the total endowment of $m$ exceeds a certain amount, there must be some free disposal in $m$ (i.e., $m$ cannot be exhausted completely) in reaching Pareto optimal allocations.
2. Solve for Pareto efficient allocations.
3. Do you think that the conclusion of this question can explain the following paradox: The individual's happiness index may not increase with the country's wealth?

Exercise 14.6 Consider the economy of $n$ consumers. Each consumer $i$ chooses an action $h_{i} \in R_{+}$and her utility function is $\phi_{i}\left(h_{i}, \sum_{i} h_{i}\right)+w_{i}$. Suppose that $\phi_{i}(\cdot)$ is strictly concave. $w_{i}$ is her initial endowment.

1. Characterize Pareto optimal actions $h_{1}, \cdots, h_{n}$.
2. Characterize Nash equilibrium on actions.
3. Compare the Pareto efficient outcome with the Nash equilibrium outcome. What kind of tax rate can result in Pareto optimal outcomes?

Exercise 14.7 There is a common grazing land in a mountain village where villagers can herd sheep. The cost of raising each sheep is 4 . The total revenue of raising sheep on this grazing land is $f(x)=20 x-3 x^{2} / 2$, where $x$ denotes the number of sheep.

1. Prove that free grazing does not maximize the total welfare of the grazing land.
2. The government now decides that a license is necessary for raising sheep. How should the government decide on the price of the license in order to maximize its revenue?

Exercise 14.8 Two persons have to decide separately how fast they should drive an automobile. Individual $i$ chooses driving speed $x_{i}$ to obtain the u tility of $u_{i}\left(x_{i}\right)$ and $u_{i}^{\prime}\left(x_{i}\right)>0$. However, the faster the automobile, the more likely there will be an automobile accident. Let $P\left(x_{1}, x_{2}\right)$ be the probability of an accident, and it is an increasing function of $x_{1}$ and $x_{2}$. Let $c_{i}>0$ be the cost to individual $i$ in the event of an accident. Each person's utility is linear with regard to currency.

1. Prove that the individual's choice of driving speed is faster than the requirement for social welfare maximization.
2. If the penalty for individual $i$ was $t_{i}$ in the event of an accident, solve for the $t_{i}$ that can internalize the externality.
3. Now, suppose that the utility of individual $i$ changes to 0 in the event of an accident. Find the penalty for the internalization of the externality.

Exercise 14.9 A manufacturer's cost function $c(q, h)$ is differentiable and strictly convex, $q \geqq 0$ is its output level, and $h$ is the negative externality level of production. This externality affects the consumer, whose indirect utility function is $\phi(h)+w$, where $\phi(h)$ is differentiable and satisfies $\phi^{\prime}(h)<$ 0.

1. Derive the first-order conditions in which the manufacturer chooses $q$ and $h$.
2. Derive the Pareto-optimal first-order conditions of $q$ and $h$.
3. Suppose that the government imposes a tax on the producer's output. Prove that it cannot achieve Pareto optimality.
4. Suppose that the government directly levies taxes on the externality, and prove that this approach can achieve Pareto optimality.
5. Suppose that $h=\gamma q$ is constant for $\gamma>0$. Prove that taxation on production can achieve Pareto optimality.

Exercise $\mathbf{1 4 . 1 0}$ (Tragedy of the Commons) Fishermen can fish freely in a lake. The cost of a fishing boat is $c>0$. When there are $b$ fishing boats in the lake, a total of $f(b)$ fish are captured. The fishing amount for each fishing boat is $f(b) / b$. For $b \geqq 0$, we have $f^{\prime}(b)>0$ and $f 0(b)<0$. The price of fish is $p>0$ per unit.

1. Solve for the equilibrium quantity of boats.
2. Solve for the Pareto optimal quantity of fishing boats, and prove that it is less than the equilibrium quantity.
3. What kind of fishing tax should be imposed on fishing boats to achieve the Pareto optimal quantity?
4. Suppose that the lake belongs to someone. How does the owner choose the number of fishing boats?

Exercise 14.11 Consider an economy with two consumers, $A$ and $B$, and two commodities, 1 and 2. $y_{i}^{j}$ represents individual $i$ 's consumption of the commodity $j$, and $I_{i}$ represents the individual's income level. The prices of the two commodities are $p^{1}$ and $p^{2}$, respectively. The utility function for consumer $A$ is $u_{A}\left(y_{A}^{1}, y_{A}^{2}, y_{B}^{2}\right)$, and the utility function for consumer $B$ is $u_{B}\left(y_{B}^{1}, y_{B}^{2}\right)$, which means that the consumption of good 2 by consumer $B$ has an externality to consumer $A$.

1. Write down the utility maximization problems of consumers, and determine the conditions that should be satisfied under an equilibrium allocation.
2. If $\partial u_{A} / \partial y_{B}<0$, is the equilibrium allocation Pareto efficient?
3. Now, suppose that a specific duty, denoted $t_{B}^{2}$, is levied on the consumption of commodity 2 by consumer $B$. What will happen to the utility maximization problem of consumer $B$ ?
4. Can the method of taxing restore the Pareto efficient allocation? Why?

Exercise 14.12 A local government proposes to implement a sewage tax system with a minimum discharge standard. Each firm is allowed to emit
a certain amount $\bar{h}$ of pollutants without being taxed, while those beyond $\bar{h}$ will be taxed.

1. Write down the objective function of the firm.
2. Explain why the system is not efficient, in general, and cannot encourage minimal-cost abatements, and under what circumstances the system is efficient.

Exercise 14.13 Consider the constant marginal abatement cost function of two firms:

$$
\begin{aligned}
& -C_{1}^{\prime}\left(h_{1}\right)=a, h_{1}<\hat{h}_{1} ; \\
& -C_{2}^{\prime}\left(h_{2}\right)=b, h_{2}<\hat{h}_{2} .
\end{aligned}
$$

1. When the damage function of pollution is convex and linear, find socially optimal emissions of the two firms.
2. Under these circumstances, is it possible to use economic incentive policy tools to achieve the socially optimal allocation?

Exercise 14.14 (Macho-Stadler and Pérez-Castrillo, 2006) Under the linear sewage tax rate and incomplete supervision, a firm decides to report its emissions of $z$, while its actual emissions are $h$. The linear tax rate is $\tau$, and the firm pays a sewage fee of $z \tau$. The firm's return is a function of the actual amount of pollutants discharged, which is denoted by $g(h)$. When firms are not subject to any regulation, their emissions are $\bar{h}$, and $g^{\prime}(\bar{h})=0$. When $h \in[0, \bar{h}), g(h)$ is an increasing and concave function: $g^{\prime}(h)>0, g 0(h)<0$. The probability that a firm's real emissions are detected by environmental protection agencies is $\rho \in[0,1]$. A penalty to a firm that is found to make a false report is $\theta(h-z)$, and the penalty is a monotonically increasing and convex function of the difference between actual emissions and reported emissions: for $x>0, \theta^{\prime}(x)>0$ and $\theta 0(x)>0$. Since the penalty of unit false report should be higher than the tax rate, we assume $\theta^{\prime}(0)>\tau$.

1. How does the firm's optimal reported emissions and actual emissions change with the regulatory intensity $\rho$ ?
2. Does the increase of regulatory intensity for the firm that reports greater than zero emissions reduce its actual emissions?

Exercise 14.15 There is a chemical plant in the upper reaches of a river, and its production will cause pollution to two downstream fishermen. The chemical plant can spend $\$ 5,000$ to purchase equipment to avoid pollution. The pollution will result in losses of $\$ 2,500$ and $\$ 4,000$ for the two fishermen, respectively. The fishermen can purchase the decontamination unit alone or jointly for $\$ 6,000$ to eliminate the pollution.

1. Suppose that the property rights are not clearly defined, pollution has already occurred, and the two fishermen can negotiate. What is the result?
2. Suppose that the property rights are owned by the chemical plant, and the chemical plant and the two fishermen can negotiate. What is the result?
3. Now, suppose that the property rights belong to the two fishermen, and the chemical plant and the two fishermen can negotiate. What is the result?
4. Which result of the above three questions is Pareto efficient?
5. If the "tax-subsidy" mechanism is introduced, how should the regulator achieve a Pareto efficient outcome?

Exercise 14.16 (Coase Neutrality Theorem) The Coase Neutrality Theorem asserts that, as long as property rights are clearly defined, the equilibrium level of the externality will be the same, irrespective of the assignment of property rights. Consider the pure exchange economy of two types of commodities and two consumers. One commodity is "money", and both consumers desire it. The other commodity is "music" . Music consumption will increases one's own utility, while reducing the utility of the other.

1. What special assumptions about consumer preferences will lead to the Coase Neutrality Theorem? Demonstrate your claim in two situations concerning the definition of property rights: (a) a musician has
the right to play music without neighbors' approval; (b) a musician must be authorized by neighbors to play music. (In order to reach an agreement, one person can compensate another person.) Use a diagram to illustrate your answer.
2. Suppose that both have the Cobb-Douglas utility function. Does the argument of the Coase Neutrality Theorem still hold? Illustrate your answer with a diagram.

Exercise 14.17 The Coase Efficiency Theorem states the following: If property rights are clearly defined and transaction costs are zero, the negotiation of externalities will lead to Pareto optimal outcomes.

1. Prove that the assumption of quasilinear utility function is a sufficient condition for this theorem to hold.
2. Is the quasilinear utility function a necessary condition for the theorem to hold? If yes, give a proof; if not, give a counterexample.

Exercise 14.18 (Kolstad, 2000) Suppose that there are two polluting firms with hidden characteristics $\theta$. For both firms, $\theta$ does not have to be equal. Suppose that $\theta$ can take a value of 1 or 2 . The revenue of firm $i$ is $S_{i}\left(h_{i}, \theta_{i}\right)=$ $1-\frac{\left(1-\theta_{i} h_{i}\right)^{2}}{2 \theta_{i}}$. The damage resultant from pollution is $D\left(h_{1}+h_{2}\right)=\left(h_{1}+\right.$ $\left.h_{2}\right)^{2} / 2$.

1. Suppose that the regulator knows each firm's $\theta: \theta_{1}$ and $\theta_{2}$. For all possible combinations of $\theta_{1}$ and $\theta_{2}$, what is the socially optimal pollution for each firm: $h_{1}^{*}\left(\theta_{1}, \theta_{2}\right), h_{2}^{*}\left(\theta_{1}, \theta_{2}\right)$ ?
2. Now, suppose that the regulator does not know $\theta$, but asks each firm to report $\theta$. After receiving reports from each firm, each firm $i$ will be charged a fee of $T_{i}\left(h_{i}, \theta_{i}\right)$. This fee is based on the reported $\theta_{i}$ by firm $i$, the reported $\theta_{j}$ by firm $j$, and real emissions $h_{i}$ :

$$
T_{i}\left(h_{i}, \theta_{i}\right)=D\left[h_{i}+h_{j}^{*}\left(\theta_{1}, \theta_{2}\right)\right]-S_{j}\left[h_{j}^{*}\left(\theta_{1}, \theta_{2}\right), \theta_{j}\right] .
$$

Before firms report their $\theta$ values, all of above specifications are common knowledge. Prove that it is in the best interest of each firm to report the true $\theta$ and take the socially optimal pollution level $h^{*}$.

### 14.8 References

## Books and Monographs:

Kolstad, C. (2000), Environmental Economics, Oxford University Press.
Laffont, J. J. (1988). Fundamentals of Public Economics, Cambridge, MIT Press.

Leach, J. (2004). A Course in Public Economics, Cambridge University Press.

Luenberger, D. (1995). Microeconomic Theory, McGraw-Hill, Inc. , Chapter 9.

Mas-Colell, A., Whinston, M. D. and Green, J. (1995). Microeconomic Theory, Oxford University Press, Chapter 11.

Pigou, A. (1928). A Study in Public Finance, New York: Macmillan.
Polyamin, A.D., Zaitsev, V.F., and Moussiaux, A. (2002). Handbook of First Order Partial Differential Equations, Taylor \& Francis, London.

Salanie, B. (2000). Microeconomics of Market Failures, MIT Press, Chapter 6.

Varian, H. R. (1992). Microeconomic Analysis, Third Edition, W. W. Norton and Company, Chapter 24.

## Papers:

Aivazian, V. A. , and Callen, J. L. (1981). "The Coase Theorem and the Empty Core", The Journal of Law and Economics, Vol. 24, 175-181.

Andel, N. (1966). "Some Note on Equating Private and Social Cost: Comment" , Southern Economic Journal, Vol. 3, 112.

Arrow, K. J. (1969). "The Organization of Economic Activity: Issues Pertinent to the Choice of Market versus Non-market Allocation" , in: The Analysis and Evaluation of Public Expenditure: The PPB System, 3.

Arrow, K. J. (1979). "The Property Rights Doctrine and Demand Revelation under Incomplete Information" , in Michael J. Boskin (ed.), Economics and Human Welfare: Essays in Honor of Tibor Scitovsky, New York: Academic Press, 23-39.

Carlson, Curtis, Dallas Burtraw, Maureen Cropper, and Karen L. Palmer (2000). "Sulfur Dioxide Control by Electric Utilities: What Are the Gains from Trade?", Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 108, No. 6, 1292-1326.

Chipman, J. S. (1998). "A Close Look to the Coase Theorem", in The Economists' Vision: Essays in Modern Economic Perspectives, eds. by James Buchanan and Bettina Monissen, Frankfur/Mmain: Campus Verlag, 131-162.

Chipman, J. S., and Tian, G. (2012). "Detrimental Externalities, Pollution Rights, and the 'Coase Theorem' ", Economic Theory, Vol. 49, 309-327.

Coase, R. (1960). "The Problem of Social Cost", The Journal of Law and Economics, Vol. 3, 1-44.

Gayer, Ted and Horowitz, J. K. (2005). "Market-based Approaches to Environmental Regulation", Foundations and Trends in Microeconomics, Vol. 1, No. 4, 201-326.

Hurwicz, L. (1995). "What Is the Coase Theorem", Japan and the World Economy, Vol. 7, 49-74.

Joskow, P. L. , Schmalensee, R. and Bailey, E. M. (1998). "The Market for Sulfur Dioxide Emissions", American Economic Review, Vol. 88, No. 4, 669-685.

Macho-Stadler, Ines and David Perez-Castrillo (2006). "Optimal Enforcement Policy and Firms' Emissions and Compliance with Environmental Taxes", Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Vol. 51, Issue 1, 110-131.

Meng, D. and Tian, G. (2008). Nonlinear Pricing with Network Externalities and Countervailing Incentives, Texas A\&M University, website: http://econ. tamu. edu/tian/ paper. htm.

Newell, R. G. and Stavins, R. N. (2003). "Cost Heterogeneity and the Potential Savings from Market-Based Policies", Journal of Regulatory Economics, Vol. 23, No. 1, 43-59.

Ng, Y-K. (2004). "Optimal Environmental Charges/Taxes: Easy to Estimate and Surplus-Yielding" Environmental and Resource Economics, Vol. 28, 395-408.

Starrett, D. A. (1972). "Fundamental Non-convexities in the Theory of Externalities", Journal of Economic Theory, Vol. 4, 180-199.

Stavins, R. N. (1995). "Transaction Costs and Tradeable Permits" , Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Vol. 29, 133-148.

Tian, G. (2000). "Property Rights and the Nature of Chinese Collective Enterprises", Journal of Comparative Economics, Vol. 28, 247-268.

Tian, G. (2001). "A Theory of Ownership Arrangements and Smooth Transition to a Free Market Economy", Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics, Vol. 157, 380-412. (The Chinese version published in China Economic Quarterly, Vol. 1 (2001), 45-70. )

Tian, G. (2003). "A Solution to the Problem of Consumption Externalities", Journal of Mathematical Economics, Vol. 39, 831-847.

Tian, G. (2004). "A Unique Informationally Efficient Allocation Mechanism in Economies with Consumption Externalities" , International Economic Review, Vol. 45, 79-111.

Tian, G. and Yang, L. (2006). "A Solution to the Happiness-Income Puzzle: Theory and Evidence" , Economic Research Journal, Vol. 11, 4-15. (In Chinese)

Tian, G. and Yang, L. (2009). "Theory of Negative Consumption Externalities with Applications to Economics of Happiness" , Economic Theo$r y$, Vol. 39, 399-424.

Tian, G. and Yang, L. (2012). "Balanced Growth: A Potential Resolution to the Easterlin Paradox", Texas A\&M University, website: http:/ /econ. tamu. edu/tian/paper. htm.

Tietenberg, T. (1995). "Tradeable Permits for Pollution Control When Emission Location Matters: What Have We Learned?" , Environmental and Resource Economics, Vol. 5, 95-113.

Varian, H. R. (1994). "A Solution to the Problem of Externalities When Agents Are Well Informed", American Economic Review, Vol. 84, 12781293.

## Chapter 15

## Public Goods

### 15.1 Introduction

The previous chapter discusses resource allocations in economic environments with externalities. In the presence of externalities, the market may fail to achieve efficient allocation even under perfect competition and freedom of choice, and then some remedies need to be implemented. These measures include: Pigouvian tax, Coase's approach, building a market for emissions trading, and designing an incentive mechanism.

The presence of public goods is another significant situation that results in market failure. Once public goods are present in an economy, externalities, and thus market failure, may occur. It is well-known that financing a public project via voluntary donation is difficult. This is because public goods are essentially distinct from private goods. Two main differences are non-exclusivity and non-rivalry. A good is excludable if other individuals can be excluded from consuming it when an individual consumes it. A good is non-rival if one person's consumption does not reduce the amount available to other consumers.

A pure public good is a good in which consuming one unit of the good by an individual in no way prevents others from consuming the same unit of the good. Thus, the good is nonexcludable and non-rival. Examples of public goods include street lights, policemen, fire protection, highway systems, national defense, flood-control projects, public television and radio broadcasts, pub-
lic parks, public projects, etc. The purest public good is national defense. It protects all citizens of a nation from aggression.

Local Public Goods: when there is a location restriction for the provision of a public good.

The non-exclusivity of public goods may result in a free-rider problem. For example, individuals want to get benefits from, but do not want to contribute to, a public project. The inefficiency of state-owned enterprises also originated from the free-rider problem. These enterprises usually lack a proper incentive to make efforts, i.e., everyone wants to enjoy the efforts provided by others. Even if the competitive market is an efficient system for allocating private goods, it is not an efficient mechanism for allocating public goods.

There are three possible ways that might be used to solve this problem: (1) forming social norms and cultures of donation habits, although it is difficult to achieve in the short term, and the effect is limited; (2) remolding one's ideology by taking altruism and work as happiness, although the reality is cruel and it is ineffective, unless the genes that pursue personal interests are altered; and (3) in situations in which social norms and cultures, such as donation habits, are difficult to form in the short run and individuals' ideological consciousness cannot be markedly improved, incentive mechanism design shall be adopted by respecting the fact that individuals' ideological realm is limited as a constraint condition on a case-by-case basis. A comprehensive governance approach that combines incentive mechanism with social norms and regulations can better solve the free-rider problem in the presence of public goods.

### 15.2 Notations and Basic Settings

A general setting of a public goods economy includes consumers, producers, private goods, public goods, and economic characteristics of consumer$s$ and produces.

The following notations will be used in what follows:

- $n$ : the number of consumers.
- $L$ : the number of private goods.
- $K$ : the number of public goods.
- $Z_{i} \subseteq \mathcal{R}_{+}^{L} \times \mathcal{R}_{+}^{K}$ : the consumption space of consumer $i$.
- $Z \subseteq \mathcal{R}_{+}^{n L} \times \mathcal{R}_{+}^{K}$ : consumption space.
- $\boldsymbol{x}_{i} \in \mathcal{R}_{+}^{L}$ : a consumption of private goods by consumer $i$.
- $\boldsymbol{y} \in \mathcal{R}_{+}^{K}$ : a consumption/production of public goods.
- $\boldsymbol{w}_{i} \in \mathcal{R}_{+}^{L}$ : the initial endowment of private goods for consumer $i$. For simplicity, it is assumed that there is no public goods endowment, but they can be produced from private goods.
- $Y \subseteq \mathcal{R}^{L+K}$ : the set of production possibilities of the firm. For simplicity, we assume that there is only one firm to produce the public goods.
- $(\boldsymbol{y},-\boldsymbol{v}) \in Y$ : a production plan, where $\boldsymbol{v} \in \mathcal{R}_{+}^{L}$ is the vector of private goods input.
- $f: \mathcal{R}_{+}^{L} \rightarrow \mathcal{R}_{+}^{K}$ : production function with $\boldsymbol{y}=f(\boldsymbol{v})$.
- $\theta_{i}$ : the profit share of consumer $i$ from the production.
- $\left(\boldsymbol{x}_{i}, \boldsymbol{y}\right) \in Z_{i}$ : a consumption of private goods and public goods by consumer $i$.
- $(\boldsymbol{x}, \boldsymbol{y})=\left(\boldsymbol{x}_{1}, \ldots, \boldsymbol{x}_{n}, \boldsymbol{y}\right) \in Z$ : an allocation.
- $\succcurlyeq_{i}$ (or $u_{i}$ if exists): a preference ordering (it is complete and transitive).
- $e_{i}=\left(Z_{i}, \succcurlyeq_{i}, \boldsymbol{w}_{i}, \theta_{i}\right)$ : the characteristic of consumer $i$.
- $e=\left(e_{1}, \ldots, e_{n}, f\right)$ : a public goods economy.

The above is a relatively simple class of public goods economic environments. Analogous to the previous discussion, in a general equilibrium
problem, the economic environments can be more general to allow for production possibility sets of general form, an arbitrary number of firms, and either public or private goods as input or output. For a detailed discussion, see Foley (1970) and Milleron (1972).

Definition 15.2.1 Allocation $\boldsymbol{z} \equiv(\boldsymbol{x}, \boldsymbol{y})=\left(\boldsymbol{x}_{1}, \ldots, \boldsymbol{x}_{n}, \boldsymbol{y}\right) \in Z$ is feasible, if $\left(\boldsymbol{y}, \sum_{i=1}^{n} \boldsymbol{x}_{i}-\hat{\boldsymbol{w}}\right) \in Y$, where $\hat{\boldsymbol{w}}=\sum_{i=1}^{n} \boldsymbol{w}_{i}$.

If technology can be represented by function $\boldsymbol{y}=f(\boldsymbol{v})$, the feasibility condition can be written as:

$$
\begin{equation*}
\sum_{i=1}^{n} \boldsymbol{x}_{i}+\mathbf{v} \leqq \sum_{i=1}^{n} \boldsymbol{w}_{i} \tag{15.2.1}
\end{equation*}
$$

and

$$
\begin{equation*}
\boldsymbol{y}=f(\boldsymbol{v}) . \tag{15.2.2}
\end{equation*}
$$

Definition 15.2.2 An allocation $(\boldsymbol{x}, \boldsymbol{y})$ is Pareto efficient for a public goods economy $e$ if it is feasible and there is no other feasible allocation $\left(\boldsymbol{x}^{\prime}, \boldsymbol{y}^{\prime}\right)$, such that $\left(\boldsymbol{x}_{i}^{\prime}, \boldsymbol{y}^{\prime}\right) \succcurlyeq_{i}\left(\boldsymbol{x}_{i}, \boldsymbol{y}\right)$ for all consumers $i$ and $\left(\boldsymbol{x}_{k}^{\prime}, \boldsymbol{y}^{\prime}\right) \succ_{k}\left(\boldsymbol{x}_{k}, \boldsymbol{y}\right)$ for some $k$.

Definition 15.2.3 An allocation $(\boldsymbol{x}, \boldsymbol{y})$ is weakly Pareto efficient for the public goods economy $e$ if it is feasible and there is no other feasible allocation $\left(\boldsymbol{x}^{\prime}, \boldsymbol{y}^{\prime}\right)$, such that $\left(\boldsymbol{x}_{i}^{\prime}, \boldsymbol{y}^{\prime}\right) \succ_{i}\left(\boldsymbol{x}_{i}, \boldsymbol{y}\right)$ for all consumers $i$.

Remark 15.2.1 Unlike private goods economies, even under the assumptions of continuity and strong monotonicity, a weakly Pareto efficient allocation may not be Pareto efficient for public goods economies. The following proposition is ascribed to Tian (1988).

Proposition 15.2.1 For public goods economies, a weakly Pareto efficient allocation may not be Pareto efficient, even if preferences satisfy strong monotonicity and continuity.

Proof. The proof is by way of a counter-example. Consider an economy with $(n, L, K)=(3,1,1)$, constant returns in producing $y$ from $x$ (the input-output coefficient normalized to one), and the following endowments and utility functions: $w_{1}=w_{2}=w_{3}=1, u_{1}\left(x_{1}, y\right)=x_{1}+y$,
and $u_{i}\left(x_{i}, y\right)=x_{i}+2 y$ for $i=2,3$. Then, $\boldsymbol{z}=(\boldsymbol{x}, y)$ with $\boldsymbol{x}=(0.5,0,0)$ and $y=2.5$ is weakly Pareto efficient, but not Pareto efficient, because $\boldsymbol{z}^{\prime}=\left(\boldsymbol{x}^{\prime}, y^{\prime}\right)=(0,0,0,3)$ Pareto-dominates $\boldsymbol{z}$ by consumers 2 and 3 .

However, under an additional condition of strict convexity, they are equivalent. The corresponding proof is left to readers.

### 15.3 Discrete Public Goods

### 15.3.1 Efficient Provision of Public Goods

For simplicity, consider a public good economy with $n$ consumers and two goods: one private good and one public good.

Discrete public goods, also called public projects, are indivisible. It is assumed that the units of public goods provided are normalized to 1 . This can also be interpreted as a logical variable of 0 or $1: 1$ for providing public projects, and 0 for not providing public projects.

Let $g_{i}$ be the contribution made by consumer $i$, so that

$$
\begin{aligned}
x_{i}+g_{i} & =w_{i} \\
\sum_{i=1}^{n} g_{i} & =v .
\end{aligned}
$$

Let $c$ be the cost of providing the public project, so that the production technology is given by

$$
y= \begin{cases}1 & \text { if } \sum_{i=1}^{n} g_{i} \geqq c \\ 0 & \text { otherwise }\end{cases}
$$

Assume that $u_{i}\left(x_{i}, y\right)$ is strictly monotonically increasing and continuous. We first want to know under what conditions providing the public good Pareto dominates not providing it, i.e., there exist $\left(g_{1}, \ldots, g_{n}\right)$, such that $\sum_{i=1}^{n} g_{i} \geqq c$ and

$$
\begin{equation*}
u_{i}\left(w_{i}-g_{i}, 1\right)>u_{i}\left(w_{i}, 0\right), \quad \forall i . \tag{15.3.3}
\end{equation*}
$$

Let $r_{i}$ be the maximum willingness-to-pay (reservation price) of consumer
$i$, i.e., $r_{i}$ must satisfy

$$
\begin{equation*}
u_{i}\left(w_{i}-r_{i}, 1\right)=u_{i}\left(w_{i}, 0\right) \tag{15.3.4}
\end{equation*}
$$

Inequality (15.3.3) implies that providing the public project will bring higher utilities for all consumers than not providing the public project. Then, from the perspective of social optimality, the public good should be provided. Therefore, as long as we know the utility function of each individual, we know their willingness-to-pay, and thus we know whether providing the public good is Pareto efficient.

If providing the public project Pareto dominates not providing the public project, we have

$$
\begin{equation*}
u_{i}\left(w_{i}-g_{i}, 1\right)>u_{i}\left(w_{i}, 0\right)=u_{i}\left(w_{i}-r_{i}, 1\right), \quad \forall i \tag{15.3.5}
\end{equation*}
$$

By strong monotonicity of $u_{i}$, we have

$$
\begin{equation*}
w_{i}-g_{i}>w_{i}-r_{i} \quad \forall i \tag{15.3.6}
\end{equation*}
$$

Then, we have

$$
\begin{equation*}
r_{i}>g_{i} \tag{15.3.7}
\end{equation*}
$$

and thus

$$
\begin{equation*}
\sum_{i=1}^{n} r_{i}>\sum_{i=1}^{n} g_{i} \geqq c \tag{15.3.8}
\end{equation*}
$$

In other words, the sum of the willingness-to-pay for the public good must exceed the cost of providing it. This condition is necessary. In fact, this condition is also sufficient. In summary, we have the following proposition.

Proposition 15.3.1 Providing a public good Pareto dominates not providing the public good if and only if $\sum_{i=1}^{n} r_{i}>\sum_{i=1}^{n} g_{i} \geqq c$.

The problem is that individual preferences/utility functions are unknown to a social planner, and thus it may result in inefficient outcomes, as we discuss below. Determination of how to design an incentive mechanism to induce individuals to truthfully report their private information then becomes an important issue.

### 15.3.2 Free-Rider Problem

First of all, we want to know whether a free competitive market leads to an efficient provision of public goods. The following example shows that, due to the free-rider problem, we generally cannot expect individual decisionmaking to result in an efficient provision of public projects.

To see this, consider a simple economy with only two participants, the maximum willingness-to-pay for each individual is $r_{i}=100, i=1,2$. Suppose that the cost for providing the public project is $c=150$. The participants decide on their own how much they will contribute for the public project. If both are willing to contribute 75 , the public project will be provided, and each participant will receive 25 units of benefit. If only one person contributes 150 , the public project is provided, but the benefit is 50 , while the benefit of another person is 100 . Formally, we have

$$
\begin{aligned}
r_{i} & =100 \quad i=1,2 ; \\
c & =150 \text { (total cost) } ; \\
g_{i} & =\left\{\begin{array}{cl}
150 / 2=75 & \text { if both agents make contributions; } \\
150 & \text { if only agent } i \text { makes contribution. }
\end{array}\right.
\end{aligned}
$$

Each person decides independently whether or not to contribute for providing the public good. As a result, each one has an incentive to be a free-rider on the other as shown by the payoff matrix in Table 15.1.

|  |  | Person 2 |  |
| :--- | ---: | :---: | :---: |
|  |  | Contribute |  |
|  |  | Not Contribute |  |
| Person 1 | Contribute | $(25,25)$ | $(-50,100)$ |
|  | Not Contribute | $(100,-50)$ | $(0,0)$ |
|  |  |  |  |

Table 15.1: Private provision of a discrete public good.
Note that net payoffs are defined by $r_{i}-g_{i}$. Thus, it is given by $100-$ 150/2 $=25$ when both consumers are willing to produce the public project, and 100-150 $=-50$ when only one person wants to contribute, but the other person does not.

The dominant strategy equilibrium in this game is (no contribution, no
contribution). Thus, although the public project benefits both agents, nobody wants to share the cost of producing the public project, but wants to free-ride on the other consumer. As a result, the public good is not provided at all, even though it would be more efficient to do so. Thus, voluntary contribution, in general, does not result in an efficient level of the public good provision.

The above-mentioned problem is typically a prisoner's dilemma. This phenomenon is common in practice, causing both participants to be worse off. For example, if two firms conspire to monopolize prices, they can gain higher profits, but if one side lowers its price slightly, it can attract more customers. Consequently, as the Bertrand model predicted, each party has an incentive to reduce the price, and ultimately the price reaches the marginal cost level. This illustrates the basic conclusion that inefficient allocation often results from self-consciousness and self-dedication only.

### 15.3.3 Voting for a Discrete Public Good

The amount of a public good is also often determined by voting. Will this generally result in an efficient provision? The answer, in general, is negative.

Voting does not result in efficient provision. Consider the following example.

## Example 15.3.1

$$
\begin{aligned}
c & =120 \\
r_{1} & =80, r_{2}=35, r_{3}=35
\end{aligned}
$$

Clearly, $r_{1}+r_{2}+r_{3}>c . g_{i}=120 / 3=40$. The efficient provision of the public project should be yes. However, under the majority rule, only consumer 1 votes "yes" since she receives a positive net benefit if the good is provided. The 2nd and 3rd persons vote "no" to provide public project, and therefore the public project will not be provided so that we have inefficient provision of the public project. The problem with majority rule is that it only measures the individuals' net benefits for the public good, whereas the
efficient condition requires a comparison of maximum willingness-to-pay, resulting in the inconsistency between individual rationality and collective rationality.

This example also shows that democracy and efficiency are often incompatible in decentralized decision-making, because voters are usually driven by their own interests. To overcome the possible inconsistency between democracy and efficiency, a criterion of whether democratic decision-making should be adopted is that the higher is the level, the more respect for public opinion is given in the election of leaders, and the more democratic decision-making should be adopted in the selection of leaders. Because leaders' decisions of directions and strategies have tremendous externalities, it is necessary to elect/select a person who respects public opinion, cares about the total welfare of a society, and is responsible to the voter$s$; otherwise, they will not be elected/selected for public office in the next term.

However, once a person is elected/selected, since she is accountable to the voters, the implementation of her goals and specific decisions should be efficient; otherwise, if her daily decisions are often rejected by her staff or team members, how can she be responsible for the voters? As such, constantly applying the simple majority rule to every specific issue may often lead to inefficient outcomes. Therefore, even in a democratic system, the major leader of an organization (e.g., presidents of a nation or of a university) usually has the power to nominate her deputies and the entire leadership team. Of course, if a unit fails to improve and does not perform well, the people will not be satisfied after the end of a term of office, and then the existing leaders may not be reelected. Thus, the top leaders have incentives to fulfill their commitments to the people. This is essentially the structure of government departments and enterprises.

An example is the professors' committee at universities. Its duty is to evaluate the academic performance and promotion of faculty members, rather than getting involved in the details of daily executive work. If every professor has a voting right to support her own field of specialty, then an inefficient outcome, as described in the above example, may arise.

The above analysis shows that neither market nor democratic voting procedures could lead to the efficient provision of public goods. The solution to this problem is quite challenging to achieve, and depends on the design of proper incentive mechanisms. We will discuss the VCG (Vickrey-Clarke-Groves) mechanism in Chapter 18, which may elicit the efficient provision of public goods and truth-telling of voters.

### 15.4 Continuous Public Goods

### 15.4.1 Efficient Provision of Public Goods

Similar results can also be obtained for the provision of continuous public goods. Again, for simplicity, we assume that there is only one public good and one private good that may be regarded as money, and $y=f(v)$, where $y$ is the production of public good, and $v$ is the input of private good used in producing the public good.

The welfare maximization approach shows that Pareto efficient allocations can be characterized by

$$
\begin{array}{ll} 
& \max _{(x, y)} \sum_{i=1}^{n} a_{i} u_{i}\left(x_{i}, y\right) \\
\text { s.t. } & \sum_{i=1}^{n} x_{i}+v \leqq \sum_{i=1}^{n} w_{i}, \\
& y \leqq f(v) .
\end{array}
$$

Define the Lagrange function:

$$
\begin{equation*}
L=\sum_{i=1}^{n} a_{i} u_{i}\left(x_{i}, y\right)+\lambda\left(\sum_{i=1}^{n} w_{i}-\sum_{i=1}^{n} x_{i}-v\right)+\mu(f(v)-y) . \tag{15.4.9}
\end{equation*}
$$

When $u_{i}$ is strictly quasi-concave and differentiable, and $f(v)$ is concave and differentiable, the set of Pareto optimal allocations is characterized by
the FOCs:

$$
\begin{array}{r}
a_{i} \frac{\partial u_{i}}{\partial x_{i}}-\lambda \leqq 0, \quad \text { with equality if } x_{i}>0 \\
\mu f^{\prime}(v)-\lambda \leqq 0, \\
\sum_{i=1}^{n} a_{i} \frac{\partial u_{i}}{\partial y}-\mu \leqq 0,  \tag{15.4.12}\\
\text { with equality if } v>0 \\
\text { with equality if } y>0
\end{array}
$$

Therefore, at an interior solution, by (15.4.10) and (15.4.11)

$$
\begin{equation*}
\frac{a_{i}}{\mu}=\frac{f^{\prime}(v)}{\frac{\partial u_{i}}{\partial x_{i}}} . \tag{15.4.13}
\end{equation*}
$$

Substituting (15.4.13) into (15.4.12), we have

$$
\begin{equation*}
\sum_{i=1}^{n} \frac{\frac{\partial u_{i}}{\partial y}}{\frac{\partial u_{i}}{\partial x_{i}}}=\frac{1}{f^{\prime}(v)} . \tag{15.4.14}
\end{equation*}
$$

Thus, we obtain the well-known Lindahl-Samuelson condition. This condition is different from the Pareto optimality for economies with private goods only. It indicates that the sum of the marginal rates of substitution of a public good for a private good across all economic agents is equal to the marginal rate of technical substitution; whereas, for the private goods economy, the marginal rate of substitution of any two goods for every agent $i$ is equal to the marginal rate of technical substitution at Pareto optimality.

Thus, the conditions for Pareto efficiency are given by

$$
\left\{\begin{array}{l}
\sum_{i=1}^{n} M R S_{y x_{i}}^{i}=M R T S_{y v}  \tag{15.4.15}\\
\sum x_{i}+v \leqq \sum_{i=1}^{n} w_{i} \\
y=f(v)
\end{array}\right.
$$

The result shows that the provision level of the public good and the consumption of the private good are jointly determined.

Example 15.4.1 Consider an economy with one public good, one private
good, and $n$ consumers. The utility function of consumer $i$ is:

$$
\begin{aligned}
u_{i} & =a_{i} \ln y+\ln x_{i}, \\
y & =v .
\end{aligned}
$$

The Lindahl-Samuelson condition is

$$
\begin{equation*}
\sum_{i=1}^{n} \frac{\frac{\partial u_{i}}{\partial u_{i}}}{\frac{\partial u_{i}}{\partial x_{i}}}=1, \tag{15.4.16}
\end{equation*}
$$

and thus

$$
\begin{equation*}
\sum_{i=1}^{n} \frac{\frac{a_{i}}{y}}{\frac{1}{x_{i}}}=\sum_{i=1}^{n} \frac{a_{i} x_{i}}{y}=1 \Rightarrow \sum a_{i} x_{i}=y \tag{15.4.17}
\end{equation*}
$$

which implies that the level of the public good depends on the private good consumptions of all agents and is not uniquely determined.

Thus, in general, the marginal willingness-to-pay for a public good depends on the amount of private good consumption, and therefore the efficient level of $y$ depends on $x_{i}$. However, in the case of quasi-linear utility functions,

$$
\begin{equation*}
u_{i}\left(x_{i}, y\right)=x_{i}+u_{i}(y) \tag{15.4.18}
\end{equation*}
$$

the Lindahl-Samuelson condition becomes

$$
\begin{equation*}
\sum_{i=1}^{n} u_{i}^{\prime}(y)=\frac{1}{f^{\prime}(v)} \equiv c^{\prime}(y) \tag{15.4.19}
\end{equation*}
$$

and thus $y$ is uniquely determined.
Example 15.4.2 Suppose that

$$
\begin{aligned}
u_{i} & =a_{i} \ln y+x_{i}, \\
y & =v .
\end{aligned}
$$

The Lindahl-Samuelson condition is

$$
\begin{equation*}
\sum_{i=1}^{n} \frac{\frac{\partial u_{i}}{\partial y}}{\partial u_{i}} \frac{\partial x_{i}}{\partial x_{i}}=1, \tag{15.4.20}
\end{equation*}
$$

and thus

$$
\begin{equation*}
\sum_{i=1}^{n} \frac{a_{i}}{y}=1 \Rightarrow \sum a_{i}=y \tag{15.4.21}
\end{equation*}
$$

which implies that the level of public good is uniquely determined.

### 15.4.2 Lindahl Mechanism and Equilibrium

We gave the conditions for Pareto efficiency in the presence of public goods. The next issue is to determine how to achieve Pareto efficient allocations under decentralized decision-making of individuals. In an economy with only private goods, as long as the local non-satiation assumption is satisfied, every competitive equilibrium allocation is Pareto efficient.

However, with public goods, a competitive mechanism in general cannot result in Pareto efficient allocations. Indeed, if public goods are allocated through a competitive market, the equilibrium outcome is the same as the one for private goods economies, i.e., the marginal rate of substitution of two goods for all individuals is equal to the price ratio of the corresponding goods and then equal to the marginal rate of technical substitution, which does not satisfy the Lindahl-Samuelson condition. As such, the competitive mechanism leads to inefficient allocations in the presence of public goods.

For instance, if we solve for competitive equilibrium in an economy with one private good, one public good and two consumers, then utility maximizing behavior would equalize the MRS of $y$ for $x$ and its relative price, e.g.,

$$
M R S_{y x}^{A}=M R S_{y x}^{B}=\frac{p_{y}}{p_{x}}
$$

which violates the Lindahl-Samuelson condition. Thus, in a public goods economy, market failure occurs.

Then, what economic mechanism should be adopted to achieve Pareto efficient allocations in public goods economies? We know that, in the private goods economy, the Walrasian mechanism can result in efficient resource allocation. In the presence of public goods, one possible institutional arrangement is the Lindahl mechanism.

In the early 20th century, Lindahl proposed an institutional arrange-
ment based on the Lindahl-Samuelson condition. Lindahl suggested to use a taxation approach to provide public goods, by which the tax rates may be different for different individuals. Each individuals should pay a specific "personalized price" for public goods, which means, for the same amount of the consumption of public goods, different prices are assigned to different individuals for consuming public goods. Thus, the Lindahl solution is a way to mimic the Walrasiansolution, with a difference that the consumption level of a public good is the same for all consumers, but the prices for consuming public goods are personalized due to different preferences of consumers.

To see this, consider an economy with $\boldsymbol{x}_{i} \in \mathcal{R}_{+}^{L}$ (private goods) and $\boldsymbol{y} \in \mathcal{R}_{+}^{K}$ (public goods). For simplicity, we assume that the production possibility set of public goods $Y$ is a closed convex cone. Thus, production technologies characterized by $y=f(v)$ exhibit constant returns to scale (CRS). A feasible allocation satisfies

$$
\begin{equation*}
\sum_{i=1}^{n} \boldsymbol{x}_{i}+\boldsymbol{v} \leqq \sum_{i=1}^{n} \boldsymbol{w}_{i} . \tag{15.4.22}
\end{equation*}
$$

Let $\boldsymbol{q}_{i} \in \mathcal{R}_{+}^{K}$ be the personalized price vector of consumer $i$ for consuming the public goods $\boldsymbol{y}$.

Let $\hat{\boldsymbol{q}}=\sum_{i=1}^{n} \boldsymbol{q}_{i}$ be the market price vector of $\boldsymbol{y}$.
Let $\boldsymbol{p} \in \mathcal{R}_{+}^{L}$ be the price vector of private goods.

The profit is defined as $\pi=\boldsymbol{q} \boldsymbol{y}-\boldsymbol{p} \boldsymbol{v}$.
Definition 15.4.1 (Lindahl Equilibrium) We say that an allocation $\left(\boldsymbol{x}^{*}, \boldsymbol{y}^{*}\right) \in$ $Z$, a price vector of private goods $\boldsymbol{p}^{*} \in \mathcal{R}_{+}^{L}$, and a personalized price vector of public goods $\boldsymbol{q}_{i}^{*} \in \mathcal{R}_{+}^{K}$, one for each individual $i=1, \cdots, n$, constitute a
Lindahl equilibrium if the following conditions are satisfied:
(i) $\boldsymbol{p}^{*} \boldsymbol{x}_{i}^{*}+\boldsymbol{q}_{i}^{*} \boldsymbol{y}^{*} \leqq \boldsymbol{p}^{*} \boldsymbol{w}_{i}$ for all $i$;
(ii) If $\left(\boldsymbol{x}_{i}, \boldsymbol{y}\right) \succ_{i}\left(\boldsymbol{x}_{i}^{*}, \boldsymbol{y}^{*}\right)$, then $\boldsymbol{p}^{*} \boldsymbol{x}_{i}+\boldsymbol{q}_{i}^{*} \boldsymbol{y}>\boldsymbol{p}^{*} \boldsymbol{w}_{i}$ for all $i$;
(iii) for all $(\boldsymbol{y},-\boldsymbol{v}) \in Y$, there is $\hat{\boldsymbol{q}}^{*} \boldsymbol{y}^{*}-\boldsymbol{p}^{*} \boldsymbol{v}^{*} \geqq \hat{\boldsymbol{q}}^{*} \boldsymbol{y}-\boldsymbol{p}^{*} \boldsymbol{v}$;
(iv) $\left(\boldsymbol{y}^{*},-\boldsymbol{v}^{*}\right) \in Y$,
where $\boldsymbol{v}^{*}=\sum_{t=1}^{n} \boldsymbol{w}_{i}-\sum_{i=1}^{n} \boldsymbol{x}_{i}^{*}, \quad \sum_{t=1}^{n} \boldsymbol{q}_{i}^{*}=\hat{\boldsymbol{q}}^{*}$.
The first condition above is a budget constraint, the second is a utility maximization condition, the third is a profit maximization condition, and the fourth is a feasibility condition.

Remark 15.4.1 Because the production function exhibits constant returns to scale, the maximum profit is zero at the Lindahl equilibrium. That is, $\hat{\boldsymbol{q}}^{*} \boldsymbol{y}^{*}-\boldsymbol{p}^{*} \boldsymbol{v}^{*}=0$, therefore

$$
\sum_{i=1}^{n} \boldsymbol{p}^{*} \boldsymbol{x}_{i}^{*}=\sum_{i=1}^{n} \boldsymbol{p}^{*} \boldsymbol{w}_{i}+\hat{\boldsymbol{q}}^{*} \boldsymbol{y}^{*}
$$

Thus, the budget constraint (i) holds with equality at Lindahl equilibrium for every consumer.

We may regard a Walrasian equilibrium as a special case of a Lindahl equilibrium when there are no public goods. In fact, the concept of Lindahl equilibrium in economies with public goods is, in numerous ways, a natural generalization of Walrasian equilibrium in private goods economies, with attention given to the well-known duality that reverses the role of prices and quantities between private and public goods, and between Walrasian and Lindahl allocations. In the Walrasian mechanism, prices for al1 commodities are the same for all consumers, but the quantities of their private goods consumption are personalized. In the Lindahl mechanism, however, the quantities of public goods consumed are the same for all consumers, while prices charged for public goods are personalized. In addition, the concepts of Walrasian and Lindahl equilibria are both relevant to private-ownership economies. Moreover, they are both characterized by purely price-taking behavior on the part of consumers. The Lindahl solution for the efficient provision of public goods is essentially an informationally decentralized decision-making process.

Lindahl equilibrium has similar properties to Walrasian equilibrium. In fact, by redefining the consumption space, an economy with public goods can be regarded as an economy with private goods only. Therefore, a Lindahl equilibrium can then be regarded as a Walrasian equilibrium under
this redefinition of the consumption space. This method is adopted in the following to prove the existence of Lindahl equilibrium, where the First and Second Fundamental Theorems of Welfare Economics still hold. The proof is similar to that of Walrasian equilibrium.

Theorem 15.4.1 (Existence Theorem on Lindahl Equilibrium) For a public goods economy $\mathbf{e}=\left(\left\{X_{i}, \mathbf{w}_{i}, \succcurlyeq_{i}\right\},\left\{Y_{j}\right\},\left\{\theta_{i}\right\}\right)$, there exists a Lindahl equilibrium if the following conditions are satisfied:
(i) $Z_{i}=\mathcal{R}_{+}^{L+K}$;
(ii) $\boldsymbol{w}_{i}>0$;
(iii) $\succcurlyeq_{i}$ is continuous, strictly convex, and monotonic;
(iv) $Y$ is a closed and convex cone, $0 \in Y,\left(-\mathbb{R}_{+}^{L}, 0\right) \subseteq Y$ (free disposal property).

Proof. We prove this theorem by constructing an economy with only private goods to which the existence theorem of Walrasian equilibrium (CE) can be applied. Specifically, treating the consumptions of different consumers of public goods as different commodities and changing the original commodity space of consumer $i$ to $\bar{Z}_{i}=\left(Z_{i},\{\mathbf{0}\}\right) \subseteq \mathcal{R}^{L+K} \times \mathcal{R}^{(n-1) K}$, where $\mathbf{0}$ is the null element of $(n-1) K$ dimensional space. The consumption bundle of $i$ is $\overline{\boldsymbol{z}}_{i}=\left(\boldsymbol{x}_{i}, \boldsymbol{y}_{i}, 0, \cdots, 0\right)$. The consumption space constructed above and the conditions of this theorem satisfy all of the requirements of Theorem 10.4.7 (Existence Theorem III for competitive equilibrium), and thus the existence of CE is guaranteed. Therefore, a Lindahl equilibrium exists for the original public goods economy.

Similarly, we can enhance the monotonicity assumption to strong monotonicity and relax the assumption of interior-point initial endowments of private goods.

For a public goods economy with one private good and one public good $y=\frac{1}{\hat{q}} v$, the definition of Lindahl equilibrium becomes much simpler.

Definition 15.4.2 An allocation $\left(\mathrm{x}^{*}, y^{*}\right)$ is a Lindahl equilibrium allocation if there exist $q_{i}^{*}, i=1, \cdots, n$, such that
(i) $x_{i}^{*}+q_{i}^{*} y^{*} \leqq w_{i}$;
(ii) if $\left(x_{i}, y\right) \succ_{i}\left(x_{i}^{*}, y^{*}\right)$, then $x_{i}+q_{i}^{*} y>w_{i}$;
(iii) $\sum_{i=1}^{n} q_{i}^{*}=\hat{q}$.

In fact, the feasibility condition is automatically satisfied when the budget constraints in (i) are satisfied.

If ( $\mathrm{x}^{*}, y^{*}$ ) is an interior point of the Lindahl equilibrium allocation, we can then have the FOC of utility maximization:

$$
\begin{equation*}
\frac{\frac{\partial u_{i}}{\partial y}}{\frac{\partial u_{i}}{\partial x_{i}}}=\frac{q_{i}}{1} \tag{15.4.23}
\end{equation*}
$$

which means that the Lindahl-Samuelson condition holds:

$$
\sum_{i=1}^{n} M R S_{y x_{i}}=\hat{q},
$$

which is the necessary condition for Pareto efficiency.
Example 15.4.3 Solve for the Lindahl equilibrium of the following public goods economy:

$$
\begin{aligned}
u_{i}\left(x_{i}, y\right) & =x_{i}^{\alpha_{i}} y^{\left(1-\alpha_{i}\right)}, \quad 0<\alpha_{i}<1, \\
y & =\frac{1}{\hat{q}} v .
\end{aligned}
$$

The budget constraint is:

$$
x_{i}+q_{i} y=w_{i} .
$$

The demand functions for private goods $x_{i}$ and public goods $y_{i}$ of consumer $i$ are given by

$$
\begin{align*}
& x_{i}=\alpha_{i} w_{i},  \tag{15.4.24}\\
& y_{i}=\frac{\left(1-\alpha_{i}\right) w_{i}}{q_{i}} . \tag{15.4.25}
\end{align*}
$$

Since $y_{1}=y_{2}=\cdots=y_{n}=y^{*}$ at Lindahl equilibrium, we have by (15.4.25)

$$
\begin{equation*}
q_{i} y^{*}=\left(1-\alpha_{i}\right) w_{i} . \tag{15.4.26}
\end{equation*}
$$

Making summation leads to

$$
\hat{q} y^{*}=\sum_{i=1}^{n}\left(1-\alpha_{i}\right) w_{i} .
$$

Then, we have

$$
y^{*}=\frac{\sum_{i=1}^{n}\left(1-\alpha_{i}\right) w_{i}}{\hat{q}} .
$$

Thus, by (15.4.26), we have

$$
\begin{equation*}
q_{i}=\frac{\left(1-\alpha_{i}\right) w_{i}}{y^{*}}=\frac{\hat{q}\left(1-\alpha_{i}\right) w_{i}}{\sum_{i=1}^{n}\left(1-\alpha_{i}\right) w_{i}} . \tag{15.4.27}
\end{equation*}
$$

If we want to find a Lindahl equilibrium, we must know the preferences or MRS of each consumer. However, the information about individuals' preferences is in general unknown and, because of the free-rider problem, each consumer will have the incentive to not truthfully reveal her preferences in order to contribute less. Moreover, as each consumer has a personalized price system, when the preferences of consumers are not public information, it is difficult to regard the personalized price system of each consumer as given because her report will affect her price.

### 15.5 Welfare Properties of Lindahl Equilibrium

### 15.5.1 The First Fundamental Theorem of Welfare Economics

Similarly, we have the following First Fundamental Theorem of Welfare Economics for public goods economies.

Theorem 15.5.1 (The First Welfare Theorem for Public Goods Economy)
For a public goods economy $\mathbf{e}=\left(e_{1}, \ldots, e_{n}, Y\right)$, every Lindahl allocation $\left(\boldsymbol{x}^{*}, \boldsymbol{y}^{*}\right)$ with the price system $\left(\boldsymbol{q}_{1}^{*}, \cdots, \boldsymbol{q}_{n}^{*}, \boldsymbol{p}^{*}\right)$ is weakly Pareto efficient. Furthermore, if local non-satiation is satisfied, it is Pareto efficient.

Proof. The proof of the first conclusion of the theorem is included in the proof of the second one. We only need to prove that, under local nonsatiation, every Lindahl allocation $\left(\boldsymbol{x}^{*}, \boldsymbol{y}^{*}\right)$ is Pareto efficient. Suppose that this is not the case. Then, there exists another feasible allocation $\left(\boldsymbol{x}_{i}, \boldsymbol{y}\right)$, such that $\left(\boldsymbol{x}_{i}, \boldsymbol{y}\right) \succcurlyeq_{i}\left(\boldsymbol{x}_{i}^{*}, \boldsymbol{y}^{*}\right)$ for all $i$ and $\left(\boldsymbol{x}_{k}, \boldsymbol{y}\right) \succ_{k}\left(\boldsymbol{x}_{k}^{*}, \boldsymbol{y}^{*}\right)$ for some $k$.

We first show

$$
\boldsymbol{p}^{*} \boldsymbol{x}_{i}+\boldsymbol{q}_{i}^{*} \boldsymbol{y} \geqq \boldsymbol{p}^{*} \boldsymbol{w}_{i}, \text { for all } i=1,2, \cdots, n
$$

If not, then there is some $i$, such that

$$
\boldsymbol{p}^{*} \boldsymbol{x}_{i}+\boldsymbol{q}_{i}^{*} \boldsymbol{y}<\boldsymbol{p}^{*} \boldsymbol{w}_{i} .
$$

Then, by local non-satiation, there is $\left(\boldsymbol{x}_{i}^{\prime}, y^{\prime}\right)$, such that $\left(\boldsymbol{x}_{i}^{\prime}, y^{\prime}\right) \succ\left(\boldsymbol{x}_{i}, y\right) \succcurlyeq_{i}$ $\left(\boldsymbol{x}_{i}^{*}, y^{*}\right)$ and $\boldsymbol{p}^{*} \boldsymbol{x}_{i}^{\prime}+\boldsymbol{q}_{i}^{*} \boldsymbol{y}^{\prime}<\boldsymbol{p}^{*} \boldsymbol{w}_{i}$, contradicting the fact that $\left(\boldsymbol{x}_{i}^{*}, y^{*}\right)$ is consumer $i$ 's utility maximizing consumption bundle.

For consumer $k$, since $\left(\boldsymbol{x}_{k}^{*}, y^{*}\right)$ is consumer $k^{\prime}$ s optimal choice, by $\left(\boldsymbol{x}_{k}, y\right) \succ_{k}$ ( $\boldsymbol{x}_{k}^{*}, y^{*}$ ), we must have

$$
\boldsymbol{p}^{*} \boldsymbol{x}_{k}+\boldsymbol{q}_{k}^{*} \boldsymbol{y}>\boldsymbol{p}^{*} \boldsymbol{w}_{k} \text { for some } k .
$$

Thus, making summation leads to

$$
\begin{equation*}
\sum_{i=1}^{n} \boldsymbol{p}^{*} \boldsymbol{x}_{i}+\sum_{i=1}^{n} \boldsymbol{q}_{i}^{*} \boldsymbol{y}>\sum_{i=1}^{n} \boldsymbol{p}^{*} \boldsymbol{w}_{i} \tag{15.5.28}
\end{equation*}
$$

i.e.,

$$
\hat{\boldsymbol{q}}^{*} \boldsymbol{y}+\boldsymbol{p}^{*} \sum_{i=1}^{n}\left(\boldsymbol{x}_{i}-\boldsymbol{w}_{i}\right)=\hat{\boldsymbol{q}}^{*} \boldsymbol{y}+\boldsymbol{p}^{*} \boldsymbol{v}>0
$$

However, according to the profit maximization condition, for all $(\boldsymbol{y}, \boldsymbol{v}) \in$ $Y$, we have

$$
\hat{\boldsymbol{q}}^{*} \boldsymbol{y}+\boldsymbol{p}^{*} \boldsymbol{v} \leqq 0
$$

This contradiction proves the theorem.
Similarly, we can define Lindahl equilibrium with transfers.
Definition 15.5.1 (Lindahl Equilibrium with Transfers) For a public goods economy $\mathbf{e}=\left(e_{1}, \ldots, e_{n}, Y\right)$, an allocation $\left(\boldsymbol{x}^{*}, \boldsymbol{y}^{*}\right) \in Z$, a price vector of private goods $\boldsymbol{p}^{*} \in \mathcal{R}_{+}^{L}$ and a personalized price vector of public goods $\boldsymbol{q}_{i}^{*} \in \mathcal{R}_{+}^{K}, \forall i$, constitute a Lindahl equilibrium with transfers if there exists an assignment of wealth levels $\left(I_{1}, \ldots, I_{n}\right)$ with $\sum_{i} I_{i}=\boldsymbol{p} \cdot \sum_{i} \boldsymbol{w}_{i}$, such that
(i) $\boldsymbol{p}^{*} \boldsymbol{x}_{i}^{*}+\boldsymbol{q}_{i}^{*} \boldsymbol{y}^{*} \leqq I_{i}$;
(ii) if $\left(\boldsymbol{x}_{i}, \boldsymbol{y}\right) \succ_{i}\left(\boldsymbol{x}_{i}^{*}, \boldsymbol{y}^{*}\right)$, then $\boldsymbol{p}^{*} \boldsymbol{x}_{i}+\boldsymbol{q}_{i}^{*} \boldsymbol{y}>I_{i}$;
(iii) for all $(\boldsymbol{y},-\boldsymbol{v}) \in Y, \hat{\boldsymbol{q}}^{*} \boldsymbol{y}^{*}-\boldsymbol{p}^{*} \boldsymbol{v}^{*} \geqq \hat{\boldsymbol{q}}^{*} \boldsymbol{y}-\boldsymbol{p}^{*} \boldsymbol{v}$;
(iv) $\left(\boldsymbol{y}^{*},-\boldsymbol{v}^{*}\right) \in Y$,
where $\boldsymbol{v}^{*}=\sum_{t=1}^{n} \boldsymbol{w}_{i}-\sum_{i=1}^{n} \boldsymbol{x}_{i}^{*}, \sum_{t=1}^{n} \boldsymbol{q}_{i}^{*}=\hat{\boldsymbol{q}}^{*}$.
Theorem 15.5.2 (The First Welfare Theorem of LE with Transfers) For a public goods economy $\mathbf{e}=\left(e_{1}, \ldots, e_{n}, Y\right)$, every Lindahl equilibrium allocation $\left(\boldsymbol{x}^{*}, \boldsymbol{y}^{*}\right)$ with transfers and price system $\left(\boldsymbol{q}_{i}^{*}, \cdots, \boldsymbol{q}_{n}^{*}, \boldsymbol{p}^{*}\right)$ is weakly Pareto efficient. Furthermore, if consumers' preferences are locally non-satiated, then it is Pareto efficient.

Proof. The proof is analogous to the proof of Theorem 15.5.1, and is thus omitted.

### 15.5.2 Economic Core in the Presence of Public Goods

Similar to a private goods economy, we can define economic core in the presence of public goods as follows:

Definition 15.5.2 (Blocking Coalition) A group of economic agents $S \subseteq N$ is said to block (improve upon) a given allocation $(\boldsymbol{x}, \boldsymbol{y})$, if the coalition can be Pareto improved within its own endowments, i.e., there exists another allocation ( $\boldsymbol{x}^{\prime}, \boldsymbol{y}^{\prime}$ ) such that
(1) $\left(\boldsymbol{x}^{\prime}, \boldsymbol{y}^{\prime}\right)$ is feasible with respect to $S$, i.e., $\left(\boldsymbol{y}, \sum_{i \in S}\left(\boldsymbol{x}_{i}^{\prime}-\boldsymbol{w}_{i}\right) \in\right.$ $Y$,
(2) $\left(\boldsymbol{x}_{i}^{\prime}, \boldsymbol{y}^{\prime}\right) \succcurlyeq_{i}\left(\boldsymbol{x}_{i}, \boldsymbol{y}\right)$ for all $i \in S$, and $\left(\boldsymbol{x}_{k}^{\prime}, \boldsymbol{y}^{\prime}\right) \succ_{k}\left(\boldsymbol{x}_{k}, \boldsymbol{y}\right)$ for some $k \in S$.

Definition 15.5.3 (Economic Core) A feasible allocation $(\boldsymbol{x}, \boldsymbol{y})$ is said to have the core property if it cannot be blocked by any coalition. The set of all allocations in the core is called the economic core or simply the core.

Remark 15.5.1 Every allocation in the core is Pareto efficient and individually rational, i.e., $\left(\boldsymbol{x}_{i}, \boldsymbol{y}\right) \succcurlyeq_{i}\left(\boldsymbol{w}_{i}, 0\right), \forall i=1,2, \ldots, n$.

Similar to the proof of the Economic Core Theorem for private goods, we can show that every Lindahl equilibrium allocation has the core property under local non-satiation of preferences.

Theorem 15.5.3 Suppose that the local non-satiation condition is satisfied. If $(\boldsymbol{x}, \boldsymbol{y}, \boldsymbol{p})$ is a Lindahl equilibrium, then $(\boldsymbol{x}, \boldsymbol{y})$ is in the core.

Although every Lindahl equilibrium allocation is in the core under local non-satiation of preferences, the core convergence theorem does not hold necessarily. See Milleron (1972) for a counterexample.

### 15.5.3 The Second Fundamental Theorem of Welfare Economics

Similarly, we have the Second Fundamental Theorem of Welfare Economics for a public goods economy.

## Theorem 15.5.4 (The Second Welfare Theorem for a Public Goods Economy)

For a public goods economy $\mathbf{e}=\left(e_{1}, \cdots, e_{n},\left\{Y_{j}\right\}\right)$, suppose that $\succcurlyeq_{i}$ is continuous, convex, and strongly monotone, $Y$ is a closed convex set, and $0 \in Y$. Then, for every Pareto efficient allocation $\left(\boldsymbol{x}^{*}, \boldsymbol{y}^{*}\right)$ with interior-point private consumption (i.e., $\boldsymbol{x}^{*} \in \mathcal{R}_{++}^{n L}$ ), there exists a nonzero price vector $\left(\boldsymbol{q}_{1}, \cdots, \boldsymbol{q}_{n}, \boldsymbol{p}\right) \in \mathcal{R}_{+}^{L+n K}$, such that $\left((\boldsymbol{x}, \boldsymbol{y}),\left(\boldsymbol{q}_{1}, \cdots, \boldsymbol{q}_{n}\right), \boldsymbol{p}\right)$ is a Lindahl equilibrium with transfers, i.e., there exists an assignment of wealth levels after transfers $\left(I_{1}, \cdots, I_{n}\right)$ satisfying $\sum_{i} I_{i}=\boldsymbol{p} \cdot \sum_{i} \boldsymbol{w}_{i}$, such that
(1) if $\left(\boldsymbol{x}_{i}, \boldsymbol{y}\right) \succ_{i}\left(\boldsymbol{x}_{i}^{*}, \boldsymbol{y}^{*}\right)$, then $\boldsymbol{p} \boldsymbol{x}_{i}+\boldsymbol{q}_{i} \boldsymbol{y}>I_{i} \equiv \boldsymbol{p} \boldsymbol{x}_{i}^{*}, i=1, \cdots, n$,
(2) for all $(\boldsymbol{y},-\boldsymbol{v}) \in Y, \hat{\boldsymbol{q}} \boldsymbol{y}^{*}-\boldsymbol{p} \boldsymbol{v}^{*} \geqq \hat{\boldsymbol{q}} \boldsymbol{y}-\boldsymbol{p} \boldsymbol{v}$,
where $\boldsymbol{v}^{*}=\sum_{t=1}^{n} \boldsymbol{w}_{i}-\sum_{i=1}^{n} \boldsymbol{x}_{i}^{*}$ and $\sum_{t=1}^{n} \boldsymbol{q}_{i}=\hat{\boldsymbol{q}}$.
Proof. Define two subsets $W$ and $P\left(\boldsymbol{x}^{*}, \boldsymbol{y}^{*}\right)$ of space $\mathcal{R}^{n K+L}$ as follows:

$$
W=\{(\boldsymbol{y}, \cdots, \boldsymbol{y} ;-\boldsymbol{v}):(\boldsymbol{y},-\boldsymbol{v}) \in Y\} .
$$

Because $Y$ is a closed convex set and $0 \in Y, W$ is non-empty, closed, and convex.

$$
P\left(\boldsymbol{x}^{*}, \boldsymbol{y}^{*}\right)=\left\{\left(\boldsymbol{y}_{1}^{\prime}, \cdots, \boldsymbol{y}_{n}^{\prime} ;-\boldsymbol{v}^{\prime}\right): \boldsymbol{v}^{\prime}=\sum_{i=1}^{n}\left(\boldsymbol{x}_{i}^{\prime}-\boldsymbol{w}_{i}\right) \&\left(\boldsymbol{x}_{i}^{\prime}, \boldsymbol{y}_{i}^{\prime}\right) \succ_{i}\left(\boldsymbol{x}_{i}^{*}, \boldsymbol{y}^{*}\right)\right\} .
$$

Since $\succcurlyeq_{i}$ is convex, $P\left(\boldsymbol{x}^{*}, \boldsymbol{y}^{*}\right)$ is convex.
Since $\left(\boldsymbol{x}^{*}, \boldsymbol{y}^{*}\right)$ is a Pareto optimal allocation, we must have $W \cap P\left(\boldsymbol{x}^{*}\right)=$ $\emptyset$; otherwise, there may exist a Pareto improvement. Therefore, applying
the Separating Hyperplane Theorem introduced in Chapter 2, we obtain that there exists $\left(\boldsymbol{q}_{1}, \cdots, \boldsymbol{q}_{n}, \boldsymbol{p}\right) \neq 0$, such that for all $(\boldsymbol{y}, \cdots, \boldsymbol{y} ;-\boldsymbol{v}) \in W$ and for all $\left(\boldsymbol{y}_{1}^{\prime}, \cdots, \boldsymbol{y}_{n}^{\prime} ;-\boldsymbol{v}^{\prime}\right) \in P\left(\boldsymbol{x}^{*}, \boldsymbol{y}^{*}\right)$, we have

$$
\begin{equation*}
\sum_{i=1}^{n} \boldsymbol{q}_{i} \boldsymbol{y}_{i}^{\prime}-\boldsymbol{p} \boldsymbol{v}^{\prime} \geqq \sum_{i=1}^{n} \boldsymbol{q}_{i} \boldsymbol{y}_{i}-\boldsymbol{p} \boldsymbol{v} \tag{15.5.29}
\end{equation*}
$$

We proceed with the proof in five steps.

1. Profit maximization, i.e., for all $(\boldsymbol{y},-\boldsymbol{v}) \in Y$, we have $\hat{\boldsymbol{q}} \boldsymbol{y}^{*}-\boldsymbol{p} \boldsymbol{v}^{*} \geqq$ $\hat{q} \boldsymbol{y}-\boldsymbol{p} \boldsymbol{v}$.

Let $\hat{\boldsymbol{z}}=\left(\boldsymbol{y}^{*}, \cdots, \boldsymbol{y}^{*} ;-\boldsymbol{v}^{\prime}\right)$, where $\boldsymbol{v}^{\prime}=\sum_{i=1}^{n}\left(\boldsymbol{w}_{i}-\boldsymbol{x}_{i}^{\prime}\right)$ and $\boldsymbol{x}_{i}^{\prime} \geq \boldsymbol{x}_{i}^{*}$ (i.e., $\boldsymbol{x}_{i}^{\prime} \geqq \boldsymbol{x}_{i}^{*}$ and $\boldsymbol{x}_{i}^{\prime} \neq \boldsymbol{x}_{i}^{*}$ ). Then, by strong monotonicity of preferences, we have $\left(\boldsymbol{x}_{i}^{\prime}, \boldsymbol{y}^{*}\right) \succ_{i}\left(\boldsymbol{x}_{i}^{*}, \boldsymbol{y}^{*}\right)$, and thus $\left(\boldsymbol{y}^{*}, \cdots, \boldsymbol{y}^{*} ;-\boldsymbol{v}^{\prime}\right) \in P\left(\boldsymbol{x}^{*}, \boldsymbol{y}^{*}\right)$. Therefore, it follows from (15.5.29) that, for any $(\boldsymbol{y},-\boldsymbol{v}) \in Y$, we have

$$
\hat{q} y^{*}-p v^{\prime} \geqq \hat{q} y-p v
$$

Let $\boldsymbol{v}^{\prime} \rightarrow \boldsymbol{v}^{*}$, then we have $\hat{\boldsymbol{q}} \boldsymbol{y}^{*}-\boldsymbol{p} \boldsymbol{v}^{*} \geqq \hat{\boldsymbol{q}} \cdot \boldsymbol{y}-\boldsymbol{p} \boldsymbol{v}, \forall(\boldsymbol{y},-\boldsymbol{v}) \in Y$.
2. $\left(\boldsymbol{q}_{1}, \cdots, \boldsymbol{q}_{n}, \boldsymbol{p}\right) \geqq 0$, and $\boldsymbol{p} \neq 0$.

Firstly, we prove $\boldsymbol{q}_{i} \geqq 0, i=1, \cdots, n$. Let

$$
\hat{z}=(\boldsymbol{y}, \cdots, \boldsymbol{y} ;-\boldsymbol{v})+\boldsymbol{e}_{y i}^{k}
$$

where $(\boldsymbol{y}, \cdots, \boldsymbol{y} ;-\boldsymbol{v})$ is an element in $W, \boldsymbol{e}_{y i}^{k}=(0, \cdots, 1,0, \cdots, 0)$ is a vector in $\mathcal{R}^{n K+L}$, such that the element of public goods $k$ associated with $\boldsymbol{q}_{i}^{k}$ is 1 , and the other elements are all zero. Then, by the strong monotonicity of preferences and the fact that $e_{y}^{k}$ is equally distributed among all economic agents, we have $\hat{\boldsymbol{z}} \in P\left(\boldsymbol{x}^{*}, \boldsymbol{y}^{*}\right)$. Therefore, from (15.5.29), we have

$$
\begin{equation*}
\hat{\boldsymbol{q}} \boldsymbol{y}-\boldsymbol{p} \boldsymbol{v}+\boldsymbol{q}_{i}^{k} \geqq \hat{\boldsymbol{q}} \boldsymbol{y}-\boldsymbol{p} \boldsymbol{v} \tag{15.5.30}
\end{equation*}
$$

Consequently,

$$
\begin{equation*}
\boldsymbol{q}_{i}^{k} \geqq 0, \quad k=1,2, \cdots, K ; i=1,2, \cdots, n . \tag{15.5.31}
\end{equation*}
$$

Now, we prove that $\boldsymbol{p} \geqq 0$. Let $\boldsymbol{e}_{x}^{l}=(0, \cdots, 1,0, \cdots, 0)$ be a vector in $\mathcal{R}^{n K+L}$, such that the element associated with good $l$ is 1 , and other elements are zero. Repeating the above procedure, we have

$$
\begin{equation*}
\boldsymbol{p}_{i}^{l} \geqq 0, \quad l=1,2, \cdots, L . \tag{15.5.32}
\end{equation*}
$$

Lastly, we prove $\boldsymbol{p} \neq 0$ by contradiction. If $\boldsymbol{p}=0$, since $\left(\boldsymbol{q}_{1}, \cdots, \boldsymbol{q}_{n}, \boldsymbol{p}\right) \neq$ 0 , then for some public good $k$, we must have its price $\boldsymbol{q}^{k}=\sum_{i=1}^{n} \boldsymbol{q}_{i}^{k}>$ 0 . Since the production of public goods exhibits constant returns to scale, when $\boldsymbol{p}=0$, the costs for all private goods as inputs are zero. Then, the profit may be infinitely large, which contradicts the fact that $y$ is a profit-maximizing plan.
3. For all $i$, if $\left(\boldsymbol{x}_{i}, \boldsymbol{y}\right) \succcurlyeq\left(\boldsymbol{x}_{i}^{*}, \boldsymbol{y}^{*}\right)$, then $\sum_{i} \boldsymbol{p} \boldsymbol{x}_{i}+\hat{\boldsymbol{q}} \boldsymbol{y} \geqq \sum_{i} \boldsymbol{p} \boldsymbol{x}_{i}^{*}+\hat{\boldsymbol{q}} \boldsymbol{y}^{*}$.

For every $i$ and $\left(\boldsymbol{x}_{i}, \boldsymbol{y}\right) \succcurlyeq\left(\boldsymbol{x}_{i}^{*}, \boldsymbol{y}^{*}\right)$, by strong monotonicity of preferences, there exists $\left(\boldsymbol{x}_{i}^{\prime}, \boldsymbol{y}^{\prime}\right)$ that is arbitrarily close to $\left(\boldsymbol{x}_{i}, \boldsymbol{y}\right)$, such that $\left(\boldsymbol{x}_{i}^{\prime}, \boldsymbol{y}^{\prime}\right) \succ_{i}\left(\boldsymbol{x}_{i}, \boldsymbol{y}\right) \succcurlyeq_{i}\left(\boldsymbol{x}_{i}^{*}, \boldsymbol{y}^{*}\right)$, and thus $\left(\boldsymbol{y}^{\prime}, \cdots, \boldsymbol{y}^{\prime} ; \sum_{i}\left(\boldsymbol{x}_{i}^{\prime}-\boldsymbol{w}_{i}\right)\right) \in$ $P\left(\boldsymbol{x}^{*}, \boldsymbol{y}^{*}\right)$. In addition, note that $\left(\boldsymbol{y}^{*}, \cdots, \boldsymbol{y}^{*} ; \sum_{i}\left(\boldsymbol{x}_{i}^{*}-\boldsymbol{w}_{i}\right)\right) \in W$. Thus, by (15.5.29), we have

$$
\sum_{i} p x_{i}^{\prime}+\hat{q} y^{\prime} \geqq \sum_{i} p x_{i}^{*}+\hat{q} y^{*}
$$

Let $\boldsymbol{x}_{i}^{\prime} \rightarrow \boldsymbol{x}_{i}$. We have $\sum_{i} \boldsymbol{p} \boldsymbol{x}_{i}+\hat{\boldsymbol{q}} \boldsymbol{y} \geqq \sum_{i} \boldsymbol{p} \boldsymbol{x}_{i}^{*}+\hat{\boldsymbol{q}} \boldsymbol{y}^{*}$.
4. For all $i$, if $\left(\boldsymbol{x}_{i}, \boldsymbol{y}\right) \succcurlyeq\left(\boldsymbol{x}_{i}^{*}, \boldsymbol{y}^{*}\right)$, then $\boldsymbol{p} \boldsymbol{x}_{i}+\boldsymbol{q}_{i} \boldsymbol{y} \geqq \boldsymbol{p} \boldsymbol{x}_{i}^{*}+\boldsymbol{q}_{i} \boldsymbol{y}^{*}$. Let

$$
\begin{aligned}
\left(\boldsymbol{x}_{i}^{\prime}, \boldsymbol{y}^{\prime}\right) & =\left(\boldsymbol{x}_{i}, \boldsymbol{y}\right), \\
\left(\boldsymbol{x}_{m}^{\prime}, \boldsymbol{y}^{\prime}\right) & =\left(\boldsymbol{x}_{m}^{*}, \boldsymbol{y}^{*}\right), \quad m \neq i .
\end{aligned}
$$

Then, it follows from step 3 that

$$
\boldsymbol{p} \boldsymbol{x}_{i}+\boldsymbol{q}_{i} \boldsymbol{y}+\sum_{m \neq i}\left(\boldsymbol{p} \boldsymbol{x}_{m}^{*}+\boldsymbol{q}_{m} \boldsymbol{y}^{*}\right) \geqq \sum_{j} \boldsymbol{p} \boldsymbol{x}_{j}^{*}+\sum_{i} \boldsymbol{q}_{i} \boldsymbol{y}^{*}
$$

therefore

$$
\boldsymbol{p} x_{i}+q_{i} y \geqq p x_{i}^{*}+q_{i} y^{*} .
$$

5. For all $i$, if $\left(\boldsymbol{x}_{i}, \boldsymbol{y}\right) \succ\left(\boldsymbol{x}_{i}^{*}, \boldsymbol{y}^{*}\right)$, then $\boldsymbol{p} \boldsymbol{x}_{i}+\boldsymbol{q}_{i} \boldsymbol{y}>\boldsymbol{p} \boldsymbol{x}_{i}^{*}+\boldsymbol{q}_{i} \boldsymbol{y}^{*} \equiv I_{i}$.

If the conclusion does not hold, then

$$
\begin{equation*}
\boldsymbol{p} \boldsymbol{x}_{i}+\boldsymbol{q}_{i} \boldsymbol{y}=\boldsymbol{p} \boldsymbol{x}_{i}^{*}+\boldsymbol{q}_{i} \boldsymbol{y}^{*} . \tag{15.5.33}
\end{equation*}
$$

Since $\left(\boldsymbol{x}_{i}, \boldsymbol{y}\right) \succ\left(\boldsymbol{x}_{i}^{*}, \boldsymbol{y}^{*}\right)$, when $0<\lambda<1$ is sufficiently close to 1 , it follows from the continuity of preferences that $\left(\lambda \boldsymbol{x}_{i}, \lambda \boldsymbol{y}\right) \succ\left(\boldsymbol{x}_{i}^{*}, \boldsymbol{y}^{*}\right)$. From the conclusion of step 4, we have $\lambda\left(\boldsymbol{p} \boldsymbol{x}_{i}+\boldsymbol{q}_{i} \boldsymbol{y}\right) \geqq \boldsymbol{p} \boldsymbol{x}_{i}^{*}+\boldsymbol{q}_{i} \boldsymbol{y}^{*}=$ $\boldsymbol{p} \boldsymbol{x}_{i}+\boldsymbol{q}_{i} \boldsymbol{y}$.

Since $\boldsymbol{x}^{*} \in \mathcal{R}_{++}^{n L}$, from step 2 where we have $\left(\boldsymbol{q}_{1}, \cdots, \boldsymbol{q}_{n}, \boldsymbol{p}\right) \geqq 0$ and $\boldsymbol{p} \neq 0$, we already know that $\boldsymbol{p} \boldsymbol{x}_{i}+\boldsymbol{q}_{i} \boldsymbol{y}=\boldsymbol{p} \boldsymbol{x}_{i}^{*}+\boldsymbol{q}_{i} \boldsymbol{y}^{*}>0$; therefore, $\lambda \geqq 1$, which contradicts the fact that $\lambda<1$.

Thus, all of the conditions of the Lindahl equilibrium with transfers are satisfied.

### 15.6 Free-Rider Problem

When the MRS is known, Pareto efficient allocation ( $\mathbf{x}, y$ ) can be determined from the Lindahl-Samuelson condition or the Lindahl solution. Subsequently, the contribution of each consumer is given by $g_{i}=w_{i}-x_{i}$. However, since individuals' preferences are private information, a social planner does not normally know the information about MRS. Of course, it would be naive to think that each individual will truthfully reveal her preferences and determine the willingness-to-pay based on the revealed information. Since all economic agents are self-interested, generally they will not tell the true MRS, so they may be able to make a smaller contribution.

Indeed, if consumers realize that their shares of the contribution for producing public goods (or the personalized prices) depend on their report of MRS, they have "incentives to deceive." In other words, when the consumers are asked to report their preferences or MRSs, they will have incentives to report their economic characteristics so that they can pay less to consume the public goods, resulting in insufficient provision of public goods and leading to Pareto inefficient allocations. This is the so-called free-rider problem. This is also why it is difficult to raise sufficient funds for the provision of public goods through voluntary contribution.

To see this, note that the social goal is to reach Pareto efficient allocations for a public goods economy. However, from the perspective of personal interest, the utility maximization problem of each person is the following:

$$
\begin{equation*}
\max u_{i}\left(x_{i}, y\right) \tag{15.6.34}
\end{equation*}
$$

subject to

$$
\begin{aligned}
g_{i} & \in\left[0, w_{i}\right] \\
x_{i}+g_{i} & =w_{i} ; \\
y & =f\left(g_{i}+\sum_{j \neq i}^{n} g_{j}\right) .
\end{aligned}
$$

That is, each consumer $i$ maximizes her payoffs when others' strategies $\boldsymbol{g}_{-i}$ are given. From this problem, we can form a non-cooperative game:

$$
\Gamma=\left(G_{i}, \phi_{i}\right)_{i=1}^{n},
$$

where $G_{i}=\left[0, w_{i}\right]$ is the strategy space of consumer $i$ and $\phi_{i}: G_{1} \times G_{2} \times$ $\cdots \times G_{n} \rightarrow R$ is the payoff function of consumer $i$, which is defined by

$$
\begin{equation*}
\phi_{i}\left(g_{i}, \mathbf{g}_{-i}\right)=u_{i}\left[\left(w_{i}-g_{i}\right), f\left(g_{i}+\sum_{j \neq i}^{n} g_{j}\right)\right] \tag{15.6.35}
\end{equation*}
$$

For the game $\Gamma=\left(G_{i}, \phi_{i}\right)_{i=1}^{n}$, the strategy $\mathbf{g}^{*}=\left(g_{1}^{*}, \cdots, g_{n}^{*}\right)$ is a Nash Equilibrium if

$$
\phi_{i}\left(g_{i}^{*}, \mathbf{g}_{-i}^{*}\right) \geqq \phi_{i}\left(g_{i}, \mathbf{g}_{-i}^{*}\right) \quad \forall g_{i} \in G_{i}, \forall i=1,2, \cdots, n
$$

and $\mathbf{g}^{*}$ is a dominant strategy equilibrium if

$$
\phi_{i}\left(g_{i}^{*}, \mathbf{g}_{-i}\right) \geqq \phi_{i}\left(g_{i}, \mathbf{g}_{-i}\right) \quad \forall g_{i} \in G_{i}, \forall i=1,2, \cdots, n .
$$

As usual, a dominant strategy equilibrium is a Nash equilibrium, but the converse may not be true. There is a dominant strategy only for very special payoff functions, while a Nash equilibrium exists for continuous and quasi-concave payoff functions that are defined on a compact set.

For Nash equilibrium, if $u_{i}$ and $f$ are differentiable, then the FOC is:

$$
\begin{equation*}
\frac{\partial \phi_{i}\left(\mathbf{g}^{*}\right)}{\partial g_{i}} \leqq 0, \text { with equality if } g_{i}>0, \quad \forall i=1, \cdots, n \tag{15.6.36}
\end{equation*}
$$

Thus, we have

$$
\frac{\partial \phi_{i}}{\partial g_{i}}=\frac{\partial u_{i}}{\partial x_{i}}(-1)+\frac{\partial u_{i}}{\partial y} f^{\prime}\left(g_{i}^{*}+\sum_{j \neq i}^{n} g_{j}\right) \leqq 0, \text { with equality if } g_{i}>0 .
$$

So, at an interior-point solution $\mathrm{g}^{*}$, we have

$$
\frac{\frac{\partial u_{i}}{\partial y}}{\frac{\partial u_{i}}{\partial x_{i}}}=\frac{1}{f^{\prime}\left(g_{i}^{*}+\sum_{j \neq i} g_{j}\right)},
$$

and thus

$$
M R S_{y x_{i}}^{i}=M R T S_{y v}
$$

which does not satisfy the Lindahl-Samuelson condition. Therefore, the Nash equilibrium, in general, does not result in Pareto efficient allocations.

The above equation implies that a lower level of public good is provided, rather than the Pareto efficient level of the public good, when utility functions are quasi-concave because of diminishing MRS (see Figure 15.1). Therefore, Nash equilibrium allocations are, in general, not consistent with Pareto efficient allocations. Then, how can one solve this free-rider problem? We will answer this question in Part VI using mechanism design the-


Figure 15.1: Free-rider results in a lower provision of public goods than the level of Pareto efficient provision of public goods.
ory. Vickrey-Clarke-Groves mechanism of demand revelation can solve the problem of efficient provision of public goods.

### 15.7 Biographies

### 15.7.1 Ludwig Mises

Ludwig von Mises (1881-1973), the third generation head of the Austrian School and a member of the Mont Pelerin Society, enrolled at the University of Vienna in 1900, where he was greatly influenced by Carl Menger (18401921) and received a doctoral degree from the School of Law in 1906. From 1909 to 1934, he was an economist for the Vienna Chamber of Commerce. After World War I, he also served as a legal advisor to a government agency, where he was responsible for drafting the terms of the final war-treaty to resolve pre-war private debt problems between belligerents. On New Year's Day in 1927, the Austrian Institute for Business Cycle Research that he founded was formally established, and Hayek became its first director.

In 1934-1940, he moved to Geneva as a professor at the Graduate Institute of International Studies. In 1940, he moved to New York. At that time, Keynesianism in the U.S. academic world was prevalent, Mises' liberalism was clearly out of the mainstream, and he was not employed by any academic organization. In 1945, through the recommendation of the Lawrence

Fertig \& William Volker Foundation , Mises entered New York University, but he could only serve as a visiting professor. In 1949, Mises published his important work "Human Behavior." Even so, he was only able to find a visiting professor position until his retirement in 1969.

For a long time, even though Mises' ideas had not been accepted by mainstream economists, his ideological influence and knowledge contribution to 20th century human society cannot be ignored. To a certain extent, it could be said that the history of economic thought of human society in the 20th century is incomplete without the inclusion of Mises. In 2000, America's "Freedom" magazine referred to Mises as "the century figure of libertarianism."

The reason why Mises occupied such an important position in the history of contemporary human society is mainly because Mises made numerous remarkable theoretical contributions in understanding the basic principles of human economic and social operations. In addition to his theoretical contributions in inflation, economic cycles, economic epistemology and methodology, and his own unique cataliactics (i.e., a theory of the way that the free market system reaches exchange ratios and prices) and praxeology, his main theoretical contributions lie in the early 1920s. He presented the following major theoretical insight: In the absence of a market price mechanism, the impossibility of economic computations will result in the infeasibility of a centrally planned economy.

### 15.7.2 Douglass North

Douglass C. North (1920-2015), as the founder and pioneer of New Economic History (Cliometrics), New Institutional Economics, and New Political Economy, was one of the most important and influential economists in the late 20th century. In 1942 and 1952, respectively, he received a bachelor's degree and a Ph.D. degree from the University of California, Berkeley. He began teaching at the University of Washington in 1951, taught at Rice University in 1979, at Cambridge University in 1981-1982, and returned to the University of Washington in 1982. North was awarded the 1993 Nobel Memorial Prize in Economic Sciences for renewed research in economic
history by applying economic theory and quantitative methods in order to explain economic and institutional change.

The main contribution of North was innovation in research methodologies, i.e., to study new objects with the methods of neoclassical economics. In other words, he used neoclassical economics and econometrics to investigate economic history. His early research on ocean shipping and the balance of payments of the U.S., in line with the school of new economic history represented by Robert W. Fogel (1926-2013), combined neoclassical production theory with data obtained in economic history research. This new method has revolutionized the study of economic history. North, however, was not satisfied with this. He also used property rights theory to explain the impact of institutional change on economic performance in U.S. history. North's early work, such as The Economic Growth of the United States: 1790-1860 and Growth and Welfare in the American Past: A New Economic History, fully reflect this.

From the 1980s, North began to use property rights theory of the new institutional economics to analyze the more general theory of industrialization in the western world in the last two centuries with the purpose to explore the causes of economic growth in the western world, internal relations between economic growth and institutional change, the trend of interaction between the property rights system and economic development, and the inherent requirements of economic development for institutions. North's works in this area include The Rise of the Western World: A New Economic History and Institutional Change and the American Economic Growth.

From the 1990s, North began to summarize his experience of 30 years' research on economic history, and extracted some theories that became important contributions to economics, and especially to the new institutional economics. His works in this area primarily include Institutions, Institutional Change, and Economic Performance. Overall, North's contribution to economics mainly includes three aspects: first, he used the method of institutional economics to explain economic growth in history; second, as one of the founders of the new institutional economics, North re-examined the role of institutions, including the property rights system; and third, North applied institutions, a concept that was not involved in neoclassical eco-
nomics, as an endogenous variable in economic research. In particular, the property rights system, ideology, state, and ethics are taken as variables in economic evolution and economic development. The theory of institutional change has thus been greatly developed.

Property rights theory, state theory, and ideology theory are the three cornerstones of North's theory of institutional change. In particular, they are the theory of property rights that describes incentives for individuals and groups in institutions ; the theory of the state that defines and enforces property rights; and the theory of ideology that influences people's different reactions on the change of objective existence, which explains why people have different understandings in practice. It is worth mentioning that North always used cost-benefit analysis to demonstrate the rationality of the choice of property rights system, the necessity of the existence of the state, and the importance of ideology. Such analysis makes his theory remarkably persuasive.

### 15.8 Exercises

Exercise 15.1 Prove that, for a public goods economy, weak Pareto efficient allocation is Pareto efficient when preferences satisfy strong monotonicity, continuity, and strict convexity.

Exercise 15.2 (Pareto efficiency of Lindahl equilibrium) Consider a public goods economy with $n$ individuals who consume one private good $x$ and one public good $y$ in consumption space $Z_{i}=\mathcal{R}_{+}^{2}$. Each individual $i$ is endowed with $w_{i}$ units of private good. There are no initial endowments for the public good, but the public good can be produced from the private good, according to a production technology

$$
y=\frac{1}{q} v .
$$

The utility function of individual $i$ is denoted by $u_{i}\left(x_{i}, y\right)$, which is continuously differentiable and satisfies

$$
\frac{\partial u_{i}}{\partial x_{i}}>0 \quad \text { for all } \quad i=1,2, \ldots, n
$$

1. Define the Lindahl equilibrium and Pareto efficiency for this economy, without assuming representation of preferences by utility functions.
2. For interior Pareto efficiency, is it necessary that all individuals have the same marginal rate of substitution, i.e., that

$$
\frac{\frac{\partial u_{1}}{\partial y}}{\frac{\partial u_{1}}{\partial x_{1}}}=\frac{\frac{\partial u_{2}}{\partial y}}{\frac{\partial u_{2}}{\partial x_{2}}}=\ldots=\frac{\frac{\partial u_{2}}{\partial y}}{\frac{\partial u_{n}}{\partial x_{n}}}
$$

If yes, provide a proof. If not, provide a counter example.
3. Now, suppose the utility functions are of the quasi-linear form $u_{i}=$ $x_{i}+v_{i}(y)$ with $v_{i}$ strictly increasing, strictly concave, and continuously differentiable.
(a) At interior Pareto efficient solutions $\left(x_{1}^{*}, x_{2}^{*}, \ldots, x_{n}^{*}, y^{*}\right)$, does $y^{*}$ vary with $\left(x_{1}^{*}, x_{2}^{*}, \ldots, x_{n}^{*}\right)$ ? Why or why not?
(b) Is the answer to part (a) different when quasi-linearity is not assumed? Why or why not?
(c) Suppose that $n=2, w_{1}=5, w_{2}=4$, production function is given by $y=1 / 2 v$, and utility function is given by

$$
\begin{aligned}
& u_{1}=x_{1}+\alpha \ln y \\
& u_{2}=x_{2}+\beta \ln y
\end{aligned}
$$

Find the Lindahl equilibrium for this economy.
Exercise 15.3 Consider a public goods economy with one private good, $x$, one public good, $y$, and $n$ agents. Each agents consumption set is the nonnegative quadrant. Each agent $i$ is endowed with $w_{i}$ units of private good. There are no initial endowments for the public good, but the public good can be produced from the private good, according to a production technology $y=v$. Utility functions of agents are given by

$$
u_{i}\left(x_{i}, y\right)=x_{i}+c_{i} \ln y, \quad c_{i}>0 .
$$

1. Define the Lindahl equilibrium and Pareto efficient allocation for this economy.
2. Find the set of interior Pareto efficient allocations.
3. Find the set of interior Lindahl equilibria. Does the First Theorem of Welfare Economics hold for Lindahl equilibria in the above economy? Justify your answer.
4. For the above economy, find the set of interior competitive equilibria (if necessary, specify values $c_{i}$ for which competitive equilibria exist). Does the First Theorem of Welfare Economics hold for competitive equilibria in the above economy? Justify your answer.

## Exercise 15.4 Consider an economy with two consumers and two goods.

One of these goods, $y$, is public, and the other good, $x$, is private. The consumer's preferences can be represented by $u_{1}(x, y)=x y$ and $u_{2}(x, y)=$ $x y^{2}$. The public good can be produced, by either consumer, with the production function $y=\frac{1}{2} x$. Consumer 1 has 20 units of $x$, and consumer 2 has 20 units of $x$. Let $y_{i}$ be the production of $y$ by consumer $i$.

1. Find the conditions for Pareto efficiency in this economy, and then all possible Pareto efficient allocations.
2. Assume that each consumer takes the other's production of $y$ as given and then maximizes personal utility. What is the Nash equilibrium? Is it Pareto efficient.
3. Find the Lindahl equilibrium.
4. Show that the Lindahl equilibrium allocation for the economy is Pareto efficient.

Exercise 15.5 Consider a public good economy with one private good $x$, one public good $y$, and $n$ consumers whose consumption choice sets are non-negative in each dimension. Each consumer $i$ owns $w_{i}$ units of private good, and they do not own public good which can be produced with a production function of $y=v$. The utility function for each consumer $i$ is
represented by $u_{i}\left(x_{i}, y\right)$, which may not be differentiable (note that it is then not possible to answer the following questions 1 and 2 with differential methods).

1. Define Lindahl equilibrium and Pareto efficient allocation of the economy.
2. Prove that every Lindahl equilibrium allocation is Pareto efficient. (Hint: If you need additional assumptions, make it clear in the proof.)
3. Now, suppose that $u_{i}$ is differentiable. Then, give the Lindahl-Samuelson first-order conditions for Pareto efficient allocation.
4. When the consumer's utility function is $u_{i}\left(x_{i}, y\right)=\left(x_{i}+1\right)^{\alpha_{i}} y^{\left(1-\alpha_{i}\right)}$ and $0<\alpha_{i}<1$, find the Lindahl equilibrium. Is it Pareto efficient?

Exercise 15.6 Consider an economy with two goods, a private (rivalrous) good $x$, e.g., leisure, and a public (non-rivalrous) good $y$, e.g., radio broadcast music. Both goods are measured in hours per day. There are two consumers, 1 and 2 , and one firm. The firm produces $y$, using labor $v$ as input. (Thus, if consumer $i$ supplies $v_{i}$ units of labor to the firm, then the amount of leisure left to $i$ is $x_{i}=w_{i}-v_{i}$, where $w_{i}$ is $i$ 's initial endowment of leisure.) Let the production function of the firm be linear (constant returns to scale), with $k$ units of $v$ needed to produce one unit of $y$ at any scale of output $(k>0)$. There is no free disposal. The initial endowments $w_{i}$ of $x$ are positive, but the initial endowment of $y$ is zero.

Assume that each consumption set is $Z_{i}=\mathcal{R}_{+}^{L+K}$, and the utility function of consumer $i$ is given by:

$$
\begin{equation*}
u_{i}=x_{i}+\phi_{i}(y), \tag{15.8.37}
\end{equation*}
$$

where the valuation function $\phi_{i}(y)$ is twice differentiable, and has a positive derivative $\phi_{i}^{\prime}(y)>0$, and a negative second derivative $\phi_{i}^{\prime \prime}(y)<0$ for all $y \geqq 0$, for $i=1,2$. (Remember, it is assumed that $w_{i}>0$ for $i=1,2$.)

Suppose that each consumer $i$ voluntarily chooses to contribute an amount of labor $v_{i} \geqq 0$ toward the production of the public good $y$, with $v_{i}<w_{i}$. By definition, at a Nash equilibrium allocation, written ( $\bar{x}_{1}, \bar{x}_{2}, \bar{v}_{1}, \bar{v}_{2}, \bar{y}$ ),
each consumer $i$ maximizes $u_{i}$, treating $v_{j}$ as given (for $j \neq i$ ), and taking into account the equality

$$
\begin{equation*}
k y=v_{1}+v_{2} \tag{15.8.38}
\end{equation*}
$$

Answer the following questions (a)-(e) and explain your answers to these questions as fully as possible.

1. Find the conditions that characterize Pareto efficient allocations. (These will be equations in $x_{1}, x_{2}, y$ and the original endowments.)
2. Suppose that, at a Nash equilibrium, consumer 2 contributes a positive amount of labor, but is still left with positive amounts of leisure, i.e., $w_{2}>\bar{v}_{2}>0$, while consumer 1 contributes nothing, i.e., $\bar{v}_{1}=0$. Could such an equilibrium be Pareto optimal?
3. Suppose that, at a Nash equilibrium, both consumers contribute positive amounts of labor, but are still left with positive amounts of leisure. Could such an equilibrium be Pareto optimal?
4. Suppose that, at a Nash equilibrium, neither consumer contributes any labor. Could such an equilibrium be Pareto optimal?
5. Define the Lindahl equilibrium, and prove that every Lindal equilibrium is Pareto efficient under local non-satiation.

Exercise 15.7 Consider a public economy with $n$ consumers, one private good $x$ and one public good $y$. Each consumer has a consumption space $Z_{i}=\mathcal{R}_{+}^{2}$, an endowment of the private good $w_{i}=10$, and her preferences can be represented by $u_{i}\left(x_{i}, y\right)=x_{i}+\theta_{i} \ln y$. The production technology of the public good is $f(q)=q$, where $q$ represents the input of the private good in production.

1. Find the Pareto optimal allocation. How does this answer change with $n$ ?
2. If each person contributes some of her endowment to produce the public good, what is the Nash equilibrium of voluntary contributions? How does this answer change with $n$ ?
3. If a government chooses to impose an individual tax of $\epsilon$ on each person to produce $n \epsilon$ units of the public good, and each individual decides whether to make an extra contribution to the public good, what is the total amount of the public good provided in this way (Assume that $\epsilon$ is very small)?
4. If the government can only collect an income tax at the rate of $\tau$, and all taxes are employed to produce the public good, what is the tax rate that can guarantee the efficient provision of the public good? If consumers vote to determine the tax rate, what is the tax rate determined by majority voting? What is the difference compared to the situation in which all consumers have the same preference parameter $\theta$ ?

Exercise 15.8 (Public goods and group size) Consider a public good economy with $n$ identical economic agents, one private good, and one public good. Suppose that consumer $i$ 's consumption space $Z_{i}=\mathcal{R}_{+}^{2}$ and the utility function is $u_{i}\left(x_{i}, y\right)=x_{i}+h(y)$, where $x_{i}$ represents the private good consumed by consumer $i$ and $y$ represents the public good. Suppose that $h$ is concave, differentiable, monotonically increasing, and satisfies $\lim _{y \rightarrow 0} h^{\prime}(y)>1$ and $\lim _{y \rightarrow \infty} h^{\prime}(y)=0$. Each agent has an endowment $\omega$ of the private good, and the amount of endowment is sufficiently large, such that the non-negativity constraint of private consumption is always non-binding. The public good production exhibits constant returns to scale. One unit of private good can produce one unit of public good, and only symmetric allocations are discussed.

1. Prove that the optimal provision level of the public good is an increasing function of $n$.
2. The level of the public good provided under the voluntary contribution equilibrium is independent of the number of people $n$. Provide an explanation for this.

Exercise 15.9 Consider a public good economy with $n$ identical economic agents, one private good, and one public good. One way to resolve the free-rider problem proposed in the economics literature is to reward the
contribution for public goods in the form of a lottery: if an individual $i$ contributes $z_{i}$, then there is a probability of $\frac{z_{i}}{\sum_{j=1}^{z_{j}}}$ to win the lottery worth $R$ units of private good. Personal contributions are used both to raise funds for public goods and to provide lottery bonuses, and thus only $\sum_{j=1}^{n} z_{j}-R$ of the contribution is put into public good production. Suppose that the lottery bonus $R$ is independent of $n$. Prove that under the symmetric Nash equilibrium in which each individual contributes $z(z$ is a function of $n$ and R):

1. If $n>1$, the provision level of the public good $y=n z-R$ is always greater than the voluntary provision level specified in the previous question.
2. The provision level of the public good $y=n z-R$ increases with $n$.
3. When $n \rightarrow \infty$, the provision level of the public good approaches a finite value.
4. Now, suppose that when $n \rightarrow \infty$, the optimal provision level of the public good also approaches infinity. The conclusion in the above question 3 is somehow negative. Therefore, assume that the total bonus increases with $n: R=n r$. Prove:
(a) The provision level of the public good $y=n(z-r)$ increases with $n$.
(b) When $n \rightarrow \infty$, the public good level also approaches infinity. Provide an explanation for this result.

Exercise 15.10 (Tragedy of the Commons) Suppose that there are $n$ households in a village, and each household has the right to raise dairy cows in a public pasture. The number of dairy cows raised by farmer $i$ is $x_{i}$. The amount of milk that a cow can produce depends on the number of cows $\hat{x}$ grazing on the pasture. Assume that the income of farmer $i$ raising $x_{i}$ cows is $x_{i} v(\hat{x}) . v(\hat{x})>0$ when $\hat{x}<\hat{x}_{0}, v(\hat{x})=0$ when $\hat{x}>\hat{x}_{0}$, where $v(0)>0$, $v^{\prime}<0$ and $v 0<0$. The cost per cow is $c$, and assume that the cow can be perfectly segmented and that $v(0)>c$. Each household also decides how
many cows to purchase at the same time, and all of the cows bought will graze on the public pasture.

1. Determine the game for the households.
2. Find the Nash equilibrium, and compare it with the socially optimal result.

Exercise 15.11 Consider a public good economy with $n$ individuals, one private good $x$, and one public good $y$. The total endowment of private good is $w$, and public good can be produced from the private good with cost function $c(y)$. The utility function for consumer $i$ is $u_{i}\left(x_{i}, y\right)=x_{i}+$ $v_{i}(y)$, where $v_{i}$ is an arbitrary function defined on $\mathcal{R}_{+}$. Each consumer's consumption set is $\mathcal{R} \times \mathcal{R}_{+}$, and the consumption of public good is nonnegative. The private good cannot be utilized for public consumption.

1. Suppose that destruction is cost-free. Write down all of the inequalities that describe the feasible allocation $\left(x_{1}, \cdots, x_{n}, y\right)$.
2. The public good consumption $y$ is said to be "surplus maximizing" if the following condition is satisfied:

$$
y \in \arg \max _{y^{\prime} \leqq 0} \sum_{i} v_{i}\left(y^{\prime}\right)-c\left(y^{\prime}\right) .
$$

Consider whether the proposition is correct:
"If $y$ is the surplus maximizing public good consumption, then any feasible allocation that produces $y$ units of public good must be Pareto optimal."

Prove your answer.
3. Consider whether the proposition is correct:

> "If the allocation $\left(x_{1}, \cdots, x_{n}, y\right)$ is Pareto optimal, then $y$ is surplus-maximizing."

Prove your answer.

Exercise 15.12 Suppose that there are $n$ fishermen in a fishing village. Some fishermen fish in the sea. Since the sea is large enough, irrespective of how many fishermen go fishing, every fisherman can catch $k$ fish. There are some other fishermen who fish a lake (the fish in the sea and the fish in the lake are perfect substitutes). If $x$ fishermen go fishing in the lake, then each fisherman can catch $x^{-1 / 2}$ fish (i.e., these fishermen can catch $x^{1 / 2}$ fish in total, and every fisherman catches the same number of fish).

1. For fishermen, it is cost-free to choose between fishing in the lake or in the sea, and no fishermen go where they believe they will catch less fish. How many fishermen will go fishing in the sea? How many fishermen will go fishing in the lake? How many fish will they catch, on average?
2. If the government restricts fishing in the lake, how many fishermen should be allowed to go fishing in the lake in order to maximize fishing capacity in this community?
3. If the demand function of the fish is assumed to be

$$
Q=A-B P,
$$

compare the price of fish in the market without restriction to that under efficient allocation.
4. Now, suppose that the fish in the lake and the fish in the sea are not perfect substitutes. The price of marine fish is $\$ 20$ each, and the demand for fish in the lake is

$$
Q_{L}=A^{\prime}-B^{\prime} P_{L} .
$$

If there are no restrictions on fishermen, how many fishermen will go fishing in the lake at equilibrium? If the government collects a fixed license fee on fishermen who go fishing in the lake, will the price of fish in the lake rise or fall? Write the derivation process.

Exercise 15.13 Suppose that $n$ economic agents have the same Cobb-Douglas utility function $u_{i}\left(x_{i}, y\right)=x_{i}^{\alpha} y^{1-\alpha}$ and the consumption set $Z_{i}=\mathcal{R}_{+}^{2}$. The total amount of wealth is $w$, and they are divided among $k \leqq n$ individuals. How many public goods are provided? How does the quantity of public goods change when $k$ increases?

Exercise 15.14 An ancient village uses some goods (e.g., sheep) for two purposes: either as food or as a public religious sacrifice. Suppose that villager $i$ 's initial endowment of sheep is $w_{i}>0$. Let $x_{i} \geqq 0$ be the consumption of sheep, and $g_{i} \geqq 0$ be the amount for public sacrifice. The total amount of sheep used for sacrifice is $y=\sum_{i=1}^{n} g_{i}$. The utility function for villager $i$ is given by:

$$
u_{i}\left(x_{i}, y\right)=x_{i}+a_{i} \ln y,
$$

where $a_{i}>1$.

1. When deciding on their sacrifice, each villager $i$ regards that the sacrifice of other villagers remain fixed, and on this basis she decides on the sacrifice that she would offer. Let

$$
y_{-i}=\sum_{j \neq i} g_{i}
$$

be the sacrifice, except villager $i$. Provide the utility-maximizing problem that determines the sacrifice of villager $i$.
2. Recall that for all individuals $i, y=g_{i}+y_{-i}$. What is the equilibrium amount of public good? (Hint: Not everyone will contribute positive public good.)
3. Who will be a free-rider in this problem?
4. In this economy, what is the Pareto efficient quantity of public good to be provided?

Exercise 15.15 A town has a population of 1,000 , and each resident's utility function is $u_{i}\left(x_{i}, y\right)=\left(x_{i}+k_{i}\right) y^{\alpha}$, where $y$ is the size of the town's ice-skating rink measured in square meters, and $x_{i}$ is the number of bread
consumed by resident $i$ each year. Suppose that the price of a loaf of bread is 1 , and the price of maintaining a square meter of skating rink is also 1 . Each resident have a different income $w_{i}$. Find the Lindahl equilibrium for this town. Under the Lindahl equilibrium, how much should the government raise from resident $i$ ?

Exercise 15.16 (The First Welfare Theorem of Lindahl Allocation with Transfers) Prove Theorem 15.4.3: given the public goods economy e $=$ $\left(e_{1}, \cdots, e_{n},\left\{Y_{j}\right\}\right)$, every Lindahl equilibrium allocation $\left(\boldsymbol{x}^{*}, \boldsymbol{y}^{*}\right)$ with transfers, and the price system $\left(\boldsymbol{q}_{i}^{*}, \cdots, \boldsymbol{q}_{n}^{*}, \boldsymbol{p}^{*}\right)$, is weakly Pareto efficient. If the consumers' preferences also satisfy local non-satiation, it is Pareto efficient.

Exercise 15.17 (The First Welfare Theorem of Welfare Economics with strictly convex preference) Suppose that $\succcurlyeq_{i}$ is strictly convex. Let allocation $(\boldsymbol{x}, \boldsymbol{y}) \in X \times Y$ and non-zero price vector $\left(\boldsymbol{q}_{1}, \cdots, \boldsymbol{q}_{n}, \boldsymbol{p}\right) \in \mathcal{R}_{+}^{L+n K}$ constitute a Lindahl equilibrium. Prove that the Lindahl equilibrium allocation is Pareto efficient.

Exercise 15.18 (Lindahl equilibrium, constrained Lindahl equilibrium, Lindahl quasi-equilibrium, and Pareto optimality) For the public goods economy $\mathbf{e}=\left(e_{1}, \cdots, e_{n},\left\{Y_{j}\right\}\right)$, suppose that for all $i, 0 \neq \boldsymbol{w}_{i} \in X_{i}=\mathcal{R}_{+}^{L}$ and $\succcurlyeq_{i}$ is preference ordering. Allocation $(\boldsymbol{x}, \boldsymbol{y}) \in X \times Y$ and non-zero price vector $\left(\boldsymbol{q}_{1}, \cdots, \boldsymbol{q}_{n}, \boldsymbol{p}\right) \in \mathcal{R}_{+}^{L+n K}$ constitute a constrained Lindahl equilibrium, if the other conditions in the definition remain the same, except that (ii) is replaced by
(ii') $\left(\boldsymbol{x}_{i}, \boldsymbol{y}\right) \succ_{i}\left(\boldsymbol{x}_{i}^{*}, \boldsymbol{y}^{*}\right)$ and $\boldsymbol{x}_{i}+\boldsymbol{y} \leqq \sum_{t=1}^{n} \boldsymbol{w}_{i}$ implies $\boldsymbol{p}^{*} \boldsymbol{x}_{i}+$ $\boldsymbol{q}_{i}^{*} \boldsymbol{y}>\boldsymbol{p}^{*} \boldsymbol{w}_{i}, \forall i=1, \cdots, n$.

Allocation $(\boldsymbol{x}, \boldsymbol{y}) \in X \times Y$ and non-zero price vector $\left(\boldsymbol{q}_{1}, \cdots, \boldsymbol{q}_{n}, \boldsymbol{p}\right) \in$ $\mathcal{R}_{+}^{L+n K}$ constitute a Lindahl quasi-equilibrium, if the other conditions in the definition remain the same, except that (ii) is replaced by
(ii0) $\left(\boldsymbol{x}_{i}, \boldsymbol{y}\right) \succcurlyeq_{i}\left(\boldsymbol{x}_{i}^{*}, \boldsymbol{y}^{*}\right)$ implies $\boldsymbol{p}^{*} \boldsymbol{x}_{i}+\boldsymbol{q}_{i}^{*} \boldsymbol{y} \geqq \boldsymbol{p}^{*} \boldsymbol{w}_{i}, \forall i=1, \cdots, n$.

1. We know that if preferences $\succcurlyeq_{i}$ satisfy local non-satiation, every Lindahl equilibrium allocation is Pareto optimal. What if the local nonsatiation is not satisfied?
2. Prove the following: If $\succcurlyeq_{i}$ satisfies convexity, then the interior-point constrained Lindahl equilibrium is a Lindahl equilibrium. Can the convexity be relaxed to local non-satiation?
3. Prove the following: If $\succcurlyeq_{i}$ satisfies strong monotonicity, then Lindahl equilibrium is Lindahl quasi-equilibrium. Can strong monotonicity be relaxed to monotonicity?
4. Prove the following: If a Lindahl equilibrium allocation is a Lindahl quasi-equilibrium allocation, it is Pareto efficient.
5. From the previous question, if $\succcurlyeq_{i}$ is strictly convex, the Lindahl equilibrium allocation is Pareto optimal. Then, if $\succcurlyeq_{i}$ is strictly convex, is Lindahl equilibrium necessarily a Lindahl quasi-equilibrium?
6. Suppose that $\succcurlyeq_{i}$ satisfies continuity for every individual $i$. Prove the following: If $\boldsymbol{p} \in \mathcal{R}_{++}^{L}$, the Lindahl quasi-equilibrium is a Lindahl equilibrium.
7. Suppose that for any individual $i, \succcurlyeq_{i}$ satisfies continuity and strong monotonicity. Prove the following: If $(\boldsymbol{p}, \boldsymbol{x})$ is a Lindahl quasi-equilibrium and $\boldsymbol{x}_{i} \in \operatorname{int} \mathcal{R}_{+}^{L}$ for some $i$, then $\boldsymbol{p} \in \mathcal{R}_{++}^{L}$.

## Exercise 15.19 (Economic Core Theorem in public economy) Prove Theo-

 rem 15.4.4: Under the local non-satiation of preferences, if $(\mathbf{x}, \mathbf{y}, \mathbf{p})$ is a Lindahl equilibrium, then $(\mathbf{x}, \mathbf{y})$ is in the core.
## Exercise 15.20 (The Second Theorem of Welfare Economics in a public

 goods economy with non-satiated preferences) Prove the theorem: for a given public goods economy $\mathbf{e}=\left(e_{1}, \cdots, e_{n},\left\{Y_{j}\right\}\right)$, suppose that preferences $\succcurlyeq_{i}$ are continuous, convex, and non-satiated. $Y$ is a closed convex set and $0 \in Y$. Then, for any Pareto optimal allocation $\left(\boldsymbol{x}^{*}, \boldsymbol{y}^{*}\right)$, there exists a non-zero price vector $\left(\boldsymbol{q}_{1}, \cdots, \boldsymbol{q}_{n}, \boldsymbol{p}\right) \in \mathcal{R}^{L+n K}$, such that $\left((\boldsymbol{x}, \boldsymbol{y}),\left(\boldsymbol{q}_{1}, \cdots, \boldsymbol{q}_{n}\right)\right.$, $\left.\boldsymbol{p}\right)$ is a Lindahl quasi-equilibrium with transfers. In other words, there is an assignment of wealth levels $\left(I_{1}, \cdots, I_{n}\right)$ with $\sum_{i} I_{i}=\boldsymbol{p} \sum_{i} \boldsymbol{w}_{i}$, such that(1) if $\left(\boldsymbol{x}_{i}, \boldsymbol{y}\right) \succ_{i}\left(\boldsymbol{x}_{i}^{*}, \boldsymbol{y}^{*}\right)$, then $\boldsymbol{p} \boldsymbol{x}_{i}+\boldsymbol{q}_{i} \boldsymbol{y} \geqq I_{i} \equiv \boldsymbol{p} \boldsymbol{x}_{i}^{*}+\boldsymbol{q}_{i} \boldsymbol{y}^{*}$, $i=1, \cdots, n$;
(2) for all $(\boldsymbol{y},-\boldsymbol{v}) \in Y$, we have $\hat{\boldsymbol{q}} \boldsymbol{y}^{*}-\boldsymbol{p} \boldsymbol{v}^{*} \geqq \hat{\boldsymbol{q}} \boldsymbol{y}-\boldsymbol{p} \boldsymbol{v}$,
where $\boldsymbol{v}^{*}=\sum_{i=1}^{n} \boldsymbol{w}_{i}-\sum_{i=1}^{n} \boldsymbol{x}_{i}^{*}, \sum_{i=1}^{n} \boldsymbol{q}_{i}=\hat{\boldsymbol{q}}$.
Furthermore, if for all $i, 0 \in X_{i}$ and $\boldsymbol{p} \boldsymbol{x}_{i}^{*}+\boldsymbol{q}_{i} \boldsymbol{y}^{*}>0$, then $\left(\boldsymbol{x}^{*}, \boldsymbol{y}^{*}, \boldsymbol{p}\right)$ is a Lindahl equilibrium with transfers.

### 15.9 References

## Books and Monographs:

Laffont, J. J. (1988). Fundamentals of Public Economics, Cambridge, MIT Press, Chapter 2.

Lindahl, E. (1958). "Die Gerechitgleit der Besteuring. Lund: Gleerup" [English tranlastion: Just Taxation-a Positive Solution, in Classics in the Theory of Public Finance, edited by R. A. Musgrave and A. T. Peacock. London: Macmillan].

Luenberger, D. (1995). Microeconomic Theory, McGraw-Hill, Inc., Chapter 9.

Mas-Colell, A., Whinston, M. D. and Green, J. (1995). Microeconomic Theory, Oxford University Press, Chapter 11.

Pigou, A. (1928). A Study in Public Finance, New York: Macmillan.
Salanie, B. (2000). Microeconomics of Market Failures, MIT Press, Chapters 5,6.

Varian, H. R. (1992). Microeconomic Analysis, Third Edition, W.W. Norton and Company, Chapter 23.

## Papers:

Foley, D. (1970). "Lindahl's Solution and the Core of an Economy with Public Goods" , Econometrica, Vol. 38, 66-72.

Milleron, J. C. (1972). "Theory of Value with Public Goods: A Survey Article", Journal of Economic Theory, Vol. 5, 419-477.

Muench, T. (1972). "The Core and the Lindahl Equilibrium of an Economy with a Public Good", Journal of Economic Theory, Vol. 4, 241-255.

Roberts, D. J. (1974). "The Lindahl Solution for Economies with Public Goods" , Journal of Public Economics, Vol. 3, 23-42.

Tian, G. (1988). "On the Constrained Walrasian and Lindahl Correspondences" , Economics Letters, Vol. 26, 299-303.

Tian, G. (1989). "Implementation of the Lindahl Correspondence by a Single-Valued, Feasible, and Continuous Mechanism", Review of Economic Studies, Vol. 56, 613-621.

Tian, G. (1990). "Completely Feasible and Continuous Nash-Implementation of the Lindahl Correspondence with a Message Space of Minimal Dimension" , Journal of Economic Theory, Vol. 51, 443-452.

Tian, G. (1991). "Implementation of Lindahl Allocations with NontotalNontransitive Preferences", Journal of Public Economics, Vol. 46, 247259.

Tian, G. (1993). "Implementing Lindahl Allocations by a Withholding Mechanism", Journal of Mathematical Economics, Vol. 22, 169-179.

Tian G. (1994a). "On Informational Efficiency and Incentive Aspects of Generalized Ratio Equilibria", Journal of Mathematical Economics, Vol. 23, 323-337.

Tian, G. (1994b). "Implementation of Linear Cost Share Equilibrium Allocations" , Journal of Economic Theory, Vol. 64, 568-584.

Tian, G. (1996a). "On the Existence of Optimal Truth-Dominant Mechanisms" , Economics Letters, Vol. 53, 17-24.

Tian, G. (1996b). "Continuous and Feasible Implementation of Rational Expectation Lindahl Allocations" , Games and Economic Behavior, Vol. 16, 135-151.

Tian, G. (2000a). "Double Implementation of Lindahl Allocations by a Continuous and Feasible Mechanism", Social Choice and Welfare, Vol. 17, 125-141.

Tian, G. (2000b). "Implementation of Balanced Linear Cost Share Equilibrium Solution in Nash and Strong Nash Equilibria" , Journal of Public Economics, Vol. 76, 239-261.

Tian, G. (2000c). "Double Implementation of Linear Cost Share Equilibrium Allocations", Mathematical Social Sciences, Vol. 40, 175-189.

Tian, G. (2000d). "A Unique Informationally Efficient Allocation Mechanism in Economies with Public Goods", Mimeo.

Tian, G. (2006). "The Unique Informational Efficiency of the Competitive Mechanism in Economies with Production", Social Choice and Welfare, Vol. 26, 155-182.

Tian, G. (2009a). "Implementation in Economies with Non-Convex Production Technologies Unknown to the Designer", Games and Economic Behavior, Vol. 66, 526-545.

Tian, G. (2009b). "Implementation of Pareto Efficient Allocations", Journal of Mathematical Economics, Vol. 45, 113-123.

Tian, G. (2010). "Implementation of Marginal Cost Pricing Equilibrium Allocations with Transfers in Economies with Increasing Returns to Scale", Review of Economic Design, Vol. 14 , 163-184.

Tian, G., and Li, Q. (1991). "Completely Feasible and Continuous Implementation of the Lindahl Correspondence with Any Number of Goods" , Mathematical Social Sciences, Vol. 21, 67-79.

Tian, G., and Li, Q. (1994). "An Implementable and Informational Efficient State-Ownership System with General Variable Returns", Journal of Economic Theory, Vol. 64, 268-297.

Tian, G. and Li, Q. (1994) "Ratio-Lindahl and Ratio Equilibria with Many Goods" , Games and Economic Behavior, Vol. 7, 441-460.

Tian, G., and Li, Q. (1995). "Ratio-Lindahl Equilibria and an Informationally Efficient and Implementable Mixed-Ownership System", Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, Vol. 26, 391-411.

Tian, G., Li, Q., and Nakamura, S. (1995). "Nash Implementation of the Lindahl Correspondence with Decreasing Returns to Scale Technology" , International Economic Review, Vol. 36, 37-52.

Varian, H. R. (1994). "A Solution to the Problem of Externalities When Agents Are Well Informed" ,American Economic Review, Vol. 84, 12781293.


[^0]:    ${ }^{1}$ This book draft is for my teaching and convenience of my students in class. Please not distribute it.

[^1]:    ${ }^{2}$ DANI RODRIK. "Economists vs. Economics", http://www.project-syndicate.org /commentary/economists-versus-economics-by-dani-rodrik-2015-09.

[^2]:    ${ }^{1}$ In his inaugural speech titled "Science and Ideology" when assuming the position of President of the American Economic Association in 1949, Schumpeter pointed out that "Science is knowledge processed by special skills. Economic analysis, i.e., scientific economics, involves skills of history, statistics, and economic theory." See Schumpeter, Joseph A. (1984). "Science and Ideology" in Daniel M. Hausman, eds., The Philosophy of Economics, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 260-275.

[^3]:    ${ }^{2}$ We will come back to discuss the role of the benchmark or reference system in more detail.

[^4]:    ${ }^{3}$ See Von Hayek F. Law, Legislation, and Liberty (Vol. 3). Chicago, IL: The University of Chicago Press, 1979, pp42.
    ${ }^{4}$ Abraham Lincoln's Quotes on Government (1854).

[^5]:    ${ }^{5}$ Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping (Second Version). Beijing: People's Publishing House. Volume 2, 333.

[^6]:    ${ }^{6}$ Adam Smith: The Theory of Moral Sentiments.

[^7]:    ${ }^{7}$ C. R. Rao, Statistics and Truth: Putting Chance to Work, World Scientific, Singapore, 2nd edition, 1997.

[^8]:    ${ }^{1}$ The concept of FS-convex is introduced by Fan (1984) \& Sonnenschein (1971), and thus it is said to be FS-convex.
    ${ }^{2}$ The concept of SS-convex is introduced by Shafer \& Sonnenschein (1975), and thus it is said to be SS-convex.

[^9]:    ${ }^{1}$ When considering the signaling game with two players whose types are the only asymmetry of information, it is called the perfect Bayesian equilibrium (PBE) since it is equivalent to the sequent equilibrium.

[^10]:    ${ }^{2} \mathrm{~F}$ a compact set $X$, a correspondence $F: X \rightarrow X$ is upper hemi-continuous correspondence, if for all sequences $\left\{x_{n}\right\}$ and $\left\{y_{n}\right\}$, where $x_{n} \in X, y_{n} \in F\left(x_{n}\right), x_{n} \rightarrow x$ and $y_{n} \rightarrow y$, then $y \in F(x)$.

[^11]:    ${ }^{3}$ A function $U: Z \times Z \rightarrow \mathcal{R}$ is diagonally quasiconcave with respect to $x$, if for any finite subset $X^{m}$ of $Z$ and $x^{0} \in c o X^{m}$ we have $\min _{k} U\left(\boldsymbol{x}^{k}, \boldsymbol{x}^{0}\right) \leqq U\left(\boldsymbol{x}^{0}, \boldsymbol{x}^{0}\right)$.

[^12]:    ${ }^{4} \mathrm{~A}$ strategy profile $y^{0} \in X$ is said to be recursively upset by $z \in X$ if there exists a finite set of deviation strategy profiles $\left\{y^{1}, y^{2}, \ldots, y^{m-1}, z\right\}$, such that $U\left(y^{1}, y^{0}\right)>U\left(y^{0}, y^{0}\right)$, $U\left(y^{2}, y^{1}\right)>U\left(y^{1}, y^{1}\right), \ldots, U\left(z, y^{m-1}\right)>U\left(y^{m-1}, y^{m-1}\right)$.

[^13]:    ${ }^{1}$ See the biography of Lloyd S. Shapley(1923-2016) in Section 22.5.1.

[^14]:    ${ }^{2}$ For the biographies of Lloyd S. Shapley (1923-2016) and Herbert Scarf (1930-2015), see Sections 22.5.1 and 12.5.2, respectively.

[^15]:    ${ }^{1}$ An excerpt from Dennis W. Carlton and Jeffrey M. Perloff (1998), Chapter 11, Page 640.

[^16]:    ${ }^{2}$ An excerpt from Tirole (1988), Chapter 3, Page 150.

[^17]:    ${ }^{1}$ Only one consumer imposes an externality on another consumer.

[^18]:    ${ }^{2}$ As we discussed above, this is true if the consumption externality is positive, or there is no externality or only one-sided externality.

